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Professionalization and Social Justice in Social Work: Discourses in Conflict

by

Jeffrey J. Olson

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Doctoral Dissertation

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Abstract

Professionalization and Social Justice in Social Work: Discourses in Conflict

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This dissertation seeks to explore the proposition that social work's professional discourse of social justice is an instrument of social injustice. The purpose of the dissertation is (1) to illuminate "how" social work's social justice discourse is an instrument of injustice, and (2) to argue that the relation between the discourses of social justice and professionalization needs to be reversed.

The dissertation argues that social injustice is generated by modernization, and that social work's drive to professionalize is a vehicle of modernization. Modernization is defined as the intertwining of three forces; (1) the cosmology of natural science, (2) capitalization of the market and (3) differentiation of a discourse of individual rights.

Section 1 of the dissertation begins by defining what is meant by social justice and injustice. It then discusses Andrew Abbott's (1988) model for the system of professions. The idea that there are two foundational projects that structure what social workers do – the social justice project and the professional project – is introduced. It is demonstrated that these two projects are conflated and that this conflation serves the ends of social injustice. Different examples are used to show how professionalization over
social work's history has utilized the discourse of social justice to achieve its own ends as part of the professional project. It is argued that these ends are unconcerned with achieving social justice.

Section 2 begins by defining ontology and hierarchy. The problem outlined in Section 1 is given theoretical context by being differentiated into three ontologies; the ontologies of (1) Subject, (2) nature, and (3) critique. Each is shown to possess a unique set of assumptions that have nothing in common with each other. What they do have in common is the language within which to exemplify just how different the worlds each assumes is from one another. It is argued that by showing how three different sets of assumptions about "what is" reality exist within social work's professional discourses, the possibility is generated to show how they can be strategically rewoven so that professionalism can become an instrument of social justice.
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Section 1

Professionalization’s Use of Social Work’s Discourse of Social Justice

To Achieve its Own Ends.

People know what they do; they frequently know why they do what they do; but what they don’t know is what they do does.

Michel Foucault
Introduction

Three voices. The dissertation argues there are three distinctly different voices at work in professional social work. These are the voices of the Subject, nature, and critique. Social work’s dominant story about itself, how social workers are taught to view what they do, are those of the Subject. Social work’s traditional histories valorize the social justice mission of social work. Social work’s students are taught to do good work in a world that is not all good, to work for social justice.

The voice of nature is found in social work’s research orientation, in how students and practitioners are encouraged to go to the research literature to find out what constitutes effective practice and interventions. Social science research explores human nature.

The critical voice argues what social workers do is insure that the dispossessed and oppressed do not organize horizontally within families, neighborhoods and communities. Instead social work has its client systems look vertically to relief from public and private social welfare agencies. The critical voice argues that the profession of social work accepts the world as it is given, “as it appears.” It does its best to “do” what its mission “says” it should. The world as it appears is a political reality disguised
by claims to nature, human nature, or inviolable "facts." The primary question the critical voice asks is, "Who gets to define and say what the facts are?" In its current form, social work can be seen as a tool of hierarchizing interests that benefit from the existence of chronic social problems. A central argument developed in this dissertation is that the world is not as it appears.

The dissertation argues that one of the main problems that the profession of social work faces is that it has situated itself so that it is unable to move in ways that address how to solve pressing social problems. One of the consequences of its drive to achieve legitimacy and respectability as a "profession" among a system of professions is that it has narrowed its focus from working to create a just world to dealing with the concrete "world as it appears." This narrowing has conflated the three distinctly different voices at work in social work's discourses. Their differences are elided and hidden, covered over and subordinated to a dominating professional voice.

The dissertation problematizes the common assumption that the profession's organizing value is social justice, and that it informs and structures what social workers do. Using the critical voice, it demonstrates that something quite different is occurring. Social work's social justice discourse is shown to be an instrument of the ends of what is called the professional project: claiming jurisdictions of practice -- turf -- in competition with other professions in a system of professions.

This problematizing is effected by using discourse analysis to illuminate and elucidate the fundamental assumptions from which social work's discourses stem. Discourse analysis in the dissertation has to do with conceptualizations, with meaning
constructs, with stated purposes and missions. Michel Foucault referred to this methodology as the effort to "reverse" discourses to show their underlying assumptions and the consequences of said assumptions. Foucault (1980) says

My general project over the past few years has been, in essence, to reverse the mode of analysis followed by the entire discourse of right from the time of the middle Ages. My aim, therefore, was to invert it, to give due weight, that is, to the fact of domination, to expose both its latent nature and its brutality.

I then wanted to show not only how right is, in a general way, the instrument of this domination – which scarcely needs saying – but also to show the extent to which, and the forms in which, right (not simply the laws but the whole complex of apparatuses, institutions and regulations responsible for their application) transmits and puts in motion relations that are not relations of sovereignty but of domination. The system of right, the domain of the law, are permanent agents of these relations of domination, these polymorphous techniques of subjugation. Right should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates (p. 95).

The complex of apparatuses, institutions and regulations he speaks of stem from the voice of nature, in which the natural is the normal and unnatural is equated with the abnormal. The kind of "knowledge" valued in modern American society is that which stems from nature, that receives its legitimacy because it is natural. The discourse of right stems from the claim to being natural, of nature. What Foucault argues is that
nature is a political construct that is arbitrary and contingent, a function of persons believing what they are told about nature is true.

The dissertation uses the methodology of reversal to de-stabilize nature and social work’s version of it so that its political origin and foundation is recognized. To this end, the dissertation argues that social work’s three voices are conflated, and that this conflation is the vehicle by which political relations of domination and subordination are maintained and extended. Who gets to say what “facts” are? Who benefits from the political order as it is? Who determines what nature is, and what is natural? How is this determination so powerful that that we don’t question what we are told is true?

The final chapter of the dissertation explores the implications for social work when totalizing discourses are de-conflated. Each voice expresses a different set of assumptions about the “nature” of reality. The three voices co-exist whether clarified or conflated. The question becomes, “how can social workers weave the discourses so that the social justice project uses professionalization and its assumption of nature as an instrument to achieve the ends of social justice?” How can academic and practicing social workers take apart the conflation and model this for students and clients so that they come up with their own means to help create a just world? To this end the “fact of human nature” is asserted as foundation for the social justice project.

Foucault (1985) says “…a philosophical exercise. The object of which is to learn to what extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently” (p. 9). The overarching purpose of the dissertation is to clear a discursive space using the methodology of reversal so that the
silent thought of conflation, the "world as it appears," is destabilized enough that the reader is given the possibility to reweave the discourses informing silent thought as part of participating in reversing the relation between the professional and social justice projects.
Chapter 1

The Social Justice and Professional Projects: Discourses in Conflict

Introduction

The main points this chapter makes are. (1) the social justice and professional projects have very different missions and visions. (2) social work discourses conflate this very important difference and. (3) this conflation serves to reproduce existing social conditions in which the mechanisms of social injustice distribute opportunity.

This chapter begins by defining how social justice and the social justice project is to be understood. Wakefield’s (1988) notion of distributive justice, modified by Young (1990) and Fraser (1997) serves as this definition. A definition of social injustice is developed, then that of the social justice mission, and finally a definition of the system of professions is offered using Abbott (1988). The professional project is outlined and the topics of how professions are founded in competition with one another, how social work’s professional project is formed, what professionals “do,” and the kinds of knowledge professionals develop and use are discussed. The professional mission is defined and the difference between academic and practice knowledge is discussed, and the foundation for professional practice – diagnosis, inference, and treatment – is
outlined. The argument that the social justice and professional projects are conflated is made, and the naïve realist and realist positions are defined. It is argued that the professional and social justice project have nothing in common, and to assert they do can be seen to be an apologetic for not engaging in practice structured by the organizing value of social justice.

The Social Justice Project

The definition of social justice. Wakefield (1988a; 1988b) has written what is perhaps the most definitive statement about social justice in social work. He argues that “social work aims to promote distributive justice…” (1988a, p. 188). He says, “Distributive justice is generally associated with the goal of alleviating economic deprivation and with the methods of policy-making and social reform” (p. 189).

Policymaking will be understood to fall under the “rule of law.” Social reform will be understood to consist of changing the social contract, which does not necessarily involve changing the rule of law. The purpose of a profession “is to promote a particular, valued goal of great importance to people’s well being that I will call its organizing value” (p. 190). This parallels medicine’s organizing value of curing disease. education’s organizing value to be learning, and legal justice in law. He later says

I believe that a Rawlsian approach to distributive justice has the power to make sense of the social work profession and its disparate activities in ways not yet generally appreciated. Social work can be conceived as a profession engaged in alleviating deprivation in all its varieties, from economic to psychological; social workers identify people who fall below the social minimum in any justice-related
good and intervene in order to help them rise above that minimally acceptable level (p. 194).

Distributive justice then, includes not only economic resources, but social resources such as “opportunity, power, and the social bases of self-respect” (p. 193). For the dissertation’s purposes, opportunity is construed as environmental. By this is meant that opportunity at its most basic consists of access to material resources – food, fuel, shelter and clothing – as well as the social resources of education, wellness care, medical care, and transportation. Again, opportunity consists of access to material and social resources. Access is provided by the social environment through the vehicles of the social contract and rule of law. Flew (1979) says the social contract is “an agreement between individuals, or between individuals and a governing power, in which some personal liberties are freely surrendered in return for the advantages of having a well-organized society” (p. 328). The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID 2001) says “

The term ‘rule of law’ embodies the basic principles of equal treatment of all people before the law, fairness, and both constitutional and actual guarantees of basic human rights. A predictable legal system with fair, transparent, and effective judicial institutions is essential to the protection of citizens against the arbitrary use of state authority and lawless acts of both organizations and individuals. Wakefield connects the abstract – organizing value – with the concrete, what social workers work for and do. Wakefield’s conceptualization of distributive justice has its roots in the Enlightenment and liberal tradition stretching back to Hobbes, moving
through Locke and Kant, "where the source of ethical principles is seen to lie in the nature of rationality, and every rational person is taken to be morally equal and deserving of respect" (p. 196/197). A person cannot act rationally without being given the opportunity to do so. This rationality lies in the social contract and the rule of law to which free citizens willingly abide.

The Subject. The dissertation argues that social work's purpose and ethics are grounded in this liberal tradition, in the codified rights of the "Subject." The Subject is defined to consist of two interdependent elements. The first is that the Subject is being-free. Secondly, the Subject involves being personally responsible for being-free. The social justice that social workers struggle to create is constituted in a social environment in which all persons are given access to the opportunity to achieve Subject status. To be given Subject status involves a person having the opportunity to participate within and benefit from the social contract and the rule of law. A person needs access to both material and social resources to achieve Subject status. The achievement of Subject status is not dependent upon individual effort but upon the (rational) equal distribution of material and social resources (opportunity) given in institutional practices as defined by the social contract and rule of law.

When all persons are given adequate food, fuel, shelter, and clothing, a minimum in material resources is given. When all persons are also given education, wellness care, medical care, and transportation, this minimum is expanded so that each person can freely choose to participate in the social contract and abide by the rule of law. Without access to opportunity, a person does not have the choice to participate. The lack
of opportunity precludes a person from the possibility of making this choice and benefiting from the way things are in the social world.

The dissertation’s definition of social justice is not completely a Rawlsian casting. Iris Young in her 1990 work *Justice and the Politics of Difference* argues against a theory of justice that claims universality, comprehensiveness, and necessity, that stands independent of a given social context and its institutional practices and norms. A theory of justice that assumes the above is transtemporal and hence makes a claim to truth that is grounded in no context. She might argue that the use of the term “Subject” is above context and is transtemporal. Young rejects a *theory* of justice while holding that it is possible to engage in rational discourse about justice. Her version of critical theory says that such discourse is situated and historical, that it takes place within a normative and normalizing historical context. One of her primary claims is that the individualistic focus of distributive justice, and its emphasis on possession actually precludes a conceptual analysis of the relation of social groups to mechanisms of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. The view of social justice being developed here seeks to account for Young’s criticism.

Social justice is seen as each person being given Subject status, and the social environment constitutes the act of giving. The social environment as it is understood here, is always background to a person’s situation. In order to be vehicles of social justice the social contract and rule of law must require that *all* persons be given the opportunity to participate in and benefit from distribution of opportunity. As will be discussed in the next section, the social groups of which Young speaks are mechanisms
that distribute opportunity to persons. Social groups known by specific characteristics that are different from other social groups and their characteristics are political, and sometimes cultural constructs. They are not necessarily cultural, but they are necessarily political. As will be demonstrated, these characteristics are loci for unequal distribution of opportunity.

Young argues that an emphasis on distributive theories of justice may include non-material, or social resources, such as Wakefield’s above, but they tend to be treated as identifiable things. Access to unlimited education, wellness care, medical care and transportation are reduced to a thingness that confuses what she sees as the central issues with which justice is concerned: domination and oppression and the politics that stems from them. She claims that a situated approach to achieving social justice requires a more process oriented and relational conceptualization. She argues that a logic of distribution undergirded with a theory of justice ignores mechanisms of oppression, that it ignores the political reality that in her view, structures distribution of opportunity. Young (1990) says, “Oppression and domination, I argue, should be the primary terms for conceptualizing injustice” (p. 9).

The dissertation’s position is that social justice is equal distribution of opportunity - material, and social resources - to persons by their social (political) environment regardless of difference in social group characteristics historically and culturally given. Social justice is the goal of the liberal social contract and rule of law. On the other hand, oppression and domination are factors in the unequal distribution of resources. Their components, as discussed shortly, are actual mechanisms of unequal distribution. Social
injustice is about unequal distribution of opportunity because of differences in social
group characteristics that are inherently political and historical, not natural.

Not all persons alive are given adequate food, fuel, shelter, and clothing. Not all persons are given as much education as they want, access to wellness care, medical care, or transportation. To the degree, this is so, social injustice constitutes the social environment of persons in their worlds. Young argues that individuals are oppressed because they belong to oppressed groups. Oppression happens to groups of persons that have a characteristic by which they are identified.

At the same time, Young argues that social group difference is a positive mechanism by which group members can seize the discursive definitions of oppression and transform them, as has queer theory, black power, or gay/lesbian pride. Young’s (1990) work makes a positive statement about the role social groups have in creating emancipatory meaning at sites of difference. She wants the site of identification and difference to be the locus of transforming injustice into justice. The dissertation argues that this perspective exemplifies a conflation of discourses. Before exploring this, another perspective on social justice is offered.

Nancy Fraser, in her (1997) Justice Interruptus, argues that what Young (1990) proposes is one of four possible solutions to the problem injustice presents. This solution is what she calls the politics of recognition. Groups differentiate themselves from each other in order to call attention to themselves, their unique cultural and historical background, and their plight. She says these struggles are expressive of mainstream multiculturalism and identity politics.
The second approach Fraser presents involves the politics of redistribution, or class politics. This approach to ending injustice targets economic structures that generate group and class differences. She argues that in America the politics of redistribution is a function of the welfare state. One of the effects of this approach to injustice is that it undercuts the efforts of those working within the first solution, the politics of recognition. The politics of recognition and politics of distribution are in tense relation for Fraser. They can simply be different or they can undercut each other. Wakefield’s liberal notion of redistribution is loosely covered by this approach.

Her third approach is affirmation. Affirmation recognizes identity politics and mainstream multiculturalism as well as the politics of redistribution found in the liberal welfare state. Affirmation is a means to extend recognition to existing social groups and their identities and to redistribute resources to them. She argues that this solution does not question to the mechanisms by which group identity is formed or the undergirding structures of capitalism. Affirmative action is an example of this possible solution to the problem of social injustice, which often leads to resentment against those groups who benefit from the policy.

The fourth approach is the politics of transformation. This is compatible with both the first and second approaches. It wants to destabilize existing social group identities with the intent that more fluid, multiple, and intersecting identities and difference emerge. It also is compatible with a socialist politics that targets economic structures. Fraser lands on the side of the politics of transformation, and its use of both recognition and redistribution as vehicles of transformation. Fraser ends her chapter by
saying that it would be necessary that “all people be weaned from their attachment to current cultural constructions of their interests and identities” (p. 31).

This can be interpreted as the endpoint, or purpose of the effort to create a just society. This effort consists of two parts. The first is that persons who have been distributed enough opportunity to participate in and benefit from the world as it is work for and develop Subject status. The second part involves taking personal responsibility for being given enough opportunity to work to become part of the social environment within which others are given opportunity to do the same. A person is given access to opportunity, develops a sense of being-free, and takes responsibility for this gift.

Fraser (1997) says. “...the project of transforming the deep structures of both political economy and culture appears to be the one overarching programmatic orientation capable of doing justice to all current struggles against injustice” (p. 32). Wakefield (1988) champions transforming the political economy, albeit under the charge of eliding difference. Young champions transforming the deep structures of culture through a politics of difference (recognition). Fraser, later in her book, but earlier in regards to date of writing, says there are four attitudes towards difference. It is worth quoting her at length as it sets the stage for the next section.

1. The first one Young calls humanism: it is the view that the differences that members of oppressed groups evince are precisely the damages of oppression or the lies that rationalize them. Difference, in other words, is an artifact of oppression, as in the stunting of skills and capacities. The proper political
response is to abolish it. This is essentially the position of Catherine MacKinnon with respect to gender difference.

2. A second position on difference is sometimes called cultural nationalism. Within feminism, it has been called (by Young) gynocentrism; within antiracist politics, it has been called Afrocentrism. It is the view that the differences that members of oppressed groups evince are marks of their cultural superiority over their oppressors. These differences, like feminine nurturance or Native-American connection to the land, merit revaluation. But this does not mean that they should be celebrated as differences. On the contrary, they should be universalized and extended to those who currently manifest inferior traits such as competitiveness and instrumentalism.

3. A third position views difference as cultural variation. This is the view that the differences manifested by members of different groups are neither superiorities nor inferiorities but simply variations. They should neither be eliminated nor universalized but rather affirmed as differences; they are valuable as expressions of human diversity. This is Young's position.

4. A fourth position, which is the one I wish to commend, is that there are different kinds of differences. Some differences are of type 1 and should be eliminated; others are of type 2 and should be universalized; still others are of type 3 and should be enjoyed. This position implies that we can make judgments about which differences fall into which categories. It also implies we can make normative judgments about the relative value of alternative norms, practices, and
interpretations, judgments that could lead to conclusions of inferiority, superiority, and equivalent value. It militates against any politics of difference that is wholesale and undifferentiated. It entails a more differentiated politics of difference (pp. 203-204).

On one hand, in the list of approaches to the problem injustice presents, Fraser recommends a politics of transformation that uses both recognition and redistribution, the politics of identity and politics of class, to achieve social justice. On the other, in the four attitudes toward difference, she seems to exclude any consideration of redistribution. Perhaps the former argument is an evolution of the latter. Whatever the case may be, she affirms Young’s use of difference as a site of resistance and transformation. Difference is both a vehicle of oppression and a vehicle of emancipation. Fraser’s fourth position above seems to bridge the complexity here.

However, the question that is begged in regards to this position on attitudes toward difference is “who gets to eliminate some of the type 1 differences, and who gets to universalize other differences, and determine which differences should be enjoyed?” Fraser says that her overarching project is transformation of deep structures of political economy and culture. If this happens within the actions of persons situated historically and culturally within their worlds, then how does this address the deep structures? Can a person or group eliminate difference or universalize? Any adherence to a transformative politics of recognition has that recognition occur within the situated group and its members. On the one hand is Fraser’s project, and the authorial view, and on the other
the discourse of situated transformation. Fraser is not as clear as she might be on this issue.

Transformation of deep structures is captured in one bridging programmatic orientation capable of doing justice to all current struggles against injustice. Fraser appears to be making an assumption that when difference is a positive site, situated and local, that it struggles against the same difference when it is seen or manifests itself as a vehicle of oppression. The dissertation argues that injustice may be given historically and culturally within a person’s situatedness, as is the possibility of social justice as defined above. but the transformation of injustice is not given historically. It is a personal act within a historical context, whether part of a social group or social movement. It is an act of freedom by one situated person or group of persons in their worlds. The question becomes, why would a person who has struggled to understand the ephemeral mechanisms of injustice that withhold opportunity, seen with eyes and felt with the belly, choose to make the very mechanism of oppression into a site of identity? The dissertation will argue that the kind of group identity of which Young speaks is a transitional phase in the hard work of creating a just world in which all persons are given the opportunity to achieve Subject status, being-free, and the possibility to take personal responsibility for being-free. To organize within a site of difference is neither right nor wrong. It is a step towards claiming the right to achieve Subject status. That this organization may take decades to achieve, and decades to work through matters not. What persons in their worlds choose to do to advance the cause of being-free can only be supported.
Another point is that the universalization suggested in approach #3 above is not about difference. How can a Native-American’s connection to the land be universalized? What is universalized is the revaluing of situated generation of meaning. If this is to occur it will happen when the social contract and rule of law are written to revalue a person, her cultural and social milieu, no matter what the difference is. The Native-American’s voice is encouraged to speak within the discursive space cleared by extension of the social contract and rule of law, not by contestation of claims of identity known by population characteristics of difference. The historical processes of oppression can be seen to absorb such contestation because it is conducted within the discourse that maintains oppression.

This claim can be made about Young’s position because the social groups within which she locates emancipatory identity utilize the very discourse that maintains oppression. Fraser’s position is more complex, and as discussed above, there are elements in her thought that are open to this claim. However, there are also elements that examine the mechanisms of oppression apart from any linking or connection to discourses of social justice. Fraser says, “Rather, all these axes of injustice intersect one another in ways that affect everyone’s interests and identities. No one is a member of only one such collectivity. And people who are subordinated along one axis of social division may well be dominant along another” (p. 32).

This statement serves as a segue for laying out the dissertation’s understanding of social injustice. Before doing so, let it be said that the point being developed here is that social justice and injustice have no discursive relation to one another. The mechanisms
of oppression - population characteristics defining social groups - have no relation to the mechanisms by which persons are given Subject status by the social (political) environment: the social contract and rule of law.

The dissertation argues that the thinking that both Young and Fraser display in their arguments is based in a conflation of the discourses of social justice and injustice. By conflate is meant “a combining or fusing together, as of two variant readings of a text” (Websters 1939). To the degree that the politics of identity and economy are used in any manner other than to reveal and illuminate the mechanisms of oppression, the injustice both approaches seek to transform is not transformed. Injustice is perpetuated, reproduced, expanded, deepened, and extended.

The dissertation argues that the discourse of social justice has to be conducted apart from the discourses of injustice by those developing the tools and perspectives to promote social justice. Perhaps persons in situ can develop their voices within a characteristic of difference, but that is up to them. Texts and discourses such as this dissertation have nothing to say about another person’s acting. What this sort of text can do is to clarify assumptions and consequences of assumptions and be part of a larger effort that clears a discursive space within the social environment. The goal is to develop the social contract and rule of law so that persons who have never felt listened to, or visible, can see that they are heard when they speak, that the social environment responds to them. To write such a text as this dissertation assumes the privilege of Subject status. The goal of social justice is to become part of the social environment in which others develop Subject status, who in turn, become part of the social environment that enables
others to do the same. The statement that began this paragraph seeks to establish an
intellectual clarity. Social justice and injustice can have nothing in common *at the level
of idea and assumption* if one is to transform the other through a person’s acting. To link
the two discursively can do nothing more than reproduce the dominance/subordination
hierarchy that is the hallmark of oppression.

Young argues for the role of a social group and the politics of recognition. The
question begged is where did the characteristic around which the group forms an identity
come from? Did it arise in situ, in dialogue among family members or neighbors, friends
and co-workers? Or was it a historically given mechanism by which opportunity is
distributed to persons. Both Young and Fraser in varying degrees conflate what the
dissertation argues are two very different discourses. In order to understand that social
justice and injustice are given in very different discourses, the following section lays out
the mechanisms by which opportunity is unequally distributed, oppression occurs and
injustice is maintained.

The distributive mechanisms of social injustice. For purposes of discussion, the
dissertation asserts there are eight primary mechanisms that distribute opportunity
unequally and maintain social injustice. These eight mechanisms are: class, gender, race,
age, sexual orientation, nation status, physical and mental ability and religion. Each of
these mechanisms targets a group of individuals that have characteristics defined by the
distributive mechanism. This list is not exhaustive, nor exclusive. Different cultures and
societies within a culture might include different, fewer or more mechanisms. The list is
illustrative.
The intersection of these eight mechanisms constitutes a social location. The idea of social location is that of an intersection of "isms," mechanisms by which oppression is effected. A person is born into a specific social location, a specific and unique intersection of the eight distributive mechanisms, and s/he develops according the opportunity this social location affords. The white, male child growing up in a middle class suburb who attends a school in a new building in classes that have a 6 to 1 student to adult ratio is distributed more opportunity than a black, female child growing up in an urban housing project who attends a school in an 80 year old building in classes that have a 20 to 1 student to adult ratio. More subtly, the white male, suburban child is distributed more opportunity than is a white female, suburban child.

The eight distributive mechanisms and the social locations they constitute for persons are purely political. By this is meant they are arbitrary and contingent, shifting and changing over time. In the late 19th century, very few women graduated from a university, and those that did were barred from entering the professions. In the first years of the 21st century, women not only make up nearly half of the college population, they can enter any profession. The gender woman distributes more opportunity to persons identified as women now than 100 years ago. However, more opportunity is distributed by the category male to persons than the category woman. Gender both withholds and gives access to opportunity.

**Suffering.** A point that needs to be mentioned is that social injustice generates personal suffering. Injustice may not be the root of all suffering, but suffering is generated for all persons within a society that distributes opportunity unequally to its
members. What is ironic is that while there are many who receive and benefit from an excess of material and social resources – opportunity – these persons are no more immune from suffering generated by the system of oppression than are those who have access to a dearth of opportunity. It is the presence of injustice in the eight distributive mechanisms that generates suffering for all. The schema of the eight mechanisms that distribute opportunity unequally would seem to suggest that to “benefit” from injustice means suffering is less while those that receive a dearth of opportunity have more suffering.

If suffering is solely a consequence of a lack of material and social resources, this is so. However, suffering is generated when a person is distributed enough opportunity to develop Subject status and s/he, doesn’t do so. A person is given access to opportunity over the course of her lifespan so that the possibility exists for her to choose to be free. As part of this choice, is the ongoing act of taking personal responsibility for being free by becoming part of the social environment that enables others to do so. The kind of suffering shying away from this possibility generates for a person is incalculable. To have this possibility present and learn to ignore it can be seen to constitute a life of quiet desperation, to be an unacknowledged social disease.

The eight mechanisms. Each mechanism defines a continuum determining how opportunity is distributed. The mechanism of class, for example, lies along a continuum of socio-economic status. In America, one pole is the lower class, which might include the person identified as indigent, or a welfare recipient. Little if any opportunity is distributed to persons on this end of the continuum. The other pole of this distributive
mechanism is the upper class, which distributes an excess of opportunity to persons. This pole of class might include a large inheritance, being sent to the best private schools, or perhaps not working at all, letting capital do the work. Class is the main determinant of economic injustice, which in this taxonomy, is a sub-set of social injustice. Class then, is a distributive mechanism of opportunity. Class is a form of oppression, and is called classism. The presence of opportunity gains its meaning and status from its absence within the lower end of the continuum. This is so for each of the other seven natural categories.

The second continuum is that of gender. On one pole is hermaphroditism, transsexuals, transvestism, or gender confusion. The other pole is the male gender. The female gender is in between. More opportunity is distributed to persons through the male gender than through the female gender, and more opportunity is distributed through the female gender than that of hermaphrodite or transsexual. Gender is a vehicle of unequal distribution of opportunity through sexism.

The continuum of age distributes more opportunity to those who are of working years – 18 through 65 - than to the young and old. Far more children and elderly live in poverty than do persons of working age. Far more opportunity is distributed to persons through the adult category than through the old category, and more is distributed through the old category than the young category. Age is a vehicle of unequal distribution of opportunity through ageism.

Sexual orientation is another mechanism that distributes opportunity unequally. The end that distributes an excess of opportunity to persons is that of heterosexuality.
The pole that distributes a dearth of opportunity is bi-sexuality or homosexuality. Sexual orientation is a vehicle of unequal distribution of opportunity through heterosexism. Heterosexism benefits a substantial majority of persons while generating suffering for a minority.

A fifth distributive mechanism is race. It is anchored on one pole by Anglo-European as White. As skin color moves from light to dark, increasingly less opportunity is distributed to a person. Race is a vehicle of unequal distribution of opportunity through racism. A vast majority of persons in the world suffer from the continuum of racism.

Physical, mental, developmental, and emotional ability is another continuum along which opportunity is distributed. Physical coordination, intelligence, mental acuity, and emotional stability define one end of the continuum. Any disability involving lack of physical coordination, normal development of any kind, lack of intelligence, or emotional or mental stability distributes less opportunity. Ability is a vehicle of unequal distribution of opportunity through ableism. A vast majority of persons benefit from the distributive mechanism of ableism.

Nation status is a distributive mechanism of opportunity. To be a first world nation, versus second or third, or to be a northern versus southern nation, creates a continuum along which opportunity is unequally distributed. Nationalism is a vehicle of unequal distribution of opportunity. Some persons benefit and others suffer from nationalism.
The last major mechanism that distributes opportunity unequally is religion. In some degree, every religion makes the claim that its system of belief constitutes “T”ruth. When one religion distributes more opportunity to persons than another religion distributes to persons within a society or culture, some persons suffer and others benefit from religionism.

These eight mechanisms constitute the broad, blunt parameters of social injustice. There are far more subtle mechanisms at work that go into constituting a social location. Young (1990) says that theories of social justice ignore the political undercurrents and structures of social injustice. The idea of social group can be said to do the same, and do so as part of an emancipatory discourse. Every statement of identity founded in a political category of difference has its own “deep structure” of injustice. Hence, Fraser’s (1997) statement that what is needed is a more differentiated politics of difference. The dissertation asserts that the eight mechanisms that distribute opportunity account for both Young’s critique of a liberal redistribution and Fraser’s views of both the politics of recognition and redistribution.

Social justice project.

Social work’s social justice project seeks to transform the social conditions that distribute opportunity unequally. The goal of this project is to create a social environment in which opportunity is distributed equally to all persons in the world. The mechanism of this project is to work through the rule of law to expand the social contract so it includes more and more people. However, it does not do so within the politics of
recognition or distribution. It does so by creating the possibility (in the social
environment) for ever more persons to work for and attain Subject status.

This means that social workers need to do this themselves before they can be part
of the social environment teaching and encouraging others to do so as part of expanding
the social contract, before they can organize well enough to redirect the rule of law to
generate equal opportunity for all. The key point here is that social injustice is a
historical and cultural artifact, political through and through. Social justice begins with
one person learning how to be free and taking personal responsibility for being so. The
possibility of social justice is given historically and culturally, but until persons act on
this possibility, it remains a discourse far removed from guiding what persons do in their
worlds.

The following outlines a more traditional orientation to social justice than the
position developed above. To distinguish it from social work’s social justice project it is
called social works social justice mission.

Social justice mission. The term mission will be understood to be, “that with
which a messenger or agent is charged; errand; commission” (Websters 1939). The
social justice mission charges social workers to generate social justice within society’s
institutions. Social work’s professional jurisdiction has traditionally been practice with
underserved populations, the poor, children, immigrants, the mentally ill, the sick, and the
incarcerated. The social justice mission is concerned with relief of individual suffering
most often seen to be generated by social and cultural conditions. This has not always
been the case. Social work’s histories have traced a path that had the origin of social
problems lie in the character of individuals to a current understanding in which structural problems – the eight mechanisms by which opportunity is distributed - are the origin of social injustice (Lubove, 1965; Trattner, 1988, Woodruffe, 1962; Simon, 1994).

Social work's social justice mission has been characterized in many different ways over social work's history. Some examples follow. Morales and Sheafor (1995) define social work's mission as, "directly serving people in need and, at the same time, making social institutions more responsible to people" (pp. 36–37). Simon (1994) notes the twin missions of "relieving the misery of the most desperate among us" and "building a human and just social order (p. 23). Hiersteiner & Peterson (1999) argue that social work has a care-centered core, an argument exemplified by telling the stories of Mary Richmond, Mary Jarrett, Jessie Taft, Virginia Robinson, and Bertha Reynolds. The authors want to resist forces that attempt to demote compassion as a guiding value for the profession. They disagree with what they see as a myth that practitioners have undermined the profession's "true" mission by abandoning social justice. Witkin (1998) defines social work in its adjective form as "pertaining to a human service activity (social work practice) or form of social inquiry (social work research) that is focused on individual and social change from a contextual perspective informed by human rights, social justice. and respect for people" (abstract). The latest version of the NASW code of ethics identifies social work's primary mission to be to "enhance human well-being and help meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty" (NASW, 1999).
Social work's social justice project is to transform existing unjust social conditions so that opportunity is distributed equally to all persons. Social injustice is the consequence of the eight "isms" and their role in unequal distribution of opportunity to persons according to social location. Social work's various mission statements formulate different visions of the relation between the social justice project and social injustice.

The dissertation argues that these different relations can be understood to be conflated discourses. The consequence of conflation is that the discourses of social justice, no matter how radical and clear in focus and intent, in the end become vehicles of the historical and cultural conditions in which social locations distribute opportunity unequally. What persons do in their worlds is given historically, culturally and socially. What persons dream about for themselves and others is also given historically, but as possibility rather than actuality. The "doing" that is done is structured by social injustice as it is given in the social environment. The "dreaming" that is done opens up the possibility that a person may choose to be free and take personal responsibility for "doing" so, but until being-free is actualized in doing, it remains a vehicle of injustice.

An important question outlined in the second section of the dissertation is, "How does a person turn the discursive possibility of being free into the foundation for what s/he does?" The dissertation argues that this is not an individual responsibility, but a social one. Those persons, in this case social workers, who have been given the opportunity by their social location to work for and achieve Subject status have the personal responsibility to become part of the social environment that distributes opportunity so that others may "do" the same.
The Professional Project

Social work's professional project has little in common with its social justice project. As will be shown, the professional project consists of claiming and maintaining jurisdictions of practice in competition with other professions. More narrowly, the professional project consists of standardizing and then codifying methods of practice so that they form a professional standard of care in all of the various venues in which social work is conducted.

The following section outlines Andrew Abbott's understanding of how the professions are organized. Key concepts that are discussed include those of jurisdiction of practice, how professions are formed, and competition between professions. The purpose of discussing a model for the professions is to understand how the professional project constitutes the framework in which social workers act. This is in contrast to the social justice project which the dissertation contends is the framework that justifies what social workers do.

Abbott's System of Professions


A jurisdiction is the link between a profession and its work. To analyze professional development is to analyze how this link is created in work, how it is
anchored by formal and informal social structure, and how the interplay of jurisdictional links between professions determines the history of the individual professions themselves (p. 20).

The "tasks of professions are human problems amenable to expert service" (Abbott, 1988, p. 35). To understand how a profession develops requires both a larger grounding in social structure and its history, and how it is connected to other professions. No task or set of tasks making up a jurisdiction is permanent. One profession may claim a set of tasks and have exclusive control of service delivery. Medical doctors' jurisdiction is one such example, although nurses in the last decade have made strides in claiming tasks normally thought of as part of what a physician does. Nursing and doctoring compete at the boundaries of their jurisdictions. The professions make up an interactional ecology and compete within this system. A profession's success is reflective of the situations of other professions with which it competes as much as its own efforts (Abbott, 1988). For example, social work can be seen to be in competitive tension with psychology, licensed professional counselors, psychiatry, school counselors, nursing and chemical dependency counselors. One profession competes with other professions in a system of professions.

The formation of professions. How professions form and become visible entities is explicated by Abbott (1995) in an article from the Social Service Review entitled "Boundaries of Social work or Social Work of Boundaries." One of the arguments Abbott makes is that the standard account of social work's emergence as a profession arose
out of a turf competition between the charity organization societies with their "scientific" ethos of casework and the settlements with their chaotically comprehensive services and their broad social agendas. The usual view is that the settlements more or less lost out to the new scientism of Mary Richmond and others. The settlements' broad interests in reform and preventive services were replaced by the narrow, vocational, casework-centered approach of the social work schools (p. 556).

He says that long before the conflict between the Charity Organization Societies (COS) and settlements reached a point where the animosity between the two became public, what he calls "structuration" of task areas and careers was already apparent. This process took place as boundaries formed between "different kinds of people doing the same kinds of work, or between different styles of work with roughly similar clients, or between one kind of workplace and another" (Abbott, 1995, p. 557). These boundaries formed out of simple locations of difference. Over time social work emerged when different social agents like leaders of the COS and settlements, the heads of state boards of charities, and superintendents of institutions responsible for care of the poor and criminal began to link these locations of difference into what Abbott calls "proto-boundaries" and then into larger organizational units.

For example, he says that the 1880s kindergartens were conducted by people with a wider variety of backgrounds than before. Brehony (1987) argues that middle and sometimes upper-middle class women in Britain who were part of the Froebelian movement and outside the Church/Tory/Capital status quo took up the kindergarten.
They were aligned with intellectuals who supported industrial training regimens leading to factory practices such as Taylorism. People came into kindergartens from churches, education, and some volunteered. In America, volunteers from the settlement houses started working in kindergartens, overwhelming the Froebelians. But, rather than becoming part of what eventually became social work, the kindergarten formed with home economics and industrial education along a boundary defined by the physical space of the school. Abbott argues that social entities - ever more formal groupings of task areas - emerge from the boundaries of these task areas.

Six years after opening in 1898, a survey of school graduates of the New York Charity Organization was conducted to ascertain within what task areas they were working.

Of these 167 had identifiable volunteer or paid employment; many of the remainder were women who had married and left any kind of work behind. Of these 167, over one-third (58) were involved in charity aid societies as visitors, agents, supervisors, editors, or general secretaries. Another 22 were involved in specific charities. However, 16 were teachers, running all the way from professors of sociology to instructors in kindergartens. 14 were settlement workers, running clubs, music schools, and various other activities. 13 worked for governments, mostly for New York City as tenement house inspectors. A mere four entered probation and medical work. These career tracks were already making the divisions of social work clear, even before the public battle of the
charity organization movement and the settlement movement had reached the boiling point (Abbot, 1995, p. 556).

**Competition between professions.** Abbott identifies competitive forces that work both internally within a profession, and externally between professions. Internal forces within a profession generally weaken or strengthen claims to current jurisdictions. “External forces directly disturb the system by opening new task areas for jurisdiction and by destroying old jurisdictions” (Abbott 1988, p. 91). The major internal events in a profession’s growth and decline are conflicts over jurisdictions. The history of the professions is a history of one profession battling another over turf. Competition then, involves conflict over the right to claim a jurisdiction within the system of professions.

