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With Liberty for Some:
Oregon Editors and the Challenge
of Civil Liberties, 1942-55

by

Floyd J. McKay

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

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Floyd J. McKay
Doctoral Dissertation

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Abstract

With Liberty for Some:
Oregon Editors and the Challenge
of Civil Liberties, 1942-55

by Floyd J. McKay

Chairman of the Supervisory Committee:
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Civil liberties were under attack in the United States well before Senator Joseph R. McCarthy strode to a West Virginia microphone in February 1950 and began the tumult that would be known as McCarthyism. State investigations had already claimed the careers of dozens of professors, union leaders and free thinkers, in an era that was rife with attacks on civil liberties.

This dissertation studies daily newspaper editors in Oregon and their response to civil liberties challenges from the beginning of World War II through the fall of McCarthy in 1954. Local issues dominate, but in dealing with internment of Oregonians of Japanese ancestry in 1942 and in dealing with McCarthy himself, Oregon editors were caught up in regional and national conflicts.

Most Oregon editors of this period were owner-publishers as well, and as businessmen were part of the closely-knit Republican political establishment that controlled the state. Political and
community ties were important as they faced civil liberties issues, and often yielded to authority rather than protect individual rights.

Their political affiliations, however, caused editors to resist McCarthy, who threatened the moderate Republicanism espoused by most Oregon editors of the time.

Editors felt responsible for community image, and they resisted broad-brush attacks on groups or institutions. They defended school teachers, professors and universities, but would abide no communist as teacher in a public institution. Their defense of groups was strongest when members of the group looked much like the editors themselves, and weakest in the case of Japanese Americans and other Oregonians of color.

Oregon's record on civil liberties in this period was mixed. The state avoided a loyalty oath, adopted civil rights laws and refused to launch wholesale red-hunts. Yet individuals were punished for their political views and Japanese Americans found only a few key editors willing to welcome them back from concentration camps in 1945. The influence of these key editors and their role within a community of editors are critical to this record and to this study.
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PREFACE

My interest in the topic of this dissertation is both professional and personal. It is professional in the sense that little has been written about civil liberties and the press at the state level, despite the fact that many of the most important battles took place there. It is professional also because in a nation of local newspapers, most of the history of the press has focused on large dailies of national importance. Oregon has been fortunate in the work of George B. Turnbull, whose History of Oregon Newspapers, was published in 1939. But little beyond the histories of a few individual newspapers followed Turnbull. This is a modest attempt to expand the field.

My interest is personal in the sense that this is a story of my formative years as a journalist, for I entered the field in 1958 as a cub reporter for the semi-weekly Springfield News. Some of the editors discussed in this study were known to me personally during my 30 years in Oregon journalism. It is quite natural that this will color my views of them and this era, although I have tried very hard to be objective in the journalistic sense and professional in the scholarly sense.

Of particular importance to declare is my admiration for Charles A. Sprague, my publisher and editor from 1960--when I joined the staff of The Oregon Statesman--until his death in 1969. I was not a confidante of Governor Sprague, but I am sure he was largely responsible for my Nieman Fellowship in 1967-68 and I owe him a debt of thanks.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express sincere appreciation to members of his supervisory committee, all of whom provided important insights and comments. I was fortunate in being able to take classes from Professors Gerald Baldasty, C. Anthony Giffard and Roger Simpson, and to do independent study with Professor John Findlay, and I am a better teacher as a result. In particular, Professor Richard B. Kielbowicz served as an expert guide through the world of graduate education, from the moment I applied for admission through the final defense of this dissertation, and his wise counsel has been invaluable.

Appreciation is also extended to former newspaper colleagues who agreed to interviews and encouraged this study, in particular Tom and Marguerite Wright, valued friends of many years. Librarians at the University of Oregon, Reed College and the Oregon Historical Society were of particular assistance.

A word of appreciation must be expressed to my colleagues on the journalism faculty at Western Washington University, who understood and supported this effort and continue to be "family" in a very real sense.
DEDICATION

From the very beginning, when I made the decision to leave the world of daily journalism and embark on a teaching career--beyond the age of 50--one person has provided the constant support, love and encouragement without which this dissertation would have been impossible. To my wife, Dixie Ann McKay, I dedicate this work.
Chapter 1

Introduction

The performance of the American news media in times of national crisis has been mixed, from the tawdry to the heroic. If we celebrate the media's role in the civil rights struggle, Watergate and Vietnam, and applaud their patriotic contributions to World War II, we must also recognize their role in fomenting the Spanish-American War, in the propaganda machine operating during World War I, and in the repression of civil liberties following that war.

The media often missed the "big picture," shamelessly traded on public emotions, and selectively applied the doctrine of objectivity to subjects they did not wish to probe, while abandoning it to support causes with which they agreed. No better example of these shortcomings can be found than the period of American political history known as the McCarthy Era. While there were also examples of great courage and foresight, the period from 1946 to 1955 was a time when much of the American news media fell far short of the profession's highest standards.

McCarthyism must be seen, however, as only the most visible part of a larger issue of civil liberties, an issue that inevitably pitted the rights of individuals against the will of the
majority. This essential conflict in democratic government comes under greatest stress when the nation itself is under stress and the pressure was intense during World War II and the ensuing Cold War, the period we associate with McCarthyism.

Although Senator Joseph R. McCarthy did not make his first major public appearance until February, 1950, and was gone by the close of 1954, his name remains to describe a period in which the search for communists, fellow-travelers and "subversives"—almost exclusively of a leftist persuasion—dominated American government and the nation's news media. "McCarthyism" today is a term of disapproval, a reminder of dark days of trial by hysteria, guilt by association, persecution of ideas and witch-hunts conducted under the guise of Americanism. The titles of books published after 1970 reveal the manner in which McCarthy and his "ism" are viewed; they contain wording such as The Hate That Haunts America, Nightmare in Red, The American Nightmare, The Politics of Fear.¹

This strange period in American history surpassed in scope and length of time even the Red hunts following World War I but there were some differences. The Palmer Raids targeted radicals in labor, the socialist press and other areas of private activity; McCarthyism focused much of its glare on governmental employees from the school house to the nation's capital.² From the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and McCarthy's Senate investigatory committees, to California's Tenney Committee and Washington's Canwell Committee, the
period was one of a frenzied search for radicals at both the state and federal level.

Inevitably, the nation's newspapers were drawn into the action as observers and sometimes as participants. Editorial lines were drawn, some in support and others in opposition. Well-known publishers dispatched reporters to help the Wisconsin senator root out subversives; much of the senator's early material came directly from employees of the Hearst newspaper empire.\textsuperscript{3} Reporters scrambling at deadline found McCarthy a ready source of news and the senator learned how to exploit their competitive instincts. Other reporters were themselves targets of bullying tactics or red-lists.\textsuperscript{4}

But the impact of McCarthy and his counterparts at the state level was uneven, and states of similar political background and disposition approached subversion from very different angles. Oregon failed to mount a serious red-hunt, although the state had a history of nativism and racism, and had taken an aggressive posture toward Japanese Americans in World War II, in one of the major civil liberties challenges of the era.

This study examines the newspaper editors of one state to better confront several questions pertinent to the period, and to further an understanding of the work of editors. By looking at the Oregon editorial community from Pearl Harbor to the fall of Senator McCarthy, it is possible to view editorial treatment of civil liberties at the state and local level, where much of the action took place but where little analysis has been undertaken.
With its beginning in the shock waves that followed Pearl Harbor and immediately placed every Oregonian of Japanese descent under a cloud of suspicion, through the firing of outspoken college professors, a failed effort to impose loyalty oaths on Oregon teachers and one final spasm of campus red-hunting, the Oregon press had more than adequate opportunity to express itself on the great civil liberties debate of the time. That so few chose to do so is as great a shortcoming as the fact that some joined the rush to judgment; that a few spoke out forcefully and repeatedly is one of the reasons the state presented to the nation an image of moderation in a time when moderation was in short supply.

Newspaper editorials mattered in the World War II era. Television did not come to Oregon until 1952 and radio was primarily a headline service. The state's newspaper editors were consulted by local and state leaders; many editors of this era also owned their newspapers, and as such were a part of the Republican business community that controlled Oregon politics well into the sixties. The dual role of civic leader and press leader placed these men (there were no women among them) in the mold of community editor, for they saw the fate of the community as their own. Yet the concept of community was changing and, as Oregon grew in the post-war era, the editor was called upon to speak for new communities of interest, as important to the civil liberties debate as the traditional communities of location. This association is important to how Oregon editors faced the
challenges of the period, which fell disproportionately on the community of higher education.

An understanding is required, then, of this community of editors, a close-knit, home-town collection of individuals who shared many characteristics. Almost to a man, they reflected the state's majority, which was white, Protestant, well-educated, and Republican in its politics. But it was an editorial community and a state in the process of transition. Editors whose careers began at the time of World War I were yielding to new men who came of age in World War II. The state was beginning to see the emergence of a modern Democratic Party, and the politics of Main Street were about to yield to politics based in the workplace and involving new faces and ideas. A community in flux turns for leadership to symbols of stability and continuity, and the nature of the editors who provided that transitional leadership is important to the way Oregon approached civil liberties during this period.

**Dimensions and Questions**

This study focuses on the period from the start of World War II to the mid-1950s in the state of Oregon. This period includes several serious assaults on civil liberties, beginning with the 1942 federal order sending about 4,000 Oregonians of Japanese ancestry to concentration camps. It concludes with the 1954 visit of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) and the subsequent dismissal of a Marxist scholar at Reed College.
Issues of individual civil liberties, racism and civil rights, and the over-arching phenomenon of McCarthyism would draw Oregon editorial views frequently during this 13-year period.

It was a time of incredible change in the state's economic and social profile, as World War II brought new people and new challenges to this corner of the nation. Yet the state's political and journalistic communities remained remarkably intact and remarkably intertwined. In this climate of stability amidst change, during the last decade of newspaper domination of public discussion, Oregon editors faced an unusual number of questions involving civil liberties, and were drawn into the national debate we remember as McCarthyism.

An examination of Oregon daily newspapers during this period suggests some fundamental questions of interest to students of media and politics, for there is no clearly defined line between the two fields as we explore this period in Oregon history. These questions, and the responses suggested by this study, are as follows:

A first research area explores the relationship between editors and duly constituted authority, whether found in the White House, state capitol or university board room. What is the personal and institutional relationship between editorial authority and the governing authorities of the community at this time? Will that relationship alter the way editors approach important issues in which authority conflicts with civil liberties?
In at least three cases examined in this study, research suggests that editors will yield to duly-constituted authority, and even abandon earlier support of civil liberties. This finding is most pronounced in the case of the internment of Oregonians of Japanese ancestry in 1942; editors who had earlier expressed support for Japanese Americans and urged tolerance on the part of fellow Oregonians quickly fell into line behind political and military authority when the decision for internment was made. An argument may be made that the period was one of perceived peril, and editors merely reflected a united political leadership as well as strong public opinion. Similar peril did not exist, however, in the two other cases in which authority figures prevailed: a 1949 Oregon State College case in which two untenured professors were fired, and a well-publicized 1954 incident at Reed College, resulting in dismissal of a tenured professor. In both cases, the Reed College case offering the most pronounced example, authority was supported.

This study suggests that this deference to authority was largely due to the close ties between editors and community and state leaders during this period. Editors were a homogeneous lot, almost exclusively white males, Protestant, business-oriented Republicans. In all of these characteristics they reflected the state's leadership. This sense of familiarity played a role in decisions regarding which groups or individuals would be defended during this period. Examination of a series of incidents involving civil liberties during a time of national attention to the
issue provides some insight into this decision process, at least within the microcosm of this study.

A second research question, foreshadowed by the dissertation title, asks for the parameters of permissable dissent: How did editors decide who was worthy of constitutional protection during a time when the rights of many were threatened? In the case of the Japanese Americans, the circumstances of imminent danger—or at least perceived danger—colored decisions immediately following Pearl Harbor. But the danger was past when editors split in 1945 regarding the climate for the returning internees. It is suggested that the lack of connections to this non-Caucasian, culturally isolated group resulted in some editors refusing to extend the benefits of community support to the beleaguered Japanese. The first-generation Japanese, in particular, were simply outside the closely knit leadership circles in which editors moved.

In looking at other cases, all products of the Cold War, we are able to discern a similar pattern. Editors unanimously drew the line at communists in teaching positions; this was clearly enunciated after the firing of professors at the University of Washington, which drew comment in Oregon. If an individual under fire could be painted red, even without positive proof, editors were not willing to allow him or her to teach, at least not in a public institution. But leading editors were not willing to paint entire groups of people—certainly not educators—with a broad brush of suspicion. Loyalty oaths drew fire, at the
University of California and when Oregon legislators appeared ready to enact one for their state. Broad McCartyite attacks were opposed by most, but professed communists could expect little sympathy.

Editors knew and were supportive of teachers and professors, and were comfortable associating with them and the community leaders who served on education governing boards. Occasional "reds" or "leftists" in the group were seen as aberrations, outside the bounds of the "respectable" community of education and therefore not eligible for the protection afforded the mainstream.

A third research question explores the close ties between editors and political leaders. Would the Republican nature of editors cause editors to view issues of civil liberties during this period in terms of the maintenance of Republican hegemony?

Research suggests that the editorial approach to McCarthy himself was heavily influenced by a desire to maintain Republican hegemony, and in particular the moderate Republicanism that was professed by the state's leading editors. Examination of correspondence between editors and two of the state's leading politicians, Richard L. Neuberger and Wayne L. Morse, indicates the intensely partisan approach of editors and their concern for maintaining Republican control. Editorial reaction to the 1951 Portland visit of Senator McCarthy provides the best example of why McCarthy was opposed by leading Oregon editors--he was viewed as a threat to the moderate wing of the party and,
implicitly, as a threat to continued Republican domination of Oregon politics. In this case, the desire to maintain GOP hegemony worked against McCarthy and in support of a more hospitable climate for civil liberties.

Daily newspaper editors in Oregon's small and mid-sized cities saw themselves as part of the community, in much the same manner as editors of weekly newspapers. Although scholarship generally excludes daily newspapers from the definition of community journalism, a fourth research question inquires if elements of community journalism existed in the approach key editors took to civil liberties challenges in this period.

Oregon's small to mid-sized dailies during this period did not fit the standard definition of community newspapers. They were general-interest papers, carrying international and national news and columns, and did not focus exclusively on local issues in the manner of weekly or semi-weekly publications. Yet key editors in this study clearly identified with community leadership and community goals, and were willing to become personally involved, more characteristic of small-town newspaper editors than of editors of larger daily publications.

No clear pattern associated with community journalism emerged from this study of editors, however. In general, the most courageous and thoughtful voices on issues of civil liberties were those of editors of mid-sized dailies rather than the smallest dailies most likely to be termed community papers. Editors of these small dailies were generally silent on these key issues or
joined the public clamor to limit the rights in question. This was particularly true when race was part of the debate; clearly some of these editors did not see non-Caucasians as part of their "community." Leadership on the part of the mid-sized dailies is discussed, but appears to reflect the personal attributes of the editors involved, rather than a contribution to the study of community journalism.

In the final analysis, what portrait emerges of Oregon's editorial community during this last decade of unrivaled newspaper supremacy in the arena of public discussion? This fifth research question has already been answered in part above; Oregon editors were part of the elite establishment of their communities and of the state, and they were in tune with that establishment and protective of its continued control.

But there is more. Oregon editors were themselves part of a community--a community of editors, whose members read the comments of leading peers and frequently quoted them. In the post-war period this community was in transition, from editors whose roots were in World War I to those who were products of World War II. The importance of leading senior editors was enhanced in this climate; they provided a bridge from past to present. This portrait of a community of editors provides material that may be useful in studies of peer influence among editors.

The dimensions of this study, then, range from an intense look at the work and influence of individual editors within the
discrete framework of one particular state, to a more regional concern with loyalty on the campuses of the three West Coast states, and finally to the broader topic of the interaction of a community of editors such as might be found in many American states during this period.

**Background and Literature Review**

In the early fifties, Oregon journalism meant newspapers. The state did not enter the television age until 1952, and the leadership role of newspapers loomed larger than in states that had already entered the electronic age. It was a time when courage in the news media often came at the price of being branded as a fellow-traveler or worse. Yet at both the national and local level, courageous editors and reporters did challenge the passion of the times and attempted to bring reason to the debate.

Most major studies of the McCarthy era discuss the role of the national news media in the rise and fall of Joe McCarthy, and two are devoted primarily to the news media during this period: Edwin R. Bayley and James Aronson's works of 1981 and 1970, respectively. The major biographies of McCarthy and other works about this period frequently contain chapters on the senator's relations with the press. Typical are David M. Oshinsky, which has a chapter on The Fourth Estate; and the works of journalists Douglass Cater, Fred J. Cook and Richard Rovere, which discuss the role the news media played in McCarthy's career. Fred Friendly's 1967 book on CBS' role during this period contains
some excellent discussion of McCarthyism. Most of the major biographies of Edward R. Murrow deal extensively with his McCarthy broadcasts; a thoughtful McCarthy-era book by Elmer Davis focuses on McCarthy and the red threat, and the topic is explored in the major histories of broadcasting.⁷

Of particular interest in this field is the work of John Lofton, who explored McCarthyism as one in a series of civil liberties challenges in which the media failed to defend the First Amendment. Lofton concluded that American media leaders will protect their own interest in freedom of expression—citing the Pentagon Papers and New York Times v. Sullivan cases—but seldom defend unpopular speech of others, even editors who are unpopular or radical.⁸ Studies by Dorothy Bowles and John D. Stevens explore similar territory, with contrasting conclusions; Stevens agreed with Lofton's findings, Bowles reported greater media tolerance of dissent.⁹

A number of scholars have studied the internment period and press reaction to events of the day. Many West Coast editors were initially supportive of the rights of the Japanese Americans, but they had moved steadily away from that position by the time Roosevelt issued his internment order. Theories to explain this behavior vary widely. Gary Okihiro and Julie Sly adopt a Marxist framework of an elitist government conceiving the evacuation plan and instigating a series of events to sway public opinion and press treatment of the issue. Lloyd Chiasson attributes the swing to press abdication of its "watchdog" role, and
editors yielding to government assertions of military necessity. Roger Daniels alludes to the influence of a Walter Lippmann column in early February, but adds that Lippmann was, "in this instance, merely an extension of the mass West Coast mind." Morton Grodzins cites pressure groups as instrumental in the change of attitude toward the Japanese, and certainly editors were susceptible to pressure groups.¹⁰

Most studies of the period place a great deal of the responsibility at the door of the Western Defense Command, the U.S. Army unit that drew up the plans. The Army's official history of the period found no military justification for the evacuation, but put heavy responsibility on the West Coast delegation in Congress—which agitated for evacuation early in 1942—and on public sentiment against people of Japanese ancestry. Whether military necessity was merely a fig leaf to cover racism is an open question, but a military rationale was placed on the decision. Editors are accustomed to challenging political decisions, but less comfortable with challenging military decisions, particularly in time of war. Placing the internment on a military basis was critical to gaining assent of the region's editors. This predisposition to honor voices of authority, particularly in a situation of stress, may be seen in studies of the wartime period, including the work of Chiasson, who traced editorial treatment of Japanese Americans and found editors yielding to voices of authority.
Marvin Pursinger's study of Oregon and the internment experience examines media reaction, but is particularly important for its observations on the role of Governor Charles A. Sprague who, following his political career, emerged as a leading editorial supporter of civil liberties.\textsuperscript{11} The wartime papers of Governor Sprague reveal insight into his view of the emergency; Sprague's official papers are in the Oregon State Archives, his journalistic and personal papers are at the Oregon Historical Society.

A number of volumes on the internment issue are valuable to an understanding of the times, and Carey McWilliams in particular discusses the media role in building hysteria. Other authors specifically discussing the role of the media include Morton Grodzins and Dillon S. Myer.\textsuperscript{12} Some of the best comprehensive studies of the period were produced by Roger Daniels, and the record of the Japanese American Citizens League (JACL) is described by Bill Hosokawa.\textsuperscript{13}

While civil liberties are frequently a casualty of war, restrictions are harder to justify during peacetime, and the United States was--nominally at least--at peace during most of the post-war period. The Korean War did not raise a threat of the magnitude of World War II, and the conflict did not by itself result in serious abuse of civil liberties in this country. What was at work, instead, was fear of subversion, a fear played upon by Republicans frustrated by their inability to regain the White House and also used by a variety of state-level politicians who
hoped to further their careers by attacking radicals and free-thinkers.

The American fear of subversion is treated historically by David Brion Davis, and more specifically in several of the major works on McCarthy, including those of Robert Griffith and a series of essays edited by Griffith and Athan Theoharis.14

There is a considerable volume of work on McCarthy and the "ism" for which he is remembered, although both have receded from discussion of the fifties at a rather alarming rate. When Douglas T. Miller and Marion Nowak discussed the fifties in 1977, their entire first chapter was devoted to McCarthyism; twenty-five years later, in an 800-page work, journalist David Halberstam devotes only a dozen pages directly to McCarthy and McCarthyism. Histories of journalism, including the leading text by Michael Emery and Edwin Emery, no longer devote major attention to the media of this period—a remarkable situation, considering how McCarthy and his tactics and followers dominated the fifties.15

During the fifties and for two decades afterward, McCarthy was the subject of intense scrutiny by media and by scholars, and a rich assortment of sources is available. Critical works include those by journalists Jack Anderson and Ronald May, Richard Rovere, Cedric Belfrage, Fred J. Cook and I. F. Stone; also scholarly works by Roberta Fuerlicht, Richard Fried, Robert Griffith, Athan Theoharis, David Oshinsky and Robert Goldston.16 McCarthy also
had his defenders; among them were William F. Buckley Jr. and Brent Bozell, and McCarthy aide Roy Cohn.\textsuperscript{17}

McCarthy did not make his appearance on an empty stage, however. Already in place were Congressional committees--notably the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)--investigating subversive activity. \textsuperscript{18} Within many of the states, similar committees dated to the pre-war era, and are of particular importance for this state-level study.

Exploring the role of states in the anti-communist crusade is greatly aided by the work of Cornell University, which in the 1950s used a Rockefeller Foundation grant to compile an impressive series of books on state anti-subversion efforts. Condensations of those books make up three of the seven chapters in an overall look at the subject, edited by Walter Gellhorn, published in 1952.\textsuperscript{19} Other detailed studies of state anti-subversion efforts include works discussing four Midwestern states (Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin and Indiana); and individual studies of Texas, California, Iowa and Vermont.\textsuperscript{20} California's Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, headed by Senator Jack B. Tenney, was founded in 1940, and there is a considerable body of work examining the committee.\textsuperscript{21}

There was, waiting for Joe McCarthy in 1950, a ready body of followers in major states and cities. No consistent pattern of geography, income level, racial or ethnic makeup emerges as one examines states that embarked on red-hunts and those that rejected the concept. States as different as California and Texas
engaged in red-baiting. Hawaii had its red-baiting but Alaska did not as both awaited admission to the Union. Mississippi, where the FBI could find only one certified communist, joined the red-hunting parade.

Other states, some with conservative heritages, rejected suggestions of investigatory committees, loyalty oaths and book bans. Oregon was such a state, and this study will examine reasons why the state remained relatively calm during a difficult period.

Academics were particular targets of most of the state red hunts, and a number of works address McCarthyism on campus. Books by Mary Sperling McAuliffe, Lionel Lewis, Ellen Schrecker and Michael Rogin are particularly important for this study. The question of the right (or even the ability) of a professed communist to also be a teacher was challenged by University of Washington President Raymond Allen, and is also the subject of commentary by professors Sidney Hook and Alexander Meikeljohn. Jane Sanders examined the important University of Washington controversy in depth.

Reed College, discussed here in Chapter 9, was the subject of special attention in several of the books reviewing McCarthyism's impact on higher education, in particular the work of Schecter and Lewis. Considerable documentation of the Reed College incident is available in the college's small archival collection. The Reed Bulletin chronicled the incident over a period of two decades, as alumni sought an apology to dismissed professor Stanley Moore.
Reed archives also shed considerable light on the role of an *Oregon Journal* editor and reporter in the Moore affair, and both men were available for interviews.

Scholars began to examine the causes of McCarthyism and the nature of McCarthyites in the mid-fifties, and while an analysis of the causes of McCarthyism is beyond the scope of this study, a review of the literature in this field is useful to an understanding of its effects. An early collection of essays by leading sociologists and historians, edited by Daniel Bell, introduced the concept of status resentment.\(^{25}\) Scholars associated with this theory believed that certain American groups (e.g. Catholics, Midwesterners, the Irish and Germans) had overcome economic hurdles and moved to politics as an area in which to express resentment against elite leadership, and in McCarthyism they found an outlet. Richard Hofstadter, associated with the Bell volume, also described the roots of the McCarthy movement in terms of a paranoid style, which he found deeply seated in American politics.\(^ {26}\) The Bell group issued a revision of their research in 1962, adding new data—in particular a lengthy analysis by Seymour Martin Lipset—but basically holding to the status resentment idea and projecting it beyond McCarthy to what appeared in 1962 to be an ascendent and threatening New Right.\(^ {27}\)

Status resentment was not universally accepted, however. A contrasting view appeared in the work of Nelson Polsby in 1960, citing party politics (Republican) as the primary explanation
for McCarthyism. This theme was advanced by Robert Griffith and later essayists in a volume edited by Griffith and Athan Theoharis. Scholars in the latter volume rejected status resentment and followed the more traditional explanations of economic resentment, placing the "blame" for McCarthy on the American business community and conventional party politics.

It is difficult to extract from these national studies, however, a coherent explanation of Oregon's posture in the McCarthy period. By the yardstick of political affiliation, Oregon's Republican electorate should have been ripe for McCarthyism, but this study suggests that the very Republican nature of the state's editorial community caused its leaders to turn against McCarthy to protect the party's good name. Nor does status resentment provide much help; many Oregonians had the sort of Midwestern roots and philosophy associated with status resentment, but this did not seem to lead to McCarthyism in Oregon.

McCarthyism, regardless of its cause, was a national assault on civil liberties, one of the most serious in the nation's history. Alan Reitman's collection of essays on civil liberties contains a chapter on McCarthyism by John W. Caughey, and the book places the era in the larger context of twentieth century assaults on civil liberties. A posthumous collection of Alan Barth's insightful editorials on civil liberties illustrates the best in journalistic comment during the period, as did Barth's 1951 work, The Loyalty of Free Men. The civil liberties implications of the internment of Japanese Americans, discussed above, are
important as the challenge that really opened the era, particularly for Pacific Coast editors.

Discussion of the role of the news media in anti-subversion efforts in Pacific Coast states is the subject of a number of articles, including those of the writer-politician Richard L. Neuberger and a brief Washington case study by Gerald Baldasty and Betty Houchin Winfield. Volumes in the Cornell series on anti-subversion activities at the state and local level contain considerable data on the role of the news media in Washington and California. Official reports of the Tenney committee discuss the role of the California news media.

Considerable attention is paid to the effect of McCarthy on elections in the various states, and of particular interest to this study are examinations of elections in the Western states in 1950, 1952 and 1954. Biographies of two major Northwest politicians, Senators Wayne L. Morse and Henry Jackson, discuss their role in elections of this period, and in confronting McCarthy in the Senate. Richard Neuberger's work is also useful for this entire period.

Discussion of the Oregon news media during the period from World War II to 1955 may be found in publications of the Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association (ONPA); in a number of academic journal articles, primarily from University of Oregon faculty and graduate students; and in several theses and dissertations dealing with Oregon newspapers and newspapermen of this era. The newspapers themselves are a primary source, and
in addition to the McCarthy material also contain several articles about the Oregon press and its leading editors. Histories of the Eugene Register-Guard and the Pendleton East-Oregonian provide insights into important editors and publications.37

This study will explore in some detail the leadership role of two senior editors, Charles A. Sprague of The Oregon Statesman and William Tugman of the Eugene Register-Guard. Both have been profiled by colleagues, and both attracted national attention during this era. Their reputations as defenders of civil liberties were a major factor in the general reputation of Oregon as a place of tolerance and civility during this period.38

Two men who joined the ranks of Oregon publishers in the early 1950s are still active although retired from daily editorial responsibility. J. W. "Bud" Forrester, publisher of the Pendleton East-Oregonian and later the Astorian, and Robert Chandler, publisher of the Bend Bulletin, were generous with their time. Among others who were active in this period and granted interviews were Roy Beadle, Donald Sterling Jr. and David Eyre of the Oregon Journal; Herbert Lundy and Robert C. Notson of The Oregonian; J. Wesley Sullivan, Marguerite Wright and Thomas G. Wright Jr. of The Oregon Statesman.

This study will of necessity involve a discussion of the role of editor as community leader. Although America's community press is sometimes referred to in the framework of weekly newspapers, Oregon's small and mid-sized dailies of this era could properly be termed community newspapers. Editors were close to
their readers, and to local movers and shakers. This intersection of roles is discussed by John Cameron Sim in his work on "grass roots" editors, and has also been surveyed by researchers trying to define the role of publishers and editors in small communities. Editorial responsibilities are discussed by Sim and in a contemporary article by Sprague. While Sim and Sprague concede that many community newspapers pay little attention to editorializing, they agree that an editor's voice can and should be a force in local decisions.

In addition to the several studies of William Allen White, perhaps the most celebrated of community editors, several researchers have examined the role of the community editor. Bruce M. Kennedy's discussion of maintaining community ties while simultaneously exercising editorial independence is drawn from his experience as a 1950s' community editor. Also valuable is the 1950 study of Chicago-area weeklies by Morris Janowitz, often used to define community journalism. The close association of those who publish weekly newspapers and those who hold positions in business or political life in the Chicago suburbs, described by Janowitz, is similar to the pattern this study found in small Oregon cities with daily newspapers.

Considerable importance is attached here to the Republican affiliation of Oregon editors of this period, necessitating a discussion of the state's political history and climate. General histories of the region by Dorothy Johansen and Charles Gates, Earl Pomeroy, Gordon Dodds and Carlos Schwantes are important for a
regional framework.\textsuperscript{42} The Pacific Northwest in World War II and
the post-war period is discussed by Gerald D. Nash, and his work
contains an extensive bibliography of additional sources.\textsuperscript{43}

Oregon politics are discussed in considerable detail in Robert
Burton's comprehensive examination of the Democratic Party; also
by Kimbark MacColl in his two-volume history of Portland; and in
many of the writings of Richard L. Neuberger.\textsuperscript{44} A. Robert Smith's
biography of Wayne Morse is particularly valuable, and
biographies of Tom McCall provide additional insight.\textsuperscript{45} The
memoirs of former governor and congressman Walter Pierce
provide a useful discussion of Oregon's nativist period, as do
studies of the Ku Klux Klan by Malcolm Clark and Eckard V. Toy.\textsuperscript{46}
The Monroe Sweetland oral history at the Oregon Historical
Society lends insight into the Oregon Commonwealth Federation
and efforts to reform the Democratic Party; Sweetland was also
interviewed.

In these works, and through interviews and drawing on the
author's own experience, a portrait of Oregon editors appears that
is heavily influenced by party affiliation and loyalty. This
characteristic is of particular importance in examining the threat
McCarthy and his allies posed to the Republicanism favored by
leading Oregon editors, a philosophy supportive of civil liberties
and civil rights, international in outlook and concerned with the
maintenance of civility and moderation.

Journalists are not noted for the attention they pay to their
own role in history, but some collections of personal papers and
documents from this era are available in Oregon depositories, and include the papers of editors Charles A. Sprague, William Tugman, Robert Frazier, Donald J. Sterling and Robert Sawyer. Malcolm Bauer saved important correspondence dealing with the 1951 Oregon loyalty oath. Other material may be found in the papers of two journalist-politicians, Tom McCall and Richard L. Neuberger.

Among other political papers of the period are those of Senator Wayne L. Morse, and a number of state legislators and politicians. Neuberger and Morse were dedicated writers of letters and very conscious of their role in history; both corresponded with Oregon editors during the period, and their letters are valuable. Interviews were granted by former Senator Maurine Neuberger and by Senator Mark O. Hatfield.

Records of the Oregon Legislature are not complete for this period; committee records are often missing, although copies of bills and amendments are complete. Published reports of state and federal anti-subversive committees are available, including HUAC hearings in the Northwest, and the reports of the Tenney and Canwell committees.

Methods

This study was conducted using historical research methods. Because this is a period within the last half-century, these methods include interviews of journalists, politicians and others who played a role in the McCarthy period in Oregon. These
interviews are valuable in understanding the communication among editors and the close ties between Oregon's civil libertarians and several key journalists. Surviving correspondence among members of the journalistic community is relatively rare, which gives additional weight to the interviews.

All Oregon dailies are filed at the University of Oregon Knight Library, and were reviewed for this study. Oregon during the early 1950s had twenty-one daily newspapers, but six had circulations under 4,000 each and rarely offered locally written editorials. The other fifteen were reviewed for this study; all were examined for the entire year 1950, and for other years the fifteen newspapers were examined at points when Oregon was considering issues related to the McCarthy period. The study also indicates which editors were quoted in other newspapers, and what sides were taken by key editors during some of the debates.

Although some comparisons are made to editorial reaction in other states, particularly California and Washington, this study is basically limited to Oregon in the period 1942 through 1954.

**Chapter organization**

Chapter 2 explores the development of Oregon politics and media in the first half of the twentieth century, with special emphasis on the continuity of Republican control of the state's politics and press. The Republican nature of Oregon editors of this period, illustrated by the manner in which Democrat Richard
Neuberger viewed their treatment of his political career and the manner in which Wayne Morse was treated when he switched from Republican to Democrat, was a significant factor in editorial treatment of Republican maverick McCarthy.

Chapter 3 will review McCarthyism as a recurring phenomenon based on the fear of subversion, and will pay particular attention to activities in the various states. The Tenney Committee in California and the Canwell Committee in Washington will be discussed in some detail, and activities in other states and cities will be reviewed.

Oregon's first civil liberties challenge of the modern era, the internment and return of Japanese Americans, will be explored in Chapter 4, with attention to the leadership of key publishers. Editorial reaction to the plight of the issei and nisei was particularly influenced by a tendency on the part of editors of this period to respond to authority, particularly President Roosevelt's 1942 order authorizing internment of Pacific Coast Japanese Americans, both aliens and citizens.

Chapter 5 examines the concept of community editor, applying the label to editors of Oregon's home-town, locally owned dailies. The nature of "community" is discussed in the context of editors who became leaders of communities based on interest rather than geography.

Chapters 6 and 7 explore specific instances of civil liberties challenges in the post-war era, and discuss the role played by key Oregon editors. The attempt to enact a loyalty oath for teachers
and professors in 1951 presents evidence of individual leadership on the part of editors Charles A. Sprague and William Tugman, in marked contrast to the apathy displayed by most Oregon dailies, including the large Portland papers. A similar picture is seen in the campaign to pass civil rights legislation in 1953.

Chapter 8 turns to Senator McCarthy himself, and his visit to Oregon in 1951. McCarthy's appearance provoked an angry reaction from Oregon's Republican editors, and a rush to disavow any connection between "official" Republicans and the maverick senator.

Chapter 9 discusses the final episode of the McCarthy era in Oregon, the 1954 HUAC hearings in Portland, with accusations of communist infiltration at Reed College. Questions of conflict of interest on the part of an important editor arise, and editorial reliance on authoritative sources and support for "establishment" control are again seen as factors in editorial comment.

Oregon's reputation as a "liberal" state during the subsequent quarter-century is due in part to the state's rejection of the worst excesses of McCarthyism in the fifties. But the legacy owed a great deal to a very few editors, as the majority of the Oregon editorial press remained on the sidelines or actually supported some of the McCarthyite tactics. Oregon's lack of outside owners with their own political agenda, and the closeness of the editorial community, were factors in the moderate manner with which newspapers dealt with McCarthyism. Lacking a William Randolph Hearst or Robert McCormick, Oregon
newspapers approached the issue cautiously and at a much lower decibel level. Oregon editors could approach the issue with the moderation that characterized their approach to most topics of the time. Their affiliation with Republican politics and concern for maintaining Republican hegemony brought attacks on those who threatened harmony and moderation, and McCarthy epitomized that threat.

Editors and editorials were important in this period, and the Oregon editorial climate shaped the state's approach to issues of civil liberties. The record of the Oregon editorial press in the post-war decade is checkered, however, and for much of the press during this period it is a record of apathy and avoidance of controversy. In particular this is true of the Portland dailies, both of which had multi-member editorial boards consisting of professional journalists rather than the owner-editors of downstate dailies.

This study found the strongest leadership for civil liberties emanating from editors who owned their newspaper or had unusually close links to the publisher. This sense of personal identity with their readers and also within the community of editors appears to have produced stronger editorial views than those of consensus-based editorial boards lacking direct links to the publisher. When these editors spoke, it was with the combined voice of community leader, editor-publisher, and at times political advisor with close links to key legislators or members of Congress.
Community ties and relationships were important, and editors who were secure in this relationship may have felt less constrained to speak out on wider issues, including controversial issues of civil liberties. Because they were well known and respected within the community's leadership circle, leading community editors could speak on these issues without fear of being branded as radicals or worse. They were, in every sense of the word, part of the community establishment.

This may help explain the dominant editorial voices of the time, Charles A. Sprague of The Oregon Statesman and William Tugman of the Register-Guard. Without their voices, and their personal involvement at key points, the Oregon record might have been quite different as the McCarthy era ground to a close. They were the editors who acted to halt a loyalty oath in 1951 and help pass civil rights in 1953, and who were most stalwart in condemning McCarthy and his allies. The publicity Sprague received in national publications and Tugman attracted through work on a national committee of editors examining McCarthyism was instrumental in forming an image of a state led by moderates at a time when moderation was in short supply.
Notes to Chapter 1


4James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1970), deals extensively with the case of James Weschler of the New York Post; Edwin Bayley, Joe McCarthy and the Press (New York: Pantheon, 1982; original copyright University of Wisconsin, 1981), is concerned specifically with the senator and newspapers.

5Aronson, The Press and the Cold War; Bayley, Joe McCarthy and the Press.

6David Oshinsky, A Conspiracy so Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: The Free Press, 1983), 179-91; Douglass


Horizons, 1989), briefly touches on Murrow (370-72) and the abuse of objectivity during this time (409-10); Mitchell Stephens, A History of News: From Drum to Satellite (New York: Viking, 1988), includes only general discussion of objectivity (268-70).


Sanders, *Cold War on Campus: Academic Freedom at the University of Washington, 1946-1964* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1979) also focused on the Washington incident.


26 Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*.

27 Daniel Bell, ed., *The Radical Right: The New American Right, Expanded and Updated* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1964, original copyright Doubleday, 1963). In addition to sociologists Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset, scholars contributing to both the 1954 and 1962 books included sociologists David Reisman, Nathan Glazer and Talcott Parsons; historians Richard Hofstadter and Peter Viereck; and law professor Alan Westin. See also Viereck's comments in *The New Leader*, 24 January and 31 January 1955.


34California Legislature, *Fifth and Sixth Reports of the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities*, 1949 and 1951.


37The ONPA publication is *The Oregon Publisher*. Books containing major discussion of this period include two newspaper histories:


Chapter 2

Continuity Amidst Change: Oregon in the West

The American West emerged from World War II a vastly different place than the somewhat isolated and homogeneous region of the Depression. Cities already well established in the 1930s grew and became magnets for Americans from other regions seeking jobs in this new promised land. States that had thrived on the war-time economy continued their expansion by capitalizing on the new defense plants and military installations. Hydroelectricity held great promise for the future of the region, a promise of industrial growth and a modern electric future for cities and farms alike.

The region found itself with a new identity and a promising future. In the words of Gerald Nash:

The end of hostilities in 1945 left the West somewhat breathless but transformed. The somber, cautious, and rather pessimistic mood of 1941 was but a memory. It had given way to an exhilarating, bubbling, optimistic outlook born of the fast-moving events of the war years. That view was based on the far-reaching changes which the war had wrought in the region. The colonial economy had been liberated; the foundations for another great population boom had been laid; sleepy western towns had been transformed into teeming cities; ethnic diversity had become a new reality in the everyday life of scores of communities in the region; and cultural isolation was largely ended as a diverse array of cultural and scientific institutions and activities was increasingly limiting the once dominant influence of the East.
The transformation of the West had begun during the Depression, as the New Deal poured millions of dollars in federal funds into the region, and initiated the giant power projects that would be used to build defense industries in wartime. In the Pacific Northwest, the Columbia River dams and power plants drew the aluminum industry to the region, and provided the power for shipbuilding and aircraft construction. The infrastructure was in place or in progress before the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor.²

Although the New Deal and World War II radically changed the West, change was less evident in the politics and journalism of Oregon. Washington and California moved sharply to the left, and even the conservative mountain states supported FDR and sent Democrats to Congress. Alone in the West, Oregon voted for FDR but remained a bastion of Republicanism, "the Vermont of the West" by some accounts, faithfully sending Republicans to Congress and maintaining a GOP-controlled legislature.³ In 1940, Oregon Senator Charles L. McNary was the GOP candidate for vice president.

The Oregon press predictably endorsed Republicans for state and national office, and some editors held office themselves.⁴ This close relationship between Republican political leadership and Republican editors would be maintained well into the sixties, when Democrats emerged as a major force and the combined
forces of television and group ownership changed the face of the state's news media.

As the region emerged from war, Oregon's transformation was less sweeping than its neighbors to north and south. War industries made a much larger impact on California and Washington; industries in those states remained during peacetime while Oregon's huge shipbuilding industry was dismantled. This resulted also in a flight of African Americans who had moved to Portland to work in the shipbuilding industry, but after the war left for better economic opportunity in Seattle and other West Coast cities. Politically, Oregon was Republican, and would remain so through the fifties and well into the next decade. That continuity, during a time of change and tension, would play a role in how the state and its press performed during the early stages of the emerging Cold War.

Reform, Reaction, Depression

Oregon politics in the first third of the 20th Century was a volatile mix of reform and reaction, but always under the flag of the dominant Republican party. The state was a national leader of progressive reforms, but less than a generation later, Oregon's revived Ku Klux Klan was one of the most active chapters in the nation.

Oregon had proved to be fertile ground for political reforms during the Progressive era. Michael P. Malone and Richard W. Etulain note that the Progressive movement in the West was "the
middle class attempting to avoid becoming proletariat," with heavy emphasis on morality, an emphasis that would later turn to nativism.\(^6\) The description fit Oregon well. Portland was a major urban center, but with a small-town bent of mind, conservative in its politics and heavily influenced by its churches and business leaders. Much of the remainder of the state was rural, and the state was not industrialized; its economy was based primarily on natural resources.

William S. U'Ren assumed leadership of the Oregon progressive movement, and its innovations—the initiative and referendum, recall, and direct elections of senators. In few other areas were the reforms as deeply rooted as in Oregon, where they gained support from all regions of the state and all elements of the population.\(^7\) U'Ren worked primarily within the Republican Party to correct the abuses Republicans had caused with their domination of the legislature and local government. It was a pattern frequently seen in Oregon in the 20th Century, as battles were fought out within the dominant party, much as they were in the Democratic South.

Washington in the period between the wars built a liberal coalition around Progressive issues, particularly public power. The coalition included former fringe parties (Socialist, Progressive, Farmer-Labor) in league with Democrats. The coalition also contained in the thirties elements of the Popular Front, a loose alliance of communists and mainstream reformers, many of whom were active in the Washington Commonwealth Federation.
Oregon's Commonwealth Federation contained many of the same elements as the Washington organization—including communists—but resisted communist leadership. The Federation's executive secretary, Monroe Sweetland, a democratic socialist, fended off an organized communist bloc within the OCF. "The big difference between the Washington and Oregon federations was that they (WCF) never departed from the Communist Party line and we broke, letting them know at the first convention that they weren't going to run the show," he recalled in an interview.

But the OCF was small, "a ragtag, bobtail bunch of militant woodworkers, loggers and others," in Sweetland's words. The Federation was never able to mount a serious challenge to a political establishment controlled by Republicans, often in league with conservative Democrats. The Progressive vote returned to the Republican party as the state's Democrats were unable to find an issue, such as public power, around which to forge an alliance with reformers. The state's political climate no longer reflected the reform spirit of the opening decade of the century.

A low point was reached in 1922, as the state came under the shadow of the revived Ku Klux Klan and passed a Klan-backed initiative outlawing parochial and private schools. The Klan was influential in politics in Portland, and leaders of the movement were linked to the city's politically powerful private electric utilities. The Klan also attracted strong support from Protestant ministers and local civic improvement and patriotic groups, and
heavily influenced the election of Governor Walter Pierce and the 1923 Legislature.\textsuperscript{10} The Klan vanished as quickly as it appeared, and was gone by the time Oregon slipped into the Great Depression, but the experience blunted reform elements for the next forty years.

Although Oregon newspapers did not overtly support the Klan, courageous opposition to the Klan and its themes was limited. The fiery George Putnam opposed the Klan in the Salem *Capital-Journal* and opposition came from Robert Ruhl in the Medford *Mail-Tribune*, but from most of the state's leading newspapers, silence or timidity was the rule.