The most important battles between professions are fought on grounds of competence and theory. State of the art knowledge is theoretical and forms the “core jurisdiction” of a profession. At the same time, overly abstract theory may weaken the core and open up a profession to challenge and loss of jurisdiction. The basic mechanism of interprofessional competition is the “use of abstract knowledge to reduce the work of competitors to a version of their own” (Abbott, 1988, p. 36).

Chapter 2 tells a story of social work’s professionalization in which this core jurisdiction moves from fact-gathering method in the early 1900s to psychodynamic theory and method, and finally to the empirically derived theories and analytic methods of today’s academic social sciences. Social work’s attempt to establish method as its core jurisdiction served a useful purpose insofar that it generated knowledge of hitherto unknown persons in their situatedness; immigrants, persons of color, the working class,
the indigent. However, as schools of social work became affiliated with universities, the criteria used by the academic social sciences for what constituted valid knowledge offered sharp contrast to social work’s core jurisdiction in fact-gathering method and psychodynamic theory. Abbott (1988) says

The organizational formalities of professions are meaningless unless we understand their context. This context always relates back to the power of the professions’ knowledge systems, their abstracting ability to define old problems in new ways. Abstraction enables survival… It is with abstractions that psychiatry stole the neurotics from neurology, the abstractions of its fancy new Freudianism. It is with abstraction that American medicine claims all of deviance, the abstraction of its all-powerful disease metaphor (p. 30).

For example, a competitive force working internally within social work was played out when social work adopted the fact gathering method of Mary Richmond. This standardized set of investigatory procedures was deemed more legitimate than the practice of moral persuasion used by friendly visitors in the 1870s and 1880s. Legitimacy was seen to be an integration of codified method and the developing competence of practitioners.

In a similar manner, the Freudian model for practice with individuals in the 1930s was adopted by a core group of social workers. This theory legitimized professional practice in a way that the fact gathering methods advocated by Mary Richmond couldn’t. With the popular understanding of the unconscious and irrational emerged a fascination with the interior of the individual. Mary Richmond’s integration of the practice wisdom
of senior practitioners and the facts of a social situation could not make the bridge to the psychological interior.

**Circles and spirals.** Abbott (1988) argues that professions define old problems in new ways. The dissertation argues that the power of professional abstraction lies not in its defining old problems in new ways, but in the actual identification, naming and solution of emerging social problems. Chapter 5 argues that the *spiralic* cycle of problem generation/solution is the creative function of modernization. This is opposed to the medieval *circle* of repetition in which problems that emerged were solved by appealing to scripture. The bible had all the answers. In contrast to the static, medieval social order, it will be shown that modernization both creates and solves social problems.

The system of professions is charged with identifying, naming and solving problems created by modernization. An individual, a dyad, group, organization, neighborhood, or community experiences a social disturbance. The professional doctor, social worker, public administrator, planner, nurse, therapist, community organizer, etc., identifies the parameters of the problem in an assessment. S/he names the problem and comes up with a means to solve it. The professional thereby generates new knowledge. This solution diffuses into the social/cultural background and becomes part of social functioning, no matter what size the client system. New problems emerge out of the always changing social context and professionals identify what they are, name them, and come up with solutions. The spiral of knowledge creation continues.

**Levels of competition.** Professional competition occurs at three levels; (1) the workplace, (2) culture and public opinion, (3) and legal and administrative rules. Abbott
(1988) says that most changes in jurisdictional control happen first in the workplace, in control of what is actually done. In a matter of ten years control of delivery of the mental health counseling services within the context of managed care has been claimed by social workers. This involves a loss of potential jurisdiction by psychologists. Second, public perception of legitimacy changes more slowly than does actual control of jurisdiction. Social work continues to try and overcome the image of a child being removed from the home, or a caseworker visiting a family to check up on them.

Social work has been successful in convincing managed care organizations that their version of what mental health services do deliver, and how they deliver them, are superior to those of psychologists (Strom-Gottfried, 1997). Social workers currently provide the majority of mental health services in managed care organizations, in part because social workers have a long history of working in hospitals, and their presence is routine in public perception. The June, 1999 issue of NASW’s monthly newspaper had as its largest headline, “Profession dominates mental health.” Another headline on the cover page is, “Managed Care Standards Oversight Proviso Faulted.” NASW is seeking accreditation standards favorable to social workers. The article says

NASW argued that social workers are trained to assess, diagnose and treat mental illness; are approved for Medicare reimbursement for services; use a holistic approach to treat patients; and deliver more than 60 percent of mental health services in the United States (NASW News, June. 1999, p. 1). This is an example of social work battling other professions and their claims for professional jurisdiction at the level of legal and administrative rules. Social workers
have already claimed the jurisdiction and are working in managed care settings as the numbers cited show. Social work has managed to weave a holistic approach to service with the medical model well enough that managed care is increasingly validating its jurisdictional claims. At the state mental hospital in Evanston, Wyoming, social workers have been successful in getting doctors to adopt a social model for interdisciplinary collaboration in patient care. In the Behavioral Sciences Unit at Children’s Hospital in Denver, doctors, psychiatrists, nurses, and social workers take pride in their team approach to providing services to children with psychiatric disabilities.

The above referenced article is part of a larger strategy in which social work’s major professional organization is seeking to more deeply institutionalize its claim over a jurisdiction for practice. Social work has been successful in claiming jurisdiction in managed care organizations first by actually performing the work, secondly by having this performance accepted by the public, and thirdly, by fighting to have its claim further legitimized in administrative and legal standards. Nieves. (2000a) says

The contemporary social and economic forces that are placing increased and exclusive power at the disposal of corporations are reverberating throughout the mental and behavioral health provider community, and the social work profession is no exception.

Some members are finding their careers undergoing profound change. Managed care can be difficult and confusing. Ethics conflicts and concerns may present themselves. Incomes are impacted (p. 3).
Managed care is expanding beyond the health and mental health care systems.

For some time now, local and state governments have been looking to get out of direct service delivery in public welfare, child welfare, and protective services. Increasingly, governments are experimenting with private companies, outsourcing service provision to low bidders. Gorin (2000) and Hudson (1999) point out that there is a national movement to privatize social security and Medicare. The State is increasingly under pressure to divest itself of responsibility for social services and their delivery. Nieves. 2000a continues.

The changes wrought by managed care organizations (MCOs) are spurring the profession of social work to protective action. It is NASW's aim to assure that social workers do more than simply weather the change, but seek opportunity and come out ahead (p. 3).

The article finishes with the statement

Whatever the result, our goal will continue to be the same — representing members' interests and concerns and protecting jobs and salaries. And we will continue our integrated, multi-pronged strategy to obtain the best for NASW members and their clients and to grow the power of professional social work. (Nieves. 2000a. p. 3)

Another example of the competitive orientation is found in Nieves (2000b). She says

The national office, chapter staff, leaders, and especially members are all integral pieces of the puzzle of success. We need to meet the demands of a
largely technological, information-hungry society — and meet those demands faster than our "dot.com" rivals. This is an issue that many organizations face today. People crave information: they need it quickly and reliably. Our goal is to find out what members want and need, as well as serve the profession and advance its mission. We all need to help meet that goal.

To be effective in the 21st century, we are adopting a new mind-set, a new corporate culture. We want to improve and increase services that are important to members and leave behind those that are of lesser priority. Our future investments will be in current members and in recruitment of new members. We will take advantage of the technological revolution and provide new products, including interactive e-commerce, distance learning, and home study. We will build new credentials and certifications that bolster members' careers. We will continue the investment in our publications. We will revamp the association to meet the goals of membership and be less cumbersome (p. 1)

It is clear that Nieves, and through her, NASW, embraces the professional mission. Social workers are in competition with dot.com rivals. Social workers are encouraged to endorse NASW's adoption of a new corporate culture, which seems to include increasing the number of credentials and certifications a social worker can earn. The professional mission at its heart involves bolstering NASW members' careers. At the same time, *Social Work*, the flagship journal sponsored by NASW, has gone from a bi-monthly to quarterly publication, a seeming contradiction of her assertion that NASW will continue to invest in its publications.
Professional Mission. Social work’s professional mission charges social workers to claim jurisdiction for practice in competition with other professions. Abbott (1988) says that a profession is an exclusive occupational group applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases in competition with other occupational groups. Wenocur and Reisch (1989), two of social work’s historians, define a profession as a “quasi-corporate enterprise whose members have obtained a substantial degree of control over the production, distribution, and consumption of a needed service commodity” (p. 4). An example of social work’s professional mission at work is found in Pardeck & Meinert’s (1999) article in which they argue that persons who sit on the editorial review board of the journal Social Work should be chosen by peer review, extending the mechanisms by which research standards are maintained to include those who choose what is to be published in the journal. The professional mission is most visible in its claim of jurisdiction here.

The argument seems to be that if academic social work is to be thought of as equal to the other academic professions, it must adopt the standards of the journals of those professions. Pardeck and Meinert (1999) are concerned with insuring social work’s claim to jurisdiction has legitimacy as a research profession within the academy. This parallels the work that NASW performs to claim jurisdictions of practice. The claim of legitimacy by academic social workers and jurisdiction by practitioners is driven respectively by the standards of social science and the system of the professions, not social justice. Abbot distinguishes between the academic and practice orientations in the following manner.
Academic and practice knowledge. A formal knowledge system is organized into a classification system and an inference system. A classification system constitutes academic knowledge. It isolates elements from one another so that they can be rationally theorized. Logical relationships between parts, their structure, and dynamics is the focus of interest, as opposed to practical application with regard to particular cases. Abbott (1988) says

The character of the abstract classification system is thus dictated by its custodians, the academics, whose criteria are not practical clarity and efficacy, but logical consistency and rationality. Professional knowledge exists, in academia, in a peculiar disassembled state that prevents its use (emphasis mine) (p. 53).

Abbot (1988) also argues that public opinion legitimizes academic knowledge in the mistaken belief it is continuous with practical professional knowledge. “It is only students and teachers who work in the arbitrarily complete classification structure of a formal knowledge system” (p. 56). A primary role academic knowledge plays is naming and invention of new patterns of human behavior that are problematic to smooth functioning of the social order. These new problems and solutions are new patterns or regularities that more practical foci are unable to see. If academic knowledge making up this core jurisdiction loses this function, professional jurisdictions gradually weaken.

The actual conduct of professional work determines many of the parameters of interprofessional competition. However, as we have just seen, these parameters are also affected by the academics. “Academic knowledge legitimizes professional work by clarifying its foundations and tracing them to major cultural values. In most modern
professions, these have been the values of rationality, logic and science” (Abbott 1988, p. 54). As custodian of professional knowledge in its most abstract form, this academic center is uniquely situated to claim new jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the claims it makes are cognitive only. They cannot become recognized jurisdictions without concrete social claims and legitimating responses by professional practitioners.

Academic professional knowledge is generated by researchers that view themselves as members of a community of citizens. As long as research submitted to peer (scientific citizen) review journals is judged to meet minimum criteria, the knowledge generated by this research is added to the knowledge base of a profession. Chapters 2 & 3 tell the story of how academic, formal knowledge systems were eschewed by the first generation of professional social caseworkers. Succeeding generations professionalized by slowly aligning with the university until finally in the 1970s social work aligned itself with the academic social science method and the formal classificational knowledge systems these methods validated.

Practice knowledge on the other hand, is generated in formulas that constitute “what is done” by a professional. Professionals view themselves as working within a social context the center of which is client system and problem. The center of doing for the social work professional is the tripartite process of diagnosis, inference and treatment.

**Diagnosis, Inference and Treatment.** As stated. Abbott distinguishes between a formal knowledge system from “professional knowledge in use,” which is routine and formulaic. Professional practice has three core elements; (1) diagnosis, or the act of classifying a problem, (2) inference, to reason about a problem, and (3) treatment, to take
action on it. For Abbot, diagnosis sets the stage for inference, and treatment is the consequence of inference. Inference, of the three elements, “is a purely professional act” (Abbott, 1988, p. 40). Inference is undertaken when the connection between diagnosis and treatment is obscure. Both diagnosis and treatment may be very clear and formulaic. Inference however, relates professional knowledge, client characteristics, and chance in ways that are usually opaque or puzzling to non-professionals.

Inference works by exclusion or by construction. He says that exclusion is used when the professional has the luxury of a second chance. This is the inference of the doctor prescribing a course of treatment she is not sure is correct. Try one treatment modality and then assess the results. Abbott argues that social workers use this kind of inference as well. Each case is unique and can have any number of logical chains of inference.

Inference then, is the centerpiece of professional practice. It consists of practical reasoning conducted within a context in which agency parameters, practice experience, client system characteristics, and the larger social and political environment all have roles. The reasoning takes place in chains that are unique to the client system, the situation, and the problem.

There is no necessary social justice component to this centerpiece of professional practice. There may be acknowledgement of the political as Young (1990) has cast it, but it is not necessary to the model of the system of professions. A social worker may act with a client from different motivations. She might want to reduce her caseload, respond to supervisor criticism she is taking too long with clients, move the client quickly out of
her office because the client smells. or because she is tired and worn down by a thankless job. None of these motivations are structured by social justice project.

The fundamental assumptions of the Professional Project. The two key ideas in Abbott’s model that must be emphasized are (1) that professions make up a system, and (2) as one among a system of professions, each profession’s self-interest is in competition with another profession’s self-interest to claim jurisdictional turf. No profession willingly gives up jurisdictional claims unless it is developing or taking over new turf. Competition takes place in the academic realm over the legitimacy of knowledge and in the professional realm in the sophistication of inferential reasoning. Both are crucial to claiming and maintaining jurisdictions of practice.

A third assumption is the idea that there is a natural universe, and that we can know this universe by using the scientific method, given enough time and resources. This thread underlies the legitimacy of professional academic knowledge and will be traced more fully in succeeding chapters. These three ideas will constitute what henceforth will be termed the “professional project.” This project is to develop, claim, and maintain jurisdictions of practice in competition with other professions within a larger system of professions within a natural universe.

Conflation of Projects. The professional and social justice projects and their missions can be understood to share no common ideational ground. This is a cornerstone of the argument developed within the dissertation. Mission concerns desired outcomes. What is the desired state of affairs that an action intends to produce? The discourse of professionalism has as desired outcome jurisdiction over an area of practice (Abbott,
1988). The discourse of social justice has as desired outcome relief and ending of human misery and suffering (Simon, 1994), or relieving economic deprivation utilizing the methods of policy-making and social reform (Wakefield, 1988a). The goals or outcomes of the professional and social justice projects have nothing in common at the level of mission.

And yet, professionalism has always had as part of its mission general or specific improvement of living conditions – the doctor seeks to heal physical malady, the psychologist to heal emotional dysfunction, the social worker to relieve human misery and suffering within the person/environment field.

However, in social work at least, the social justice part of the professional mission serves an instrumental function. It promotes professional ends. Wakefield (1988a) argues that "teleological concepts, such as the purpose, goal, and mission of a profession all refer to the promotion of the profession's organizing value" (p. 192). He goes on to say, "An understanding of the organizing value of a profession informs and constrains all aspects of professional practice... Every step in the process of professional intervention, from assessment to evaluation, is shaped by the organizing value" (p. 192/193).

It is argued here that the organizing value of social work is the professional project and its inhering mission. There is a discursive commitment to social justice, but rather than organizing and guiding social workers in what they do, it serves as an instrument of the professional project. There is a disjuncture between "what is said" and "what is done" by social workers. Wakefield's article does not take into account what
academic or practicing social workers do. What is said is performed in service of what is done.

Wakefield (1988a) goes on to say in this section, "To the degree that the organizing value of social work can be made more explicit than it has been, the profession can have a clearer target at which to aim and a better chance to realize its goals" (p. 193). He wants to make more explicit the role of social justice in social work practice. This parallels the intent of the dissertation. However, Wakefield does not take into account that the professions are a vehicle of forces that have no interest in social justice, e.g., jurisdiction over an area of practice, or turf. He is writing within a tradition that assumes social work's organizing value structures what social workers do. His perspective here is an appropriate target for Young's (1990) criticism of theories of social justice, and their assumption of universality, transtemporality and lack of context. As a member of a system of professions, social work can be understood to be driven by competition for jurisdiction, status, and higher pay. This is its primary organizing value. Secondly, the discourse of social justice is used to further the ends of the professional project.

The "world as it appears." An argument can be made that it is not contradictory to hold both missions as general frames and then have to deal with specific situations in which they conflict. A large caseload can see to conflict with a specific client's needs - time cannot be given to arrange services or explore what creative fashioning of services can be made. The professional's desire for increase in salary can lead to decreased services for clients as a finite amount of money is shifted within an agency. These
situations are usually cast as ethical problems that the social worker attempts to resolve according to the NASW code of ethics, some ethical theory, or position. Nevertheless, the identified conflicts are between specific needs within a context, not between discourses. There is already the assumption that "the world is as it appears."

**Conflation of discourses.** This assumption that the world is as it appears serves the beginning point for understanding how the two projects are conflated. Again, by conflate is meant "a combining or fusing together, as of two variant readings of a text" (Websters 1939). The foundation for conflation of social work’s two projects is this assumption that "the world is as it appears." Facts are facts. You can’t argue with events. Common sense says that the world is objective, obdurate, and real. A table is a table and the sun comes up in the east. This common sense view of the world can be called naïve realism. It is a highly functional perspective when things are reduced to a "thingness" as Young (1990) calls it. The world IS as it appears. This perspective does not find the assertion that social work has one organizing value or mission to be problematic. This naïve realism is a simple view of the world.

The last 40 pages has made the argument that the world is not as it appears, that social work has two projects that have completely different missions, completely different goals for the profession. This view of the world is comparatively a "complex" one. Facts are not just facts. Many of the simple facts offered as evidence for the "T"ruth of the naïve realist’s worldview can be seen as sophisticated mechanisms by which opportunity is unequally distributed in the creation and maintenance of social injustice. When a person is labeled "black" s/he is distributed less opportunity than
someone labeled “white.” In the naïve realist’s view, the color of skin is a fact of nature, one that is incontrovertible. The question to be asked within this more complex view is, “Who gets to define and say what the facts are?”

In the complex view being developed here, the color of a person’s skin is a mechanism by which opportunity is distributed that is imposed upon a person by historical tradition, culture and social location. The naïve realist perspective assumes a common sense world that exists independent of any person’s subjective perception of it. There is no problem in saying that NASW works for higher salaries, laws and statutes that benefit social workers while hurting licensed professional counselors and also works for social justice. The conflation at the level of idea that this view assumes is in the more complex view wrought with politics that facilitates unequal distribution of opportunity.

To assert that social work has two projects that have nothing in common is part of a complex perspective that section 2 of the dissertation more fully explores. For now it is enough to say that naïve realism conflates the many possible perspectives about a given fact into one view.

The naïve realist’s position is altered when it is assumed by social work’s academicians and practitioners. The common sense world of facts and events assumes a crisper focus and becomes the “nature” of science and naïve realism becomes realism. The realist assumes that nature as western science defines it is real. There is only “one” nature. Other cultural views of “nature” may be philosophically interesting but the nature of science is the “T”rue nature. The simplest view, much in line with naïve realism, is
that there is an objective nature and natural world independent of any subjective perception of it. Nature is the backdrop and what is, is.

The realist position admits no distinction between professional and social justice missions. They are inextricably woven together. In this view, professional helping is dedicated to relief of human misery and suffering, or at least helping those who can least help themselves. The tools of social science used by academic social workers that assume an obdurate and objective nature are put in service of social justice. To suggest otherwise is countered by the realist position by pointing how as individuals, social workers are doing their best within an already existing context in which problems to be solved are intractable and systemic. Conflicts between ethical principles or values are seen to part of "nature" or the way things are. This conflation exists because the tools have not been developed and disseminated so that social work's MSW and PhD students can operate within the dimension of ideas and determine for themselves that professionalization does not "necessarily" have distributive justice as its organizing value.

The NASW Code of Ethics. An example of how intractable and obfuscated the conflation of these two missions is can be found in the NASW Code of Ethics (1999). The Code has four sections organized from general to specific in the area of practice it addresses. It is intended to serve as a guide to the everyday professional conduct of social workers. This Code includes four sections. The first Section, "Preamble," summarizes the social work profession's mission and core values. The second
section, "Purpose of the NASW Code of Ethics," provides an overview of the Code's main functions and a brief guide for dealing with ethical issues or dilemmas in social work practice. The third section, "Ethical Principles," presents broad ethical principles, based on social work's core values, that inform social work practice. The final section, "Ethical Standards," includes specific ethical standards to guide social workers' conduct and to provide a basis for adjudication (NASW, 2000).

In the third section, "Ethical Principles" the first core value social work has is that of Service. The ethical principle structured by this value is stated, "Social works' primary goal is to help people in need and to address social problems. The text under the ethical principle reads, "Social workers elevate service to others above self-interest. Social workers draw on their knowledge, values, and skills to help people in need and to address social problems ..." (NASW, 1999, p. 5).

The second of social work's core values is that of social justice. The ethical principle under this value is "Social workers challenge social injustice" (NASW, 1999). The text under this ethical principle says:

Social workers pursue social change, particularly with and on behalf of vulnerable and oppressed individuals and groups of people. Social workers' social change efforts are focused primarily on issues of poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and other forms of social injustice. These activities seek to promote sensitivity to and knowledge about oppression and cultural and ethnic diversity. Social workers
strive to ensure access to needed information, services, and resources; equality of opportunity; and meaningful participation in decision making for all people (p. 5).

The first ethical principle has social workers “address social problems.” The second has social workers “pursue social change” and “strive to ensure access.” The third value and its ethical principle has a supporting text that says,

...Social workers promote clients’ socially responsible self-determination. Social workers seek to enhance clients’ capacity and opportunity to change and address their own needs. Social workers are cognizant of their dual responsibility to clients and to the broader society. They seek to resolve conflicts between client’s interests and the broader society’s interests in a socially responsible manner consistent with the values, ethical principles, and ethical standards of the profession” (NASW, 1999, p. 6).

Another statement the code makes comes from 6.04a, Social and Political Action. It says that

Social workers should engage in social and political action that seeks to ensure that all people have equal access to the resources, employment, services, and opportunities they require to meet their basic human needs and to develop fully. Social workers should be aware of the impact of the political arena on practice and should advocate for changes in policy and legislation to improve social conditions in order to meet basic human needs and promote social justice (p. 16)

There appears to be two themes here that can be understood to contradict each other when examined as “ideas.” When social workers address social problems, pursue
social change, strive to ensure access and engage in political action they may be addressing structural problems that are not viewed as problems by "broader society interests." For example, the broader society’s interest is a healthy market economy. If the market economy is seen to distribute opportunity unequally, and a client system suffers from his or her social location, which distributes relatively little opportunity to him or her, then it is in the client system’s interests to transform the market economy. If social injustice is understood to involve unequal distribution of opportunity, then it is the market economy, which is a target for social change. The broader interests of society may not be served by social work’s working for this change. These interests have a stake in the status quo of unequal distribution of opportunity, i.e., the structural conditions of social injustice. In this example, the NASW Code of Ethics can be read to conflate the two missions into one.

In the second section, "The Purpose of the NASW Code of Ethics," the second full paragraph states

The Code offers a set of values, principles, and standards to guide decision-making and conduct when ethical issues arise. It does not provide a set of rules that prescribe how social workers should act in all situations. Specific applications of the Code must take into account the context in which it is being considered and the possibility of conflicts among the Codes’ values, principles, and standards. (NASW, 1999, p. 2)

The point is that the Code guides “decision making and conduct,” and that the “context” of a situation must be taken into account. The question that begs to be asked is
who determines how a context is defined and how it is taken into account? Are the
"broader interests of society" once again the undergirding structure? If social workers
are to effect social change, how can they do so when the rules of professional conduct are
determined by the very system that is the target for change?

Another example of how the code of ethics conflates missions while at the same
time attempting to resolve the irresolvable is the rank ordering of ethical principles
Loewenberg & Dolgoff (1992) have developed.

**Ethical Principles – Rank order**

1. **Principle of the protection of life**

   This is the most basic of all rights, and supersedes all others.

2. **Principle of equality and inequality**

   Equal persons have the right to be treated equally and nonequal persons have the
   right to be treated differently if the inequality is relevant to the issue in question.

   **Example: child abuse.** Since the abused child is not in an “equal” position, the
   principles of confidentiality and autonomy with respect to the abusing adult are of a
   lower rank order than the obligation to protect the child even when it is not a question of
   life or death.

3. **Principle of autonomy and freedom**

   A social worker should make practice decisions that foster a person’s autonomy,
   independence, and freedom

4. **Principle of least harm**
A social worker should always choose the option that will cause the least harm, the least permanent harm, and/or the most easily reversible harm.

5. Principle of quality of life

A social worker should choose the option that promotes a better quality of life for all people, for the individual as well as for the community.

6. Principle of privacy and confidentiality

A social worker should make practice decisions that strengthen every person's right to privacy. Keeping confidential information inviolate is a direct derivative of this obligation.

7. Principle of truthfulness and full disclosure

A social worker should make practice decisions that permit her to speak the truth and to fully disclose all relevant information to her client and to others.

Loewenberg & Dolgoff's (1992) schematic is firmly grounded in a situation and its context, and offers a very sophisticated way to resolve conflict between different parts of the Code. Again, the question that is begged is "who gets to define situation?" From the point of view of someone actually caught on the horns of a dilemma, such a question is superfluous and possibly harmful to a client, or one's professional status. It is immediate framing and resolution of the dilemma that is called for. Loewenberg & Dolgoff offer a tool to do this. By and large the teaching and application of the code of ethics begins with the situation, which assumes the conflation of discourses, that "the world is as it appears." The situation is understood in the discourse of professional social work, not the discourse of the client system. When no dilemma is present, it is still the
dominance of the professional mission that determines how a social worker will understand what she is to do.

There are at least two ways in which ethics can be viewed. A simple view accepts the world as it is and argues that the NASW code is "a set of standards by which a particular group or community decides to regulate its behavior – to distinguish what is legitimate or acceptable in pursuit of their aims from what is not" (Flew, 1979, p. 112). It is a practical guide for professional practice. A more complex view has ethics, "an investigation into the fundamental principles and basic concepts that are or ought to be found in a given field of human thought and activity" (p. 112). The NASW code assumes the world is as it appears, and that a code of ethics exists to guide action within it. The more complex view opens the field of inquiry to include questions of human nature and nature itself as part of the realm in which social work is conducted. There is little if any discussion in a school of social work or agency that has a student or practitioner distinguish between a professional and social justice project at the level of idea. "How" the world is given in a case study, practicum, or in an agency is accepted without question. This is so basic and simple that it is seldom if ever questioned.

The conflict between different parts of the code can be understood to be a function of the built-in inequality in distribution of opportunity. Were the code of ethics to found itself in the social justice project and transformation of this unequal distribution and the slippery political dimension in which facts become mechanisms by which opportunity is distributed, it would necessarily challenge the realist's perception of the social and cultural world.
Conflict exists between parts of the code, in social work's journals, between the simple and complex view of nature because the professional and social justice projects and their different missions are conflated, and this conflation glosses over and hides the different worldviews understood by the two projects. The two projects are distinct and separate. They describe totally different perceptions of the world. The conflation serves the professional project, the status quo of unequal distribution of opportunity by using the discourse of social justice as an instrument of its professional ends.

Again, in the simple view, this conflation is not a conflation. The problem of conflation does not exist. Therefore, there is no conflict, but only a "tension between equally valued objectives" as suggested by Austin (1986, p. 46) in the final sentence of his history of social work education. This tension is between the forces working for social reform and social change and those of educational institutions seeking to survive. Austin's acknowledgement of the existence of a tension comes from within a very complex understanding of social work and its history. Nonetheless, at the level of idea, the use of the term tension is reflective of the assumption that the world is as it appears.


As a guide to social work actions and decisions, and as a basis for evaluating them, social work ethics are concerned with what is morally valued for clients and others rather than what fulfills professional responsibility to them. Ethical practice may or may not coincide with effective practice (p. 39)

The last sentence is a huge caveat that illuminates just how conflated social work's ethical code is at the level of mission. What Levy appears to be saying is that
professional ethics first must take into account what is valued by a client system. The professional mission is to claim jurisdiction in a battle for turf with other professions as an expression of professional self-interest. What a client system values, which can be founded in another culture and its practices, cannot be validated by practice driven by the professional mission. Nowhere does the battle for turf include a concern for the moral values of client systems. The perspective being developed here is that the rhetoric of social justice and sensitivity to other cultures is utilized to cover over this battle for dominance. In practice, the professional mission dominates and uses the social justice mission to effect its own ends, assuming the world is as it appears, obdurate, concrete, and unjust.

Levy (1993) offers another example of conflation. The organization of his book parallels that of the NASW Code of Ethics. He begins with the statement; “Ethics are the application of values to human relationships and transactions” (Levy, 1993, p. 1). Like the Code, Levy moves from general purposes and principles to concrete applications defining ethical conduct.

The path his discourse takes begins with a definition of values and ethics. He talks about how they are formed by different levels of social organization: society, government, social organizations, agencies, occupational groups, individual actors, and actions (Levy, 1993). The discourse then moves to talking about how ethics structure social work roles. Levy says, “The starting point of professional responsibility is quality of work and competence” (p. 19). The discussion defines competence, power relationships, and ethical standards in the clinical, community, organizational,
supervisory, administrative, research, educational and consultation areas of practice. The focus then moves to variables that influence the choice of principles to apply in a given situation. He then defines the ethical dimension constituting the relationships between social workers and their clients, colleagues, employers, and the profession.

The discussion has moved from the general to the specific, until it focuses on the "facts" of the matter. Levy (1993) says

"Although ethical judgments in social work practice must often be made quickly and in the heat and turmoil of some practice situations, they must be made with sufficient thought and care to afford social workers a degree of assurance and conviction about their aptness and applicability... In any social work practice situation, awareness and consideration of all the relevant facts are essential for purposes of both competent and ethical professional performance, and for the effective exercise of professional discretion and judgment (p. 49).

This quotation again begs the question, "who gets to define what the facts of a situation are?" This question takes into account that most of what social workers do is context related. The kind of questions being raised here can be seen to take apart unquestioned assumptions about the world as it appears. The answer to the question, "who gets to define what the facts of a situation are?" encourages thinking about meaning, purpose and mission. To understand the assumptions, the ideational or cultural roots of a "fact" of a situation is to suggest that the locus of reality can shift from the world as it appears to a perspective that asks how this world came to be this way and how it can be changed."
The first part of the above quotation has "sufficient thought and care" structure what is done. Once a social worker has to determine the facts of a situation, the opportunity is lost to connect action to idea. The situation in large part demands what is done. The social worker is a reactive force to the immediacy of problems generated by the mechanisms of social injustice. Professional protocols are applied to resolve a crisis or put out the proverbial fire.

Brill's (1990) dissertation studied social workers' knowledge of and views about the NASW Code of Ethics and how well they are implementing its mandates on issues of social injustice. The majority of social workers reported that they were not implementing these sections of the Code in their practice. Brill found that action taken tended to be on issues that were focused on clients rather than social change. He recommended that social workers work together to change this focus. The major caveat to this recommendation is that without seeking broader social changes, the possibility of reforming the profession is limited.

Summary Statement

The overall purpose of the chapter was to lay out the social justice and professional projects and demonstrate how some of social work's discourses conflate the two. The chapter began with a definition of social justice and the social justice project; to transform existing unjust social conditions so that opportunity is distributed equally to all persons. Social injustice was defined as the eight mechanisms that distribute opportunity unequally. The social justice mission was then defined.
The professional project was introduced and its specific components identified. The three main concepts forming the professional project is that professions are in competition with one another within a system of professions within a naïve realist’s or realists understanding of nature. The professional mission was discussed and the difference between academic and practice knowledge adumbrated. Academics create and maintain the core jurisdiction for social work. The three core elements of professional practice were described; diagnosis, inference and treatment, and inference was identified as the centerpiece of professional practice.

The argument was introduced that social work discourse conflates the two projects. and that this conflation is a result of a simple, common sense naïve realist’s view of “the world as it appears.” The simple view was contrasted with a more complex view that asks, “Who gets to define and say what the facts are?” The realist view is introduced and then specific examples are offered of how some of social work’s discourses conflate the social justice and professional projects.

The main points this chapter makes are. (1) the social justice and professional projects have very different missions and visions. (2) social work discourses conflate this very important difference. The consequence of this conflation is generally perceived to be an intractable tension within social work that is simply part of how things in social work are. For social work, the conflation of the social justice and professional projects is most in evidence in the assumption “the world is as it appears to be.”

Chapter 2 offers an historical account that illuminates two points. The first is to show how this conflation of discourses shaped the world as it is for social work. The
second point that the historical narrative makes is to show how the conflation allowed the professional project to slowly but surely dominate the social justice project and turn its discourse into an instrument of professionalization’s ends.
Chapter 2

The Historical March of Social Work’s Professionalization:

Mapping the Internal and External Worlds

Introduction

The overall goal of this chapter is give an historical perspective to the argument that social work’s path of professionalization has conflated its two projects and that this conflation serves the professional, not social justice project. The story the chapter tells reveals the professional project to have dominated the discourses of social work’s thinkers and the formation of schools and departments of social work. At the end of the 19th century there was little known about immigrants, the poor and dispossessed, the laboring man and his family. Social work began it’s life by trying to change individual character as a way to lessen the prevalence of social problems. From 1879 through the early 1970s, social work had three distinct periods. The first was to change character. This was the moral period stretching from 1879 through 1898. The second period, from
1898 to 1930 or so, was that of mapping the social environment of populations about which little was known. This is exemplified in Mary Richmond’s 1917 idea of “social evidence.” This was the fact gathering/practice wisdom period. The third period, 1930 through the early 1970s, had the project of mapping the internal world of normal, middle class citizens, as well as that of the poor, newly immigrated and worker. This was the psychodynamic period.

The chapter is organized into three sections that correspond to these different periods and the kind of knowledge social worker’s thought would legitimize their claim to different jurisdictions of practice and professional status amongst the system of professions. These periods are (1) the moral period, (2) the fact gathering and practice wisdom period, and (3) the psychodynamic period. The fourth, and current period, what here is called the empirical period, is the subject of Chapter 3.

The first section on the moral period discusses the social context in the post-Civil War period. Historicism, nature and its laws, and Social Darwinism are shown to be layered on top of a moral and religious worldview. The ideas of pauper and character are explored. Historicism is shown to lose influence as the academic social sciences emerge within the public university in the last decades of the 20th century. A crisis in authority is discussed as part of the social science’s transition from a bible based, single cause orientation towards social problems to one multi-causal and tentative, from a circular mode of dealing with problems to one spirallic.

Social work is shown to have emerged from within the moral and religious as well. However, rather than following the path of the academic social sciences and their
emphasis on theory and research, social work chose to deal with concrete problems. The formation of the Charity Organization Societies (COS) is outlined. Their ideas of investigation, friendly visiting and scientific charity and their emphasis on character as the root of social problems are explored. The transforming idea that emerged at the end of this period for social casework is that to be efficient and economical, it must transform its method from ‘subjective investigation’ to ‘objective diagnosis’ (Reisch, 1998).

The second section “The Fact Gather & Practice Wisdom” period, discusses how the need for more objective methods in casework was actualized in the work of Mary Richmond (1917, 1922) and her generation. Richmond’s increasingly codified methods and classificational systems began the task of mapping the external world of poor people, immigrants, the unemployed, the debauched, and their families. Social work’s professionalizing path focused on development of methods to diagnose, infer and treat. Social work’s core jurisdiction during this period was method, not theory. It’s practice jurisdiction was the complete private sphere of the family, which included other contexts in which families and their members received service, like the guidance clinic, hospital, and insane asylum.

The emergence of social work’s educational institutions is charted as central to social work’s professionalization. It was in schools of social work that standardized methods could be taught and the bar of professional practice raised. The professional project establishes itself during this time as the dominant force guiding what social workers do.
The third section. “The Psychodynamic Period” outlines how professionalization of casework involved moving from mapping the external world of marginalized populations, and its lack of coherent theory, to the theoretically defined inner or intrapsychic world of middle class populations as ground for a new casework method. “Natural” drives and forces were identified to be operant in all human beings. The focus on character in the moral period was suspended for a focus on the world of social evidence in the second. In the psychodynamic period the focus is on personality. Increasingly during these decades social work criticized what it did as subjective and unverifiable, based more on common sense than research based in theory and induction.

The diagnostic and functional schools emerged with competing theoretical claims to jurisdiction. These two school defined the mainstream path along which social work professionalized. The Rank and File movement emerged as a consequence of social breakdown during the 1930s and challenged capital and its workings. They were victims of structural forces embedded in the capitalism of the times. The Rank and Filers entered public service acutely sensitized to forces traditional casework for the most part ignored, or at best spoke of as an arena in which social workers had a duty to become familiar and work. By the time World War II started, the work Rank and Filers did was absorbed into the mainstream, burgeoning, social welfare bureaucracy.

Professional social work remained committed to diagnosis, inference and treatment, now backed by a well-respected psychological theory. The professional project had built on Mary Richmond’s distinction between retail/casework and wholesale reform so that evidence of the latter in what social workers did was nearly absent.
Expertise in technique, in rules of inference, in status as a profession among professions; this was the foundation for social work’s claim to jurisdictions of practice.

The story told in this chapter is one that focuses on the emerging professions’ jurisdictions of practice, and what is done in them. As will be seen, the concerns of social justice were second to the efforts to codify casework procedures. Only during the 1930s did social work experience an upsurge of sentiment stemming from concerns of social justice. For a few short years, the Rank and Filers organized as a vehicle of social justice. At the same time, professionalizing forces had traditional casework reaffirm its commitment to the focus on individuals and families. It was development of technique to more legitimately claim jurisdictions of practice in competition with other professions that drove social work. In the end, the Rank and Filers concern for social justice was co-opted by the drive to professionalize.

In this chapter the background to social work education’s is discussed. The role of the public research university is shown to be a vehicle of professionalization. The shift from amateur to professional scientist is shown to be a function of the problems generated by Reconstruction and modernization. Historicism is defined and its transitional role in the change from a single to multi-causal view of reality is explored.

The multi-causal view of human behavior finds its roots in the natural world and human history becomes something one studies as part of a liberal arts education. What the first generations of social scientists find is a focus on the present, on patterns and change processes explained by inductively derived theories. The public research university was a major vehicle in the naturalizing of the linear, historicist world. As part
of this naturalization was the generation of demographic variables that came to define
populations, about which there was little if any knowledge prior to the Civil War.

Once the broad-brush strokes of this background are in place the particular
emergence of the need for educated caseworkers is discussed and a short history of the
development of social work education offered. Particularly telling is the role
professionalization played in this effort, and how the concern for social justice can be
seen to be professionalization's handmaiden. The role of research in social work
education is discussed and the section ends with a discussion about the role of special
interest groups in CSWE policy.

The Moral Period – From single to multi-cause, from divine to natural

Background and Motivations: The Emergence of the Public Research University.

The Civil War had torn up both the social and physical landscapes. Nevins and
Commager (1945) describe the aftermath of the Civil War.

The impact of war and of defeat on the South was immediate and cataclysmic.
Devastation without parallel in American history greeted the eyes of the veterans
in gray as they trudged wearily home after Nashville and Appomattox.
Contending armies had ravaged large parts of Virginia and Tennessee; Sherman
had cut a sixty-mile swath through the heart of Georgia and South Carolina;
Hunter and Sheridan had swept the rich valley of Virginia; vast areas of northern
Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas lay in ruins. Proud cities like Richmond,
Charleston, Columbia, and Atlanta had been gutted by fire or battered by
bombardment. Bridges were down, roads neglected, hundreds of miles of railroad
track torn up, rolling stock was destroyed, and quays and docks were rotted.

Normal economic life was almost paralyzed. Confederate money was worthless, and the only specie was that which had been hoarded or which the Union army brought into the conquered country. Banks had closed their doors, insurance companies were insolvent, industries and business ruined, and a large part of the cotton that had been stored in warehouses was put to the torch or confiscated by the military authorities (pp. 242-243).

At the same time, a revolution was taking place in the north. Five years after the end of the war all industrial production records were broken (Nevin & Commager, 1945). More coal and iron ore, silver and copper were mined, more steel forged, rails laid, lumber sawed and houses built, cotton woven flour milled, oil refined than ever before.

Both Reconstruction and the triumph of the industrial revolution created social problems of a magnitude beyond anything known before.

The old way of dealing with social problems was no longer effective. Reconstruction, industrialization, increased immigration, and the shift of population from rural to urban settings were a few of the forces that generated social problems. The success of the scientific method was evident in new technologies that seemed to arrive on the social scene almost monthly. The cotton gin, the harvester, internal combustion engine, telegraph and later the telephone, were but a few of the 19th century technological innovations that served as evidence that the methods of applied science were creating a brave new world. The new social problems created by the Civil War and industrialization were layered on top of a deeply religious view of the world. There was
a single cause and this cause was God. The medieval belief in a divinely originating
world continued to be foundation for most of America’s people.

**Historicism.** Ross (1991) understands historicism to be result of the “earthly
world being loosened from the eternal world” (p. 4). Divine law gave over to natural
law. This was a transitional solution to the problem presented by widespread belief in
God and the evidence science presented about nature. Worldly change was understood as
a series of qualitatively different phenomena, rather than surface differences underscored
by divine will. The past is causally linked to the present in a continuous procession of
contextually rooted qualitative changes.

Touraine (1995) understands historicism to involve the slow subsuming of
individual creativity and freedom, the Subject, to the idea of progress connected with
history. Hegel’s world spirit coming to know itself through the evolution of the State and
Marx’s historical stages culminating in communism are two examples of historicist
discourses. Touraine (1995) says

The most dangerous aspect of historicist thought is the subordination of social
actors to the State, which is seen as the agent of historical transformation... The
thought of the 17th and 18th century was dominated by the encounter between
reason and the Subject, between utilitarianism and natural law; the historicism of
the 19th century absorbs the Subject into reason, freedom into historical necessity,
and society into the State. (pp. 78-79)

Society, the rule of law and the citizen and his creativity were all absorbed into
larger historical processes in the 19th century.
Mandelbaum, (1967) offers the following thoughts on historicism.

Considering the very great diversity in usage which we have now traced, one may ask whether there is any characterization of historicism which can serve to connect the various ways in which the term has been used and which at the same time can give it a relatively clear meaning. Without suggesting that all problems concerning the deviant meanings of historicism can be solved in this way, the following definition may be proposed as an approximation of that goal:

Historicism is the belief that an adequate understanding of the nature of anything and an adequate assessment of its value are to be gained by considering it in terms of the place it occupied and the role it played within a process of development.

(pp. 24).

Historical development can be interpreted as “historical progress.” Ross says that by the mid 19th century the divine presence was “discounted, but the characteristics of divine law – its necessity, uniformity, and action as a governing agency – most often continued to adhere to the laws scientists discovered in nature” (p. 17). Between the years 1865 and 1900, capital invested in America increased by 1200%, and the number of workers employed increased 350% (Trattner. 1989). Not only did this economic revolution enhance the national wealth, raise the standard of living, encourage immigration, and speed up urbanization, it created cycles of depression (1873 – 1877 and 1893 - 1897). A great disparity was created between the few who controlled the means of production and nation’s resources, and the many who suffered from terrible working and living conditions. As capital and corporations, two of the newly emerging historical
forces, wove the two forces of science and the market, they appealed to the grand theories of the day, particularly that of Social Darwinism.

**Natural law and Social Darwinism.** Social Darwinism served as the theoretical foundation for voluntary helping (Axinn and Levin, 1992). These authors characterize Social Darwinism as a new social religion that reflected the economic laissez-faire ideas of the late 19th century. Social Darwinism places responsibility for both independence and dependence of any kind within the individual. Natural selection privileges individual initiative and achievement while culling dependent tendencies from the population.

Social Darwinism was adopted by the reading public and its popularization included a single cause, biblical morality that privileged acquisition of personal wealth as a sign of moral superiority. The single, originary force of divine law now was that of the single originary force of natural law. The natural universe was a lawful universe.

Touraine (1995) argues that “the modernist ideology is the final form of the belief that man and nature form a unity” (p. 24). This naturalism was based in the idea of universal natural law of which humankind was a part. This unity of man and nature within the realm of natural law can be seen as one of the sediments of the transition from a divine to natural universe. Mannheim (1924) thought that theologically oriented cosmology had been retained in secularized form in the during the 18th century because both appealed to the atemporal doctrine of reason. Ross (1991) says that “18th century social scientists propounded the laws of nature as ‘rules through which divine governance’ flowed, thus fusing the scientific view of law as observed regularities in
nature with the older religious concept of natural law as the agency by which God
governed the natural world” (pp. 16-17)

In the 19th century nature was seen to be given in the languages of mathematics
and logic and the specific fields of the natural and human sciences. It was through the
process of applying the principles of science to solve problems created by the Civil War
and industrialization that the natural universe slowly supplanted, if not replaced the
divine universe. It was within this transition that social work boundaries began to emerge
(Abbott, 1995).

The processes of applied science in development of new technologies and
hierarchizing (dividing) business practices legitimated themselves by assuming the
authority of natural law. The force of natural law given in Social Darwinism transformed
how those were seen who were not able to support themselves and/or their families or
chose not to. The very idea of pauper had its defining cultural foundation shifted in the
movement from divine to natural law.

The pauper. The term pauper was many centuries old and during medieval times
named someone who was under the care of the Church. The divinely originating, static
social order saw paupers as a natural part of society. Pauperism was a social position just
as natural as the positions of sovereign, nobility, or gentry.

After the Civil War, pauperism became a term used to define a population of
persons without means and dependent upon charity, upon the generosity of their social
betters. Social Darwinism transformed paupers from being a natural part of God’s world
into pauperism, into being an abnormal state of character. No longer was pauperism
rooted in the mystery of divine will. The forces of natural selection and survival of the fittest cast the traits associated with pauperism to be undesirable and abnormal, and hence traits to be culled from the human race. Pauperism was seen to involve a “destructive immorality” a state, argued by early providers of scientific charity, that was aggravated by unsystematic provision of charitable help or poor relief (Austin, 1983). If a man failed to work hard and achieve what was given him in his natural constitution, fault and blame could be placed nowhere else but in his own character. Trattner (1989) says that “the poor were held in contempt in an acquisitive society in which wealth became almost an end in itself” (p. 83).

Social problems generated by the transformation of a rural/agrarian to urban/industrial economy were seen to reside in the “character” of individuals rather than the social circumstances of the times (Woodruffe, 1965). Character was a function of social status, which found validation in natural law. These laws found their validation in the assumption that larger historical processes worked themselves out through the existing social order. Social Darwinism routinized standards for human conduct and character that in the last third of the 19th century were a curious blend of morality and science. If a pauper could not cull his character of abnormal traits, then natural selection would. This period was very much a transitional one.

The origins of American social science. Germain (1971) traces the origin of modern social science to the creation in 1863 of the Massachusetts Board of State Charities. The Board’s formation was part of the widespread response to the challenge posed by Reconstruction. The State Board of Charity’s mission was to bring order into
the chaotic system of public relief, to collect facts about distribution of assistance to those in need. It both investigated and supervised all of the state's charitable and correctional institutions and was charged with recommending changes that would make institutions and relief giving more efficient and economical (Trattner, 1989). The Board of State Charities of Massachusetts. Second Annual Report, 1866. in Germain (1971) says

Above all, it was seen that such an agency might consider carefully the causes which create such great numbers of dependents; it might ascertain the social conditions which affect those numbers: and when those conditions are such as can be modified by legislation, appeal to the legislature; when they are such as can be modified only by the people, then appeal to the intelligence and moral sense of the people. (p. 35)

The Board was also charged with collecting data that would allow for an annual report on the causes and best treatment of pauperism, crime, disease, and insanity. In response to this charge the Board created the American Social Science Association (ASSA) in 1865. The ASSA organized in four departments. Education, Public Health, Social Economy, and Jurisprudence.

Under the head of Social Economy, we shall consider Pauperism, actual rather than legal, and the relation and the responsibilities of the gifted and educated classes toward the weak, the witless, and the ignorant. We shall endeavor to make useful inquiries into the causes of Human Failure, and the Duties devolving upon Human Success. We shall consider the hours of Labor, the relation of Employees and Employed; the Employment of Women by itself considered; the
relation of Idleness to female Crime, Prostitution and Intemperance; Workhouses; Public Libraries and Museums; Savings Banks and Dispensaries. (ASSA, Constitution, Address, and List of Members, 1865; in Germain, 1971, p. 38)

The ASSA became the primary arena in which the academic social sciences developed. The three major disciplines that emerged from the ASSA were economics, political science, and sociology (Austin, 1996). For the next three decades, the ASSA embraced the inductive methods of the natural sciences as it formed into academic social science disciplines.

Haskell (1988) argues that the members of the ASSA were the last generation of amateur social scientists. Its members were well-to-do amateurs, usually from the American Northeast. It was their practices and single-causal ideology grounded in the bible that the first generation of professional social scientists rejected when they constructed the academic disciplines of history, economics, political science, and sociology. “What began in 1865 as a lively and often perceptive quest for social reality ended 45 years later as a clubbish and stuffy enterprise, intellectually sterile” (p. 25). Membership in a truly professional community could not be based overtly on charm, social standing, personal connection, good character, or perhaps even decency, but on demonstrated intellectual merit alone” (p. 236). Solomon & Solomon (1993) argued that the private university was a playground for children of the rich. Family and social ties determined who was educated. Merit, hard work, and intellect counted for nothing. “Harvard started giving grades on the basis of schoolwork instead of social connections only in the 1930s” (p. xvii).
In the 1870s, the academic professional developed within an institutional milieu in which the role of the university was that of a place for discipline, not for doing research. The traditional role of the University was to re-establish the normalizing force of the bible. It was the purpose of the university to train scholars in its truths and teach them to disseminate it (Ross, 1991). She says,

(One of) the cultural contexts that most influenced American social science was the antebellum college, a milieu heavily religious and increasingly elitist in tone. Although regional and religious differences existed, the collegiate model developed in New England spread throughout the North, West, and South. The colleges were generally founded or annexed by denominational clerical bodies and their aim was to preserve Christian learning and morality in a society undergoing rapid secular change... The social role the colleges conceived themselves as playing, therefore, was conservator of the social authority as well as the Christian belief of the respectable elite (p. 35).

Ross (1991) said that the new universities offered stable careers, increasing control over access to specialized knowledge and a modicum of professional autonomy. The public research university emerged as the training ground for the first generation of professionals. Theirs was a brave new world, a measurable, objective mathematical universe that increasingly more powerful and sophisticated tools and methodological protocols could name, measure, and understand.

The American university was very much at the forefront of this technological revolution. Within its classrooms the new way of doing science was being taught and
graduates in engineering, metallurgy, physics, chemistry and biology were conducting the basic and applied science resulting in innovation. The social sciences adopted the methods of the natural sciences and became part of the movement that transformed higher education in America.

Haskell (1988) argues that during the 1880s and 1890s the public research university was in part crafted by the first generation of professional social scientists. Teaching institutions had to be revamped to accommodate the specialized needs of researchers in newly emergent disciplines. New standards for working towards and attaining professional status had to be developed and tested. Codes of professional behavior and definitions of academic freedom were fought over and institutionalized during this period. Professional associations and journals were initiated and helped form the disciplines that became academic departments.

Haskell (1988) says the key context that marked the emergence of the social science professional is the interdependence of modernity’s multitudinous contexts. The amateur, antebellum professional worked alone. The modern professional worked in concert with his colleagues. Haskell (1988) says

The point of departure for the professionalization of social science was a pervasive mood of doubt and uncertainty, triggered certainly by Darwin and historical criticism of the Bible, but rooted also in the intellectual quicksand of an increasingly interdependent social universe. By depriving sensitive thinkers of the opportunity for easy, unambiguous causal attribution that had enabled earlier generations to be serenely confident in their judgments of men and social affairs,
the growing interdependence of society contributed to an erosion of confidence
that made men receptive to claims of social science expertise. (p. 47)

This "crisis in authority" gave rise to an uncertainty that the new generation of
social scientists saw as their greatest problem. The multi-causal nature of the natural and
social worlds offered no firm foundation for determining truth. The authority of the
Bible was fragmenting in the face of an onslaught of problems generated by the applied
sciences of the 19th century. The vision of the new professionals centered on replicable
methods to ascertain disciplinary truths. The social sciences eagerly embraced the
natural science model and its vision of what constituted adequate explanation. The
modernizing forces at work in the late 19th and early 20th centuries required a means by
which the problems it created could be identified, named and solved. The social sciences
adopted a modern spirallic as opposed to medieval circular approach to problem solving.
As part of this transformation was the move from single to multi-causal view of reality.

From single to multi-causal view of reality. The new social sciences adopted a
multi-causal view of social problems and began to acknowledge that empirically derived
knowledge was not complete, that it was tentative (Austin, 1983). Empirical observation
and scientific induction could test theory that explained regular patterns in the world.
However, there was always more to be explained. Ross (1991) says of the newly
emerging social sciences;

The social sciences were imbued at their inception with a new understanding of
history and with high expectations of modernity. They approved the historical
supports of modern society – commercial development, science, and in most
cases, the representative state. Drawing on the Enlightenment understanding of civilization developed in Scotland and France, they defined modernity as diversification, in which the rude and simple structures of primitive and feudal life gave way to complexity, multiplying comforts, and multiplying values (p. 7).

The transition to a modern academy was signaled by the move from a single cause origin to a multi-causal one. The circular, closed system movement from problem to Biblical/scriptural foundation for solution of a problem gave over to the spirallic problem/solution process of an emergent modernity. The complexity of post-Civil War, industrializing America formed the context in which specific disciplines claimed responsibility for sub-divisions of natural and social problems. Problems were just too complex and there too many of them for the grand solutions of moral science. However, Haskell says, professionalization should not be seen as a response to the urban industrial transformation of the 19th century, but an integral part of it. Haskell (1988), quoting William J. Goode says, “An industrializing society is a professionalizing society” (p.26).

The independent inquirer had to be replaced by collective inquiry of peers for fundamentally epistemological reasons: in a highly interdependent society the mind of the isolated, amateur investigator seemed powerless to grasp the complexity of multiple relations of causes and effects. For the amateur, the meaning of the cause/effect relation was defined by its place within the divinely created whole. For the new professional, it was the relations themselves that provided the milieu of understanding and determined what constituted valid knowledge. The success of professionalization was not simply a
matter of status-seeking strategy, but also the consequence of "a profound change in the conditions of satisfactory explanation" (Ross. 1991, p. 237).

**The dissolution of historicism.** Historicist assumptions were challenged and social conditions were explored using newly developed statistical tools and models for change they afforded. The emerging social sciences, each along their own path, slowly focused on current social, political and economic conditions while de-emphasizing historical forces. By the second decade of the 20th century, social science had reduced historical inquiry to a dichotomy. In sociology constructs such as gemeinschaft and gesellschaft were used to de-historicize subject matter.

Ross (1991, p. 256. 386) argues that in both sociology and political science, there was a rejection of socialist (i.e. historicist) challenge to capital and its formation of markets. In political science, there was also an increasing focus on change processes rather than "the underlying sameness stretching back to Anglo-Saxon principles" (p. 300). At the same time, political scientists had difficulty adopting the discourse of natural law and natural progress (p. 469). In economics, models of economic growth were seen in terms of "recurring cycles" rather than a linear historical force (p. 383), or a theoretical depiction of "perpetual liberal progress" (p. 467). This dichotomization of content within the social sciences was a process of naturalizing the historical world. Ross (1991) says that this "scientism" had the aim of establishing

...prediction and control of the historical world and perhaps its most conspicuous accomplishment has been a set of quantitative techniques for information
gathering and analysis that are used to manipulate such things as the money
supply, consumer choices, votes, and remedial social therapies (p., 472).

Current conditions in society, the market, in politics, and the family were
accepted by the social sciences to be "how things are." Over the first decades of the 20th
century the historicist challenge was marginalized to theoretical camps within the
American social sciences and their teaching reduced to being part of a well-rounded
liberal arts education.

The creation of "natural" individuals and populations. Individuals and
populations that before were part of the great unwashed, or during the depression of
1893-1897, were seen as the dangerous classes. became objects of systematic study by
the newly professionalizing social sciences. These new populations had no history. They
were constructs of the emerging professions that viewed time and history as functions of
nature. Human time was superseded by natural time. Historicism and the human role in
the great sweep of history was relegated to a few tens of thousands of years and
biological evolution.

The distinctive character of American social science has necessarily had a
profound effect on social practice and social thought in the United States. A
historical world is a humanly created one. It is composed of people, institutions,
practices, and languages that are created by the circumstances of human
experience and sustained by structures of power. History can be used to achieve a
critical understanding of historical experience and allows us to change the social
structures that shape it. In contrast, the models of the social world that have
dominated American social science in the 20th century invite us to look through history to a presumably natural process beneath. Here the social world is composed of individual behaviors responding to natural stimuli, and the capitalist market and modern urban society are understood, in effect, as part of nature. (Ross, 1991. p. xiii)

The 19th century began with the amateur social scientist functioning within the private university. Valid knowledge was based in scripture. Over the course of the century the single cause, biblical roots of this knowledge gave over to scientific knowledge of a natural world, knowledge that was tentative and always changing. Knowledge founded in the bible and the university's role to insure its integrity was radically transformed. Systems of classification were created to order the new empirically derived knowledge and the public university emerged as home to its creation. At the end of the century the institutional context of the public university and its academic departments was home to the newly professionalizing social scientist. The curious mixture of historicism, moral philosophy, and science was mostly abandoned by American social scientists by the end of the 19th century (Ross, 1991).

The origin of social work.

In 1874, nine state Boards of Charities met at the annual meeting of the ASSA in the first Conference of Charities (CC) to discuss issues of common concern. In 1879, the CC broke away from the ASSA and formed the National Conference of Charities and Corrections (NCCC). This split was motivated primarily by dissatisfaction with the ASSA's emphasis on theory and scientifically derived knowledge. Members of the CC
thought that not enough attention was being given to care for the dependent classes. Germain (1971) argues that the issue emerged as a tension between theory and practice, "between the proponents of science and knowledge on the one hand, and the proponents of practical procedures and methods on the other" (p. 40).

Members of the CC thought the ASSA valued the aims of social science over the practical concerns of philanthropy. The ASSA sought to discover the scientific laws that governed the social world and to apply these laws through use of scientific methods to improve social conditions. The CC wanted to focus on the actual needs of real people. Theories, laws, and their testing were all very interesting, but had little to do with dealing with concrete social problems demanding solution. By leaving the ASSA, the new NCCC declared its practical concerns over and against the more theoretical and in their view, impractical concerns of the academic disciplines that were forming out of the ASSA. It was not until the 1970s, nearly a hundred years later, that this split effected by the NCCC was undone.

The NCCC became the national body that directed how philanthropic social welfare institutions would develop (Bruno, as cited in Austin, 1996). In 1917, the NCCC became the National Conference of Social Work (NCSWa), which in 1950 was renamed the National Conference of Social Welfare (NCSWb).

The late 1860s and 1870s saw the proliferation of sectarian and lay relief societies struggling to survive while serving the needs of their identified clients. America was "a Christian nation with a charitable impulse and tradition that was too strong to be eliminated" (Truttner, 1995, p. 84). Altruism was part of the Christian spirit that
validated the worthiness of voluntary charity. At the same time, public relief was frowned upon because of the graft and corruption of local government and their ties to capitalists.

The Charity Organization Societies. In response to the ongoing Christian concern for the needy, and distrust of government and its distribution of goods and services, a movement began with the first Charity Organization Society (COS) that formed in Buffalo in 1877 (Axinn & Levin, 1992). The first report of the Buffalo COS said that nearly one in seven of the city’s population was wholly or in part supported by charity, and that one-half of the relief given them was wasted on fakers and the unworthy, the undeserving. The underlying cause of this waste was seen to be either a lack of thorough investigation or the unwillingness of charity organizations to cooperate with one another.

The charity organization societies (COS) emerged as part of this transitional period in which single cause, biblical morality was being replaced with a multi-cause, complex understanding of human nature and its social, political and economic milieu. The COS movement mixed morality and transitional science. The ringing cry of the COS was “scientific charity.” What this meant was that outdoor relief, food, fuel, and clothing, was actually thought to promote and incite pauperism, and hence was to be avoided at all costs. “There were a number of general purposes that charity organizations envisioned as part of their mission; prevention of begging, promotion of municipal reforms that would assist the poor to achieve self-sufficiency, prevention of random distribution of money to the poor and helping impoverished families by teaching them to find work, find medical assistance or to be more thrifty” (Lederman, 1994, p. 46)
The new orientation to social welfare involved applying the principles of science to delivery systems rendered hopelessly chaotic by immigration, by the great movement of people brought on by Reconstruction, by industrialization and urbanization. The Charity Organization Societies coordinated services by assessing a client’s needs and referring them to the proper relief agency, if the claimed need was judged worthy. The societies themselves did not provide relief. They maintained lists of those who applied for relief, who was deemed “worthy” or “unworthy of relief, and who was referred to what agency, and kept records of aid distributed to the worthy poor.

During the heyday of the COS, from the mid-1870s through the end of the 1890s, scientific philanthropy involved marshalling and organizing facts about cases. To be scientific was to be rational and efficient. Rationality and efficiency were more closely allied with the “trustification and monopolization of big business” than the protocols of the social sciences (Trattner, 1989, p. 86).

While academics did serve on the Boards of the Charity Organization Societies, for the most part the COS rejected the academic, scientific approach (Germain, 1971). Scientific charity forged its own path and its own normalizing vision of what constituted science. For example, the new science of statistics was used by COS leaders. However, it was used to prove individuals were the cause of poverty and crime (Axinn and Levin, 1992). These authors quote Josephine Shaw Lowell, a national COS leader to say that public relief should be given only in extreme circumstances, “when starvation is imminent” (p. 95). Trattner (1989) also quoted Lowell to say
Human nature is so constituted that no man can receive as a gift what he should earn by his own labor without a moral deterioration. No human being ... will work to provide the means of living for himself if he can get a living in any other manner agreeable to himself (p. 89).

To end pauperism it was necessary to investigate a claim of need and determine its worthiness. The ostensible vision of the COS was to end pauperism. The scientific method of investigation focused on worthiness of a claim of need, which was a question of character. Efficiency and rationality were the terms COS workers rallied around to develop scientific techniques to investigate character. Reverend Gurteen, an early leader in the COS movement, cited in Trattner (1989), said

The basic axiom, the cardinal principle of the charity organization society is diametrically opposed to all systems, all institutions, all charities, and all forms of relief whatsoever... The fundamental law of its operation is expressed in one-word "INVESTIGATE." Its motto is "No relief (except in extreme cases of despair or imminent death) without previous and searching examining (p. 90).

Early scientific charity hinged on determination of a person's or family's claim of need to be worthy or unworthy. Investigation focused on character. Character was the bridge between divine will and natural law. It was a transitional form that scientific charity adopted before opening its perspective at the end of the 19th century to include environmental/social factors in its understanding of how need was generated.

Later COS efforts were based on solid investigation of need that included multiple sources of information; neighbors, employers, friends, and the clergy. The newly
developing multi-causal view of the academic social sciences was mirrored in the COS movement towards multiple sources for information to ascertain the facts about a case. However, this movement didn’t become institutionalized until after the depression of 1893 –1897 when it became obvious to most COS workers that structural conditions had a role in how people lived (Axinn & Levin, 1992.).

**Friendly visiting.** Prior to these years it was the moral suasion of “friendly visitors” that was offered to those whose character was deemed root cause of their personal or family problems. Early COS relief efforts for those whose need was determined to be moral rather than material was provided by friendly visitors. Friendly visitors were often well-educated middle-class women who, barred from entering the male professions of law, medicine, clergy, and University, had their passions and concerns channeled into volunteer service. Many friendly visitors were wives and mothers with no professional aspirations, but a well developed moral sense. Whether because they were barred from the male professions or from a sense of moral duty, friendly visitors went into the homes of families investigation had determined were in need of moral uplift. Investigation and friendly visiting formed the cornerstones of the COS movement.

Investigation was the keystone of treatment; granting relief without investigation was analogous to prescribing medicine without diagnosis. Friendly visiting, then, or personal contact between the rich and the poor as a substitute for alms, was the second basic aim of the movement. Along with registration, cooperation, and coordination, it formed the basis of this “science” of social therapeutics that was
supposed to relieve philanthropy of sentimentality and indiscriminate almsgiving... (Trattner. 1989, p. 87).

This adherence that pauperism was a moral, not material problem was captured in the motto, "not alms, but a friend." This was the rallying cry of the COS in its early years. "Friendly visiting, then, assumed the right and duty of intervention in the lives of the poor by their social and economic betters" (Trattner. 1989, p. 92). The purpose of friendly visiting, in line with the two goals of the COS, to organize relief services and end pauperism, was to transform the character of the unworthy poor, the lower or dependent classes, by their economic betters. This transformation was believed best to be effected by educated, women volunteers who would instill the values of the middle classes within the poor.

The message these women were to deliver to the poor was that thrift, hard work, abstinence from drink and sexual relations, except to procreate, regular church attendance and a maintenance of a strong family were characteristics of moral people and behaviors that were necessary if one were to transform one's character. To work hard and save money was normal. To work intermittently, or not at all was abnormal. To spend what one earned was abnormal, even if what was earned was not enough to both provide for basic needs and save. To spend one's time at home, with family was normal. To spend time in bars or gambling houses was abnormal. The set of virtues that were to be instilled in the lower classes, and thereby transform them into productive members of the economic order, were very, very clear.
As opposed to other fields of helping, early COS friendly visitors went into the homes of the poor and listened to their stories. Their case narratives formed how the lives of the poor were to be understood. Trattner (1989) says friendly visitors viewed their clients as wayward children who drifted astray or who were incapable of discerning their own self-interest. They required no resource so desperately, therefore, as the advice of an intelligent friend who would offer sympathy, tact, patience, cheer, and wise counsel. The visitor's job was to discern the moral lapse responsible for the problem and then supply the appropriate guidance – something, of course, they were certain they could do. (pp. 92-93)

Josephine Shaw Lowell (1898) argued that investigation of pauperism is not an end in itself. Investigation of need in cases subsequently deemed to be unworthy of charity, were given over to friendly visitors. Nevertheless, as the following quotation elaborates, this focus on character developed an unsavory reputation. The term “investigation” within the context of the 1893-1897 depression was seen to lead to justification that charity was warranted. Lowell on the other hand vigorously debated this view, holding fast to a moral high ground that was losing its legitimacy in the public eye.

We had in New York, in the hard times of 1893 and 1894, a most painful experience in this regard. The very word “investigation” seemed then to have been made a sort of shibboleth by the newspapers, and in too many cases, by the ministers also. To every remonstrance against methods of relief-giving which were injurious to the character of those who were supposed to be helped by them.
and cruel in their entire disregard of their comfort, happiness, and moral and physical well-being, it seemed to be considered a sufficient answer to say: “All the cases have been thoroughly investigated.” and it was evidently thought that this answer ought to be entirely satisfactory to charity organizations, even though the investigations were made not for the purpose of furnishing guidance and knowledge for a long course of “treatment” by which weak wills might be strengthened, bad habits be cured, and independence developed, but in order that a ticket might be given by means of which, after a long, weary waiting in the street in the midst of a crowd of miserable people, whose poverty and beggary were published to every passerby, some old clothes or some groceries might be got. (Lowell, 1898)

Transformation of character of those in the lower classes by the techniques of moral persuasion by the superior classes in the cause of ending pauperism was problematized during the depression of 1893 – 1897. The very idea of pauperism had always had its critics (Axinn & Levin. 1992). COS efficiency resulted in huge accumulations of facts that showed character was not the sole origin of need. Warner (1894) and Hunter (1904) illustrate how organized facts about the dependent classes revealed that social and economic conditions had much more to do with “poverty” rather than “pauperism.”

This forced COS leaders to re-evaluate their positions on dependency and need, to see that their efforts might be better directed toward social and economic conditions rather than personal moral failings. While there continued to be a moralistic strain that
survives today in how the poor and needy are viewed. The COS view at the end of the 19th century grounded itself in a rational foundation, collection of facts about individuals that were then aggregated to understand social and economic conditions. Devine (1904) as cited in Trattner (1989) summed up how the COS had changed by saying

We may quite safely throw overboard, once and for all, the idea that the dependent poor are our moral inferiors, that there is any necessary connection between wealth and virtue, or between poverty and guilt (p. 96).

Scientific charity was slowly throwing off its moralistic beginnings. Efficiency and rationality lost the vestiges of Social Darwinism in the last years of the 19th century. However, social work was still a long way from adopting the methods of the natural sciences. Scientific investigation of factors contributing to need was the next project that the emerging profession of social work charted for itself. How could the facts be collected, collated, organized and interpreted if everyone had their own idea of what the facts were? While the themes of the moral period no longer formed the foundation for social casework, they are very much still in evidence in social welfare policy, particularly in means testing to determine need. There was a slow transition during this time that Reisch (1998) has interpreted to be that from “subjectively” rooted investigation to “objectively” rooted diagnosis.

The Fact-Gathering/Practice Wisdom Period: Mapping the External World

Social work’s breakaway from the American Social Science Association (ASSA) to focus on practical problems demanding immediate attention, allowed social work to develop its own methods of investigation and its own taxonomy. The work of Mary
Richmond (1917, 1922) and her generation developed both. Logical classification of the multiple causes of need allowed for investigation and understanding of what was happening to immigrants and their neighborhoods, families, persons of color, women, the insane, etc.

At the end of the 19th century there was almost nothing known about the lower classes and how they lived. What was important to them. Persons living in middle and upper class society believed that drink and debauchery were the primary causes of pauperism. The depression of 1893-1897 scared those who had a stake in the status quo. It has been argued that these classes were fearful that the great unwashed would revolt and America suffer another revolution. The single cause view and the solutions it offered - friendly visiting - no longer worked, no longer served to contain the passions of urban workers. The kinds of problems generated by urbanization, immigration, and the other modernizing forces of the post-Civil War period were simply beyond the scope of moral suasion. What were the factors that led to discontent among the poor, dispossessed, and colored? What were solutions to their need?

Answers to these questions involved a refinement of both investigational techniques, and the classifications that organized investigation. This was the task of this first generation of professional social workers. Richmond (1917) said

Fifteen years ago, I began to take notes, gather illustrations, and even draft a few chapters for a book on Social Work in Families. In it I hoped to pass on to the younger people coming into the charity organization field an explanation of the methods that their seniors had found useful. It soon became apparent, however,
that no methods or aims were peculiarly and solely adapted to the treatment of the families that found their way to a charity organization society; that, in essentials, the methods and aims of social case work were or should be the same in every type of service, whether the subject was a homeless paralytic, the neglected boy of drunken parents, or the widowed mother of small children. Some procedures, of course, were peculiar to one group of cases and some to another, according to the special social disability under treatment. But the things that most needed to be said about case work were the things that were common to all (p. 5).

The problem for social casework during the late 19th and early 20th centuries was the lack of a coherent core theory and formulaic set of practice methods informing what social caseworkers did. Professionalization in large measure consisted of developing techniques and standards for practice that could be transmitted to other caseworkers. Because charity organizations societies had forged their own path when the Conference of Charities and Corrections broke away from the ASSA, there was no "core jurisdiction" of theory anchoring what social caseworkers did in practice. As a consequence, social casework was searching for its own formulation of professional practice. At the end of the 19th century, no institutionalized vehicle existed to train caseworkers in a unique casework method. Caseworkers learned on the job.

COS workers went to other professions for theory. Richmond cites three works by Dr. Richard Healy as being important to caseworkers working with children; The Individual Delinquent: a Textbook of Diagnosis and Prognosis for All Concerned in Understanding Offenders. Pathological Lying: Accusation, and Swindling: A Study in
*Forensic Psychology,* and *Honesty: A Study of the Causes and Treatment of Dishonesty Among Children.* She says, "Social case workers read these books with more interest than they do any others relating to child study" (Richmond, 1917, p. 34). Thinkers in other professions were developing the theoretical domains social caseworkers used to legitimize what they did.

Casework's unique professionalizing path, as given voice by Mary Richmond, did not believe that theory constituted the core jurisdiction of social casework. Rather, it was method. Reisch (1998) said that the genius of Richmond's *Social Diagnosis* was that it codified the activities that had been called "investigation" and redefined them as "diagnosis." In this, the subjective casework of the friendly visitor became objective collection and assessment of social evidence by paid staff.

The rift between practice and theory that the CC's split from the ASSA signaled was extended by Richmond. Her concerns were eminently practical. It is for this reason that she attempted to link the various and distinctly different areas in which caseworkers functioned by developing a common practice method, not theory. Recognizing that she could not ignore theory, that it was important to social work's professionalization, she borrowed theory from a wide range of disciplines and professions.

Richmond's theoretical justification for her method was an eclectic mix of philosophy, literature, history, logic, education, medicine, criminology, and perhaps most of all the laws of evidence developed by jurisprudence (Glenn, Brandt, & Andrews. 1947, p. 129). For Mary Richmond the professionalization of social casework concerned itself with developing a common method based in protocols of inference. However, before she
got to inference, she had to outline a general framework within which to develop professional protocols that were transmittable. This was the function served by her landmark work *Social Diagnosis*, published in 1917. It sought to establish a general method for diagnosis, inference, and treatment. Richmond founded her method of diagnosis in the idea of social evidence. Richmond (1917) says of social evidence:

> Social evidence, like that sought by the scientist or historian, includes all items which, however trifling or apparently irrelevant when regarded as isolated facts, may, when taken together, throw light upon the question at issue; namely, as regards social work, the question what course of procedure will place this client in his right relation to society (p. 39).

In short, social evidence may be defined as consisting of any and all facts as to personal or family history which, taken together, indicate the nature of a given client’s social difficulties and the means to their solution. Such facts, when duly tested in ways that fit the uses to which they are to be put, will influence, as suggested in the preceding chapter, the diagnosis of physical and mental disorders, will reveal unrecognized sources of disease, will change court procedure with reference to certain groups of defendants, and will modify methods in the school class room. (p. 43)

Based on Abbott’s (1988, p. 40 – 52) description of the three acts of professional practice, diagnosis, inference, and treatment, what Richmond describes as social evidence is part of diagnosis. Diagnosis involves interpretation of meaning (Richmond, 1917).
Diagnosis, for Richmond, is a term that has its roots in what was previously called investigation (Reisch. 1998). Richmond (1917) said

The effort to get the essential facts bearing upon a man’s social difficulties has commonly been called “an investigation.” but the term here adopted as a substitute – social diagnosis – has the advantage that from the first step it fixes the mind of the case worker upon the end in view (p. 26).

Diagnosis begins with the gathering of facts. and for Richmond, the more the better. These facts are then “colligated” or assembled into “a picture of the client; it (colligation) consists largely of rules declaring what kinds of evidence are relevant and irrelevant, valid and invalid. as well as rules specifying the admissible level of ambiguity” (Abbott. 1988, p. 41). Colligation is paired with classification for Abbott. “Classification means referring the colligated picture to the dictionary of professionally legitimate problems. A classification system is a profession’s own mapping of its jurisdiction. an internal dictionary embodying the professional dimensions of classification” (Abbott. 1988. p. 41).

Mapping professional jurisdiction for Mary Richmond was governed by the parameters within her concept of social evidence - “any and all facts as to personal and family history” (Richmond, 1917, p. 53) She tempers the scope of evidence used in casework by saying, “In social diagnosis, the kinds of evidence available, being largely testimonial in character, can of course never show a probative value equal to that of the facts in the exact sciences. All that is possible for us is to obtain proof that amounts to a reasonable certainty” ( p. 55). At the same time, she says, “In real evidence the very fact
at issue is presented to our senses," (p. 56) where "our" signifies the caseworker doing the observing. When the caseworker reports real evidence to a supervisor or colleague, it becomes testimonial evidence. One of the great weaknesses in the COS system that used low paid agents and volunteer visitors, was the translation of real evidence into testimonial evidence. Because it was "subjective" there was no way that what was said or written could be interpreted to mean the same thing by all parties concerned.

Richmond's vision of professionalized casework was based in codifying this translation so that the same words meant the same things to different people. This meant case records could be read by anyone schooled in the methods of casework and the facts of the case, diagnosis, and treatment were related to each other. It was by learning the language of professional casework that professionals could communicate to one another, and claim different jurisdictions of practice in competition with other professions.

The rules and procedures for diagnosis Richmond was developing claimed a jurisdiction of practice that was uniquely social casework's. No other profession went into the home of its clients to do its work. No other profession was cataloguing facts about the poor and indigent, or developing the language within and through which to know them. The work Richmond and her generation performed in the last decade of the 19th and first decades of the 20th century mapped the patterns of behavior, interests, desires, dreams and aspirations of the lower classes. This mapping of the social world of the dangerous classes helped create the knowledge of the world as it appears that forms the basis of common sense and the naïve realist's position today. The eight mechanisms
of opportunity distribution were roughed out during these years, and the knowledge of populations they described were considered real.