Robert Ruhl was a Harvard graduate, a classmate and *Crimson* colleague of Franklin D. Roosevelt, who through his long career maintained a liberal Republican political stance. He arrived in Medford in 1911 after seventeen years as a reporter and editor elsewhere, and purchased part ownership of both the *Mail-Tribune* and the weekly *Sun*. In 1919 he took full ownership of the *Mail-Tribune*. Ruhl opposed the KKK in one of its Oregon strongholds, and in 1933 would win a Pulitzer Prize for his battle to rid the community of political corruption rooted in the KKK era and emerging in the Depression in a violence-prone populist revolt.\textsuperscript{11}

George Putnam began his news career as private secretary to E.W. Scripps (1899-1900), served as Pacific Coast manager for the Scripps-McRae Press Association in 1901, and subsequently was editor of a Scripps newspaper in Spokane. He was with the
Oregon Journal when, in 1907, he purchased the Medford Mail-Tribune. Putnam edited it until he sold it in 1919 to Ruhl. Shortly after his arrival as the new publisher of the Capital-Journal, patriotic societies began making their move to control Oregon politics and Putnam emerged as the Klan's strongest enemy. Putnam raged against the secret society, and criticized fellow editors, particularly those at The Oregonian, the Oregon Journal and the Statesman, for their timidity.¹²

The leading Portland newspapers, The Oregonian and the Oregon Journal, were editorially silent or neutral when they did review the Klan and the school measure, and The Oregon Statesman, then edited by R. J. Hendricks, refused to challenge Klan themes. Portland's smaller dailies, the News and Telegram, provided some opposition, with the Telegram often outspoken against the KKK. But The Oregonian, the state's most powerful daily, treated the Klan neutrally in its editorial columns; one study found that thirty-two of the forty-two Klan themes appearing in Oregonian editorials during the 1922 school bill debate were treated in a neutral manner. The major Portland dailies, in an intense competition for readers, chose not to oppose the popular Klan themes of patriotism, Protestantism, and white supremacy.¹³ This timidity on the part of the large Portland dailies would be repeated a quarter-century later, and editors of downstate papers again took the lead in protecting civil liberties.
Oregon Bucks the New Deal Trend

Oregon newspapers were overwhelmingly Republican as the state moved deeper into Depression and looked to the politics of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal. Most editors stayed with Herbert Hoover in 1932, and with Republicans throughout the period.

The Oregon Journal supported FDR until 1940, and editorial page editor Marshall Dana chaired a regional planning commission set up under the New Deal. But from 1940 through 1948, the Journal endorsed Republicans. The Oregonian continued to be a staunch Republican flagship.

Downstate, Ed Aldrich at Pendleton was the only avowed Democrat among publishers as the New Deal reached Oregon. By the end of the decade, Sheldon Sackett at the Coos Bay Times added a strong and often strident, Democratic voice to the mix. The state's voters reflected the politics of Oregon editors, as Oregon parted company with Washington and California and refused to back the New Deal, supporting Roosevelt personally but giving him no Congressional help.

Paul Kleppner, in a study of voting patterns of western states in the 20th Century, examined partisan voting for five periods of time from 1900 to 1984. In three of the time periods, Washington was actually more inclined to support Republicans in statewide elections than was Oregon; yet during the critical period 1932-44, the period of Depression and war, Washington swung to
the Democratic column by a much wider margin than Oregon. Washington's political switch for the 1932-44 period was the most dramatic of any state in the West, according to Kleppner.14

Oregon bucked the national trend, as Oregon Democrats failed to wrest the progressive mantle from the state's dominant Republicans, in large measure because they failed to seize on an issue, such as public power, that would attract Progressives away from their traditional alliance with Republicans.15 The split was typified by the position of Oswald West, who as governor from 1911 to 1915 carved out a record as a reform Democrat. But West, like many Oregon governors, had no independent wealth or ready source of income when he left office; he went to work for a major private utility and campaigned against reform Democrats in the thirties. West was largely responsible for recruiting the conservative Charles H. Martin to run for governor in 1934.16

Governor Martin proved to be more conservative than most Republicans, openly opposing the Roosevelt administration and major elements of the New Deal. As a result, Martin was popular with the state's private utilities, powerful players in the politics of the time. Martin's term was one of labor turmoil, and his employment of "anti-goon" units of the state police in a crackdown on labor violence was widely applauded in the state's newspapers. Martin was expected to win re-election handily in 1938, but he was upset in the Democratic primary by Henry Hess, a New Dealer and a state legislator. The defeat of Martin marked the high-water mark for the Oregon Commonwealth Federation
which, with backstage help from the Roosevelt administration, upset Martin.\textsuperscript{17}

Hess, however, was too liberal for the general election, and lost to Republican Charles A. Sprague, editor and publisher of The Oregon Statesman, a reluctant candidate who had been recruited by young Republicans when it appeared that no major candidate would challenge the supposedly unbeatable Martin.\textsuperscript{18} It was Sprague's first bid for elective office, although he had been active in progressive GOP politics as a young man in Washington state. Monroe Sweetland, then executive secretary of the Oregon Commonwealth Federation, found Sprague more compatible than the Democrat Martin. "He was an independent-thinking Republican who tried to look at many issues from a new perspective," recalled Sweetland.\textsuperscript{19}

Sprague was a relative newcomer to Oregon; at the time of his election he had lived in the state only 13 years. Sprague had purchased two-thirds interest in the Statesman in 1929, with the other third held by Sheldon Sackett until 1939. Prior to his Salem career, Sprague had published a weekly in Ritzville, Washington, from 1915 until 1925, when he purchased an interest in the Corvallis Gazette-Times, his foothold in Oregon. In Corvallis he was business manager, but very early began looking for an outlet for his writing and political interests. His future would be in Salem, where he owned and edited the Statesman until his death in 1969.\textsuperscript{20}
His term as governor was overshadowed by events on the national scene, as Roosevelt prepared the nation for war. Sprague was a strong backer of Wendell Willkie, but his policies seldom challenged Roosevelt. His term was unremarkable, leaving as its major legacy a beginning of state laws to regulate forestry.²¹

Sprague, a shy and intellectual man, was no match in the 1942 GOP primary for the extrovert Earl Snell, secretary of state, who defeated Sprague and continued Republican control of the governor's office. Excepting two brief (1956-58 and 1974-78) Democratic stints, the party held the office until 1986.

Oregon as a Republican Bastion

The New Deal scarcely gained a political foothold in Oregon, despite such major public works as Bonneville Dam, Timberline Lodge and a host of forestry projects. Republicans through the entire period controlled both seats in the U.S. Senate and a majority of the seats in Congress, as well as the Legislature.

Democrats finally began to make inroads in federal elections, beginning with the election of Senator Richard Neuberger and Congresswoman Edith Green in 1954, and soon became the majority in the state's congressional delegation. But Oregon continued to vote Republican for state offices, particularly the important office of governor.

As Oregon editors faced the issues of McCarthyism, maintenance of Republican hegemony was an element in their approach to McCarthy and the movement he represented within
the Republican party. All this is a part of the story to come, a study of the last era of newspapers as unrivalled opinion leaders in a time before television, universal jet travel and international business.

In Oregon, it was also the last era of Republican domination of state politics, of the control of state government by rural legislators closely tied to the politics of Main Street and the county courthouse. It was a world in which the publisher-editor was heard, respected, and seated in the inner councils where decisions were made in the days before open meetings and reapportioned legislatures.

This climate would not survive television and the expansion of the big newspaper chains. As this study is written, more Americans say—and have said for many years—that they get more of their news from television than from newspapers. Over 90 percent of the nation's newspaper circulation is controlled by newspaper groups. In Oregon the independent newspaper survives, but its ranks are severely reduced.

Largely because the state was late in acquiring network television, Oregonians in the post-war era looked to their daily newspapers for news of international and national affairs as well as state and local fare. Editors were expected to have views on these issues as well as the school bond and the election of a mayor. The national and international scene played itself out on the Oregon stage in a variety of ways, from the well-publicized maneuvering of U.S. Senator Wayne Morse as he moved from
Republican to Democratic Party; to the visits of red-hunting Congressional committees; to the inevitable calls for purges of local subversives; and to deep and agonized debates over Korea, Harry Truman and Douglas MacArthur, and the United Nations.

In many ways these issues, though seemingly remote, were more difficult for editors than domestic politics. The latter was, in post-war Oregon, basically a matter of anointing a proper Republican in the May primary election, for Democrats were not a factor in most parts of the state for another decade. Editors were Republican almost to a man, and they hewed to the party line when it came to elections. The agony of decision would come in matters where the GOP was in disarray, and no area saw both parties in greater disarray than the search for subversive activity and disloyalty known as McCarthyism. For Oregon's Republican editors, it was a time of testing, for the issues of McCarthyism would challenge their community leadership and call for stands certain to bring dissension within their community of readers.

The Maintenance of Republican Hegemony

As veterans returned from World War II, they began building a new Democratic Party, and by the mid-fifties they were breaking through the solid Republican ranks, but it was slow work, and through the fifties, Republicans maintained control. The period from 1940 to 1955 was one of the least competitive times in Oregon political history and the Oregon press viewed politics through a very Republican lens. The press—like the
state--was Republican.

No Democrat felt the frustration more than Richard L. Neuberger, a prolific writer whose work appeared in the nation's leading magazines and newspapers as well as the Sunday supplements of both Portland dailies. Neuberger managed to stay on speaking terms with Oregon editors, despite some heated exchanges.

That was not the case however, with Senator Wayne L. Morse, once the darling of Republican liberals but after 1952 a frequent target of editorial writers who had once championed his cause. Morse as Democrat became a bitter enemy of editors with whom he had once worked hand-in-hand. Morse's frequent attacks on the "one-party press" began with the general election campaign of 1952, when he stumped for Adlai Stevenson.22

Stevenson, himself a newspaper publisher, became increasingly angry with the Republican newspaper establishment as the 1952 campaign unfolded, and he chose a Portland speech to make one of the decade's strongest accusations of newspaper bias.

**Adlai's One-Party Press**

The Oregon Journal in 1952 celebrated its 50th Anniversary by returning to its Democratic roots and, for the first time since 1936, endorsing the Democratic candidate for president. When that candidate came to Portland on September 8, Journal Publisher P. L. Jackson hosted a luncheon for about 140 of the state's leading newspaper and radio executives. Stevenson used
the occasion to launch a strong attack on what he termed "a one-party press in a two-party country."

In a speech that would stir national reaction, Stevenson noted a recent *Editor & Publisher* survey showing that with a month until the election, he had the backing of only 15.4 percent of dailies, commanding 10 percent of the circulation. Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower was supported by 51.7 percent of the dailies with 75.6 percent of the circulation. Eisenhower's advantage increased during the final weeks of the campaign; an election-eve survey showed the president-elect with support of 67.34 percent compared to Stevenson's 14.52 percent. The circulation gap was even wider, with Eisenhower newspapers claiming 80.24 percent of the circulation, compared to Stevenson's 18.14 percent. Undecided were 18.14 percent of the newspapers, with 8.88 percent of circulation.

Ironically, Oregon ranked only behind Wisconsin in terms of northern-state newspaper support for Stevenson, thanks to the *Journal's* endorsement. The *Journal*, joined by two small dailies, the Pendleton *East-Oregonian* and the Coos Bay *Times*, gave Stevenson 37 percent of the Oregon circulation, support topped in the North only by Wisconsin's 47 percent.

Noting that Presidents Roosevelt and Truman had never won the support of a majority of the nation's newspapers, Stevenson observed:
It would seem that the overwhelming majority of the press is just against Democrats. And it is against Democrats, so far as I can see, not after a sober and considered review of the alternatives, but automatically, as dogs are against cats. . . .

I still haven't gotten over the way some of our nation's great papers rushed to commit themselves to a candidate last spring, long before they knew who his opponent was, or what would be the issues of the campaign. . . .

I am in favor of a two-party system in politics. And I think we have a pretty healthy two-party system at this moment. But I am in favor of a two-party system in our press too. And I am, frankly, considerably concerned when I see the extent to which we are developing a one-party press in a two-party country.26

Although some in the audience doubtless fit Stevenson's description, reaction to the speech on the part of the Oregon press was strangely muted. Only The Oregonian and the Statesman played the talk as front-page news, The Oregonian quoting extensively from the address. The Journal inexplicably failed to cover its own luncheon, and mildly admonished its candidate in a next-day editorial noting that "The Journal believes in taking men and issues on their merits."27 Register-Guard Editor Bill Tugman was at the luncheon but his story failed to mention Stevenson's charges. Other Oregon dailies ignored the story or played a wire service account inside.

The Oregonian, which had given Stevenson heavy coverage despite the newspaper's endorsement of Eisenhower, bristled editorially that "it is a bit hard for the press to have to sit and
hear itself criticized as 'captive' for exercising the freedom which the candidate so nobly advocates from the stump.\(^{28}\)

Nationally, the Stevenson speech attracted major coverage and reaction from publishers. The New York Times reprinted the text, and editorialized that publishers could not abide by some type of arbitrary formula in order to establish "balance" in endorsements.\(^{29}\) The president of the American Newspaper Publishers Association also defended individual publishers. "Fortunately there is no power in this country to standardize the editorial views of any editor or publisher," said Charles F. McCahill of the Cleveland News.\(^{30}\)

Stevenson's charges sounded remarkably similar to earlier complaints by Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, both of whom campaigned against heavy newspaper opposition. The press was Republican, and had endorsed GOP candidates for a century (after giving Abraham Lincoln only 30 percent support in 1860). The best Roosevelt was able to gain was 23.5 percent in 1936; Truman got only 10.3 percent endorsement in 1948. Measured by circulation, the Republican advantage was even greater.\(^{31}\)

There was post-election interest in election coverage bias, with both Sigma Delta Chi and Editor & Publisher calling for research, but the result was only a series of limited surveys.\(^{32}\) Nathan Blumberg of the University of Nebraska surveyed the largest or second-largest dailies in thirty-five states and concluded that bias was relatively minor and extended to papers
that supported Stevenson as well as those supporting Eisenhower. Blumberg found eighteen of the thirty-five papers without any perceivable bias, and among these papers was *The Oregonian*, which Blumberg termed "remarkably impartial" in its coverage.\textsuperscript{33}

Other studies conducted after the campaign seemed to support Stevenson's charge of unfair treatment. Arthur Edward Rowse studied thirty-one newspapers' coverage of Richard Nixon's "secret fund" crisis and concluded that Republican newspapers played the story down, giving GOP explanations as much play as the breaking story. "Some were so weighted down by explanatory and laudatory statements from the Republicans that almost no mention was made of the original revelations or reactions of Democrats," concluded Rowse, a veteran journalist.\textsuperscript{34} Rowse also examined *The Oregonian*, and again the Portland daily got a clean bill of health. It played the Nixon story early and prominently and, despite a heavy GOP edge in the number of front-page photographs, showed general balance in its coverage of the campaign.\textsuperscript{35}

Another survey, conducted by the *New Republic*, examined twenty-one newspapers and came to conclusions similar to those of Rowse.\textsuperscript{36}

The study of bias in newspaper coverage is extremely difficult, for the mere measuring of column-inches and counting of photographs (which constituted the Blumberg study) reveals none of the subtleties of photo selection or headline choice. On the other hand, qualitative surveys such as those of Rowse and the
New Republic are themselves subject to bias in the researcher. One is left ultimately with a known fact: in the fifties—and in Oregon in particular—the editorial pages were predominantly Republican and Democrats had a very difficult task in gaining favorable treatment.

That comment would have drawn no argument from two men who campaigned actively in Oregon and elsewhere for Stevenson in 1952. For Richard L. Neuberger, a state senator but a nationally known writer, support for Stevenson was based on a longtime friendship. But for Senator Wayne Morse, elected in 1944 as a liberal Republican, the 1952 campaign marked the first formal step on his road to the Democratic caucus. A declared Independent before Election Day, 1952, he would hold that position for more than two years before filing as a Democrat in 1955 in a move that swung the U.S. Senate to the party and elected Lyndon B. Johnson as majority leader.

In 1952, during a brief hiatus in a rivalry that would become deep and personal, Neuberger and Morse campaigned together for Stevenson, and both assailed the Republican press, each in his own manner.

**Journalist cum Politician: Richard L. Neuberger**

Criticizing the press pains Dick Neuberger, for he was a journalist, one of the most successful free-lance writers in Northwest history, with regular publication in the nation's top magazines and newspapers and four books to his credit by 1952.
Reporting from Germany at the age of 20, his stories in the *Nation* and *New Republic* in 1933 were among the first to expose Adolph Hitler's treatment of Jews.37

Neuberger wrote regularly for the Sunday magazine of *The Oregonian*, and had journalists as friends. He was close to Charles A. Sprague, and a sometime guest in the Sprague home; the men shared views on social issues, but parted on fiscal matters—Neuberger was an unabashed New Dealer, Sprague a fiscal conservative. Neuberger was also on first-name basis with Bill Tugman in Eugene, Bud Forrester in Pendleton and several Portland editors, particularly Malcolm Bauer and Herb Lundy of *The Oregonian*.

Neuberger bucked the Republican press as he tried to build a modern Democratic Party in a state with little press support and no major sources of campaign funds. He passed up a U.S. Senate race in 1948 because of this lack of funding, and wrote about it in the New York *Times*.38 In 1954, as he once again considered running, the problem of campaign funds was exacerbated by what Neuberger saw as a policy to "blacklist" him in the Portland dailies.

The idea had concerned Neuberger for some time. In 1948 he charged, in a letter to Managing Editor Donald J. Sterling, that the *Oregon Journal* "had orders to mention me in print only 'when absolutely necessary' and not favorably if possible." Neuberger claimed that two *Journal* reporters had confirmed that an informal "black list" was in existence, and he threatened to write
about it for a journalism magazine. There is no record that the article was written, but the possibility of such a list continued to bother Neuberger.

Sterling was a registered Democrat and the Journal was nominally pro-Democrat, but it leaned toward the party's conservative wing. Sterling, managing editor of the paper for 33 years, was a conservative whose views were sought out by Governor Charles Martin, the right-wing Democrat and New Deal critic, and also by Guy Cordon, who received early support from Sterling in his 1944 Senate campaign.

Monroe Sweetland, a Democratic leader and legislator, found Journal political reporters Ralph Watson and Larry Smythe "openly antagonistic" toward Democrats, and charged them with "playing games" to avoid coverage of Democrats. Even the openly Republican Oregonian was more receptive to stories—if not editorial endorsements—about Democrats, Sweetland felt.

A content analysis of Portland's dailies in the 1954 general election supports Neuberger's contention that coverage was not balanced. Although Neuberger conducted a more aggressive campaign than did the incumbent, Cordon received the major share of coverage and pictures in both newspapers. Cordon refused to debate Neuberger, but the study found that the dailies gave more prominent coverage to Cordon's debate surrogates than to Neuberger, the actual candidate.

Neuberger and Sweetland felt they could gain a sympathetic ear from Herb Lundy, veteran political reporter for The Oregonian
now writing editorials. In September 1952, Neuberger asked Lundy for a meeting with the editorial board. The conversation did not go well. Neuberger's next-day note threatened an appeal to Michael J. Frey, *Oregonian* general manager.\(^43\)

A year later, now actively considering the Senate race, Neuberger engaged in another letter-writing duel with Lundy, criticizing the newspaper's failure to cover Cordon's record in the Senate, accusing *The Oregonian* of lack of integrity, and raising the specter of a blacklist:

One might ask if personal vindictiveness decides which Oregon authors shall merit comment on the Oregonian's editorial page. One might ask about a policy of not publishing letters from candidates during a political campaign, particularly when the editorial page involved saves its attacks almost exclusively for the candidates of one particular political party.

One might ask if a blacklist exists on the Oregonian editorial page, a device I doubt is used on almost any other page in America which claims for itself high ideals.

I believe that, generally, my wife and I are regarded as persons of integrity, a quality recognized in us by nearly everyone except the Oregonian's editorial page.\(^44\)

A subsequent letter exchange was prompted by editorial writer Malcolm Bauer's examination of *Oregonian* files in an attempt to prove that the newspaper had adequately covered Neuberger's activities. Neuberger held to his position, and then noted the newspaper's criticism of Morse since the latter's departure from Republican ranks:
It seems to me that the whole test at the Oregonian is Republican orthodoxy. Morse is the same personality he always was. But so long as he belabored liberals and stumped for Cain, Cordon, Snell, McKay, etc., he was okey-dokey with the Oregonian. Now, all of his undesirable personality traits suddenly become evident.45

Neuberger discussed his political decisions with Sprague, a confidant over a period of years. The two men were on a common wave length on many issues, but Sprague maintained loyalty to the Republican Party and a firm belief that if liberals of his type left the party it would be taken over by the Taft wing.

In a 1952 letter, Sprague confessed to Neuberger his misgivings about the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket (Sprague had endorsed Earl Warren in the GOP primary). Disappointed in the nomination of Nixon and in Eisenhower's campaign, Sprague concluded:

To let the Republican party become only a shell of reaction would doom it as an instrument of good government, whether it held office or not. So while I have a lot of sympathy for Steve Anderson in his shift to support Stevenson, who is to me much more appealing than Eisenhower, I intend to vote for Eisenhower. I am more interested in the long war than in the single campaign.46

A year later and on the verge of declaring his candidacy against Cordon, Neuberger expressed his frustrations to Sprague, clearly hoping that Sprague would break Republican ranks:

I am quite discouraged to think that a person of your views can support Republicans like Cordon, Ellsworth, etc. It seems to me that partisanship should not erase issues, which lie at the root of political
decisions. Your attitude on international affairs—and on most domestic questions—is so divergent from these men that your backing of them cannot really make sense. Perhaps I am wrong. You know that I yield to no one in my respect for your sincerity and honesty, and thus I know you will understand this letter.

I am willing to do my part in politics. Yet Paul Douglas, in the Godkin Lectures at Harvard last year, said, "If one party ever attains overwhelming superiority in money, newspaper support and patronage, it will be almost impossible for it ever to be defeated."

I know you are candid enough to realize that this situation prevails in Oregon today. In normal years Republican headquarters will spend $250,000 while the Democrats are spending, perhaps, $15,000. I feel an obligation to give the people of the state a chance to voice divergent views on major issues, and an opportunity to vote for a Democrat who tries reasonably hard to be honest and truthful. Yet I wonder if I owe an obligation to enter a field where the press, the money and virtually all courthouses, the capitol, etc., are against me before I start?

You and I have been friends for a long time, and I believe you will give me your honest views on the situation. Have we reached the stage in Oregon where it is impossible for a Democrat to win a major policy-making office? 47

Neuberger was elected in 1954, in a close vote that was at first declared a Cordon victory by The Oregonian. Had he lived, he would have been easily returned in 1960; his widow, Maurine, was elected to the seat and held it until 1967. Although Neuberger continued to criticize press performance, relations with Oregon editors were generally cordial during his Senate term. The same could not be said for Wayne Morse, whose press reviews went from positive to negative as he shifted his registration from
Republican to Democrat. Morse left office in 1969 a man deeply embittered against the press.

The Maverick and the Media

No politician in Oregon history has inspired the emotion that surrounded Wayne L. Morse. Elected to the U.S. Senate in 1944 by defeating the reactionary Senator Rufus Holman in a Republican primary, the former law school dean and labor negotiator built a following of liberal Republicans—including several of Oregon's major newspaper editors. He also built a deep and bitter enmity among the party's conservatives, who considered him a donkey in an elephant costume, particularly because of his pro-labor views.

This schism produced a parting of the ways in 1952, in a series of events beginning with the Republican National Convention. Morse sought a position on the Platform Committee, and with the second-highest popular vote total among Oregon delegates (Governor Douglas McKay won the most votes in the May GOP primary), Morse would normally be entitled to his choice. The party's Old Guard decided to send the senator a message, however, and selected a young state representative, Mark O. Hatfield, for the position sought by Morse. Although surface relations were cordial, beneath the surface the sensitive Morse was seething. Following the convention, at which he played no significant role, Morse split with the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket, endorsed Stevenson and declared himself an Independent.
As Morse moved from Republican to Independent and finally to Democrat in 1955, the wrath of the Republican establishment increased, and the state's GOP newspapers found faults they had previously overlooked in Morse. In some cases, notably that of Bill Tugman in Eugene, the split was deeply personal and bitter.

Tugman came to Oregon from Cleveland, where he had been a crusading police reporter with the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the newspaper home of Alton Baker, who in 1927 bought the Eugene Guard. Tugman was 33 when he arrived in Eugene, and he was the voice of the newspaper until he left in 1955 to buy a weekly at Reedsport on the Oregon Coast.

Tugman was already a veteran of several civic crusades when he faced his greatest challenge of the pre-war era with a 1932 proposal to move the University of Oregon to Corvallis and merge it with arch-rival Oregon State College. Bonds were forged between Tugman and Morse, then dean of the Oregon law school, that would later be a factor in Morse's 1944 decision to seek the U.S. Senate seat.49

In that year, Morse sought out Tugman and two other leading Oregon editors. Oregonian Editor Palmer Hoyt was active in liberal Republican causes and among those being considered as a GOP candidate. Hoyt, however, urged Morse to enter the primary against the aging and reactionary Holman.50 Before filing, Morse sought out Sprague in Salem, to determine Sprague's intentions. Sprague, defeated for re-election as governor only two
years before, told Morse he would not run against Holman.\textsuperscript{51}
Later in 1944, the death of Senator Charles McNary created a second opening, and Sprague did seek the remaining four years of McNary's term, losing to Guy Cordon in the Republican primary.

The close linkage of Republican editors and Republican politics, then, brought Morse as a fledgling office-seeker to the doors of three leading Oregon editors. All urged him to run, all supported and counseled him during his first term in the Senate. Hoyt moved to the Denver Post in 1946 but continued to advise Morse.

Morse and the state's Republican newspapers parted company after the senator's 1952 endorsement of Stevenson, for reasons of personality as well as politics. From the very beginning, associates recognized in Morse problems of ego and temperament. Tugman in 1944 noted that Morse "loses [his] sense of perspective" and forecast that "he must learn to work patiently with other men [and] then can become a very great senator."\textsuperscript{52}

Sprague chided Morse about the latter's self-righteousness and verbosity. Commenting on a 1951 speech, Sprague wrote: "You take 37 columns to say in substance what (pardon me) I said in five paragraphs. You were never an editor or you would have learned how to compress your words. Just a friendly criticism."\textsuperscript{53} A year later, Sprague noted Morse's bitter exchange with the Register-Guard over President Truman's seizure of the steel industry, and advised Morse: "May I in all kindness offer you a
suggestion? Treat yourself, once in a while to the luxury of being wrong!"  

Although Sprague and Tugman regularly defended Morse against the GOP right wing, they also criticized some of his votes, particularly on fiscal matters. In a 1951 column, Sprague noted Morse had voted against the GOP position on all 41 policy votes taken that year on appropriations measures, charging him with deserting the party "in the one great area where its stand has been the soundest: that of economy in government." Sprague added, "I am not running out on the senator whom I have consistently supported; but I hope that he doesn't continue to stretch his "constitutional liberalism" to being liberal with money from the public treasury."  

Tugman split with Morse over President Truman's seizure of the steel mills in 1952, and the two former associates exchanged increasingly bitter letters, particularly after Morse lambasted press coverage of the issue. In editorials and letters to the editor the bile spilled out for a period of weeks on the pages of the Register-Guard. The split was irrevocable before Morse deserted the GOP. But clearly the events of 1952 did affect Morse's relationship with the state's Republican press.  

In his study of Morse's treatment by five Oregon dailies, Robert Blaine Whipple concluded that 1952 was the point at which the split occurred, and that it was directly related to party affiliation. Three of the papers surveyed by Whipple (Oregon Journal, Capital-Journal and Register-Guard) labeled themselves
"Independent;" *The Oregonian* labeled itself "Independent Republican;" and *The Oregon Statesman* was listed as "Republican" until 1953, when it adopted "Independent Republican" identification. Whipple concluded:

The predominant approval and disapproval of Senator Morse seems, largely, to have been determined by his party affiliation. Despite claimed political independence, the papers did, in fact, adhere to a Republican partisanship. Indeed, it seems apparent that membership in the Republican party is of primary importance to an Oregonian seeking major political office if he is interested in the editorial support of the five papers studied here.\(^57\)

Its seems to this writer that *The Oregonian*, the *Capital-Journal* and the *Register-Guard* determined many of their editorial policies on the basis of party label with opinions formulated beforehand instead of letting facts be the determining factor. And, finally, the Morse personality clouded their vision.

*The Statesman* and the *Oregon Daily Journal*, comparatively speaking, were more objective in their editorial assessments. While falling short of the goal set forth here, their overall editorial treatment comes closer to objectivity than the first mentioned three publications. There were many more indications that these editors had looked to both sides of a question before presenting conclusions to their readers.\(^58\)

Whether one accepts Whipple's analysis or the explanation of A. Robert Smith and others that Morse's ego-driven personality made him unable to accept criticism, it is clear that when Wayne Morse left the Republican Party he also took up weapons against the Republican press. He waded into the backyard of Col. Robert McCormick during a speaking tour for Stevenson, charging American newspapers with editorializing in their news pages.\(^59\)
The chasm seemed to deepen over the years, and in 1967 Morse, then deeply involved in opposing the Vietnam War, told Warren C. Price that, "As far as I am concerned, American journalism can be dispensed with." Price observed that Morse "couldn't have meant it that literally," but it was a telling remark.60

A Constant Factor: The Press Is Republican

Even allowing for a considerable personality factor in the case of Wayne Morse, the criticisms of Morse, Neuberger, Stevenson and other Democrats of the post-war period were telling. In Oregon, and nationwide, the press was Republican. Newspapers were, of course, commercial enterprises and publishers were businessmen, so linkage with Republican politics should not have been surprising. In the case of small dailies such as those found in Oregon, the publishers were often the men who wrote editorials as well as running the business side of the newspaper. As journalism chains gained greater influence later in the century, it became unusual for a publisher to also write editorials and the editorial pages began to take on a much more bipartisan hue. Chain owners were also less concerned about local politics than were the family owners discussed in this study, and the strong linkage with the Republican Party had virtually disappeared in Oregon by the end of the seventies. But in the fifties, it was strong.

In Oregon, the Republican roots of the older editors had taken hold in the Progressive era, and were linked to that element
of the Republican legacy. William U'ren lived until 1949 and his idea of progressive reform was accepted by most Oregon editors. Through the first half of the century the Democratic Party was never able to wrest the progressive agenda away from the old Republican progressives; now, after the war and with new voters flooding into the state, Oregon was on the verge of seeing a major shift in its politics. This time, it would be Democrats who would take up the mandate of change, and in many ways the party maneuvering of Wayne Morse signaled the break. With other Democrats elected in 1952, 1954 and 1956, Morse would epitomize the new Oregon Democrat: internationalist, socially liberal, pro-growth, egalitarian in their views of education, and absolutely unafraid to criticize the entrenched Republican establishment.

Oregon editors, intrigued by the ideas and principles of the new Democrats, would not join Morse in shifting party. That would be too abrupt, and unlike an elected senator, editors did not have to be identified with a party in order to function.

Editors increasingly opted for a position in which they supported the Democratic platforms much of the time, while endorsing all but the most reactionary Republican office-seekers. The resulting image was at times confusing to the reader, frustrating to Democrats and unsatisfactory to Republican hardliners as the state moved each year toward the left. Oregon's editors remained Republican, but many were inwardly at war
with the direction their party was taking, and the issues of McCarthyism brought that inward war to the surface.

Oregon editors were not under pressure from the large chains, particularly the Hearst group, with their own political agenda. S. I. Newhouse, the sole chain owner active in Oregon, did not from all accounts impose political preferences on his editors, who remained liberal to moderate Republicans on most issues. There was no Hearst or McCormick dictum, no Scripps-Howard group unity to push the state's newspapers to the right.

In this climate, the Republican editorial philosophy borrowed heavily from senior editors, and particularly Charles A. Sprague, the former governor and--in 1952--member of the United Nations delegation. Sprague's brand of Republicanism, rooted in the Progressive era, had always been to the left of his national party. Sprague was antagonistic to the slash-and-burn tactics adopted by congressional Republicans in reaction to President Truman's upset victory in 1948.

As the national party turned right and intensified its search for subversion, Oregon editors found themselves increasingly in opposition to national GOP direction, in a serious contest for the soul of the Republican Party. Liberal Republican editors such as Sprague, Tugman and Robert Ruhl were internationalists, generally supportive of civil liberties and civil rights; they supported public education and were moderate in their views on labor and social welfare. They were fiscal conservatives and strong proponents of private business. Members of the
"establishment" of their own communities, they deferred to people in power, in private or public capacity, and tended to back incumbents in political contests.

All were deeply anti-communist, and none had been involved in the radical politics of the Popular Front or its components. They were Middle American to the core—white males, Protestant, well-educated, of northern European stock and often with Midwest roots.

It was a decidedly Republican group of Oregon editors who approached the civil liberties issues that followed the war. In their partisan makeup they did not differ greatly from the editors of other states, but the Oregon editorial community was closely knit and lacked the strident voices of outside chain owners, particularly the Hearst newspapers.

In several areas relating to civil liberties and civil rights, this difference would be critical, as Oregon took a stance different from the press of its neighbor states. The war had scarcely ended before legislators and newspapers in California and Washington were in hot pursuit of domestic reds. Oregon would be more cautious.
Notes to Chapter 2


4 Among the most prominent Republican editor-politicians were Charles A. Sprague of *The Oregon Statesman* (governor, 1939-43), Elmo Smith of the Ontario *Argus-Observer* (legislator 1949-56; governor, 1956), Merle Chessman of *The Astorian* (legislator, 1943-48), Giles French of the *Sherman County Journal* (legislator, 1935-52), and Robert Sawyer of the Bend *Bulletin*, county judge (commissioner) in the 1920s.


8Monroe Sweetland, Tape 5, Oral History, Oregon Historical Society.


13Paul Valenti, "The Portland Press, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Oregon Compulsory Education Bill" (Paper delivered at the 1994
Western Journalism Historians Conference, Berkeley, California), 14.


16Burton, Democrats of Oregon, 60-80 and passim; Sweetland, Oral History Tape 5.


18David Eccles, interview with author, 28 August 1992, Portland. Eccles was one of the men who called on Sprague; he later became his state budget director. Tape in possession of author.

19Sweetland, Oral History Tape 7.

20The most complete biography of Sprague is the obituary printed by his newspaper, The Oregon Statesman, on 14 March 1969. See also Who's Who in America for this period.


25Ibid.


39 Neuberger to Donald J. Sterling, 13 February 1948, Neuberger Papers, Box 37/7, University of Oregon.

40 Charles H. Martin to Donald J. Sterling, 11 June 1932; Guy Cordon to Sterling, 3 June 1944; Sterling Papers, Oregon Historical Society.

41 Sweetland interview.


43 Neuberger to Herbert Lundy, 27 September 1952, Box 37/8, Neuberger Papers, University of Oregon.

44 Neuberger to Lundy, 24 May 1953, Box 37/8, Neuberger Papers, University of Oregon.

45 Neuberger to Malcolm Bauer, 16 October 1953, Box 37/8, Neuberger Papers, University of Oregon.

46 Charles A. Sprague to Neuberger, 23 September 1952, Box 37/10, Neuberger Papers, University of Oregon.

47 Neuberger to Sprague, 17 September 1953, Box 37/10, Neuberger Papers, University of Oregon.

48 The best account of this period is Smith, *The Tiger in the Senate*, 135-44.

50 Smith, *The Tiger in the Senate*, 97-100.

51 "It Seems To Me," *Statesman* (9 October 1951): 1, 4.

52 Quoted in Price, *The Eugene Register-Guard*, 304.

53 Charles A. Sprague to Wayne L. Morse, undated, Morse Papers, University of Oregon.

54 Sprague to Morse, 5 June 1952, Morse Papers.


58 Ibid, 264.


60 Price, *The Eugene Register-Guard*, 301.

Chapter 3

All Politics is Local: Hunting Subversion in the States

The American press shares with individuals the right of free expression of ideas, and has accepted the role of critic of the powerful and defender of constitutional freedoms. But it has often failed in this role, and in some cases actually led the clamor against individuals who express unpopular views. Particularly in time of war or societal stress, editors have sometimes encouraged suppression of alternative publications, such as the socialist press early in the century. At other times, the press has simply been silent while the rights of individuals are violated. These failures to defend free speech and press are as important a part of the history of American journalism as the more-celebrated occasions when the press honored its constitutional obligations and worked to guarantee the rights of dissidents.

America's press is essentially a local press, in contrast to the centralized newspaper industries of Western Europe and Japan. When the American press is under pressure and forced to make difficult choices between majority power and minority rights, the pressure is greatest regarding local conflicts. This is particularly true of the community press, where the editor or publisher is a home-town fixture, a civic leader who meets sources and readers every day on Main Street. As civic leader, the editor is part of a mainstream establishment; taking positions contrary to that of the
mainstream is difficult and often unpleasant work. Nowhere is this more difficult than when issues of patriotism intrude. The mettle of a courageous editor is to resist the mob, and the chapters ahead examine how the home-town press in one somewhat-isolated state dealt with attacks on civil liberties at both the local and national levels.

Attacks on civil liberties seem to be closely associated with wars—and their aftermath. Following both of the great wars of the first half of the twentieth century, Americans turned inward, rejected the leadership that had prevailed during the war, and turned upon neighbors who in one way or another were thought to be subversive.

Shifts in political balance, particularly from left to right, have in America often been accompanied by a search for subversion. Reforms of the Wilson and Roosevelt presidencies were forced aside by the demands of war, and as the wars ended the failing health of these architects of reform left their legacies open to attack from the right. Rather than attack the dead or dying godheads, reactionary elements focused on subversion and rallied Americans to the banners of god and country.

In the period immediately following World War II, pressure to support majority power against minority rights was greatest at the state level, even during the reign of Senator Joe McCarthy as the chief red-baiter of the U.S. Senate. Before McCarthy strode to a West Virginia podium in February 1950 and launched the roller-coaster ride that would be known as McCarthyism, the hunt
for subversives was ingrained in state capitols across the nation, including California and Washington on the Pacific Coast. McCarthy was, in the words of David Halberstam, "the accidental demagogue," a man about to "lend his name to a phenomenon that, in fact, already existed."²

The search for subversion is part of the warp and woof of American culture, rooted in the tug-of-war between the powerful democratic majority and the constitutionally protected minority. The right to hold unpopular ideas and to express them publicly is enshrined in the Constitution, and few Americans are as protective of the First Amendment as the nation's editors. But they are also vulnerable to the power of the majority, and when the balance is tipped the result can be incursions on civil liberties, and even civic strife.

**The Fear of Subversion**

The fear of subversion may be a universal trait in all civilizations, regardless of the orientation of government. It is as pervasive in governments of the left as it is in governments of the right, and its roots are historic and closely linked to strains of nativism, religion and--in the United States--property rights.

David Brion Davis, introducing his volume of essays, *Fear of Conspiracy*, notes the universality of counter-subversive movements, "It is probable that every society contains certain personality types who are inclined to blame disrupting change on
secret, diabolical forces and who gain hearers at times of particular stress."

In the United States in this century, times of stress have typically introduced crusades against subversion from the left. The "Palmer Raids" of 1919 typically targeted radicals or suspected radicals of the left: socialists, communists, radical labor unionists, anarchists. Anti-subversion campaigns against leftist labor unions and intellectuals were launched again during the Depression, with elements of American business and industry deeply involved in the organizing, but the popularity of President Franklin D. Roosevelt prevented their widespread success.

Corporate leaders created the Liberty League in 1936, the best-financed of many right-wing organizations directed against Roosevelt and the New Deal. Several major newspaper publishers, including William Randolph Hearst and Frank Gannett, were involved in the League or its successor, The Committee for Constitutional Government. Gannett ran unsuccessfully for the GOP presidential nomination in 1940, using CCG as a platform. The association brought publishers remarkably close to known pro-fascist and anti-semite organizations and spokesmen such as America First and Father Charles Coughlin, and the groups worked closely with Representative Martin Dies and his House investigative committee.\textsuperscript{4}

The 1930s' version of anti-subversion did not die during World War II. It was placed on hold as it became expedient for
Americans to swallow their fears of communism while the U.S. and the Soviet Union fought a common enemy.

On the West Coast, the fear of subversion was directed against Japanese Americans. An entire race was targeted in the drive that resulted in the internment of 80,000 citizens of Japanese descent and 30,000 Japanese aliens, who were held from 1942 until 1945 in guarded camps, although none had been accused of disloyalty or espionage. The West Coast press encouraged the internment, or silently acquiesced in the government's edict. The Oregon press' attitude toward Japanese Americans would change markedly as the war neared its end and the military threat of Japan faded. As we will see in Chapter 4, editors were among those urging tolerance for returning internees, in what would become one of the first post-war tests of editorial support for civil liberties.

The case of the Japanese, whether alien or citizen, was not typical of the search for subversives, however, as it was directed at a nationality and a race rather than an ideological grouping or political threat. More typical were the campaigns against radicals and reformers launched in the thirties and forties by the U.S. House of Representatives (the Dies Committee) and by several of the states, including California and Washington.
The Dies Committee and HUAC

A series of special House investigating committees, usually termed the Dies Committee after its chairman, Representative Martin Dies (D-Texas), pursued subversives from 1938 to 1945. In 1945 the House made the committee a permanent body, the House Un-American Activities Committee. The Dies Committee and its successor in HUAC kept the investigatory spirit alive through the war, launched the career of Representative Richard Nixon while ending that of Alger Hiss, and created records and files that would later fuel the initial forays of Joe McCarthy.

Dies popularized investigation of communism by Congress, and first used guilt by association in the manner in which it would later be used by McCarthy. Dies also established the value of former communists as witnesses, beginning the practice of reeling off long lists of names of former Party members or those suspected of affiliation. Dies named as many names in a single year as McCarthy did during his entire career. The largest single instance of "naming" was a list of some 22,000 "fellow travelers" compiled in 1944. The list was never officially released, but copies of it provided so-called experts on subversion with the fodder for future blacklists and "namings."

Dies established close ties with conservative newspaper columnists, include George Sokolsky and Westbrook Pegler of the Hearst publications, and Fulton Lewis, Jr. William Randolph Hearst had turned sharply to the right in the thirties, and by 1934
was engaging in an orchestrated attack on college professors and others who held leftist views. The attack, complete with instructions to editors to play up such charges, had only mixed success, but it created a natural alliance between the Hearst organization and Dies. In states where Hearst had newspapers—such as California and Washington—the alliance of Hearst and his columnists with the efforts of Dies and other red-baiters would later play itself out in support for state anti-subversion campaigns following the war.

Following on the record of the Dies Committee, HUAC after 1945 maintained a close liaison with influential newspapers, particularly those of the conservative McCormick-Patterson alliance. The Washington Times-Herald, published by Cissy Patterson, was particularly close to HUAC, as were the New York World-Telegram and Sun.

The well-publicized efforts of Congress did not operate alone. Equally important in keeping the anti-subversive movement alive, and creating a climate in which the McCarthy crusade would later prosper, were legislative investigations in many of the states.

State Campaigns Against Subversion

Investigators were active during the Depression in several of the largest states, including New York, Illinois and California. Their targets ranged widely, but all included communists and
most of the state investigations looked into labor unions, higher education, and public school teachers.

Higher education was a particularly attractive target, and nearly every state campaign confronted faculty members of leftist views. Public university campuses were vulnerable because they were governed by politically appointed boards; administrators hired by those boards were aware of the budget power of state legislatures. Private institutions were less directly tied to politics, but governing boards were often dominated by business and financial leaders of conservative bent.

In the activities of these investigative bodies may be seen the roots of the anti-red crusades that marched across the nation in the period immediately following World War II.

The 1935 Illinois Legislature investigated communist influence at the University of Chicago after drugstore mogul Charles R. Walgren pulled his niece from the university, charging indoctrination.10 New York had a record of continuous anti-subversion investigations dating from World War I, active through the Depression and World War II. A loyalty oath for teachers was enacted in 1921, repealed in 1923 at the urging of Governor Al Smith, and re-enacted in 1934.11

Labor unrest also spurred investigations during the Depression. Detroit regularly went through red-baiting in municipal elections of the 1930s. A 1941 committee of the Oklahoma Legislature spotted communistic influence in that state's labor unions.12
Following the war, there was a great deal of interaction between state and federal investigators. Committees in California, Washington state and Illinois worked closely with each other and with HUAC. Witnesses rushed from state to state to recant their careers as communists and to name former colleagues. States copied the laws and procedures of other states. In 1948, ten states sent representatives to an Interstate Legislative Conference on Un-American Activities, in Los Angeles.

Long before McCarthy emerged on the national scene, all forty-eight states had enacted a variety of statutes related in one way or another to subversive activities. These laws governed activity ranging from treason and sedition to the prohibition of red flags and the wearing of masks and disguises. Some had been enacted to combat subversion of the right (the ban on masks and disguises was primarily to unmask the Ku Klux Klan), but most had some base in fear of the left, communism in particular.13

Domestic subversion continued to be the major theme of state investigations, as ambitious legislators, urged on by patriotic groups such as the American Legion, attempted to purge society of radical thought as well as subversive activity. Of particular interest for this study are the campaigns in Oregon's neighboring states, California and Washington, both of which began investigating the labor movement but eventually found their mother lode in two of the nation's most prestigious universities. Oregon editors, watching neighboring states in a national spotlight, dealt with red-hunting on a smaller scale, but as early as 1948
began grappling with their own charges of domestic communism or alleged subversion on the part of public employees.

The Tenney Committee in California

Depression-era politics in California ranged from the unusual to the strange, with Townsendites, radical longshoremen, Upton Sinclair, radio evangelists and assorted other players jockeying for position on the new frontier. Jack Tenney fit well into this melange. A songwriter known primarily for the composition "Mexicali Rose," Tenney was also a band leader and union official. He entered the California Legislature in 1936 as a Democratic assemblyman from Los Angeles. In 1941 he was named Assembly co-chairman of the Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities and remained as committee head until his resignation in 1949. In his nine-year stint he was widely regarded as the most prominent if not the most effective of the state red-hunters. Tenney was, in effect, the committee, and he set the tone for other state investigations.

Tenney's methods were typical of red-baiting investigators. The committee hearings were described as prosecutorial in nature, but without the safeguards of a courtroom; friendly witnesses were coached, hostile witnesses bullied; legal counsel was denied or silenced; the personal inclinations of the chairman were indulged.

Tenney used the media extensively, and formed alliances in the Dies manner. His 1947 report commented:
Particular commendation is extended to the Los Angeles *Examiner* and the San Francisco *Examiner* and the Hearst papers in general for their outstanding crusade against communism in particular and subversive groups in general. . . . In spite of vicious, lying propaganda, the Hearst papers have stood as a bulwark against the rising tide of Red Fascism in America. William Randolph Hearst has rendered a great service to the people of the United States in courageously exposing the traitorous agents of Stalin's Russia in their underhanded attempt to destroy American freedom.\textsuperscript{16}

Similar praise for the Hearst papers would be included in his later committee reports. In 1948 and 1949, Tenney again singled out Hearst newspapers, which at that time numbered six in the state, easily the most powerful media voice in California.\textsuperscript{17}

Like McCarthy a few years later, Tenney brought about his own downfall by over-reaching politically. He introduced a package of seven measures in the 1949 Legislature, and managed to get the package through the Senate. In the process, he began to question the loyalty of legislative Democrats (Tenney had long since become a Republican), and internal politics brought him down. The Assembly killed the entire Tenney package, and the chairman resigned his nine-year reign.\textsuperscript{18} But in the period from January, when the bills were introduced, to May, when they died, the seeds of bitter fruit were planted in the huge University of California system.