Richmond's vision of professionalization can be seen to include as jurisdiction for practice the complete private sphere of the individual and family. The parameters of social evidence, again, "any and all facts as to personal and family history," are hugely inclusive. This was another problem that professionalization presented to early social work leaders. How do you link individual and family problems, the common element, that arise in a highly complex manifold of contexts? Is there a common core to individual and family problems that can be identified regardless of the context in which they arise? Is there a way to link problems for individuals that arise in elementary schools, factories, child guidance clinics, psychiatric clinics, hospitals, mental hospitals, on the farm, in the city and country, orphanages, people's homes, neighborhoods or the streets themselves?

It can be argued that Richmond's vision encompassed all social contexts, that social casework's jurisdiction was potentially any social problem directly experienced by individuals and families. What need was there for theory in this vision? Based on the practice wisdom of charity workers who had been in the business for a long time, and the gathering of enough facts to construct a picture of the client, problem, and solution, it was obvious that the knowledge that needed to be communicated to new caseworkers was that of method, not theory. Richmond did use theory, but it was a classificational schema of domains to organize social evidence rather than grander theory laying out foundations to effect the ends of social justice.
Diagnosis was an act that COS Secretaries and their agents had routinized, but there was little communication between agencies about the kinds of facts, truths and rules that went into colligation, making up the picture of a client and her problem. District and national conferences did much to move workers toward a common discourse, if not framework for practice, but line staff and volunteer workers, especially during the depression of 1893 – 1897, were overworked, underpaid, had low morale, and often didn't stay long enough to benefit from what training there was.

**Inference.** Inference began to replace moral suasion to determine what treatment was best suited for a particular case in a particular situation. There were many facts playing in the picture now, and inference emerged to be more and more important in what case workers did. The standards that Mary Richmond wanted in place for all caseworkers was a professionalizing response to the perceived inadequacy of volunteer and amateur helping and the discourses through which caseworkers talked to one another. The complexity and abstraction of practice and the ability to make sense of these is exactly what Abbott sees as differentiating professional from nonprofessional practice.

Richmond defined inference in the following manner.

Inference, then, a passing from known to unknown facts, is the reasoning process – most familiar when it takes the form of drawing a conclusion from the relation existing between a general truth and a particular instance. It may, however, proceed from many particular cases to a general rule, as well as from a rule to some new fact about a particular case (Richmond, 1917, p. 81).
In the early years of the COS there was no inference. There was one origin of social problems, character. The links between a person’s character and scripture and the rules and general truths for what constituted moral behavior were very clear. All was presumed to be known. The ineffable mass and momentum of modernizing forces transforming the material world created social problems that this single cause model could not account for or solve. Richmond’s use of inference spread out causation to lie in how the facts of social evidence were classified to understand a case. Because the logical chains linking fact to truth through guiding rules were many, there was always the chance that based on new evidence, the overall picture and treatment modality could change.

Inference then is based on a solid body of knowledge (colligation of facts according to a set of classificational rules) from which a course of treatment is suggested. This course may be very clear and formulaic, or very unclear, and subject to inference. Mary Richmond began with what to social workers in the 1890s seem to be very clear, albeit suspect, general truths and rules of inference. One example of a fairly concrete relation of particular circumstance to general rule Richmond (1917) offers is

A knowledge of the number of rooms occupied is necessary in order to determine whether the family is living under dangerously overcrowded conditions, either from a physical or from a moral standpoint (p. 81).

Another example, this time from a rule to a new fact about a particular case is

A man with a record of drink owed a bill to a hospital. Its social worker learned from the cashier at the patient’s place of business that he had recently received a
considerable sum of money from accident insurance. The inference drawn was that he could pay his hospital bill. (p. 82)

While the language of inference itself can be daunting, the manner in which Richmond used it was very practical and concrete. It is an interesting juxtaposition to look at the relative lack of sophistication (compared to today’s complex knowledge of the inward and outward: intrapsychic workings and social behavior) of social facts and the parameters in which facts are gathered. Richmond’s vision knew no boundaries. She effectively mapped a way that casework could claim character and context as its jurisdiction of practice.

Normalization. Social casework can be seen to have begun with individuals being defined by classificational schemas and their rules. These rules assumed character could be made up of normal traits, middle class norms, and abnormal traits, captured in words such as drunk, immoral woman, lazy, pauper, debaucher, indigent, and feebleminded.

Normalizing implies the development of forms of knowledge that set standards and ideals for human thought and human conduct and against which individuals are assessed, measured, and judged. It implies processes by which society (specifically, the human sciences and the helping professions) acts upon individuals and groups to regulate, shape, or make them conform to a normalizing process. (Chambon, Irving & Epstein, 1999, p. 276)

Richmond’s social evidence and protocols of inference constituted a set of normalizing mechanisms by which individuals and populations were produced, were moulded. For caseworkers and educators of Richmond’s generation professionalization
began with mapping individuals and families according to social facts. There was a building body of knowledge about the circumstances of populations (Riis, 1996). At the end of the 19th century the impact of modernizing forces on families and children, the poor and dispossessed was an area of study that contributed to the larger shift from single cause in character to multi-causal frames of explanation of poverty. Modernization's answer to the social problems it generated was to differentiate broad descriptive categories of people such as the worthy and unworthy poor, into taxonomies by which the unworthy poor became criminals, the debauched, the wanton and fallen. These categories were then themselves refined and populations were created in which individuals were defined by common characteristics, much like the attributes and characteristics that make up a demographic variable.

The simplistic orientation toward truth, rule, and evidence developed by Richmond is so only from within our retrospective gaze. Casework through the 1920s was hard at work creating the social categories in which individuals and populations would be known. It grappled with an increasingly complex world within which modernization generated more and more social problems. Richmond laid out the mechanisms and protocols with which to map the social world, to gather and organize social evidence, to create knowledge of individuals and populations.

After discussing investigation, diagnosis, and inference, Richmond spent the rest of Social Diagnosis laying out step-by-step procedures to obtain social histories in interviews with relatives, employers, schools, churches, hospitals, neighbors, and other members of the community. For Richmond, the family situation, or an individual, can
only be understood in its actual social setting. As discussed in the next chapter, this is the forerunner of the person in environment perspective. The caseworker was required to elicit information so as to see through the eyes of various persons with whom the client has been associated. The paid agents of the COS and volunteers who reported to them had developed a stock of knowledge in what was called "practice wisdom." This is the knowledge that senior practitioners communicated to new hires. This informal communication was the first concerted effort to professionalize casework practice.

Casework focused on individuals and families at the very lowest rung of the social ladder. Richmond's method served as the first institutionalized effort to develop a knowledge base that defined individuals and families as populations in the contexts within which they lived. The knowledge Richmond's generation created about persons in their social environments was unique. It was based on investigation, cum diagnosis, face-to-face contact between worker and client in the client's home. Richmond codified this knowledge in Social Diagnosis, and in 1922, What is Social Casework. She developed rules of inference that connected real people who loved, laughed, toiled, gave birth, and died, recreated and debauched, living in the newly modernizing world with general truths. She developed mechanisms of inference that led to knowledge of individuals and populations and the effects of the environment on their functioning.

Lederman (1994) says that Mary Richmond early in her career wanted the COS to institutionalize compassion. She defined charity as love. However, by the late 1890s, "she transformed her evangelical crusade for compassion into a movement to create a cadre of professionally trained case workers" (p. 82). This meant a cadre of caseworkers
well schooled in diagnosis, inference, and treatment. Social science theory was generally not a focus; nor were the ideals of social reformers and “wholesale” methods of treatment (Trolander, 1997).

**The Emergence of Social Work Education as a Professionalizing Force.** The emergence of social work education in 1898 signals the end of the moral period in social work’s history, and the beginning of the fact gathering and practice wisdom period. In the late 19th century, an overriding concern of social work’s leaders was the quality of casework being delivered. In particular, part of Mary Richmond’s concern for developing common standards for casework was that paid agents were overworked and underpaid. Morale was consistently low and it was hard to keep people once they had been trained. In a speech delivered at the 1897 NCCC, she said she thought that by raising standards that caseworkers would develop better self esteem (Richmond, 1897).

This was a very human concern based in direct experience with caseworkers. Much as Robinson (1930) attributes development of her professional perspective to personal experience, so Richmond’s perspective was molded by what she experienced. At the same time, it appears that Richmond’s motivation to standardize training of paid charity organization society agents originated in her awareness that other forms of skilled service had training schools. Charity organization work did not, and Richmond, highly aware of the model presented by the medical profession, advocated for a training school in her Richmond (1897) address to the NCCC.

The question now is how to get educated young men and women to make a life vocation of charity organization work. We must educate them. Through
these twenty years, our charity organization societies have stood for trained
service in charity. We are thoroughly committed to that, in theory at least. But it
is not enough to create a demand for trained service. Having created the demand
(and I think we may claim that our share in its creation has been considerable) we
should strive to supply it.

Moreover, we owe it to those who shall come after us that they shall be
spared the groping and blundering by which we have acquired our own stock of
experience. In these days of specialization, when we train our cooks, our
apothecaries, our engineers, our librarians, our nurses. - when, in fact, there is a
training school for almost every form of skilled service. - we have yet to establish
our first training school for charity workers. or. as I prefer to call it, "Training
School in Applied Philanthropy.

...Surely, they have the right to demand from the profession of applied
philanthropy (we really have not even a name for it) that which they have a right
to demand from any other profession. - further opportunities for education and
development. and incidentally. the opportunity to earn a living (p. 181).

Edward Devine. Secretary of the New York COS. in his own 1897 speech at the
NCCC, "made a strong plea for improvement in the personnel of the investigators. for
their training. and for a clearer definition of the end which investigation has in view"
(Richmond, 1917, p. 31). Bertha Reynolds (1963) said

Miss Richmond recognized the crude practices surviving after 20 years of
organized charitable work, but insisted that these could be overcome, if only a
definite professional standard could be set by regulated professional education. That standard should include professional ideals, habits of thought, and a philosophy of life.

Such an education would involve full-time study to master the sciences and underlying principles. Apprentice training could only teach how to do in one set of local conditions. (p. 36)

The complexity that the COS was encountering in the social world made the need for establishment of a training school increasingly paramount. In 1898, Edward Devine established a summer training course for staff persons from charity agencies at the New York School. At the same time Richmond was writing a second handbook that was published in 1899, *Friendly Visiting Among the Poor*. It was far more detailed than her previous work, focusing on investigation as the foundation for scientific diagnosis.

The concern for establishing a professional standard was part of larger forces at work. The creation of disciplines within the public university, and the adoption by these disciplines of scientific methods and theories was part of the background within which Richmond and her peers developed a vision for social casework. The depression of 1893-1897 stimulated the realization that character was not the source of social ills, that structural forces were at work that generated these ills. The single cause, moral framework within which character was the origin of social problems was slowly supplanted by a more complex understanding of the world. Richmond's social evidence and its role in mapping the social world of the dangerous classes, the poor, indigent, and
debauched, single mothers and old people, immigrants and persons from different cultures generated knowledge that supported the progressive movement of the times.

**Retail vs. wholesale reform.** During the first six years of the 20th century, Richmond helped fight for child labor legislation, a law prohibiting wife desertion, compulsory education legislation, and municipal reform. By 1907, she abandoned her reform work, having developed a skepticism that social legislation would ever accomplish what the spirit of reformers said it would (Lederman. 1994). Her disillusionment with “wholesale reform” strengthened her resolve to establish standards for social casework. Many others felt this resolve during the first decades of the new century. Bertha Reynolds (1963) said

> In general, social workers who attended professional schools were educated to follow the vision which Miss Richmond so eloquently expressed in her papers, a great crusade for human betterment in which case-by-case personal contact with people in poor circumstances would not only raise individual families to a higher level but would furnish data for far-reaching reforms (p. 44).

The retail method, case-by-case study, diagnosis, and treatment, would lead to wholesale reform. Wholesale reform would involve change in law to recognize needs of populations that in current law were invisible. Abbott (1931), writing from within the perspective held by the settlement movement, said of COS training policies, “The student too often becomes a routine technician, sometimes a clever technician — but still a technician” (p. 13). She thought that all social workers should be able to evaluate and make policy, administer social agencies, and to lead. Abbott wanted social work
education to begin with social justice through the vehicle of social reform. Richmond's vision had social work education begin with casework method, which would then generate social reform.

Hunter (1902) saw that the COS dealt with individuals and the Settlements focused on social conditions. He argued that the two groups ought to cooperate with one another. Even Mary Richmond saw that the two could learn from each other (Lederman, 1994, p. 100, n. 24).

Nonetheless, there was a long, public wrangling between the two visions. After engaging in acrimonious debate at the 1895 NCCC, Richmond realized she could not "win" the battle for dominance by attacking Settlement workers. What was needed was to develop the charity society's standing amidst the professions. She began lecturing agents and visitors and in 1897 published the first training manual or handbook for district agents. The manual was 70 pages and "included every detail about the way agents were to solicit information from their clients" (Lederman, 1994, p. 101). To the degree there was a battle for dominance, winning involved professionalizing what caseworkers did. Settlement workers and academic sociologists often worked together, and these ties to a university discipline and their theoretical, jurisdictional cores, legitimized the Settlements in a different way than casework eventually legitimized itself. Social justice and wholesale reform was closer to the heart of what Settlement workers did than to what caseworkers practiced. Mary Richmond's vision included wholesale reform and social justice, but the subject matter of casework texts was work with individuals and their families within a social environment that included facts about a
case. This is a theme that stretched not only through practice, but how schools of social work were developed.

What concern for social justice social casework had during these years was frustrated by forces embracing the "natural" world and its laws. Social casework was active in many different settings within the social world. Competition for jurisdictions of practice, codified methods of investigation, a body of inductively derived theory and knowledge were identified as necessary if social casework was to engage in effective practice within this ever more complex world.

**The Flexner Report.** In 1915, Abraham Flexner pronounced that social work was not a profession, that it was possibly a quasi-profession (Abbott, 1942). Social work's story about itself makes this speech into a fulcrum around which the field focused its professionalizing efforts (Austin, 1983). Flexner argued that social work is not a profession in itself but a mediating occupation, coordinating activities of other professions. Social work was not so much a field as an aspect of work in many fields. He did not think that any kind of technical skill was needed. Ehrenreich (1985) says that the social work literature over the next decade was filled with proposals to increase the professionalization of social work. At the same time, there were efforts to make sure that the powers that be were not offended, which was perceived to jeopardize the professionalization of social work. The importance given to Flexner's speech by social work's thinkers most likely cannot be overemphasized. Specht & Courtney (1994) marked Flexner's speech as the turning point when "the search for theory began in earnest" (p. 87). This search for a theory within which to ground practice, what Abbott
(1988) calls a core jurisdiction, further rendered the social justice project a mechanism of professional ends, competition for turf amongst the system of professions.

The model for the professions was a beacon that called Richmond and her generation. Key to the professional vision was a means to organize the newly recognized complexity of individual and family problems. to teach practitioners how to classify and categorize the social world. This meant standardizing casework protocols in what was to become professional education. The movement towards professionalism served to organize what caseworkers did and the “wholesale reform” with which Richmond was disillusioned was replaced by focus on developing techniques and standards for practice within the training school.

The emergence of training schools. The New York Summer Training Program begun in 1898 became a full year program in 1903-4 and by 1910 was a full two-year program. The fact gathering process had become extremely complicated by 1910 -- so much so that the amateur could no longer be expected to grasp the complexity of casework (Briar and Miller, 1979).

Because training focused on new staff members, there was relatively less emphasis on social reform and social action than there was on individual case situations (Hollis & Taylor, 1951). Lederman. (1994) argues that

Richmond masterminded the opposition to public welfare in the early 20th century, in particular opposition to widows’ pensions from 1911 to 1914. and became a lightening rod for grievances against social workers. Richmond’s infamy was equaled by her influence. While reformers and social justice
advocates such as Jane Addams enjoyed wide acclaim. Richmond received only one public honor in her life and resented her rival’s popularity. In the end, Richmond left a far deeper mark on the social work profession than did her rivals. Convinced that poverty should be treated on a case-by-case basis, she developed the methodology of social casework. Moreover, she succeeded in establishing this methodology as the core of the social work curriculum. . . Ultimately, the casework methodology of the unpopular Mary Richmond became more central to the social work professional than the social justice ideology of the popular reformers (p. 1).

This emphasis on casework method was the beating heart of the professional project. The social justice project was rendered an “ideology.” The rift between casework methodology and social justice ideology identified by Lederman is a constant theme in social work’s histories. Hollis & Taylor (1951) said that the early Settlement movement and its emphasis on community organization, social action and work with neighborhood groups had much less effect on social work education than did the COS movement.

Shoemaker (1998) says of social casework training schools during the first two decades of the century:

As guest lectures gradually gave way to more regimented course work, the diversity in approaches to social work remained. Curricula at all of the schools included highly theoretical and historical courses in economics and sociology; deeply personal and even religious discussions of social ethics; practical, nuts-
and-bolts coverage of relief work with families, the mechanics of institutions, and child welfare work; reform oriented courses on labor and housing legislation; and even plumbing. From social theory to lead pipes, a cacophony of voices and visions worked to construct the meanings of social work in the early 20th century. In these years, schools of social work well reflected the amorphous, chaotic, and often contradictory world of Progressive reform swirling around them. (p. 185)

This general description of what happened “in” the developing schools belies social work’s leaders attempts to standardize curricula, ethics, policies, and procedures. Another way of putting Shoemaker’s point is that professionalization was the primary force around which these discourses swirled.

In 1919, there were 17 schools of social work that became charter members of social work education’s first professional association, the Association of Training Schools for Professional Social Work (ATSPSW). Most of these programs were postgraduate. Three universities - Indiana, Minnesota, and Ohio State - established undergraduate programs. While a few programs, notably that which eventually affiliated with the University of Chicago, emphasized social reform from within a sociological context, most schools focused on teaching casework methods. The ATSPSW began developing uniform and professional standards for social work education.

By 1923, 13 of the original 17 ATSPSW members were affiliated with universities or colleges. Shoemaker (1998) argues that the New York school, through the vision of Porter Lee, turned toward casework, seeking to find answers to individual distress in individual and psychological motivations, rather than structural explanations.
As the New York school was not only a leader in casework method, but in its training, this turn toward casework set the tone for most of social work education in the 1920s. The professional project had established itself as the dominant force in social work education by this time.

In 1927, the ATSPSW became the American Association of Schools of Social Work (AASSW). During this year the first school was officially certified by the organization, and in 1929, requirements were established that had to be met by new schools seeking to join the Association. This included a requirement that a school be affiliated with a university. In 1929, there were 28 members of the AASSW. In 1932 the first set of standards for a minimum curriculum were published by the AASSW. It required a two-year graduate professional education covering four core areas. Despite this movement towards greater organization, Porter Lee, in a 1926 speech, said, "In social work, we have made a beginning in regard to professional education. It is still erratic, tentative, and the country over, not well organized" (p. 143).

This lack of organization in social work education mirrored the state of casework practice. Lubove (1965) said that the normal caseworker, regardless of setting, usually had a caseload too large to allow for the kind of differential diagnosis called for by Mary Richmond. Even more difficult was to find the time and training to do the intensive investigation and therapy required by the child guidance clinic.

In 1929, the Milford Conference Report was published. It formally stated a point Mary Richmond had been making since the late 1890s, that the problems faced by social caseworkers and the tools they brought to casework are the same across all fields.
Reynolds (1963) said the Milford Conference emerged with common agreement on three points.

1. That there was a general concept of "generic social casework" which was acted upon in practice better than it was defined in theory, and which was more substantial and content in more significant than had been supposed.

2. That division of labor among social agencies had separated out various fields of social casework without clear understanding of why, or of the principles which might govern the relations of the special fields to each other.

3. That "while the trained worker was a fact," nobody knew how she came to be a fact. Professional training had been established for 25 years, but nobody knew the requirements of the specific fields of social casework, which might guide the formulation of training programs. (p. 133)

While the field itself was disorganized, it was reacting to Flexner's speech and closer to developing a generic casework method. Hollis & Taylor (1951) summarized the progress of social work education through the time of the Milford Conference Report by saying:

By the end of this period many of the characteristics of American social work education as we see it today were apparent. It was rooted more in practice than in the academic setting; it was developing from the specializations toward a common base; it was showing strength in delineating and teaching of process, particularly in casework, but was weak in preparing for administration, community organization, group work, research, and supervision; it was lacking in clarity about philosophic foundations; but it was already making a significant
contribution to education through field work teaching in which emphasis was on knowledge becoming a part of the “doer” instead of merely adding to intellectual understanding. With this foundation a very young profession had to meet the demands of the 1930’s, a decade that produced the most rapid and fundamental changes in the history of social work education and practice (p. 21).

This account of the development of social work education up until 1930 emphasizes the struggle social work’s leaders had to keep up with an ever-changing world. Social work’s solution to the social problems generated by an increasingly complex modern world was to standardize methods of practice and the vehicle to do this was the training school, then a school affiliated with or department within a university. Professionalization was embraced by social work as the means by which to continue its claims to jurisdictions and develop new ones. Social justice discourses were taught within the new schools, however their primary focus was on teaching technique, rules of inference, in preparation to work in private, nonprofit agencies.

Psychodynamic Period 1930 – 1973: Mapping the Interior World

The increasing consciousness of personal facts in the past five years, through all fields of science and knowledge and the overwhelming popularization of this knowledge through literature, education, and social work have brought about a new level of personality development. a greater degree of self-consciousness, a greater capacity for seeing the other person as a different individual.

Virginia Robinson, (1930)
Professionalization over the course of the first two decades of the 20th century had focused mostly on Mary Richmond's "facts" of social evidence. These facts were classified according to rules that formed a map of a person's external world, their environment. Porter Lee, director of the New York School of Philanthropy, cited in Wenocur & Reisch (1989), commented about Mary Richmond's Social Diagnosis. "This book closes one epoch entirely and carries us a long way into the next one" (p. 96). Wenocur & Reisch also said that Richmond's book "remained a bible for social work education and internal agency training throughout the 1920s and 1930s" (p. 96). In a similar manner, the seeds of what by some was called the "psychiatric deluge" of the 1920s that flowered in psychodynamic casework in the 1930s through 1960s, were set earlier. Mary Richmond, cited in Robinson (1930) in a National Conference of Social Work (NCSW) paper delivered in 1917 said "...the criterion of the social, its indispensable element, always is the influence of mind upon mind" (p. 52). This exemplifies the increasing individualizing focus of social casework of this time.

Casework above the poverty line. After World War I, there was a new kind of client, the families of the men who fought in the war. At the 1918 NCSW, Agnes Murray, a Red Cross worker, introduced the concept of casework above the poverty line, where people come to caseworkers of their own free will. These caseworkers were highly sensitive to the investigative techniques of early charity workers. Medical/psychiatric knowledge gave caseworkers entry into new client markets and higher status (Reisch 1998). For the first time a client's attitude came into the consideration of the caseworker. This was a crucial difference – that working with
voluntary clients is much different than working with involuntary clients who are assumed to have characters lacking in moral fiber.

E.E. Southard and Mary Jarrett taught the first course on psychiatry at Smith College in the summer of 1919. Mary Jarrett, at the 1919 NCSW argued

Inasmuch as the adaptation of an individual to his environment, in the last analysis, depends upon the mental make-up, the study of mental life is fundamental to any activity having for its object the better adjustment of the individual. . . . Another product of the psychiatric point of view is the habit of objective observation – the study of an individual as he really is. not as we feel that we should be in his place, or as he himself tells us, he is. (p. 587)

**Nature and personality.** The conflation of social justice and professional projects is particularly evident in this citation. There was an assumption that there was one nature and humankind was part of it. The interior of individuals became a target for understanding for social workers. Better adjustment of the individual personality became the goal. Social evidence had attempted to classify any and all influences on a case in the first three decades of the 20th century. Character, it was realized, was too simple a way to account for the complexity found in the modern world. With the emergence of Freudian theory, personality, as a matrix of motivations, drives and forces always lurking in the background, became the primary focus for a new generation of social workers. In her chapter entitled, “After Social Diagnosis” Robinson, (1930) makes the case that
Social caseworkers had not yet developed the capacity to observe and record clearly enough the concrete behavior facts in a situation to be ready to trust themselves in such crystallizations of observation and interpretations as diagnoses enforce... The workers continue to amass facts often far beyond their capacity to interpret or their need for treatment. (p. 64)

What social caseworkers were doing was not precise, was not organized by theory or method. The language of social casework was no more accurate than the language of the moralizing visitors. Robinson cites some terms used by Ada Sheffield. Sheffield was one of social work's thinkers who attempted to overcome dichotomization of person and situation she saw in the work of Mary Richmond. Sheffield also attempted to alter the focus on dysfunction she saw emerging in psychodynamic approaches, advocating an interventive model that sought to educate rather than treat (Kemp, 1994, pp. 185-199). Robinson argued that Sheffield's terms - affectionate parental monopoly, filial distrust, maternal-sexual conflict - were just as open to different interpretations and emphases as were the terms of the friendly visitors, such as self-centered, obedient, truthful, lazy, or debauched.

Robinson (1930) said that the sociological basis for Social Diagnosis was a creature of its era, and that the interest in the individual and his psychological problems has "revolutionized the case work movement of the country" (p.67). The discursive movement from investigation to diagnosis as portrayed by Reisch (1998) takes another step towards solving ever more complex problems with ever more sophisticated techniques.
The 1931 Karpf Report concluded that social workers had not developed the skills to apply the knowledge being developed in the social, psychological and biological sciences. Paralleling Robinson's observations, Karpf said that social workers judgments were "largely subjective, individualistic, and unverifiable" (p. 352). Common sense was more foundation for practice than was the knowledge of science, or empirically verified technique. Karpf and Robinson offered different perspectives on social work's professionalization process that while critical, was not dismissive as was Flexner in his 1915 speech.

Bertha Reynolds in her 1963 work, _An Uncharted Journey: 50 Years of Growth in Social Work_, said about her experiences in the 1920s. "We became accustomed to thinking of psychiatry as a key to unlock all the mysteries of personality in all kinds of circumstances. Circumstances became less important to us than the kinds of people exposed to them" (p. 58). Carpenter (1923) said that personality occupied the center of the picture with material factors as background on the canvas.

The mental hygiene movement that started with the end of the First World War diffused through social casework practice as an attractive idea. Here was the jurisdiction that 50 years of casework, from its moral beginnings, through its focus on facts and their use by practice wisdom, had lacked. The reality of casework in the 1920s was large caseloads and not enough time to do the differential diagnosis suggested by Mary Richmond, let alone engage a client in exploration of their personality. However, professionalism was a force working through social work. Social workers wanted to be respected, to be seen as equals to the other professions. The furor stimulated by
Flexner in 1915 was a major factor leading to social work's adoption of the psychodynamic perspective, to work with clients who were not poor, to compete for new jurisdictions with other professions in hospitals, schools, mental health centers while maintaining jurisdiction within child guidance clinics and public welfare agencies.

For many of social work's educators, Freudian theory offered a firmer scientific foundation for casework than did that offered by Richmond's fact gathering/practice wisdom approach, or earlier versions of psychiatric theory as practiced by Adolph Meyer and Richard Cabot. The earnest search for theory triggered by Flexner's 1915 speech developed into what came to be known as the diagnostic school of social casework. It also reflected a more general and slower pace of change in American social history.

**America's inward turning.** After World War I, America retreated into a shocked isolationism. The irrational, given expression by Nietzsche, and the unconscious, given life by Freud, were not only real, but very much constitutive of the social landscape (Touraine, 1995). The reactive isolationism can be seen to be a productive response as well. Rather than examining social institutions and their inhering standards for conduct, attitude and thought, the inward turning represented by fascination with Freudian thought continued to place the origin for social ills in the individual.

This inward turning was the flip side of a general distrust of Progressive Era, social reform excesses. The progressive era had complete faith in rationality and a deep belief in progress (Ehrenreich, 1989). Freudianism was perceived by some of social work's thinkers to be a scientific way of dealing with irrationality and the unconscious. No longer moral suasion of character or concern with social facts, the psychologizing of
character created the personality. Therapy was a way that personality could be altered to adapt to the realities of the social order. This intensely individual focus of psychoanalytic casework gave casework a toehold above the poverty line. This dovetailed very well with the middle class' new openness to engaging in therapy.

Lubove (1965) argued that Virginia Robinson abstracted casework from its origins in the client's social environment and placed it within the domain then occupied by psychologists and psychiatrists. He said her vision was a morality play in which the psychiatric heroes revealed the "true word" and saved social work from "eternal damnation in the hell of the old sociologic approach" (p. 113). Her work can also be seen to be built on an already professionalizing process begun with the work of Mary Richmond that had casework focus on social evidence that gave insight into the character of the individual.

By adopting the work of Otto Rank, Robinson helped transform the notion of character and its focus on the individual into a focus on the personality. Early in her career Robinson (1930) was influenced by William Alanson White's use of Freud in "The Family Romance, The meaning of Disease, Mechanisms of Character Formation and his editorship of the great, progressive journal, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly." (p. 9). In 1924, she contracted with Rank to deliver the commencement address at the Pennsylvania School of Social Work. Three years later, she entered therapy with him. She said

How little I realized when I applied for "therapy" with Rank in 1927 that the experience which was to follow of one hour a day for six weeks, a time-limited,
internal process. could possibly be the basis, the raw material, as it were, for an understanding of the problem of relationship, of self and other, professional as well as personal relationships. That it can be so remains always beyond explanation, often beyond belief, and certainly beyond proof when one approaches it intellectually or scientifically (p. 16).

Robinson quoted Anita Faatz, whose The Nature of Choice in Casework Process, traced the development of what came to be known as the “functional school” of social casework.

But first, in order to give the focus and approach by which this development unfolds, I should like to state the thesis which constitutes, in these pages, the single strand of development to which all detail and factual content are related. It is this: that the important change, above all others, which functional casework embodies, is the shift of the dynamic center for the source of therapeutic results from the helper to the one being helped. From this all other detail of concept, method, process and content flows. By this statement, we do not intend to imply any denial of the determinative role played by the skill of the helper or lack of it: nor of the crucial importance of the helping process in affecting release of these vital elements in the self. However, the quality of this skill does not arise from the caseworker’s understanding of the facts and the problem, or from the competence of the diagnosis, or the control by the caseworker of the level upon which the self uses help; nor does it rest upon the accurate delineation of steps of treatment. It arises, instead, out of a primary acknowledgement that the source of
understanding is within the self; that here, internally is located the original up
springing of the impulse towards life, and here lies the control of change and
growth (p. 19).

The notion of environment as understood by Mary Richmond – the facts of social
evidence - was transformed to become the self, both of worker and client within the
agency structure.

**Diagnostic and functional schools.** Two schools of thought competed for
dominance to determine the direction that casework practice would take in the 1930s: the
diagnostic and functional schools. Represented by the Pennsylvania School of Social
Work, and developing the ideas of Otto Rank, John Dewey and George Herbert Mead
the functional school argued for a casework relationship defined by the agency’s structure
and service. Virginia Robinson and Jessie Taft are the principle historical figures in this
school. The older diagnostic school, centered in New York, advocated a more traditional
view of psychoanalytic casework. The diagnostic school, led by Florence Hollis. Lucille
Austin, Fern Lowry, and Gordon Hamilton. was based in Mary Richmond’s study-
diagnosis-treatment model and strongly influenced by Freudian theory (Kemp. 1994).
The textbooks written by Hamilton and Hollis were widely used in MSW programs
during this time (Kemp. 1999).

With the advent of the depression, there were three directions in which casework
could move to claim professional jurisdiction (Briar & Miller. 1971). One was centered
in the public agency, a response to depression era social conditions. This was the social
work of the Rank and File Movement, which did not emerge from traditional casework,
but from the increased numbers of public service jobs created to cope with overwhelming social need. The second was psychoanalytic casework of the diagnostic school. The third was relationship casework of the functional school.

The rank and file movement. The Rank and File Movement "exerted a strong, politically progressive counterforce to the profession's attempts to control the emerging national social welfare industry" (Wenocur & Reisch. 1989. p. 182). It aligned itself with the political left in the beginning of its 11-year history (1931 - 1942), responding to the overwhelming disruptions to the social order brought on by the depression. It focused on social work's relation to the means of production, and as labor unions emerged this different breed of social worker sought to protect their interests from the larger disruptive forces at work. At its peak in 1936, the Rank and File Movement had established itself as an alternative to professionalizing social work. "It was identified with unions and the use of labor tactics, and with radical reforms stemming from a Marxist perspective" (Wenocur & Reisch. 1989. p. 197).

By the end of the rank and file tenure, social welfare jobs had been claimed by the civil service, subject to all its myriad of rules and regulations. Passage of the social security act ended the possibility of more radical legislated solutions. The casework stream of social work had coalesced and raised "the standards of service through job classification, salary schedules, training, and personnel practices" (Wenocur & Reisch. 1989. p. 184) The depression forced social work to formulate policies that resisted the lowering of standards that the new public service jobs created. Social Work's professional association, the American Association of Social Workers (AASW) excluded
untrained workers and urged professionals to resist salary cuts for themselves. This turned out to be a futile effort as salary was determined by competitive demand, and in 1930, there were ten applicants for every social work job.

The depression and its aftermath generated a schism for social work between the private and public sectors. The federal welfare edifice that grew out of the depression effectively codified a set of rights in a safety net for large segments of the population, the elderly, single mothers with dependent children, and the unemployed (Trattner, 1995). Means testing for eligibility, distribution of resources, and the paperwork that went along with such a massive system marginalized casework by professionals even more to orient itself above the poverty line. There was a vociferous debate among professionals about whether casework should be a part of welfare services (Kemp, 1999). However, for the time being, practice within the welfare bureaucracy was formulaic, with little time or room for professional inference.

The two other directions social work could move during and after the depression were expressed in the diagnostic and functional schools, both of which struggled for professional dominance. The internal debates conducted during the 1940s are indicative of a relative stability within the profession. The leftist challenge presented by the Rank and File Movement was met with a concerted professionalizing by AASW. Time and energy could be spent by social work’s thinkers on what direction to move the profession.

In 1947, the Family Service Association of America created a committee to study these two approaches and ascertain their relationship. It was concluded that the two orientations could not be reconciled or combined (Karius, 1950, in Kemp, 1994, p. 228).
Kemp, (1999) argues that in the end, the two schools were synthesized. As a number of historians have commented, a few elite social work theorists conducted this debate. Most caseworkers, on the other hand, did what they had been doing for decades (Lubove, 1965; Woodruffe, 1965; Briar & Miller, 1971; Reisch, 1998). It was this elite, affiliated with universities, that taught the new generation of social workers.

**Professionalization and casework method.** The search for a common casework methodology championed by Mary Richmond, affirmed in the 1929 Milford Conference Report, had begun in social evidence, "all facts about individuals and families." As concern for character revealed itself to express subjective and moralist frameworks, the idea of personality undergirded by the irrational and unconscious emerged. The search for a common casework method was to be guided by the theories of Freud, and then Rank.

Professionalization began to direct the questioning focus of social work's thinkers inward into the psyche, to discover how the unconscious and irrational played themselves out within the emotional world of the client.

Lehninger (1978) argues that professionalization of social work had two goals. Improved service and greater autonomy, and that there was a tension between the two. The move to claim the psyche as an area of practice was a move towards autonomy. It can be argued that this professionalizing move redefined what service meant. For example, in her work on the concept of environment in social casework, Kemp (1994) argues that the idea of therapy became increasingly acceptable to middle as well as upper class persons. This professionalizing move narrowed social casework's focus and as a
consequence, caseworkers became increasingly concerned with the development of psychodynamic technique (p. 212). The search for an autonomous knowledge base led many to adopt Freudian theory (Dunlap, 1993).

To be scientific for social workers in the 19th and early 20th centuries meant organizing charity, with the goal of ending pauperism. During the fact-gathering period to be scientific was to gather facts according to the classifications of social evidence and protocols by which this evidence was gathered. In the psychodynamic period to be scientific meant adhering to the protocols of diagnosis, inference and treatment, but now organized by psychodynamic theory and its insights.

There was another voice that constituted a barely heard minor chord, the voice of the Settlements and their ties to the academic social sciences that emerged alongside the work of Richmond and her generation, and then during the psychoanalytic period, the voices of individual writers such as Coyle (1958); Eaton (1959); Greenwood (1955, 1957); Kahn (1954); and Meyer (1959).

Bertha Reynolds was perhaps the marquee figure challenging the dominance of psychodynamic theory in casework practice. While she herself was educated at Smith in psychodynamic theory, and later taught there, after her experiences with the Rank and Filers during the depression she moved towards an activist, social justice approach to casework. This included the idea that the role of caseworker was to assist the client to build on strengths and resources, and solve problems as the client defined them to be. This precluded an expert, professional model then dominating social work practice. She thought there should be no difference in service rendered in private and public agencies.
As she so poignantly discusses in her 1963 review of her life's work, the profession marginalized her as it sought to take one more step toward finding a unifying, professional method.

The world of social behavior mapped by Richmond's social evidence and the world of intrapsychic behavior mapped by different schools of psychodynamic thought were pretty well integrated by the 1960s. Kemp (1994) argues that the late 1950s and 1960s were a time during which social work sought to unify itself. She says:

The attempt to reconfigure the profession had two key aspects: the implementation of a unified structure for social work practice across its various fields and methods, and the effort to develop a comprehensive conceptual framework. The first came through consolidation of professional structure. The latter was pursued particularly through the revitalization and amplification of connections between social casework and the social sciences (p. 237).

This connection between social casework and the social sciences was one step away from functionalist grounding in Rankian psychodynamic theory, or the ego psychology that was fast becoming popular. A central concern became development of "knowledge-for-use" in which the knowledge developed by the social sciences was made accessible to casework practitioners. A bridging figure in the outward move from psychodynamic theory to the next period in social work's development of a unified method was Carol Meyer. She wanted to "broaden the theoretical base of social casework through integration of psychodynamic and social science theory. Meyer
suggested that in the social sciences, social work might find the concepts needed to maintain a dual focus on both personality and situation” (Kemp, 1994, p. 247).

This movement outward into the social environment from the depths of Freudian theory continued to be more discursive than actual. While practitioners who worked in private, nonprofit agencies struggled to utilize theory in their practice, social workers in public agencies continued to be bound by agency parameters, large caseloads, and status and wage concerns. The social turbulence of the 1960s opened up a social justice dimension, but professionalizing social work in private agencies remained wedded to the psychodynamic tradition in casework (Kemp, 1994; Lehninger, 1978).