California's internationally respected university system was governed by an independent board of regents, constitutionally protected from legislative policy-making. One of Tenney's
measures was a constitutional amendment to break this barrier and force employees of the system to take loyalty oaths. University of California President Robert Gordon Sproul, attempting to pre-empt Tenney and without consulting his faculty, recommended loyalty oaths to the regents and they approved in March, 1949. It was one of the great political mistakes of the time, and it ignited a firestorm that would leave permanent scars on the Berkeley campus.

The Regents' strongest voice was that of John Francis Neylan, personal attorney to William Randolph Hearst. Neylan organized the Regents' vote to reject a compromise in 1950, and in essence fire those who refused to sign contracts containing the basic elements of the oath. Although the Regents were eventually overturned in the courts, the episode set off a rash of oath-taking across the state. Governor Earl Warren, who had previously scoffed at the oaths as ineffective, was running for re-election in 1950 and ordered an oath for all state employees. University employees were once again thrown into the fray, but this time with thousands of other state employees. The affair turned into a farce when Neylan objected to taking the state oath, stating the Regents' independence, and threatened to take the state to court.

The crux of the matter in California, and in most other situations, was the wording and intent of a separate loyalty oath. California professors and other state employees had all taken
general oaths of allegiance. But they objected to being singled out for special consideration. Max Radin described the dilemma:

To ask any person to declare that he has not committed a specific wrongful act carries an implication that he is suspected. To suspect a man without adequate reason is intolerably offensive, and to offend gratuitously a group of scholars and scientists whose presence and whose rank and accomplishments are the only evidence the Regents can offer to prove that they are performing their Constitutional duty, is something which, one would say, could not be done by grown men who have reflected on what they are doing.  

The philosophical objections of university faculty were quickly engulfed by the fervor of the times, as California was swept by a rush to conformity, nurtured by the work of the Tenney Committee, with its search for ideas outside the mainstream, whether they be communism, socialism, sex education or civil rights. The climate could be seen throughout the nation. In many ways, Tenney mirrored the work of Washington Representative Albert Canwell.

The Canwell Committee in Washington

Washingtonians learned of plans for an investigative committee in an exclusive story by reporter Fred Niendorff in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer. The December 13, 1946 article said the effort was spearheaded by a coalition of legislative Republicans and right-wing Democrats who had been in touch with Tenney and other state investigators. A letter of encouragement from Tenney was quoted. The organizers in Washington made their
targets clear from the start: labor unions, teachers, college professors and the left wing of the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{23}

Following a bitter 1946 election in which several left-wing Democrats, including Congressman Hugh DeLacey, were defeated, the party engaged in a bitter internal fight and the right wing was not reluctant to label opponents as communists. Nor was the \textit{Post-Intelligencer}. In an article opposite that announcing the investigation plans, reporter Stub Nelson referred to DeLacey and other defeated Democrats as "leaders of the Democratic faction which has consistently followed the Communist Party line."\textsuperscript{24}

Washington had been a hotbed of the International Workers of the World movement earlier in the century, and its politics often had a radical tint; the nation watched the progress of Seattle's general strike in 1919. Its radicalism was closer to that of California than to its nearest neighbor, Oregon. Washington did not have a candidacy as radical as that of Upton Sinclair in the 1934 California gubernatorial race, but in 1932 Democrats swept Republicans from power, electing the populist Homer Bone to the U.S. Senate and Monrad Wallgren to the governorship.\textsuperscript{25}

Despite its radical period under the New Deal, Washington was quick to turn Republican after World War II and the death of Roosevelt, and Republicans won a sweeping victory in 1946. The U.S. House delegation switched from 4 to 2 Democrat to 5 to 1 Republican, and the Legislature came under GOP control Among the winners was U.S. Senator Harry Cain, elected on an anti-red campaign. Democrats were in disarray.\textsuperscript{26}
Canwell, a Republican from Spokane and a former deputy sheriff, co-sponsored the 1947 statute establishing the investigation, and was named co-chairman of the committee. The opening hearings in October, November and December, focused on labor unions. But by mid-1948 the committee had turned to the University of Washington and approached its major confrontation.

Canwell opened hearings on July 19, 1948, with the cooperation of President Raymond B. Allen and the Board of Regents. The hearings ranged from recantations of former communists, accompanied by listing of names, to the charge by a Seattle lawyer that his son was "indoctrinated" with communism while a student at the university, leading to the son's death in the Spanish Civil War.27

Washington newspapers gave prominent play to accusations, less play to rebuttals, and presented a uniformly negative picture of faculty defendants. "In those times of political stress, the press did not provide a sympathetic or even a neutral hearing for the accused faculty members," according to one study of press coverage of the hearings. Non-Seattle dailies exhibited the greatest bias, although both the *Times* and *Post-Intelligencer* were also criticized for lack of balance.28

The strong role played in the investigations by the Seattle press was emphasized by Yale law professor Vern Countryman, who scored the poor performance of both big Seattle dailies, but added that the *Times* recovered somewhat by a courageous investigation of wrongful charges against Professor Melvin Rader.
Countryman observed of the *Times* that "while its editors lacked the courage necessary to expose some of the most irregular activities of the Canwell Committee, they sought to encourage others to do so." 29

As for Hearst's *Post-Intelligencer*, Countryman singled out *P-I* reporter Niendorff's stories as going beyond the committee record to add material and to slant descriptions of witnesses. 30 Niendorff allegedly boasted to colleagues that he was the "father of the Canwell legislative committee." 31 Countryman charged Niendorff with personal involvement in the story he was covering, and the *P-I* with consistent distortion of the record. 32

Hearst's *P-I* set the climate for the red-hunt, actively played the story, and allowed or encouraged personnel to be deeply involved with the investigation. The lack of ringing editorials in the *P-I* was of little significance; the news pages did the job. The performance was a mirror-image of Hearst in California.

Canwell's committee filed with the 1949 Washington Legislature a 406-page report, culminating in a dozen recommendations. Among them were continuation of the investigation, automatic dismissal of any public employee who refused to answer committee questions, a loyalty oath by any person receiving a public pension or welfare assistance, and a probe into public school textbooks. The committee also recommended expansion of the definition of communist to include affiliation with three or more communist-front organizations, or
where an individual "undeviately adheres to the Communist Party Line. . . ."33

Canwell, like Tenney, over-reached his political ability. The Legislature rejected his proposed legislation. A 1952 effort by Canwell to use the issue of red-baiting to win election to the U.S. Congress was unsuccessful, despite strong backing from the Post-Intelligencer. But the state's political atmosphere had been tainted by the Canwell committee, and Washington did enact a version of Maryland's anti-subversion law in 1951. The Seattle political atmosphere was described by one scholar as "dominated by the work of Al Canwell. He . . . had convinced many of the presence of 'Communists in the state'."34

Canwell also planted seeds that would grow into a major dispute at the University of Washington. President Allen had warned colleagues in December 1947, and again in May 1948, that the administration would not defend communists on the faculty, and he urged the faculty to reveal any present or past connections. The faculty was deeply divided on the issue, many questioning the right of a professor to belong to the Communist Party but insisting on due process on the part of the university and legislature. The Canwell committee called eleven professors, and cited three for contempt, for refusing to answer questions. Two of the three were prosecuted, and one, Ralph Gundlach, was convicted and spent 30 days in jail.35 Gundlach and two other professors, both of whom admitted to C.P. membership (Gundlach
did not), were fired. Three professors who admitted to being former communists were retained.

The case was important in the nation's discussion of civil liberties and communism, and the popular press as well as the academic press devoted considerable space to the issue. Sidney Hook, who had been warning academics to purge communists or risk right-wing reaction, made the case that membership in the Communist Party was incompatible with academic freedom because of the party's demand for total adherence to the party line, and because of the conspiratorial nature of the party. Using this reasoning, Hook and Allen presented the Washington case as one defending--rather than invading--academic freedom.36

These views were widely accepted by education leaders and were seized upon by newspaper editors to justify the firing of professors with communist connections. The National Education Association voted to bar communists as members or teachers. University presidents James B. Conant of Harvard and Dwight D. Eisenhower of Columbia came out against communists as teachers.37 Across the nation, a line was being drawn against mixing higher education and any tinge of communism.

**Other pre-McCarthy State Investigations**

When Jack Tenney and Albert Canwell were in their heydays of red-hunting, their committees co-sponsored a "First Conference of State Legislative Committees and Representatives," in Los Angeles, September 20-21, 1948. There was no "Second
Conference," but the ability of Tenney and Canwell to draw political leaders from ten states, primarily from the West, attested to the widespread interest in their work. The conference heard from speakers from such patriotic orders as the American Legion and Catholic Daughters of America, as well as representatives of HUAC.38

Anti-subversion efforts were widespread but not uniform, and there was no apparent pattern or predictability. In most states, however, there was a strong correlation between anti-subversive activity and support for this work by major daily newspapers.

Blacklisted Hollywood writer John Henry Faulk cited as one of five important points to learn from the McCarthy era:

That 'bulwark of liberty,' our free press, behaved most slavishly in the midst of Red Scares. The media not only aided and abetted the vigilantism but also often instigated and orchestrated the witch-hunt, hiring experts on subversion to write the inflammatory pieces on the peril threatening the community.39

Faulk's comments prefaces a description of one of the many local red hunts, in which the Houston School Board yielded to the political right and fired a newly hired assistant school superintendent. The combined efforts of the Houston Chronicle and a conservative radio talk host played major roles in the firing of George Ebey, who had come to Houston from a similar post in Portland.40

A strong newspaper role was also seen in Detroit, where the fear of subversion had long influenced municipal politics. The
Detroit *News* published a front-page editorial, "Shut the Door to Commies by Changing the Charter," and accompanied it with a coupon which readers could send to the City Council, urging it to send a city loyalty board to the voters in a 1949 election. When the loyalty board passed by a margin of 3 to 1, the *News* was incensed that the margin was not higher, blaming CIO leadership.⁴¹

The Broyles Commission of the Illinois Legislature spent 1947, 1948 and 1949 looking not as much for subversion as for what Chairman Paul Broyles termed "over-liberal educators" who might indoctrinate young people in a variety of "isms."⁴² Broyles focused on Roosevelt University and the University of Chicago. The hearings featured a debate between J. B. Mathews, an ex-HUAC investigator, and Chancellor Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago, in which Hutchins effectively countered the argument that professors should be dismissed on the basis of associations rather than teaching record.⁴³ The legislature in 1949 rejected all of the commission's recommendations, including a variety of loyalty oaths, outlawing the Communist Party, and loss of tax exemption for private universities employing subversive teachers.⁴⁴ The Chicago press, including the *Tribune*, opposed Broyles' package, as did the Bar Association and several civic groups.

Ohio passed a loyalty oath for unemployment recipients in 1949, but rejected one for state employees. But Ohio burst forth
with a rash of six measures in 1953, after electing a big Republican legislative majority.\textsuperscript{45}

Maryland's Ober Committee produced in 1949 an anti-subversion statute that was soon copied by several states. Rather than outlawing the Communist Party or belief in communism, the statute defined subversion, set fines and the loss of voting rights as the penalty for those found guilty of joining a subversive group, and established loyalty oaths for public employees. The commission held no hearings, named no names, but presumed there was a threat, because the Legislature declared one existed.\textsuperscript{46} During the legislative vote, Hearst's Baltimore \textit{News Post} presented the measure as a stand for or against communism, and published a daily bold-face statement captioned "Show Your Americanism," urging readers to write legislators in support of the bill.\textsuperscript{47} Several Baltimore city employees were fired for refusing to take the oath, and the only legislator to vote against the Ober Law was defeated in 1950. The law was put to a referendum and passed 259,250 to 79,120.\textsuperscript{48}

In remote Vermont, a biologist at the University of Vermont was fired in 1953 for refusing to testify before a Senate subcommittee; he had been a communist briefly some twenty years before. The firing was supported by both Burlington newspapers, the \textit{Free Press} and the \textit{Daily News}, and the latter, owned by the reactionary New Hampshire publisher William Loeb, agitated for the dismissal.\textsuperscript{49}
Some Common Themes: Professors and Press

Surveying the field in 1951, Walter Gellhorn observed that the major targets had been in the field of education. Only eighteen states barred subversives from general governmental employment, he noted, but twenty-six barred them from teaching. In many states, curriculum was also affected. The Tenney Committee stopped California schools from teaching courses in marriage and family relations. Nebraska required a "Committee on Americanism" in every school district.50

Walter Gellhorn noted that the concentration on communists in education rested on twin propositions: "first that their political obligations include surrender of their intellectual freedom; and second, that they will abuse their academic privileges by seeking to indoctrinate their students."51 He concluded that the states had produced no concrete evidence of the first proposition, and the second had been carefully avoided by the investigators, including those at the University of Washington, where the teaching records of the accused professors had never been challenged.52

The concentration on campuses was ironic because radical political activity after World War II had virtually disappeared. Ellen Schrecker's study of the era found that "the student left was all but extinct on American campuses, its demise the product of external repression and personal prudence. Faculty radicalism, which even during the 1930s had always been much less in evidence than the student variety, simply did not exist in any organized form after the Second World War."53 Other studies of
the era agree--the period of faculty radicalism had been in the thirties, certainly not the fifties.

But the impact of the red-baiting was serious, and it was widespread. A 1951 New York Times survey of 72 institutions of higher education revealed both students and faculty had become reluctant to speak out on controversial issues, avoided political clubs or activities, and were turning inward to parochial concerns, avoiding discussion of national and international affairs.54

Lionel S. Lewis observed that universities were a particularly easy target because administrators failed to protect faculty and in many instances seemed to welcome the opportunity to discipline those of leftist persuasion. Wild charges by McCarthy and others, quoting statistics that had no basis in fact, were not effectively refuted by the academic community and as a result many Americans believed campuses were full of communists and fellow-travellers.55

This unusual situation, in which campuses were believed to be hotbeds of radicalism although they were in reality models of conformity, could only occur with the compliance of politicians and the press. For the former it was a chance to advance their fortunes, for the latter an easy source of flashy headlines. As Walter Gellhorn concluded:

The tendency to punish or banish the political irregular has been especially marked in some of the state legislative investigating committees . . . the temptation is to make charges, and headlines. That is one reason why an investigation of subversive activities almost inevitably becomes an investigation
of persons rather than deeds . . . . The truth of the matter, revealed by all the studies in this field, is that the state committees' hearings have rarely been held for the purpose of inquiring into facts at all. Their objective is to spread before the public the assertions the committee has previously resolved to make.56

In the latter goal, state as well as national investigators would require, and obtain, willing cooperation from the American news media. Red-hunting was page-one copy for a generation of American editors and reporters, some of whom were actively caught up in the chase, in addition to their role as chroniclers of the action.

**The Hearst Red-Baiters**

Particularly involved were a corps of red-baiters associated with the Hearst newspaper empire. Howard Rushmore, a former communist who worked on Hearst's New York _Journal-American_ as an expert on subversion, rushed from state to state to testify, his arrival trumpeted by the local Hearst newspaper. Rushmore was a major witness in the Seattle hearings, heavily featured in the _Post-Intelligencer_.57 J. B. Mathews, a former communist who changed sides and became a Dies Committee staffer and then assistant to W. R. Hearst, Jr. until beginning a free-lance career as expert witness on subversion, also received red carpet treatment in the Hearst press. The _P-I_ organized its own "red squad" and in 1954 proudly turned its records over to HUAC chairman Harold Velde.58
Although the Hearst empire was in decline, in 1952 it still had eighteen newspapers in twelve major American cities, with a daily circulation of 5,240,272 and a Sunday circulation of 7,475,649.59 No other major newspaper group had yet attained the power of Hearst in the nation's urban centers.

Hearst had newspapers in ten states, and in six of those states the chain was a major factor in promoting the hunt for subversives. Hearst's role was strongest in California, where the Tenney Committee found strong support from Hearst papers and Hearst attorney Francis Neyland spearheaded the Regents' loyalty oath drive. The Seattle P-I was a major player in the Washington campaigns. Hearst's two papers in Baltimore crusaded for the Ober Law, aided by the Patterson press in Washington, D.C. Hearst had large newspapers in Detroit and New York, also areas of state activity during this period. He also had the Herald-American in Chicago, and attacks on academics in Chicago were the keystone of the Broyles Committee.

W. R. Hearst, Jr. maintained control over his newspapers' editorial policy, unlike most of the chain owners of the time—including S. I. Newhouse in Portland—who allowed local editorial autonomy in exchange for maximum profitability. James Aronson, commenting on Hearst's admission of editorial control, observed, "In a monotonous sea of group hypocrisy, this chip-off-the-old-block candor was almost refreshing."60

Yet Hearst was only one among many publishers who rode the red bandwagon in the post-war period. Without exception, in
states where the worst excesses were recorded, major newspapers led the cheering sections. There were always courageous exceptions, of course--in California the San Francisco *Chronicle* led this group, in Illinois the Chicago *Daily News* was a leader--but newspapers helped build the climate that allowed the investigative committees to flourish.

What of the states where efforts failed to gain a foothold? There were interesting exceptions. Wisconsin, home of Joe McCarthy, did not engage in "little McCarthyism." Little activity was noted in such urban states as Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Massachusetts. On the Pacific Coast, sandwiched between hotbeds Washington and California, Oregon moved through the period without adopting any anti-subversion legislation, despite several proposals.

Less attention has been paid to states that did not establish legislative investigations patterned on the Tenney or Canwell models, perhaps on the theory that they escaped the worst excesses of McCarthyism. Yet the assault on individual liberties was often carried out in other venues, including the press.

Oregon's experience with incursions on civil liberties during this period began with the internment of Japanese Americans in 1942, continued with their return in 1945, and then moved into the anti-communist arena as early as 1949, continuing in that mode until the mid-fifties. In this arena, the press played an important role, as will become apparent in the following chapters.
Notes to Chapter 3


2David Halberstam, *The Fifties* (New York: Villard Books, 1993), 49. For purposes of this study, McCarthyism is defined as a public accusation of disloyalty or subversion, often based on claims unsupported by proof and reported by hearsay; the extensive use of guilt by association; the abuse of investigative power by bullying, loaded questions, slanted evidence and other unfair techniques; and the persistent search for disloyalty or subversion among political opponents. This definition closely follows that of *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language* (New York: Random House, 1966): 887.


13A complete listing of these statutes is in Appendix A of *The States and Subversion*, ed. Gellhorn, 393-440.


15Barrett, Jr., *The Tenney Committee*, 45.
16 Quoted in Barrett, Jr., *The Tenney Committee*, 281.

17 Hearst at that time published the San Francisco *Examiner*, Los Angeles *Examiner*, San Francisco *Call-Bulletin*, Los Angeles *Herald-Express*, and Oakland *Post-Enquirer*, with combined daily circulation of over 1.2 million and Sunday circulation in excess of that figure.


22 Radin, "The Loyalty Oath at the University of California:" 279.


30Ibid, 140.

31Ibid, 293.

32Ibid, 394-96.


38 In addition to the host states, representatives were from New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Iowa, Illinois, Georgia and Alabama. A report of the convention is in California Legislature, *Sixth Report of the Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities*, 1949.


40 Ibid, 189-221.


44 Ibid, 62.


50 *The States and Subversion*, ed. Gellhorn, 373-75.

51 Ibid, 377.

52 Ibid, 379.

53 Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*, 93.


56 *The States and Subversion*, ed. Gellhorn, 385-87.


Chapter 4

Civil Liberties Suspended: World War II in Oregon

World War II was a watershed in development of the West Coast, but it was also a time when residents of the area believed they were in mortal danger. The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, subsequent American setbacks in the Pacific, rumors of imminent Japanese invasion and deep-rooted nativistic fear and resentment of Asian immigrants combined to create a climate of hostility toward the region's Japanese Americans.

For regional newspapers, it was a test of their willingness to protect an unpopular minority against the emotional demands of a vocal segment of their readership. At first protective of the rights of Japanese Americans, Oregon editors began shifting their views as authorities ordered Japanese aliens removed from strategic areas in January 1942. By the time of President Roosevelt's internment order in February 1942 editors had joined the clamor against Japanese Americans. Early support for civil liberties evaporated under the dual pressure of a governmental order and the loud voices of superpatriots and nativists.

The pattern was not without precedent. If the first casualty of war is truth, often the next casualty is the rights of unpopular minorities. Americans in World War I turned on neighbors of German descent, and for good measure added socialists, radical unionists and others outside the mainstream. Oregon's editors of
1941 had come of age during World War I and had experienced the super-patriotism that marked that war, with its incursions on the civil liberties of German Americans. Had the target of American wrath in 1941 been German Americans, editors might have rallied to their defense or at least resisted the call to join the mob.

But World War II, at least on the West Coast, provided an easier target, one that combined wartime fears with a long history of racism and nativism. That target was the Japanese American community, virtually non-existent in Oregon at the turn of the century (the 1890 census reported only 25 Japanese in Oregon), but by 1940 numbering about 4,000. Japanese immigrants were most prominent in eastern Multnomah County and the Hood River Valley, and in both locations developed successful fruit and vegetable farms. But several Oregon counties had no Japanese aliens or citizens in the 1940 census.

Despite their success in establishing farms, small businesses and professional lives, the Japanese Americans of Oregon and other West Coast states were not fully accepted by the Caucasian majority. The region had a history of hostility and even violence against Asians, who had been encouraged to immigrate to provide labor for development of the railroad and for mining and other labor-intensive occupations.
Nativism: A Pacific Coast Tradition

Ben Holladay, one of the railroad barons of the day, imported Chinese labor in 1870 to help construct his Oregon & California Railroad, contracting with one Wa Kee to bring in Chinese laborers in shipload lots. Immediately, the practice became a political issue in the 1870 Oregon gubernatorial campaign and in 1873 prompted editorials in the Catholic Sentinel. The Sentinel circulated widely among Irish immigrants, who stood to lose the most in the way of employment if the Chinese immigration continued. Ironically, a half-century later, it would be Catholics who would suffer from nativism; but in 1873, Sentinel editorials were largely responsible for the formation of the blatantly anti-Chinese People's Alliance, which agitated with some success until a fire of incendiary origin was widely blamed on the Alliance, causing it to disband.²

Oregon nativists soon divided their attention between Chinese and "papists," causing the Sentinel to abandon the anti-Chinese cause to defend its Irish readers. There was sufficient animosity to go around, and the 1879 Oregon Methodist Conference adopted a resolution reflecting the prevailing sentiment. It read in part: "We do not encourage Chinese immigration, but we think it less a source of danger than the papal superstition of Europe . . ."³

By the 1880s, Oregon was the scene of violence against Chinese, spurred in part by strong anti-Chinese editorials in two
Portland dailies, the News and the Standard. The Oregonian opposed the anti-Chinese movement, and was boycotted by agitators. In 1886, mobs drove Chinese woodcutters from their jobs in the Portland area, and agitators dynamited several buildings used by Chinese. The Chinese, in 1885 approximately one-fourth of Portland's residents, were not driven from the city, but their ranks began dropping rapidly during this period.

Discrimination against Chinese was institutionalized with the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which was renewed in 1892, made permanent in 1902 and not repealed until 1943, when the U. S. was allied with China in World War II.

Japanese immigration was not a factor prior to 1890; that year's federal census revealed only 2,039 Japanese immigrants and native-born citizens of Japanese ancestry. But in the next 20 years, 127,000 Japanese entered the United States.

Japanese immigrants followed the Chinese pattern and concentrated in California, but significant populations developed in Oregon and Washington. By the 1920 census, California counted 70,196 residents of Japanese ancestry; Oregon had 4,022 and Washington had 17,134. Despite their fast-growing reputation as superb fruit and vegetable farmers, most actually lived in cities. In Oregon, 1,675 or 42 percent, lived within the Portland city limits. In Washington, 7,742 or 45 percent, lived within the Seattle city limits. The pattern was also true in California.
In all three states, immigrants established their own communities, with the male immigrants often sending for "picture brides" from their native land. The issei, or first generation, were isolated from the mainstream society in large part because of language barriers. But the spectre of nativism and racial prejudice that had plagued the Chinese also accompanied Japanese settlement.

The first anti-Japanese agitation may have been in 1888 in San Francisco, following hard on the heels of anti-Chinese movements. That first effort, and several to follow in the remainder of the nineteenth century, involved elements of organized labor. By the turn of the century, politicians had taken up the cry in California and the 1905 Legislature approved a resolution asking Congress to limit further immigration of Japanese. Anti-Japanese sentiment was becoming increasingly organized.

Newspapers—in particular the Hearst chain—played a part in this agitation. Notable in its excess was Hearst's San Francisco Examiner, which in 1906 issued the first of a series of fantasy reports that would run intermittently for months. The headline on the opening item, December 20:

JAPAN SOUNDS OUR COASTS
Brown Men Have
Maps and Could
Land Easily

What followed included a two-part Sunday supplement written by Alabama Congressman Richmond Pearson, in which an invasion
of the Japanese "yellow peril" was fantasized; and another supplement written by Homer Lea, a military adviser to Sun Yat Sen, predicting a Japanese invasion of the West Coast. Hearst was only the most prominent of the anti-Japanese press leaders; V. S. McClatchy, former publisher of the Sacramento Bee, was engaged nearly fulltime in nativist causes, focusing on Asian immigration. Although the same fervor was not present among Oregon publishers, California papers were widely read in Oregon, and the views of Hearst were well known nationwide.

California passed its first anti-Japanese law in 1913, barring aliens who were not eligible for citizenship (Asians) from owning land. The law was easily circumvented, however, often by placing land title in the name of an American-born child, or nisei, who by virtue of birth became an American citizen.

As Japanese continued to expand land holdings and compete with Caucasian farmers, California nativists passed an initiative in 1920 in an attempt to further tighten and enforce the anti-alien laws. Governor William D. Stephens, in a long letter to Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, cited the increases in Japanese production of vegetables, predicting a coming Japanese control of key products. But, Stephens continued, the threat was not limited to farm production, it was against the entire occidental civilization of the state:

California harbors no animosity against the Japanese people or their nation. California, however, does not wish the Japanese people to settle within her borders and to develop a Japanese population within
her midst. California views with alarm the rapid growth of these people within the last decade in population as well as in land control and foresees in the not distant future the gravest menace of serious conflict if this development is not immediately and effectively checked. Without disparaging these people of just sensibilities, we can not look for intermarriage or that social inter-relationship which must exist between the citizenry of a contented community.

It may be an exquisite refinement, but we can not feel contented at our children inbibing their first rudiments of education from the lips of the public school teacher in classrooms crowded with other children of a different race.10

Stephens' sentiments were reflective of growing nativist sentiment, not limited to California but in play all along the Pacific Coast. Oregon and Washington engaged in similar anti-Japanese agitation, just as they had earlier agitated against the Chinese.

**Anti-Japanese Roots in Oregon**

In an attempt to limit the Japanese community's ability to expand farming operations, the Oregon Legislature as early as 1917 began considering anti-Japanese legislation modeled on California's 1913 anti-alien law. The 1923 Oregon Legislature, heavily influenced by the Ku Klux Klan, passed a measure preventing Japanese aliens from owning land. The measure attracted unanimous support in the Senate, and only one negative vote in the House. Oregon had joined California in the effort to maintain Japanese immigrants' second-class status.

Typically, Oregon's anti-Japanese encounters were less hostile than those in California, but Stefan Tanaka cites six
noteworthy racial events involving Asian immigrants between 1886 and 1925, the first two against Chinese, the others against Japanese. The 1925 incident involved a large mill at Toledo; owner C. D. Johnson brought thirty-five Japanese from Portland on a Friday, and by Sunday a mob had driven them from the community. The local weekly newspaper, the Lincoln County Leader, was strongly anti-Japanese, as were most of the community's elected leaders. While none of the Japanese were injured, the situation bordered on a race riot.

The Japanese victims of the Toledo incident were never interviewed by state investigators, who reported to a governor, Walter Pierce, who had been elected in 1922 with backing from the Ku Klux Klan. Nothing came of the investigation. Governor Pierce, although not a KKK member, was in tune with its nativist views and, in the words of his biographer, "In modern terms, Pierce was a racist and remained so throughout his life." Pierce frequently used the term "yellow peril" to refer to Asians, and throughout his long political career was a foe of the Japanese, showing up at rallies after World War II called to prevent return of the interned Japanese Americans.

As noted in Chapter 2, the Klan rose quickly to power on the strength of nativist feelings, directed primarily against Catholics but also against the state's Japanese Americans. The Klan played a strong role in adoption of the 1923 anti-alien land law and in an accompanying resolution asking Congress to impose added restrictions on Japanese immigration. Another drastic measure,
requiring all foreign owners of businesses to post a notice of their nationality, failed narrowly in the Senate after passing the House.\textsuperscript{16}

Anti-immigrant legislation meant two classes of Japanese Americans. The first generation, the issei, were barred from becoming citizens and could not legally own land; the second generation, the nisei, by virtue of birth in the United States were citizens and could own land. The constitutional standing afforded citizens is considerably greater than that afforded aliens, but little practical distinction was made between the two classes, as all those of Japanese heritage were singled out for suspicion in the wake of Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{17}

Isolation of the Japanese brought suspicion and fear. They were criticized for working too hard to secure a life for their families, yet censured for not being sufficiently "American."

Issues concerning the Japanese American community were discussed in Oregon newspapers in the period between the wars, but invariably in the abstract, as few Japanese spoke fluent English and the community had no organized voice with which to enter protests. The Japanese-American Citizens' League (JACL) did not emerge in Oregon until the thirties; formed in 1930, the JACL had a Portland chapter which sent five delegates to the inaugural convention.\textsuperscript{18}

Oregon editors knew few Japanese Americans personally; they were simply outside the circles in which editors moved at the time. In the tightly knit editorial community of 1941, there
were few peers to look to for guidance in dealing with this racial minority, for—with the singular exception of weekly editor Hugh Ball of Hood River—Oregon editors were largely ignorant of the Japanese American community.¹⁹

Early editorial support for the rights of Japanese Americans, particularly the nisei, quickly yielded to public opinion and governmental authority. Pearl Harbor rocked the Pacific Coast to its roots, and there was genuine fear on the part of people of all walks of life. Invasion of the U.S. mainland, unthinkable in the previous war, was suddenly discussed in serious tones and a paranoid public searched for enemies or their sympathizers.

**Outbreak of war, reaction to internment**

When war broke out in 1941, newspapers turned to JACL leaders for reaction. *The Oregonian* printed a statement by JACL leader Howard Nomura, pleading for understanding:

> This is something we hoped and prayed would never happen. As far as the Nisei is concerned, we know our lot is going to be a tough one. We can only rely on the fairness of Caucasian Americans to help us through. We're hoping they will see our status. At best our position is not good—we look like Japanese and nothing can be done about it. We only ask for the chance to show we are good Americans.²⁰

In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, Nomura's plea seemed to have some effect. Newspapers and some political leaders seemed willing to differentiate between Japanese aliens
and citizens, and even grant a modicum of protection to aliens. Governor Charles A. Sprague assured Oregonians that Japanese Americans were loyal and deserving of protection, and as late as January 24 sought to assure Japanese of their place in the community, while warning that "any evidence of disloyalty on the part of any Japanese American citizens will invite reprisals on the whole group." Sprague in December had warned Oregonians not to retaliate against Japanese Americans in their midst, and his words drew praise from *The Oregonian*. Editors noted instances of social ostracism and economic boycott and cited Sprague in calling for fair play:

To those who have practiced such prejudice, The Oregonian would suggest greater familiarity with the appeal of Governor Sprague for simple fairness. . . . Something more intelligent is expected of white Americans than a reversal to that type we have long outgrown. Unreasoning prejudice and injustice are instruments of the enemy, not of ours.

But as the war deepened and American forces in the Pacific suffered a series of major losses, anti-Japanese forces stepped up their attacks and began calling for internment of all residents of Japanese heritage who lived on the West Coast. Newspapers joined in the clamor, and abandoned the civil liberties of Japanese Americans.

Oregon editors, caught up in the anti-Japanese fervor following Pearl Harbor and the internment order of President Roosevelt, proved to be poor guardians of civil liberties in 1942, as Oregonians of Japanese ancestry were shipped off to
internment camps. Internment went without question in the editorial columns, and newspapers printed letters from angry readers demanding severe treatment of Japanese, regardless of citizenship. Lloyd Chiasson's study of twenty-seven West Coast newspapers, including seven in Oregon, revealed that only four had written an editorial in 1941-42 supporting the rights of the affected Japanese Americans; all appeared prior to the February 19 issuance of Executive Order 9066, authorizing internment. After the order, fifteen of twenty-seven papers supported and none opposed the order; editorial support for the rights of the Japanese community vanished. 23

Prior to the internment order, Oregon newspapers had made an effort to stem the anti-Japanese feelings, both editorially and in the news columns. The Oregonian, in editorials appearing on two consecutive days in December, defended the rights of the American-born, or nisei, noting that they "are possessed of every right, privilege, and aspiration of other Americans." 24

The Oregon Journal also pleaded for toleration and likened the case of Japanese Americans to that of German Americans in World War I who served in the U. S. Army. "America needs every loyal citizen regardless of color," the Journal concluded, "America needs in every citizen the self-control, the breadth, the justice, the service and the spirit that make a nation impregnable." In the Capital-Journal, George Putnam noted that the F.B.I. was taking care of dangerous aliens, and observed that it was tragic that "loyal American citizens of Japanese parentage" were placed
under "unjust suspicion." No editorial hostile to Japanese Americans, alien or citizen, appeared in Oregon newspapers until February.

Public opinion was shifting, however, and a few angry letters appeared on newspaper editorial pages. Some indication of the change in attitude may be seen in the reaction to an article in the Sunday magazine section of The Oregonian, which on January 4, 1942, suggested that the wave of anti-Japanese hysteria had not begun, at least in Portland. Reporter Herbert Lundy, after interviewing Japanese American leaders, concluded:

The loyal Japanese-Americans—and they must be considered loyal until proved otherwise—find much to encourage them.

Hardly a Japanese business or professional man in Portland but received at least a half-dozen telephone calls from Caucasian friends expressing sympathy and confidence on that black Sunday of December 7, 1941, when radio and press were revealing the treachery at Pearl Harbor.

Leading the crusade for tolerance have been the teachers in Portland schools and there has been no reported instance of intolerant treatment of a Japanese child—even by unthinking classmates.

The Japanese race in Oregon awaits uncomfortably on a munitions dump of public opinion, fully aware that wars engender blind and cruel hatred, yet hopeful that the spark which may ignite the explosive will not be fanned either by their own people or their Caucasian neighbors in this land of democracy.

Some of the "munitions dump of public opinion" exploded on Lundy, as letter-writers called for his firing, urged imprisonment of all Japanese, and suggested that "cold steel" was the solution to
the Japanese situation.\textsuperscript{27} Obviously, public opinion was already turning, and reader reaction to Lundy's article was typical of a rising tide of intolerance as the new year brought more setbacks for American forces in Asia. An \textit{Oregonian} poll a month later, but before Roosevelt's internment order, showed that 80 percent favored evacuation of all aliens and 36 percent favored evacuating citizens of Japanese ancestry.\textsuperscript{28}

The Portland City Council in January revoked business licenses of Japanese nationals, and the \textit{Journal} began its shift toward lumping all Oregonians of Japanese ancestry into a common lot. "There is no way to draw a line clearly enough to set saboteurs and fifth columnists on one side and on the other those who unwillingly and involuntarily are grouped among alien enemies," the \textit{Journal} intoned, adding that the actions must be carried out "with tolerance and understanding. . ."\textsuperscript{29}

The term "fifth column" began showing up with regularity in editorials supporting internment or other anti-Japanese measures, and editors referred to betrayal in Hawaii at the time of Pearl Harbor. Internment was supported in January or February by the \textit{Oregon Journal, Capital Journal, Klamath Falls Herald, Astorian-Budget and Gazette-Times}; in March the Coos Bay \textit{Times} supported internment.\textsuperscript{30} Most editorials defended the action as necessary because of the potential danger. Only the \textit{Gazette-Times} resorted to racist language and stereotyping, in three editorials that could at best be termed hysterical, one noting that, "If Hitler can get away with several million aliens by keeping
them in concentration camps, we ought to be able to have comparatively few Japanese here in the same way."31 Ironically, Benton County (Corvallis) had no residents of Japanese ancestry in the 1940 census.

*The Oregonian* came out for evacuation on February 28, supporting the Roosevelt order and citing protection of Japanese Americans from possible race riots.32 Palmer Hoyt was a featured witness at Portland hearings that day of a House committee headed by Representative John Tolan of California. *The Oregonian*'s editorial was entered into the committee record.33 The House committee also heard from Portland Mayor Earl Riley and former Mayor Joseph Carson, both in favor of internment. Notably missing was Governor Sprague, nor was a spokesman for the governor present, in sharp contrast to the appearance of the governors of California and Washington at other Tolan Committee hearings. The Tolan Committee issued a report that failed to challenge the internment, and supported separate treatment of Americans of Japanese ancestry, as contrasted to those of Italian or German heritage.34

The *Oregon Journal* also supported the evacuation and called for speedy implementation.35 *The Oregon Statesman* editorialized that "their removal is a matter of military necessity and involves only some theoretical injustice to those who are loyal to the United States but no practical injustice. They will be better off."36 Although Governor Sprague left his editorial duties to others when he left the *Statesman* in January 1941 to assume the
governorship, the editorial approximated his views on evacuation as implementation of the presidential order neared.

The Statesman's comment appeared to be the view of most Oregon editors: military necessity should prevail, even in the absence of any proven cases of disloyalty; violations of human rights were of secondary importance, if considered at all; and Japanese Americans might enjoy greater physical safety if removed from an emotional citizenry. As soon as the internment order was issued, Oregon editors abandoned whatever support they had previously extended to Japanese Americans and joined in the clamor for immediate evacuation. There was support for the Japanese Americans from the American Civil Liberties Union and from a handful of church leaders in Portland. But for most, the argument of military necessity was sufficient to override any lingering concerns for civil liberties.

In time of war, orders issued on the rationale of military necessity are difficult for editors to challenge. Editors accustomed to questioning political decisions operate in a different arena when dealing with military authority, and Oregon editors accepted without question the claims of military necessity, including two official reports that claimed widespread espionage and sabotage in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor. As the Army's own historians later declared, these claims were simply false, as was the military necessity of evacuation of over 100,000 Japanese Americans. The internment, the historians found, was necessitated by popular and
Congressional agitation for removal, rather than military necessity.37

Oregon editors reacted in much the same manner as editors in California. Initially supportive, they had moved steadily away from that position by the time Roosevelt issued his internment order. Theories to explain this behavior vary widely. Okihiro and Sly adopt a Marxist framework of an elitist government conceiving the evacuation plan and instigating a series of events to sway public opinion and press treatment of the issue. Chiasson attributes the swing to press abdication of its "watchdog" role, yielding instead to government assertions of military necessity. Daniels alluded to the influence of a Walter Lippmann column, but noted that he was, "in this instance, merely an extension of the mass West Coast mind." The Army's official historians, while acknowledging that no military reason existed for the internment, also argue that public pressure was probably the largest single reason for internment. Grodzins cites pressure groups as instrumental in the change of attitude toward the Japanese, and certainly editors were susceptible to pressure groups.38

By January, virulent voices began to appear in some regional media. Radio commentator John B. Hughes began a month-long series from Los Angeles, aired over the Mutual network, attacking ethnic Japanese and suggesting their participation in a master war plan; Hearst columnist Henry McLemore unleashed a vicious diatribe calling the the
government to "Herd 'em up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside room in the badlands...." Several strongly anti-Japanese syndicated columns had already appeared in the *Oregon Journal*, under the bylines of Westbrook Pegler and Peter Edson, the later calling for concentration camps as early as December 30.40

Editors essentially shared the view of the region's politicians, most of whom had climbed on the anti-Japanese bandwagon as soon as the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor. The West Coast delegation in Congress urged evacuation of all people of Japanese ancestry, and their view was well known to the President.41 Sprague was the last of the region's governors to abandon the Japanese Americans, and the least vocal in calling for internment, but by February he had also acceded to demands for evacuation.

Oregon was on the Pacific front line, but removed from the nation's capital. Frightened by the war's progress and concerned that it might soon reach Oregon's shore, editors and officials alike responded to authority. Always respectful and deferential to established authority, editors were particularly vulnerable during this time of national crisis and regional fear.

**Editor as Governor: The Case of Charles A. Sprague**

No Oregonian was under as much pressure in the days following Pearl Harbor as Governor Charles A. Sprague. Nearing a campaign for re-election, Sprague had to balance the competing demands of wartime emergency and federal orders with his own
political needs and his natural sympathy for civil liberties. It was, he would later tell colleagues, the most difficult time of his career.

In the wake of Pearl Harbor, Sprague's first reaction was to differentiate between Japanese aliens and the second-generation Japanese American citizens. On December 8, he ordered aliens to remain in their homes awaiting further orders. He apparently hoped, however, that citizens of Japanese ancestry would be undisturbed. In telegrams to Portland Mayor Earl Riley and Multnomah County Sheriff Martin Pratt, Sprague noted:

Have had some complaints that Japanese-American citizens were being interfered with in employment at lumber mills. Kindly request your deputies to protect citizens from molestation unless guilty of acts of disloyalty. Enemy aliens should remain at home pending further federal instructions.42

Sprague took the position that citizens of Japanese heritage had constitutional protection, and so advised correspondents who urged him to support internment.43 The Portland chapter of the JACL held its first meeting since Pearl Harbor on January 23, and Sprague sent a message warning that "any evidence of disloyalty on the part of any Japanese-American citizens will invite reprisals on the whole group," but adding, "Let us try our utmost to preserve goodwill and unity among all Americans, regardless of race or creed."44

In the next three weeks, several events may have helped to change Sprague's views. Secretary of State Earl Snell on February 1 announced his candidacy for the Republican nomination for governor, a candidacy rumored for several months; federal orders
excluded Japanese aliens from several key defense areas; and a public opinion poll found Oregonians supported removal of aliens. In a February 17 telegram to Attorney General Francis Biddle, Sprague turned to a harder position, writing:

I am convinced that our people on this coast demand more thorough action for protection against possible alien activity particularly by Japanese residing on coast. I do not believe measures now being taken are adequate and urge further and prompt action to remove this menace and recommend internment. We want no repetition of Honolulu experience here. Recommend your agents confer with military and police authorities to plan positive protection for Americans, with decent treatment of Japanese.\textsuperscript{45}

The telegram did not mention Japanese American citizens, who had earlier been seen by Sprague as constitutionally protected; but the language was sufficiently vague as to allow a variety of interpretations. It is interesting to note Sprague's reference to the "Honolulu experience," for it may be an indication of the influence of a well-publicized report to the President by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, who visited Hawaii shortly after Pearl Harbor and condemned Hawaiians of Japanese ancestry as "fifth columnists," despite the lack of any hard evidence to support the charge.\textsuperscript{46} Knox was also a newspaper publisher, and as a journalist may have had greater credibility with Sprague than military or bureaucratic sources. It is more likely, however, that Sprague was influenced by a February 12 column by Walter Lippmann, entitled "The Fifth Column on the Coast," in which Lippmann argued for mass removal of Japanese from the coastal
zone. No journalist was as widely respected within the profession, and Sprague had been a reader of Lippmann since the latter was an editor of The New Republic two decades previously.

For Sprague, the die was cast with the Biddle telegram. In the days following, he received numerous letters congratulating him on his stand, and replied to these letters with a copy of his telegram to Biddle. On February 19, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066, giving the War Department authority to remove Japanese aliens and Japanese American citizens from designated military areas. On March 3, evacuation was announced.

After issuance of the presidential order, Sprague committed Oregon to the program and issued a statement of support. In later years he confided to associates that he regretted this decision more than any other of his career, but he felt it was necessary in order to avoid a federal takeover of the state government. This may be a rationalization in hindsight, but the Japanese American internment ordeal clearly had an effect on Sprague, one that would shape his approach to civil liberties issues ahead.48

The Hostile Homecoming

Although Sprague had not written either of the two Statesman editorials supporting internment in 1942 (he withdrew from active management of the newspaper's editorial policies during his governorship), he was clearly the author of two editorials in 1944 and 1945 when the Statesman reversed its
policy and opposed the internment, primarily on constitutional grounds. The *Statesman* and the Bend *Bulletin* were two of six papers (and the only Oregon papers) in Chiasson’s study to make such a reversal; among the others was the San Francisco *Chronicle.*

The constitutional grounds had been present in 1942 as well in 1944, but what had changed in the interim was the sense of present danger. The West Coast after Pearl Harbor was awash with rumors of Japanese invasion plans. Politicians spoke out of genuine concern as well as political expediency. Newspaper editors, who during the war were unusually receptive to official requests, went along with internment.

Two years later, victory appeared certain, Japanese invasion was not possible, the feats of Japanese American soldiers had been publicized, and there was the beginning of a civil liberties effort to redress the wrongs of internment. That Sprague should be one of those to come to the side of the internees was not surprising, for his position in 1942 had been one of official responsibility; in 1944 he was once again an editor.

Following the war, Sprague led efforts to peacefully bring Japanese Americans back into the communities they had left. For Sprague, a man of deeply held Christian values, it may have been a way to atone for a decision he deeply regretted, the acceptance of internment in 1942. James Pursinger, whose 1961 study of Oregon’s experience with internment is the most
comprehensive examination of Sprague's role in this episode, commented:

Charles Sprague, governor during the relocation process, did nothing whatever to help the Japanese but assuredly did nothing directly to harm them. . . . If the governor sinned in not affording the protection to life and property for all the residents of the state, the sin was one of omission most likely stemming from his own incertitude in handling the emotionally charged pressure groups whose noise was mistaken for numbers . . . . (Sprague) was one of the most tireless workers in preparing Oregonians for welcoming the return of their evacuated fellow citizens. His forthright editorials in his influential Oregon Statesman successfully challenging Oregon's congressional delegation were couched in the language of a great humanitarian. Septuagenarian Sprague remarked to the author that the evacuation was the only event of his administration that he regretted, and that regret was very deep. When the Japanese American Citizens League made him an honorary member of that organization in 1947, the governor was cited for his great skill in smoothing the return of the frightened evacuees in 1945.52

The heart of opposition in Oregon was the lower Columbia River Gorge, with the Hood River Valley at the eastern end and the Gresham area at the western end. In this narrow corridor of less than 50 miles lived most of the farm-based Japanese Americans. Many had been able to buy land, placing it in the names of nisei children, and develop the land into profitable orchards and vegetable farms. When war came, the land was often leased at forced rates well below market, and the evacuees were most anxious to return and claim the land. Lease-holders,
including county governments in some cases, were less anxious to relinquish the profitable arrangements.

Predictably, the most serious cases of civil liberties' violations came in Hood River and Gresham. Problems in both areas began in late 1944, as federal authorities announced plans to allow internees to return to their homes. Although the war had turned and threats of Japanese victory were ended, tales of Japanese atrocities accompanied the liberation of Pacific islands and prison camps, fueling the anti-Japanese sentiments already rife in the farming communities. Congress frequently joined in the pressure to prevent return of the Japanese, and Oregon Senator Rufus Holman was among the most rabid of the Japanese-baiters. The Hood River case would attract national attention, and call upon Oregon editors to face a serious challenge to the constitutional rights of Japanese Americans. Their response was mixed.

**Hood River Defines Americanism**

Hood River County as World War II opened had one of the largest concentrations of Japanese in Oregon, 462 people or 4 percent of all residents. Many of the Japanese were becoming successful, owning land and developing orchards and farms; a few were in business and established in the community's civic structure. But racism was also deeply rooted in the area, and most of the Japanese lived primarily within their own community, conscious of barriers based on race. Internment meant for most
either sale of land for a fraction of its value or leasing to white
tenants who failed to care for it as well as the Japanese owners.\textsuperscript{54}

Only half of the Japanese returned to Hood River County
after internment, and they faced the most bitter reaction of any
Oregon area. Threats were economic and often physical.

Even before the Japanese began returning from the camps,
Hood River achieved national notoriety following a November 29,
1944, vote of the American Legion post to remove the names of
sixteen nisei from a public honor roll of local servicemen. The
action was carried by Associated Press on December 3 and printed
in papers across the nation.

The Hood River Legion poured more fuel on the flames at a
December 4 meeting of Legionnaires and others, to discuss
methods of forcing Japanese from the community. According to
the Hood River News, the meeting was to discuss:

plans for the total elimination of all alien Japanese and
their sons and daughters of American citizenship from
the Hood River area and to formulate plans for the
'fair disposal' of property held by these people."... If
there were any present who disapproved of the
resolutions submitted by the Legion, they held their
peace.\textsuperscript{55}

Nationally, the Hood River controversy was covered in the
major newspapers and news magazines, and the New York Times
in a December 19 editorial called upon the Legion to apologize to
the nisei veterans.\textsuperscript{56} The Times actually covered the issue in its
news columns more extensively than did some Oregon dailies,
which downplayed the issue. The Times on December 31 carried
a United Press dispatch, detailing angry reaction from American soldiers, particularly those who had fought with nisei regiments in Italy and Germany.57

The Hood River Legion was not without supporters in the Oregon press. The Albany Democrat-Herald diminished the value of nisei combat veterans by noting that they had not served against Japanese troops, then went on to sympathize with the Legion.58 In a second editorial, the Democrat-Herald said those who would not become "Americanized" should be deported, cited concerns that the Japanese would "out-breed" others, and that this alleged fertility was part of a Japanese plot.59 The Pendleton East-Oregonian also called attention to these allegations, charging that "some calculators say that if they continue to multiply, and this relates to those who are already here, the Japanese population will in time outnumber the white population, on the Pacific coast."60 The fear of "fast-breeding" immigrants has always been an element in nativistic beliefs, and showed up both in Hood River and at Gresham, used by those who opposed return of the Japanese.

Albany and Pendleton editorials were in the minority, however, as most Oregon editors criticized the Legion's removal of names. Editorials opposing the action came from the Capital-Journal, The Oregonian, Oregon Statesman, Medford Mail-Tribune, and the Corvallis Gazette-Times. Typical was the statement of Robert Ruhl at Medford, "the Hood River action is not right, is not American, is opposed to every principle of fair play and tolerance
for which the democracies of the world stand and are now fighting."\textsuperscript{61}

Publicity at the national level was finally brought to bear on the Hood River post. The national organization, despite its usual policy of local autonomy, first requested and then ordered restoration of the names. After the Hood River post on March 7 yielded to pressure from national and state headquarters, several editors praised the Legion for returning the nisei names (only fifteen were returned; one soldier had been dishonorably discharged).

Praise for the Legion's restoration of the names came from *The Oregonian, Capital-Journal, Astorian-Budget*, Eugene Register-Guard, *Oregon Journal* and Corvallis Gazette-Times. The nature of most editorials was commendatory, but also critical of the petulant tone of the Legion statement, which said the post yielded only because of national headquarters pressure.

Editors voiced concern about the nature of the Hood River Legion's comments, while praising the action. *The Oregonian* concluded: "One's name on the roll of honor would mean mockery were one forbidden to come back to the home valley, whether prohibited by statute or by strong prejudice."\textsuperscript{62} Some editorials mentioned testimony of soldiers or war correspondents who had witnessed the nisei soldiers' valor. No editorials supported the Legion's continued opposition to return of the Japanese.

In Hood River, weekly editor Hugh Ball took a cautious position in his editorials, never openly condemning the Legion,
but opening his letters columns to a wide variety of writers, nearly all of whom opposed the Legion, some in very heated terms. Ball also reprinted an editorial from the Detroit *Free Press* and quoted the San Francisco *Chronicle*, both highly critical of the Legion's action. The only Oregon editorial quoted by Ball was from The Dalles *Chronicle*; the neighboring daily termed the Legion action "narrow racial prejudice," and compared it to Hitlerism. Ball also ran at least two letters from Hood River men in the armed forces who opposed the Legion. Without taking a direct editorial stand, Ball helped the cause of the returnees in his selection of letters and reprints, with the preponderance of both running against sentiment in the Hood River community.

Almost unnoticed by the daily press, however, was the campaign of hatred and villification conducted in early 1945 by Kent Shoemaker, a Hood River World War I veteran. Shoemaker took out six full-page advertisements in the Hood River *News* from January 26 to March 23, identifying Japanese American property owners and urging them to sell their land. The ads were signed by dozens of people and carried the headline, "No Japs Wanted in Hood River." Shoemaker's ads inflamed the Hood River Valley, but failed to attract editorial comments outside the community.

The Legion at this time was perhaps the state's strongest political force, and criticism of the organization was a liability for any candidate for public office, and potentially for editors as well. Governors Earl Snell and Douglas McKay were particularly active
in the Legion during this period, as were many state legislators. Senator Guy Cordon (R-Ore) was a former state commander, and Representative Walter Norblad (R-Ore) wrote a monthly column for the Legion newspaper.

Organized Opposition at Gresham

Evacuated residents of the Pacific Coast began preparing to return to their homes and farms after a December 19, 1944, Army order ending the exclusion of Japanese from the Pacific Coast. Referring to the Army's reversal of policy, Sprague in the Statesman urged his successor as Oregon governor, Earl Snell, to join California's Governor Earl Warren in calling for citizens to recognize the rights of the returnees and order officers of the law to prevent "intemperate action."64 Two days later, Sprague editorially predicted that claims would eventually be filed against the federal government, adding that "in the end congress may appoint some agency to examine such claims for damage, and provide funds to pay the approved claims."65 It would take a third of a century for the payments to be approved.

Sprague in his December 22 editorial appealed to citizens to "absorb into community life those who do return." But in many cases, although the threat of Japanese invasion was gone and the bravery of Japanese American troops had been widely heralded, the returnees were already finding bitter opposition.

In Gresham, Oregon Anti-Japanese Inc. was organized, with directors including the mayor and a former mayor, and several
prominent business leaders and farmers. The organization was localized at first, then began to pick up support throughout the eastern portion of Multnomah County; it also adopted a less-inflamatory name, Oregon Property Owners Protective League. Founders wanted to move swiftly, and seek support from the 1945 Legislature. "We want to get this job done before the boys come back (from the war), because if we don't do it the returning service men will," said one farmer.

Editorial opposition soon appeared, however. The Oregonian labeled the group's rationale as economic, not patriotic, and noted that the complaints "reveal a basic community weakness which has not yet been solved." The Oregonian called upon anyone considering membership to "examine his deepest beliefs in democracy; to balance his immediate economic desires and his social prejudices against the fundamental concepts of liberty and fair play which have made this nation great."

The Portland Council of Churches and the American Civil Liberties Union immediately protested the move, and Council President H. J. Maulbetsch was the victim of personal threats after he announced the Council's position. This prompted George Putnam in the Capital-Journal, a veteran of the battle against the Ku Klux Klan, to compare the threats to Klan tactics, which he called "terroristic."

The Hood River and Gresham anti-Japanese forces found some support among editors, however. The Albany Democrat-Herald was most outspoken, accusing the Japanese of
"colonization" and teaching their children that "Japan has the first claim on their allegiance." The editorial concluded that "Those who refuse to become assimilated should be rejected."70 The Oregon Journal urged the government to delay allowing the Japanese to return, citing a fear for their safety.71

In Gresham, the home-town editor, T.C. Purcell, admitted that The Oregonian was correct in attributing the movement to economic motives, but assured the metropolitan daily that the effort was in the hands of leading citizens, "able, clear-thinking sound business men, farmers and community leaders." Purcell worried about the rights of the Japanese Americans, but insisted Gresham leaders would "make haste slowly."72 A mass meeting February 9 in the Gresham high school, sponsored by the Oregon Property Owners Protective League, drew about 1,000 people. Former Governor Walter Pierce, now 85 years old and in his final major political effort, called for a constitutional amendment removing Japanese from the country, and accused the immigrants of rapid breeding of children as part of a plan to take over the country.73 Pierce had involved himself in the anti-Japanese movement during most of the century, and in 1945 he was instrumental in resolutions approved by the Oregon State Grange and introduced in the Oregon Legislature, calling for deportation of the Japanese aliens. Until his death in 1954, he remained firmly committed to anti-Japanese measures.74

A professional organizer from Seattle was hired and, at a March 8 mass meeting, memberships were solicited to push the
effort beyond the Gresham area. Speakers called for the removal of all Japanese from the country.\textsuperscript{75}

Protests picked up steam as the evacuees began returning to the area to claim their land. The returning Japanese American farmers met opposition ranging from outright hostility to more subtle discrimination. One of the first of those returning, a vegetable grower from Maryhill, Washington, made at least three unsuccessful trips to sell his produce in the Portland wholesale market. Each time he was shunned, and subjected to epithets from buyers. In a March 11 editorial, Sprague urged an end to the prejudice and, based on his own experience as an editor in a community of German Americans during World War I, wrote:

\begin{quote}
We have faith, however, that this unthinking prejudice will pass. We recall how much Americans of German extraction and name were maligned and unjustly persecuted during the first world war. Eventually this prejudice died out, though it left many scars on its victims.

The hopeful thing about relations with Japanese-Americans is the way men who have soldiered with them come to their defense. This is true both from Italy and the Pacific. They sharply rebuke the stay-at-home super-patriots.\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

Church leaders and others in the Gresham and Portland area began organizing a counter-campaign to assure that the Japanese Americans would be allowed to return in peace, and a few letters--some written by servicemen--began appearing in newspapers, reminding readers of the sacrifices of nisei soldiers.

The counter-campaign peaked at a meeting in Gresham March 16, attended by from 500 to 600 people (\textit{Oregonian}) or as
many as 1,000 (Gresham Outlook). The principal speakers were Sprague and E. B. MacNaughton, prominent Portland banker. Both urged the community to allow Japanese to return, and Sprague said he had assented to the evacuation order because the Army ordered it. He continued: "Up to that time and since then, I know of not one single act of sabotage or traitorism committed or on record as having been committed by any person of Japanese extraction in the state of Oregon, and to the best of my knowledge I know of none on the entire Pacific Coast."77 Sprague quoted U.S. Census figures to rebut Pierce's claim of Japanese "outbreeding" the native-born, showing that the Japanese population in Oregon actually dropped from 1930 to 1940.

Banker MacNaughton declared:

We are at a crossroads. The greatest evil of war is not physical, but spiritual; not the ruin of cities and killing of bodies, but the perversion of all that is best in men's spirit to serve the purposes of destruction, hate, cruelty, avarice, deceit and revenge...In the confused and dreadfully anxious postwar days ahead of us, our state and nation may face other appeals to prejudice. We know what happened in Europe. It can happen here.78

Both MacNaughton and Sprague were later honored by the Japanese American Citizens' League and by the Japanese government for their leadership in helping internees to return peacefully.

Gradually, opposition to the Japanese receded as evacuees returned to homes and farms. Perhaps the greatest factor was the ending of the war, and the return of veterans, including those who
knew of the heroism of the Japanese American units. But lingering racism and ethnocentrism played one final act, as the Legislature approved a measure directly linked to the Gresham campaign.

The 1945 Legislature and Japanese Land

Sprague's successor as governor, Earl Snell, had close ties to the American Legion, and had failed to speak out to urge reconciliation with the returning Japanese. A consummate politician, Snell was described by Pursinger as "a man very influenced by political considerations, a man who chose to bait the Japanese and thereby placate the racist forces within the state in order to enhance his own political fortunes."79

In the 1945 legislative session, Governor Snell was the driving force behind a measure aimed at reducing Japanese Americans' ability to own land. The measure emerged late in the session, with little news coverage and no editorial notice until its passage. Snell's proposal appeared relatively moderate when compared with two more inflammatory measures, resolutions calling on Congress to deport or exclude from the West Coast those of Japanese descent. Those measures died in House committees, although they had the support of the Grange and the American Legion.

More successful was Snell's reinforcing of the state's alien property act, which prohibited Japanese aliens from owning land. Snell's office wrote a measure also making it illegal for Japanese
aliens (issei) to lease or own agricultural lands in the names of their children (nisei). The practice was commonplace in Hood River and Gresham.

The measure passed the Senate unanimously and the House 53 to 2, all in two days in mid-March. The loosely-worded law, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional in the courts, subjected anyone leasing or selling to Japanese aliens to severe penalties.

Oregon editors, perhaps surprised by the sudden emergence and passage of the bill, remained silent. Even upon adjournment, only Sprague spoke out, in a March 29 column. Noting that there were only 1617 Japanese aliens in Oregon in the 1940 census, Sprague said the measure was less important for its impact on these aging aliens than for what it said about "almost insensate prejudice within the white mind." The bill, he said, "is so studied in its malevolence, so vicious in its effort to freeze animosity into law that one is startled at the mental psychosis which produced such legislation." Sprague concluded:

The damage of legislation of this kind is to the thinking and the morality of the group that perpetrates it. The law reflects a social attitude which is unhealthy and far at variance with the principles of our own democratic government. I doubt if the law hurts the old Japs very much. They can work as laborers on the land or hire out elsewhere or go into towns and engage in occupations. Some day, and I hope it isn't too far off, an aroused conscience in Oregon may repeal this law, just as now the state is repealing old discriminatory laws against the Chinese.80
Sprague was referring in his final sentence to a measure referred to the voters by the 1945 Legislature, to repeal an old section of the Oregon Constitution which prohibited "Chinamen" from holding real estate or mining claims. The measure did pass at the 1946 General Election, but only by a margin of 161,865 to 133,111, and it actually failed in a number of rural counties.

**Oregon Editors and the Japanese in 1942 and 1944-45**

The record of Oregon editors in meeting the challenge of the internment was mixed, and did not reveal great editorial courage. The fact that so few spoke out in 1942 is not surprising because there was virtually no opposition to the evacuation. The only visible organization representing Japanese Americans, the Japanese-American Citizens League (JACL) acquiesced in the internment, and advised cooperation. Political liberals, few in number, were usually Roosevelt supporters, and the internment was a Roosevelt order. And it must be remembered that the entire Pacific Coast felt the danger of imminent invasion or at least sabotage during the early months of the war. That editors did not react to protect the rights of the Japanese is not surprising, although it is certainly not commendable.

Most Oregon editors did speak during the period when Japanese were returning to Oregon, and their mixed reaction is less defensible than their reaction in 1942. In late 1944 and in 1945, the danger of invasion or defeat was past, and nisei combat units had distinguished themselves in American uniforms. The
case for the returning Japanese was more clear-cut than was the case against evacuation. In 1942, evacuation could be rationalized as a method of protecting the Japanese—and in some cases that may have been the case—but in 1944 that was not a serviceable rationale.

The anti-Japanese fervor was, as The Oregonian put it, more a matter of economics than patriotism, and often a matter of racism as well. Among the editors of the period, only Charles A. Sprague of The Oregon Statesman and at times the editors of The Oregonian spoke on multiple occasions for the rights of the returning Japanese. The silence of major newspapers, the Oregon Journal in particular, is difficult to defend. Some of the downstate papers served areas with virtually no Japanese populations—Eugene, Bend, Coos Bay and Klamath Falls were cities with little Japanese presence. That their editors were generally silent is understandable when one considers their readers; that the Journal was so weak on the rights of the returning Japanese is beyond defense.

None of the editors responded to anti-Japanese legislation moving through the 1945 Legislature. What publicity was given to the measures largely surrounded the draconian House resolutions calling on Congress to permanently remove those of Japanese descent from the West Coast. These measures had no chance of passage, and editors may have felt no need to weigh in when the outcome was not in doubt. But the measure that did pass, with Governor Snell's blessing, should have evoked protest,
and it failed to bring a single editorial. Sprague was the only editor who commented, and he spoke after the measure was approved.

Among Oregon editors addressing the issue of Japanese Americans during this period, Sprague was the most consistent, with seven editorials in the period from Thanksgiving through March 31, all supportive of the rights of the Japanese Americans. No other daily newspaper had more than three editorials on the topic during this critical period, which included the Hood River American Legion affair, the Gresham citizens' movement, and the Legislature.

Oregon editors simply did not give the rights of the returnees any priority on their editorial pages, and when editors did speak, they generally followed changes in public mood. The editorials opposing the Hood River Legion appeared after the Council of Churches and ACLU condemned the action; much the same was the case when the Gresham area organized to prevent the return. Editors were clearly not willing to get out ahead of other community leaders on an issue so volatile, sensing the parameters of their community. Oregon's editors of this period, cautious by nature, were unwilling to test the tolerance of their audience on an issue they knew to be heavy with emotion.

Sprague proved to be the major exception to this rule. His personal involvement in the emotional meeting at Gresham gave him a stake in the affair beyond that of his editorial pen. But he had an additional stake—he was, after all, the governor who had
gone along with internment in 1942--and he had standing as a political leader as well as editor.

Sprague was troubled through the rest of his life by his decision to support internment. Accepting the first E. B. McNaughton award presented by the Oregon chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, in 1962, he spoke emotionally and frankly about the decision, and late in his life confided to friends that it was the one regret of his public career. The return of the internees gave him a first opportunity to balance the record, and it revealed a man willing to combine the role of editor and civic activist.

Sprague's shift in position was primarily due to his change in official role from governor to editor, but other factors may also have been involved. As noted previously, he would likely have been influenced in 1942 both by the report of Secretary of the Navy Knox, a former publisher, and also by Walter Lippmann's influential column. In like manner, Sprague's later stand is likely to have been influenced by the writing of Lawrence Davies in the New York Times. Davies, San Francisco and Northwest correspondent for the Times, wrote sympathetically of the interned Japanese; his accounts were cited for balance by Okihiro and Sly in their study of media coverage. Davies and Sprague were friends, and Davies' reports may have been a factor in Sprague's emerging position as the war lengthened and he left the governorship.
The battle for the rights of the returning Japanese essentially marked Sprague's first public crusade after he decided to devote his energies entirely to his newspaper and to community service, giving up hopes of further elective office. Sprague had been a candidate in the Republican primary of 1944 for the U.S. Senate vacancy created by the February 25 death of Senator Charles McNary. Sprague lost the fight for nomination, as Republicans supported Guy Cordon, who had been appointed by Snell to fill out the McNary term. Following his Senate defeat, Sprague began writing his front-page column, "It Seems to Me," in addition to his editorials.
Notes to Chapter 4

1 The 1940 U.S. Census listed 4,071 Japanese in Oregon, including 1,617 aliens (issei) and 2,454 citizens (nisei). The majority, 2,390 people, were residents of Multnomah County, including 1,680 who lived in Portland; Hood River County had 462; no other county had more than 200.


3 Ibid, 127.

4 Ibid, 128.


13 Ibid, 124.


17 A comprehensive discussion of the legal issues raised by internment is Jacobus tenBroek, Edward N. Barnhart and Floyd W. Matson, Prejudice, War and the Constitution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954); citizenship is discussed in particular in pp 311-25; see also Sidney Fine, "Mr. Justice Murphy and the Hirabayashi Case," Pacific Historical Review (1964): 195-209.


21 Telegram, Charles A. Sprague to Hito Okada, 24 January 1942, Sprague Papers, Box 4, 76A-68, Oregon State Archives.


24 Oregonian (18 December 1941); see also "An Appeal for Fair Play," Oregonian (19 December 1941): 18.


32 "For the Tolan Committee," Oregonian (28 February 1942): 10.


42 Sprague to Sheriff Martin Pratt, 8 December 1941, Sprague Papers, Box 4, 76A-68, Oregon State Archives.

43 Sprague to Anna M. Hunsaker, 12 January 1942, Sprague Papers, Box 4, 76A-68, Oregon State Archives.


45 Sprague to Francis Biddle, 17 February 1942, Sprague Papers, Box 4, 76A-68, Oregon State Archives.


47 The column is discussed in Roger Daniels, *Concentration Camps USA*, 68-9.

48 For a fuller discussion of Sprague's role in World War II preparations and the internment, see the author's forthcoming article in *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, scheduled for publication in 1995.


50 Ibid.

51 The exact number of Oregon Japanese Americans interned is difficult to determine. An official estimate in February 1942 placed the number in Western Oregon at about 4,000. Official statistics of the time are contained in U. S. Department of War,


59 "Be Americans or Else," Albany Democrat-Herald (25 January 1945): 4


70"Be Americans or Else," Albany Democrat-Herald (25 January 1945).


74Bone, Oregon Cattleman, Governor, Congressman, 395-99.

75"Start Drive To Get Funds For Campaign," Gresham Outlook (15 March 1945): 3.


80 "It Seems To Me," *Statesman* (29 March 1945): 1, 4.


Chapter 5

Oregon's Editors Define Their Communities

America lacks a national press, and only a few newspapers can truly be considered regional in scope. We are a nation of local papers that have always displayed distinct local characteristics. As the industry has increasingly become one of large corporate owners, some of the regional character has been lost. But in the post-war period in Oregon, a period with little experience with group owners, it was possible for Oregon newspapers to have a distinct character, to define their place in a state that was still governed on a personal basis.

Newspapers provided the public with most of their information in this pre-television era. Commercial television didn't come to Portland until late 1952, and then spread slowly downstate. Citizens were forced to rely on daily newspapers and a wide variety of magazines. Radio was active, but more valuable for news bulletins than depth reports.

Newspapers had regained their domination of the news media after a war in which radio news had reached its peak, but it was the last decade in American history when newspapers would dominate the information function of American life. And newspapers were changing and growing to meet the challenge.
Portland's daily newspapers were far removed from their roots and by war's end ranked among the nation's major publications, with circulations in the neighborhood of 200,000 each. They had acquired the bureaucracy of the modern newspaper, with editors and sub-editors, and separate editorial boards of three or four fulltime writers. The Oregonian and the Oregon Journal were big businesses and the journalists who wrote the stories and editorials were hired hands who knew little about the business side of their papers. They were quite removed from the world of community journalism as practiced by Oregon's downstate newspapers.

In downstate Oregon, the essential structure of the newspaper industry was unchanged over the previous 50 years. Oregon newspapers in 1950 were still home-owned, often by the same families that guided them through the Depression. No complex chain-of-command led from a newsroom to a regional office and finally to national headquarters. Reporters could simply walk a few feet to the publisher's modest office, where the buck always stopped. Responsibility was clearly fixed, and publishers had deep community roots and long-established areas of influence both at home and statewide.

As communities changed in the post-war era, and as newspapers grew more sophisticated, the identification of editors with communities changed as well. Increasingly, editors were called upon to deal with communities of interest as well as communities defined by geography. Oregon and its press were
facing more complex issues and demands, but facing them with
the same institutional structure that had served for generations,
and often with the same editors and publishers who had guided
the publications for decades. In most cases the newspaper's
owner served as publisher and often as editor as well.

Oregon editors identified with the personal leadership of the
state; indeed, they were part of that leadership. Most editors of
the period considered themselves to be community editors,
responsible for and responsive to local needs and interests rather
than those of outside corporate interests. But communities were
changing, Oregon was more a part of the outside world, and the
influx of newcomers during and after the war was forcing the
state's editors to broaden their coverage and their views on
important issues.

Oregon editors found themselves busier, with larger staffs to
supervise, thicker papers to produce, and inevitably more areas of
news to follow. Small community-oriented papers now had the
resources to buy syndicated columns for their editorial pages; the
Portland newspapers began investing in Washington, D.C.,
correspondents and smaller dailies pooled resources to hire their
own Washington columnist.

Coverage during World War II had been relatively simple:
the war dominated the front page, and the remainder of the
newspaper was local news and wire copy. Now, the world was
more complex, with an incipient Cold War complicated by charges
of domestic communism, and political upheavals from China to
Palestine strained editors' knowledge as they struggled to interpret the world for the public. Issues of right and wrong, so easy during the war, were more complex when the nation began turning on itself in a search for domestic enemies. The return of the Japanese internees had split the state and its editors in the first civil liberties challenge of the post-war period. In the coming decade editors would find themselves speaking not only for communities defined by county lines but also for communities of interest. The business of being a community editor was changing, and the changes would appear in civil liberties challenges of the decade.

Tradition Despite Change: The Community Editor

Downstate editors, working with dailies ranging in circulation from the Eugene Register-Guard's 28,257 to the Hood River Sun's 1,725, were responsible for their newspapers from top to bottom. One researcher found they had "open door" policies in a literal sense; most had no "gatekeeper" to shield them from their readers. An editor who joined their ranks in 1951 commented that when the editorials appeared, everyone in town knew who had written them, and who to find in case of disagreement. The community editor served many roles, including that of intellectual and opinion leader, owner of a small to mid-sized business, spokesman to the outside world for community interests, and often mediator of disputes between rival civic factions. With rare exceptions, later generations of editors and publishers employed
by newspaper groups could not hope to fill all these roles, and most did not try.

In the small body of literature dealing with community journalism, the genre is defined by frequency of publication rather than the relationship of publication to community or the role an editor played within a community. Studies of community journalism by Janowitz, Kennedy and Sim generally limit the field to newspapers published weekly or semi-weekly.\textsuperscript{3} This is a logical but simplistic definition, for it ignores the human dimension, one that is difficult to quantify but important in the actual working of the field. More broad in their definitions are Byerly and Shaw, who include some small dailies in their listing of community papers.\textsuperscript{4} Their broader definition would seem to apply to most of Oregon's newspapers in the post-World War II era.

The small-city daily newspaper in fifties' Oregon was such an essential part of the warp and weave of the community fabric that to consider it other than a community newspaper would be to distort reality. With a door opening on Main Street, with an editor who knew readers by name and was called upon for matters of church and state, the county seat daily newspaper had grown up with the state and maintained a unique position in the councils of power.

As these newspapers faced the emerging issues of civil liberties raised by state and national red-baiting, the relationship of editors to other community leaders would come into play. Of
particular importance was the relationship of key editors to Oregon's college and university community, for it was this community that came under the heaviest fire throughout this entire period. Editors would bring to the debate their own personal ties and priorities, and in some cases would serve as emissaries to other power structures, including the Legislature and their peers in editorial offices.

Journalism historian Warren C. Price titled his history of the Register-Guard, "A Citizen of Its Community," and although the Guard's high quality was atypical of most small daily newspapers, its concept of community was shared by others. When Alton S. Baker in 1929 placed on the Guard's masthead the words "A Newspaper Is a Citizen of Its Community," he marked his own commitment to community interests. Price, reflecting on the idea of a newspaper as citizen, commented:

A community-minded purpose presumes, too, a city and county concerned with its own growth and development and appreciative of a forward-looking newspaper. The two, newspaper and city, go together. . . . When the city or city and county don't exist in some sort of balance with the press we have conditions in which the newspaper is of better quality than the community deserves—and perhaps is unappreciated; or conditions in which the community suffers because of poor local journalism. Vocal critics of the press are inclined to say the second condition more often holds. When the first exists, however, and it frequently does, it exists because the newspaper has a fair-minded and strong-minded publisher.
Price was referring specifically to Baker, publisher of the *Guard*, whose commitment to journalism and community service was a model for other small dailies. Under Baker and Editor Bill Tugman the *Guard* stood out as an independent voice and a community leader. Whether Eugene "deserved" the *Guard* and whether it was fully appreciated is a topic beyond the scope of this study. But Price's suggestion that a strong publisher can make a great difference in a community seems beyond dispute.

In post-war Oregon there existed, then, a situation in which editors with strong community ties could be expected to exert influence beyond local affairs, because they had forged bonds with their readers due to a shared interest in community advancement.

**Post-War Expansion in Downstate Oregon**

Although growth in the Portland area during and after the war was significant, it was even greater in the Willamette Valley and the small timber towns of southern Oregon. The Willamette Valley university communities of Corvallis and Eugene swelled with returning veterans on the G.I. Bill. Lane County, including Eugene, grew by 82 percent and Benton, including Corvallis, by 69.5 percent.6

Lane's growth was also fueled by massive increases in logging, and the timber town of Springfield jumped from 3,805 in 1940 to 10,807 a decade later. The 1950 census reported 79,104 employed in Oregon's wood products industry, another 5,200 in
pulp and paper, a massive increase from 1940 employment totals of 45,000 and 3,600.7 A similar increase took place in ancillary industries, and tiny logging towns became small cities almost overnight.

Newspapers changed as well. Consumer demand was frustrated during the war, with its rationing and limited supplies of goods. As newsprint became more available and advertisements poured in from department stores, car dealers and others fueling the post-war consumption frenzy, the state's daily newspapers grew fatter, staffs were expanded as veterans returned, and the press took on a much larger role in coverage of community affairs.

The Portland dailies' combined circulation increased 53 percent (The Oregonian and Journal together claimed circulation of 265,116 in 1940 and 405,756 in 1950), circulation of downstate papers increased even more dramatically. The Medford Mail-Tribune jumped from 5,769 to 12,727, an increase of 121 percent; in Roseburg the News-Review went from 3,520 to 7,512, up 113 percent. The lumber industry was the major factor in these increases. In Eugene, lumber and education pushed the Register-Guard from 14,726 to 27,360, an increase of 86 percent. A 71 percent increase in circulation was noted by the Corvallis Gazette-Times, and Salem's two dailies increased 70 percent in combined circulation.8

With the circulation came increased ad lineage and pages for coverage of news. Television had yet to make its Oregon debut
and the period from 1946 to 1950 was a time in which Oregonians turned to their daily newspapers for most of their daily news.

The state's newspapers were forced to change to meet the new reading demands and also the expectations of returning veterans who were now filling their newsrooms. The expanded role of editor was described in 1952 by Charles A. Sprague, editor and publisher of The Oregon Statesman, in an address to the California Editors' Conference:

A greatly enlarged responsibility falls on the editor today. His function remains the same: To interpret the news, to guide opinion and to crusade for righteous causes. But the area in which he must perform has been greatly extended.

Americans are thrust into a new role in world affairs which they carry haltingly. Confusion abounds, much of it artificially stimulated. Strident voices are heard, and people are bewildered by claims and charges. Self-reliant, self-satisfied, boastful even, Americans find a great power challenging them, or bluffing them—they are not sure which.

A global orientation is thus forced on editors who too often have been parochially minded. In all honesty, we are poorly prepared to make the necessary readjustment.9

Sprague, of course, was well ahead of his contemporaries in preparation for this task. In addition to a term as governor (1939-43), he served on national and regional commissions and would in the year ahead serve a stint as an alternate United States delegate to the United Nations. His columns and editorials on national and international topics carried the weight of his experience, and were often quoted by other newspapers in the state.
This broader role for editors was felt by others as well, and the period saw them adjusting to a more complex environment. One of the results may be seen as an alteration of the traditional definition of community journalism, to one recognizing broader types of community interest. As the state grew, villages became small cities, suburbs appeared on the rich Willamette Valley floor, and a more affluent and more diverse population began defining communities of interest that were less tied to geographic or political boundaries than to the personal interests and concerns of Oregonians. This would have implications for the field traditionally known as community journalism.

Community Journalism: Some New Definitions

The post-war period brought changes in the national pattern of community publications, with the growth of suburbs and an increase in group ownership. By 1950, some suburban weeklies were much larger than small-town dailies, and group owners included metropolitan dailies purchasing weeklies in their suburban area, further confusing the definitions. In his 1952 study of community papers in the Chicago area, Janowitz found that despite the powerful Chicago dailies, the city and its suburbs also supported 181 community papers, 82 of which were within the city limits. Among the 82, the mean weekly circulation was 11,990, which would be larger than all but seven Oregon dailies.10 While the diverse communities in the Chicago area differ significantly from Oregon's homogeneous environment, editors
performed similar roles, particularly that of interaction with community leaders, and speaking for civic betterment.\textsuperscript{11} Janowitz found that community leaders expected editors to speak for the community, to serve somewhat of a "cheerleader" role, to function in a service role for the established leadership. Personal contact between editors and the civic establishment is frequent, and an expected part of the job of publishing or editing a community newspaper.\textsuperscript{12} Oregon's small dailies were in transition as the state itself was in transition from an isolated rural society to one experiencing growth in population and economy and greater exposure to national and international issues. Several of the key editors had launched their careers on weekly newspapers and were intensely in tune with the concept of community editor described by Janowitz. Their newspapers had grown beyond the traditional description of community papers—that is, they were published daily rather than weekly or semi-weekly, and they contained news of events beyond the local community. But the editors themselves maintained the habits of community editors, and those personal contacts would play a role at several points as they faced issues of leadership.

In Oregon, there appeared to be little distinction between the editorial responsibilities on a large weekly and those on a small daily. While the small daily carried news outside the local community, largely from the wire services, the editor commented only infrequently on national or international issues, barring some strong personal interest in a particular topic.
The distinction between weeklies and small dailies appears, then, to be somewhat arbitrary, at least in respect to the Oregon press in the immediate post-war era. Some students of the community press have recognized this situation, and added small dailies to their definition of community newspaper. Kenneth Byerly in 1961 expanded the definition of community newspapers to include dailies under 10,000 circulation, noting that it was a departure from previous practice. Byerly supported his decision by quoting the publisher of a daily in a town of 12,000:

We use wire stories, but let's face it--we would be out of business if we tried to compete with big city dailies that come in here on coverage of state, national and foreign news. But they can't touch us on local news, and that's what our people want most.

Besides, what can a metropolitan daily do, for example, to help our Girl Scouts on their annual fund drive or work for better parking facilities for our country and town shoppers? 13

Using Byerly's definition and N.W. Ayers' 1952 report, 14 of Oregon's 21 dailies could be defined as "community newspapers." A more accurate categorization of newspapers in Oregon might be that of regional, sectional and community. The Portland newspapers saw themselves as serving the region, including southwest Washington. Newspapers in Salem, Eugene, Medford and to some extent Klamath Falls served larger communities (sections) that covered more than one county. Smaller newspapers primarily served a county or, in the case of Eastern Oregon, several sparsely populated rural counties (See Table 1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Daily</th>
<th>Sunday</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional publications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>Oregonian</td>
<td>222,562</td>
<td>278,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oregon Journal</td>
<td>190,838</td>
<td>205,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sectional publications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eugene</td>
<td>Register-Guard</td>
<td>28,257</td>
<td>29,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salem</td>
<td>Capital-Journal</td>
<td>18,184</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oregon Statesman</td>
<td>16,378</td>
<td>16,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medford</td>
<td>Mail-Tribune</td>
<td>13,611</td>
<td>13,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klamath Falls</td>
<td>Herald &amp; News</td>
<td>12,217</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community publications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coos Bay</td>
<td>Times</td>
<td>9,303</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albany</td>
<td>Democrat-Herald</td>
<td>8,868</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roseburg</td>
<td>News-Review</td>
<td>8,674</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pendleton</td>
<td>East-Oregonian</td>
<td>7,373</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astoria</td>
<td>Astorian-Budget</td>
<td>7,298</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon City</td>
<td>Enterprise-Courier#</td>
<td>6,755</td>
<td>6,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant Pass</td>
<td>Courier</td>
<td>6,535</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvallis</td>
<td>Gazette-Times</td>
<td>5,413</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bend</td>
<td>Bulletin</td>
<td>5,127</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dalles</td>
<td>Chronicle*</td>
<td>3,906</td>
<td>3,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaGrande</td>
<td>Observer</td>
<td>3,452</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baker</td>
<td>Democrat-Herald</td>
<td>3,210</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashland</td>
<td>Daily Tidings</td>
<td>2,512</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hood River</td>
<td>Sun*</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#not published Saturday or Monday
*not published Saturday or Sunday

Despite the larger circulation and greater resources of the Portland dailies, editorial leadership was exerted more frequently during this period by the sectional newspapers and their veteran editors. That much of the editorial leadership during the period would come from these mid-sized dailies may be due in part to their particular positioning between the metropolitan dailies and the community papers. They were forced to take on the responsibility of state, national and even international topics, yet they could not abandon close ties to traditional community topics and sources. It was a daunting task, for the downstate editors also had managerial tasks and in many cases the added burden of ownership.

The influence of community editors has always been a matter of debate. Alex S. Edelstein and J. Blaine Schulz in 1963 found that leaders in small Washington communities did not rank the local newspaper as among the influential voices of the communities.\textsuperscript{14} John Cameron Sim in 1967 challenged the sociological view of limited community editorial influence, citing among other reasons the diffused nature of an editor's influence and the self-importance of many community leaders responding to surveys of local influence. Sim concluded that determining the influence of such a pervasive element as the community newspaper was exceedingly difficult, but his research found sufficient examples of effective leadership to conclude that it remained at the best community papers.\textsuperscript{15}

Sim's conclusion could be supported in Oregon by newspapers with strong community ties, ranging from the small
dailies in Bend, Pendleton and Astoria to mid-sized dailies in Salem, Eugene and Medford. All were strongly influenced by publishers who had come of age during World War I, who began their careers as community editors and carried this concept with them as their communities and newspapers grew following the second war.

The Second Generation as Community Editor

Oregon journalism in the post-World War II era was dominated by men who may be described as the Second Generation of the state's newspaper editors. Within this community of editors the commitment to community journalism remained as their newspapers grew from the struggling dailies of the Depression to larger and more sophisticated publications following the war.

Second Generation editors replaced the founders, such as Harvey Scott of The Oregonian and C. S. Jackson of the Oregon Journal. Most of this new generation began careers at the time of World War I, often at weekly newspapers. Nearly all of these editors were also publishers and owners and this gave them added standing in a civic leadership that was still dominated by Main Street businessmen.

Several of the Second Generation editors came to Oregon after entering the trade in another state, but all were firmly established before World War II. This generation of editors was strongly committed to the idea of personal involvement in the
hands-on work of a community; the concept of objectivity might have applied to their news pages, but editors (particularly those who were also owners) did not stop their work at the office door, or worry about conflicts of interest.

The post-war period was the twilight of many Second Generation careers. Among the leading editorialists whose careers pre-dated the war, only three (Sprague of Salem, Tugman of Eugene, Ruhl of Medford) would still be active as late as 1955. Tugman left Eugene that year to buy a weekly on the Oregon Coast. Ruhl by the mid-fifties had turned most editorial writing over to Eric Allen Jr. Only Sprague continued into the sixties. Table 2 illustrates the changing of the editorial guard that took place in this period; perhaps no other decade has seen such a substantial generational shift.

Also included among the older, or Second Generation editors, were Merle Chessman of the Astorian-Budget, who died in 1947; Claude Ingalls of the Corvallis Gazette-Times, who retired in 1950; Edwin O. Aldrich of the Pendleton East-Oregonian, who died in 1950; and George Putnam of the Salem Capital-Journal and Robert Sawyer of the Bend Bulletin, both of whom sold their papers in 1953.
Table 2
Major Editorial Leaders on
Oregon Daily Newspapers, 1946-1958

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Editor, 1946</th>
<th>Passage</th>
<th>Editor, 1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oregonian</td>
<td>Phil Parrish*</td>
<td>Ret/1955</td>
<td>Herb Lundy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon Journal</td>
<td>Marshall Dana*</td>
<td>Ret/1950</td>
<td>Roy Beadle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Register-Guard</td>
<td>Bill Tugman</td>
<td>Ret/1954</td>
<td>Bob Frazier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital-Journal</td>
<td>George Putnam#</td>
<td>Sold/1953</td>
<td>James Welch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon Statesman</td>
<td>Charles Sprague#</td>
<td>Sold/1953</td>
<td>Sprague#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulletin</td>
<td>Robert Sawyer#</td>
<td>Sold/1953</td>
<td>Bob Chandler#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-Oregonian</td>
<td>E. B. Aldrich#</td>
<td>Died/1950</td>
<td>J.W. Forrester#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazette-Times</td>
<td>Claude Ingalls#</td>
<td>Ret/1950</td>
<td>Bob Ingalls#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astorian-Budget</td>
<td>Merle Chessman#</td>
<td>Died/1947</td>
<td>Fred Andrus#</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Chief editorial writer, not editor
#Also owner and publisher

Note: Selection of major editorial leaders is subjective, of course, but based in part on the reprinting or quoting of editorials by other newspapers, the size of the newspaper and its editorial page, and involvement of the editor in professional organizations. Notable exclusions here are the state's 7th-largest newspaper, the Klamath Falls Herald & News, and the 8th-largest, the Coos Bay Times. At Klamath Falls, brothers Frank and Bill Jenkins relied primarily on personal columns rather than editorials, and the columns were seldom editorial in nature, tending toward home-town commentary and promotion. At Coos Bay, Sheldon Sackett by the 1950s was primarily engaged in trying to expand his publishing and broadcasting empire, and his once-thunderous support of Democratic issues and candidates was muted.

In this group of older editors, Chessman had been a legislator, Sawyer a county judge and Sprague a governor. Editors left little doubt about their party loyalty, and it was almost universally Republican. Aldrich was a Democrat, the only one in this group, and introduced President Truman when he campaigned in Pendleton in the 1948 election. Ruhl, a colleague
of Franklin D. Roosevelt on the Harvard Crimson in his college
days, was supportive of Democrats but generally viewed as a
liberal Republican. By the fifties, Ruhl was often absent from
Medford, but when he was home his zeal for good government
continued, and in 1951 he was credited with defeating a district
attorney who failed to enforce gambling laws.¹⁷

The Oregon Journal's World War II era editorial page chief,
Marshall Dana, had come of age under C. S. Jackson, the pioneering
Oregon Journal publisher and a Democrat personally close to
President Woodrow Wilson.¹⁸ Jackson came out of Pendleton and
the East-Oregonian in 1902 to purchase the struggling Evening
Journal. He died in 1924, but the newspaper continued under
family ownership until its sale in 1961 to S. I. Newhouse. Jackson
supported Democrats, and his struggling newspaper became a
rival for the Republican Oregonian. During the Depression and
World War II, the Journal was a strong competitor for The
Oregonian, but the advent of television was to have an impact on
the Journal similar to that of other afternoon dailies.

Editorially, however, the Journal had never recovered the
influence it had under Jackson and B. F. Irvine, who edited the
newspaper from 1919 until 1937. Dana was a leonine presence
with a mane of white hair but in the view of many
contemporaries a bit of a blowhard, given to utterances with little
meaning. "Horrible, just horrible, the editorials just took up
space," said Bud Forrester.¹⁹ "He was a great speechmaker, but
after he'd made his speech, you wondered what he had said,"
commented Roy Beadle, who began writing editorials under Dana.20

_Oregonian_ editors were unfailingly Republican, reflecting the tradition of the paper from the days of Harvey Scott. During most of the 19th century, _The Oregonian_ was the state's dominant editorial voice, due to the influence of Scott, who edited the newspaper from 1860 until his death in 1910. Scott held a variety of strong views, and was noted for his extensive reading and certainty of opinion.21 "It was not the _Oregonian's_ circulation, its undeniable prosperity, or its good news coverage that gave it its reputation: it was Harvey W. Scott's editorial page," wrote historian Frank L. Mott. "He was the scholarly type of editor; his reading was extraordinary in range and volume, his memory was phenomenal and his powers of reasoning were strong and original."22

_The Oregonian's_ editorial page had lost the influence of its early days, however, even during under the editorship (1939-46) of Palmer Hoyt. Hoyt transformed the paper's stodgy and partisan news columns into a more lively and objective product, but had less impact on the editorial page. Subsequent _Oregonian_ editors, working under a management structure headed by a general manager whose career began in the circulation department, reverted in the post-war period to firm defense of all that was Republican, and a predilection to discuss such mundane topics as gardening, fishing and obscure foreign leaders.23 The
editorial board began to awaken from its slumber only in the mid-fifties with the addition of new members.

The absence of strong editorial leadership from the big Portland dailies allowed, indeed encouraged, downstate editors to look within their own ranks for direction when the issues went beyond their immediate communities. This was enhanced by the view of community taken by most downstate editors of the time.