Reisch (1998) argues that the casework theories and methods crafted in private, volunteer agencies dominated casework through the 1940s. Casework was crafted around a counseling function rather than relief giving, or social justice function. Casework emphasized needs, not rights. Professionalization meant that the practice methods that had developed in the private agencies were superior to those developed in public agencies. Individual treatment rather than environmental reform had higher status and priority within the social work profession. In a final sentence Reisch says, “this failure to recognize the essential mutuality between satisfying common human needs through daily practice of social work and establishing common human rights through social reform continues to haunt the profession to this day” (p. 179).

The alignment with the social sciences presaged by Meyer (1959) had yet to take hold. The critiques of practice that quantitative methods offered were not welcomed by some social workers (Reisch, 1998). Bruno (1957) said, “The researchers in social work
were conspicuous for their distinction and their rarity – in fact, ill disposed social workers have said unfairly that the distinction came from rarity” (p. 431). Psychodynamic perspectives continued to shape casework theory and method, and social work education during the 1960s.

**Summary.** This chapter began by laying out the social background to the emergence of the public university, the academic social sciences and social work in the moral period of social work’s history. In the early- and mid-19th century historicism constituted a bridge between divine law and natural law. In the late 19th century Social Darwinism bridged the divine and nature world for social work’s ancestors. The origin and development of social science was put forth as another bridge between bible based university education and the new public research universities. Another bridge of these two worlds occurred in the move from a single to multi-causal view of reality. Social work’s origins are traced to the late 1870s, the NCCC and COS. The fact gathering/practice wisdom period mapped the social world of America’s underclasses. Social work education is a professionalizing force that codifies standards and protocols by which to map the social world, to develop and transmit efficient techniques for practice from one generation to the next. During this period method was the core jurisdiction for social work, not theory. In the psychodynamic period social work began to map the intrapsychic world to more clearly claim professional legitimacy. Professionalization now involved the use of self by the social worker in a way that had been impossible in earlier periods. Social justice concerns had been marginalized with the absorption of the Rank and File Movement into social welfare bureaucracy.
Professionalization had generated an infrastructure within which claims to jurisdictions of practice were both maintained and defended.

Social work developed as a profession among the professions, even though its core jurisdiction was method and later, psychodynamic theory. By the early 1970s a new generation of academic social workers raised their voices to ask if what social workers did was effective. The answer was, "we don’t know!"
Chapter 3

The Realist and Constructivist Positions; Discourses in Competition

The failure in the past to apply scientific method and scientific leadership to the needs of the poor has wasted the taxpayers’ money and left behind a trail of good intentions and futile efforts.

Edith Abbott (1930)

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the path social work took to establish a core jurisdiction for the professional project. The dissertation argues that the professional project has either co-opted the discourses of social justice to achieve its own ends, or marginalized them in its claim to turf as an academic profession within the system of academic professions within the university.

In the previous chapter three periods in social work’s history were discussed; the moral period, the fact-gathering/practice wisdom period, and the psychodynamic period. Each in its own way assumed a core jurisdiction. Again, a core jurisdiction is the theory that informs and legitimizes what practitioners do. The core jurisdiction of the moral
period was scientific charity, of the fact gathering period. rules of inference based in
social evidence. and the psychodynamic period. various iterations of psychodynamic
theory. The fourth period's core jurisdiction is the empirically derived theories and
methods of the academic social sciences. It is called the empirical period in social work's
history. Its mapping function is to create knowledge about the field of intersection of
person and environment.

It is argued that there are two traditions that meet in the 1970s as a result of social
work's drive to professionalize. The first is the ecosystems perspective that traces its
roots back to the casework of Mary Richmond and the emergence of the NCCC from the
ASSA in 1879. The second is the tradition born out of the ASSA in the academic social
sciences. The historical role of research in social work education is then discussed. This
discussion leads to definition of social work education's realist position and cosmology
of natural science. The relations between the realist position and the social justice project
and then that of social justice and the curriculum policy statements found within social
work education are examined. As part of this discussion the emergence of special
interest groups is outlined. The next section of the chapter lays out the constructionist
challenge to the realist position that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The
position constructionism has on social work education and how some of social work's
historians have used the critical side of constructionism to examine what social workers
do is discussed.
The Empirical Period, 1973 – Present: Mapping the intersection of the personality and environment

This section discusses how, in the early 1970s, social work adopted the scientific method used by the academic social sciences to generate valid knowledge and to solidify its claim to be a profession. Valid knowledge was no longer an outgrowth of a theory about human motivation and behavior; rather, it was generated from replicable observations of patterns of human behavior and attitudes. The cohort that received its PhDs in the 1970s mastered the empirical methods of the academic social sciences. This cohort claimed empirically generated scientific knowledge was the best tool social work had to determine what kinds of practice methods were effective, and which weren't.

The move toward research. In his 1973 article Joel Fisher asked of social work, “Is what we do effective?” This question was directed at psychodynamic practice. After reviewing 11 experimental research studies that examined social casework that met his selection criteria, Fischer concluded that casework not only “failed to demonstrate that it is effective,” but also that “lack of effectiveness appears to be the rule rather than the exception” (p.14). This article can be seen as a warning shot fired across social work’s bows. The professionalizing drive that had social casework latch onto Freudian theory, and the theories of Freud’s followers, had never really been amenable to empirical validation, and hence, research was never a priority. Social work education used faculty drawn from social science departments rather than from the social work practice community to teach research (Austin, 1986). This was the norm through the 1970s.
Dinerman & Geismar (1984) said that few schools of social work had systematic research programs and few faculty were involved in ongoing research studies.

Fischer's article was one of the first to stimulate a closer alliance between social work's educators and the research methods of the academic social sciences. Tripodi (1984) examined trends in research published by social workers from 1956 through 1980. The study reviewed 4,856 articles published in Social Casework, Child Welfare, Social Service Review, and Social Work. It also reviewed 160 articles published between 1977 and 1980 in Social Work Research and Abstracts and the Journal of Social Service Research. He found that more research articles appeared each year than the year before in the first sample, and that more increasingly sophisticated statistical techniques were used, and critical essay reviews of research were found in the second sample in succeeding years. Nurius & Tripodi (1985) found that through 1983, standards for conducting research varied within the social work profession.

Hartman (1990) argues that the major shift in power within social work has been from professional practice to the academy. Until the 1970s professional schools successfully defended the position that said they were different from academic disciplines, and that standards for promotion and tenure, faculty profiles, structure of the curriculum, and expected outcomes should be different. Increasingly social work adopted the norms of the academic world; intellectual achievement in particular in realms that are abstract, theoretical and interesting for their own sakes. This parallels Abbott's (1988) description of academic knowledge as both the core jurisdiction of a profession as well as being relatively unusable for practitioners.
Indications that this trend was growing are articles that discuss how practitioners use research. Schilling, Schinke, & Gilchrist (1985), for example, say that the interests of researchers and the constraints of journal formats result in the publication of articles that often have little relevance to practitioners. Most studies devote more space to background, hypotheses, and methodology than to descriptions of the intervention or discussions of its implications for practice. Especially in the Carnegie Category 1 research universities, it became increasingly apparent that for social work to continue to claim professional legitimacy e.g., compete for resources within the academy, it needed to do so within the context of social science research, often in alliance with other disciplines.

The lack of a theoretical foundation grounded in what were now traditional social sciences continued to haunt social work. Professional academic legitimacy would come only when social work’s researchers started to develop and/or use empirically derived theories. The academic social sciences had many different theories that could be used to inform social work practice: behaviorism, social learning theory, social control theory, cognitive models, etc. Increasing social work adopted these models as part of its effort to develop a core jurisdiction. However, in the 1970s, and 1980s, this trend was still developing. Fischer (1993) argued that the empirically based practice model seemed well positioned to be the dominant social work practice orientation of the 1990s and beyond. Pardeck & Meinert (1999) argue that selections to the editorial board of the journal Social Work should be judged by their research output. Their main point asks, how can peer
review take place when the peers reviewing are not themselves producing peer reviewed research?

Fischer's 1973 words became the rallying cry for a generation of social work researchers attempting the massive project of generating an empirical knowledge base to guide social work practice. He and his cohort would no longer accept the declaration that casework practice worked as evidence of effectiveness. Social work, in its ongoing effort to become more professional, would base its practice in knowledge and skills validated by the methods of academic social sciences. The scientific method that worked so well for the natural sciences, that for decades had been used by psychology and sociology (statistical analysis) and political science (demographics and policy analysis), was embraced wholeheartedly by social work's researchers.

The professionalizing move to an empirical knowledge base was to be conducted by academic researchers trained in the methods of the academic social sciences. The answer to Fischer's 1973 question involves a reuniting of what was now professional social work and the academic social sciences. Social work had traveled its own path since the National Conference of Charities and Corrections had separated from the American Social Science Association in 1879. The meeting of these two historical paths can be seen in two traditions; the ecosystems perspective and the perspective of the academic social sciences.

The ecosystems perspective. Germain (1973 introduced the ecological perspective and its conceptual framework was formalized in Germain (1979). It was expanded and refined in Germain & Gitterman (1987). Kemp distinguishes between the
terms: "unitary," "integrative," and "generalist." In her lexicon, the terms unitary and integrative are concerned with a conceptual framework, while generalist refers to the efforts to integrate the three method specializations: casework, group work, and community work (p. 267, n18). In the 1970s, the unitary conceptual framework that emerged to dominate professional discourse was a melding of systems theory and the ecological perspective, which can be taken to describe similar if not identical structures (Schrider, 1997; Meyer, 1983). The two were integrated into the ecosystems perspective.

Systems theory promoted the combining of knowledge of psychological, social, and cultural processes into an integrating framework. Germain (1968) built on the idea that the client and world are interacting systems and sub-systems in dynamic interaction. Kemp (1994) quoted Meyer (1970), who said, "In a systemic view there is no inner and outer, but rather an operational field in which all elements intersect and affect each other" (p. 282). It is this field that social work's and the academic social science's paths meet.

The ecosystems framework is not a theoretical base for practice, as psychodynamic theories are. Instead, it organizes how the social environment, which includes social workers and clients, is to be perceived. It is a metaphor not a theory or method. It views people and environments as a unitary system within a cultural and historical context.

The ecosystems metaphor is very much in the casework tradition stretching back to the beginning of this century to the work of Mary Richmond. Kemp (1994) suggests that "the dynamic tension between the settlements and early caseworkers was one of the factors that encouraged and sustained social casework's dual commitment to person and
environment” (p. 132). However, as the dissertation has argued, if commitment to the environment involves working within the social justice project, then it can be seen to be more discursive than actual.

Kemp later says, “Rarely in this period (post-World War I) was there explicit discussion of the idea of the environment” (p. 137). “Faced in the 1920’s with a choice between the contextual practice of the early caseworkers and the person-environment approach constructed by Mary Richmond, or a new practice modeled on psychotherapy, social caseworkers could not resist the possibilities held out by the new psychiatry” (p. 143). The legitimacy this theory offered undergirded by the inward turning of the larger society made it hard for social workers to resist the psychodynamic perspective.

The diagnostic school of social casework followed the tradition laid by Mary Richmond, but added a psychodynamic theoretical underpinning. This theory underlay the study-diagnosis-treatment model and redefined the interaction between person and environment to “person in environment” (Kemp, 1994, p. 167). The functionalists, on the other hand, emphasized that “all social problems are at bottom the inner problems of the human beings involved” (Taft, 1931 quoted in Kemp, 1994, p. 174). The environment was held to be a function of subjective perception by the client.

Ada Sheffield, writing in the 20’s and 30’s expanded the idea of person in environment by relating it to the field theory of Kurt Lewin. However, her contribution was a minor one (Kemp, 1994). In the 1940s, ego psychology emerged as a theoretical framework for practice and relegated the environment side of the equation to relative unimportance. Kemp makes the point that the role of the environment through the 1940s
was more "metaphorical" than actual (p. 311). Through the 1960s, the person and environment relation was overwhelmed by the profession's commitment to psychotherapy.

With the introduction and adoption of the ecosystems perspective social work's understanding of human behavior in the social environment matured. A child's world now could be seen to be a set of influences including the largest of cultural and social forces, the work environment of a working parent, parent's friendship ties, nuclear and extended family, a child's school setting, or that of daycare.

However, the professional act that distinguishes a natural from professional helper is the use of inference. Social work's arena for inference is the intersection of person (or client system) and environment. The ecosystem's perspective encourages social worker's to validate the complexity of their client's lives, to search until major domain systems are identified and their influences noted. But it is not a practice method or theory. It does not make suggestions about treatment. It is simply a way of insuring that the multiple realities within a person's life are accounted for during the process of assessment, inference, intervention and evaluation. There is no necessary element of either the professional or social justice projects.

To the degree this is so, it is a neutral vehicle of whatever project dominates, which in social work, is the professional project and its mission to claim jurisdiction and turf in the system of professions. Hence academic social work's adoption of the methods and theories of the social sciences as core jurisdiction found fertile ground upon which compete with other academic disciplines. The intersection of demographic variables
belonging to populations and their members and interventions in rigorous research designs began the process of mapping the person/environment field.

The current emphasis on using the best practices, interventions and methods research has shown to be effective, gives practicing professionals a stronger claim to jurisdictions of practice than those using non-research based strategies. For example, Olds, et al. (1998) have built evaluation tools into the clinical interview in their nurse home visitation program. This allows the researcher to adjust the intervention according to what happens in the field. Both nurse and client attitudes and behaviors are charted and made available to the researcher. This is one among 10s of dozens of programs that stand up to peer review that define the specific context of a helping professional and client system, the person/environment field. The mapping of specific contexts according to replicable interventions can be seen to augur a possible next step in social work research.

The Role of Research in Social Work Education. The 19th century movement from research conducted within a natural law/historicist background to investigation of the natural world was late in coming to social work. It was not until 1942 that the AASSW formally put research into the curriculum of schools of social work. Research was deemed one of eight primary areas of content. By the end of the 1940s, the connection between research and social problems was overwhelmed by preoccupation with the inner workings of individuals (Dunlap, 1993). Until the 1969 CSWE Curriculum Policy Statement, it appeared that the generic approach and three methods competed for “curricular popularity, all with a heavily Freudian emphasis” (Meinert,
1979, p. 52). While research was being conducted, its background was the laws and language of the psychodynamic perspective.

The 1951 Hollis-Taylor report proposed a first-year, generic focus, and a specialized second year for graduate programs in social work. Meinert (1979) says that the three dominant methods – casework, groupwork, and community organizing - made up the specializations and “were not anchored in a shared, integrated conceptual foundation (p. 52). Mary Richmond’s vision of a coherent casework method used in different contexts was on increasingly shaky ground. Post-war academic disciplines were increasingly finding their foundation in the scientific method, the natural world, and knowledge of it in patterns of regularity. For knowledge to be legitimate, its discovery or generation had to be replicable.

The Hollis & Taylor Report also recommended that a single national organization be established for social work education. To that end, the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) was established in 1952. It unified the AASSW and the national Association of Schools of Social Administration (NASSA), which represented undergraduate programs, into a single body. CSWE was set up primarily to resolve conflicts between undergraduate and graduate programs. Its establishment also created a more complex administrative structure for social work education (Austin, 1986).

As part of the ongoing effort to professionalize, CSWE conducted “The Curriculum Study of 1959, or the Boehm Report (Boehm, et al., 1959). This was a massive effort of 13 volumes one of which dealt with the role of research in social work education (Mencher, 1959). Block (1978) said that this report, along with existing
accreditation standards. generated a growth in research requirements at the MSW level. Graduate programs in social work had included a wide range of research content, and this can be considered the “high point in research in masters degree social work education.” Dunlap (1993) says that the CSWE CPS of 1962 “relegated research to a relatively insignificant position in the curriculum of most master’s degree programs. During the turbulent times of the 1960s different, high priority content areas were offered, and research as a content area was given even less emphasis in the curriculum (Block, 1978).

In the 1968 revised accreditation standards, CSWE removed the mandatory elements of the basic eight content areas and encouraged considerable flexibility in curriculum design. What was now supported by CSWE were the specific objectives of a schools program, and needs of the region served. Block (1978) argues that many schools didn’t fully understand the role of research within the context of their mission, which led to increased loss of centrality of research in the MSW education.

In 1969, CSWE put out a revised Curriculum Policy Statement that followed the 1968 change in accreditation standards. It was seen by some “as a child of the sixties” (Meyer, 1986, p. 9). Schools were encouraged to create as many concentrations beyond casework, group work and community organizing as was thought appropriate. Research was eliminated as a method although graduates were expected to be intelligent consumers of research (Dunlap, 1993).

Joel Fischer’s questions, and those of a whole generation of social work researchers, were not focused on developing a unifying method for practice as much as finding out what practice methods being used by social workers were effective. To ask
the sorts of questions that would generate this knowledge, theory and practice had to have a connection. The problem, which has existed in some form from the time of Mary Richmond, was how to operationalize the constructs social work used to rationalize what it did. The term "person" for example, has a practical infinity of possible sub-divisions. The criticisms leveled by Ida Sheffield at Richmond's terms, and by Robinson (1930) at Sheffield's, or Rubin & Babbie (1997) at the terms of qualitative research, or Briar (1971) at psychodynamic terminology, have plagued social work researchers who have attempted to measure what social workers do. The theories available to social work's researchers were exemplified by social learning theory, social control theory, behaviorism, or cognitive-behaviorism. Psychodynamic methods did not lend themselves to empirical measurement. Practice guided by single-systems designs did.

Single-systems designs provided a means for social workers to compete for ever scarcer social service resources in the 1970s. The profession had failed to generate a knowledge foundation that showed what social workers did actually helped those they served. MSW education did not train its practitioners to engage in rigorous research on their own practice. Single-systems designs were seen as a means to bridge the great gap between practitioner and researcher.

In 1982, Bloom & Fischer published their landmark textbook, *Evaluating Practice: Guidelines for the Accountable Professional*. In it they say

> Our point of view is that if a problem is too subtle or vague to measure, it just may be too subtle or vague to work with in practice. If a problem is worth working on, it can and must be measured. Otherwise, there will be no way of
knowing how well you are doing with your intervention program or whether or not you have ever reached your goal. (p. 34)

In 1981, the "Dinerman Report" was issued. It sought to determine actual conditions in which research and practice were integrated within schools of social work. The report suggested there was a wide gap between the standards that were to be part of the CPS issued in 1982, and what was really going on. The Curriculum Policy Statement of 1982 called for an integration of research and practice. All students were required to take courses in the research curriculum, with no exceptions. Research was to be integrated into all content areas as well (Dunlap, 1993). Fischer's question had been heard by social work's educators/researchers.

Thyer (1990) read the 1982 CPS to say

In the CPS, the profession reaffirmed its historic commitment to the development and delivery of social work services based on empirically supported knowledge regarding human behavior, the value of scientific methods as the primary means of developing such knowledge, and reliance on conventional scientific inquiry as the major vehicle to evaluate the efficacy of social work services. (p. 145).

Clearly, the emphasis on empirical evidence and scientific method had increased in the 1982 CPS compared to its relative unimportance in the 1969 version. For example, Aigner (1984) discusses what he calls the emerging consensus in social work education expressed by the 1983-revised CPS. Following the lead of Meyer (1981) he wants to transcend the "classic dialectic" between professional ideology and technical skill. "We
need to strike the balance between a progressive social philosophy and the demonstrated effectiveness of professional intervention. Aigner says

In the fall of 1983, a job opening to teach psychodynamics at a major urban university was announced. It may be that that program is already using its instructional resources to teach the professional foundation effectively. There may be programs that have resources to teach practice theories which have not yet been empirically validated. However, to teach such theories without having first delivered material on practice interventions that have empirical support is to leave a program or school open to charges of irresponsibility. (p. 11)

Aigner's point valorizes the mission of the "academic" professional project. The turf about which he is concerned is that within the academic system of professions. Social workers in the field have a whole different set of turf issues over which competition for jurisdictions of practice are fought. The focus of the CPS is that of academic social workers wanting to solidify and expand what claim to jurisdiction they have within the field of social work.

However, despite the increasing emphasis on research-based practice in the 1970s and 80s, the momentum to found practice in empirically derived knowledge suffered a setback when the CPS was revised in 1988. Dunlap (1993) says

According to the amended document, the curriculum at the master's level should "impart scientific methods of building knowledge for practice and of evaluating service delivery in all areas of practice." The phrase generate knowledge for practice, however, was deleted (Commission on Accreditation, 1988, p. 127).
The new standard appears to be much weaker than that proposed in 1982, and it seems to reflect the profession's continuing disagreement over the role of research in the curriculum. (p. 299).

The 1992 CPS says nearly the same thing. It says that "Every part of the master's curriculum must strengthen the student's understanding and appreciation of a scientific, analytic approach to building knowledge for the delivery and evaluation of practice" (M6.2). The CPS says later, "The foundation research curriculum must provide an understanding and appreciation of a scientific, analytic approach to building knowledge for practice and for evaluating service delivery in all areas of practice" (M6.12). The orientation to practice has remained relatively unchanged over the last 12 years. Despite the calls for research based-practice to dominate social work education it has not found strong foothold in social work education's primary document, the CPS. Abbott's claim that academic knowledge is relatively useless to practitioners would seem to be given evidential weight in how social work's educators construct the parameters for what should be included in an MSW education. This is of course balanced by the practitioner's need to have a core jurisdiction that gives legitimacy to a claim of jurisdiction of practice. The CPS seems to balance these two forces nicely.

Social Work Education's Realist Position.

Chapter 1 defined the naïve realist position as a common sense view of the world. It is a highly functional perspective, and there is little ambiguity within it. The world IS as it appears. Poverty exists, and there is little "realistically" we can do about it. In some views, heterosexuality is normal and homosexuality abnormal. This view does not find
problematic the assertion that social work has one organizing value or mission. This naïve realism is a "simple" view of the world. The naïve realist's position is made more complex when it is assumed by social work's academicians and practitioners. The common sense world of facts and events assumes a crisper focus and becomes "nature" with regular patterns of activity. Naïve realism becomes realism.

The realist position is an educated position. It assumes that nature as western science defines it is real. There is only "one" nature. As said, other cultural views of "nature" may be philosophically interesting but the nature of science is the "T"rue nature. The simplest view within the realist position, much in line with naïve realism, is that there is an objective nature and natural world independent of any subjective perception of it. Nature is the backdrop and what is. is. More complex views within the realist position hold to the notion that nature is somehow real apart from human perception of it, but that there is far more we don't know about what is than what we do know. Speculation is permitted as long as it is so labeled.

As discussed above, until the early 1970s social work traveled its own path until it became obvious that to survive within the educational system of the academic professions, it needed to legitimize itself. To do this the "One" nature of the West and methods and theories the academic social sciences assumed had to be adopted.

Social work's version of the realist position is found in its clearest form in research textbooks such as (Cournoyer & Klein, 2000; Kirk, 1999; Neuman, 2000; Rubin & Babbie, 2001; Williams, et al. 1998; Yegidis, et al. 1999; and York, 1996). This section seeks to explicate the realist position as it is taught to BSW and MSW social
workers. To this end Rubin & Babbie (1997), a widely used research textbook, will be
used to exemplify this position. Rubin and Babbie (2001, ) say that

Reality, then, is a tricky business. How can you really know what’s real? People
have grappled with that question for thousands of years. Science is one of the
strategies that has arisen out of that grappling (p. 5).

These authors say that the fundamental basis of knowledge is agreement.

Science offers an approach to both agreement reality and experiential reality.

Scientists have certain criteria that must be met before they will accept the reality
of something they haven’t personally experienced. In general, an assertion must
have both logical and empirical support: It must make sense, and it must align
with observations in the world (p. 5).

Later they say

Ultimately, there is no way of proving whether there is an objective reality
beyond our perceptions, or – if it does exist – whether we are observing it
accurately at any given moment. Nonetheless, there is a standard that scientists
use in lieu of a direct pipeline to objective reality: agreement (p. 45).

Rubin & Babbie validate the uncertainty of what is beyond perception, or beyond
the range of scientific instruments. They also validate that what we do know is a function
of agreement, and this agreement establishes criteria for what counts as knowledge.

Insofar that social science modifies and utilizes the methods of the natural sciences,
progress is being made to know the social world much as natural science knows the
natural world.
However, the two endeavors are distinctly different. The realist position holds the background of the natural world is in some degree objective apart from human perception of it. There is a solid world behind or outside the realm of cognition, attitude, emotion and behavior of which these human attributes are characteristics. In some degree nature is certain. What social work's researchers explore is the field of intersection of the certain and uncertain, between what is agreed upon as valid knowledge, agreement certainty, and that which is hypothesized but not yet agreed upon as knowledge. The neutral metaphor of person/environment field is founded in “nature.” The distinguishing characteristic of the realist position is the unvalidated belief that the nature of natural science is in some degree the “T”rue nature. There is no evidence supporting the assertion the West’s view of nature is “T”rue. This is what makes it a belief.

The cosmology of natural science. The interweaving of the known and unknown and different versions thereof constitutes a complex understanding of nature. A simple understanding gives credence, or truth status, to the idea there is one nature, objective and real. What we know about this nature is therefore valid knowledge. The complex is reduced to the simple. Rubin & Babbie say, “Science has no place for the common human conclusion that some things are ultimately unexplainable” (p. 30). It is in this reduction that emerges the cosmology of natural science.

The cosmology of natural science says this world is objective and real apart from subjective perception of it. It is ultimately knowable. It is a cosmology rather than truth because it is based in the common sense faith of the naïve realist. A realist’s more complex understanding of nature would be hard pressed to make this claim. The realist
not only works at the cutting edge of knowledge development, she can remain uncertain philosophically about the reality of nature. At its crudest, a social scientist cannot say anything about that which is beyond perception, beyond the instruments that reveal patterns in the human world.

In the previous edition of this text (Rubin & Babbie, 1993) the authors quoted Briar (1973, p. 23) to say.

I realized that the problem is that all these orienting concepts (and I could give a very long list) have no tangible, observable referents in the real world. Their only referents are to their definitions, which are stated in words that are also without tangible meaning in the real world, the definitions often being only descriptive analogies. Efforts have been made, of course, to give concepts such as “ego strength” some meaning in the real world. However, even very sophisticated efforts have been unsatisfactory, because this concept, and others like it, were never anchored in the real world in the first place (p. 10).

The realist’s sophisticated understanding of scientific investigation has peer scientists engaging in agreement about what constitutes valid knowledge. In this earlier edition of their text they offer a much simpler view, assuming in their use of Briar’s words, that there is a real world. The realist position itself is complex and manifold. Perspectives compete within the realist position. There are competing versions, and perhaps visions, about what is real.

The kind of knowledge considered valid has undergone a long history of transformation in the social sciences. From the late 1920s through the 1930s, a group of
concerned academicians famously known as the Vienna Circle met. The Circle expressed overt hostility toward metaphysics and theology and promoted mathematical logic to support the empirical tradition of Hume, Comte, and Ernst Mach. Theirs was a strict inductive method that came to be known as logical empiricism, or logical positivism. It is this empiricism that was, and continues to be modified by the developing social sciences, and expresses the most reductionist and simple view within the realist position.

In its simplest characterization, this group of philosophers, mathematicians, and scientists held a position that there is an objectively real world apart from the subjectivity of the knower. The purpose of science is to explore this objective world. Developing and using codified methods in research designs that are replicable by anyone with the proper training determines objectivity. If the same procedures are used under the same conditions, the same results should occur. This perspective is perhaps the clearest statement that reality is first "nature" and "human nature" is a later development within this first context. The human universe is part of the natural universe. The importance of this point will become clearer. This view that the natural universe is objectively real apart from human perception, and that factual statements can be distinguished from non-factual statements will be henceforth understood as the cosmology of natural science.

The realist position and the social justice project. Rubin & Babbie weakened their claim that there is a real world between their 1993 and 1997/2001, editions. They substantially rewrote the section in the first chapter describing the foundations of social science and re-titled it. "What's really real?" What before was a discussion conducted
under the heading, "Theory, not philosophy or belief," is moved downstream in the text to a less inclusive position under the heading, "Theory in Research." This section begins with,

Social scientific theory has to do with what is, not with what should be... This means that scientific theory – and, more broadly, science itself – cannot settle debates on value. Science cannot determine whether capitalism is better or worse than socialism except in terms of some set of agreed-on criteria. (Rubin & Babbie. 1997, p. 42; Rubin & Babbie, 1993, p. 18).

There are two points that can now be drawn. The first is that the authors have narrowed their claim for a real, objective world from the foundation of social science to the role of theory in research. This is a distinct move from a simpler realist position to one that is more complex. The realist position at its most complex would open itself to the possibility that its assumptions about nature may be wrong, or culturally arrogant. In this manner it would maintain the presence of uncertainty as its foundational firmament rather than a solid nature. The spirit of Briar's statement about orienting concepts continues to live in Rubin & Babbie (1997). They say

Before we leave this section on terminology we want to remind you of the overlapping way these terms are used in many reports of qualitative research studies. Don't be surprised, for example, if you encounter a study reported as ethnographic research that uses grounded theory in a naturalistic investigation guided by phenomenological inquiry using heuristic observation methods and a hermeneutic approach to data interpretation. If you read such a study, we can,
based on our own introspection, empathize with you, and we hope this chapter
will help you in your verstehen of it. (p. 377)
The author could not find this statement in the 2001 edition. In fact, they expand their
discussion of qualitative research and give it a legitimacy lacking in previous editions.

Rubin & Babbie’s 1993 version of the realist position is simple to the degree that
it affirms the world is the way it is, and is not open to ground itself in the reality of a
multiplicity of social science research traditions. The 1997 edition affirms a more
complex view of reality, and the 2001 edition portrays one even more complex. Their
shift from claiming social science theory is one of the foundations of social science to a
lessened role as framing theory in research marks an important move toward this
opening, but it is incremental. Rubin & Babbie’s (2001) position is that there is a real
world and the methodologies taken from the natural sciences – randomized clinical trials,
experimental/control group, longitudinal designs, etc. – that are used to generate valid
knowledge, are the most accurate means to describe this world. The authors say,
“Ultimately science is neutral on the topics of war and peace, but scientists are not” (p.
101). This statement reiterates that nature and the natural universe is larger and more
inclusive than human nature and the human universe. The latter is part of the former.
Mathematics is the language of nature, and it is neutral to the meaning of social behavior.
Humans, and humanity, as part of nature, may come and go; what remains is nature. This
realist position is central to the cosmology of natural science that later will be introduced
as one of the three forces of modernization.
Secondly, they also claim a degree of objectivity in regards to the role of scientific theory within the milieu of human values. "Who gets to determine 'what is'?" This is the dimension of meaning that many constructionist researchers and thinkers (discussed in the next section of this chapter) wish to explore. By separating value from science, the authors more firmly ground the social scientific endeavor in the natural, as opposed to human universe.

This separation of human values from scientific endeavor can only make sense within the milieu of the academic social sciences and its classificatory schemas. To the social work practitioner, such a separation doesn't make sense. The discourses of social justice have to inform the research project. To claim otherwise is to some degree invalidate what researchers do. What statements that separate science from human values do is make very clear that the core jurisdiction of the professional project to some degree founds itself in an inhuman universe, one in which the concepts of social justice and injustice are simply not applicable.

Social justice and social work education. Specht & Courtney (1994) say that a 1991 version of the CSWE CPS, "which leaned heavily in the direction of supporting clinical (psychotherapeutic) social work, made no mention of the importance of serving the poor and deprived, or dependent children, or the mentally ill, or the frail aged. This oversight was corrected in a later draft after complaints from some members of CSWE" (p. 148). There was still no content requirement about these groups. There is a requirement in the section on MSW curriculum content that discusses diversity. It says that content including, but not limited to the following population groups; groups
distinguished by race, ethnicity, culture, class, gender, sexual orientation, religion, physical or mental ability, age and national origin be included in the curriculum (CSWE CPS, 1992, Section M6.6). It is ironic that these categories mirror almost exactly the eight mechanisms by which opportunity is unequally distributed that were outlined in Chapter 1. This use of the same language for very different understandings of populations is an example of the conflated state of social work’s discourses in the CPS.

The 1992 CPS under the section entitled “Promotion of Social and Economic Justice” says that

Programs of social work education must provide an understanding of the dynamics and consequences of social and economic injustice, including all forms of human oppression and discrimination. They must provide students with the skills to promote social change and to implement a wide range of interventions that further the achievement of individual and collective social and economic justice. Theoretical and practice content must be provided about strategies of intervention for achieving social and economic justice and for combating the causes and effects of institutionalized forms of oppression (CSWE CPS, 1992, Section M6.7).

This section makes four statements. The first concerns injustice. The next two concern social justice. The last concerns injustice. Sandwiched between understanding cause of injustice and interventions to combat cause and effect of oppression, are statements about skills to promote social change and content about strategies of intervention to achieve social justice. What is missing is any guide or reference to the responsibility schools
have to provide the opportunity for students to develop their own vision of social justice, and allow students to apply it within the context of their own lives. Students are not asked to identify the institutional practices within their own education that serve to maintain and extend injustice. Students are asked to "combat" causes and effects of oppression, as if they existed "out there" in the world, apart from what happens in the academy.

Greene (2000) argues that CSWE and its Commission on Accreditation (COA) has adopted the social justice mission for social work, however, it "has offered little guidance to programs to define or operationalize these essential concepts" (p. 10). The dissertation argues that the reason for this is that the professional and social justice missions are conflated. To begin the project of operationalizing the social justice mission would lead to the realization that it is a discourse in service of professionalization, the mission of which is to claim jurisdictions of practice in competition with other professions amongst a system of professions. This would engender destabilization in social work's understanding of itself.

Greene goes on to suggest that CSWE provide a clearinghouse for innovations in progress, and that the lack of such "contributes to a stagnant, if not archaic, CPS foundation. She quotes the 1982 CPS to say "social work relies heavily on recently trained practitioners to bring innovations and new knowledge to the field" (p. 12). She recommends a national process to identify and gather this information. She ends her article by recommending social work adopt suggestions made by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH 1991) task force on social work research.
They are: (a) NASW must establish an office specifically concerned with the application of research-based, practice-relevant knowledge into the professional curriculum at all levels and (b) CSWE must establish an office that is concerned specifically with the integration of research-based, practice-relevant knowledge into the professional curriculum at all levels (p. 12).

Greene's article is the latest that seeks to found social work education and practice in research-based knowledge. What is noteworthy in her work is that she effectively isolates the social justice and professional missions from one another and then lands on the side of the professional project as the most effective means to "bring the profession, the CPS foundation content, and the CSWE accreditation process into the 21st century" (p.12). This is squarely a realist position.

**The emergence of special interest groups.** Guzzetta (1996) argues that the Boehm Study helped bring about an educational unity during the 1960s. He then makes the point that this unity was fragmented as special interest groups began to demand to be recognized. He says

It was a glorious few years, with American social workers fighting poverty, battling for civil rights, and extending the work of the profession. Then, it became a casualty of America's calamitous involvement in Vietnam. Even before the US finally extricated itself from that country, the unified reform thrust of American social work education was already being replaced by reform in bits and pieces... Turning from concern for *all* persons in poverty, and *all* oppressed
peoples, and general social need. American social work education slipped into concern primarily for the interests of particular groups. (p. 305)

In 1970, CSWE established the Commission on Minority Groups. This group was fragmented "into assorted committees responsible only for their own special interests" (Guzzetta, 1996, p. 305). In 1972, CSWE reorganized the CSWE House of Delegates to provide representation of "minority of color" faculty constituencies and student constituencies. In 1975, CSWE established the Commission on the Role and Status of Women in Social Work Education. In 1982, the Task Force on Gay and Lesbian Issues was established by CSWE (Austin, 1986). In 1999 the Delegate Assembly of NASW made a change to the NASW code of ethics - in response to efforts of the National Committee on Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals. The National Committee on Women's Issues, and the National Committee on Racial and Ethnic Diversity (NASW, Personal Correspondence).

The Commission on Minority Groups focused on ethnic and culturally sensitive content in social work's educational curriculum and made it an issue in the early 1970s (Chestang, 1972; Norton, 1978; Solomon, 1976). Behavioral differences between ethnic groups became a focus for discerning effective practice techniques (Chau, 1990; Chestang, 1988. Devore & Schlesinger, 1991: Lum, 1992; Nakanishi & Rittner, 1992). In a review of 10 years of publications of four major social work journals, McMahon et al. (1993) conclude that much of the literature that focuses on interventions with ethnic minorities is naïve and superficial, and fails to address social context. Sands and Nuccio (1992, p. 493) approach CSWE's requirement that educational curricula include content
on women, people of color and other groups from a similar perspective, arguing with Tice. (1990) that the very categories promulgated to stem oppression are themselves oppressive in their superficiality.

Guzzetta (1996) tells the story of a meeting of CSWE’s elected representatives in the early 1970s in which Leon Ginzberg introduced a resolution to recognize oppressed groups included in an executive order of the US President. Some of these groups were Slavs, Jews, Catholics, and others. Representatives of existing committees shouted down any attempt to speak in its support and the resolution was defeated. No similar public proposal has again been made.

The latest CPS mandates content be included in curricula about people of color, women and gay and lesbian persons, and that “such content must emphasize the impact of discrimination, economic deprivation and oppression upon these groups” (M6.8). Three of the eight mechanisms by which opportunity is unequally distributed are named. Nowhere does the CPS ask social work educational programs to provide the student with the opportunity to define what a just world would look like, “how” human relationships might be constructed in a just social order. By focusing on oppression first, and then, from within this understanding, learning to “combat” oppression, the student never gets an opportunity to practice the vision she didn’t have the opportunity to create. Without this foundation, the dissertation argues, “skills to promote social change” will always be reactive and assume “the world as it is.”
Professional social work continues to generate an internal tension that on the surface seems irresolvable. One of the issues David Austin discusses in his 1986 history of social work education is

A second long-standing and still unresolved issue faced by both social work and social work education is the balance to be sought among: professional practice competencies; personal commitment to goals of social justice and social reform; organized advocacy by schools of social work, by the organized profession, and by service organizations in which social workers are employed. The tension between the social movement tradition in social work and the search for technical competence as a practicing profession has taken different forms in different eras, without any final resolution. It appears likely that this tension will continue to be one of the distinctive characteristics of social work as a profession (p. 46).