Among these Second Generation editors, community involvement extended beyond the geographic confines of their own small city and to a wider community that might be based on an economic interest such as timber or farming, or a wider interest in highways, higher education or conservation. These interests often—but not always—coincided with important interests of their reading audience. Other editors often deferred to their expert views, as each editor carved out a "community" that went beyond the geographic confines of his newspaper audience.

This extension of the commonly held definition of "community" allowed individual editors to gain considerable influence among peers when they spoke on subjects of their expertise. Editorials on these subjects might be quoted by other editors, usually supporting the position but occasionally as a springboard for an opposition editorial. The individual editor, then, gained influence beyond the scope of his readership, for he was seen by peers as speaking for or to a "community" that might include the state's hunters or boaters, educators, farmers or park
advocates. This would allow the editor of a newspaper with a
circulation of only 5,127 (Robert Sawyer at the Bend Bulletin) to
exercise leadership on a par with the editors of much larger
dailies, because the small-town editor was perceived as having
expertise or experience that was lacking in the metropolitan
editors. Second Generation editors were also comfortable in
assuming elective or appointive office; intense professional
scrutiny surrounding conflicts of interest was yet to come.

**Bridging Change: Sprague and Tugman**

The transition of power to a new generation was a factor in
the strong peer influence exerted during this era by two editors
whose careers in Oregon bridged the generations. These editors
were Charles A. Sprague, publisher of The Oregon Statesman from
1929 until his death in 1969; and William Tugman, managing
editor and then editor of the Eugene Register-Guard from 1927 to
1954.

Sprague emerged as the state's pre-eminent editor in the
post-war period. Prior to his service as governor (1939-43), he
was highly regarded as an intellectual and moderate Republican,
but on a statewide basis he was overshadowed by editors with
greater longevity in the state. It was his almost-accidental
election as governor that gave Sprague the base from which he
would emerge as an editorial leader. Sprague returned to his
newspaper and, after a brief and unsuccessful run for the U.S.
Senate in 1944, gave up partisan office in favor of his editorial page.

His major platform was his front-page column, "It Seems To Me," which ran seven days a week. Contemporary Robert C. Notson, who in the fifties was moving through the editorial chairs of The Oregonian, believes it was the combination of the governorship and the column that gave Sprague stature, particularly with legislators and state leaders. "Legislators would read that column to find out what they thought about public issues," Notson recalled. Forest Amsden, a Democratic legislative staffer and journalist who later worked with Sprague on a state committee to revise the Oregon Constitution, observed:

I don't know whether Statesman readers and employees knew it, but Sprague's daily column was must reading for every politician and editor in the state; they may not have agreed, but they felt they had to cope with what he said. If those in power have to react to you, right or wrong, you have power, and he had it in spades from about 1950 on. By setting the agenda for public discussion, he had become an institution.

Sprague was at the helm of one of Oregon's pioneer dailies. Only the Statesman and The Oregonian traced their roots to the days of the Oregon Territory, when both were struggling weeklies engaged in vituperative political debate, dubbed by some journalism historians as "the Oregon Style." But the once-fierce rivalry between the state's only morning newspapers had shifted
a great deal in a century, as Portland grew into a major metropolitan city and Salem remained an overgrown rural town.

When Sprague purchased the paper in 1929 it was a distant second in its small Salem market, and disregarded as an editorial power. In the span of a generation, Sprague would reverse the newspapers' relative influence, and exercise editorial leadership that had not been exercised by an Oregon editor since the death of Harvey Scott.

Scott and Sprague were Republicans of an intellectual bent, but there the similarity stopped. Scott was totally partisan and news pages of The Oregonian often reflected the editorial page; Sprague kept his politics to his column and editorial page, and often embraced Democratic issues if not candidates. Scott was bombastic and domineering, Sprague was shy and reserved. Sprague had a much greater interest in international affairs, particularly following his stint as governor.

Unlike Sprague, Tugman did not own the newspaper; but like Sprague he dominated its editorial policies and he spoke in his columns for and to the community. Tugman's community was Lane County, one of the fastest growing areas of the state. The county centered on Eugene, with its university, business and financial area; and adjacent Springfield, the blue-collar hub of the lumber industry.

The University of Oregon was an integral part of Eugene, and its journalism school trained many of the Guard's reporters and editors. Tugman formed a close bond with the university
and, in matters dealing with it and higher education in general, Tugman became a "community spokesman," other editors frequently deferring to his views. Tugman was a leading example of the editor with two communities: Eugene and Lane County, but also the wider community of higher education.

Sprague was also seen as speaking for more than one community. In addition to addressing his subscribers in the largely agricultural area of Salem and Marion County, Sprague was clearly the editor most followed on issues of state government. His past role as governor was important, of course, as was his location in the capital. State officials were at hand, leading politicians regularly visited his modest office, and he was acquainted with Supreme Court justices, legislators, lobbyists and leading bureaucrats. Sprague's real community was Oregon, and he perceived his role as one of leadership on issues that reached well beyond his immediate readership.

Sprague and Tugman were progressive Republicans, both with Midwestern roots. As the era of red-baiting and McCarthyism unfolded, Sprague and Tugman would lead the efforts to blunt the most radical of the proposals, uphold the international policies of President Truman (as opposed to Truman's domestic policies), and argue for racial tolerance toward blacks and Asians.

The two men shared principles but were quite different in temperament and style. Sprague was reserved, intellectual, a shy man with a disconcerting habit of avoiding direct eye contact
while in conversation. Tugman was emotional, an amateur actor, given to fits of temper. Sprague was personally involved in business, church, and governmental bodies; Tugman eschewed most such activities although he had close friends in all. Tugman's editorials were long and sometimes rambling--Kenneth Cushman's 1950 study measured them at an average of 565 words, second in the state only to Charles Stanton at Roseburg--while Sprague wrote tersely, and was sparing of phrase; his average editorial in the Cushman study was 345 words, one of only four editorialists averaging under 350 words per editorial. Tugman's successor, Robert Frazier, dubbed Sprague "the master of the simple sentence." 

Another important difference existed between the men, however; that of ownership of the publication and the status of business leader in addition to editorial leader. Unlike Tugman, Sprague spoke as the president of a sizeable community employer, which gave him an extra cachet when dealing with the Republican leadership of the state. Although Tugman had the full backing of Publisher Alton S. Baker, it was Baker's name on the paychecks and it was Baker who was expected to represent the Register-Guard in business affairs.

In at least one instance during this period, the important 1951 teachers' loyalty oath battle, this difference in role would allow Sprague to use personal influence in addition to editorial statements; Tugman would be limited to an editorial role, speaking for the community of higher education. But the two
editors, widely respected by peers, exercised enormous personal influence at the time. Their closeness to the state's political leaders played a role; legislators, city officials and others considered their editorials "must reading." But they were also influential because so much change was taking place in the state's editorial offices; Sprague and Tugman represented a bridge to the new generation, and the next generation looked to them for leadership. Sprague would play this role until his death in 1969; Tugman's role was short-lived, as he left Eugene in 1955 and died in 1960.

Passing the Editorial Torch

By 1958, new voices had established themselves as leaders in the field for the next generation: Bob Chandler at Bend, J. W. "Bud" Forrester at Pendleton, Eric Allen Jr. at Medford, Robert Frazier at Eugene, Robert Inghals at Corvallis, Fred Andrus at Astoria.

At the Salem Capital-Journal, the combative and courageous George Putnam was winding down his long career. Putnam would sell the C-J to Bernard Mainwaring in 1953, and the next year Mainwaring and Charles A. Sprague would form a joint venture to publish their two newspapers from the same plant. Putnam continued to contribute some editorials into the sixties, but most of the responsibility fell first to Robert Letts Jones and later in the decade to James Welch.
Portland editorial ranks would also undergo major changes in this decade, most notably with the retirements of Philip Parrish of *The Oregonian* and Marshall Dana of the *Oregon Journal*. Both careers dated to the pre-World War II era. By decade's end, two other *Oregonian* editorial writers were gone, R.G. Callvert (a Pulitzer Prize winner in 1934) and the poet Ben Hur Lampman; and A. L. Crookham and Dean Collins were gone from the *Journal's* editorial board. The 1950s saw the emergence of Herbert Lundy and Malcolm Bauer as leading *Oregonian* editorial voices, with Tom Humphrey and Roy Beadle moving into leadership on the *Journal*. No Portland editors were prominent statewide during the early 1950s, however, at least in the eyes of other editors, and editorials from the Portland newspapers were rarely quoted on downstate pages.

Two men who joined the editorial ranks in the 1950s, Chandler of the Bend *Bulletin* and Forrester of the Pendleton *East-Oregonian*, recall that the downstate group saw itself as separate from the large Portland staffs. The downstaters were one-man shops; there were no editorial board meetings and when they walked down Main Street the townspeople they encountered knew who had written that day's editorial.31

Many of the downstate editors were also owner-publishers, and this gave the downstate editors an outlook colored by business and community ties that was not the case with the Portland editors. Downstate newspapers were of necessity more concerned with local politics and issues, in contrast to the broader
interests of the Portland papers. The downstate editors, largely because so many were also publishers, had a continuity that the metropolitan papers seldom matched.

In a state that remained homogeneous despite the changes brought about by the war, editors were also a homogeneous group, remarkably similar in background, outlook and view.

Oregon editors were well educated; Gordon A. Sabine's 1950 study of editorial writers on Oregon's 21 dailies revealed that while only 12 of the 23 had college degrees, all but two had some college.32 In the group were at least three Harvard graduates (Sawyer, Tugman and Ruhl). Oregon editors in the post-war era were overwhelmingly Republican, Protestant, middle-class family men active in their communities. There were in their ranks no women and no ethnic or racial minorities.

Within the community, downstate publishers seemed to have a close bond with their readers, according to Bill Fendall's 1958 survey of Oregon communities with daily newspapers. Readers frequently referred to the newspaper as "his newspaper," or other terms indicating a personal link, and readers regarded publishers as journalists rather than as businessmen.33

A circle of downstate editors gathered infrequently on social occasions, some in connection with Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association meetings, and also exchanged personal and family news.34 The group was made up primarily of World War II era journalists, although some of the older men had not served in the war. But most were in their thirties and forties, raising families
and building lives in communities where they expected to remain through the remainder of their careers.

Chandler and Forrester recalled that Sprague seldom joined the social gatherings; he was a generation older, did not smoke or drink, and was never an easy conversationalist. But when the others were in Salem, they invariably visited Sprague at the Statesman, and as Sprague traveled in the state he would visit their offices. Notes and telephone calls were exchanged, but the key to Sprague's influence with the others was his page one-column and his editorials. Chandler recalled that Bob Frazier once described Sprague's influence, "like casting a stone into a still pond," with the ripples gradually spreading across the state's editorial pages.35

Some of these young editors adopted the model of the Second Generation, and plunged into community and state activities. Forrester consciously modeled himself after Sprague, but recalled years later that he could not keep the pace of editorials, news management and community work. Chandler also adopted the model, as did Bob Ingalls at Corvallis, who later served in the Legislature. But among the newer editors there were several who looked to a more detached model. Forrester recalled intense discussion within the group; Welch of the Capital-Journal held the view that editors shouldn't even belong to a church for fear of conflicts of interest.36 But the group universally believed in the power of their pages, and each editor looked frequently to his peers for guidance in areas of expertise.
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the Republican cast of the Second Generation editors continued as younger editors took their places, and continued through the sixties. Oregon's editorial pages remained a challenge for Democrats and a bulwark of support for liberal Republicans.

This circle of editors could, in an age before television and the domination of newspaper chains, exert an influence across the state, particularly if they were in concert on matters of principle, and even more so if they were willing to take additional action for their cause. Some of the editors did take such a view of their role, and this willingness to take a leadership role gave them greater influence with their editorial peers and also in state political circles. Of most importance in this respect were the transitional editors, Sprague and Tugman.
Notes to Chapter 5


7 Census of Manufacturing, U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1940 and 1950 Census.


11 Ibid, 185-206.


13 Byerly, Community Journalism, 6-7.


17 "It Seems To Me," Oregon Statesman (22 May 1951): 1, 4.


19 Forrester interview.


24 The name of the column was the same as the famous column written earlier in the century by Heywood Broun in the New York *World*.


34 Chandler and Forrester interviews.

35 Chandler interview.

36 Forrester interview.
Chapter 6

The Emerging Issue, 1948-49

The sound and fury of red-hunting surrounded Oregon editors before they joined the debate over the legitimate boundaries between freedom of expression and the needs of national security. Washington and California were busy investigating labor unions and college professors and the House Un-American Activities Committee had examined Hollywood and Alger Hiss by the time the issue forced its way onto the agenda of Oregon editors.

The debate developed slowly in Oregon, and brought a subdued and mixed reaction. On an intellectual plane the question was carried to Oregon by the 1948 presidential campaigns of Republicans Harold Stassen and Thomas Dewey; on a more visceral level the summary firings of two untenured professors at Oregon State College brought the national rage home.

In the process, Oregon editors began to define their stands and civil libertarians learned who within the editorial ranks might be sought out for support. The state's most recent experience with majority fears and minority rights had produced few examples of editorial courage. But that was a shooting war, and editors yielded to governmental dictates during war. Where was the line to be drawn in a Cold War?
The West Coast's treatment of Japanese Americans--particularly as they returned from the camps in 1945--had almost been a test run for McCarthyism. Japanese were subject to stereotyping, to guilt by association, to rumors and class hatred; if one was suspect all were suspect, and would face special restrictions based not on their acts but on what they might do or have done. If no sabotage was found, it was because they were too clever or they were awaiting the proper moment. In like manner, McCarthyism targeted people who thought radical thoughts, or refused to disclose their thoughts to others. Association with radicals was tantamount to being subversive, and entire classes of people--teachers, unionists--were suspect, just as the entire Japanese race had been suspect.

Whether the restrictions prevented land ownership or forced citizens to take a special loyalty oath, they presented serious incursions on individual freedom. There was strong public support for these positions, however, and editors who defended the accused often bucked community sentiment. Accordingly, editorial silence was frequently the prudent decision and, while a few editors engaged the issue, most abstained. In this, the Oregon editorial community was similar to the national editorial climate.

What was missing in the Oregon press--and continued to be missing throughout the period--was a strident editorial campaign of the nature mounted by the Hearst newspaper chain and a few other large urban dailies.
Oregon editors approached issues of the day in a moderate manner. Circulation competition in Portland and Salem was manifested in exhaustive coverage of elements of McCarthyism rather than in editorial duels. Editorial pages disagreed, but in a gentlemanly manner recognizing the personal, close-knit nature of the state's journalism and politics. Oregon newspapers avoided the frantic maneuvering for popular opinion that marked the McCarthy debate elsewhere. There was no editorial call for an Oregon version of the Tenney and Canwell committees, no evidence of newsroom "gumshoes" conducting their own private probes of suspected radicals.

Ultimately the legacy of McCarthyism would be relatively faint in Oregon, in contrast to neighboring Pacific Coast states. Oregon Republicans did not need McCarthyism to maintain control, and Oregon editors both reflected and influenced the party that claimed their allegiance.

Until the emergence of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy in 1950, the civil liberties' debate in Oregon lacked any tinge of political partisanship. One seeks in vain for mention of a party role in any of the skirmishes taking place prior to 1950. The debate was carried out within a framework that took Republican politics as a starting point. In Washington and California, legislative committees ultimately went after left-wing Democrats, but in Oregon there were few who fit that label and fewer who held positions of power.
Oregon simply lacked the strong radical tradition of Washington with its "wobblies" and California with its variety of Depression-era radicals. The Oregon Commonwealth Federation harbored leftists of various stripes, but did not survive the war. Some OCF members joined the camp of Henry Wallace as he mounted his independent campaign for President. Wallace campaigned in Oregon, including an appearance on the campus of Oregon State College. Wallace ultimately won 14,808 votes (6 percent) in the 1948 Oregon general election, twice the percentage of support he received in Washington state.

Typically, however, the major political event of the season was in the Republican primary, attracting brief but intense national attention and also presenting for Oregon editors a chance to confront the growing national concern with communism and domestic subversion.

The Dewey-Stassen Debate

In 1948, Oregon was one of the few states holding a direct primary election, and the opportunity to prove voter appeal drew candidates. Harold Stassen came to Oregon after upset wins in earlier primaries, and New York Governor Thomas Dewey saw victory in the state as necessary in his effort to derail the upstart Stassen. Oregon quickly became the national proving ground for Dewey's effort to make a second run as the Republican nominee. The two candidates, looking for a national publicity breakthrough that would put one of them over the top, spent much of May in
the state, accompanied by major elements of the nation's political press corps.

The issue of communism reached its peak in a national radio debate, held May 17 in the Portland studios of KEX, with a national audience estimated at anywhere from 40 million to 80 million listeners.¹ The classically formatted debate centered on the single issue of whether the Communist Party should be outlawed, and allowed rebuttals but no cross-questioning or participation by a press panel or audience.

Dewey took the view that the Party should not be outlawed, and mounted a classic defense of the First Amendment:

I am unalterably, wholeheartedly and unswervingly against any scheme to write laws outlawing people because of their religion, political, social, or economic ideas. I am against it because it is a violation of the Constitution of the United States and of the Bill of Rights, and clearly so. I am against it because it is immoral and nothing but totalitarianism itself. I am against it because I know from a great many years experience in the enforcement of the law that the proposal wouldn't work, and instead it would rapidly advance the cause of Communism in the United States and all over the world . . . . Stripped to its naked essentials, this is nothing but the method of Hitler and Stalin. It is thought control, borrowed from the Japanese war leadership. It is an attempt to beat down ideas with a club. It is a surrender of everything we believe in.²

Dewey had running room on the issue because of his reputation as a crime-busting prosecutor, but biographies of the New York governor leave little doubt that the position was one which he genuinely held. Whether the debate was conclusive in
Oregon could not be proved, as exit polls had yet to make their appearance, but Dewey won the GOP primary, 100,740 to 92,926, and went on to gain the party's nomination.

Although the debate gave Oregon editors an opportunity to speak on the matter of outlawing the CP, few accepted the invitation. Noncommittal editorials appeared in both Portland papers, neither of which endorsed a candidate in the GOP primary.\(^3\) The Republican debate, however, gave William Tugman in the Eugene Register-Guard and Charles A. Sprague in The Oregon Statesman an opening to define for their readers where a line might be drawn between free speech and subversion.

Tugman was most outspoken, declaring that the debate had swung him to Dewey, who he described as having greater faith in free speech, while Stassen was "immature" in his approach to the issue. "In the mad days following World War I we saw too many jail cells jammed with innocent people because self-appointed patriots tried to outlaw them for daring to think," observed Tugman.\(^4\) Dewey carried Lane County, Tugman's market.

Sprague sided with Dewey on the debate question but lined up editorially for Stassen on the basis of the latter's international outlook and electability. Stassen, said Sprague, "has had the courage to express himself on public questions and at times to lead out with new ideas. He is strongly in favor of increasing international controls for peace, even with concessions of national sovereignty. Sometimes his proposals have seemed extreme or premature, but at least they showed he has a probing mind and a
willingness to venture in the field of opinion." Stassen carried Marion and Polk counties, Sprague's market.

When Stassen ultimately faltered, Sprague blamed Stassen's approach to outlawing the CP for losing the support of liberal Republicans who previously favored the Minnesotan. Sprague said it was the issue of outlawing communists, not the debate itself, that cost him the support of liberal Republicans.6

At least one analyst cited the debate as decisive, noting that Dewey "emerged as the champion of freedom of speech and expression."7 But Dewey's victory in Oregon may have had less to do with his stand on communism than the organization he was able to forge, drawing heavily on the state's entrenched GOP establishment, but also relying heavily on advertising and the formation of local Dewey committees staffed with workers imported from New York. Dewey spent some $150,000 in the Oregon primary, three times the previous record.8 Sixteen years later, another New York governor, Nelson Rockefeller, would carry Oregon using exactly the same tactics.

A side note of the Stassen campaign was that it brought Senator Joseph R. McCarthy to Oregon, probably for the first time. McCarthy was actually targeted by Dewey in the closing days of the campaign for remaining in Oregon as Stassen's campaign manager and missing a Senate vote on funding for McNary Dam, which was vital for Oregon.9 McCarthy was at Stassen's side in the KEX studios, and may have met important Oregon editors as Stassen's campaign bus and plane covered the state.
The May primary brought the issue of communism to a more personal level for Oregonians, as the state was being pulled into a debate that was raging nationally. Gradually, beginning later in 1948, expanding in 1949, and then reaching higher political stakes in 1951, Oregon would join the national debate that would soon be known as McCarthyism, carrying the name of the man who had so recently been in Oregon with the Stassen campaign.

An Oath for State Workers

Oregon, in company with other states, had a standard oath of allegiance for public employees, but in November, 1948, a proposal for a specific loyalty oath and ban on employment of communists came before the Oregon State Employees Association, which represented most of the state's civil service workers.

Meeting in Portland, OSEA on November 19 heard a report from its civil service committee, in which Chairman R. M. Smith called for a "loyalty test," in the words of the Associated Press report, and also an amendment of Oregon law to prohibit the employment of Communist Party members.¹⁰

The story gained page-one prominence in the November 20 editions of The Oregonian, The Oregon Statesman and the Pendleton East-Oregonian. Timing of the OSEA proposal made editorial reaction difficult. The story broke on a Friday afternoon, and the OSEA general membership vote on the measure was to take place the following day. Editors had no time to write before
the vote, so their reactions were of necessity based on the concept rather than an attempt to sway action. Only two took the issue to the editorial page; both served the large number of state workers in the Salem area.

George Putnam in the Capital-Journal observed that Oregon had been outside the general debate on communism until the Dewey-Stassen debate in May of 1948. Putnam observed that the federal government had loyalty tests, and added: "The welfare of the state and nation can't be jeopardized by communists working within government to defeat the purposes of democracy. On that point, there is no argument except by the reds and fellow travelers." But Putnam reached no firm conclusion on the loyalty oath. After observing, "The rugged 'republican' state has always been a great advocate of the individual and his rights as an individual," Putnam limped to a non-conclusion: "Oregon is no longer watching the battle against communism from the outside. The loyalty suggestion brings the question right within our borders."11

Writing for Sunday morning's Statesman, Charles A. Sprague rejected the idea of a state loyalty test and illustrated the pragmatic approach he would take in future cases. Sprague noted the simple logistics of conducting such a test, which he said would involve setting up a special state police unit, panels to judge those accused, and a civil service apparatus to handle the paperwork. He observed that his membership on a regional loyalty board for the Truman Administration gave him insight into the problems
involved, and noted that the State of Oregon was not dealing with atomic scientists or foreign policy. Sprague concluded:

The political climate of Oregon is admittedly very conservative. That goes for its educational institutions, too. Perhaps there is not enough intellectual independence in the state--though we have no time for teachers in particular who are poisoning minds against the government. There seems little need for any loyalty test in Oregon. This will be one of the last redoubts to yield--'come the revolution.' We can employ our money and our minds to far better purpose than staging an all-out jackrabbit hunt through all the state office-warrens in Oregon.\(^{12}\)

The OSEA voted against the loyalty test, passing instead a general statement that subversion, should it be discovered, be punished. Because of the timing of the OSEA action, members could not have been influenced by editorial opinion. The loyalty test apparently fell of its own weight in a convention unlikely to place additional burdens on the shoulders of its membership. And, as Sprague noted, there had been no notable incidents to raise an alarm.

Emerging from the short-lived incident, however, was the manner in which Sprague would view similar proposals. As a publisher and as governor, Sprague was conservative in matters of finance and personnel. The idea of setting up an administrative web to attempt to capture a handful of radicals was as distasteful to him as hiring an extra police reporter when one could handle the beat. Additionally, Sprague's experience with the Japanese American internment had soured him on viewing an entire class of individuals with distrust. In the state loyalty oath issue and
later as California and Washington viewed subversion, he would be firm about individual subversion or disloyalty but resistant to sweeping accusations of entire groups of people. His views, already widely read throughout the state in his page-one column, "It Seems To Me," influenced other editors as the McCarthy era deepened.

The OSEA proposal was a ripple in the stream of McCarthyite activity sweeping across the nation, but a more serious incident took place the following year on the campus of Oregon State College (OSC would not gain university status until 1961). Unlike the OSEA loyalty oath, the incident at OSC was complex, and it left editors divided and unsure.

**Soviet Science in Corvallis?**

Oregon editors who regularly read national publications were aware of an intense debate among scientists concerning the role of party ideology in the sciences. Soviet geneticist T. D. Lysenko's challenging of conventional genetics with a Soviet-approved theory based on environment rather than inherited genes caused an uproar in the international scientific community in 1948. It was perhaps the most publicized of a series of revisionist views of science promoted by the Soviets during the post-war period, and it attracted the attention of Oregon editors. Sprague debunked the Lysenko theory and attributed it to "the current phase of the all-out drive to purge Soviet culture of 'decadent foreign imperialist' contamination."\(^{13}\)
Lysenko's theory would make the journey to Corvallis in the months ahead, and bring the conservative college community into the midst of the post-war search for radicals. Unnoticed at the time by Oregon editors but not by Oregon State College officials, a long letter from OSC Associate Professor of Chemistry Ralph Spitzer was printed in the January 31, 1949, issue of *Chemical and Engineering News*, a professional journal. Spitzer gave a spirited defense of Lysenko, in reply to an earlier editorial, and urged colleagues to read Lysenko's work.\textsuperscript{14}

Shortly after the letter appeared, Oregon State President A. L. Strand refused to renew Spitzer's one-year contract. Also terminated was L. R. LaVallee, an assistant professor of economics on a one-year contract. Neither man had been granted tenure, a critical fact which caused the university's AAUP chapter to decline to intervene. Spitzer had been on annual contract since 1946, LaVallee since 1947.

The story broke in the February 15 editions of Oregon newspapers, apparently after the professors or supporters notified Portland dailies of the incident. Strand issued a terse statement pointing out the lack of tenure protection in both cases, and commented:

\textquote{We have decided we don't want either of them. Their very activity indicated we would not make permanent members of the staff out of them. Anybody's politics is all right down here, but I don't think I'd better say anything further. You see, I don't have to give them a statement because that is precisely what they want.}\textsuperscript{15}
Strand's seemingly political rationale immediately increased interest in the firings. Both men and Spitzer's wife had been active in the Young Progressives. Spitzer said he had been summoned with his wife to Strand's office and told that a scheduled meeting of the Young Progressives could not be held on campus because he (Strand) did not approve of the speaker, an official of the CIO International Longshoremen and Warehouseman's Union. Spitzer was then told of his dismissal; he said Strand gave no reason for the dismissal, told him the quality of his teaching was not at issue, and offered a good recommendation if he would "go quietly and not raise a fuss."16

With Strand looking as if he had fired Spitzer and LaVallee because of their Young Progressives activity, Spitzer had the best of the early going on the state's editorial pages.

Coming in the wake of the University of Washington's firing of three professors, the Spitzer-LaVallee case brought inevitable comparisons. Tugman in the Register-Guard noted that, unlike the Washington cases, neither OSC professor had been accused of membership in the Communist Party. Taking a characteristic swipe at rival OSC, Tugman observed that "Oregon State College has always been exceedingly jealous of its reputation for moral and political purity." Tugman continued, concerned that the dismissals were for political reasons:

However, we think that President Strand may misjudge the temper of the people of Oregon if he believes that arbitrary methods will go unchallenged. We do not want communists worming their way into
our schools and operating under cover. Neither do we want his censorship of the thoughts or actions of our teachers. Nor do we want purges because purges endanger the liberty of everybody.

If these men have been fired because of their political beliefs, then President Strand owes it to them and to the people of Oregon to state so without equivocation. Then the issue can be fought on whether these particular beliefs deserved to be forbidden. Strand's action goes far beyond that of the University of Washington.\textsuperscript{17}

Similar concern was voiced by Sprague. Also drawing the line at Communist Party involvement, he noted that the men had not been accused of CP membership but had been associated with the Progressive Party. "While the Progressive party was heavily infiltrated with party liners, not all its members were communists, by any means," Sprague commented. "Closer identification with communism than membership in the progressive party would seem to be necessary as a basis for dropping of faculty members on account of political activity."\textsuperscript{18}

Sprague had addressed the issue earlier in the year, commenting on the University of Washington incident. After acknowledging that "one may be an 'academic' communist, one who believes that the socialist state is desirable and that the only practicable means of getting it is by revolution . . . but who would do nothing to propagate such belief or to aid in a revolution," he concluded:

It is hard, in these tense times to draw the line between mere personal belief and joining in a communist conspiracy. To protect itself, government must draw a line somewhere; and in this case the line
is drawn to bar from teaching positions in a state university those associating with a party of revolution. Unless a government is willing to permit revolution to thrive it is hard to see how it can do otherwise.¹⁹

In his somewhat-tortured attempt to separate "academic" communists from "revolutionary" communists, Sprague tried to draw a fine line at a time when most of his colleagues used a heavier brush that lumped all communists and fellow-travellers in the proscribed category. Membership in the Young Progressives should not be grounds for dismissal, Sprague reasoned, although the YP may in fact have included some communists; membership in the Communist Party itself was another matter. Sprague's efforts were similar to those of many Cold War intellectuals, who were fervently anti-communist but also tried to uphold at least the basic tenets of free speech and association. It was a daunting task.

Sprague and Tugman, who would emerge during the coming period as the state's most influential editorial voices, appeared willing to draw a line between a communist speaking on campus or other public places, and a communist on the government payroll, particularly a teaching payroll.

Tugman expressed it most clearly and emphatically in an editorial commenting on the University of Washington Regents' action dismissing three faculty members:

[the] Communist Party not only receives its direction from Moscow and demands COMPLETE OBEDIENCE of members but it does not tolerate tolerance anywhere, whether in political or religious beliefs or in literature, art, or music . . .
The Canwell committee which the Washington legislature created to investigate Communism has been almost as objectionable in its methods as the un-American activities committee of Congress. We do not defend the Canwell committee. We do approve the action of the regents . . . .

Communism needs to be discussed and studied freely on every campus. If Mr. Molotov would accept an invitation to speak in McArthur Court and expound Communist doctrine we would welcome it, but if he were employed as a permanent member of the staff we would object. Are we fairly clear in the distinctions we try to make?²⁰

At no time during the ensuing period did either Sprague or Tugman defend employment of a known communist teacher; but they refused to allow government to go on a blanket search for subversives by requiring all teachers to affirm that they were not communists. The line was sometimes fuzzy—should the rule be different for private schools such as Reed College, an issue they would face in 1954? What of those who refused to answer questions from governmental investigators? Sprague and Tugman would wrestle with the fine points of their positions, generally willing to discipline an individual communist but unwilling to target whole groups of people, particularly teachers.

Other editors were less subtle in their reasoning, and gave full support to authorities. The Oregon Journal called for "a showdown at the University of Washington, at Oregon State College and the University of Oregon, and in every other college and university in the United States where Communist propagandists may have infiltrated as teachers."²¹ The Journal gave page-one play to comments by the student body president at
Oregon State, charging that the Young Progressives club contained communists who were attempting to convert students; Tom House charged that communism was "a real factor" at OSC, and *Journal* editors seemed to agree.\textsuperscript{22}

Other editors who took a position on the OSC affair generally supported President Strand. George Putnam huffed that the whole affair was overblown and a professor had no "divine right to his job." Strand should have the right to act, Putnam declared, concluding that "The infiltration of radicals in faculty is the bane of universities as it is of labor unions."\textsuperscript{23}

Closest to the scene, the Corvallis *Gazette-Times* confined its role almost entirely to news accounts of the affair. Its only editorial comment was a one-paragraph statement that appeared to defend the professors' right to "believe whatever they want to," and insisted that they had not been dismissed for their beliefs.\textsuperscript{24} Claude Ingalls, as might be expected of a publisher in a small college town, was close to the OSC administration and Strand in particular, and unlikely to criticize him in print.

Both Portland dailies were characteristically deferential to authority, the *Oregon Journal* even praising Strand for not detailing his complaints against the professors. The *Journal* then proceeded to imply—in the absence of a detailed complaint—that the men were subversive. The *Journal* called for a policy that "the faculties of tax-supported institutions of learning are not to include teachers who teach the overthrow of government." After advising readers that "these comments are not intended to
express a final judgment." The Journal concluded, "But in one judgment we wish to be clear and final--we want no Reds or Pinks in American public education."25

The Oregonian was more circumspect regarding the reputations of the professors, basing its stand primarily on the right of Strand to decide who would be hired and fired prior to granting of tenure. The editors, stating their opposition to "witch hunts," prescribed as the remedy the careful "weeding out" of nontenured faculty to avoid future problems. In the case of Spitzer and LaVallee, the editors concluded, Strand was acting properly.26

Strand clinched his case in a February 23 speech, turning the debate from political freedom to one of "red science" by citing Spitzer's letter to Chemical and Engineering News. With the issue refocused, sympathy for Spitzer disappeared. The Gazette-Times gave the president's speech extensive coverage, under a page-one banner that made the newspaper's position more apparent than any editorial: "STRAND LASHES AT COMMIE PROFESSOR." The ensuing story was headlined "OSC President Says Spitzer Has Consistently Followed Party Line." The banner went well beyond Strand's charges, which essentially accused Spitzer in his journal letter of following the CP line on genetics, but in no way accused him of being a communist.

Having failed to gain support from the OSC Faculty Council, which sided with Strand, Spitzer and LaValle were cashiered.27 A later examination of the incident by Lionel S. Lewis left little
doubt that it was politics, rather than any academic shortcomings, that cost LaVallee and Spitzer their positions.  

LaVallee was one of the few tainted professors able to obtain another position. For most, the label of "controversial" followed dismissals and seemed to be stamped on their vitaes. LaVallee went to Dickinson College and in 1956 was hauled before HUAC and accused of being a member of a communist cell ten years earlier, while employed by the National War Labor Board. LaVallee informed the Dickinson president that he was not and had not been a communist, but he refused to testify before HUAC. After hearings, he was dismissed by the college's trustees, despite a faculty recommendation that he be given a one-year appointment.  

Spitzer was later detained in 1950 in The Hague, returning from a student congress in Prague, and his passport was invalidated by the U.S. State Department. The Oregon Journal used the occasion to praise Strand and suggest that Spitzer be further investigated "to determine just where his loyalties are."  

That Oregon was caught up in a larger web of affairs could be judged by news stories accompanying the OSC affair. On February 24, following Strand's "party line" charges, a rebuttal by Spitzer and LaVallee played on page one of the Register-Guard alongside stories of an Oklahoma probe into red professors, the appearance in Berkeley of one of the fired University of Washington professors, and the return to the United States of Anna Louise Strong, who was immediately summoned before a
federal grand jury probing communism. Seemingly subversion, or at least the fear of subversion, was everywhere.

Oregon editors were defining their approach to the complex issues of free speech, academic freedom and communism. In the case of the University of Washington, Oregon editors had lined up solidly behind the Regents in firing admitted communists. In the case of the Oregon State College professors, however, the editorial community was split, with Sprague and Tugman raising the issue of political freedom and the Portland newspapers and Putnam siding with the OSC administration.

The difference between these cases (the U of W and OSC), Sprague and Tugman stated, was the matter of membership in the Communist Party. The two editors believed that went beyond the limits of academic freedom, reasoning that the CP enforced loyalty to party doctrine, which was not compatible with academic freedom. It was a position widely held by academic administrators of the time, including President Raymond Allen of the University of Washington.

In March, Sprague debated the issue at Willamette University in Salem, taking the position that "academic freedom is not absolute or unrestricted." Sociologist John Rademaker advocated total freedom of academic discussion. Describing the discussion later in his column, Sprague quoted Justice Brandeis (Whitney v. California) on the nature of permissible restrictions of free expression. Sprague then added:
Likewise with the university there is an orbit outside of which freedom may not range. The nature and extent of that orbit depends on the nature of the university. Thus a school maintained by the Catholic church would not tolerate instruction in Protestant religion . . . . A state-supported institution will not retain a teacher who advocates overthrow of the state. A university unrelated to a church and not maintained by the state will have a wider orbit for professorial thought to range, but still it would impose standards of good form and intellectual honesty.

There is a deeper reason for challenging the privilege of communists to teach and that is the very real threat that communism presents to intellectual freedom. As developed in Russia, communism has become a form of state religion and deviationists are heretics . . . .

The academic freedom that extends to the nurture of habits of thinking which imprison the mind is committing suicide. The evidence of the slavery of the mind imposed by communism is too strong to be denied. No intellectual freedom is tolerated under Soviet communism. The preservation of freedom of inquiry calls for no quarter with the isms which challenge it at every turn.32

In the University of Washington case, Oregon editors, relying on information carried by the news wires, concluded that the Regents had dismissed professors on the basis of communist affiliations, and no sympathy was shown. At Oregon State, when it appeared early in the incident that the professors were being dismissed for radical political views, Sprague and Tugman came to their defense; but as the OSC administration shifted its case to that of taking the "communist line," support for the professors disappeared.
While the Washington and Oregon State controversies involved action against specified individuals, the case of the University of California raised the question of stigmatization of an entire class of people, in this case professors in the University system. California was embroiled in the loyalty oath described more fully in Chapter 3, and it brought new questions to the fore, and new divisions in the Oregon editorial community.

Looking to California

The University of California loyalty oath controversy brought a rash of comment from Oregon editors, in contrast to the rather subdued reaction to the University of Washington and Oregon State College affairs. The latter, of course, lacked the elements of organized red-baiting featured in the Washington and California affairs, with their combination of legislative committees and politicized boards of regents.

When the University of Washington affair surfaced, the major editorialists were in agreement on the hiring (or firing) of communist professors, and with varying degrees of enthusiasm supported the regents. None of the editors wrote more than once on the issue, however.

The Oregon State affair, as noted, produced a split in the ranks but, again, no editor weighed in more than once. The controversy disappeared as rapidly as it had surfaced, perhaps because the fired professors found no faculty support for their positions.
The California incident, however, was very political, with a legislative committee opening the door and the Board of Regents following that lead. California's university system in 1950 was widely regarded as one of the best public systems in the nation, and Berkeley was its flagship. Here the issue was not one of individual communists but one of refusal to take a loyalty oath directed at a particular group of public employees. The first six months of 1950 saw more than a dozen editorials from Oregon's daily newspaper editors, with agreement nowhere in sight.

The California oath controversy saw Tugman move to the leadership of editors who wrote on this issue, in his informal role as a spokesman for the community of higher education. Tugman, in a series of four editorials in February and March, outlined the classic First Amendment defense of political speech, and criticized guilt by association and the targeting of one group of public employees.

In his opening salvo, using his peculiar style of capitalizing words he wished to emphasize and placing quotations or hypothetical comments in agate type, Tugman laid out the problem with the California-style oath:

Some time ago we pointed out the vital difference between the AFFIRMATIVE oath of allegiance and the NEGATIVE implications of the "anti-communist" oath. Suppose somebody were to say to you:

"It isn't enough to pledge that you will be a good law-abiding citizen. You must promise never to speak to or associate with anybody who gets even a parking ticket--or suffer loss of your job and social ostracism."
Such an oath inhibits freedom of speech, jeopardizes the critical functions which are indispensable to academic freedom and good teaching, and insults the dignity of the teaching professions. That is why all 11,000 in the California system are united in protest.33

Tugman continued to return to the difference between what he called "positive" oaths of allegiance and "negative" oaths such as the California loyalty oath. On March 24, following a faculty vote on the California campuses, Tugman repeated the distinction between types of oaths, and also the contrast between allowing communists to teach—which he had opposed at the University of Washington--and requiring all professors to swear a separate loyalty oath:

The regents will find that it is a tough job trying to fire an entire faculty and especially one which knows how to make the necessary distinctions between negative and positive loyalty. There will be some people who will ask:

"How can the California faculty take a stand against the hiring of communists as teachers and in the same breath refuse to subscribe to the non-communist pledge?"

There is nothing inconsistent or paradoxical in this policy. The same question arose concerning the professors who were dismissed at the University of Washington because of their known affiliations with the communist party. When a man joins the communist party he ceases to have the FREE MIND which every person who proposes to teach should have. . . . Therefore he should be dismissed as soon as the fact of the communist membership has been proved.34

Tugman was close to faculty at the University of Oregon and journalism professors regularly worked in the R-G newsroom. Both from his own education (Harvard) and his Eugene
associations, Tugman could be expected to better understand academic freedom than some of his peers in the editorial community. His strong and persistent editorials dealing with the University of Washington, Oregon State College and the University of California laid out a rather clear view of the boundaries he would defend. He would not defend a known communist, agreeing in this case with Sprague that acceptance of Party membership meant the end of objective teaching. But he would oppose blanket oaths and attacks, and the inference that professors or teachers were less loyal than other citizens. And, short of advocating armed insurrection, he would defend free speech on a university campus. Through the period, he would consistently be the strongest voice defending his "community" of higher education.

Tugman's editorial colleague at Corvallis was now Bob Ingalls, who had taken the reins when his father retired. The younger Ingalls shared his father's Republican politics and, as the editor for Oregon State College's community, he quickly took on the mantle of defender of OSC. He was uncertain on the California oath, however, much as his father had been uncertain when Oregon State fired the two professors. Bob Ingalls waited until July to write, when the Regents were faced with professors who refused to sign the oaths on grounds of principle. They faced firing, as Ingalls wrote:

As with conscientious objectors to war, the problem of sincere objectors to non-Communist affidavits is a difficult one. To punish an individual
citizen for following his conscience is more typical of a totalitarian dictatorship than of the American system. Yet no government is secure if its authority can be successfully defied in time of crisis, and the University of California is a state institution, with its employees to be classified in the ultimate analysis as employees of the state government.35

The concept of a government under seige, necessitating abridgements of normal civil liberties, was a defense easily available to regents, legislators and even editors. Ingalls accepted that rationale, siding with the state authority over the individual rights of the professors.

A similar view was voiced by the Oregon Journal, which had taken a firm stance against professors at Oregon State and Washington. The Journal editorial was almost a classic in its reasoning:

We will agree without reservation that the majority of the faculty are patriotic Americans with no pinkish tinge or Communist leanings.

We will support the tenets of academic freedom which cause the California faculty members to withhold their signatures from an anti-Communist affidavit.

But—and this "but" reaches beyond the delicate subleties of personal liberty inherent in being an American and of academic freedom inherent in being an American teacher—the times are exceedingly difficult and unusual . . . .

Americans want students to know about the real nature of communism but they want patriotic Americans and not Communists to teach them . . . .

The writer of this article holds the freedom of the press to be a precious possession. He holds his American citizenship to be his most valuable possession. Just now democracy is in peril. America is endangered. If asked to say or sign "I am not a
Communist," he would do it, nor consider his freedom less, but that the freedom of America had been protected more.\textsuperscript{36}

George Putnam at the \textit{Capital-Journal}, always salty and often populist in outlook, often took an anti-intellectual position, particularly as he aged and grew more conservative (he would, however, leave a large portion of his estate to Willamette University, to build a student center which bears his name). Putnam was more blunt than the \textit{Journal} editors as he stated his impatience with the academic resistance:

\begin{quote}
It is hard to see what objection any good American could have to taking the anti-communist oath, or how it could be an infringement on "academic freedom." This is utilized as an alibi for many communists and fellow travelers, whose only loyalty is to Moscow as revealed by the convictions of Fuch, Hiss and many others of the pink intelligensia. Many university faculties are permeated by communist termites poisoning the rising generation with their regimented ideology.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

The California controversy marked a shift in attitude for \textit{The Oregonian}, which had supported university administrations at Washington and Oregon State. The California oath went too far for \textit{The Oregonian}:

\begin{quote}
We do not approve the employment of Communist teachers in the colleges and schools of the nation. They should not have the opportunity to poison the thinking of impressionable youth. But this is an administrative problem, not curable by such an order as that given by the California regents. It is an evasion of administrative responsibility and a needless affront to a group of intelligent citizens whose integrity will match that of any other group.\textsuperscript{38}
\end{quote}
In Salem, Sprague did not write directly on the California controversy, perhaps because his column dealt extensively with similar national issues during 1950. Joe McCarthy's antics occupied much of Sprague's attention in 1950, with at least twenty columns or editorials criticizing McCarthy's tactics and associated matters such as the McCarran Act. His only reference to the California controversy would be to defend Robert Oppenheimer when the latter was attacked by a converted communist testifying before a California legislative committee.39

Sprague was particularly sensitive to the dangers of political intrusion into scientific inquiry. He had stressed the need for independent science in his 1948 column discussing the Lysenko affair in Russia. Also in 1948, Sprague quoted with approval comments of Harvard President James B. Conant, urging free inquiry in campus research. Sprague concluded:

The tests of loyalty frequently applied by government bureaucrats or the FBI or military intelligence or the house committee on subversive activities are far too narrow to fit the climate of the research laboratory or the university campus. We ourselves will find greater gain from the liberal interchange of results from scientific research than by erecting soundproof curtains about our laboratories.40

The same year, he accused HUAC of smearing the reputation of Edward U. Condon, head of the Bureau of Standards and a former atomic scientist, who had been accused by HUAC of ties to atom spies.41 Noting later that the Atomic Energy Commission had cleared Condon, Sprague commented, "Dr. Condon's reputation is vindicated by the findings of the atomic energy commission."
Now it is the un-American affairs committee which stands indicted as a weak link in the chain that secures our conception of a democracy."42

Additional columns in the next two years made it clear that McCarthyism would encounter a strong opponent in Sprague when the investigations moved into the field of education. He was a teacher before becoming a journalist, had married a teacher, and served for many years as a trustee of Willamette University, as a Rhodes Scholar regional chair, and on numerous groups promoting Oregon's system of higher education. Educators always had the ear of this former teacher.

Oregon editors entering the era of Joseph R. McCarthy had already established some boundaries on dissent and individualism, based on views that grew from the struggle over loyalty oaths or investigations at the University of Washington, Oregon State College and the University of California. None in their ranks supported the hiring of an admitted communist, at least on a public payroll. But beyond this absolute, editors were divided on requiring teachers or professors to take special loyalty oaths, and on what restrictions could be placed on their political activity. The greatest concern was voiced by Sprague and Tugman, with The Oregonian adding a somewhat-qualified voice against blanket indictments. Most strident in opposition to any hint of pink were the two afternoon dailies, the Oregon Journal and the Capital-Journal. But Oregon's debate was low-key, there
was no waving of a bloody shirt and no editorial demands for a "little HUAC."

That demand would surface the following year but rapidly disappear, and in its wake would appear Oregon's major brush with a serious effort to install a loyalty oath aimed at educators. The loyalty oath would prove to be the sternest test of the period for Oregon editors.
Notes to Chapter 6


6"It Seems To Me," *Statesman* (29 June 1948): 1, 4.


26 "Faculty Dismissals," Oregonian (16 February 1949): 16.

27 "Faculty Backs Strand in Case OSC Dismissals," Gazette-Times (19 March 1948): 1, 2.

29 Ibid., 179-81.

30 "Passport Lifted From Ralph Spitzer, Ex-OSC Faculty Man," Gazette-Times (19 September 1950): 1.


32 "It Seems To Me," Statesman (4 March 1949): 1, 4.


Chapter 7

The Editor as Personal Leader for Human Rights

The news business was a personal business in post-war Oregon, and readers knew the men who wrote editorials and directed the news rooms. This was particularly true in the state's smaller communities. Because they were closely connected to their readers and to state and local political, business and civic establishments, editors were in a pivotal position to decide what would be emphasized in the public debate as well as what slant would be taken. Failure to cover or comment on an important issue doomed it to the tender mercies of a legislature heavily influenced by lobbyists. But a commitment to deal with an issue meant for some editors going beyond the editorial page to become personally involved in the battle. That involvement could sway political decisions.

These struggles to define civil liberties and civil rights often revealed a community editor working the political system by calling up old contacts and moving outside the newspaper office and into the political arena to serve as the community's conscience. Oregon's community editors of this generation were involved in the work of the community, were personally close to decision-makers, and had sufficient community support to make
their editorial pages a force with which politicians must reckon. Editors' leadership derived partly from their status as media owners who had invested personally and financially in the community, where they planned to stay.

Journalism historians have consciously moved away from the "great man" view of the field that was widely held in the first half of the twentieth century by such scholars as Frank Mott, Edwin Emery and Willard Bleyer. Today's historians see the field closely tied to economics, sociology and other environmental factors, eschewing history as a march of unusually talented or driven journalists.

While the trend toward a more holistic view of journalism history probably paints a more accurate picture of the forces that move journalism and journalists, it is also indisputable that at certain times and places individual editors and reporters rose to challenges that others avoided, and made lasting contributions to the communities they served. This need not be a repudiation of the concept of journalism as a field moved by impersonal forces rather than a field where strong leaders move events; but the persistence of individual courage and dedication is a reminder that "great men" may still be found in an increasingly corporate world.

Oregon in the fifties saw the influence of two editors of this stature as the state considered an important civil liberties measure involving the ever-popular anti-communist oaths for teachers, and a civil rights measure calling for an end to
discrimination in public places such as restaurants, hotels and theaters. In both cases, the role of editors Charles A. Sprague of Salem and William Tugman of Eugene was pivotal, and in both cases Sprague in particular called upon the power he had built as a political and civic leader statewide and in his community to add to his editorial influence.

In part as a result of the defeat of a major McCarthy era proposal—the teachers' oath—and the passage of a key civil rights law, Oregon maintained an image in the fifties as a bulwark for liberal Republicanism, a state that had not lost its head during a nationwide panic. By the mid-1960s, with such nationally known political leaders as Wayne Morse, Mark Hatfield and Tom McCall, Oregon was on its way to a national reputation for civilized discourse and progressive government. Actions during the 1950s laid a foundation for this image.

Were it not for the leadership of key editors, the outcome might have been quite different. For the civil liberties issue was greeted with indifference by most of the Oregon press, and the civil rights debate saw editors divided, with the influential Portland press on the sidelines avoiding the conflict. Sprague and Tugman, with additional support from a few colleagues, held to a standard of journalism that honored individual liberties, and helped provide support for Oregon politicians who eventually did the right thing.

It was not coincidental that Sprague and Tugman would take the lead, for they had emerged in the post-war period as
leaders among peers, as senior editors bridging the transition between the Second Generation editors and the Post-War Generation. Both men held strong opinions and had deep roots in their communities, and that was a factor in their success.

The teachers' oath in 1951 and the civil rights measure in 1953 were fought out in a Republican legislature, largely between factions of the majority party. Oregon's Republican editors, having endorsed the election of most of the legislative majority, had 'entre' to the inside chambers of the leadership if they chose to exercise the privilege. That they failed to even address the issue of the teachers' oath speaks for the general timidity of the majority of Oregon editors. That Sprague and Tugman were willing to speak out attests to their reputation as editorial leaders.

The loyalty oath was introduced into a legislature well aware of McCarthyism nationally and also in the neighboring states of Washington and California.

A Red Hunt Deflected: Tom Mahoney's Ploy

Oregon's Democratic Party maintained its split between conservatives and reformers as the fifties began, and the decade's first McCarthyite attack came--not surprisingly--from a politician identified with the party's right wing. The scheme was revealed in a daily newspaper that was often close to the Democratic right, the Oregon Journal.

Tom Mahoney was a state senator from Portland, a renegade Democrat who had been a Republican in the thirties, a man who
enjoyed controversy and intrigue. Active in the conservative wing of the party, Mahoney epitomized the type of Democrat standing in the way of a takeover of the party in the fifties by a moderate-to-liberal element. The insurgents were known by some as the "Neuberger wing" of the party, after state Senator Richard L. Neuberger and his wife, state Representative Maurine Neuberger.

On March 11, readers of the Journal learned in a front-page article that Mahoney planned to introduce a measure creating a committee similar to the Canwell Committee in Washington state, and that it would focus on private colleges in Oregon. The real target was not difficult to discern--Portland's Young Democrats had just voted to censure Mahoney, and the deciding vote was cast by a Reed College student.\(^1\) Mahoney viewed politics in a very personal manner and his zeal in punishing opponents was legendary.

Mahoney was a serious force within the Legislature, with ties to the Republican leadership, and he enjoyed pulling the tail of liberal Democrats. Neuberger took the threat at face value, and immediately mounted a counterattack. An early visit was with Sprague, who responded to the Mahoney announcement with a next-day editorial warning the Legislature to avoid the Mahoney challenge:

A Mahoney-led witch-hunt would be in the McCarthy tradition, complete with sound effects. Only perhaps it should wait until Portland gets TV to add spectacle to the reporting. Surely the Oregon legislature which has
kept its feet on the ground pretty well in the midst of hysteria, will not finance Mahoney's play to the gallery, by the medium of an anti-communist crusade.²

Neuberger also fired off a "heads-up" to E. B. MacNaughton, then serving as Reed's president. Neuberger enclosed a copy of the Sprague editorial, adding, "I have talked to him twice about Mahoney's proposed witch-hunt, and I am sure you can count on him as a vigorous opponent of the project."³

In a subsequent letter, carboned to Sprague, Neuberger informed MacNaughton that five of the nine Senate Democrats had signed a statement to be given privately to Mahoney, but released to the public if Mahoney introduced his red-hunt measure.

Signed by Neuberger and Senators Bob Holmes, Phil Brady, Ben Musa and Manley Wilson, the statement was blunt:

We, the undersigned Democratic members of the Oregon State Senate, are opposed to attempts to cast doubts on the loyalty and patriotism of this state's fine system of privately-operated colleges.

If anyone has any specific information of this nature, he has a duty to communicate it immediately and forthwith to the Federal Bureau of Investigation or to Military Intelligence.

If he has no such information and nevertheless uses innuendo and guilt by association to damage these educational institutions, he has committed an unfair and unworthy act.

The Democratic Party is the party of Thomas Jefferson, apostle of freedom, who all his life opposed restrictions on the liberties and minds of men.⁴
In comments to MacNaughton, Neuberger was prescient, for he laid out a course that three years later would batter Reed College (see Chapter 9):

You and I know there is nothing disloyal or unpatriotic about Reed College. However, the uses of guilt by association and innuendo are many. Such an investigation presumably will operate behind the cloak of legislative immunity from libel .... This is the same sort of protection which has proved to be useful to Senator McCarthy.

Behind such a shield a man like Mahoney might do inestimable damage to the reputation and standing of Reed College without proving a single fact, because he has announced in conversations around the Senate that Reed is one of his main targets. I believe we should head off the resolution if we possibly can.5

By the time MacNaughton replied to Neuberger, the teachers' loyalty oath had been introduced, and Mahoney had quietly dropped his investigation. "I am grateful for all you have done re the Mahoney legislation," MacNaughton told Neuberger. Noting that he had personally aided Russian War Relief and had financially helped five young Spaniards escape Franco, MacNaughton observed that, "by any interpretation of a McCarthy my action in this matter could be declared subversive." Adding that Oregon already had a "positive" oath for all public employees, MacNaughton reasoned it was sufficient "to meet the requirements of the present situation."6

The loyalty oath had quietly replaced Mahoney's red-hunt as a focus of those who searched for a way to root out subversion. Mahoney was not listed among the sponsors of Senate Bill 323; it
was primarily a Republican bill, listing only one Democrat (Robert Y. Thornton of Tillamook) among its eleven sponsors. And in contrast to the front-page notoriety of Mahoney's threat, SB 323 began its journey quietly, with little public notice.

The 1951 Loyalty Oath, First Stirring

As introduced on March 15, SB 323 was similar to loyalty oaths adopted in several states, requiring public school teachers to swear that they had not been a member of the Communist Party "or any other organization that believes in, advocates or teaches the overthrow of the United States government or the government of the State of Oregon by force or by unlawful means."

Additionally, the bill in Section 1, subsection (2) required disclosure of "Whether the applicant has contributed time or money to the support of, or has subscribed to, taught or advocated the principles of such party or organization." It was a wide-ranging measure, particularly subsection (2), but it enjoyed broad support in the Legislature, including that of several veteran leaders.

Although the Senate bill specifically identified public school teachers and did not refer to college and university faculty, the House State and Federal Affairs Committee later amended it to include "any school or educational institution supported wholly or in part from any tax monies of the State of Oregon," a definition that included some private schools and colleges.
Despite its implications, the bill was not widely reported by the political press corps, which was preoccupied with taxation and the political maneuvering of the leadership. The author could find no news report of the loyalty oath upon introduction, and Oregon news pages remained silent until well after Tugman had issued a first strong warning in an April 4 editorial in the Eugene Register-Guard.

The appearance of a major editorial before the issue had appeared in the news columns was unusual; the normal editorial process calls for coverage of an issue before editorial notice. But the first news story mentioning the loyalty oath did not appear in Oregon dailies until April 29, upon Senate passage. Clearly the news priorities of reporters covering the Capitol were not the same as the editorial priorities of several of their newspapers. Before a single news story appeared in an Oregon daily, both Tugman and J.W. Forrester in Pendleton had written strong anti-oath editorials. These editors' ties to the state's higher education community were factors in their editorial response.

As the state's only university, the University of Oregon could be expected to be a target for those suspicious of subversion or liberal thinking in general. In the thirties the American Legion had conducted a campaign to purge the campus of liberals, and a confidential report by Legion investigators had identified a number of Oregon faculty—including Law Dean Wayne Morse and Journalism Dean Eric Allen—as dangerous left-wingers, apparently because of their support of the ACLU. Department of Oregon
Commander George L. Koehn appeared on campus to promote Americanism and denounce communism and other forms of left-wing radicalism. The campus was a center of an unsuccessful 1936 initiative effort to eliminate required military training from Oregon's public colleges and universities, again drawing the wrath of the Legion and other patriotic orders. The faculty senate was concerned about the 1951 loyalty oath, and it would be natural to convey those concerns to Tugman.

Forrester, in turn, was very close to Oregon State College, connected to the school through family and his own personal history. His father-in-law, E. B. Aldrich, was a 1900 graduate of Oregon Agricultural College and, as the college became Oregon State, Aldrich was among its strongest supporters. When Aldrich died in 1950, after 42 years as editor of the East-Oregonian, he was succeeded by Forrester, also a graduate of OSC and for several years director of the school's sports publicity.

Although Oregon State, the land grant university, was considered "safer" politically because of its stress on forestry and agriculture, it had in 1949 ousted two faculty members suspected of harboring radical thoughts (Chapter 6), and it might be expected that the faculty was also nervous at Corvallis.

Tugman and Forrester, then, had strong ties to the state's leading universities, and often spoke on their behalf. When the loyalty oath surfaced, a natural reaction of faculty or sympathetic administrators would be to alert friendly editors.
Where editors have unusually strong ties to particular community interests, they sometime move ahead of their own news pages to initiate discussion in the editorial columns. That is what occurred in the loyalty oath case in 1951. The loyalty oath did not appear to be a major issue in the minds of reporters or city editors of the state's dailies, or of the wire services providing most of the state's legislative coverage. With the readers of Oregon largely ignorant of the issue because of this lack of coverage, editorial pressure appears to have been primarily directed toward legislators and others in positions of power who might be expected to read the editorial pages of influential newspapers.

**Early Editorial Concern**

In a ringing editorial terming the measure "little better than an instrument for terrorism," Tugman on April 4 warned that SB 323 would create a climate in which it would be impossible to teach about communism or Marxism. Tugman contrasted it with the oath of allegiance administered to public employees: the oath of allegiance, he noted, is an affirmative oath to support the nation's laws; a loyalty oath is a negative oath and singles out teachers as being more suspect than other categories of public employees. It would inhibit free speech and inquiry, he concluded:

Freedom to teach becomes almost impossible under such an act because it places the teacher in the danger of being constantly suspect, constantly "on the
spot" to explain and justify any passing classroom remark which may displease somebody. It renders the teacher vulnerable to vicious attacks by people who simply don't like him and use any pretext to get him out . . .

True patriotism must be an act of AFFIRMATION, not of denial. It is wrong and an offense against American principles to ask teachers to subscribe to any other oath than that which every president and every legislator, judge and soldier takes, "to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." This measure is an act of fear, unworthy of Americans who believe.¹⁰

Ten days later, Forrester picked up the baton in the Pendleton East-Oregonian and observed that a similar California loyalty oath had recently been declared unconstitutional. The controversial University of California oath, discussed in Chapter 3, had been imposed by the state's Board of Regents. Forrester saw the Oregon proposal as an attempt at thought control, and quoted from the federal court ruling:

Because of their grave responsibility to society teachers always have, and always will be most severely judged. It is right to regulate the acts--the performance--of a teacher. But to attempt to regulate the thinking of a teacher or any other person involves an extreme threat to his constitutional rights.¹¹

Despite the strong wording of the Tugman and Forrester editorials, Oregon's legislative reporters continued to ignore the measure until its 25-5 approval by the Senate on April 28. The measure had been diluted in committee, with the offensive subsection (2) merged into another section. But the measure remained broadly written, and included not only Communist
Party membership but membership in other unidentified subversive groups, and the "contribution, subscription, teaching or advocacy" of the principles of these unnamed groups.\textsuperscript{12}

The question of whether a teacher could be disciplined for teaching about the suspect groups or organizations remained one of interpretation and was not an idle threat. Future governor and U.S. Senator Mark Hatfield, then a freshman legislator representing Marion County, had co-sponsored the bill, reacting, he later recalled, to a rear-guard action he had fought during his campaign. In rural areas, Hatfield had to defend himself against charges that he was a "commie sympathizer" because as a political science professor at Willamette University he required his students to read the \textit{Communist Manifesto} and other works by Marx and Lenin. Hatfield, a World War II veteran, reacted to the charges by saying he would be happy to take an oath any time, and he said later that his sponsorship of the bill was in reaction to his recent election campaign.\textsuperscript{13}

Although committee amendments softened the measure, five senators voted against it on the floor. Richard Neuberger's comments, inserted in the Senate Journal, charged that the bill singled teachers out as less loyal than other Oregonians, when "not one shred of evidence has been produced to show that Oregon teachers are less loyal to their country than any other persons in positions of public trust."\textsuperscript{14} Neuberger, in a letter to MacNaughton, asked rhetorically, "Why is it that educators in
general are always the prime target of the demagogues such as
McCarthy on a national scale and Mahoney on a local scale?"\textsuperscript{15}

Neuberger also discussed the bill with Sprague, and it is possible that Sprague worked behind the scenes to dilute the
measure by amendment in the Senate Education Committee.\textsuperscript{16}
Sprague and Tugman may have testified during the Senate
committee's deliberations. Committee records are sparse, but
both editors recalled hearings at which both appeared. In a 1960
letter to Malcolm Bauer, who was writing a profile of Sprague,
Tugman recalled:

There was one very violent hearing at Salem at which both Charlie and I spoke. Of course being a vet and
the father of such I could say some things Charlie
could not. Besides I am just Shanty Irish and Charlie
is always a gent. . . .

Anyhow it was a rough house and after it was
over we realized we had won a battle but not the war.
So - we had watchdogs in the House and sure enough
in the closing days or hours Rep. Earl Hill called me
and said the patrioteers were going to spring the
teachers oath bill out of committee in the final hours.
I alerted Sprague and he went to work at the Salem
end.\textsuperscript{17}

Sprague and Tugman shared Neuberger's concern about
singling teachers out for special approbation. Several years later,
also in a letter to Bauer, Sprague recalled:

My objection was to singling out the teachers for a
special test of loyalty, holding that an affirmative oath
of loyalty was all that was necessary. I pointed out
also the uncertainty as to the subversive character of
many organizations. A teacher might omit reference
to some organization which later was shown to be
subversive, and would be subject to discipline if the matter came to light. This might have hurt innocent people and would have injured the higher institutions of learning by putting a cloud on professors.\textsuperscript{18}

Sprague did not speak editorially, however, until it appeared that the House might pass the measure; Tugman and Forrester were the only editors raising the alarm as the measure moved through the Senate on April 28, and on April 30 went to the House State and Federal Affairs Committee.

News coverage of the loyalty oath bill continued to be light, and even on Senate passage the loyalty oath was not a major story. Headlines were typical of the hyperbole of the McCarthy era. The \textit{Statesman} Headlined "Senate Passes Anti-Commie Teachers Bill," and \textit{The Oregonian} termed it "Bill to Spot Red Teachers." Taxes and elections overshadowed the loyalty oath bill during the Legislature's final week.

\textbf{The Final Days: Pressure Builds}

Passage by the Senate stirred Tugman for a second time, and his May 1 editorial urged "Teachers Should Voice Protest." When Sprague weighed in on May 3, he quoted the Tugman editorial, and termed the measure "a product of fear." Sprague repeated the argument that teachers should not be singled out, and worried that the passage of the bill would lead to additional incursions on civil liberties.\textsuperscript{19}

Teachers did not voice their concerns, however, at least in part because they were afraid to be involved politically. Maurine
Neuberger, who had been active in the teachers' union before she left the classroom to marry and enter politics, recalls that "teachers were afraid to speak out . . . afraid to participate in politics." Evidence of the climate could be seen on the front page of the May 3 Oregon Journal, the same day the loyalty oath was scheduled for debate in the House. The Journal headlined a story "Visit to Brewery Rapped by Drys," and reported that teachers on a city-wide tour of industry were under fire for stopping at Portland's Blitz-Weinhard brewery and sampling some of the product. The story was several times the size of Journal reportage of the loyalty oath. Although the Journal detailed the teachers' visit to the brewery, the newspaper failed to alert readers to the fact that the loyalty oath had been expanded in House committee and now covered teachers in all public institutions, and possibly private ones as well. Journal editors remained silent on the loyalty oath.

College professors similarly remained quiet, despite private efforts by some faculty against the measure. University of Oregon faculty communicated with Tugman, and it is likely that other contacts were made. Three Willamette University faculty members walked across State Street to the Capitol to testify at the May 1 House hearing, speaking against the measure. No record exists of testimony from Reed, or from the major state colleges. Sprague later noted the lack of activity on the part of faculty:

During the legislative battle the AAUP was not very active. I think the professors were somewhat reluctant to get involved though I believe they
entered protest. After the session the AAUP became more active. In advance of the 1953 session contacts were made with some who had backed the bill and got them to drop the matter.\textsuperscript{22}

Educators had become cautious by 1951, as colleagues in California, Washington and elsewhere had fared poorly in the spotlight of McCarthyism. But logistics of the hearings also made it difficult for organized opposition. The House hearings were scheduled at the last minute, and the closest public campuses were an hour's drive. Professors had no organized lobby or legislative representative in 1951; faculties worked quietly with their supporters, and among their allies were key editors, in particular Sprague and Tugman.

Tugman and Sprague by this point were involved in efforts to quash the loyalty oath by one method or another. Their editorials of May 1 and May 3 had produced no echoes from other editorial writers. Except for Forrester, other editorial writers remained silent during the entire debate. When editorial pens failed to rally opposition, and teachers and professors failed to protest, Sprague took more direct action.

**The Editor as Personal Lobbyist**

No Oregon editor in 1951 had the political influence of Charles A. Sprague, yet he seldom displayed the muscle of a former governor who had carried the banner of the dominant Republican Party. A shy and gentle man, he preferred intellectual combat to personal jousts. As governor he seldom appeared at
legislative social gatherings, and his abstinence from alcohol and tobacco kept him outside the smoke-filled rooms frequented by lawmakers and lobbyists of the time. Politicians normally came to Sprague—sitting in the hard chairs of his unobtrusive office on Commercial Street, waiting for an audience along with any citizen who happened to drop by. Typically, when Sprague felt the interview or conversation had reached the end of its productive life, he would simply turn to his typewriter, and his visitor would be staring at the editor's back. The tactic, while off-putting at first, was so standard for visitor and employe alike that it became part of Statesman lore. But in the case of the loyalty oath, it was Sprague who walked the few blocks to the Capitol to seek out key players in the closing days of the 1951 session.

With the Legislature on the lip of adjournment, the State and Federal Affairs Committee reported the loyalty oath to the House for a vote, and passage appeared likely. Sprague then pressured Speaker John Steelhammer, a Salem Republican, and State and Federal Affairs reopened its discussions, a very unusual occurrence so late in the session. Sprague testified personally against the measure, but representatives of teachers or higher education faculty again failed to appear, despite Tugman's editorial advice. The legislative spokesman for the State System of Higher Education took no position, stating only that time did not allow those in authority to appear. The committee stuck with its earlier approval, and the measure was returned to the House for a special night session.
Sprague sought out Hatfield three times, Hatfield recalls, and "gently but tenaciously" urged him to change his mind. Sprague clearly felt strongly about the bill, Hatfield recalls, and did convince the young lawmaker to change his earlier support although he had spoken for the bill in committee and was one of three committee members designated to carry the bill on the floor of the House.\(^24\) But Hatfield and other House members never had a chance to cast a final vote on the loyalty oath, because of Sprague's backdoor maneuvering.\(^25\)

Sprague then returned to political tactics. Bauer, in discussing Sprague's subsequent role in killing the oath, used a baseball metaphor:

> He went to Speaker John Steelhammer, Majority Floor Leader Earl Hill and Judiciary Committee Chairman Carl Francis, all friends, and arranged for a Tinker-to-Evers-to-Chance play that recommitted the bill to the committee and to Francis' pocket, from which it never emerged. . . . Excusing his maneuver, Sprague told this writer: "I figured this was a time when 'children of light' might learn something from the 'children of darkness."\(^26\)

Sprague and Steelhammer were not personally close, although both were part of the Salem civic leadership. Steelhammer was a lawyer, a traditional backroom operator with cigar and whiskey near to hand; Sprague was a teetotaling Presbyterian. But Steelhammer knew Sprague's power in Salem, editorially and also in a personal sense, and on this issue he must have understood the urgency in the former governor's manner.
Maurine Neuberger recalls watching the maneuver unfold from her seat in the House. As a Democrat in a Republican chamber, she was not part of the action, but she recalled Sprague appearing outside the House rail, where invited guests are allowed into the chamber.

I'll always remember, my seat was close to the rail, and I looked up and here was Governor Sprague. I think his presence had a lot to do with (the bill's defeat). He was just so respected . . . As I remember looking around over the floor that day, everyone looked a bit ashamed if they were going to vote for it, and there was Governor Sprague facing them. I don't know, he must have talked to some of them individually. He would have had to.27

The House Journal for the day simply records that Hill moved the bill be taken from the calendar and referred to Judiciary (Francis's committee). And on adjournment late that night, that was where it remained, one of a host of proposals that died with the end of the legislative session.

Sprague wrote no follow-up column or editorial. The only editorial comment following adjournment came from Forrester, who also mentioned the Portland brewery incident and concluded that "This treatment of school teachers as a special class of citizens is most unfair."28

At the University of Oregon, where opposition to the oath had been most intense, Faculty Secretary George N. Belknap wrote a letter of appreciation to Tugman. In his reply, Tugman thanked Belknap, but added, "Charley Sprague, of Salem, did more than anyone else to stop Senate Bill 323 in the closing hours."29
The loyalty oath was an example of the multi-faceted approach that was unique to Sprague among all of Oregon's journalists and politicians. He worked with Democratic liberal Richard Neuberger when the bill was in Senate committee. Then he joined Tugman and Forrester to speak editorially against the measure. And finally he pulled political experience and Republican contacts out of his pocket to shelve the measure before it came to a House vote. Alone among Oregon editors, Sprague had the stature to combine his pen and his political background in a course of action.

The loyalty oath became part of Sprague lore. It was featured in Bauer's story in the New York Herald Tribune, and Richard Neuberger, writing in the Nation, gave Sprague credit for keeping loyalty oaths out of the state.\(^30\)

Harder to explain is the silence on the part of Oregon editors other than Sprague, Tugman and Forrester. They had commented on similar issues in California and Washington, and by this time in 1951 most had also expressed opinions on Senator McCarthy and his tactics. Yet the editorial columns were silent on the oath, focusing instead on tax reform and the political gamesmanship of legislative leaders.

Two years later, more editors would weigh in as the Legislature debated a key civil rights measure, but again leadership in support of individual liberties would come from Sprague and Tugman. And once again Portland editors would remain silent.
Oregon's Tepid Support for Civil Rights

Racial issues in Oregon in 1953 primarily revolved around an expanded African American (the term generally used at that time was "negro") population in the Portland area as a result of World War II. Although the state had a significant Mexican population, it was primarily migrant and few had settled permanently in the state. Asian and Native American numbers were relatively low.

Oregon's 1940 census reported only 2,500 African Americans in a state of 1,076,000--less than one percent. Other minorities were not enumerated, but the state was essentially a white society. War industries brought the African American population to a 1944 high of 11,316 in the Portland area with its huge shipyards and Vanport housing project.31

In Portland, the immigrants faced discrimination on every front. Labor unions refused them membership, parks and playgrounds refused entrance or established separate times to use the facilities, public accommodations of all types were closed to them, and they frequently paid surcharges on insurance.32

An enormous housing problem emerged with the Memorial Day, 1948 flooding of the Vanport housing project, where many African Americans lived, often supporting themselves on unemployment benefits after the wartime industries closed. The Vanport flood and the lack of jobs contributed to an outflow of African Americans in the latter part of the forties, and by the 1950 census Oregon's African American population was down to
12,000, essentially the same as Portland alone claimed in 1944. Despite the drop from wartime highs, the African American population of Oregon had increased in ten years from 2,500 to 12,000, an increase that could not go unnoticed.

Portland newspapers, like most major newspapers of the day, gave scant coverage to minority community activities. Their lack of contact with the African American community could be seen as the 1953 Oregon Legislature prepared to deal with discrimination in public accommodations. Portland newspapers were also reminded of how badly they had misjudged their community only three years before.

**Early Attempts: Portland, 1950**

Portland leaders were suffering from criticisms by African American leaders that wartime Portland was, in the words of one National Urban League official, "just like any Southern town . . . the most prejudiced (city) in the west." The city alternated between efforts to pressure the African American population to move (by attempting to close the Vanport housing project, an action rendered moot by the 1948 flood) and attempts to offer some legal remedy for discrimination.

In 1950, the Portland City Council unanimously approved a public accommodations bill, on the same night (February 21) as the city received an award from the National Conference of Christians and Jews as the U.S. city most improved in racial and religious relations. The Council was so certain of public
acceptance that it cancelled a later public hearing, noting that there was nothing more to hear.\textsuperscript{34}

Both Portland dailies supported the action; \textit{The Oregonian} two days before the decision had called on the Council to pass the ordinance, and on the day following it praised the Council and cited the action as a first step to redress past racial problems.\textsuperscript{35} The \textit{Oregon Journal} gave belated support in a March 25 editorial, but angry opponents of the measure were already gathering signatures to place the Council's action on the November ballot.\textsuperscript{36}

The speed with which citizens gathered referendum signatures was evidence of the overly optimistic view the city fathers and the daily newspapers held on the issue of civil rights. When the vote took place in November, Portlanders overwhelmingly rejected the public accommodations code. The \textit{Journal} philosophized that it was good to have the matter debated, there should be no cause for bitterness, and people of goodwill could work together.\textsuperscript{37}

What is most remarkable is not that the measure failed, for the city's leaders were obviously far ahead of their constituents, but that the Portland dailies had nothing to say about the issue after it was placed on the ballot. Despite their early backing of the proposal, once it hit the ballot \textit{The Oregonian} and \textit{Journal} failed to urge its support at the polls. Editors of the big dailies simply abandoned the field.

Three years later, when a similar measure was introduced for the state during the legislative session, the silence from the
big dailies was deafening. As in the loyalty oath battle of 1951, the burden of human rights would be borne by downstate editors.

The 1953 Civil Rights Bill

Senate Bill 169 was introduced on February 4 by a bipartisan coalition of 19 (of 30) senators and 27 (of 60) representatives. The chief sponsor was Senator Phil Hitchcock, a liberal Republican from Klamath Falls, one of the state's most conservative areas. Other sponsors came from across the state, which gave the measure a good chance of passage. The measure prohibited discrimination in public places, including hotels, restaurants, taverns and places of amusement.

Introduction of the measure brought no notice from the state's newspapers, and the legislation remained unnoticed until its March 4 passage by the Senate Judiciary Committee on a 5-2 vote. Associated Press dispatches were printed in several newspapers, and on March 6 the first editorial appeared, a brief in the Pendleton East-Oregonian suggesting that the measure be broadened to include all businesses and services.

Although the measure handily passed the Judiciary Committee, it was apparent that it would not have as easy a trip as the number of its sponsors indicated. The state's powerful hotel, restaurant and beverage industries had weighed in against the bill. Essentially, the bill was in the hands of Republicans; there were only four Democrats in the Senate, and eleven in the House.
As the Senate debate neared, a second editor provided support. In *The Oregon Statesman*, Sprague noted that arguments against the bill were based on "freedom of association," and observed, "there are many crimes committed in the name of freedom; and discrimination is one of them." Sprague urged passage, concluding, "In good conscience we cannot do other than respect fundamental rights."  

The position was consistent with previous Sprague editorials on civil rights. In 1949 he had supported the Legislature's fair employment practices act, and he had argued for tolerance in cases of mixed-race marriage, outlawed in Oregon until 1951.

Sprague's position prevailed in the Senate, which voted down three minority reports before finally passing the public accommodations bill 21-9 on March 16. The real battle was yet to come, and Oregon's editors would be split on a proper course of action. Perhaps the most unusual—and unfortunate—element of the editorial debate was not that the state's newspapers were split but that the Portland dailies, which served most of the state's minority population, remained silent during the entire affair.

**Editorial Opposition Forms**

Sprague's cross-town rival, the *Capital-Journal*, opened the campaign to defeat the civil rights bill with an editorial the day after Senate passage. Asserting that discrimination against religious and racial minorities was on the wane in Oregon, the *C-J* proclaimed the measure undemocratic, and a loss of freedom. Such
laws, said the \textit{C-J}, "are no more a part of democracy than the compulsory regimentation practiced against racial and religious minorities by the nazis and communists." The editorial also charged that the measure discriminated against businesses singled out in the legislation.\textsuperscript{42}

Authorship of the editorial is difficult to establish. George Putnam had sold the newspaper in 1953 to Bernard Mainwaring, but was still writing many of the editorials, with Robert Letts Jones. Putnam probably wrote the civil rights editorial, for he relished a battle with Sprague and the editorial sentiment was typical of Putnam at this stage in his long and colorful career.\textsuperscript{43}

The \textit{Capital-Journal}'s editorial was the base for an ensuing editorial against the measure in the Grants Pass \textit{Daily Courier}. Both the \textit{C-J} and \textit{Courier} editorials were then cited by the Albany \textit{Democrat-Herald}.\textsuperscript{44}

News coverage of the measure intensified after Senate passage and the likelihood of a more difficult House struggle. Opponents were turning their tactics in a familiar direction; increasingly, the hotel-restaurant-beverage lobby was calling for referral of the measure to a statewide vote. In a state accustomed to voting on several initiatives or referendums every election, passing a thorny issue to the people was a time-honored way to avoid difficult votes.
The House Debate

In the House, the measure was sent to the State and Federal Affairs Committee, traditionally dubbed the "Speaker's Committee," because it was normally heavily weighted with representatives who were close to the Speaker and could be counted upon to follow his wishes. The chairman was ambitious young Mark O. Hatfield of Salem, in only his second session but already making moves toward the statewide career he would begin in 1956 and continue for four decades. Hatfield had six Republicans on his committee and only one Democrat, Maurine Neuberger. But Republicans were split and there was sentiment to send the measure to the voters.

Editorial backing for the measure came from the Eugene Register-Guard on April 3, as a key hearing neared in Hatfield's committee. Tugman took on the issue of referendum, urging the Legislature to pass the bill and not duck responsibility. Editorials on the measure now counted three newspapers in favor (Register-Guard, Oregon Statesman and East-Oregonian), and three opposed (Capital-Journal, Democrat-Herald and Daily Courier). The state's big dailies remained silent. But in a Legislature controlled by downstate Republicans and generally occupied with the interests of the state outside Portland, there was strong influence from editors outside the state's largest city.
The Road Once Taken

Repeating his role in the 1951 teachers' oath controversy, Sprague again made the walk from his Commercial Street office to the Capitol to press personally for the legislation at an April 7 hearing. Sprague apparently did not involve himself in the intense personal lobbying he used to defeat the 1951 loyalty oath, but Maurine Neuberger remembers that he was in the gallery when the vote was taken in the House.45

Passage in the House was surprisingly easy, after the narrow (4-3) margin by which the measure passed Hatfield's committee. The primary vote came as predicted, on a motion to send the measure to voters via referendum. But the House rejected the idea, 39-18 and then passed the public accommodations bill, 46 to 11. In a follow-up column, Sprague said the action established "standards for treating human beings as individuals and not as a race."46

It was not until the Legislature had adjourned that the Portland dailies offered editorial comment, then only a tepid mention by the Oregon Journal in a list of reasons to congratulate the 47th Assembly.47 The state's largest daily, The Oregonian, serving the vast majority of Oregon's minority population, never mentioned the bill or the debate editorially.

The silence is hard to explain, given the newspapers' support in 1950 of a Portland public accommodations bill. But the defeat of that measure at the hands of Portland voters may have
frightened the Portland papers, which had stepped out ahead of their readers on this volatile subject. *The Oregonian* and the *Journal* were locked in intense competition in the early fifties, and the editors may have feared that taking a stand on this issue would result in a loss of circulation. To oppose the civil rights bill would have been a direct contradiction of their position in 1950; silence may have been the safe option.

Once again it was left to downstate editors Sprague, Tugman and Forrester to carry the cause of personal liberty. And once again Sprague went beyond his editorial page and carried the cause to the Legislature in person. In 1953, as in 1951, the three editors were successful in their combined approach.

**Editor and Community**

Personal leadership on the part of an editor was an integral part of the profession in the fifties, and many of Oregon's editors wore several hats. This was particularly true of editors who were also publishers and owners, such as Sprague and Forrester. Tugman was not an owner but his relationship with his publisher was unique among Oregon editors. Personal leadership was enhanced if an editor spoke with the authority of a business owner, for most of the small cities of Oregon at this time were governed by businessmen. It was still a time when an aspiring young politician could be hurt by the charge that he had "never met a payroll."
The personal leadership exercised by editors in the loyalty oath and civil rights campaigns was enhanced by their standing in their communities. In Sprague's case, that community was the Oregon political community. Sprague had paid his dues by serving as governor and also on numerous high-level commissions, and he did his homework. Politicians who might disagree with his liberal views respected his work in the trenches and would not dream of challenging his integrity. He also carried a personal air of authority that could make a wavering legislator reluctant to challenge him.

Could Sprague have exercised the personal leadership if he had not served as governor? Possibly, because of the power of his intellect, but his experience as governor and in the later positions that were open to him as a former governor gave him insights that were not available to other community editors. An editor in Salem, with its handful of non-white residents, would have little direct contact with racial minorities in 1953. But Sprague's views on civil rights were shaped in part by his friendship with Eleanor Roosevelt when they served together at the United Nations in 1952, and his UN assignment dealt with South Africa. In like manner, Sprague's concern for the return of Japanese Americans was forged in his experiences as governor, an experience no other editor could have had.

Tugman and Forrester in 1951 brought to the loyalty oath their community ties with Oregon's major universities. Sprague brought to that issue his own history as a teacher, an experience
that through his long editorial career would see him constantly supportive of education and educators.

Portland's editorial boards of three or four men were certainly not without experience, but they were attempting to speak as a collective voice rather than as a single writer, and in a committee the influence of any one experience or association is certain to be diluted. Sprague, Tugman and Forrester editorialized knowing they spoke for the ownership and knowing they would bear the responsibility of the editorial. The personal nature of the editorial was easily translated into personal involvement in an issue or campaign. The same did not apply to the relative anonymity of the Portland editorial boards.
Notes to Chapter 7


3Richard L. Neuberger to E. B. MacNaughton, 12 March 1951, Box 37/5, Neuberger Papers, University of Oregon; Box 29E, MacNaughton Papers, Reed College.

4"Statement," in Neuberger letter to MacNaughton, 13 March 1951, Box 29E, MacNaughton Papers.

5Neuberger to MacNaughton, 13 March 1951, Box 29E, MacNaughton Papers.

6MacNaughton to Neuberger, 20 March 1951, Box 29E, MacNaughton Papers.

7"Confidential Report" of Division of Subversive Activities, American Legion, Department of Oregon, dated 29 February 1963; copy in Box 2, Robert W. Frazier Papers, University of Oregon.


11"Know this as Tyranny," *East Oregonian* (14 April 1951): 8.

12Copies of the legislation as introduced and amended are contained in the Senate and House Journals of the 1951 Oregon
Legislature, and in the files of the committees assigned to consider the legislation. All are housed in the Oregon State Archives.


15 Richard Neuberger to E. B. MacNaughton, 24 April 1951, Box 37/5, Neuberger Papers, University of Oregon.


20 M. Neuberger interview.

21 The professors were Jack Pierce, Stan Ashmer and Alfred Sheets; minutes of House State & Federal Affairs Committee, 3 May 1951.

22 Sprague to Bauer, 4 October 1960, Bauer papers.


24 Hatfield interview.
25 Sprague's last meeting with Hatfield was after the final hearing, at which Sprague spoke; Hatfield had voted with the majority supporting the bill when it was sent to the House floor after the hearing, so the public record shows no change of position on his part. Of course, had the bill come to a House vote he would have had a chance at that time to vote in opposition.

26 Malcolm Bauer, "The Northwest's Most Influential Editor."

27 M. Neuberger interview.


31 Quintard Taylor, "The Great Migration: The Afro-American Communities of Seattle and Portland during the 1940s," Arizona and the West 23 (Summer 1981): 117.

32 Ibid, 118.


38 Records of the legislative journey of SB 169 may be found in the Senate and House Journals of the 1953 Oregon Legislature and in the records of committees that considered the legislation.


45 M. Neuberger interview.

46 "It Seems To Me," *Statesman* (15 April 1953): 1, 4.

Chapter 8

Oregon Editors Confront Joe McCarthy, 1950-54

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy produced in Oregon editors a near-unanimity that was lacking in previous encounters with the Red Scare, loyalty oaths and investigation of subversives in general. Oregon editors, almost to a man, loathed McCarthy. Editors who in 1954 would approve HUAC's inquisition of Reed College faculty, and who had in 1949 egged-on the firing of professors at Oregon State College, found in McCarthy a man who transgressed their boundaries of proper behavior. The senator was not welcome in Oregon, and his tactics were generally condemned.

What was the difference between McCarthy and Representative Harold Velde, the chairman of HUAC? In the eyes of at least some editors, it was the methods used by the inquisitor, rather than the inquisition itself. Velde, hauling witnesses before his committee to take the Fifth Amendment, was in his Portland appearance unfailingly polite, seemingly respectful of the legislative process. Unlike McCarthy, he made no arm-flailing speeches, waved no lists of disloyal subjects.

When Velde left Oregon after his June 1954 hearings, his praises were sung by several editors, as we will see in greater detail in Chapter 9. Velde's crushing of careers escaped
reprobation. In contrast, the mere appearance of McCarthy at a Republican group's picnic in 1951 sent Oregon editors to their typewriters to both condemn McCarthy and assure readers that his GOP hosts were not an official arm of the party.

That was a major part of the problem for many Oregon editors: McCarthy was not their type of Republican, and his attacks were seen as destroying the liberal wing of the party, the ideological home of most Oregon editors. Although several of the Oregon editors had Midwestern roots, most were internationalist in their outlook and supported the Dewey-Warren-Eisenhower wing of the party. A favorite politician, until he foresook the party in 1952, was Senator Wayne L. Morse, and as regularly as the editors deplored McCarthy they praised Morse for his liberal stand on issues, urging him to take greater leadership in the anti-McCarthy movement. Morse was a signer of the "Declaration of Conscience" authored by Senator Margaret Chase Smith, and in 1954 would vote to censure McCarthy. He had solid backing from Oregon editors in his opposition to McCarthy.

Oregon editors differed, then, from colleagues in other regions in presenting a common front against McCarthy. Only the Oregon City Enterprise-Courier, and on one occasion the Klamath Falls Herald and News, had anything good to say for McCarthy. And in both cases other editors rebuked their errant colleagues, taking the view that McCarthy was bad for the Republican Party. Several factors were at play in the creation of Oregon's anti-McCarthy press.
The state had only one outside owner, and S. I. Newhouse did not impose editorial control on *The Oregonian*. Oregon lacked any outlet for the nation's most notorious McCarthy backers: the Hearst and Scripps-Howard newspaper chains, and the newspapers published by Robert R. McCormick and Eleanor M. Patterson.

The closeness of Oregon editors—the state was small, personal contact was easy and nearly all dailies were read by colleagues—was a factor as well. Editors sometimes were accused of writing for each other on affairs of state, and a pro-McCarthy stand would not wear well with the most influential editors. When Walter May in Oregon City after the 1950 election credited McCarthy with Republican wins in Congress, Charles A. Sprague roasted May in a strongly-worded rebuke.¹ Others could expect the same treatment. When Frank Jenkins in Klamath Falls included praise for McCarthy in a column, he was taken to task by Robert Ruhl in Medford.² Sprague and Ruhl were the state's senior editors at the time.

The issue of McCarthy's Republican affiliation grew most intense in 1951, when the senator was invited to address a Portland picnic sponsored by a Republican group. Editors stressed the unofficial nature of the group—it was not the Republican Party of Oregon, but an informal organization of Republicans. While this distinction may have been lost on many readers, it was clearly a point that editors wished to emphasize—nearly every
editorial discussing McCarthy's 1951 Portland appearance stressed the unofficial nature of the GOP host.

Oregon editors paid a great deal of attention to McCarthy in 1950 and 1951, but their interest declined after McCarthy's visit to Portland in 1951. When Oregon Republican leaders resisted a McCarthy visit during the 1952 campaign, they were praised by editors, but in general McCarthy did not make frequent appearances in editorials in 1953 and 1954. When the senator was discussed, it was with disapproval, and often with the fervent hope that President Eisenhower or Senate Republican liberals would discipline the Wisconsin senator. Again, McCarthy was treated as a GOP embarrassment, as if the editors were speaking to a Republican choir rather than to their entire readership.

Oregon's editors depended upon national news services and syndicated columns for coverage of the nation's capital, and for much of the fodder for their editorials on McCarthy and McCarthyism. An examination of the national media climate is essential, therefore, to understand the Oregon press in this period.

Although the national press had been deeply involved in prior anti-subversion efforts, particularly the Dies Committee andHUAC, the appearance of McCarthy in 1950 brought relations between press and anti-subversion campaigns to a new level. McCarthy proved to be a genius in obtaining news coverage, and the press was forced to reconsider the doctrine of objectivity, which for at least a generation had been unchallenged as a tenet of journalism.
The period known as the McCarthy era would see a deep split in national press opinion. From the beginning of his career, McCarthy had been resisted by strong editors—dating to his Wisconsin duels with the Milwaukee Journal and Madison Capital-Times. But also from the beginning he would have editorial backers who saw him as a blunt weapon to rout the communist evil, or perhaps simply as a populist-style voice making for good headlines.

In his examination of press coverage of McCarthy, Edwin Bayley concluded that the press helped McCarthy come to power and also played a major role in his decline. Bayley accused the press, particularly the wire services and smaller papers depending upon them, of failing to give the American people a full account of what McCarthy was doing and to probe his charges. But Bayley also credited the press with applying constant pressure that eventually brought his downfall.³

The Emergence of Joe McCarthy

Americans united during World War II against common foes and behind a popular president. Internationally, a union of convenience was forged with the Soviet Union, but it was an uneasy alliance quickly shattered by events immediately following the war. The Soviet expansion into Central Europe, the countering Marshall Plan offered by President Truman, and the victory of communist forces in China all served to build tensions and create the Cold War.
The international climate fueled American anti-subversion forces although domestic communism had peaked in the 1930s and was virtually non-existent by 1950. The Popular Front had vanished, organized labor purged its communists, and the desperate search for economic solutions that marked the Depression was replaced by a pell-mell rush to spend new wealth in a goods-scarce market. Commenting on the lack of genuine communists within the United States, particularly within government, Richard Rovere observed, "This sort of talk would have been nonsense at any time; in 1951 and 1952 it was assinine."⁴

Despite the lack of a domestic threat, the international military threat was real, and President Truman managed to link the two with his 1947 loyalty oath order for federal employees, which he tied to the danger of international spying but which soon came to cover a wide variety of domestic activities.⁵ Similar oaths soon emerged in a variety of other organizations, public and private. "Loyalty Day" became a popular holiday and patriotic organizations such as the American Legion enjoyed extraordinary power.