The realist position, following Greene's (2000) lead, would have social work practice in the 21st century found itself in research-based evidence. Thyer & Wodarski (1990) offer what is perhaps the best example of the attempt by the realist position to claim social work education for its own. They want to ground social work education in research-based social learning theory, arguing that both effective and ineffective social work practices have now been identified. They say

In is now clear that social learning theory, involving elements of respondent (Pavlovian), operant (reinforcement and punishment), and observational (modeling) learning, can provide a comprehensive conceptual framework to guide
social work intervention at all levels of practice: individual, family, group, organizational, community, and societal. The individual components of social learning theory are well supported in terms of empirical research on their validity across people of various countries, cultures, and ethnic and minority groups, more so than any other theory of human behavior. It has also been clearly established that social work interventions derived from social learning theory are a highly effective means of helping individual clients and larger systems resolve significant problems of social and interpersonal importance. It would only make sense, we believe, for social learning theory and its methods of interpersonal helping to form the central focus of social work educational curricula (p. 146).

The dissertation argues that the progenitors of the realist position are neither right nor wrong. The realist position contributes knowledge that is valuable and perhaps necessary. However, what is being challenged is that this position is somehow divorced from political interests and that the purity of its science is somehow directly connected to and is a vehicle of the discourses of social justice. When the texts are examined, what is found is disjuncture between discourses, such as found in Greene (2000), or a passing mention as found in Thyer & Wodarski (1990).

The next section of this chapter explores more fully the challenge that has kept the realist position from moving to a position of dominance within social work practice and education. This challenge has been offered by those holding to the tenets of social constructionism, what will henceforth be called the constructionist position.
The Constructionist Challenge to the Realist Position

Over the last 30 years or so, a body of work has emerged that both challenges the dominance of the realist position in social work education and practice and offers an alternative perspective. One of the key features of this developing tradition is that it attempts to maintain a complex perspective on social reality. Gergen (1985) says that social constructionist inquiry

is principally concerned with explicating the processes by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in which they live. It attempts to articulate common forms of understanding as they now exist, as they have existed in prior historical periods, and as they might exist should creative attention be so directed. . . It begins with radical doubt in the taken-for-granted world – whether in the sciences or daily life – and in a specialized way acts as a form of social criticism. . . The terms in which the world is understood are social artifacts, products of historically situated interchanges among people. (pp. 266, 267)

Constructionist perspectives are founded in the idea that the world is multi-faceted, multi-cultural, and complex. The dissertation understands constructionism to be both a critique of the privilege assumed by the realist position and the positive effort to open up a discursive space in which oppressed persons can speak, be heard, and participate in the social contract. This is in contrast to the realist position that assumes the organizing value of social work is social justice, operates as if it is, and ignores the political reality it helps create and maintain.
Despite the complexity of research designs using quantitative analytic techniques such as structural equation modeling or hierarchical linear modeling, the realist's view of the world is very basic and simple. Nature exists within a natural universe. This adherence to "nature" as objective, obvious and simple can be understood to be a conservative position resistant to opening to other culture's worldviews as equally valid ways to understand nature.

Constructionism on the other hand, attempts to be a vehicle of this openness and refuses to reduce a complex world to ideological simplicity. This can be understood to be a liberal position. A conservative viewpoint is invested in the world-as-it-appears and is resistant to change. A liberal viewpoint refuses to accept the world "as it appears" because it is founded in a multi-cultural, multi-faceted world. There are many versions of nature and no one version holds more "T"ruth than any other. The constructionist position would vehemently support the argument that the knowledge produced within the realist worldview is immensely valuable. However, the politics that support the realist position and its defining reach into the worlds of individuals and populations constitute a reality that the constructionist finds problematic, if not terrifying. The constructionist works to enhance social uncertainty within the solid world of nature and human nature by encouraging the emergence of many viewpoints.

The constructionist position is constituted by two principles that form two poles of process. The first pole is what Gergen (1985) called "radical doubt." It is the pole within the constructionist position that refuses to accept the world as it is. Every positive statement is viewed as a vehicle of politics. Rubin & Babie's (2001) claim above that
science is value free is subject to radical doubt. The assumption undergirding this doubt is that the world is not as it appears.

The other pole is "the processes by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world (including themselves) in which they live (Gergen, 1985. p. 266). This pole has discourse originate within a local, situated, historical and cultural context of a person speaking within her own experience. The doubt is focused on general, non-situated statements of nature that do not originate from within the process of a person or group of persons describing, explaining or making meaning of the world in which they live. The nature of the realist position is one focus of constructionist doubt, for it assumes the privilege of a "true" world, a privilege that assumes a reality in which the eight mechanisms distribute opportunity unequally. However, this doubt is necessarily focused on situated statements as well, for as will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6, one of the mechanisms maintaining social injustice is any claim to rights based in difference.

The black man wants what the white man has, and if self-interest overwhelms institution of distributive mechanisms structured by the principles of social justice, then injustice continues. It is not a reversal, and a simple recombinining of the eight continuums distributing opportunity that is needed, but a dissolution of the mechanisms themselves that form the boundaries of difference found within all positive statements.

Social work's constructionist tradition can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s. Its emergence can be understood as a reaction to the power of the new realist's position as given voice by Joel Fischer and his generation of academic social work
researchers. Mary Richmond's effort to form a core jurisdiction around practice method, around inference, lost its voice. The last vestige of this voice is found in the psychotherapeutic traditions critiqued by Specht & Courtney (1994). With the movement by social work's educators to adopt the approach of the academic social sciences as social work's core jurisdiction, those for whom social justice was more than a discourse began to critique what they saw as professional movement in a misguided direction.

Many authors contribute to critiquing the realist's position and to building a framework in which situated voices can speak and be heard. The critique opens the discursive space for these voices to learn how to speak, and once spoken, how to learn to be heard. Heineman-Piper (1981) argued that in a misguided attempt to be scientific, social work has adopted an outmoded, overly restrictive paradigm of research. Methodological rather than substantive requirements determine the subject matter to be studied. She critiques the scientific model of research and suggests alternative, less restrictive approaches to research. Saleebey (1979) criticizes social work's development of an empirical knowledge base that opposes a theoretical, clinical-intuitive basis for practice. He suggests that the empirical model for practice will reproduce the manipulative framework of experimental research designs. These two articles are early and pointed in their attack on the professional project's realist position. Witkin & Gottschalk (1988) lay out a set of criteria within a social constructionist framework for evaluating theories that inform social work research. One of the four criteria is that a research theory should promote social justice. This is in direct contradiction to Rubin &
Babbie's (2001) assertion that social science is value free. In an important sense, the gauntlet is laid down.

Witkin (1991) examines the argument for empirical based clinical practice, finds it weak and recommends that alternative approaches should be encouraged. Witkin (1992) says that empirically based practice "corresponds to an individualistic, method-driven view of social work whose objectives are prediction and control." He recommends new ways of using social work's mission to structure practice. He continues to express his concerns in Witkin (1996) where he provides a historical context within which to raise questions about empirically based practice. Witkin (1999) discusses some of the influences of the postmodern era; challenging of assumptions about the nature of truth and reality, iconoclastic ideas (such as the existence of multiverses), challenges to taken-for-granted dichotomies, (such as fact and fiction), reconceptualizations of formerly "unassailable" concepts (such as mind and emotion), and critiques of the presumed authoritative bases of knowledge (such as objectivity). He writes to loosen the solidity of the realist's nature.

Saleebey (1989) calls for a rethinking of how "knowing" and "doing" are related to include the practitioner's perception, artistry and intuition. Gottschalk & Witkin (1991) argue that rationality in social work is seen as instrumental (means-oriented) and individualistic rather than substantive (ends-oriented) and social.

In Saleebey (1991) the technology that accompanies empirically derived knowledge is examined. Saleebey (1993) argues for the refurbishing of theoretical thinking in social work. He distinguishes between "generative" and "normalizing" theory
and its role in meaning making. Generative theory is concerned with the human condition, challenges the guiding assumptions of a culture in order to raise questions from a concern for social justice, and generates new or fresh alternatives such as those arising from social action. "The task of the theorist is to explain and account for relationships between empirical generalizations, usually at a higher level of abstraction" (p. 7).

The normative approach to theory is that it explains relationships in a systematic way, between discrete groups of uniformities that, without theory, would seem to stand in no relationship to each other. Theory yields propositions which can be tested in the real world for their correspondence with observable data (p. 9).

Saleebey (1993), discussing Gergen (1985) says

Gergen departs from the realist view. He contends that what human beings are doing all the time, whether conversing, building a theory, conducting an experiment, making a business decision or wooing a lover, in both sacred and profane contexts, is engaging in discourse, establishing linguistic conventions, both constructing as well as construing a reality that satisfies, protects, interests, and is palpable and plausible. In other words, much of daily life is spent proposing and testing theories to figure out what is happening, what we will do, and what, if fact, did happen. Over time, some of our stories become collectivized, become conventions that are institutionalized and create the basis for individual motives, desires, and orientations to the world. We, scientists and lay person alike, are in the business of developing languages of understanding,
themes and patterns of discourse, and that is how we construct or world, making it resonant and reducing chaos and surprise (p. 15).

Saleebey (1996) discusses the strengths perspective, and how it may be used in increasingly institutionalized ways formed around the principles of empirically based practice, rather than social justice. Saleebey is concerned with how the empowerment and strengths perspectives are being transformed by professionalism into normalizing apologetics for unjust social conditions. Abbott (1999) defines social justice as a commitment to personal freedom. In his study of 128 social workers from 26 countries, he found that the data did not support a shared sense of social responsibility or commitment to individual freedom.

Goldstein (1990) criticizes the dominance of technical knowledge in social work and suggests, as he did throughout his career, that social work practice is creative, reflective, and in large degree, artistic and dramatic; in other words, far more complex than a set of technical protocols makes it out to be. Paralleling Saleebey, Goldstein suggests that social workers use generative rather than normative theories. Various generative traditions he cites include social constructionism, cognitive theory, feminist theory, moral theory, faith, and spirituality. Goldstein (1992,) argues that social work’s project involves shifting its knowledge base from the social sciences to humanities. Social work should open its epistemological door to new perspectives rather than attempting to legitimize itself by advancing linear scientific thought. Goldstein (1999) argues that “without sincere interest, a compelling curiosity, and aesthetic sensitivity, understanding becomes an objective undertaking that really belongs to the pursuits of the
natural scientist" (p. 235). He also says, "For social work practice in any setting, science without art becomes sterile and dehumanizing; but art without scientific rigor becomes random and haphazard" (p. 235). It is such a statement that moves social work's project towards a more complex position.

Figueira-McDonough (1993) starts from the premise that the two goals framing social work practice are self-determination and social justice. The author argues that social work has been more devoted to the implementation of the former than the latter. This article proposes that implementation of the social justice goal requires a commitment to policy practice.

Joel Schriver's (1998) Human Behavior in the Social Environment (HBSE) textbook develops the idea that there are two paradigms in social work; the traditional and alternative. He defines "alternative or possible paradigms" to be "world views that have had less influence and have been less prominent in shaping our own and others' views about humans and their environments" (p. 7). The traditional is seen to align itself with the position developed by Rubin and Babbie (2001). Schriver presents his material with the implicit assumption that the traditional is slowly giving over to the alternative in social work.

Gorman. (1993) suggests that social work embrace narrative as a method of inquiry and as a transformational tool at the individual and societal levels. She says there exists the potential to bring social work's practice, research, and social action aspects into harmony. Whitmore & Wilson (1999) suggest research on transnational popular movement networks be conducted as part of a larger process dedicated to more equitable
distribution of resources and for social justice. They explore how research can support this effort. Brawley & Martinez-Brawley (1999) argue that social justice concerns can be addressed by social workers by using the media.

Weick, (1999) argues that in the last 50 years the trend in social work has been to seek knowledge gained at a distance. Researchers have claimed questions concerning the human condition. She argues that in the mid-twentieth century academic social work turned to the social sciences for the means to develop this knowledge. Social work’s researchers’ intent has been to introduce objective methods and strategies that intentionally filter out human judgment. She argues that this movement should not silence a different view that says social workers’ knowledge comes from the profession’s value perspective. This voice needs to be reclaimed in order for social work to realize its commitment to social justice. All these authors challenge the presumptions of social work’s professional project in order to open the discursive realm so that more voices can participate in generation of knowledge.

Constructivism and Social Work Education. Over the last ten years, the above referenced authors and others have expressed a deep concern for the role of the professional project in social work education as well as practice. Weick (1993) argues that social work education rarely looks at itself through a wider lens. She begins the process of revisioning professional education by taking a historical stance as basis for analysis. Walz & Uematsu (1997) explore how to make better use of the creative infrastructure in education as opposed to conventional teaching. Graham (1997) outlines different paradigms for social work education and a strategy for expanding pedagogical
techniques. Lynn (1999) argues that social work needs to develop a reflexive theory/practice model to understand how institutional oppression affects all aspects of an individual's world in order to better understand how to generate social justice. Dean & Rhodes (1998) argue that narrative and constructivist approaches to clinical work helps social work educators teach students to learn to balance respect for unique and diverse accounts with the profession's commitment to social justice. Laird (1993) introduces a complete issue of *The Journal of Teaching in Social Work* devoted to the role of postmodern thought in social work education. Austin (1996) writes about how graduate social work education has been largely shaped by external forces, mostly those of the market economy through the vehicle of jobs for newly graduated social workers. He suggests that students and faculty should confront the controversies around what here is called the rift between positions and missions openly and directly. Each of these authors is struggling to articulate a path for social work that opens to and honors the complexity of the modern world.

Hartman (1993) echoes Saleebey's concerns about the normalizing of theory and makes a provocative suggestion about social work practice that can be applied to social work education as well. She says,

> It may be that empowerment exists more in the professional discourse than in actual practice. There are many forces – institutional, economic, political, ideological, and historical – that continue to be obstacles to the achievement of a truly empowering practice. Social workers have been reluctant to speculate that
perhaps if their clients are to truly become empowered, they must learn to shed some power (abstract).

Found here is a particularly straightforward expression of the problem upon which the dissertation focuses: that social work’s social justice discourse is an instrument of social injustice.

Hartman’s 1992 article suggests more directly that in research and practice a social worker must abandon his/her role as expert, that social workers must give up the identity of objective observers of clients who are passive subjects to be described and defined. Her comments can be applied to social work’s educators as well. Witkin (1990, 1992.), Weick. (1993). Laird (1993). Fleck-Henderson (1993). Dean & Fleck-Henderson (1992.). Rossiter (1996) and Kohler - Riessman (1993) develop arguments that generate more space for alternate pedagogical practices. At the heart of this momentous effort seems to be a developing trust by these educators that just as students are taught they need to begin with where the client is, and how the client makes meaning, so educators should begin with where the student is, and how they make meaning. The department or school of social work socializes a student to the profession. In the expert model, education is educator centered. In the constructionist model, it is a process of co-learning that is centered.

Another criticism from a different angle comes from Siporin 1982. He argues that social work has detached from its moral and communal origins and is adrift in a “prevailing cult of individualism that gives primacy to autonomy” (p. 527). This is the same autonomy Lehninger (1978) called one of the goals of professionalization, a goal
that justified a knowledge base founded in the research tradition of the quantitative social sciences. Weinbach (1977) argued that professionalization is social work's enemy, that the drive for accountability has resulted in social workers being required to demonstrate in empirical terms how they are effective and efficient. This demonstration involves "operating in an arena where computational strategies are possible, tasks can be delegated to technical levels because of certainty with the environment, and perfection can be identified" (p. 1019). An expert in the social science research tradition who can reduce complexity to linear, technical protocols in problem solution in the role of educator models for students how to address working with clients.

Reid & Peebles-Wilkins (1991) argue that social work education is grounded in the traditions of the liberal arts, that the "ideological aspects of social work did precede the technical/interventive aspects of the profession..." (p. 218). These authors argue that "social work is an expression of a collection of ideas, ideas with their substance and roots in the cultural tradition and body of thought and knowledge that is the liberal arts" (p. 218). The liberal arts, in contrast to the peer agreement reality of social scientists, affirms a rich and complex world in which disciplinary knowledge is woven into an interdisciplinary framework that defies reduction to one "nature."

Van Soest (1992) presents a framework for incorporating peace and social justice into the social work curriculum by laying out the major concepts and themes of peace education, providing a rationale for a peace curriculum effort. She then presents a curriculum approach for schools of social work. Reeser & Leighninger (1990) chronicle the attempt to implement a social justice curriculum in an MSW program. The article
includes descriptions of resistance to a social change curriculum and strategies for working through such resistance.

Reisch (1988) says that two generations of social work’s students have been raised in an ahistorical culture and have been subtly encouraged to dissociate present problems and future solutions for those problems from their historical antecedents. The natural world has no history outside of the language of mathematics. Hence, social research is ahistorical as well. to the degree that it uses the language of applied mathematics – statistics – to identify regularities in social behavior as valid knowledge.

Regardless of where on the positional continuum an educator finds herself, the very heated and pervasive existence of a debate in social work’s literature speaks to the concern many have with the professional project and the consequences of this project for social work.


Abbott (1988) speaks of interprofessional competition, and a claim can be made that intra-professional competition exists and is taking place within internal shifts of what is viewed as valid abstract knowledge within a profession. The constructionist
challenge to the dominance of the realist position within social work can be seen to be
effecting an internal shift in the abstract knowledge base for practice from simple to
complex. Again, constructionists don’t argue that the knowledge generated by social
work’s empiricist researchers is not valuable; rather, the argument is that other kinds of
knowledge and the cultures these knowledges come from are just as valuable.

The earlier constructionist articles that protested the move by academic social
work researchers to determine social work’s core jurisdiction emerged in counter-point to
the realist position. They necessarily assumed that the realist position was dominant. In
retrospect, from the time the first training school associated itself with a university, it was
inevitable that social work’s core jurisdiction would form itself in line with what was
valued by academic social scientists in psychology, political science, sociology,
anthropology and economics. Social work’s constructionist position could emerge only
when the realist position established itself as social work’s core jurisdiction. Underlying
the constructionist challenge was the invisible assumption of the conflation of
professional and social justice projects and the use of the latter by the former to achieve
its ends. Generative theory can be known only in its distinction from normalizing theory.
Post-modern views assume modern views. It is only in the last few years that thinkers
such as Witkin (1999) have sought to destabilize, to make the certain less certain, to
make nature a little less solid. The pole of “radical doubt” in the constructionist position
that seeks to destabilize the privilege of assumed “T”ruth is now being wielded so that
the reader, in her situated, cultural, historical context provides a new stability, in her own
voice. The role of constructionist critique is maturing. The modern point-counterpoint is
giving birth to a tradition that examines what is said for its relation to what is done as a method to destabilize unquestioned assumptions that generate social injustice. The following section cites some of the works that have emerged over the last ten years that perform this sort of critique without offering an alternative to what is critiqued.

*Social Work History, Professionalization, and Social Justice.* Many of social work's historians have chronicled the effect of professionalization on social work practice. While a number support and celebrate the professionalizing effort (Briar & Miller, 1971; Leiby, 1978), there is a tradition that is critical. For example, Lubove (1965) chronicles social casework's transition from volunteer to professional status from 1880 until 1930. While not overtly criticizing the effect of professionalization, he implicitly expresses doubts about the consequences of bureaucratization and rationalization of practice for those served. However, he does have a strain of radical doubt about the direction professionalization is taking social work. He says.

Yet, if social work could claim any distinctive function in an atomized urban society with serious problems of group communication and mass deprivation, it was not individual therapy but liaison between groups and the stimulation of social legislation and institutional change. Since no other occupational group presumes as does social work a generalized mandate to perform these indispensable functions, the preeminence of the therapeutic role created a vacuum which remains unfulfilled. Professionalization - the machinery of altruism - was adapted far more successfully to a limited individual and group service process
than to the distinctive social work functions of liaison and resource mobilization. (p. 220-221).

Lubove attributes to social work "a generalized mandate" to move social organization towards actualizing principles of social justice. His statement that no other occupational group – profession – is dedicated to this task is as true today as it was in 1965 when he published his book, and 1900 when social casework was beginning to standardize and codify its methods. Much of the critical literature being written about social work today offers no positive suggestion about the direction the profession should take. Lubove's statement speaks to the possibility social work has to take the lead in generating a just world. Examples of more critical discourses are now offered.

Writing in 1962, Kathleen Woodruffe said.

From the 1920's to the early 1950's except for the dramatic years of the depression, social work displayed little of its previous concern with reform and social policy (p. 220)

Although they acknowledge the importance of social action, they still see themselves primarily as clinicians whose first responsibility is to their clients, rather than as reformers bent upon curing the ills of society (p. 223).

In the process of clearing a space in the professional sun, the conception of social work was whittled down to a fragment of its former range. It was forced to concentrate on method and technique, and social action, perhaps because it is too precarious a basis for professional specialization, was relegated to a limbo large and broad (p. 225).
Woodruffe and Lubove wrote in the midst of the cold war, in a political climate that was quick to marginalize critique into a political ideology. Whether grave doubt or serious disappointment or disillusionment, the inquisitorial eyes of McCarthyites buffered historical writing during this period. For example, Bertha Reynolds was ostracized from the profession she loved for her work with the rank and file during the depression and with the unions after WWII.

In an oft-quoted 1957 article in Harpers Magazine, Marion Sanders said, “In achieving a profession, social work has lost its mission.” Ehrenreich (1989) says that professionalism is “an occupational strategy, which reflects both occupational needs and characteristic class ideologies, for legitimizing and stabilizing the roles characteristically played by professional-managerial class occupations (pp. 56-57). This relatively recent definition highlights how dominating the professional project is in social work, and how social work may be continuing to lose its social justice mission.

Specht & Courtney (1994) link the professionalization of social work to its increasingly broad and deep commitment to psychotherapy. They say, “Both of them (Mary Richmond and Jane Addams) started out with a vision of a profession that would help construct the city on the hill; but instead, at this century’s end, we have a profession dedicated to building the church of individual repair” (p. 85). Specht and Courtney claim that the relief of human suffering has been reduced to the intrapsychic arena and that this relief ignores the social justice and environmental sides of social work’s mission.

Probably the clearest historical critique of social work’s commitment to the professional project, is provided by Simon (1994). Simon’s history is cast through a
feminist and constructionist lens. While not focusing on the professional project, she does center the mechanisms of paternalistic practice and illuminates the consequences of said practice for social worker, client, and their worlds.

Her history can be read as a challenge to the underlying, and unquestioned assumptions of the professional project. She both critiques the world as it is within a feminist lens and in the space she clears lets heretofore different, non-traditional, subordinated voices to be heard. Specifically she founds empowerment practice in a long tradition far more diverse and varied than do traditional histories of social work. She opens a space for the voices of anarchists, populists, social gospelists, the union movement, the Niagara Movement, transcendentalists, Freudianism, the Black Nationalism of Marcus Garvey, the Existentialism movement, Marxism and Socialism, the non-violence movement emerging with Gandhi, Paulo Freire’s work, African Independence movements, the civil rights movements, liberation theology, the New Left, Feminism, Gay and Lesbian Liberation, and the Disability Rights Movement. She traces threads of discourses championing social justice within which social work’s adoption of an empowerment practice can weave.

Her work also serves as a vehicle through which to understand the undergirding assumptions in social work’s histories that remain neutral on, if not champion the professional project, such as those by Leiby (1978) and Briar & Miller (1971). Her work is part of a larger movement in historiography (Novick, 1988; White, 1987) that rejects assumptions that historical facts tell their own story, that they are “objective.”
Examples and Evidence. Leslie Margolin's (1997) work, Under the cover of kindness: The invention of social work, takes the critical focus to a new edge. He critiques social work practice and offers no resolution as did Solomon with her set of marginalized historical voices. For example, he claims that what social workers “do” is keep track of marginalized people in their homes as they engage in private activities. Social workers investigate, interrogate and surveill marginalized populations; poor people, immigrants, persons of color, sexual orientation, gender, nationality, and age. Clients today are often identified in numerical codes, such as those in the DSM-IV. Social workers also invent themselves while constructing and using the categories that identify clients.

He argues that what is referred to in this dissertation as the discourse of social justice, as part of the story social work tells about itself, is used to disguise what professional social workers do in order to keep on doing it. What is said validates what is done. He suggests that if social workers took off the discursive blinders we would be horrified at much of what we do. Professional practice can be understood to be a process that extends the defining reach of the dominant, privileged populations deeper into the private lives of the different populations social work serves. In Chapter 6, The Ontology of Critique, this assertion will be more fully explored by laying out the tenets of French post-structuralism as given in the work of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault.

Claims such as that made by Margolin (1997) reveal a deep-rooted tension within the professional project, but no resolution. Professional discourse champions what social workers do as working for a just world. Margolin’s critical perspective says just the
opposite. An example of this unresolved tension between social workers coming from
different discursive traditions is Jerome Wakefield's (1998) review of Leslie Margolin's
(1997) work. Margolin utilized Foucault's methodology of reversal to show how social
work can be seen to be a successfully institutionalized effort at social control of
marginalized populations. Wakefield focuses on evidence Margolin offers in support of
his argument and finds it wanting. Wakefield can be seen to be utilizing the criteria of a
realist position to dismiss a text that critiques the efficacy and validity of this selfsame
criteria.

Margolin uses case materials as "examples" of "how" a discourse can be
mobilized to interpret what social workers do in a different manner from the received
view given in the professional project. Margolin uses case materials as "examples" to
illustrate his critique. Wakefield views case materials as "evidence" having an objective,
obdurate content that can be misinterpreted, which he thinks Margolin does. Wakefield
insists that evidence be used to support claims. The two authors write in very different
traditions that value very different epistemologies. Wakefield can be seen to be
conflating apples and oranges in his critique, or as in this case, examples and evidence.

Radical doubt in textual analysis. Another example of conflating discourses is
found in Floersch (2000). Floersch "wants to avoid this now conventional temptation to
reduce social workers and their practices to the disciplinary power of theory" (p. 171).
Floersch references the works of Kunzel, (1998); Gordon, (1994); Lunbeck (1994);
Odem, (1995); and Tice, (1998) as examples of social work theorists who privilege
institutional and historical determinants over what happens in a given context. He argues
that these writers reduce practice to theory. He says, "without individual actors, there can be no action" (Floersch, 2000: p. 171). He looks at what social workers "say" as well as what they write. He analyzes the discourse and actions of case managers who work with the severe and persistently mentally ill by combining their written and spoken narratives. His purpose is to show that the written record is only a partial representation of case management.

Floersch, like Wakefield, mixes apples and oranges. The texts he cites are all examining historical records. Floersch is not interested in the role that institutions have in the creating the identity of the client or social worker, or the relevance of historical antecedents to the practice of case management. He argues for both situated (practice) and disciplinary (theoretical) knowledge. His dichotomizing of situated practice as an oral event and disciplinary theory as a textual event is an erroneous usage of Foucault, who understands both as kinds of discourses making up a specific strategic situation that articulates disciplinary power. That aside, Floersch says that "by comparing the two narratives, I establish that in some instances the written and spoken do similar work; in other instances, the spoken performs work that the written cannot begin to do" (p. 172).

Floersch collected oral and written data about the same event. Disciplinary, theoretical knowledge was driven by the strengths perspective that focused on the wants, dreams and desires of a consumer, as opposed to the medical model that came up in situated practice that focused on needs of a patient. "Situated management recovered a language of needs. Strengths did not make sense when individuals did not want medications or it failed to produce desired effects" (p. 182). "When Robert did not
follow up the desire to live alone with appropriate manners, the power of strengths management was neutralized” (p. 183). As part of his discussion of his findings, Floersch says, "One effect of ignoring the oral narrative is that the personal, the practical, and the situated have become invisible, that is, research often reduces situated forms of knowledge to organizational structure, policy and disciplinary knowledge” (p. 185). “My findings lead me to conclude that there are two types of practice power – disciplinary and situated - and within each, there are many forms” (186).

Floersch argues that theory is privileged over practice. He engages in a dichotomization of perspectives. When the strengths perspective – theory – no longer adequately describes what is going on in a situation, the case manager reverts to “doing him,” telling the client what he must do in order to receive a set of services or maintain a certain level of independence. What Floersch doesn’t seem to understand is that both kinds of knowledge impose an externally originating set of meanings upon the client.

In the framework being developed in the dissertation, the strengths perspective is part of the social justice project while “doing him” is part of the professional project. The client has no say in either of these discourses. The strengths perspective is used until a problem emerges that is outside its “theoretical” parameters. The caseworker then reverts to an older, less client centered model of practice. The client in both cases is literally constructed by the caseworker. He has no voice in either the strengths perspective or medical model.

The caseworker uses the discourse of social justice until the client needs to be managed. The bottom line is that it is management of client behavior that is the goal, not
creating a social environment in which the client works to achieve and maintain his highest level of functioning. The texts show that the strengths perspective is being used while observation and recording of the same context the text describes shows the medical model being used. The former is used as an instrument of the latter. The discourse of social justice is used as an instrument of social injustice. Floersch's dichotomization of theory and practice is a straw person that conflates two very different projects. What he describes is a very clear case study of the main point the dissertation is making.

Tice (1998) examines how social workers advanced the cause of professionalization by charting how the writing of case records changed in the early years of the profession. She argues that social workers created clients, their problems, and solutions as part of developing professional authority and identity over what Abbott (1988) called jurisdictions. Following Lehninger (1987), Tice argues there was much more tempestuous conflict internally as social work professionalized than traditional historical accounts emphasize.

Kunzel (1993) examines the role of gender in the construction of professional identity through the vehicle of competing discourses struggling to control how unmarried mothers are to be seen. She textures the normalizing story social work tells about itself by exploring how gender has intersected with the field's professionalization and generation of the professional as expert. Social workers wanted to distance themselves from the discourses of "evangelical women" as a means to legitimize their jurisdictional claims.
Each of these authors explores how discourses compete for the right to claim jurisdictions. For example, Tice (1997) argues the professionalization of case recording was a story of increasing technical organization of details that created clients, authorities, problems, and solutions. Each emphasizes an already existing set of normalizing processes to understand social practices. Caseworkers transformed client biographies into professional representations shaped by emerging professional interests (p. 3).

Professionalization of case records was a response to social work’s drive to legitimize itself as a profession. The caseworker’s transformation of a client biography into a case record rendered a client’s narrative into a derivation of the professional project. It is one means that social workers use to standardize what is known about a case, and to talk to one another about a case, or to develop a case history that means the same thing to different people. This is part of the solution that professionalization offers to the problems created by the various forces of modernization. Despite the rhetoric of social justice, reducing a client to a case record is a telling function illuminating just how significant the client’s voice is for social workers.

Kunzel (1993) connects the experience of unwed mothers with their construction as discursive objects by professionals. Unwed mothers were constructed as a subpopulation of women whose very individuality is derived from professional contestation over turf. Who gets to define these women’s problems and the solutions for them was an issue through which professionalization of the field was carried out.
One of the curious perspectives Kunzel put together in her research of case documents was how professionalism served to solidify identity for caseworkers. The characters of morally superior, evangelical women of the benevolent societies actually served as ground for contestation and seat of reform. Concluding her book, Kunzel says

As embarrassed as their male colleagues were by the association of social work with sentimental womanly benevolence, women in social work strived to distance themselves from that rhetoric. Embracing the language of professionalism, they used it to criticize and transcend the language of female essentialism and female difference that seemed to the old-fashioned and self-defeating. But in the process of rejecting what seemed them a conservative strategy – the linking of reform with womanly character – women in social work accepted definitions of professionalism that were, insidiously, as gendered as the terms they rejected (p. 170).

Margolin (1997) looks at what he calls “new case records,” numerical representations of empirically generated factors. Talking of a case record using the PIE notational system he says

Just as poetry, in Eliot’s famous phrase, “can communicate before it is understood.” Jean’s record communicates before it is even read. Its look communicates: so many adjectives and adjectival phrases strung together – “Parent role problem responsibility/performance expectation type, moderate severity, one to five years duration, somewhat inadequate coping skills” – make the writing appear as if it went through a syntactic compressor. The words do not
appear to be written so much as riveted onto the page. Then there are all these mystery terms – Factor I, Factor II, Factor III, Code 5401.31. Axis II V71.09 – which proclaim in the clearest possible way that this literature is not for the consumption of the uninitiated. So even if Jean, thanks to the Federal Privacy Act, were to get permission to read the document, she would not only fail to see herself but she would also fail to see her mother tongue: the grammar of firm subject, active verb, seeable object has been exchanged for a language without sentences, without images, without actions or actors (p. 154).

The discourse of social justice is absent from the case record he describes. If social justice in part involves the act of social workers beginning where their client system is, facilitating the client system to develop its own narrative, thereby empowering the client to define her world, then no case record using PIE or the DSM-IV can participate in generating a just world. Margolin argues that social work acknowledges it cannot empower clients, that clients have to do it themselves. He goes on to say that whatever discourse about social justice exists serves to validate what social workers do rather than acting as a mechanism to transform institutional practices.

Haynes & White (1999) argue that social work has its roots in the altruism of the charity workers of the Charity Organization Society (COS) and the social justice tradition is grounded in the Settlement House movement. These two perspectives have been set at odds with one another from the beginning of the profession. The authors assert that the dominance of one over the other will continue to divide the profession and that a vision for future social work depends on reconciling historic dualities. They challenge social
workers to work against the fragmentation of the profession. Within the framework being developed here, reconciling historical dualities involves seeking to develop a more complex perspective on social reality. That there might be two projects at work within social work, two missions serving as organizing values, and that they are conflated is one such perspective. If, as the dissertation suggests, part of conflation is that the discourse of social justice is an instrument of the ends of the professional project – competition for jurisdictions of practice both in academia and the turf of professions – then working against fragmentation of the profession involves reversing the relation between social justice and professionalization. The latter can serve as a vehicle of the former.

The second section lays out a framework that develops a different set of relations between the realist position and the two poles of the constructionist position, the critical and positive. These relations are not conflictual, competitive or replete with chronic and dynamic tension. This framework shows how the professional project can be seen as distinct from the social justice project. Once conflation is eradicated, it becomes possible to reintegrate the two projects so that the professional project becomes an instrument of the social justice project.
Section 2

Reframing the Problem: Discourses, Assumptions, and their Relations

The debate in the social work academy about the pertinence of empiricist/positivist modes of knowing and doing is epistemological in character. It is the argument of this essay that prior ontological questions must be answered before the profession of social work can profitably enter this debate. These questions center on the nature of social work, the symbolic and moral essence of the social work enterprise and what the profession is becoming.

Dennis Saleebey (1990)
Introduction

The first section of this dissertation discussed the relation of the professional and social justice projects and cast them to be part of a conflated discourse. The argument was made that the discourse of social justice is an instrument of the ends of the professional project. Chapter 3 argued that there is an ongoing tension between the realist and constructionist positions, and as Austin (1986) gloomily suggested, this may be part of social work's makeup.

It is the dissertation's argument that the conflation of the two discourses – professional project and social justice – serves larger social forces, those of modernization. While the discourse of social justice may be an instrumental vehicle of professionalization, it is argued that professionalization is a vehicle of modernization. Modernization is made up of three forces that frame what counts as reality in the West. They are (1) the cosmology of natural science, (2) capitalization of the market economy, and (3) differentiation of the discourse of rights. These three forces work in a spirllic process of problem emergence, problem naming, and problem solution. Modernization creates social problems that only the three forces of modernization working through professionalization can solve. The frame and spirllic nature of the process are always the same. What differs are the populations and individual members of those populations that are constantly being created by the professions.

The four chapters that follow attempt to generate an understanding in which professionalism, distributive justice, the fight for human rights, social science and its knowledge, multi-culturalism, and diversity, can be understood to make certain
assumptions about the nature of reality that often are in contradiction if not conflict with one another. The dissertation contends that the conflation of discourses and the tension Austin speaks of are a function of lack of clarity concerning the fundamental assumptions these discourses make about the nature of reality.

To the end of parsing out what these assumptions are, and how they play within social work's discourses, three very different ontologies are identified to exist in these discourses. They are the ontologies of the Subject, nature, and critique. Each assumes a different world that has no common ground, other than the language used to define each in distinction from one another. It will be shown that the ontology of the Subject at root, assumes a world in which there is an overarching, all-inclusive presence that is qualitatively different from any element, sum of elements or set of relations between elements in the world. The ontology of nature assumes at root a world of part-to-part relations. There is nothing greater or more inclusive than sums of parts, or sums of relations. The ontology of critique assumes at root that all assumptions are a function of language, and that reality is known only in language. The Subject and nature are political constructs with stake in the world as it appears within the ontologies they express.

The rest of this introduction defines two terms in great detail; ontology and hierarchy. The intersection of structure and process is given in the phrase, "Being becoming being(s). The term cosmology of natural science has been previously defined as the conservative and simple understanding of agreed-upon knowledge being in some degree "true." This is also reflective of the less complex pole in what is called the realist position. This is contrasted to a liberal, complex understanding that there is far more we
are uncertain about and don't know than what we agree upon, and that there are a manifold of cultural perspectives that define reality. This is a constructionist perspective.

Ontology and Hierarchy: The Origin and Organization of Reality

Onta. The term ontology comes from two Ancient Greek terms, onta and logos. Onto is the present participle of the infinitive einai. Einai in English means "to be." An infinitive is "the simple, uninflected form of a verb expressing existence or action without reference to person, number, or tense" (Websters, 1983). To inflect a verb is to change its form by conjugating or declining, for example. To decline a verb is to shape it, to bend it, to give it more specific and directing form. An uninflected verb is one that simply expresses existence and/or acting. The verb "to be" is an infinitive. The term "Being," with a capital B denotes the uninflected present participle of the verb to be.

This is a difficult and important point to grasp. "Being" is existing and acting and needs to be thought of as the definitive ground for all that follows in the dissertation. The term has a history that stretches back to Pre-Socratic philosopher/physicists. Every philosopher and most social theorists attempt to define what they mean by "Being." Social workers though, by in larger have not been trained in classical philosophy, and so don’t have the conceptual baggage attached to the term that philosophers do.

For the purposes of the dissertation, the term is meant to express existing and acting with no reference to a "thing" existing or "thing" acting. The term has not yet been declined. It has not yet been differentiated. The process of existing and acting expressed in the term "Being" includes all that is. Being is the whole of which being(s) are the parts. This means that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. "Being" is
qualitatively different than any part or sum of parts. Another way of understanding the
term is to think of the difference between what we know, patterns of part-to-part
relations, and what we don’t know, the whole within which these relations form.