The national election of 1948 was important to the rise of McCarthy and the "ism" that would bear his name. Truman's gritty campaign and upset victory left Republicans in shock, and fueled the Republican right, which had urged a stronger anti-communist platform than was acceptable to nominee Thomas E. Dewey. The issue of domestic communism was suddenly more
attractive, and by 1950 the Republican right had found a leader in Joe McCarthy.

McCarthy was a small-town politician who in the 1946 Republican primary defeated Senator Robert LaFollette Jr., son of the famed "Fighting Bob" of Progressive Era fame. McCarthy's campaign hinted at future red-baiting. He took advantage of an unsolicited endorsement of Democrat Howard McMurray by the Wisconsin Communist Party to launch a series of attacks designed to paint McMurray red.6

By 1950, with a somewhat lackluster and uneven record after three years in the Senate, McCarthy was searching for a re-election platform. He burst on the national scene with a February 9, 1950, speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, the first stop on a national Lincoln Day tour. Republicans had given the junior senator a series of "minor league" stops, while GOP speakers with larger followings were in the major cities.

For his speech, McCarthy relied on extensive notes provided by Willard Edwards, a Chicago Tribune reporter who had just completed a series on communism.7 It would not be his last such boost from friendly reporters and publishers. The Wheeling speech, in which McCarthy brandished a paper which he said contained 205 names of people who were security risks within the State Department, began the tide that would be labeled McCarthyism. As with many of McCarthy's early statements, there is some doubt as to exactly what was said in Wheeling; a
radio tape was accidentally erased, and the only press account was condensed by the Associated Press.

As McCarthy worked his way through his Lincoln Day schedule, the number of security risks was reduced to fifty-seven (in Salt Lake City), then increased to eighty-one on the floor of the Senate later in the month. Regardless of the numbers, McCarthy and the nation were launched on a wild ride that would continue nearly five years and result in untold damage to reputations, careers and democratic institutions.

McCarthy was widely credited for engineering the defeat of key Democratic senators in 1950, giving the GOP control of the Senate and McCarthy the committee chairmanship he needed to advance his attacks. By 1952 McCarthy was riding high, but the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower meant the party no longer needed Joe; he had become an embarrassment.

The reign of Joe McCarthy ended as abruptly as it began. By 1954, McCarthy was dealing with a serious alcohol problem, and his behavior increasingly embarrassed Republican leaders and editors. Striking for ever-larger targets, McCarthy fixed the U.S. Army in his sights, and by implication drew in a White House now under the command of a retired military hero. Nationally televised hearings continued through much of the first half of 1954, and badly damaged McCarthy. The American press, at times deeply divided over the man and his crusade, began to unite behind his detractors.
In July a motion of censure was introduced by Senator Ralph Flanders (R-Vt). After a rancorous debate following months of hearings and public argument, the Senate on December 2, 1954 censured McCarthy by a vote of 67-22. McCarthy would remain a senator for three more years, but without his committee chairmanship, the principal source of his power. A crushed man and an alcoholic, he died May 1, 1957, still a senator but no longer a force to be recognized.\textsuperscript{10}

He virtually disappeared from the nation's newspapers after his censure, but McCarthy had exposed some critical weaknesses in the American press' ability to deal with threats to civil liberties.

\textbf{The Wire Services and McCarthy}

Press attention has always accompanied anti-subversion campaigns, which are easily personalized and provide a certain level of scandal appealing to readers. The press puts the name of the chairman in headlines, and the press seizes on provocative labels ("Reds," "Commies") for headlines. But in the case of McCarthy, and to some extent his counterparts on the Dies Committee and HUAC, the press also found itself manipulated by politicians who understood the weaknesses of the established norms of journalism that were in effect in the middle part of the twentieth century.

Among those norms was the doctrine of objectivity, which embraced the idea of a detached observer presenting to the
public the information needed by citizens to make rational decisions in a democratic manner. Objectivity meant reliance on "experts" or those in a position to know; inevitably it was skewed toward official sources, and resulted in a preponderance of coverage of the comments of elected and appointed officials. Although the doctrine also called for seeking out contrary views, often these views appeared in a later story, or at the end of a story dominated by an official source.

This was particularly true of the national wire services, which provided the bulk of national coverage for the nation's small and mid-sized dailies. As the fifties opened, the nation's dominant wire service, the Associated Press, was in a struggle with United Press and International News Service, the latter a division of the Hearst newspaper empire. In the days following McCarthy's Wheeling speech, 85 percent of the daily newspaper coverage came from the wires, and virtually all radio coverage was based on wire reports.11

Wire reporters, under intense pressure not only from competition but from deadlines around the clock, had little time to check the latest charges from McCarthy or other publicity-seeking officials. Hasty calls were made to those charged, but deadlines did not often allow proper follow-up reporting, and stories were heavily weighted toward the charge, regardless of its validity. Wire service reporters, trying to serve both morning and afternoon clients, desperately searched for fresh leads, and McCarthy was always willing to provide new charges and quotes.
His willingness to exploit wire deadlines gave McCarthy his greatest advantage in terms of newspaper coverage, reporters felt.12

Although newspapers were beginning to accept the concept of interpretive reporting, for the wire services the pressure of deadlines and the need for a fresh lead for each news cycle rendered moot the question of independent analysis. Not until April, 1954, during the McCarthy-Army hearings and after Edward R. Murrow's "See It Now" program on CBS-TV, did AP file a series of interpretive reports examining McCarthy from his early days in Wisconsin through his controversies in Washington.13

For newspapers in Oregon, the wire services were essential; none maintained a fulltime Washington bureau in the fifties, although all used a variety of syndicated columns. Editors read other material, of course, but their daily fare was from the wires.

**McCarthy's Newspaper Friends**

The nation's newspapers came to the McCarthy issue with a history of dealing with other red-baiters, from Martin Dies and various state organizations to HUAC in the post-war era.

In the thirties, various right-wing organizations were launched against the New Deal, including the Liberty League, which was followed in 1941 by the Committee for Constitutional Government. Among the supporters of these actions were press moguls William Randolph Heart, Robert McCormick and Frank
Gannett. Within the Hearst organization and at other papers of similar bent, a hierarchy of editors steeped in the lore of anti-communism was building as early as the Thirties.14

The Hearst press was already targeting college professors in the thirties, focusing on California, where Hearst had powerful voices in both Los Angeles and San Francisco. The campaign spread to several other states where Hearst had newspapers, and included assaults on such noted institutions as the University of Chicago and Harvard.15

Consequently, when McCarthy entered the scene there was already a coterie of experienced red-baiters within the press corps, and they would prove useful to McCarthy's cause. Following his Wheeling speech, McCarthy appealed to W. R. Hearst, Jr., a social friend. As described later by Hearst, McCarthy requested help in supplying something to back up the infamous list of 205 subversives. Hearst supplied more than a little help—he gave McCarthy his chief assistant at the New York Journal-American. J. B. Matthews had been a Dies Committee staff member after undergoing a conversion from communism, and when he left the committee he took with him to the Hearst organization a copy of "Appendix 9," an unpublished list of some 10,000 people allegedly linked to various red fronts. At the Hearst organization, he was joined by others who were deeply involved in the search for subversives: Howard Rushmore, a recanted Daily Worker reporter; Larry Kerley, an ex-FBI agent; George Sokolsy, a former Trotsky friend and now a right-wing
columnist; and several newsmen who had made red-hunting their specialty. The Hearst team used Matthews' list and other sources to prime McCarthy for Senate hearings that followed his 1950 speaking tour. Throughout his career, McCarthy would funnel material to Hearst insiders, assuring prominent placement in Hearst papers and the INS wire. Hearst columnists Westbrook Pegler, Fulton Lewis Jr. and Walter Winchell were widely published, and rabidly anti-communist.  

At the state level, Hearst newspapers were particularly active, as noted in Chapter 3. In 1952, the Hearst chain included eighteen dailies in twelve cities, with a total circulation of 5,240,272 weekdays and 7,475,649 Sundays. In over half of the circulation areas, major anti-subversion drives had been conducted in the post-war era: New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, Baltimore, Chicago and Detroit. In Milwaukee Hearst's Sentinel backed McCarthy himself. Hearst's syndicated columnists were among the most-read in the nation. No other publisher did as much to build and sustain McCarthyism.

Hearst had plenty of help in keeping the movement active, particularly from the McCormick and Patterson newspapers. Willard Edwards, a reporter for McCormick's flagship, the Chicago Tribune, helped provide material for McCarthy's Wheeling speech, and aided the senator at various times during this period. George Waters, a reporter for the Washington Times-Herald (Patterson), also helped write the Wheeling speech.
Thus McCarthy in many ways had the best of both worlds—he took advantage of most reporters' adherence to the doctrine of objectivity, and in special cases he was able to use the skills of those who forsook objectivity to become partisans.

**McCarthy's Newspaper Foes**

From the beginning, McCarthy had staunch opposition right in his backyard, as the Milwaukee Journal and the Madison Capital-Times aggressively investigated his past and his claims, and opposed his tactics in Washington. And as McCarthy began his crusade against subversives, he developed other powerful enemies in the press.

Among those enemies were the most respected newspapers of the nation. Jack Anderson and Roland May examined the editorial positions of the ten newspapers selected as the nation's best in a poll of the nation's publishers, and found all ten to be sharply critical of the Wisconsin senator. Many of the papers were Republican in outlook, as was another formidable McCarthy foe, Henry Luce of Time and Life magazines. Luce, a key member of the "China lobby" and a staunch anti-Communist, could not abide McCarthy's tactics.

McCarthy had his own list of "left wing press," and it contained some of the nation's leading conservative publishers; eight of the ten "best" newspapers, Time magazine, and four other newspapers, including the Denver Post and the Portland Oregonian.
The Oregonian's place on "the list" was puzzling, for the paper was neither "left wing" by any definition, nor particularly hard on McCarthy, although it did criticize him. Malcolm Bauer, who with Herbert Lundy wrote most of the anti-McCarthy editorials, assumed that McCarthy on a Portland visit happened upon a critical editorial; otherwise, the newspaper did not stand out.20

McCarthy's Oregon list might have included, rather than The Oregonian, downstate editors Charles A. Sprague of The Oregon Statesman and William Tugman of the Eugene Register-Guard. Both were consistent in their denunciation of McCarthy, and Tugman in 1953 played an additional role in the controversy.

The McCarthy Era Begins, Oregon Reacts

Oregon editors did not react immediately to McCarthy's "Lincoln Day" speaking tour in February 1950, during which he unveiled the tactics that would soon become familiar to Americans. By the time McCarthy reached the West, Oregon newspapers were covering his tour, however, and his Reno speech on February 12 was widely reported.21 Newspapers in Oregon were as fascinated as their counterparts elsewhere, with headlines proclaiming "Red" and "Commie;" McCarthy was to dominate Oregon news columns for the next four years. Editorially, a pattern of opposition to McCarthy and his tactics was in place within weeks of the Wheeling speech, and it remained intact throughout McCarthy's career.
Before 1950 was out, the state's 15 largest dailies would print 34 editorials on McCarthy and McCarthyism, and 27 would be critical. Another five were neutral, and only two in the Oregon City Enterprise-Courier would favor McCarthy. The large Portland papers were quiet—The Oregonian writing one neutral editorial, the Journal one critical and one neutral editorial. Twenty-one of the 34 editorials would come from the typewriter of Charles A. Sprague of The Oregon Statesman, the state's most respected Republican editor and the editor who would take the strongest and most consistent stands against McCarthyism.

Charles A. Sprague on McCarthy

A man not given to small talk or suffering fools lightly, Sprague was personally affronted by Joseph McCarthy—as an American, as a Republican, and as someone who believed deeply in civility and proper form in society and government. McCarthy met none of Sprague's tests of propriety, and beyond that was seen by Sprague as a dangerous demagogue who was capable of bringing out the worst in people. Sprague became a crusader in opposing McCarthy. In an era when editorial crusades were rare, he went after McCarthy with a zeal unmatched by any of his Oregon colleagues.

His advocacy was influential with other editors; Sprague was an editor to be reckoned with, and no Oregon editor of his generation was as frequently quoted. This was particularly true
of his editorials and columns on McCarthy, which regularly showed up on other editorial pages.

Uncharacteristically, Sprague's first effort was sardonic humor, a tactic he rarely employed. Sprague had a wry sense of humor, and a hearty belly laugh, but was seldom sardonic or sarcastic. His March 1 editorial, the first notice paid McCarthy by an Oregon editor, cited some of the reasons for President Truman to withhold loyalty files from McCarthy. Sprague concluded:

The inquiries may turn up some dirt but the intradepartmental screening has been so severe it is not probable that any 57 reds will be flushed. The inquiry will make headlines, and consume time in which the senate might otherwise spend in passing bad legislation. So the country should suffer it.\(^\text{22}\)

Sprague's almost-flippant reference may have been based in part on his own experience as a member of one of President Truman's regional loyalty boards screening federal employees. Or McCarthy may simply have caught Sprague off guard, as he did many editors who were not prepared for the severity of the McCarthy campaign. In his study of 129 dailies' reaction to McCarthy's Lincoln Day tour, Edwin Bayley found that Sprague was the only editor attempting a humorous or sarcastic approach to the affair.\(^\text{23}\) It would be Sprague's only use of the tactic when dealing with McCarthy over the ensuing five years.

On March 28, 1950, Sprague launched a strong defense of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, urging "responsible, patriotic republicans to see that Acheson is not lost," and imploring Senators Morse and Henry Cabot Lodge to take leadership roles.\(^\text{24}\)
Two days later, Tugman in Eugene echoed the theme, urging Republicans to take a positive approach to foreign policy and reject McCarthy.25

Sprague had met briefly with Acheson two days before his editorial, while on an Eastern trip. A consistent supporter of the embattled Acheson, Sprague in a March 26 column observed, "I have been so disgusted with the campaign of political irresponsibles against Mr. Acheson and the state department I wanted to assure him of one citizen's confidence in him and his work."26 The 1950 visit was arranged by Carlton Savage, a Salem native working with the State Department's Vital Policy Advisory Committee. Two years later, Sprague would be appointed an alternate delegate to the United Nations, an action in which Acheson is sure to have been involved.27

In both his March 28 editorial and later on December 2, Sprague used as his springboard an editorial in the Oregon City Enterprise-Courier, edited by Walter W. R. May. The E-C was the descendant of a pioneer newspaper, but had long since lost its lustre and under May was well to the right of other Oregon dailies. May was one of McCarthy's few Oregon editorial supporters in 1950. The editorial that most incensed Sprague was on November 29, when May alleged that Republican wins in the November election were largely due to McCarthy and despite "Salem and Portland editors" who failed to support McCarthy.28 Sprague's response was blunt:
To the extent that republican victories in the late election were the result of McCarthy's charges and campaigning, it should be an occasion for republican shame and humiliation. For McCarthy failed miserably to prove his charges. . . . As far as the political effect is concerned, months ago The Statesman said the McCarthy charges in the surheated atmosphere over communism would have effect and probably win votes for the republican party. The technique of propaganda is well recognized. Hitler put it very simply: repeating the Big Lie often enough finally becomes convincing. If the E-C relishes victory by employment of that technique it is quite welcome. The Statesman regrets it . . . . The Statesman assures the Enterprise-Courier that it is not opportunistic, that it still regards McCarthy as a purveyor of falsehood and the method he employed as a menace to democratic government.29

Sprague's editorial was reprinted four days later by Robert Ruhl in Medford.30

In addition to his tilt with Walter May, Sprague also differed with the Oregon Journal, which opposed McCarthy personally but endorsed many McCarthyite tactics. The issue was the April appearance of Louis Budenz, one of the former communists McCarthy cultivated for "inside" information on his targets, in this case Owen Lattimore. Sprague in an April 21 column saw Budenz as a failure in that effort.31 The Journal the same day proclaimed Budenz was "in the know," and urged stiffer prosecution of his charges.32 A week later, Sprague again noted contradictions in Budenz' testimony, adding, "The score at present is that none of McCarthy's charges have been made to stick."33

These exchanges with other editors typify Sprague's use of other editorial comment. He seldom reprinted an entire editorial
from another source in Oregon. Occasionally he used editorial comment from the *San Francisco Chronicle*, *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, *Christian Science Monitor* or a national magazine, but if an Oregon editor was quoted, it was usually in truncated form, and often as a springboard for rebuttal. He used editorial exchanges to spark debate rather than to buttress his own views.

During 1950 Sprague was quoted more frequently than any other editor. Table 3 reveals that of the state's fifteen largest dailies, ten were quoted on other editorial pages during 1950, and of the total of forty-four quoted editorials, exactly half were from Sprague's pen. Additionally, Sprague was quoted in half a dozen different publications, the only editor quoted by more than three peers. Although Sprague was quoted with regularity, it was almost never to prompt disagreement—editors used a Sprague quote to buttress their views. Six of the reprinted Sprague columns or editorials were on McCarthy or subjects linked to McCarthyism.
Table 3
Number and Source of Reprinted Editorials in Fifteen Oregon Dailies, 1950

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<th>Source newspaper</th>
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<td>1. The Oregonian</td>
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<td>2. Oregon Journal</td>
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<td>3. Eugene Register-Guard</td>
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<td>4. Salem Capital-Journal</td>
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<td>5. Oregon Statesman</td>
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<td>6. Kl Falls Herald/News</td>
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<td>7. Medford Mail-Tribune</td>
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<td>8. Coos Bay Times</td>
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<td>9. Roseburg News-Review</td>
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<td>10. Albany Dem-Herald</td>
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<td>11. Daily Astorian</td>
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<td>12. Pendleton E-Oregonian</td>
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<td>13. Grants Pass Courier</td>
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<td>14. Bend Bulletin</td>
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<td>15. Corvallis Gaz-Times</td>
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<td>Total reprinted, quoted</td>
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A lively exchange of editorial views came during February's debate over air raid warnings, when Sprague and George Putnam at the Capital-Journal criticized civil defense plans calling for elaborate air raid protection. Civil defense was a major issue in the Cold War period, and for the West Coast was reminiscent of World War II jitters over potential Japanese attacks. Sprague, as governor of Oregon from 1939 to 1943, had played an active role in that period's civil defense activities, which gave his comments on the latest preparations particular relevance.

Sprague's remarks on February 14 drew reaction from three colleagues. The Oregonian, in a page-one story, quoted extensively from Sprague's column, including his observations that much of the civil defense program from World War II had been "ill advised." The news item was followed by an approving editorial the following day. When Sprague continued his attack on February 17, the Register-Guard quoted him in an editorial criticizing the defense plans. An opposing view came from the Oregon Journal, on February 27, criticizing the Salem editors for "pooh-poohing" the reactivation of the air raid warning plan. Sprague did not reply to the Journal, but Putnam responded in a same-day editorial accusing the Journal of missing the C-J editor's point.34

The exchange was instructive in several ways:

1) Sprague was capable of making front-page news with his comments, a characteristic not shared by his colleagues.
2) When editors shared Sprague's views, they used his name, invoking his background as governor and editor.

3) On the rare cases when editors disagreed publicly with him, they did not refer to him by name, citing only the Statesman. The Oregon Journal referred to "Some upstate editors, notably the editors of The Oregon Statesman and Capital-Journal at Salem."

Because of Sprague's standing with other editors, his views on a controversial topic such as McCarthy could be expected to carry weight; that he chose not only to oppose McCarthy but to do so with a vengeance was a major element in limiting McCarthyism in Oregon. Certainly the senator himself was not greeted--even by Republicans--with the warmth he received elsewhere. His one Oregon appearance brought no editorial support, and limited public response.

**McCarthy in Oregon**

When McCarthy was invited to Oregon for an August 25, 1951 speech at a Multnomah Republican Club picnic, Oregon editors were hostile, and scolded the club for its invitation. As would increasingly be the case, it was apparent that Republican editors were embarrassed by the presence in the state of a man they thought was dividing the party--their party.

Sprague opened the barrage with an August 13 column, which was then quoted by the East-Oregonian and Mail-Tribune. After citing some of McCarthy's false claims, Sprague concluded:
We believe in free speech in Oregon, so let this adept at the technique of the Big Lie have his say, and let who will attend. But if the republican party is to endorse McCarthyism it deserves to be laid in a grave both wide and deep. And to win the presidency by condoning McCarthy's tactics would be to obtain office under false pretenses.\(^{35}\)

Sprague returned to the issue on August 24, the eve of McCarthy's visit, quoting extensively from material printed in the Madison, Wisconsin, Capital-Times by editor Bill Evjue, and concluding, "Because The Statesman regards him as a mendacious demagogue it protests his appearance in Oregon as a guest of an organization identified with the republican party."\(^{36}\)

Editorial opposition also appeared in the Register-Guard, which was then quoted by the Mail-Tribune; and in the Gazette-Times, which was quoted by the East-Oregonian. Other critical editorials appeared in the East-Oregonian and Oregon Journal.

Tugman's two editorials in the Register-Guard echoed Sprague's concern about Republican divisions over McCarthy, and Tugman quoted with obvious approval a Young Republican leader protesting the senator's appearance at the GOP picnic.\(^{37}\) Freeman Holmer, the YR leader and a liberal, reminded Oregonians that McCarthy did not speak for the GOP, only for himself. Holmer's letter to the editor was also printed in the Statesman (August 22) and Oregon Journal (August 23). The Statesman (August 25) and The Oregonian (August 27) printed a similar letter from YR leader Steve Anderson of Salem. Both letters tried to distance the Young Republicans, at that time a liberal force in the party, from
McCarthy. Reader reaction was mixed, with the Portland papers printing a handful of letters, primarily opposed to the McCarthy visit and some echoing the theme that Republicans would be hurt by the association.

Editorials appearing at the time reminded voters that McCarthy was not a Republican official, and did not reflect the type of Republicanism favored by the editor. Bob Ingalls concluded his editorial in the *Gazette-Times*:

> We note with extreme chagrin and embarrassment the Multnomah Republican Club has chosen the loud and malicious Senator Joe McCarthy of Wisconsin to address their picnic at Jantzen Beach. It is doubtful the party could be represented by a worse demagogue . . . .

> It is fortunate that McCarthy will speak only to a gathering of old line Republicans . . . . Since it is unlikely that any political neutrals will attend this Republican rally, McCarthy will probably pull no votes away from the party he unfortunately claims as his own.38

Ingalls' editorial was reprinted in Pendleton. In Medford, Robert Ruhl reprinted both Sprague's column of August 13 and a Tugman editorial of August 19.

*The Oregonian* also pointed out that McCarthy's host, the Multnomah Republican Club, "is not, by the way, an official party organization," and added, "We do not think his techniques will capture the Republican party or have much effect on Republicans in Oregon."39 *The Oregonian* also used the occasion to print a four-part series written by Robert Fleming of the Milwaukee *Journal*, a leading McCarthy critic. Fleming's articles appeared at
about the same time as the Evjue article in the Statesman, giving readers of the state's two morning newspapers a thorough dose of criticism. The Capital-Journal also printed excerpts from the Wisconsin newspapers in an August 22 editorial; although the editorial itself did not take a stand on McCarthy, the excerpted material was uniformly critical.40

The net result of this onslaught was that nearly every newspaper reader in Oregon had been exposed to McCarthy's darker side, and should have known that neither the senator nor his Portland hosts were official representatives of the Republican Party. The message could hardly be clearer: McCarthy is a dangerous demagogue and a rogue Republican not worthy of the party label he bears.

This loud editorial voice appeared to be lost, however, on GOP leadership. Appearing at the McCarthy rally were Governor Douglas McKay and the heads of the state's Republican Party, the Multnomah County Republican Party and the state Young Republicans. National Committeeman Ralph Cake and Committeewoman Olive Cornett were also present. About half a dozen Republican legislators were also on hand. A casual observer might find it hard to differentiate between an "official" Republican welcome for McCarthy and an "unofficial" one; despite the state's editors, top Republicans were in attendance, even if most were circumspect in their comments. The most prominent absentees were members of the state's congressional delegation, all Republicans; three other statewide officials, and the
overwhelming majority of GOP legislators. The rally drew a sparse crowd, estimated at from 1,000 (Statesman) to 2,000 (Oregonian), including a small band of hecklers.41

The McCarthy road show proved to be of modest success—a relatively small crowd for a man who was then dominating the nation’s headlines, stinging criticism from the Republican left, and an unenthusiastic turnout of state Republican figures. It was left to Sprague to sum up the McCarthy appearance in a column the following morning:

But the McCarthy party in Portland Sunday was no love feast. Some 2000 showed up for the picnic but most of them sat on their hands through the speaking. There is a wide clef between the McCarthyites and those disowning his tactics, and the division shows up in state politics.42

McCarthy was divisive, one of the most divisive politicians in the nation’s history. But he divided more than the Republican party; he divided those who lived in the American political system, and nowhere were those divisions more obvious than in the American newspaper business. Editors were torn, publishers worried about the circulation impact of taking one side or the other, reporters felt themselves manipulated by McCarthy and his followers—it was a difficult time for the press.

Reporters with a leftist history feared exposure by McCarthy, and the senator used bullying tactics with national newsmen such as Edward R. Murrow as well as small-town reporters in Wisconsin. Television, feeling its way and uncertain about its role, operated with black lists adopted from film studios,
and employees signed loyalty oaths. America's press was free, but freedom was under attack.

Far from the eastern hub of most of these actions, Oregon was seemingly immune from McCarthy, if not from McCarthyism. But in 1953, with the senator at the height of his power, small-town editor William Tugman found himself briefly in the national spotlight focused on McCarthy.

**Bill Tugman, ASNE and McCarthyism**

Tugman was among those attending the 1953 session of the American Society of Newspaper Editors when ASNE president Basil L. Walters appointed a committee to examine the question of whether McCarthy was purposely intimidating the press, specifically James A. Wechsler, editor of the New York *Post*. The *Post* had pilloried McCarthy in a 17-part series in 1951, and McCarthy subpoenaed Wechsler. Wechsler had been a communist from 1934 to 1937 but he then publicly recanted and took a strongly anti-communist--but politically liberal--stance. There was a strong feeling among news professionals that Wechsler was being harassed not for being an ex-communist but for being a liberal critic of McCarthy.43

Tugman was named to the ASNE committee, chaired by J. Russell Wiggins of the Washington *Post*. Tugman was the only non-metropolitan editor on the panel, and the appointment reflected the growing national reputation of Tugman and the *Register-Guard*. Oregon newspapers at this time had gained
national notice, due to profiles of Sprague in the *Nation* and also Sprague's United Nations appointment; in addition, the University of Oregon journalism faculty were heavy contributors to *Journalism Quarterly* during the fifties, and several of their articles dealt with the Oregon press. As a result, small-town editor Tugman joined the ASNE panel representing both the *Guard* and a state newspaper community that was known outside its borders.

The ASNE was split, however, and the fact that Wechsler was a controversial leftist editor did not help his cause. After several sessions, the committee was unable to agree whether press freedom had been infringed in the Wechsler case. But Tugman, Wiggins and two other editors--Herbert Brucker of the Hartford *Courant* and Eugene C. Pulliam Jr. of the Indianapolis *News*--filed a strong dissent in which they outlined McCarthy's abuse of the press. In a final paragraph they highlighted the dangers:

> Newspapermen, by the very choice of their profession, avail themselves of the privileges and immunities of a free press, guaranteed in the Constitution, and they assume at the same time certain obligations and duties, not the least among which is to defend the freedom of the press against all attack. Where such an invasion of freedom occurs, other citizens may speak or remain silent without being identified with trespass; but the silence of the press is invariably construed, and properly construed, as an indication that no trespass has occurred and its silences inevitably will be summoned to the support of like trespasses in the future. In our opinion, therefore, whatever inconvenience results, whatever
controversy ensures, we are compelled by every command of duty to brand this and every threat to freedom of the press, from whatever sources, as a peril to American freedom.44

McCarthy responded to the ASNE critics by calling for an investigation of Wiggins and the Post. Predictably perhaps, the American press gave more attention to McCarthy's rebuttal than to Wiggins' original statement.45

Lacking a committee majority urging action, the ASNE merely filed the report of its committee, and moved on to a debate at its 1954 convention between pro-McCarthy editor Sam H. Day of Hearst's New York Journal-American and anti-McCarthy editor James Kerney, Jr. of the Trenton Times. Kerney called for the type of double-checking of McCarthy's charges that was recommended by Palmer Hoyt of the Denver Post, and criticized the ASNE for sidestepping the Wechsler issue by referring it to a committee.46

The case of ASNE and the Wechsler incident was typical of press reaction to the abuse of civil liberties during the period. Editors accepted the existence of a domestic communism threat, and were reluctant to go against those who led the charge. In a group as large as ASNE (565 members in 1954), it was inevitable that views would range from right to left, making the search for consensus difficult at best. In the case of Wechsler, who was certainly on the far left of ASNE's ideological spectrum, the matter became more difficult; had he been a pillar of the conservative Republican press, his defense might have been by acclamation.
The ASNE affair, largely unnoticed by readers but of considerable interest to Tugman's editorial colleagues, came during a lull in editorial comment on McCarthy himself. It was almost certainly discussed at the 1953 convention of the Oregon Newspaper Publishers Association. Dean Gordon A. Sabine of the University of Oregon School of Journalism was a keynote speaker, and delivered a strong attack on McCarthy with a warning of his dangers to journalism. The ONPA, which rarely discussed controversial topics in its publication, reprinted major segments of Sabine's talk.47

Republican Editors Look to Ike

McCarthy made no further Oregon appearances and the election of Eisenhower raised hopes by GOP editors that Ike would clean the party's stables of McCarthy and his associates. Sprague in particular never let up on McCarthy, always hopeful that the Republican Party would eventually discipline its errant senator. In 1953, when McCarthy went after Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen, who had been named ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sprague called for Eisenhower to lead the counterattack. "McCarthy has humiliated the administration enough," he wrote, "Eisenhower should make this a showdown fight. McCarthy has asked for it."48 Again, the column was reprinted, the same day by the Medford Mail-Tribune and later by the Bend Bulletin.49 Less than two weeks later, Sprague was back on the attack, urging Eisenhower to move against McCarthy.50
Oregon editors seemed exhausted by the whole McCarthy affair as the senator moved toward his curtain call in 1954. Editorials unanimously disapproved of McCarthy's conduct in the showdown with the Army, and the Register-Guard also expressed its revulsion against the Senate committee selected to examine McCarthy's handling of the Army hearings, terming their report "one of the most worthless public documents ever published . . . . It is a peculiarly cowardly report. It censures the bully boys. But it holds McCarthy himself blameless for monstrous goings on which could not have occurred without his knowledge and assent."51 Sprague reprinted the Eugene editorial on September 5.

When Oregon GOP Chairman Ed Boehnke announced that McCarthy would not be among party headliners invited to Oregon for the 1954 fall campaign, the Register-Guard breathed a sigh of relief, and noted the decision might convince a number of Republicans not to abandon the party.

The fear of party damage was real enough. After dominating the state's politics for most of the century, the Republican Party of Oregon would see in 1954 an opening crack in its fortress, a crack which by 1960 would widen to the point where Oregon had the beginnings of genuine two-party politics. The opening wedge came with the 1954 election of Democrat Richard L. Neuberger to the U.S. Senate and Democrat Edith Green in the Third Congressional District. With Senator Wayne Morse now declaring himself an Independent, the Republican hegemony
so strongly supported by the state's editors was beginning to erode.

For Oregon's Republican leadership, McCarthy was essentially a sideshow conducted far from home. The real concerns were control of the governorship and legislature, and in that respect the party maintained hegemony. Except for a brief two-year Democratic control, Republicans held the governorship from 1938 to 1974, and the legislature was effectively in Republican hands until the 1970s.

But with changes in the Congressional delegation, Oregon's long-quiescent political scene suddenly came to life, and that as much as anything pulled editorial attention away from McCarthy. Beyond a brief and well-publicized visit of HUAC in 1954 and its subsequent fallout at Reed College, McCarthyism took a back seat to local maneuverings and ambitions. It was not that Oregon editors ceased caring about McCarthy after 1952--there was a much better and more important story closer to hand, and the characters were as interesting as they were familiar.

The visit of HUAC in 1954 was a diversion from domestic politics, and it provided one last opportunity for Oregon editors to examine the delicate issues of individual rights that surrounded higher education in the fifties.
Notes to Chapter 8


8 Ibid, 110-13; Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy, 125-30.

9 A detailed description of the Army hearings is in Oshinsky, A Conspiracy so Immense, 355-471.


11 Bayley, Joe McCarthy and the Press, 66.


The series was issued in May, 1954, as a booklet entitled The AP McCarthy Series (New York: Associated Press, 1954).


Griffith, Politics of Fear, 62.

Jack Anderson and Ronald W. May, McCarthy: The Man, the Senator, the "Ism" (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952), 288-90.


Bayley, Joe McCarthy and the Press, 167-68.

The Oregon Statesman gave the Reno speech nearly two full columns under the heading "Sen. McCarthy Climaxes Lincoln Day Talk on 'Traitorous Actions in Government' with Names of Four Persons 'with Communist Connections'" (13 February 1950): 2.

Bayley, Joe McCarthy and the Press, 52.


"It Seems To Me," Statesman (26 March 1950): 1, 4. When Sprague travelled, he wrote regular "travel letters" to his column, a practice begun when he was a weekly editor in Ritzville, Washington, in the World War I era.

Savage also played a role in this appointment, according to Martha Sprague Hurley, Sprague's daughter; interview with author, Berkeley, California, 26 February 1993. Tape in possession of author.


35"It Seems To Me, Statesman (13 August 1951): 1, 4.


42"It Seems To Me," Statesman (29 August 1951): 1, 4.

43The best review of the Wechsler case is Aronson, The Press and the Cold War, which focuses on the case.


45Aronson, The Press and the Cold War, 94.

"McCarthy Tactics Are A Danger To Every Newspaperman, Sabine Tells Convention," *Oregon Publisher* 22 (July 1953): 3.


Chapter 9

Red-Baiting at Reed

Beginning with the return of Japanese Americans and continuing through the loyalty oath threat in 1951 and the civil rights debate of 1953, Oregon editors had frequent occasion to comment on the rights of their fellow citizens. But the issues were local, and the national circus known as McCarthyism played to larger audiences in other states.

But as McCarthy neared his final days of power in 1954, Oregon had its day in the red-hunting spotlight and Oregon editors were forced into the national drama. A June visit of the House Un-American Activities Committee played in two acts, involving the committee's actions and then the after-shock of its visit. By year's end one of the state's most noted colleges had been painted with a red brush, a bitter internal battle had cost one professor his job and resulted in the subsequent resignation of the college president, and a handful of less-known Oregonians had been stripped of their jobs by HUAC charges and newspaper publicity.

The state's editorial community would compromise its defense of civil liberties by defending the institution of Reed College but failing adequately to understand or defend the principle of academic freedom. Once again, Oregon editors came
down on the side of duly constituted authority and supported the civic establishment, of which they were an integral part.

Editors responded to appeals for understanding of Reed's situation when the appeals came from a colleague, *Oregon Journal* managing editor David Eyre. A Reed trustee, Eyre stimulated a rash of editorials backing Reed. A community of editors rallied behind one of their own, and behind a respected institution; insiders were protected. No similar support was extended, however, to Reed faculty when they resisted both HUAC and the Reed board. Reed faculty, individually or as a group, could not match the influence of establishment media and establishment civic leadership and somewhere in the scuffle an important civil liberties battle was lost.

Reed was different because the faculty stood up for their colleagues, something that had not happened at Oregon State or at many other campuses. Ellen Schrecker, in her extensive investigation of McCarthyism on campus, concluded that Reed was unique among colleges because of the position taken by faculty:

In fact, if we view academic freedom in its functional sense, as the faculty's control over its own hiring and promotion, then Reed may well have had the only real academic freedom case of the McCarthy period. For Reed was the only school at which the faculty openly disagreed with the trustees and administration about the basic criteria for employment. At every other school the issue was less clear, for at every other school the faculty was willing to impose some kind of a political test on itself.\(^1\)
The Reed affair presented Oregon editors with other new twists to the familiar campus redhunts. Unlike most besieged campuses, Reed was a private institution and the cry of "not with taxpayer money" was not relevant. Reed trustees clearly had rights and responsibilities that differed from the public governance of Oregon State or the University of Washington. This distinction was recognized but proved not to be decisive; in the final reckoning, Reed trustees were pillars of the Portland community, wealthier versions of the state's editors.

The 1949 affair at Oregon State had been an internal matter; no legislative committees were involved. But Reed fell into the HUAC snare, complete with "namings" by former communists and invocation of 5th Amendment rights. A legislative body opened the inquiry at Reed, but as with the universities of Washington and California, the lasting damage was then done by local trustees.

Reed, then, was something new for Oregon but depressingly similar to the earlier well-publicized cases in Seattle and Berkeley. Reed's brush with HUAC came as the nation was caught up in the last great burst of McCarthyism, the senator's attempt to purge the U.S. Army. Waiting in the wings were Senate hearings and the censure that would bring McCarthy down by year's end. Reed College played on the front pages of Portland newspapers alongside events in the nation's capital. It was a last binge of McCarthyism on both coasts.
The Velde Hearings Reach Portland

Just as Oregon's leading newspapers were excoriating Joe McCarthy for his heavy-handed approach to witnesses in Washington, D.C., they found themselves giving higher marks to McCarthy's counterpart, U.S. Representative Harold Velde (R-Ill), as he brought his House Un-American Activities Committee to the Northwest in June 1954. Early in his chairmanship Velde had used a heavy—and clumsy—hand in dealing with his responsibilities. He had tried to subpoena former President Harry S. Truman, and had engaged in some of the witness-baiting used by McCarthy. By the time he reached the Northwest, he was behaving in a more conventional manner, and Oregon editors paid him compliments upon his departure.

Despite the decorum of Velde and Representative James B. Frazier (D-Tenn), the other congressman on the trip, the HUAC hearings seemed to have little purpose beyond public exposure of what the committee already knew. Oregon newspapers mused about the necessity of the hearings, but were once again weak defenders of civil liberties, passing over the careers ruined in the wake of the hearings.

Velde spent a week in Seattle before launching a two-day session in Portland, June 18 and 19. Portland proved to be less fruitful than Seattle for flushing reds, but the tactics and results were similar. Reformed communists identified former colleagues as party members or as sympathetic to the cause. In both Seattle
and Portland, many of the accused cited the 5th Amendment or other constitutional protection in refusing to answer questions. In both cities, subpoenas were threatened and in a few cases issued to hostile witnesses. And in both cities, careers were ruined by charges unproven but highly touted in Seattle and Portland dailies.

The big dailies, locked in fierce competition for readers, vied to print the most detail about the hearings, down to descriptions of the clothing, side comments and mannerisms of the visiting celebrities. Names given by Velde witnesses were faithfully transcribed, and reporters followed the "namings" with attempts to get comment from those attacked.²

Portland's prize witnesses were linked to Reed College, the small liberal arts institution that was nationally known for its production of Rhodes Scholars and Ph.D. candidates in Ivy League institutions. Long a haven of liberal politics, Reed was widely rumored to harbor "reds" on its faculty, although its Board of Trustees contained some of Portland's major business figures. The chairman of the board in 1954 was Henry F. Cabell, scion of one of Portland's oldest and wealthiest families.

Velde produced as prize witnesses a former Reed student, Homer L. Owen, who described himself as a member of the Communist Party central committee for Oregon from 1947 to 1950 while a student at Reed; and Robert W. Canon, who had recently resigned as dean of students at Reed. Canon said he joined the C.P. during World War II, but was no longer in the
Party. During the time he was a Party member, he also ran for the Oregon Legislature as a Progressive Party candidate. Several members of the Progressive Party were candidates in 1948, running on a Democrat-Progressive label in league with Henry Wallace's presidential bid, but none was elected. A third cooperative witness, Barbara Hartle, had been a key witness in Seattle but added little to the Portland hearings. The three federal witnesses identified forty-two Oregonians as communists, and several of the "named" were called before the committee. Although none admitted to party membership and most took constitutional protection, their personal lives were significantly damaged.

An *Oregonian* follow-up story only four days after the hearings ended showed that six of those subpoenaed had already lost jobs, and the status of four more of the fifteen who refused to answer questions was "in doubt." Among those fired were an assistant manager at a Fred Meyer store and two truck drivers. An advertising copy writer resigned from his firm, a self-employed bookkeeper lost accounts. *The Oregonian* pointedly noted that one of those named as a member of the John Reed Club at Reed College "has not been dismissed from his position with the Multnomah county welfare commission." The John Reed Club was no longer active on campus but Owen described it as a unit of the Communist Party during the time he was active in the party.

The entire purpose of the Velde hearings appeared to have been publicity, rather than the actual ferreting-out of
subversives. All three friendly witnesses had been previously interviewed by the committee and the FBI, and no new names were elicited at the Portland hearings. Most of the allegations involved activities several years old.

Following the sessions, both The Oregonian and the Journal mused editorially about the value of the inquiry, while praising the decorum of Velde and his associates. The Oregonian noted a "sharp contrast" in conduct between the Velde hearings and the recently completed Army-McCarthy hearings. The committee's patience with recalcitrant Portland witnesses who parroted the Commie line and took thinly veiled refuge in the Constitution was phenomenal," marveled the Journal. "The committee behaved very well," observed the Register-Guard. "It showed itself to be fair and it did not 'witch-hunt'."

Seemingly fascinated by the committee's decorum, editors passed over the substance of the event and its implications for civil liberties. The Oregonian found value in publicizing the "illusion" that communism is a "legitimate economic, philosophical or political force," and concluded that "in that sense, the Velde hearings performed a service." The Journal, after observing that the hearings "had a staged, unreal quality" because all the information was known to the committee beforehand, went on to raise questions of fairness to Reed, which among all Oregon colleges was singled out for investigation. Journal editors then approached the civil liberties issue, but after a strong start wound up on the fence:
And what about persons named by friendly or co-operative witnesses as party members or members of Communist-front groups? Even if they take advantage of the 1953 committee rules to deny these charges, aren't the reputations of the innocent, if there be innocent among them, damaged beyond repair?

Is the testimony of these reformed Communist witnesses credible? Do they deserve the buildup and profuse thanks given them by the Velde committee and staff?

Finally, is punishment by publicity justifiable?

We wonder, and leave the final decision to our readers and those who saw or heard the Velde committee.9

It was the closest Portland editors got to the critical issue of character assassination by innuendo and hearsay. In their concern for the form and style of the hearings, the substance of ruined careers and reputations seemed to be secondary. Tom Humphrey, editor of the Journal's editorial page, told the Portland City Club that it was good that Velde visited Portland, for it gave locals a chance to see the committee at work, handling its duties with "neatness and dispatch," although Humphrey added that the committee had accomplished nothing of "material interest or importance" in its Portland visit.10 The cases of most of those accused were soon forgotten, after Portland reporters confirmed that several had in fact lost their jobs.

Not as easily forgotten, however, was the situation at Reed, and it was to engage both the college and the state's newspaper community for some period of time. As with the University of California and the University of Washington, sharp divisions
emerged within the academic community, and careers were ruined.

_The Reed College Affair, Round 1: Velde_

Reed College had occupied a unique place in the Oregon educational community since its founding in 1911 by leading Portland businessmen. From the time its first president, William T. Foster, turned out to be a pacifist in the ultra-patriotic climate of World War I, Reed had been a source of both pride and anger in Portland.

The pride came from the school's outstanding record of scholarship. Its production of Rhodes Scholars surpassed any college of its size and ranked in the top ten of all U.S. colleges and universities, despite its small (627 in 1954) enrollment. "Reedies" were readily admitted to Ivy League graduate programs and the college's faculty were widely recognized for scholarship in a variety of fields. The university had no connection to the radical writer John Reed, but his leftist reputation was easily linked to the college, and the formation of a John Reed Club during World War II apparently attracted or was the foundation for communists on campus.

Reed had always prided itself on academic freedom and had on its faculty self-professed Marxists, most notably the philosopher Stanley Moore. But the school maintained as well its tie to the Portland establishment. The relationship was epitomized by the presidency of E. B. MacNaughton, who at one
time (1948-50) was simultaneously president of both Reed College and *The Oregonian*, and chairman of the board of First National Bank. He had taken the Reed presidency on an interim basis while a search was conducted for fill the post. MacNaughton was a longtime Reed trustee. He had been trustee of *The Oregonian* since 1939, and president from 1947 until he negotiated its sale in 1950 to S. I. Newhouse. MacNaughton was a liberal in social affairs and following his death in 1960 the Oregon chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union named an annual award in his honor.\(^{11}\)

MacNaughton was succeeded at Reed by Duncan S. Ballantine in 1952, and it fell to Ballantine to deal with the HUAC investigation and the "naming" of three Reed professors as communists. They were Lloyd J. Reynolds, professor of art; Leonard Marsak, instructor in history; and Stanley W. Moore, professor of philosophy. All three cited the 5th Amendment in refusing to testify before Velde.

Ballantine announced that the college would conduct its own probe, using procedures similar to those at Harvard. Ballantine declared support for his faculty and declared that the college would not be stampeded into any hasty action against accused faculty. But in announcing the college's hearings, he also ruled that Reynolds would not teach during summer term, as had been scheduled.\(^{12}\) After a three-hour meeting with Ballantine, the Reed faculty passed a resolution asking trustees to reverse Ballantine, noting the lack of faculty consultation prior to the
decision on Reynolds, and concluding that there was a "grave weakening" of faculty support for Ballantine. The resolution stopped short of "no confidence," faculty leaders told the press. Board of Trustees Chairman Henry F. Cabell immediately announced his support for the embattled president.

Portland editors rallied behind Ballantine. The Journal emphasized the governance role of the president and trustees. Likening the college to other institutions, the Journal cautioned, "There can be only one central authority in an educational institution as in a business, a factory, a railroad or a church." As faculty opposition intensified it attracted alumni attention, and the Journal in two editorials cautioned alumni against taking a hasty position.