Liddell & Scott (1987) in their Greek/English lexicon, broaden the definition of
onta to include “existing things, the present, as opposed to past and future, but also
reality, truth, as opposed to that which is not” (p. 560). This definition is the basis for
understanding what the term “being” means, in comparison to “Being.” The use of the
term “being” is nominative. By nominative is meant “the subject of a finite verb”
(Websters, 1983). The term “being” with a small letter b denotes that the infinitive
“Being” has declined to become the subject of a finite verb or a predicate. A finite verb
is one that is limited, defined, given parameters by a person, number, or tense. A finite
verb forms the predicate of a sentence. The term “being” is in this case a noun, and in its
infinite variety, forms the subject of a sentence.

The dissertation will use the term onta in both ways; first to denote “Being” as an
infinitive, uninflected, undelined verb denoting existing and acting. Secondly, “being”
will be understood as the becoming, forming, or differentiation of Being. There are three
primary forms through which Being becomes being: verb, nominative subject, and
adverb. The first involves transformation of the infinitive verb without reference into a
finite verb denoting tense. I “am” running. I “was” there. She “has been” there before.
The term “Being” does not have tense. It does not signify a “present” because this
depends on its contrast to past and future.
The second form of Being becoming being is that of a noun. "The being is running" includes the idea that existing and acting are part of the subject of the sentence. All subjects exist, and when placed in relation to a transitive verb, the subject is active in its existing. Any noun placed where the word being is in the above sentence denotes something existing and acting. This is the part-to-part relation. A noun is so only within a set of relations with other nouns. It is the "difference" between what one noun and another signifies that defines this relation. Being becoming being includes, if not depends upon relations of difference. The declining of Being as acting and existing into a being where being is given ontological priority creates relations of difference that do not necessarily assume Being.

The tricky point here is "how" we think of the differences between nouns and what they signify. A grammatical form that has far reaching implications for social work's vision of social justice concerns the structure of a sentence such as "The rock is gray." This denotes existence without action. This is a relation of identity, a static quality of being that assumes and emphasizes existing - the rock is existing, and part of its existing includes being gray. There is no sense of the acting side of Being. This grammatical structure dissociates existing from acting.

The separation of existence and action in this grammatical structure is more obvious in statements such as "The man is black," "the woman is lesbian," or the woman is pregnant." Even the form "I am black." or "I am lesbian" are relations of identity that can be seen to separate existing from acting. This was apparent in chapter one when the mechanisms of distribution were discussed. The role of relations of identity in that
context is to distribute opportunity unequally. There is no sense that a person acts from within the category. In chapter 6, where the ontology of critique is discussed, relations of identity are viewed as “natural categories” forming the basis of personal identity.

The third form of Being becoming being is the adverb that shapes “how” something is. The adverbial use of being declines Being so that the sentence has a subject and predicate. She “is being” good. or She “has been” good. qualifies “how” she is. “She” is the nominative subject, “is being” or “has been” the conjugated, inflected, declined verb, and “good” the adverbial qualification of the being being.

All three forms of “Being becoming being” intertwine in the grammatical structure of language to express an infinite variety of meaning. The core process understood as existing and acting, that is Being, inheres and is part of all being(s). So being can be and is verb, noun, and adverb, depending upon where it lies in a sentence and the role that is emphasized. The bending or shaping of the infinitive by tense, gender, conjugation, etc., results in the nominative subject, verb, or adverb.

There is one key point here. It is that the idea of Being becoming being occurs in the routine use of language through its grammar; morphological and syntactic structures. Morphology is the study of the forms and structures of words and syntax is concerns the customary arrangement of words in phrases and sentences. The very constitution of the world occurs through these structures. Cultural history provides the specific meanings (the study of semantics) that structure existing and acting. The three ontologies that the next three chapters discuss at root decline, shape or form “Being” in three very different ways. The final chapter will show how the some of the problems discussed in the first
three chapters can be parsed at the level of ontology to separate and clarify conflated assumptions in order to directly connect the consequences of prefiguring the world in one way or another. By doing this a discursive space is created for the reader, students and educators, to examine their own discourses in a very different way than is currently done.

**Logos.** Logos comes from the Ancient Greek term legein, which means, "to speak." Logos denotes "the word by which the inward thought is expressed" (Websters, 1983). In Greek philosophy, the term denotes reason, the controlling principle of the universe. In Christian theology, logos is the word of God. The term -logy is a combining form that means a speaking the science, doctrine, or theory of. Logos as it is used here will mean the reasoned study of.

Ontology then is the study of Being becoming being(s). The addition of the (s) makes it easier to understand that the specific structures through which Being is understood are manifold. What Being designates is formless. What being(s) designates are various and manifold shapings and shapes giving form to formless Being.

The transformation of infinitive verb to finite noun, verb, and adverb is not one that happens in a single move. This transformation is constant. It is an emanation. The word emanate means "to flow out, arise, to issue from a source; to flow forth; as light emanates from the sun." In this sense, the becoming of being(s) flows out of formless Being. Being is framed as origin, and in this sense, the idea of emanation from this origin is the foundation of a culture's assumption about the origin and nature of reality. In this transformation, Being becoming being(s), the whole is differentiated into parts and part-to-part relations.
What we "know," the subject of epistemology, is constituted by the relations between different emanations of Being in being(s): part-to-part relations. The subject of ontology concerns the transforming (declining, conjugating) relation between the whole and the part-to-part relations, the relation between Being and being(s). It is the fundamental position in the dissertation that we cannot know the "whole" or Being, in the same way we can know the part-to-part relations. The three different ontologies discussed in the following chapters configure the relation between Being and being(s) differently enough that it becomes possible to show how the problems discussed in the first three chapters can be reframed so as not to be of the same world at all.

In this sense, ontology examines how a culture has constructed the shape of speaking, the path of emanation, the forms of Being becoming being(s). Every culture understands the origin of reality differently. For most in western culture, this understanding was sedimented over time into a religion. The "One Church" of the medieval period in Europe as part of its own claim to define how Being becoming being is reality sedimented a story about the origin of all that is. The vertical relation between God and God's creations includes different interpretations of the role of God the origin. God the Aristotelian unmoved mover set reality in motion, and "what is" is the current effect of divine creation. For different Christian sects God exists according to different interpretations of the bible. God the formless courses through everything in another understanding of emanation. Buddhism and its sects gave a different form and content to Being becoming being. The form, context, and content of the ongoing moment are illusion – i.e. being(s) – and what is really real is "The Eternal," or formless Being.
Cosmology. Where ontology is the reasoned study of Being becoming being(s) a cosmology is "the theory or philosophy of the nature and principles of the universe" (Websters, 1983). Speake (1979) says that cosmology is "the branch of philosophy, often considered a subdivision of metaphysics, that deals with the Universe as a totality of phenomena attempting to combine metaphysical speculation and scientific evidence within a coherent framework" (pp. 78-79). The term "cosmos" comes from the Pythagorean idea of a rational, ordered whole. The ancient Greek word "Kosmos" means order, harmony, ornament, the world as an orderly system (Websters, 1983). A cosmology then is to be seen to denote an ordered, harmonious universe. The three ontologies – those of natural science, the Subject and that of critique – each assumes an orderly universe (or in the case of the ontology of critique, a political universe ripe for being taking apart). A cosmology may or may not take into account the ontological concern with Being. For example, the cosmology of nature may assume that Being is an illusion or superstition, there is no whole, and that all that is is in part-to-part relations given in natural law. The ontology of the Subject on the other hand, finds its origin in the assumption of Being. A cosmology assumes a set of relations that makes up the principles of the universe, usually some sort of statement of a set of laws that can divine, natural or imagined in origin. For example, The One Church of medieval culture had divine law as foundation for principles through which to understand the universe.

The cosmology of natural science has its origin some version of a big bang. Its cosmology assumes a body of natural laws discovered through the scientific method in different fields; astronomy, physics, and chemistry for example. Being for this
cosmology is a speculation about what "was" before the big bang. Its becoming consists of formation and expansion of the universe. Becoming is formed in light years, a concept that includes both the linear movement of time and dimensional expansion of space. Time consists of part-to-part relations, one moment to the next, one year to the next.

Another way of understanding the study of Being becoming being(s) is that the inward thought is being-expressed in word, what happens in speaking and/or writing. The study of Being becoming being(s) not only occurs in language and speaking, it can include the study of what happens in music, architecture, painting, sculpture, or morals and ethics as well. The realms of aesthetics and ideology are just as viable a way to understand how a culture forms the formless as is ontology.

For the dissertation's purposes though, it is with ontology that we begin. The purpose here is to form a bridge between the more philosophical concerns of Being becoming being(s) and social work's discourses, each of which assumes its ends are those of a just world. Ontology will be understood as the reasoned study of the "assumptions about existence (and action) underlying any conceptual scheme or any theory or system of ideas" (Flew 1981, p. 256). Assumptions about Being are usually cast in a culture's version/vision of nature in a cosmology. These assumptions are the way that a culture pre-figures Being into nature.

A set of assumptions that constitutes a culture's ontology is the foundation for how a culture orders the world. This set of assumptions lays out the origin of a culture, where origin is understood to be the story a culture tells about itself that over time is sedimented into a cosmology of nature. How human behavior, and even more concretely,
the wind, fire, rain and earth are viewed, is a function of cultural assumptions. The origin of all, and the discourses around this origin constitute a culture’s set of assumptions.

There are three different ontologies that form the theoretical foundation of the dissertation. They are the ontology of the Subject, the ontology of natural science, and the ontology of critique. The ontology of the Subject has its origin in the “idea” of a divine Subject, which emerged as origin 2,500 or so years ago. With the advent of modernity, the human Subject replaces the divine Subject. The Subject is understood to be freedom and personal responsibility for being free (Touraine, 1995).

The ontology of nature has its origin in the natural world. While this idea of origin is only 600 years old or so, the universe it assumes to be “true” is billions of solar years old. The story of the development of the cosmology of natural science occurred during the 15th to 17th centuries. Its development is marked by the work of Copernicus, Galileo, Bacon, Newton, and Darwin. The “origin” that basic science assumes is a natural universe that existed prior to the biological emergence of humanity. There is no room for the story of God or divine will in the natural universe. There is no room for humanity within the universe’s origin. The history and existence of the universe is spoken in the language of mathematics. Its current visions of an origin are framed in various speculations of a “big bang.” The natural universe and “nature” may include humanity, but it does not exist as a human product.

The ontology of critique refuses to accept the world as it is given within Western culture. It sees any claim to nature or truth as arbitrary, contingent, and hence political and irrational. This ontology has had three phases over the course of modernity. It had
its historical origin in the Enlightenment when educated citizens argued that the social order that privileged kings and clerics was arbitrary and contingent. The Enlightenment critique was taken over by Marx who critiqued the assumptions underlying capitalism and the relation between capitalist/worker and control of the means of production. The third critique of cultural assumptions emerged in the late 19th century and one strain is found in the work of DeSaussure and was developed over the course of the 20th century into what is now called post-structuralism and peaked in the work of Jacque Derrida and Michel Foucault.

In the ontology of critique all attributions of origin, whether divine or natural, are cultural constructs, stories that over time are sedimented to be real, constitutive, and natural. The ontologies of Subject and Nature are seen to be cultural constructs privileging one cultural perspective over and against another. This privileging is a function of hierarchical ordering of the social order.

**Hierarchy.** The word hierarchy comes from the Ancient Greek term hierarches, a combination of the two terms; hieros, sacred, and archos, a ruler. The term archos comes from the verb archein, to rule (Websters. 1983). In Ancient Greek the term arche forms the basis from which the above are derivations and applications. Arche denotes a beginning, or to begin with, to be first, to lead the way (Liddell & Scott, 1987; p. 122). Hieros, can be translated to mean super-human, mighty, divine, wonderful, holy (Liddell & Scott, 1987; p. 376). Its Latin form is sacer, which is the root of the word sacred. In this sense the sacred is the beginning, first, and leads the way. The term hierarchy is to be understood to include beginning, to be first, as in leading the way. This is the first
ideational formalization of formless Being. A hierarchy differentiates existing and acting in an ongoing beginning. “Being” emanates, and this emanation is accounted for by the immediacy of everything that is within the ongoing moment. It is not a beginning now past relative to the present heading toward a future. The idea of origin is not given tense. It may be given tense by a culture in the next differentiation of forms, but hierarchy is to be understood as not having tense. It is a structure through which “Being” emanates and is declined.

Being is differentiated into the idea of hieros, origin, and is further differentiated through arche, to rule. What rules is the ongoing origin postulated by a culture in their version/vision of “Being.” Further downstream in the hierarchy being(s) exist and act. according to patterns of meaning delivered through language, the speaking of logos. Grammar and syntax form the rules by which Being is declined into being(s). Being(s) have existed and acted, will exist and act, or are and have been acted upon by other being(s). They are located in time and space. Because Being is becoming being(s) as a structured emanation through hierarchy, the formless is always the origin of the formed. This sense of emanation as process is key to this theoretic. This description of a hierarchy illuminates the structure through which process occurs.

This use of hierarchy is different from common usage, which involves reference to a graded ranking of objects or persons. The first definition of hierarchy in Websters,(1983) is “a system of church government by priests or other clergy in graded ranks.” This version of the term references how the origin, God, and his will, is interpreted within a set of institutional practices, including rules and social roles. Again,
this is far “downstream” from the idea of Being becoming as beginning, origin, or leading the way. The key element to the way the term hierarchy is used in the dissertation is that hierarchy is grounded in Being as origin, in an ontology that structures all that follows from it.

For example, for the medievalists. it was God that is beginning, that emanates. For Touraine, it is the human Subject and the idea of freedom and personal and collective responsibility for being free that is origin, that emanates through all less inclusive structures of the hierarchical continuum. The term hierarchy means something very specific for the medievalists. For the cosmology of natural science, it is the natural universe and its big bang that serves as origin for emanation. Science may not be able to observe the big bang, but its cosmology says that the universe is an emanation of this event, that universal expansion in four dimensions (and perhaps more) is the process of emanation from the speculated origin. Assuming the cosmology of natural science, hierarchy may be seen as organizing the social order, or the market. For Foucault, it is the critical focusing on what different ontologies say is natural and normal. A hierarchy is a way that local knowledge is taken up by totalizing discourses.

The other word in the phrase hierarchical continuum. comes from the Latin word, continere, to hold together. A continuum is a “continuous whole, quantity, or series; a thing whose parts cannot be separated or separately discerned (Websters, 1983). The specific continuum being developed here is a “hierarchical” continuum. This means that there is a whole forming one pole of the continuum, Being, that cannot be “known” as the differentiated “parts” in being(s) can be known. The other pole of the continuum is
being(s). The forms giving shape to the process of becoming are anchored by these two poles.

A primary argument that the next three chapters makes is that hierarchy is rooted in a ruling origin, and that any use of the term privileges the upstream pole, whether it be the medieval God, the Subject, nature and its laws, the market economy or a discourse of rights given in the social contract and rule of law. As will be laid out in chapter 6, this “originary pole” of a hierarchical continuum is Jacque Derrida’s center of a system of which the derivative pole are the margins. Each of the eight distributive mechanisms is a hierarchical continuum privileging one pole and marginalizing the other. A social location is the intersection of the eight hierarchical continuums, the function of which is to distribute opportunity to the persons according to the specific historical context in which the hierarchy exists. The whole of the West’s social history can be seen to be have been a struggle to claim the right that one culture’s version of reality is the “true” origin from which all flows. In an important sense what the dissertation suggests is that it is this an arbitrary, contingent and hence, political mode of organizing what persons in their worlds do. What will become evident is where there is hierarchy as defined, there is social injustice.

The next three chapters lay out the history and principles by which the three ontologies and their cosmologies can be understood. The final chapter discusses some implications such an analysis has for social work.
Chapter 4

The Ontology of the Subject

Introduction

This chapter tells the story of the Subject and its transformation from medieval to the modern eras. It ends with an explication of Alain Touraine’s definition of the Subject as freedom and personal responsibility for being free. The Subject is very much a creature of the West, of the modern world, of modernization and its blessed fruits. It is responsible for its own dying as well as living. It is this Subject that will be both responsible for and the consequence of a reversal of the current relation between the professional and social justice projects.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the Subject in relation to the social justice project. The idea is introduced that the social justice project is to transform the “One God” as the only Subject to as many Subjects as there are persons. God’s universe as lived in the medieval period of European history is then discussed. The emergence of the Enlightenment and its foundation in “society,” and John Locke’s notions of the social
contract and the role of the state are outlined, and then Adam Smith’s notions of the
relation between self-interest, capital and the market economy is juxtaposed to Locke’s
thought. After this broad-brush background is laid out the discourse of rights is
introduced and defined. Then Alain Touraine’s idea of the Subject is fleshed out. The
idea of modernity is presented as a dialogue between the Subject and reason. The
relation between the Subject and Constructionism is discussed in preparation to
understanding how the ontology of nature (chapter 5) has assumed the right of Subject
status.

The Ontology of the Subject

The Subject and social justice. The idea of the Subject is one that has a rich and
complex history. The story this chapter tells is that of Being becoming being, the
transformation of the “One” Subject, God, into manifold of human Subjects. The
Subject, for the purposes of the dissertation, is defined as freedom and personal
responsibility for being-free. Being-free is defined as being given the opportunity to be
part of creating, participating within, and benefiting from the social contract and rule of
law. Personal responsibility for being free involves being part of and facilitating creation
of the social environment in which others find their Subject status. The social contract is
the mechanism that institutionalizes personal responsibility for being-free and extends the
opportunity to achieve Subject status to ever more persons in the move from the “One to
the many ones.”

One of the main themes this chapter develops is that the process of moving from
the “One Subject God” to “many Subjects” is one of individual movements from one
political category (distributive mechanism of opportunity) to manifold categories. The movement is always to imbue more and more categories with rights in the rule of law. This transforms their function from distributing opportunity unequally through social locations, the eight distributive mechanisms, to being defined from within the cultural location of persons and groups of persons by said person or persons. Eventually, political categories that distribute opportunity unequally will dissipate in the actuality of opportunity being distributed equally. It is not part of the dissertation's scope to say how any person in their world might see what this means. The rule of law and social contract generates and maintains the social environment in which different persons and groups of persons within their cultural locations help create laws that include ever more persons and their own self-definitions.

The chapter tells the story of the "One" becoming the "many." It is this becoming that is the ideational foundation of the social justice project. By this is meant that the overall goal of the social justice project is to generate a social environment in which all persons are given Subject status. This goal is always present if the social justice project structures what persons do. To be given Subject status involves a person having the opportunity to help create, participate within, and benefit from the social contract and the rule of law. as s/he understands and acts on what this means for her. The achievement of Subject status is not dependent upon individual effort but upon the (rational) equal distribution of material and social opportunity through institutional practices. Personal responsibility for being free requires that those persons with Subject status work to
distribute opportunity so that more and more persons feel themselves to be able to help create, and participate in, and benefit from the social contract and rule of law.

The original Subject in the West was God, from which all emanated. The word of God as given in the bible and interpreted by the Catholic clergy constituted divine law. With the Enlightenment emerged the human Subject in the role of the citizen among citizens within rational society. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries the citizen was a property owner, male, and of European ancestry. Divine law was superseded by the Lockean idea of the social contract, and its most far-reaching codification in property law. The capital-controlling citizen in the middle of the 19th century, especially in America, joined the property-owning citizen. The robber baron controlled the flow of capital during the Gilded Age. The mechanisms of right were written into law, defining the rights of property owners, and then the rights of capital and corporations. Citizens, males, property owners, capitalists, and corporations were Subjects at the end of the 19th century. For the most part, these were the poles on the eight distributive mechanisms that benefited from the existing social contract and rule of law.

In both Europe and America during the latter half of the 19th century, the worker rose to claim the Subject status assumed by the capitalist. Other claims to Subject status were made as well. Women in the suffrage movement demanded the right to vote, to become part of society. Rational men challenged the institution of slavery and American blacks were freed, if not given the franchise. Over the course of the 19th century, orphans were recognized to be different from the criminal, from the insane, and orphanages were
created. The insane were discovered to be different from the criminal and asylums were built to house them.

At the end of the 19th century the idea of the child as more than an unformed adult emerged. While not achieving Subject status, children were recognized to be different and law created that defined discovered differences. The first half of the 20th century saw the lawful recognition that women deserved the franchise, that old people deserved social security, that children deserved material support as written into law as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). World War II was fought in part to defend the rights of Jews, Catholics, and Gypsies as Subjects. Over the last 50 years the civil rights movement, the gay rights movement, the women's movement and liberation movements in third world or southern nations fought and fight for Subject status, recognition of difference and codification of this difference as deserving of Subject status in law.

In the first years of the third millennia, there are countless classes and categories. populations of people seeking to be recognized in law as Subjects equal to all others. To be a woman intersects with culture, nationality, sexual preference, the market, class, and many other population categories. Each claim to Subject status is a challenge to Subjects benefiting from how the law is currently written. The divine Subject, the "One God" is now a myriad of subject populations known by differences. The Palestinian woman declaiming the nationalism hidden there within challenges the American woman's movement. The Palestinian lesbian who charges heterosexism challenges the Palestinian woman. The old Palestinian lesbian who charges ageism challenges the Palestinian lesbian. The poor, old Palestinian lesbian charges classism. Each challenge is a
destabilization of an historical sediment that originates within the domination/subjugation hierarchy originating in the “One God.” Each challenge is both a declaration of Subject status by persons identifying with a more stratified and complex category, and a demand that this newly claimed status be given equal rights with other categories in law. The many becomes many more.

The Subject is not a fact or a final becoming of Being. It is an idea through which emanates the real possibility of being free. It is a status that is part of Being becoming being(s). It is a transformational vehicle of the social and cultural world, neither Being nor being(s). In western societies to achieve Subject status is to benefit from the world as it is. The opportunity has been given by the material and social environment to individuals to make decisions where a person comes to understand s/he creates his or her own life. S/he comes to see s/he is free of the trappings of the medieval social order, of historicist forces assuming the right to create individuals and populations in the name of a natural law, free from the power of capital to create consumers out of persons. This does not mean that social and cultural constraints cease to exist; rather, it means that the possibility of freedom harbored in these constraints is now being acted upon.

**The Medieval Period**

The medieval worldview consisted of the belief that the social order was divinely made and that a person’s place within it was static and unchangeable. Royals, nobles, gentry, and peasants were born into a social world that was God’s making. Because it was God’s creation, human reality was derivative of divine reality. There was much mystery in God’s universe. Humans were made in God’s image. Be it unspeakable
suffering, the miracle of birth, or the seasons and their changes, there was an underlying awe and wonder about God's creation in all its manifest forms. In particular, there was great mystery felt by the medievals about God's reasons for creating the world, and why things were the way they were. The answer to "why" was invariably, "It is God's will."

The sole interpreters of God's will and divine mystery were the Scholastic clerics of the "One Church," the Catholic Church. They spent centuries engaging in hermeneutics - interpretation and explanation of God's will as written in scripture. Their interpretations generated divine law and served to define all roles within the social order. These interpretations were set in place as dogma, as "the" interpretation of reality. No other views were countenanced. European social history is writ through with stories of holy wars spreading the word of the One Church. Church based inquisitions rooted out questions challenging the truth of dogma, for to question dogma was heresy. From inquisition of individuals to root out internal heresy to holy war against other cultures and their threatening beliefs, dogma was defended on all fronts.

Working in concert with the power of the Church was the divinely originating feudal social order that had the blood of the royal family the vehicle of power and privilege. The bloodlines of nobility, landed gentry, and the peasantry determined what station in life a person would occupy for the whole of their lives. There was no movement, both upwardly to new stations of privilege, or geographically to other towns for the majority of a kingdom's people. To be sure, there was a constant stratum within different medieval societies that explored the non-European world. The Crusades involved movement of armies across the world and interpenetration of cultures. The
Vikings touched on what became the United States, and Columbus sailed into the unknown. Traders traveled between kingdoms. However, the majority of medieval subjects never traveled from their villages.

In the 10th and 11th centuries, European society existed as groups of dependents (Bloch, 1961). Most people were serfs, protected by their lords or masters against sickness, unemployment, and old age (Trattner, 1995). These lords in turn were beholden to the Sovereign for protection against invasion by other Sovereignties.

At the end of the 12th century a great change began that was signified by the formation of classes, economic changes and formation of the state. Knighthood became hereditary and changed into nobility. Cities developed and trade became more active. Different social codes developed based in the idea that the community, rather than Sovereign, provided protection. Money as a medium of exchange allowed development of a salaried class and contributed to the rebirth of the state. It wasn’t until as late as the 18th century though, that rural forms of feudal or manorial social organization gave over to more modern forms in newly forming nations (Bloch. 1967). The old social order, repetitive and circular, gave over to the new, productive and spirallic – what has been called the age of reason, or the Enlightenment.

The Reformation fragmented the dominance of the One Church in the West. The power of one interpretation of scripture gave over to manifold interpretations. The reformation traditionally is said to have started in 1517 with Luther’s posting of the 95 Theses on the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg. Luther’s vision was medieval insofar as he desired to reform the Catholic church, not replace it, or bring another church
into the world. The reformation failed to achieve its goals, but it did fragment the One Church and the dogmatic power it held within the social order. The manifold interpretations of scripture weakened the power of the Catholic church and made room for the power of science through the vehicle of the human Subject to interpret awe and mystery.

The transformation of the Divine to human Subject began with the Enlightenment, and the vehicle of change during the Enlightenment was reason. The theoretical discourses of the Enlightenment elevated the guiding beacon of reason to the source of progress in knowledge and society. Reason, given new form in the scientific method, acquired the unquestioned status as the means to discover principles and practical rules upon which systems of thought and action could be built and medieval society could be restructured into a modern one. This was the Enlightenment project.

The Enlightenment

The Enlightenment is the era traditionally characterized to have emerged in late 17th century and early 18th century France and has been called “The age of reason.” The term Enlightenment can be understood to cover the flowering of the cultural transformation that began with Copernicus. A set of core ideas that fell under the rubric of “rationalism” was spread by a group of advanced thinkers to a relatively large number of the educated public. In France, “café society” became a public venue where the ideas of the day were debated (Habermas, 1962). Such coffee houses became a public forum for more and more people. It was here that the ideas of the “contract” and “natural rights” first expressed in the ideas of Hobbes, then developed by Locke and Rousseau
began to structure the social order of the age. These were not debates between members of the aristocracy, but between subjects equal in the eyes of the State.

The French Revolution coincided with the declaration by d’Holbach (1770) that “man is unhappy because he is ignorant of Nature.” Nature is knowable through human experience and thought. He argued that explanations of nature should not be sought in the traditional interpretations of the church, in exegesis or revelation, that religion and it’s grounding in the metaphysical and supernatural narrows and inhibits the free play of the human spirit to achieve happiness and self-preservation. The 200-year process by which the canons of science replaced the canons of religion became visible during the Enlightenment. The cosmology of the developing natural sciences bore the fruit of a social upheaval that signaled the emergence of modernity as the dominant cultural context in the West.

Finally, in building the worldview of the Enlightenment, the increasing prestige of natural science – then usually known as “natural philosophy” – played an important part. By the early eighteenth century, the achievements in mathematics, astronomy, and physics that culminated in Newton’s *Principia* (1687) had penetrated widely, if not deeply into the public mind of the West. That very modern phenomenon, “science made easy,” began with a number of explanations of Newton’s work… Indeed Newton appears as the first of a line of culture heroes from among natural scientists that extends through Darwin to Einstein. No doubt the ladies and gentlemen who admired Newton were for the most part incapable of understanding the Principia, and, though some of them fashionably
dabbled at home with scientific experiments. They had no very sophisticated concepts of scientific method. Science was for them, however, living, growing evidence that human beings, using the "natural" reasoning powers in a fairly obvious and teachable way, could not only understand the way things really are in the universe; they could understand what human beings are really like, and by combining this knowledge of nature and human nature, learn how to live better and happier lives (Brinton, 1967)

The Enlightenment Vision writ large for most consisted of sure belief in the natural and inevitable triumph of rational science and its application over the social and natural ills of poverty, disease, and perhaps even death itself. However, despite the mounting evidence of the awful power of the scientific method, this belief was written over 17 centuries of belief in divine law and God its origin. The work of Enlightenment thinkers is founded in the premise that God exists.

**The social contract and the State.** The Enlightenment vision was given concrete form in the work of John Locke (1632 – 1704). Touraine (1995) said

Locke's starting point is that because God has granted him an understanding which guides his actions, man enjoys free will and is free to act. The primary meaning of action is labor. The law of nature is the law of the common ownership of the land and all its products. Yet whilst certain men live, like the American Indians, in accordance with the law of nature, others transform and increase natural resources through their labor, and that gives them the right of ownership. Paragraph 27 of the second *Treatise* (Locke 1690b: 287-288)
provides the starting point for the argument that will justify the existence of
property, money and inequality...(pp. 48-49)

Property begins with man's possession of himself, and when he mixes his labor
with the fruits of the earth, it becomes his property. In feudal society, the Sovereign
owned all property. The right of property was fixed by one's place in the social order.
Locke's idea of the individual origin of property as a mixture of natural law and labor is a
radical departure from the medieval status quo.

The transition from common ownership to individual property therefore
transforms the role of the law: far from being based on the common good, it must
protect the freedom to act, to trade and to own property (Touraine, 1995, p. 49)

The Sovereign relation between King and his vassals is constructed of sanguine
law and duty to obey said law. Standards for rights and responsibilities are maintained
within a static social order. It is circular and reproductive. In contrast, Locke's vision
assumes that labor, as a form of property, is the transformative force that powers social
change. The difference between modern and medieval worlds is that the modern world is
productive within the context of society. Touraine (1995) said "The right to own
property, the right to freedom and the right to resist oppression are the principles that
found civil society" (p. 51).

Locke assumed that men existed in a state of nature, bound to preserve peace,
preserve humankind and refrain from hurting one another. Each individual is responsible
for upholding the law of nature manifested in the state of nature. Locke also assumes that
some men are somehow inclined to violate the rights of others. The solution to this
problem is civil government where by common consent equally free men (Subjects) form a social contract. The purpose of the social contract is to preserve and maintain the freedom, lives, and property of all. Note that the definition of social contract given in chapter one and the first pages of this chapter does not include the term “property.” This is a consequence of Young’s (1990) criticism of Rawls distributive justice.

Political society is based in the social contract, which has men give up their legislative and executive rights given in the law of nature, all in the name of the common good. Sovereignty is shifted from the Sovereign body of the King to the people in the form of a legislative or executive body or both (Clapp, 1967). The liberal notion of “society” emerges to replace the role of sovereign as origin of law, which is nothing more than contractual relations defined in civil law, backed by the force of criminal law. Both are developed and enforced by “society.”

The Subject for Locke is free, a freedom given by God and bound by natural law, a law that has as its highest expression the formation of a social contract.

**Self-interest, capital, and the market economy.** The political economist, Adam Smith (1723 – 1790), writing 80 years after Locke, thought that the common good was best served by permitting each person to pursue his own interest. Self-interests were naturally balancing, for if one man violated the interests of others, he would find himself ostracized from participating in the market, and hence, the source of his very livelihood. Smith argued that consumable goods constitute wealth and that the wealthiest nation is the one that itself produces the greatest amount of consumable goods, or can command these goods from others. Swingewood (1991) says that for Smith, “the development of a
commercial society produced a social structure divided into three clear classes, landowners, capitalists and laborers, who respectively lived from rent, stock and wages."

The core of Locke's vision was the citizen, the first differentiation of the idea of the Enlightenment Subject. The core of Smith's vision was class structure and the roles of landowner, capitalist and laborer. In the late 18th century, the landowner assumed the privilege of dominance. At the end of the 19th century, it is the capitalist that assumes this position. From the Enlightenment idea of civil government embodying the rule of law, Smith signaled the emergence of a rule of economic law. Political rationalization of the social order created the notion of citizen and his rights. New forms of social organization based on economic function displaced older forms of organization based on geographic proximity. The role of capital as a background force to social work's professionalization will be more fully explored in the next chapter.

**Discourse of Rights**

The Subject became citizen became property owner, capitalist, worker, suffragist and voter. God, formless Being, became being(s) in and through these various roles. The primary vehicle of this becoming was the writing of new laws that recognized the claims of different populations. These laws were not limited to property law or law protecting accumulation of capital in a few hands.

For example, the poorhouses of the early 19th century did not differentiate between populations. The young and old, ill and healthy, criminal and juvenile delinquent, sane and insane, alcoholic, men and women, blind, feebleminded and
epileptic were not yet seen to have differing needs and problems calling for different solutions (Trattner, 1995). Each had its divinely originating place in the social order, and the causes of difference were not questioned as they lay in the will of God. To be feebleminded was not a problem as the moderns perceived it to be.

Over the course of the 19th century, different populations were recognized to have different needs. In 1819, the Connecticut Asylum for the Deaf and Dumb was granted 23,000 acres of land, which it sold to support its operations. Dorothea Dix fought for the rights of the mentally ill and to get federal aid for their care and support. Largely as a result of her efforts mental hospitals were established in nine states. The federal role in social welfare efforts was curtailed by Franklin Pierce’s 1853 veto of legislation that would have devoted ten million acres of federal land to be sold by the States to build mental hospitals. This veto had a legacy that lasted until the 1930s when for the first time the American federal government took an active role in the social welfare of its citizens.

The Freedman’s Bureau (1865 – 1872) was the first federal welfare agency and served mostly Black southerners displaced by the Civil War. It provided transportation to refugees wanting to return to their homes, distributed rations to the hungry, established 46 hospitals, set up orphan asylums and set up 4,329 schools for Black children (Axinn & Levin. 1992,). The Northern view that this was a radical movement to distribute Northern income to the South led to its dissolution.

In 1848, a first Women’s Rights Convention was held, and increasingly women became involved in reform movements – temperance, suffrage, and the abolition of slavery. The American Equal Rights Association formed in 1866, and after some internal
contentions, in 1890 formed into the National American Women’s Suffrage Association.
While numbers were small during these years, never more than 10,000 or so, the efforts
of these organizations presaged passage of the 19th Amendment in 1919 codifying
women’s right to vote (Lubove, 1965).

After the Civil War, children were separated from the general population housed
in state and county institutions. It was recognized that institutions housing the insane,
feebleminded, criminals, the promiscuous and deviant, were not aiding residents to
reconstruct their lives, but serving to protect larger society from criminals, paupers, and
the insane. Efforts were made to place children in foster homes, or to support pauper
families so that children could remain at home (Axinn & Levin, 1992). In a summarizing
statement, Axinn and Levin say. “The latter part of the 19th century saw efforts to remove
various groups from the catchall almshouse. The deaf and dumb, the mentally ill, and
children were all defined as worthy of special treatment” (p. 106). What special
treatment involved was first a recognition of “rights,” a codification thereof in law by
legislation, and then the attempt to define and satisfy the needs of these special
populations. Those unworthy of special treatment, criminals and deviant, had no special
needs to be accounted for. Rather, it was the needs of society to manage these
populations that were codified.

The recognition of sub-populations was constructed to be dichotomous. Those
whose claims are worthy, the child, deaf and dumb or insane, were distinguished from
those whose claims to need were deemed unworthy, criminals, or the deviant. Paupers in
medieval times had been taken care of by the church within the person’s local parish.
Paupers in the late 19th century were now sub-divided into populations with codified rights designating a person as worthy or unworthy of help. More and more populations of Subjects emerged within the social landscape, each claiming the right to be recognized in law, each fighting for a set of rights, or having those rights fought for by others if they were incapable of fighting for them on their own.

Towards the end of the 19th century state government began to codify the rights of populations suffering from laissez faire capitalism and unchecked technological innovation (Trattner, 1995). In 1898, Illinois passed the first juvenile justice act that legally separated children from adults within the court system. The public school was institutionalized during this decade and laws requiring children to attend were passed.

The movement, begun by Dorothea Dix and her associates prior to the Civil War, to have increasingly larger units of government be responsible for social welfare problems, continued, albeit in fits and starts. It wasn't until the Progressive era that State governments began to assume this responsibility, and only in the depression beginning in the 1930s that the federal government generated a safety net in a codified discourse of rights for specific populations in law. A general movement from town to county to State to Federal responsibility for the rights of increasing numbers of different populations can be charted to have taken place during this time (Trattner, 1995).

The discourse of rights is inextricably part of the movement of the "One to the many." Until a group's claim to Subject status is codified in law and the social contract broadens to welcome its participation, the group has no legitimacy. In an important sense it neither exists nor acts until its rights are recognized and codified in law. The
intertwining of the discourse of rights and rule of law has as its Subject a different group with each movement from identification, naming, and codification. In this sense it parallel’s professionalization’s spiralling process of problem identification, naming, and solution.

Alain Touraine’s Idea of the Subject

The idea of the Subject will be taken from the work of Alain Touraine, a French social theorist. Ten Nobels (2000) offers a short biography of Touraine. He was born in 1925 in and received his degree in History from the Ecole Normale Sup & Egraverieure of Paris in 1950. He was a Rockefeller Fellow in 1952 and 1953 at Harvard, Columbia, and Chicago and was a researcher at the French National Research Council until 1958.

In 1956, Touraine founded the Research Center for the Sociology of Labor at the University of Chile and in 1958 founded the Industrial Sociology Workshop of Paris, which became the Centre for the Study of Social Movements in 1970. In 1960, he became senior researcher at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes and, after receiving his doctorate in literature, he taught at the Department of Literature of the University of Paris-Nanterre from 1966 to 1969. In 1981, he founded the Centre for Sociological Analysis, which he directed until 1993.

The body of Alain Touraine’s work constitutes a "sociology of action" and can be divided into three periods. The first was devoted to the sociology of labor and workers’ consciousness, mainly based on field studies in Latin America. The second was concerned with social movements: starting with studies of the events of May 1968, and military coups in Latin America and the birth of Solidarity in Poland. The third and
present period is mainly concerned with the Subject as the fundamental agent of social
movements.

Touraine has written twenty books, about half of which have been translated into
English. These include *Workers Movement, The Return of the Actor*, and *Critique of
Modernity*. It is the *Critique of Modernity* that offers the theoretical background for
understanding the ontology of the Subject. Touraine summarizes the *Critique of
Modernity* in a fairly critical voice by saying

What can we do to remedy a situation in which nostalgia for the One and the
world order seems pointless and where the complete divorce between actor and
system leads to the coexistence of a savage subjectivity and an enforced order, but
not to their integration? The book you have just read attempts to provide an
answer. It traces the decline of the Christian and Cartesian dualism, which was
repressed by the optimistic materialism of the enlightenment and then repressed
even more severely by the philosophies of Progress. It then describes the
antimodernist reaction against historicism that takes us from Nietzsche to the
Frankfurt School and Michel Foucault. Having examined the break between a
rationalist neo-liberalism that believes only in change, and a post-modern
subjectivity that cobbles together signs from past cultures, it finally puts forward
the idea that the only way to avoid the fragmentation of modern society is to
recognize that modernity is not based upon rationalization alone. From the very
outset, it was defined by the divorce - and the complementarity - between
reason and the Subject, and more specifically, between rationalization and
subjectivation. Rather than taking the view that technical and economic
erationality are increasingly destroying subjectivity, this book demonstrates how
modernity produces the Subject, which is synonymous with neither the individual
nor the role-set that is constructed by the social organization. The subject is the
labour through which an individual transforms him or herself in to an actor, or in
other words, an actor capable of transforming a situation rather than reproducing
it through his mode of behavior (Touraine. 1988, p. 373-4)

For Touraine, the idea of modernity is the conceptual fundament for understanding social
and cultural change. Modernity is a dialogue between the Subject and reason.