The Journal's views sounded remarkably like the position of the Reed trustees, and there was a direct link between the two institutions. David W. Eyre, managing editor of the Journal, was a Reed trustee, and a member of the committee investigating Moore.

Eyre, son of a prominent Salem banker, was friendly with E. B. MacNaughton, and that friendship brought him an invitation to serve on the Reed board, he recalled in a 1994 interview. Looking back on the incident, Eyre says the board "kind of compromised and gave something for everybody," reinstating two of the three accused faculty members but firing Moore for refusal to cooperate with the board by answering questions. The board, Eyre recalled, was reacting to the national climate. "The board could
not help but be influenced by strong feelings nationwide, created by McCarthy and the Velde hearings."\textsuperscript{17} In retrospect, Eyre believes the trustees "caved in to the times . . . I wish we'd just said these men are all right, they weren't carrying any bombs to throw."\textsuperscript{18} At the time, to have resisted pressure to discipline the accused faculty would have created national headlines, for it would have been virtually unprecedented.

Eyre recalled that he had assigned himself some of the news coverage of the affair, including board actions, and later had some misgivings about the conflict of interest involved. "I think I was objective," he recalled, but conceded that he was wearing two hats on the story.

It is impossible to know with certainty who wrote some of the \textit{Journal} coverage, as three of the major board stories carry no byline, in contrast to others carrying the byline of Donald J. Sterling, Jr. Eyre possibly did write some of the stories, and he was a source quoted on at least one occasion by both Portland dailies. If Eyre did not actually write any of the stories, in his role as managing editor he would have supervised their writing. Eyre maintains that he did not "lobby" either \textit{Journal} editors or other editors on the Reed College case, although he said it would have been quite natural for Tom Humphrey, then \textit{Journal} editorial page editor, to drop by the newsroom to discuss the subject.\textsuperscript{19}

There is considerable evidence, however, that in a series of letters to downstate editors, Eyre did attempt to provide a positive "spin" to the HUAC hearings. The content of Eyre's letters
is unknown, as no copies exist in the Reed file or in papers available to the public, but Eyre apparently promised that "cool heads will prevail" in terms of a Trustee investigation. That term appears in at least two simultaneous downstate editorials, and Eyre himself clipped one editorial and sent it with a note to Ballantine.  

Bob Frazier in Eugene received a letter from Eyre explaining Reed's position in regards to the HUAC hearings, and in reply sent Eyre copies of two editorials on HUAC and Reed. In his June 24 editorial, Frazier noted that "The mail brings two letters. One is from Duncan S. Ballantine, president of Reed College, and the other is from a friend of ours who is a respected newspaperman and a trustee of the college." The editorial was attached to Frazier's reply to Eyre, which noted that "Tug is in the east and in his absence I am pointing with pride, viewing with alarm, cautioning, praising, and scaring our readers who look at the editorial page. Your note about reaction to Reed College and the Velde Committee came just as I was sitting down to pontificate. The result I attach hereto." Frazier concluded, "I hope we took some of the sting out of your wounds. And if I get tarred & feathered by the local Legion, will you give me a job?"

Frazier would, with Albert Curry, in 1955 succeed William Tugman as editorial page voices of the Eugene Register-Guard. Tugman, after 27 years with the paper, in 1955 purchased a weekly at Reedsport on the Oregon Coast. Frazier and Curry
continued Tugman's liberal Republican policies and Frazier became an editorial defender of civil liberties.

Frazier criticized Velde for centering on Reed when no new information was gained: "So, as far as Reed is concerned, the committee's purpose was to give the people of the Northwest more eggs to throw at Reed; or, to put it bluntly, further to pinken Reed's name." 23

Frazier in this case was in agreement with an earlier editorial by Charles A. Sprague, noting that the private status of Reed posed questions different from those raised at public institutions, and urging consideration of Reed's long record of scholarship and outstanding graduates, and the fact that only three members of the faculty were under a cloud. 24 Like Sprague, Frazier failed to provide advice for the trustees, beyond calling for faculty involvement and public airing of any findings.

Frazier was one of several editors who responded to an appeal by Journal managing editor Eyre. Eyre clearly inspired an editorial in the Roseburg News-Review; Publisher Charles Stanton enclosed his June 24 editorial in a note to Eyre. 25 The editorial referred to what appears to be an Eyre letter:

An officer of the school writes us in a personal letter that the governing board 'will decide what to do with the members of its faculty who have communist connections.' These decisions, our correspondent states, will come only after 'cool deliberation.' 26

Stanton, ordinarily not one to comment on civil liberties, went on to state that "We do not believe, however, that academic freedom,
much as it is to be desired, requires the employment of Communists as instructors." The editorial then called for the firing of any faculty determined to be "of communist faith or leanings."27

Ralph Cronise, publisher of the Albany Democrat-Herald, in a June 24 note also promised an editorial response, noting "I was glad to get your letter of June 21."28 The subsequent D-H editorial praised Reed's academic reputation, defended academic freedom and expressed confidence in Reed's ability to conduct an objective investigation. It was apparently the work of George Turnbull, the University of Oregon journalism professor who at the time was writing editorials for the Democrat-Herald. Cronise in his note to Eyre stated he had "turned the matter over to George Turnbull."29 Like Stanton at Roseburg, Cronise did not customarily comment on issues of civil liberties or higher education; clearly Eyre stimulated the two editorials.

Similarly, the Coos Bay Times, where Eyre had previously been a reporter, in a June 28 editorial referred to "'cool deliberation', according to one Trustee," an indication that Eyre had also contacted the Times. Quoting Sprague's June 20 editorial in the Statesman, the Times editorial defended Reed and suggested that "Reed's excellence occurs because of its liberality, not in spite of it."30

Taken as a whole, most of the editorial flurry following the Velde hearings seem to have been instigated by Eyre's personal interest in alerting Oregon editors to Reed's vulnerability. Only
Sprague's June 20 editorial, which probably pre-dated Eyre's letters; and editorials in *The Oregonian* and the Baker *Democrat-Herald* bear no evidence of Eyre's personal efforts on behalf of Reed.

Judged by the standards of a later day, Eyre clearly faced a conflict of interest, particularly if he wrote any of the *Journal* articles. But conflicts were frequent during the McCarthy era, ranging from Hearst reporters who actively collaborated with the senator himself by writing speeches, to editors such as Eyre who found themselves accidentally pulled into the fray when a personal friend or a favorite organization wound up on the list of suspected subversives. No one has accused Eyre of dishonesty in the matter; he accepted the responsibility of representing the board to the news community because he alone on the board had a news background.

Under standards of the day, Eyre operated in an accepted manner. Oregon editors, particularly in the smaller cities, often served on community boards and were encouraged to do so by their publishers. The author remembers reporters and editors in the early 1960s serving on such disparate boards as the Red Cross, Catholic Charities, college boards and even as Republican or Democratic precinct chairs. It was not until the Watergate era that intense concern for conflicts of interest penetrated the newspaper offices of most of the nation.

But even in 1954 the code of objectivity called for reporters to maintain some distance from their sources and to report
opposing views. Under that code, Eyre should have excused himself from the Reed board or from supervision of the story; clearly he should not have written any account of board action, as he recalls doing. In his defense, it must be said that the board reports in the Journal appear balanced, although relying heavily on direct quotation of official statements. The accused faculty were quoted by the Journal, but only The Oregonian printed the full text of a lengthy letter from Moore to the Reed community explaining his position before HUAC.\(^\text{31}\)

The Oregonian displayed considerable interest in academic communism. In addition to Moore's lengthy letter explaining his position, The Oregonian printed the full text of an article by Sidney Hook in defense of barring communists from teaching, and another lengthy article by Reed Professor Frank Munk, also opposing the hiring of communists as teachers.\(^\text{32}\)

While The Oregonian identified Eyre as an editor when he was quoted in August 15 reports of the Moore firing, the Journal made no similar identification, again showing a lack of sensitivity to Eyre's conflict.\(^\text{33}\) Communicating with other editors, which Eyre clearly did, would not amount to the same breach of ethics; editorial colleagues, including those at the Journal, would be aware of Eyre's role in the matter and could make an independent judgment of his comments. Readers, on the other hand, should have been informed that one of the principal actors in the Moore case was also writing or at least directing its coverage.
Conflicts of this nature inevitably arise for community editors, who are expected to be involved in local affairs. But in the case of editors in smaller cities, many readers are aware of their conflicts; the editor is a known personage, closely identified with the newspaper in which his or her work appears. But editors of a large metropolitan daily such as the Oregon Journal move about their community with less notice.

Eyre had played an important role in rallying his editorial colleagues to Reed's side when the college was under attack as a haven for suspected subversives. As the next phase of the Reed affair unfolded, he played a different role, as one of five trustees on the committee examining the three accused professors. At this point there is no record of Eyre contacting editors to plead Reed's case; he did serve as trustee spokesman on at least one occasion, but purely as a purveyor of news about board actions and not as an advocate.

The next phase opened in early August, as the trustees reinstated Reynolds and Marsak, after both met privately with the subcommittee investigating the affair, admitted to past membership in the Communist Party, and convinced trustees that they had not been active in the Party for some years. No disciplinary action was taken, although when Marsak's non-tenure contract expired in 1955 he was not renewed. In the case of Stanley Moore, trustees decided to pursue an investigation, as Moore refused to answer questions regarding his political beliefs. The action put the trustees in direct conflict with the Reed faculty,
which held that Moore's refusal to answer the questions was not a "significant failure of cooperation," and that even if trustees decided it was a failure, such failure was not grounds for dismissal. The faculty had their own definition of grounds for dismissal, and it was directly related to the standards for granting tenure. Moore was a tenured professor.

More clearly than their colleagues at other colleges and universities, the Reed faculty had defined academic freedom as a principle connected to teaching, and the particular role occupied by faculty within the college governance system. The faculty sided with Moore on this point: faculty in granting tenure should judge the quality of peers, based on scholarship and teaching. That should remain the standard by which a professor would be judged, regardless of his or her outside political views. Reed faculty drew a line around this concept of academic freedom, and defended all three of the "named" faculty.

Reed College, Round 2: Academic Freedom

Stanley Moore was nationally recognized as a Marxist scholar, and had come to Reed specifically because of the college's reputation for harboring free thinkers. In his six years at Reed he was rapidly promoted from instructor to full professor with tenure. He was one of the most visible Reed professors, socially as well as academically. Moore, whose first wife was the journalist Marguerite Higgins, had in 1953 married a daughter of one of
Portland's prominent families, a marriage that placed him in close proximity to members of the Reed governing board.

Moore placed much of his defense on the fact that he was known as a Marxist when he was hired by E. B. MacNaughton. A story widely circulated at the time was that Mac and Moore had several conversations and at least one round of golf, after which MacNaughton concluded that Moore was a splendid fellow and probably a Republican to boot! Had MacNaughton remained at Reed's helm, the entire Moore affair would likely have been averted.

Moore had indeed been a communist for several years, resigning from the Party about six months before he was summoned beforeHUAC. Had he admitted that, the Reed board might have treated him as they did his two colleagues. But the board had boxed itself in with statements that made refusal to cooperate sufficient grounds for dismissal. A later Reed board, reviewing the matter, acknowledged that Moore's refusal to answer questions should have been considered along with his teaching and research, and in that event "there would have been no dismissal." Studies of the McCarthy era have shown that few institutions voiced sympathy for academic freedom. Faculty groups were often silent or even hostile to the view taken by the Reed faculty. If a few college presidents such as Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago stood against legislative inquiries, there were far more like Washington's Raymond Allen, who
cooperated with and even supported the inquisitions. University faculty, with the singular exception of Reed College in 1954, sided against rather than with their beleaguered colleagues, even when the colleagues were tenured faculty. Moore was widely recognized as an excellent teacher, and had been tenured and promoted quickly; none of the three accused professors was charged with propagandizing in the classroom.

This important aspect of civil liberties and academic freedom was not recognized by Oregon editors, who saw the Reed matter largely in terms of governance rather than civil liberties. The Reed Trustees' final statement on Moore cited "refusal to cooperate" as grounds for dismissal; in denying the trustees' right to inquire into his political beliefs, Moore had failed to cooperate with their inquiry.\(^{37}\) It was an argument acceptable to major Oregon editors. Both The Oregonian and the Oregon Journal wrapped up their views of the Moore incident with editorials dwelling on the administrative resolution of the conflict.

The Journal stated strong support for both the trustees and Ballantine, and found the nub of the decision in the matter of control of the institution:

The trustees have made it clear, too, they intend to regain and hold more control of faculty matters--a situation which got out of control in a period of financial stringency when educational matters were turned over to the faculty steering committee while the college office concentrated on money matters.\(^{38}\)

The Oregonian also saw the issue largely in institutional rather than individual terms, making it clear that faculty would
be expected to cooperate with administration inquiries into alleged communist activity. *The Oregonian* applauded the trustees for making it clear that current C.P. membership is not acceptable, although past membership would be forgiven if confessed.\(^{39}\) In taking this view, editors reflected the prevailing view not only of the public and their elected representatives, but of the academic community as well.\(^{40}\)

The trustees' action in dismissing Moore was widely ignored outside Portland, both in the news columns and on the editorial pages. Only Sprague revisited the issue, in an August 9 column praising the Reed board for reinstating Marsak and Reynolds, and for dismissing Moore on grounds of failure to cooperate rather than on his use of the 5th Amendment before HUAC.\(^{41}\)

In Sprague's concern for protecting the 5th Amendment he shared the view of *Oregonian* editors, who had also noted that none of the Reed professors had been dismissed for "taking the 5th." But neither Sprague nor *The Oregonian* criticized the Reed trustees for placing the major burden of their decision on the single issue of responding to a question regarding political belief. This, in effect, simply transferred the 5th Amendment question from HUAC to a closed hearing of a board of trustees. While HUAC had no interest in the teaching and scholarship record of an accused professor, it should have been considered by a college or university governing board. That it was not, either at Reed or elsewhere during this period, was one of the major tragedies of
McCarthyism. But it was a tragedy that did not appear to concern Oregon editors of the time.

Moore summarized the dilemma succinctly in an open letter to the Reed community in which he rebutted the charge that no communist was fit to teach:

The incompetent get eliminated by their colleagues in the normal course of faculty selection. The competent get eliminated by their employers in the sudden frenzy of political persecution. Behind the falsehood that no communist is qualified to teach lies the truth that all communists get fired.42

Moore, the brilliant philosopher and wordsmith, had held to a standard that in retrospect makes the Reed administration and board look foolish, for he framed the issue of academic freedom as well as any participant in the academic trials of the McCarthy period. A month after Moore's firing one of his antagonists, Ballantine, resigned his presidency, citing "resistence to change in the status quo at Reed."43

Oregon editors observed the Ballantine departure with a plea for Reed to put its house in order. The Albany Democrat-Herald, again reflecting the editorial pen of George Turnbull, was most supportive of faculty, observing that Reed's first president had established a tradition of faculty control and present trustees "should not attempt to depart too far from that administrative theory."44 In Salem, Sprague also cited Reed's founding as a "place where the winds of intellectual freedom might blow freely," and urged trustees to define or redefine presidential
responsibilities. The Oregonian noted longstanding divisions on campus, and called for a "supreme effort" at resolution.

There would be yet one more chapter for Reed and for the Oregon press, in particular Moore's other antagonist, the Oregon Journal.

**The Journal and the Ford Foundation**

A month before the House Un-American Activities Committee discovered Stanley Moore, he had been awarded a prestigious Ford Foundation post-doctoral research grant, a $4,500 fellowship in Soviet and East European studies. Although his Reed colleagues were aware of the award, for which a sabbatical leave had been approved, no mention of it appeared in public comments surrounding his dismissal.

Shortly after the Reed trustees fired Moore, Journal reporter Donald Sterling, Jr. queried the Ford Foundation about Moore's grant, asking if one existed and "if so, for what purpose and under what terms?" In a follow-up letter Sterling outlined the circumstances of Moore's firing, including Moore's refusal to respond to both HUAC and the Reed board, adding:

> We are interested in knowing whether the Ford Foundation has taken any action regarding Dr. Moore's fellowship as a result of the proceedings involving him with the Velde committee. Specifically I would be grateful for any answers you could give me to such questions as these. . . .

A list of ten questions followed, the last of which inquired:

"Have the Ford Foundation in general or the Soviet and East
European fellowship program in particular any announced policy on whether grants should be extended to persons who (a) are accused on congressional committee testimony of having had Communist connections, or (b) refuse to testify before congressional committees about their political beliefs or activities on grounds of the Fifth Amendment or other Constitutional grounds?"\textsuperscript{50}

The inquiry quickly escalated at the Foundation and, on September 21, Vice President Don K. Price responded to Sterling with a careful statement of Ford Foundation policy and defense of the award to Moore. But in a separate letter Price queried Ballantine concerning "any pertinent information . . . concerning the action of your Trustees regarding Dr. Moore and the evidence of his alleged affiliations."\textsuperscript{51} Ballantine sent to the Foundation copies of the testimony of Homer Owen and Robert Canon—the testimony identifying Moore as a communist—along with copies of Reed's actions.\textsuperscript{52}

A month after the Price-Sterling-Ballantine exchanges, the Ford Foundation notified Moore that "information received by the Ford Foundation shows that you do not satisfy the basic terms and conditions of its fellowship award to you," and asked Moore to return $2,000 already paid.\textsuperscript{53}

The matter escalated, with correspondence between Moore and the Foundation; lawyers were called in on both sides, concluding with an angry letter from a defeated Moore. Moore accused the Foundation of removing his support under what
Moore termed "a policy of communist exclusion," in which a small part of an organization is disciplined or removed in order to protect the whole. "But it doesn't work that way," Moore concluded, "persecuting the small part corrupts the whole."54 Once again, the brilliant philosopher had won a battle of words but lost the war; his Ford grant had been terminated.

In the world of post-Watergate media, Sterling's follow-up on Stanley Moore would have been routine. In the relatively quiescent world of fifties journalism in Oregon, it was unusual but certainly not without precedent. The decade was not marked by aggressive investigative reporting, although it was a time when The Oregonian won a Pulitzer Prize for an investigation of labor corruption.

Sterling was carrying a large burden at the Journal, attempting to follow in the footsteps of his father, who served as Journal managing editor from 1919 until his retirement in 1952. The younger Sterling had impressed Palmer Hoyt in a stint at the Denver Post, and was clearly a rising star on the Journal news staff when Eyre assigned him to the Reed story. It was a running front-page story for several weeks, and once Sterling was informed of the Ford Foundation grant it would have been natural to make inquiries. The Foundation grant must have been well known on campus and even in the wider Portland community because of Moore's marriage into a prominent Portland family. Regardless of who initiated the inquiry, the Ford Foundation support of Moore could not have been a secret.
Sterling's reporting of the entire Reed matter, including articles on Moore, appears objective and aggressive, and the inquiry to the Ford Foundation was in keeping with his posture on covering the Reed affair. Later in his career, as an editor, Sterling would be known as a defender of civil liberties; in 1954 he was a young reporter on a big story, and behaved as such in contacting the Ford Foundation. That the Foundation appeared to yield to what appeared at least to Moore as an implied threat is an indictment more of the Foundation than it is of the Journal or Sterling.

Moore eventually was granted a full apology from the Reed trustees in 1981, and in 1993 was formally invited to the campus by President Steven Koblik. Moore resumed his academic career after the Reed incident, first at Barnard then at the University of California, San Diego, retiring in 1975. More than most victims of the time, he regained stature and a full professional life.

The Reed College incident was a last gasp of McCarthyism in Oregon; McCarthy himself was gone by the end of the year, and Oregon soon had two Democratic senators, the newly elected Richard L. Neuberger and the newly converted Wayne L. Morse. The emergence of a real Democratic Party quickly claimed the attention of Oregon's Republican editors as they geared up for a donnybrook in 1956, when Morse would stand for the first time as a Democrat. McCarthy and the "ism" were buried with little fanfare, and the state entered a new political era.
Editors were changing, too, the Second Generation nearly
gone by the time Morse went to the hustings in 1956; only
Sprague remained among those with roots going back to World
War I. Editorials increasingly were written by young men (no
women yet) who had served in World War II and who often did
not have ownership responsibilities. One-person editorial staffs
yielded to multiple-editor boards. Television, introduced in 1952
in Oregon, was beginning to produce a news product, and a young
newscaster in Portland named Tom Lawson McCall was expressing
editorial opinion on the air. The closing of the McCarthy era
marked the end of newspaper domination of news and opinion in
Oregon, and with it the personal influence of a community of
editors.
Notes to Chapter 9


2The most complete account of the Velde hearings in Portland may be found in The Oregonian, beginning with pre-hearing stories 18 June and continuing through 23 June 1954.

3"6 Refusing to Testify At Probe Lose Jobs; Reed to Hold Quiz," Oregonian (23 June 1954): 1.


12"College to Conduct Inquiry on Three Called From Staff," Oregonian (23 June 1954): 1, 19.


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David W. Eyre to Duncan Ballantine, undated, Stanley Moore files, 77G/1, Reed College.


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Charles Stanton to David W. Eyre, dated 23 June 1954, Moore files, 77G/1.

27 Ibid.

28 Ralph Cronise to David W. Eyre, 24 June 1954, Moore files, 77G/1.

29 Ibid.

30 "Reed Doing Well Despite Criticism," Coos Bay Times (28 June 1954).


34 Michael Munk, interview with author, 1 September 1994, Portland. Notes in possession of author.


37 "Statement by the Board of Trustees of the Reed Institute," 13 August 1954, Moore files, 77G/3.


A number of scholars have examined the reaction of the academic community to McCarthyism. Among the best of the general works are Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower*; and Lionel S. Lewis, *Cold War on Campus: A Study of the Politics of Organizational Control* (New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1988).


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54 Moore to McDaniel, 6 June 1955, Moore files, 77G/3.

55 For discussion of efforts to convince the Reed trustees to grant Moore a full apology, see Michael Munk, "Reversing the Verdicts: The Case of Reed College," *Monthly Review* 43 (March 1992): 38-49.
Chapter 10

Conclusion

Oregon newspapers would change dramatically in the next two decades, and the homogeneous, home-owned newspaper community of the fifties would yield to the impersonal forces of corporate journalism. By 1975, the afternoon dailies in Portland and Salem were gone, folded into The Oregonian and The Statesman-Journal respectively. Both would be under group ownership, Newhouse in Portland and Gannett in Salem. Newspapers in Corvallis and Medford would also come under group ownership. But the family ownership of the Register-Guard, Bend Bulletin and Pendleton East Oregonian would remain under the Baker, Chandler and Forrester families respectively.

Gone also were the partisan days of Republican publishers; by the seventies it was Republicans who frequently complained of liberal editorial pages that were in most cases edited by professional journalists who had no ownership stake.

The last of the Second Generation editors, Charles A. Sprague, died in 1969, still at the helm of The Oregon Statesman. There was no single leader to take his place, and editorial pages were now competing with statewide television. King Broadcasting introduced on-air editorials and regular political commentary on Portland’s KGW-TV and Fisher Broadcasting followed on KATU-TV.
Oregonians were flooded with media choices as television became the dominant news source for most Americans. The monopoly on media influence enjoyed by the Second Generation editors of the post-World War II era was gone, as it was nationwide.

A similar generational shift also occurred in Oregon's political climate, as Oregon became a two-party state with control of state and federal offices strongly contested by a new breed of politicians lacking close ties to party structures. Beginning with Mark Hatfield, successful Oregon Republicans built personal political organizations and often campaigned at arm's-length from the party organization. The state's voters registered Democratic but frequently elected Republicans to major offices. Editorial connections in future decades would be to individual politicians rather than to the Republican Party; the fifties was the last decade when the party connection was strong, and it was strong in part because of senior editors whose loyalties were forged early in the century.

The bridge from the homogeneous and cautious Republican Oregon of pre-World War II times to the progressive state that attracted national attention in the sixties and seventies was constructed in the decade following the war, as the state's leaders dealt with growth and change. Oregon's newspaper editors played an important role in the adjustment, and their approach to the civil liberties challenges of the post-war era helped construct an image of civility and common sense.
Editorial opinion was important in the post-war period, for ordinary Oregonians and their elected leaders were dependent on the printed word until late 1952, when the state's first television station was licensed. Until television was established statewide a few years later, newspapers dominated the public debate.

This study has focused on one aspect of this editorial leadership, but civil liberties under a variety of labels was an important topic during this period. The manner in which a state and its press approached civil liberties and McCarthyism tells us much about the climate of the times and about the individuals who exercised leadership.

How, then, did Oregon editors influence each other and the politics of a state still somewhat isolated from national influence? To what degree were these influences determined by outside forces, and to what degree are they within the control of principal editors of the time? What can this tell us about the work of editors? Are there persistent themes running through the entire period? Five broad research areas were outlined in the introduction to this dissertation, and these areas will be revisited in this concluding chapter.

**McCarthyism Not Needed Here: The Oregon Climate**

Oregon editors operated in a national political climate dominated by the fear of communism, and in this respect the state differed little from its neighboring states. McCarthyism swept through the states after the war ended, in most cases
before Senator Joseph R. McCarthy came to power. The Tenney
and Canwell committees conducted serious red hunts just outside
Oregon's borders before McCarthy's 1950 emergence.

But Oregon had less of a radical tradition than either
California or Washington; its labor unions were less likely to be
militant and communist-influenced, its populist movements had
failed to elect sizeable numbers of adherents, its academic
communities were more conservative and were located outside
the major urban center. The state simply lacked substantial
groups of reds or even pinks. As Charles A. Sprague noted in
1949, "this will be one of the last redoubts to yield--'come the
revolution.'"

Nor was there reason on the part of Republicans to resort to
McCarthyism to subdue a dominant Democratic Party. Oregon was
a solidly Republican state and remained so through the Depression
and World War II, one of the few states to be consistently
Republican during that time. Oregon Republicans did not need
McCarthy--in fact, they feared the controversy he attracted.
McCarthyite stirrings were as likely to come from conservative
Democrats as from the GOP. For it was the right wing of the
Democratic Party that in this period saw its influence undermined
by the new forces entering Oregon politics. The liberal wing of
the Democratic Party was in its ascendancy, and the party's right
wing was rapidly losing influence. When a bill to create an
Oregon version of the Tenney and Canwell committees was
threatened, the threat came from a right-wing Democrat.
Oregon politics had taken a twist that could not have been predicted before World War II brought new people to the state. The fifties was a time when new values and new leaders confronted the established order in Oregon. The state's editorial community was in the midst of the struggle, most visibly when Wayne Morse changed parties but also during the McCarthy period as Republican editors staked out positions contrary to McCarthy and his wing of the Republican party.

This struggle was taking place in a remarkably homogeneous and close-knit editorial community. Oregon editors and publishers differed in a major way from colleagues to the north and south. California and, to a lesser degree, Washington, were heavily influenced by the Hearst newspaper chain, with its virulent hatred of subversive influences. California also had the McClatchey newspapers, nativist and anti-communist, and Washington had the Cowles family's *Spokesman-Review* in Spokane, a staunch pro-McCarthy voice. Oregon had no similar editorial voice calling for a purge. The state's lone group owner, S. I. Newhouse after his 1950 purchase of *The Oregonian*, by all accounts left his editors alone and was not part of the red-baiting brigade.

The editorial climate in Oregon was one of cautious conservatism, anti-communist to the core but not inclined to see a national conspiracy or to wave the bloody shirt for political or circulation gains. Although both Salem and Portland had lively circulation competition during this period and in both cities the
afternoon papers were more aggressively anti-communist, the issue did not stir an excess of editorial bile comparable to that spilled in neighboring states.

This lack of a strong McCarthyite newspaper egging on legislative red-hunting kept Oregon from falling into the worst excesses of the period, in contrast to states with Hearst, Scripps-Howard, McCormick or Patterson newspaper influence. Those states, including California, Washington, Maryland, Michigan and Illinois, saw the most aggressive local red-hunts.

The political and journalistic climate, then, was a factor in Oregon's record of avoiding the worst of the McCarthy period. The state's solid and respectable Republican tradition produced neither the radical element to serve as targets of McCarthyites nor the incentive for Republicans to use McCarthyism to achieve power. And the Oregon newspaper community was under no outside pressure to join a red-hunt for circulation or political gain. Oregon, both politically and journalistically, could make its own decisions with relatively little influence or pressure from outside forces.

But while Oregon's journalistic community emerged from the period relatively clear of transgressions, examples of courage and leadership were also rare, and individuals under attack had a limited number of editorial refuges. They encountered a monolithic editorial community in terms of political affiliation--Oregon newspapers were Republican--and to an unfortunate degree it was also a newspaper community that was frequently
indifferent to civil liberties. Neither the news pages nor the editorial pages of the major papers paid sufficient attention to local incursions on individual liberties, or to efforts to advance civil rights in this period.

According to Authoritative Sources . . .

Oregon editors were part of the state's political and civic establishment, and in many communities were looked to for informal advice as well as editorial leadership. They, in turn, respected their peers in government, including administrators in the field of education. The result was an inclination to support established authority.

This was shown early in the period, as some initial editorial sympathy for Oregon's Japanese American population evaporated with the signing of the presidential evacuation order. No editorial opponents of internment could be found, as established authority and even the Japanese American Citizens League lined up to support internment. Three years later, with the federal government urging Oregonians to allow the internees to return in peace, editors reversed course and most stood for tolerance and a safe homecoming.

Again in 1949, early support for the cashiered professors at Oregon State disappeared when the OSC administration turned up the heat by linking one of the men to discredited Soviet science, and the OSC faculty refused to back their fired colleagues. Authority again prevailed in 1954 as Reed College trustees and
faculty squared off in one of the most clear-cut academic freedom battles of the period. Editors who engaged the issue made it clear that they supported a strong administration capable of exercising authority over the faculty.

Oregon was growing rapidly, but it remained during this period a relatively small state whose power structure was easily identified and whose major players were acquainted with each other. Reed trustees, Oregon State administrators, leading politicians and editors were of the same sex, race, class, religion and political party. A challenge to the authority of one was essentially a challenge to the structure they represented, and was almost uniformly rejected. A group loyalty oath represented a challenge to their sense of fair play, but when an individual such as Stanley Moore pushed the boundaries of their world and challenged their exercise of power, he was quickly rejected.

An initial research question inquired into the relationship between editors and governing authorities, and the effect this relationship had on editorial approaches to issues of civil liberties. The findings of this study clearly portray editors—particularly editors of small to mid-sized dailies—as an integral part of Oregon's governing elite. Some had held elective office, all were close to authority figures, whether at the capitol, school board or university board of trustees. Editors shared many of the personal characteristics of Oregon's leadership elite—all were white males, and most were Protestant, business-oriented Republicans. When authority was challenged, the most common response of editors
was to back authority, even at peril of abandoning a previous commitment to civil liberties.

**With Liberty for Some**

In those instances in which editors took up a cause, it was to defend groups rather than individuals. Teachers at the public school and university level were defended as a group, as was Reed College as an institution. But individuals targeted for discipline at both Oregon State College and Reed found little sympathy among the editors of the state. No editor spoke for Stanley Moore, and early editorial sympathy for Ralph Spitzer and L. R. LaValle proved to be short-lived.

Editorial leadership was exerted to avoid one of the worst elements of the McCarthy era, the tarring of an entire class or group of people because of the sins or alleged sins of individual members. It was this tactic that incensed Sprague and William Tugman and drove their efforts to quash the teachers' loyalty oath.

Opposition to singling out an entire group of people for suspicion had also been the initial reaction of key editors in the wake of Pearl Harbor, but their instincts were quickly buried under an avalanche of public opinion and their own strong inclination to respond to voices of authority during a time of emergency. Both Sprague--then serving as Oregon governor--and editors of *The Oregonian* were inclined to protect the civil liberties of the nisei, and to urge a reasoned approach to the issei. But the
governor and the state's editors caved to pressure from the Roosevelt administration and from citizens of Oregon, and supported internment in 1942, punishing an entire group of people on suspicion that some individuals might be subversive. Sprague and The Oregonian reversed course in 1945 and spoke on behalf of the returning Japanese Americans, but in 1942 their instincts to avoid group discrimination were over-ruled by two other strong instincts: to accept voices of authority in times of crisis, and to protect those most familiar to them.

Certainly the crisis mentality that prevailed in 1941 and 1942 was a big factor in the reaction of Oregon editors and other leaders. But another reason why Japanese Americans in 1942 failed to gain the editorial support that was extended in 1951 to Oregon's teachers and professors was the lack of familiarity with the former, contrasted to the close association of key editors with the Oregon education community. Both editors who played the key roles in the 1951 decision were close to the education community. Sprague was a former teacher and was a university trustee, and Tugman was a journalistic spokesman for the state's only university; both saw in their friends and colleagues people much like themselves. The concept of the Oregon education community as a hotbed of radicals not only offended their sense of fair play, it contradicted what they knew from personal contacts and experience. Neither man had extensive contacts among Japanese Americans--there is no evidence that, as
governor, Sprague consulted Japanese Americans in making his decision to support internment.

Conflicting influences tugged at the editorial sleeve, and in the case of the Japanese Americans, the forces of authority and public fear outweighed editors' inclination to oppose blanket discrimination against entire groups of people. In the case of the teachers' loyalty oath, the latter instinct prevailed, because editors were familiar with teachers and professors—which was not the case with the Japanese Americans—and because the fear of imminent danger was not present.

But when individuals were targeted, even Sprague and Tugman yielded to the fear of communism. Two admitted communists fired by the University of Washington got no sympathy from any Oregon editor, including Sprague and Tugman. The latter went out of his way to draw a line: free speech on campus—even communist speech—was fine, but a communist could not teach, at least not at a public institution. Oregon editors bought the prevailing academic line, which was that no practicing communist could also have an independent mind; to be a communist was to be a Lysenko, parroting the communist line. It was the prevailing view of nearly all academic administrators and most faculty as well, and it seemed reasonable to Oregon editors.

A second research question asked how editors decided who was worthy of constitutional protection during this period. In much the same manner that they deferred to authority figures with whom they shared common characteristics, it is apparent
that editors were most willing to protect the civil liberties of those who were known and familiar to them. Teachers and professors, excluding communists, were such individuals and as groups were defended. Japanese Americans and others of color could be less certain of editorial support, and in some cases editors were hostile. Those individuals and groups who were part of a "community" with which editors were comfortable were most likely to be defended.

**Party and Proper Republicanism**

Throughout the history of this era, the importance for Oregon editors of being Republican was paramount, and the maintenance of Republican hegemony was at the root of editorial distaste for Senator Joseph McCarthy. The senator's demeanor and tactics threatened editors' sense of decorum, and posed a threat to the moderate-to-liberal Republicanism they supported.

Liberal Republicans were wavering in their loyalty, and the combination of McCarthy and the defection of Senator Wayne Morse sent many to the Democratic Party in the mid-fifties. That was exactly what the state's Republican editors feared and warned against. It was a factor in their abandonment of Morse when he switched parties, and in the difficulty Richard Neuberger had in gaining coverage in his 1954 campaign. Unwilling to change party loyalty themselves, editors were backed into a corner as Democrats increasingly stole their issues and then
converted the man (Morse) who had carried the banner of liberal Republicanism in the Senate.

In their 1951 protest of McCarthy's Portland appearance, the sense of maintaining Republican hegemony is prominent; editorials stressed that McCarthy was the guest of an unofficial group and not the official GOP hierarchy. Letters of protest from Young Republicans gained prominent editorial page space. A party dominated by McCarthy was anathema to editors, and when one (Walter May in Oregon City) broke ranks to support the senator, he was excoriated by the most prominent within the group, former GOP governor Sprague. Peer pressure was at work, and to be outside the frame of proper Republican behavior was to be isolated.

Oregon editors were as uniformly anti-communist as their colleagues in other states, in an era when the hatred of communism foreign and domestic was an accepted tenet of American life. But if they opposed communism and were at times willing to accept some incursions on individual rights in the name of fighting communism, this community of editors united against McCarthy himself. The reason was that McCarthy and his extreme tactics threatened the maintenance of liberal-to-moderate Republican hegemony, and that was important to Oregon editors.

The point was perhaps best illustrated by Sprague's frank comments to Neuberger in 1952, in which he confessed to preferring Stevenson to Eisenhower, but concluded: "To let the Republican party become only a shell of reaction would doom it as
an instrument of good government, whether it held office or not. .
. . I am more interested in the long war than in the single
campaign." It was that long war, to preserve Oregon for their
style of progressive Republicanism, that called Oregon editors to
battle against McCarthy.

A third research area involved how editors would view civil
liberties during this period in terms of their desire to maintain
Republican hegemony in the state. Certainly in confronting
Senator McCarthy himself, that appears to be the case; editors
were insistent in 1951 that McCarthy's Oregon visit was not
hosted by the "official" Republican Party. Throughout the period,
McCarthy's strongest critic was Sprague, a former Republican
governor and frequent spokesman for liberal-to-moderate
Republicanism. Sprague was frequently quoted by colleagues,
particularly on political topics.

**Collegiality, Influence and Leadership**

Oregon editors read the editorial pages of their colleagues,
and were in regular, if informal, contact. A request for help or
support would be favorably received. In 1951, Tugman and
Sprague were in frequent contact as the loyalty oath developed;
Tugman and Sprague were regular correspondents with Robert
Sawyer in Bend on a variety of subjects; later Bob Frazier in
Eugene corresponded with Sprague and Malcolm Bauer of The
Oregonian on matters of higher education. Oregon Newspaper
Publishers Association gatherings attracted heavy attendance, and
informal gatherings of editors are recalled by J. W. Forrester and Bob Chandler, who were part of the post-war generation.

David Eyre, although not a part of the inner circle, was known to the state's editors and played on personal contacts on behalf of Reed College in 1954. Most Oregon editors were only part-time editorial writers, and devoted much of their day to managerial or business affairs. They depended on others to supply information and opinion, and they often responded to a request such as Eyre's, or reprinted a colleague's editorial. The editor quoted most frequently was Sprague, whose range of views and credibility were the strongest within this community of editors. Had Sprague taken a different view of civil liberties, it is entirely possible that it would have been reflected in other editors' views, because of Sprague's personal standing among editors.

Leadership in small groups is always highly personal, very much based on trust and credibility, and so it was among Oregon editors of the time—and in the Oregon political-journalistic community as a whole. Key players knew each other, and personal trust allowed a Richard Neuberger and a Charles Sprague to join on some issues while holding diametrically opposite views on others. A person's reputation was his or her calling card, and views strongly held were guaranteed a hearing if the caller carried a reputation for integrity.

That was the hand that Sprague brought to the loyalty oath issue in 1951, as it was the hand he had brought to Gresham in
the heated days of Japanese return. Alliances were informally created: Sprague and E. B. MacNaughton spoke at Gresham; Sprague and Neuberger joined to turn back Tom Mahoney and his "little HUAC" proposal; Sprague and William Tugman joined forces to defeat the loyalty oath.

Sheer weight of intellect could not carry the day in editorial and political battles, though the intellectual ability of Sprague, Tugman, Neuberger and MacNaughton was formidable indeed. It was also important to bring to the table the views and experience of business, for the period was dominated by small-town Republicans, who above all respected a man who understood their world. Editors who were also publishers--Sprague, Sawyer and then Chandler, Aldrich and then Forrester, Ingalls father and son, Putnam and Ruhl--had that extra cachet of ownership.

Editors were always constrained by the necessity of retaining advertiser and reader support, but within the boundaries of moderate politics there was running room for an owner-editor who did not have to report to a supervising publisher or outside owner. When Sprague, Ruhl and Forrester blasted McCarthy or a loyalty oath, they took their shots the next day as they walked down Main Street, not when a publisher or newspaper chain executive read their editorial page. In the group of strong editors only Tugman was not also an owner--and the relationship of Tugman and Alton S. Baker was unusually close.

The lack of ownership ties helps explain the lack of statewide leadership on the part of the Portland dailies, which
had been edited by multi-member editorial boards since the Depression. It would later restrict the influence of chain newspaper editors. In later years, as urban Democrats replaced Main Street Republicans in state political leadership, the importance of editors as business owners diminished, but in the fifties it was important to an understanding of the role played by strong individual editors.

A Community of Editors

Oregon was losing its parochial image in the post-war period, as suburbs blossomed on Willamette Valley farm land and the city of Portland expanded its international role. In this climate, an editor could no longer see his horizons as the outer boundaries of his county or market area. Editors were increasingly called upon to deal with national and international affairs, for Americans had learned about the world during the war, and new Oregonians had roots in other states and even other countries.

Two final research questions inquired into the concept of community journalism, and the nature of an editorial "community." Elements of community journalism clearly existed in the practice of journalism by editors of small to mid-sized Oregon dailies during this period, as suggested in the fourth question, but there is no clear pattern to indicate that editors who saw themselves in this mold took any consistent approach to issues of civil liberties. Editorial opinion appeared to be much
more linked to the personal background and approach of individual editors than to size or type of community or publication. This study argues that editors of small and mid-sized dailies were in most respects community editors, but the research does not support any conclusion that editors who saw themselves as community editors took a common or consistent approach to civil liberties. Quite the contrary was the case in most instances.

Editors were still community editors in the old sense, that of an office on Main Street, contacts in the Rotary and Chamber of Commerce, and a certain amount of proper boosterism, but increasingly they were forced to look to larger issues, to reflect the more cosmopolitan outlook of a changing and growing state.

A new sense of community was emerging, in which editors accepted a role speaking for wider interests. No one represented that sense more than Sprague, a wartime governor forced to grapple with national issues and then a United Nations alternate delegate thrown into the controversies of Africa and the Middle East. Other editors also spoke for wider communities of interest: Tugman for higher education, Sawyer for parks and water, others for emerging segments of the economy or society. They came to be seen as editorial experts on their topics, but as the post-war period became a Cold War with its domestic side anchored in a fear of subversion, editors increasingly turned to Sprague, who had the most experience and interest in national and international affairs.
An examination of the editors of a discrete community—in this case the state of Oregon—can help us understand, perhaps more effectively than national studies, how decisions are reached within a community of editors, and what influences are at work on a specific group of editors at a particular point in time. Such a portrait should not be enlarged to suggest a credible theory of national journalistic behavior, but it must be remembered that the American press is—and was in the fifties—primarily a state or regional press, and the behavior of editors at the state level influenced the thinking of most Americans at the time.

How does one explain the uneven nature of McCarthyism and other civil liberties challenges in states that shared many other political characteristics? Surely the approach of leading editors to these topics was of significance in an era before widespread influence of television, and was of particular significance in states where editors were part of the political power structure. The combination of political, community and personal affiliations that exists in a relatively homogeneous society such as Oregon allows for considerable influence on the part of editors who are connected to all these aspects of society. If they choose to exercise leadership, their platform is provided by their standing within this community.

A final research question sought a portrait of this editorial community, and the research reveals a community in transition, whose members were much alike in terms of their personal
background and affiliations, but separated into groups based on their ability or willingness to exercise this personal leadership.

Editors of the large Portland dailies, separated from ownership by a corporate structure, had the independence of separation from business pressures, but they were also driven to caution by the necessity of consensus decisions. Despite the size of their circulations, they were not consistently looked to for leadership by editorial peers, and were not part of the state's elite establishment, which had considerable respect for business ownership.

Owner-editors of Oregon's smaller dailies enjoyed the independence that comes with financial control, although the necessities of satisfying advertisers could lead to editorial caution on some topics. Civil liberty was generally not such a topic, however, advertiser pressure tending to be more acute on issues of a business nature. But small-town editors were limited by the limited access to information and the demands of other publishing duties. They were forced to depend upon each other for information and ideas, and in this climate certain editors came to speak with special authority in areas of their expertise or interest.

Because of his unique experience as a former governor and later a U.N. representative, authority in the area of national and international policy came naturally to Sprague and, as the focus of the news moved toward the delicate area of civil liberties, his stature was enhanced not only with editors but within the political community. At Gresham in 1945 and with the loyalty
oath in 1951 and civil rights in 1953, Sprague took direct action, combining his roles of editor and political leader, with successful results in all three cases.

Had Sprague not acted, or had he been inclined to move in another direction, the state's politics might have taken a different turn for, with the exception of Tugman and at times Forrester, other Oregon editors were silent or actually antagonistic to issues of individual rights.

Oregon maintained its image as a state of uncommon civility not because it rejected Joseph McCarthy but because it rejected the most egregious elements of the "ism" that accompanied the senator. A state and its editorial community can have only limited effect on a national phenomenon such as McCarthyism or a man such as McCarthy, but it can determine its own role within that spectrum. Key Oregon editors may have been motivated by a partisan political goal—the maintenance of Republican hegemony—but their rejection of the worst of the McCarthy era helped preserve the civility of political discourse within the state.

Oregon avoided McCarthyism's vortex, but within the Oregon press only a few courageous voices broke the silence of the timorous majority, and even their response was never uniformly in support of civil liberties. Japanese Americans were abandoned in 1942 but supported in 1945; individual victims of McCarthyism frequently lost out to editorial respect for authority, but broad-brush attacks on educators were rejected and even produced
considerable personal commitment on the part of influential editors Sprague and Tugman.

For Sprague and Tugman, joined on occasion by others, it was a time to mold a state's image for the heady days of the sixties and seventies. Their reaction was not always consistent and not always courageous, but they engaged the issues of their time and influenced the course of the state's politics. Particularly in the case of the loyalty oath of 1951, national attention focused on their example of courage and leadership helped build the image of a state of civility and reasoned discourse.
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Curriculum Vitae

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1990-94 Assistant Professor, Western Washington University.

Professional Experience (Media)

1989  Senior Fellow in Journalism, East-West Center, Honolulu.

1987-89 Administrative Assistant/Communications to Governor Neil Goldschmidt, Oregon.


Academic Publications

"Charles A. Sprague: An Editor and Governor Faces Civil Liberties Challenges in Two World Wars." Oregon Historical Quarterly (forthcoming, Fall 1995).


Papers


Professional Awards and Activities

1986 Sigma Delta Chi, Northwest regional award for commentary on television.

1978 American Civil Liberties Union, Oregon chapter, award for commentaries.

1977 DuPont-Columbia Broadcast Award, Columbia University, for 1976 documentary and news series.