Democracy is connected to modernity where a rational subject in the form of a social
movement emerges to formulate universal principles, laws, and rights. Modernity for
Touraine is secular (Kellner, 1997). Braun (1999) says, “Touraine is correct that science
rather than God is the central legitimating construct of modern society.” In the end, for
Touraine, the Subject is a social movement that discovers and creates its own laws,
institutions, and social forms that will preserve its freedom and enhance its well-being. A
beginning sketch of the Subject has it be the locus of action. of being-free, which by the
use of reason transforms the world.

Touraine is a critic of participatory democracy and argues against a
multiculturalism that involves the logic of pursuing diversity and difference without
seeking a common ground of higher principles and values, or a shared public sphere and
polis. This perspective parallels Fraser’s (1997) commentary on Young’s (1991) work.
These higher principles are grounded in the concerns of French existentialism. Touraine,
at heart, seems to be concerned with the issue of human freedom. His work can be seen to put the concerns of French existentialism and exploration of the idea of freedom on a more sociological footing (Braun, 1999).

There is danger here in referring to freedom and existentialism in the same thought. The themes of meaningfulness and absurdity in the face of the deaths of both God and Man, often associated with existential thought, leave the subject alone in the infinite universe. The existential subject stands outside of history, contemplating its fate, its finitude, the ultimate origin of its own existence. This is not the how the relation between freedom and the Subject is to be understood. The Subject is writ through and through with its own history. The Subject is inescapably in the world, in the midst of history. However, it is not a history coming to know itself. Nor is it the history of the Enlightenment subject given at the center of the modern world, rational and ahistorical in its objectivity. The Subject both reproduces and produces its history. Being-free involves the creation of one's own life within an historical and cultural context. Some definitions of the subject offered by Touraine (1995) are as follows.

The idea of a subject is a dissident idea that has always upheld the right to rebel against an unjust power. ... The modern spirit was defined by its struggle against religion. ... modernity's subject is none other than the secularized descendant of religious expression of the subject (p. 230).

The Subject is the individual's will to produce and not simply consume an individual experience and a social environment (p. 232).
In the medieval period only God was productive. All else was a vehicle of God's will, his creative force. The reference to consuming anticipates the discussion of modernization in the next chapter. Touraine maintains that freedom has in part been co-opted by the relation of company and consumer, often mediated by sexuality. The role of consumer could easily be added as the ninth distributive mechanism of a social location.

The subject does not imply the care of the self, but the defense of the ability to be an actor, or in other words, to modify one's social environment by resisting the norms and forms of social organization through which the Self is constructed (p. 263).

The reference to care of the self assumes knowledge of Michel Foucault's later work in which he explores how persons learn to produce and maintain themselves as objects. Modification of the social environment is directed so that others may be given Subject status and participate in creating a just world. Here is found the root of the Subject's personal responsibility for being free.

The subject is a conscious will to construct individual experience, but it also implies affection for a communitarian tradition. It is a form of self-enjoyment, but also a form of submission to reason. It does not replace the shattered world of post-modernism with an omnipotent principle of unity; it is a 'weak' notion that is not so much a central affirmation as a network of relations between commitment and non-commitment, individuality and collectivity (p. 269).

The commitment to individuality is found in choosing to be free while collective commitment is found in being personally responsible for being free. The individuality
and collectivity toward which is directed non-commitment is that of founding respectively. personal identity and group identity within a categorical mechanism that distributes opportunity unequally. Reason suggests that it is unreasonable to found one's personal declaration of Subject status within personal and social categories given historically within a hierarchy of domination/subjugation.

What I am calling the subject is the individual's ability to reflect upon his or her own identity (p. 274).

This reflection leads to understanding that identity is static. The introduction of this section argued that the grammatical relation of identity separates existing and acting. When personal identity is grounded in identity relations, it emphasizes existence, not action. This view of identity is founded in the idea that God created the universe and that his categories are unchanging and hence static. Identity in this casting is a medieval construct bound up in a circle of reproduction. There is no productive, generative, or creative force to an identity founded in the form "I am XXX." In contrast, to reflect on one's identity is to create for oneself the possibility to change it, to create what Fraser (1997) called a more fluid identity. In the ontology of the Subject, this fluidity is found in the ongoing act of being-free and being responsible for being-free.

...to define the subject as the demand to be an individual, to lead a personal life.

The subject is defined by its freedom and efforts to achieve liberation rather than by reason and rationalizing techniques... Yet the tragic consciousness of the subject, which is associated with the attempt to break free of social roles and to resist the pressure of groups, public opinion and apparatuses, cannot be reduced to
a self-sacrificial consciousness, as it submits to no law and to no higher necessity, but only to human existence (p. 275).

The Subject is existing and acting with no reference to any "thing" or state of affairs, event, or interpretation. At the same time it is historically situated within both a cultural and social location. A person has been given the possibility by her social environment to achieve Subject status, and again, part of this status is being responsible for being free. The Subject is both acting and producing the social environment in being free and reproducing it so that others may learn to be free and take responsibility for being-so.

The Subject is freedom, or the act of freeing, of working for liberation from the bonds of social conformity by self-consciously creating the world. Subject status is the goal of all persons and peoples who don’t have it, and the beckoning call of modernity. From the time of the Reformation, the Renaissance, and the age of revolutions, the right to be a Subject has framed the dreams and generated the passions of those not so enslaved or weary to dream and feel passion. The divine Subject created the world. The human Subject creates his or her own life within the historical and cultural world.

Liberal "society" as envisioned by Locke is a society of laws. The rights of Subjects are codified in law. The citizen Subject and a society based on reason form the Enlightenment dream that beats at the heart of the modernity. Whether a person has grown up a woman, a woman of color, a lesbian or gay man, a child or retiree, a person with a developmental disability or someone from a southern nation or tribe within that nation, there is a common thread that exposure to the West and its liberal society
generates. This is the passion to be free, to make choices unrestricted by State or economic interests. This thread is the Subject.

Modernity. Modernity is a dialogue between the Subject and reason. This cryptic statement is given context throughout the *Critique of Modernity*. Some clarifications and definitions follow.

The best definition of modernity is ... the demand for freedom and the defense of freedom against everything that transforms individuals into instruments, objects, or absolute strangers.

Modernity means the permanent creation of the world by human beings who are endowed with the power and ability to create data and language, and also to defend themselves against their creations when they turn against them ... It transfers the subject from God to man (p. 230)

Modernity is to be understood as the constant dialogue or interplay between reason and the Subject, or rationalization and subjectivation. Rationalization protects reason from the traditional forces of political propaganda, religious beliefs, nepotism, political patronage and corruption, personal power, private wealth and private life. The idea of rationalization is broadened to include the idea of a rational society, where reason controls the government of human beings. Touraine (1995) says

In all cases, rationalization was seen as the sole principle behind the organization of personal and collective life, and it was associated with the theme of secularization, or in other words, with a refusal to define ‘ultimate ends’” (p. 10).
Subjectivation on the other hand, is the process in which the human Subject replaces the divine subject. This process of subjectivation moves the origin of creativity and free will from God to the human Subject.

The medieval world was divine. The modern world secularizes the divine, destroying "the enchanted world of magic and sacraments" (Touraine. 1995. p. 39). Modernity replaces the divine world with two forces; reason and the Subject. Rationalization and subjectivation.

Touraine begins Critique of Modernity by going straight to existential concerns with a discussion of Christian thought and the idea of the Divine Subject and shows how the creative, productive or "free" elements assumed by the divine Subject over time were assumed by the human Subject. Touraine thinks that reason can contribute to, if not generate human freedom. Much of his book is given over to a discussion of how modernity, the dialogue between subject and reason, is being fragmented by a number of forces that assume the rights of the liberal Subject: sexuality, the company, the nation, and consumption.

The Subject and Constructionism. Constructionism falls very much within the liberal tradition of the transformation of the divine into human Subject. It affirms the multiplicity of cultures and their worlds, and insists that social workers begin where the client is within these worlds. It seeks to affirm the complexity of a cultures beliefs and principles, and the uncertainty generated when cultures for which these beliefs and principles are sacred, come into contact with another culture’s beliefs and standards. Constructionism not only seeks to understand how difference is constructed by members
of other cultures, it critiques Western culture's assumption of privilege, that our natural
world is the "real" world and other cultures' understanding of the universe is in some
measure superstition or irrational.

Constructionist discourses (see chapter 3) are found in empowerment practices, in
the strengths perspective, in working to change the larger social systems that create
misery and suffering for individuals, families, groups, organizations and communities.
The emerging constructionist tradition in social work operates very much within the
liberal tradition of the Subject, society and the reasoned codification of rights of
populations. It is very much a vehicle of transforming the "One" Subject into "many"
Subjects, until all persons achieve Subject status.

The Subject is the focus of the discourses of social justice found in social work. Social
workers are taught to work for social justice, to use their own achieved Subject
status to create law that recognizes and validates the claims of populations who want this
status. Social works' professional code of ethics mandates that social workers work to
codify the rights of oppressed populations in law, to work at changing community and
organizational norms that privilege one population over another so that the "differences"
between persons no longer determine Subject status. Equal rights for all populations who
are recognized, or recognize themselves to be oppressed is a goal that underlies every
professional act by a social worker. A liberal society of laws is believed to have the
possibility to erase the historical assumption of privilege by populations who benefit from
other's lack of Subject status.
Social work can create its own understanding of its role as a vehicle that transforms the "One" into the "many." Social work's foundation is the interdisciplinary understandings of the liberal arts. It affirms this foundation in movement towards adopting a constructionist perspective on the complexity of the modern world. Being able to maintain a complex and sophisticated view generates confusion and uncertainty as new claims to Subject status amongst hitherto silenced populations emerges.

The move to reduce this perspective to a simpler view, that of a natural universe as Western science defines it, is constantly resisted by social workers. For, as introduced in the next chapter, and more fully explored in Chapter 6, the vision of Subject as freedom and personal responsibility for being free, in dialogue with reason in the creation of modernity can be cast in a perspective that conflates this social justice project with the project of modernization, which in part works through professionalization.

On one hand libratory discourses demand Subject status and codification in law and recognition in the social contract. This is the positive side of the social justice project: moving from the "One to the many ones." This position parallels Fraser (1997) position in which she envisions social justice is best achieved in a politics of transformation that uses both recognition and redistribution as vehicles of transformation. She wants to destabilize existing identity categories as part of persons creating new, more fluid identities for themselves, in their situatedness.

On the other hand, the absence of discourses in social work exploring what it means to be free is an example of the consequence of conflated discourses and the lack of an active social justice project. Instead, the language of oppression, the world it assumes,
and its categories that organize this world and distribute opportunity within it serve can be seen to stabilize themselves by use of the discourses of social justice.

The force of the Subject's passion to be recognized in law, within society, as a Subject. whether person or population. can be assumed by larger forces having their own ends. All the rights based movements of the modern era have sought to be recognized as Subjects. as ends in themselves. rather than instruments of natural law. capitalism. Marxism. or professional. scientifically derived knowledge. And yet. there is a perspective that argues this is exactly what has and is happening.

The next chapter sets the broad brushed background for understanding how differentiation of the "One" divine Subject into the "many" human Subjects within the social justice project is a futile struggle. What makes the rational end of a just world a struggle to achieve is the dominance of the social contract and rule of law by the three forces of modernization. The heart of the Subject. freedom. and personal responsibility for being free. is assumed by modernization and professionalization. The foundation of modernization's assumption of this status is the story found in the ontology of nature.
Chapter 5

The Ontology of Nature

With Freud, man lost his Godlike mind; with Darwin, his exalted place among the creatures on earth; with Copernicus man had lost his privileged position in the universe. The general intellectual repercussions of this fact are more dramatic than any consequences within technical astronomy, where one can speak of the Keplerian "revolution" but of not more than a Copernican "disturbance." For the broad history of ideas, however, the implications of Copernicanism can hardly be exaggerated. Even religious revolutionaries such as Luther and Malanchthon came to view Copernicus' position with abhorrence. His views challenged the literal interpretation of Scripture, the philosophical and metaphysical foundations of moral theory, and even common sense itself. The result was a massive opposition, learned and lay, to the reported ideas of Copernicus.

Hanson, (1967, p. 221)
The Ontology of Nature

The ontology of the Subject has Being becoming being(s) where Being is assumed to exist, albeit formless and unknown. The ontology of nature holds no position on the existence of Being. What is primary in natural science, which studies nature, are the relations between being(s). Any concern with Being is outside of the purview of science and is viewed as speculation. The part-to-part relations between being(s) can be viewed as lawful relations, probabilistic patterns of relations, and as problems to be solved. When relations between being(s) are combined, theory is generated. However, this theory is always a generalization of specific relations (knowledge) that are agreed to exist. Nature is understood to be the sum total of relations between being(s), a sum that is constantly changing. Where nature changes is on the frontier or cutting edge of scientific knowledge of nature. Agents of change are scientists utilizing the scientific method and increasingly more powerful and refined instrumentation to generate knowledge deemed valid by peer agreement. Science is conducted within a boundaryland between agreed-upon knowledge and what is unknown. The more agreed-upon knowledge is sedimented as a culture’s own story about itself into nature, the simpler nature appears in its objective reality. The more the relations between known and unknown, regular and certain patterns of events and random, uncertain events interpenetrate, the more complex and less objective nature appears. The dichotomous distinction between subjective and objective becomes a reference point of common sense
and the naïve realist’s foundation. The realist’s position has a far more complex range within which nature is understood.

This chapter begins by tracing the origins of how reality is understood to the work of Copernicus, and then tells the story of the history of nature in broad brush strokes. The idea of modernization is introduced and defined, both as a set of three framing forces and a spirally progressive movement of problem creation, naming, and solution. The idea of sedimentation is introduced to account for the mechanism by which a culture turns the story of its own origin about itself into nature. The three forces of modernization – the cosmology of natural science, capitalization of the market economy, and differentiation of the discourse of rights, are discussed and defined in turn. The ideas of complex and simple views of reality held by social scientists are revisited, this time in a discussion of the idea of falsification offered by Karl Popper.

The History of Nature

The ontology of nature can have its origins traced to the 16th century work of Copernicus (1473-1543). He introduced the idea that it was not the earth, and hence humankind, that was the physical center of the universe. He suggested the earth rotated around the sun. What so disturbed the medievalists was the proposition that there existed a “nature” nowhere to be found in the bible. The physical universe that Copernicus described was a pebble dropped into a medieval pond, the ripples of which are still being felt today. The following few paragraphs tell the story of how this ripple was sedimented into a nature that continues to form the West’s cultural background, its story of its own origins in a cosmology of natural science.
Galileo (1564-1642) built on Copernicus’ heliocentric theory. He also discovered the law of falling bodies. Galileo argued publicly for the strict separation of theology and natural science. He flouted Churchly canon by violating the ban on discussing Copernican heliocentrism. He introduced mathematics into physics, and was also one of the first advocates of the inductive method of scientific investigation, where observation and experiment were the primary determinants of “T”ruth. In 1633, he was called to Rome to face the Inquisition. He was forced by the Church to recant his views that were officially deemed heretical and spent the last nine years of his life under house arrest.

Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626), while not a scientist himself, was pivotal in development of the scientific method. Cranston (1967) says that Bacon become the founding father of modern science in England during a time when the “religious fanaticism of the counter-reformation had driven modern science from its birthplace in Italy” (p. 235). Bacon introduced the idea that science involved “systematic study.” Cranston (1967), quoting Thomas Fowler (1881), one of Bacon’s biographers, says, “He stood like a prophet on the verge of the promised land, bidding men to leave without regret the desert that was behind them, and enter with joyfulness and hopefulness on the rich inheritance that was spread before them.”

Isaac Newton (1642-1727) formalized Galileo’s law of falling bodies and worked out the inverse square law of universal gravitation, among others. The heliocentric universe became a nomocentric universe with Newton’s work; a universe of natural laws. Newton’s most famous work. Principia Mathematica, published in 1687, claimed to account for all motion in the universe. It was based on a century of observation and
study and required a substantial background in mathematics to be read. Newton’s work became the foundation for what today is called classical physics.

Newton also argued that discovery of universal gravitation was supporting evidence for belief in a deity. In spite of his theological arguments, his work can be seen as a fulcrumal marker for the establishment of the cosmology of natural science. He continued the modernistic trend beginning with Copernicus that actively separated theology from natural science. God’s universe slowly fragmented as the mathematical universe of natural law was explored with an increasingly sophisticated scientific method.

Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882) initiated a revolution in thought more far-reaching than that ushered in by Copernicus. He established beyond reasonable doubt that all living things, including man, have developed from a few extremely simple forms, perhaps from one form, by a gradual process of descent with modification. Furthermore, he formulated a theory (natural selection) supporting it with a large body of evidence, to account for this process and particularly to explain the “transmutation of Species” and the origin of adaptations. As a result, the biological sciences were given a test of unifying principles and man was given a new and challenging conception of his place in nature (Goudge, 1967).

Darwin was one of the first scientists to use historical or genetic explanations and to engage in statistical thinking in terms of populations. Darwin’s work was hostile to the religious beliefs of his time, and generated a lot of controversy. He avoided this controversy but did not stop others from publicly attacking religious dogma. His own
beliefs as he relates in his Autobiography (1958) moved from unquestioning acceptance of Christian doctrines to active disbelief. Goudge (1967) notes that his 1881 Autobiography had omitted material that contained caustic judgments about the Christian religion that were restored in the 1958 version.

The physicist’s mathematical universe and the evolutionist’s universe of natural selection had no concern for God, or questions about divine origin or God’s will. Where the Scholastic clerics had interpreted God’s will in hermeneutic deduction from scripture, the new scientists engaged in inductive exploration of the objective and natural world described by the new mathematics. These laws and principles were not seen as arbitrary and contingent. From the late 17th through the end of the 19th centuries. the basic research that new scientists performed sedimented the scientific foundation for “Truth” upon which the modern world is built.

The canons of science replaced theological canons as the reign of clerics gave way to that of scientists. The cosmology of natural science in the post-Enlightenment period slowly supplanted the divine cosmology of the medieval period. Touraine (1995) said “The idea of modernity makes science, rather than God, central to society and at best relegates religious beliefs to the inner realm of private life” (p. 9).

God and religion remain(ed) real presences in the lives of individuals. However, at the level of culture and its assumptions, the natural world of science was gaining dominance while the divine world lost its hold on the power to define reality. The ontology of nature was slowly sedimented as a more fundamentally “T”rue way to understand the universe and humankind’s place within it.
Inductive, scientific methods replaced deductive hermeneutics as a way to interpret the play of natural forces. The mysterious universe was so only because science had not yet developed the tools and methods to make the unknown known. The objectively real, natural world of western science and its inductive methods both created and solved natural and social problems in its rise to dominance.

**Modernization**

Modernization is the achievement of reason itself, and it is therefore primarily the achievement of science, technology, and education. The sole goal of social policies for modernization must be to clear a path for reason by doing away with corporatist rules, defenses or customs barriers, by creating the security and predictability required by business, and by training competent and conscientious managers and operatives. (Touraine. 1995. p. 11)

Modernization is to be understood as both a process and a framework through which process takes place. It transforms divine cosmology into a cosmology that assumes a natural universe. For the purposes of the dissertation, the framework of modernization consists of three forces; the cosmology of natural science, capitalization of the market, and differentiation of the discourse of rights. The process of modernization is defined as the triumvirate of problem generation, identification, and solution. It is a spiralic process that transforms the material and social world.

**Modernization: progressive movement.** The medieval social order was based in repetitious social practices, a perpetual circle bound by God, sanguinity, and seasons. It was reproductive. Born a peasant, always a peasant. The modern social order is based in
progressive social practices, an emerging, spiraling cycle of problems emerging that stem from technological and social change. These problems are solved utilizing the tools of applied science. The modern social order is productive. The discoveries of basic science are applied to newly emerging problems and solutions are generated. The productive process of problem generation, identification, and solution by technological means is the broadest definition of the process of modernization.

The cosmology of natural science serves as modernization's foundation. With every successful solution to a material or social problem, this cosmology was sedimented to describe "T"rue nature. As long as the problems produced by emergent technologies were solved by technological means to the satisfaction of dominant stakeholders, the cosmology of natural science increasingly structured how social and economic commerce was conducted. Luther may have fragmented the One Church, but awe and mystery can be viewed to have been increasingly bound up in solutions to problems created by technological innovation and application. Whether the water wheel, the steam engine or factory, lawful natural forces were harnessed and directed to do the bidding of men creating the modern world. A traditional definition of modernization is that offered by Best & Kellner (1991).

Modernity entered everyday life through the dissemination of modern art, the products of consumer society, new technologies, and new modes of transportation and communication. The dynamics by which modernity produced a new industrial and colonial world can be described as 'modernization' - a term denoting those processes of individualization, secularization, industrialization.
cultural differentiation, commodification, urbanization, bureaucratization, and rationalization which together have constituted the modern world. (pp. 2 - 3)

Modernization is the means by which the cosmology of natural science solidified the commonsense understanding of nature. For example, in England, the closing in movement fenced what before had been common lands and more sheep were raised on fewer acres through the scientific practices of animal husbandry. New agricultural techniques and technology to support them allowed for larger farms. The cities of the 16th and 17th centuries grew in size, responding to the centralization of production of consumer goods. How to get food from the country to the city to feed a city’s inhabitants became a major problem. Businesses devoted solely to developing new forms of transportation were created. In the 19th century, the railroad and steam engine were more efficient means to move both food and people than horse and wagon (Trattner, 1995).

During the 18th century, the revolutionary wars in America and France changed the political landscape, and then in the 19th century, scientists and engineers changed the natural landscape. They interpreted the natural processes and their elements and harnessed them for humankind’s benefit (Touraine, 1995).

The reign of kings and their feudatories in the static hierarchy of social roles slowly gave way to the rise of industrialists who remade the world with active application of the principles of modern science. The material world was transformed so that the truth of a universe of natural law was self-evident. The objectively real and natural world as understood in the language of mathematics transformed the medieval world of kings and clerics into one of industrialists and scientists, steam and steel, factories and
slaughterhouses, telegraphs and the internal combustion engine. Modernization reigned triumphant.

The key to this triumph was modernization's progressive production of solutions to material and social problems generated by invention and implementation of new technologies. Every solution once implemented became part of the physical and social background within which new problems emerged. Modernization generated a cycle of progress, a spiralic process of problem emergence, identification, and solution. Solutions to these new problems were implemented and became part of the way things are in the world. This spiralic process constituted the sedimentation by which succeeding generations assumed a "real world" in nature, a cosmology of natural science.

**Sedimentation.** In the largest arena, sedimentation is the process of a culture transforming its own assumptions about "what is real" into nature. As long as nature makes sense, a culture's assumptions about reality, its "Truths," are reproduced without question. The productive function of modernization deepens and broadens nature, extending and expanding the reach of cultural assumptions. New knowledge is generated that extends what is known about nature. This new knowledge becomes a platform upon which the understanding of nature is further extended. The process of sedimentation occurs when new knowledge becomes old knowledge. Cultural assumptions are sedimented into nature, which includes knowledge of human nature. Within nature, new knowledge is generated by basic science, both natural and social, which is then applied in creation of new technologies and discourses. These discourses frame new social practices that generate new problems. Solutions to these problems are generated by
applied science. Over time these solutions become part of the natural and social background that constitute the universe.

An example of the emergence of new discourses as frame for social practices is seen in how the word *dis* is used. The word *dis* over the last ten years has emerged within youth culture. It articulates a standard for behavior and conduct towards another person. The word is not the reverse of "respect." Rather, it defines a whole set of standards for conduct between peers that have natural consequences. In some youth cultures, if you *dis* someone the natural consequence is to beat the person up, or in extreme cases, to kill him. The choices of an individual who has been dissed are determined by standards of conduct that are not questioned. Rather, they are so given and routine, so constitutive of social practices that they become natural. To respond in any other way than what is natural and normal is to open oneself to marginalization or rejection by the peer group, and perhaps eradication for being unnatural or abnormal.

Another example can be found in basic science. Basic scientific research makes discoveries that are used to develop new technologies that result in new social practices. In the human sciences, this often takes the form of researchers engaging in discourse on the leading edge of knowledge in a field, and coming up with a construct about human behavior or attitudes. New variables are generated that are hypothesized to constitute the construct. An instrument is developed to measure the pattern in behavior or attitude the variables are hypothesized to describe. The instrument itself is assessed as to validity and reliability and then disseminated as a tool that measures a real component of human functioning. Each time an instrument is used, it sediments new knowledge about human
behavior. This knowledge becomes part of the background within which new knowledge is produced. If an instrument’s use becomes routine, it serves as reproductive platform for extending the productive reach of cultural assumptions about nature in the act of discovering the next construct, which through sedimentation, becomes a natural part of being human.

The successes of modern science served as evidence of the “T”ruth of the cosmology of natural science. With each successful solution to a problem the three forces of modernization sediment themselves a bit more deeply within social practices.

**The Cosmology of Natural Science.**

The cosmology of natural science lays out the principles for universal order in both the macro realm that is astronomy’s domain, and the micro realm of sub-atomic physics. The cosmology of natural science is just as much a matter of faith and belief as is a divine cosmology. The only difference in God as universal organizing principle and lawful nature as organizing principle is the actual principles that ostensibly organize the universe: God or lawful nature. Neither the existence of God nor lawful nature can be proven (Rubin & Babbie, 2001)

The cosmology of natural science constitutes the realist’s foundation for understanding “what is” reality. There exists a real and objective universe that it is measurable. The protocols of the scientific method reveal the laws and patterns within this measurable universe. Positivism is to be understood as

the sense of that which is given or laid down, that which has to be accepted as we find it and is not further explicable; the word is intended to convey a warning
against the attempts of theology and metaphysics to go beyond the world given to
observation in order to enquire into first causes and ultimate ends. All genuine
human knowledge is contained within the boundaries of science, that is the
systematic study of phenomena and the explication of the laws embodied therein
(Speake, 1979, p. 283).

During the 100 years that social work charted its own course apart from the
mainstream academic social sciences, their theoretical orientation has shifted from the
"grand theory" of thinkers such as Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, John Dewey,
Talcott Parsons and Sigmund Freud. These theories attempted to explain and describe
the functioning of cultural and social systems, or the infrastructure of the human mind
and personality. The Grand Theory that survives the move toward inductive inquiry by
the social sciences is used as the backdrop for more specific theoretical models used
today.

For example, the theory of Max Weber is referenced today, while that of Herbert
Spencer is not. Weber’s theory is viewed as a valid description of social process and
order while Spencer’s is not. Spencer (1961) said, “There can be no complete acceptance
of sociology as a science, so long as the belief in a social order not conforming to natural
law survives” (Ch. XVI). Those theories that didn’t stand up to empirical testing were
deemed to akin to the deductive systems of the Scholastic clerics of the pre-
Enlightenment centuries. Spencer’s assumption that social order conforms to natural law
is a “first principle” that distinguishes deductive Grand theory from today’s inductively
derived models.
The Scholastics attempted to deduce the will of God in logical chains in order to understand social reality. Grand Theory moved the foundation for exploring human reality from one divine to one in propositions. Arguments were then constructed which both proved and supported the validity of those propositions. Talcott Parsons (1965) traces the history of Grand social theory through the work of Nico Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Thomas Malthus, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, Auguste Comte, and Herbert Spencer. In the late 19th and early 20th century the work of Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud and Max Weber culminated this tradition. These European authors formed the intellectual backdrop against which the American University and its social sciences developed.

While there were a number of American social and behavioral scientists who did Grand Theory, the kind of social science that developed in public Universities moved incrementally toward the model of research used by the natural sciences (Haskell. 1988). The new social scientists saw Grand Theory arbitrarily asserting a set of foundational propositions in a deductive logic, much as the Grand Theorists saw the will of God as an arbitrary foundation. The social sciences in America, while not rejecting these arbitrary systems of thought, nonetheless used them only for defining the most general parameters of their inductively derived models. Especially after World War II, the natural science model of research served as jumping off point for the academic social sciences.

It is within the unique construction of a “probabilistic reality” by mathematics that valid, scientific, and empirical knowledge is generated. In this sense, social science and quantum physics are not different. Both create mathematical universes in which to
formulate questions and answers. The kinds of questions that constitute good science are driven by the algorithms of algebraic equations.

Empirical social science generates a mathematical universe that its creators (researchers) attempt to translate or interpret to non-scientists. Probabilistic patterns are written in a unique set of symbols that take time to learn, much like learning to speak a foreign language takes time. It takes three to seven years to complete a research doctoral program in the social sciences. Much of that time is spent becoming familiar with how to walk around in mathematical environments and how to translate what is found into English. Then, the researcher publishes and his or her findings which become part of a public record that others use to reference their work and extend the frontiers at the leading edge of knowledge creation.

However, the criteria for what constitutes good social science are not only a matter of learning the language and protocols. If research doesn’t show significant findings, however that is defined within a tradition, then the research is (usually) not published, and the pattern of knowledge being explored and/or expanded, is abandoned. Funding does not support research that is not significant. Significance is the home run of the social science game.

Within any given research tradition there are competing models and theories guiding research. Jurisdiction over a research area is determined mostly by what projects get funded, which is directly tied to the significance of findings. This is the realm of the academic professional, the core jurisdiction for social work’s professional practice.
Again, social work's academicians are in competition with researchers in other fields for research dollars. This is their turf.

The concept of significance is the fulcrum where the social world being studied and the patterns created within the probabilistic universe are connected in an interpretive act. No matter how rigorous the research design, how carefully units of analysis defined, measurement instruments crafted and data collected, or how carefully protocols followed so they may be replicated, the final product in social science is an interpretive act based on a standard of significance.

Researchers are constantly seeking to establish significance in their findings, even to the point of abandoning original hypotheses and "mining the data" for significant patterns amongst variables. Social science research cannot make a statement about the social world that is considered "valid" without appealing to numerical/mathematical significance. It is in this act of interpretation that the distinction between deductive and inductive modes of determining truth becomes blurred.

Cut offs for what are considered significant findings, be it the .01 or .05 level, are probabilistic expressions that take on non-mathematical meaning as the primary vehicle of interpreting significance of knowledge generated by social science research. Significance is a function of consensus within a research tradition, by researchers. This is the "agreement reality" described by Rubin & Babbie (2001) and discussed in chapter 3.

A central idea in social science research is that of a latent dimension that the constructs of a research project purport to tap, define, and measure. Within the mathematical universe in which initial conditions are held constant and variables of
interest and their intersection measured within constant background conditions, the idea of a latent dimension works. The consequences of controlling the billions of interactions of sub-atomic particles of Uranium 238 can be predicted mathematically. The equation defining the aggregation of particles predicts what will happen each and every time.

However, to equate a latent dimension which can only be defined in algebraic equations with an underlying or latent social/cultural reality that can be measured is to perform what Alfred North Whitehead called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. This is the act of “making the accidental error of mistaking the abstract for the concrete” (Whitehead, 1967: p. 51). There are no initial or background conditions in the social universe that can be held constant within which variables and their interactions can be measured. Whether it is the probabilistic or social universe that is thought to be concrete, the other cannot be.

It is in this sense that Einstein and Infeld (1961) say that, “science is not just a collection of laws, a catalogue of unrelated facts. It is a creation of the human mind, with its freely invented ideas and concepts” (p. 294). Social science is not about “discovering” what is objectively there. It is about creating patterns of meaning in knowledge deemed valid by peer review and consensus. This is the complex pole of the realist’s position.

Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is perhaps the most easily graspable concept that marks just how different modern physics is from classical physics, how different the positivism of the Vienna Circle is from modern empiricism. It was Heisenberg’s discovery that both the speed and position of an electron cannot be known simultaneously
because in the act of observing the electron, the observer disturbs its integrity. This principle led to the reconceptualization of the traditional relationship between physical reality and the scientific observer. It is worth quoting Heisenberg (1974) on this point.

The old compartmentalization of the world into an objective process in space and time, on the one hand, and the soul in which this process is mirrored, on the other — that is, the Cartesian differentiation of res cogitans and res extensa — is no longer suitable as the starting point for the understanding of modern science. In the field of view of this science, there appears above all the network of relations between man and nature. of the connections through which we as physical beings are dependent parts of nature and at the same time, as human beings, make them the object of our thought and actions. Science no longer is in the position of observer of nature, but rather recognizes itself as part of the interplay between man and nature. The scientific method of separating, explaining, and arranging becomes conscious of its limits. set by the fact that employment of this procedure changes and transforms its object: the procedure can no longer keep its distance from the object (p. 134)

The key point is that what was being measured were effects of processes which themselves are affected by measurement. Elementary events are effects of processes and observation, as well as probability relations. In a parallel manner, the name given to the object being measured is a matter of "agreement" and historical convention, not fact. One research tradition in sub-atomic physics says that the effects of particles are being measured, while another says effects of waves are being measured. This is a
mathematical distinction that is lost when interpreted or translated into English. The difference is a matter of how the equations are set up to hold initial electro-magnetic conditions constant and how effects are measured, not an argument about whether it is waves or particles being measured. For the new physicists, working both in the micro-regions of sub-atomic physics and macro-regions of interstellar physics, it is effects that are being measured, and not a thing-itself, a concrete, real measurable, sensible thing.

The cosmology of natural science is then to be understood to be far more than the simple naïve realist’s dichotomy of subjective perception and objective reality. It takes into account the production of knowledge as a uniquely human activity. Perhaps more importantly, the modern natural and social scientist necessarily works in a universe that cannot (yet) be fully measured. Scientific instrumentation, be it a psychological inventory or an electron microscope, has not illuminated the universe in its totality. What is known, is always changing as instruments are made more powerful.

**Falsification.** One of the clearest perspectives within a cosmology of natural science is the work of Karl Popper (1959, 1963). He asserts that all observation is selective and theory-laden. There are no pure or theory-free observations. One of the traditional criteria for judging an activity to be science or non-science is whether or not it uses inductive methodology. Popper argued that this was completely misguided, that there is no methodology basic to science, and that its most basic function is problem solving. For Popper, a theory was scientific only if it is falsifiable by a conceivable event. Every genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is an attempt to falsify it. For Popper, one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory.
In a critical sense, Popper's theory of demarcation is based upon his perception of the logical asymmetry which holds between verification and falsification: it is logically impossible to conclusively verify a universal proposition by reference to experience (as Hume saw clearly), but a single counter-instance conclusively falsifies the corresponding universal law. In a word, an exception, far from 'proving' a rule, conclusively refutes it. Thus Popper stresses that it should not be inferred from the fact that a theory has withstood the most rigorous testing, for however long a period of time, that it has been verified. Rather we should recognize that such a theory has received a high measure of corroboration and may be provisionally retained as the best available theory until it is finally falsified (if indeed it is ever falsified), and/or is superseded by a better theory. (Thornton, 1997).

Popper's use of falsification affirms, for philosophers of science at least, both the underlying tenuousness of any claim to theoretical validity, and the utility of such claims in the world of applied science. Despite Popper's masterful bridging of the certain and uncertain, known and unknown so that they almost completely overlap, there remains within the cosmology of natural science a vestige of the naïve realism of positivism.

This vestige can be found in two assumptions within the cosmology of natural science. The first assumption is that science is logical, rational, and that observation in any degree or case can be objective. In this vestige, depending on the degree to which it is asserted, the universe has a reality apart from human perception of it. There is an inhering belief at the heart of this cosmology that the universe as science knows it is
"the" real universe. The ontology of nature affirms Heisenberg’s and Einstein & Insfeld’s perception of science. The cosmology of natural science contains a vestige of positivism.

The second assumption implicit within this cosmology is that the problems that new technologies create are solvable by the same problem-solving scientific methods that directly or indirectly, led to the emergence of a problem. Popper’s assertion that the scientific method is not a process of induction but one of problem solving is an overt affirmation of the spirallic process of modernization as it is being defined in this document.

In summary, social work’s ontology of nature is in some degree filtered by a cosmology that assumes a positivist vestige of a “real” and “objective” universe apart from human perception of it. It also assumes that science not only discovers the universe, but in technological development of tools, goods and services, science can solve any problem that emerges, both physical and social. Where the frontiers of science assume what is unknown, random, or uncertain as their primary exploratory arena, applied science assumes as its background what basic science has developed, what is known, patterned, and certain. It is within this certainty about what is known about the universe that the second force of modernization functions. Capitalization of the market economy.

Capitalization of the Market Economy.

The second force of modernization is capitalization of the market economy. It is dependent on the existence of the cosmology of natural science. Hooker (1996) argues that capitalism existed as mercantilism in pre-modern eras. What medieval mercantilism
and modern capitalism have in common is the overt intent to realize a profit. What is different between the two is that the medieval market was based in barter and trade, horizontal distribution of goods. The modern, capitalized market is based in vertical (hierarchical) organization of the means of production so that distribution of goods is determined by placement in a hierarchy of social roles, ranging from capitalist, who controls the means of production and distribution systems, through worker working for wages rather than products, to consumer, to the non-working, non-productive pauper who is outside the capitalist system. The idea of the market concerns production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services.

Another difference between the medieval and modern is the development of a money economy with its elements of capital investment, credit, interest, rent, and wages, and the development of the factory system which led to the decline of rural handicrafts and the rise of urban populations with limited skills. Where the family, farm, home, and village had been the center of commerce and industry during medieval times, in the emerging modern era it was the factory and city. Where individual families had worked their trades and grown food for the manor and village, now employment was dependent upon those who owned and controlled the natural resources (Goudge, 1967). Hooker (1996) offers a short history of capitalism.

The earliest forms of capitalism—which we call "mercantilism"—originate in Rome, the Middle East, and the early Middle Ages. Mercantilism might be roughly defined as the distribution of goods in order to realize a profit.
Goods are bought at one site for a certain price, moved to another site, and sold at a higher price.

From the 1300's, Europeans would begin expanding their mercantile practices, resulting in a social mobility hitherto unseen in European culture as well as pushing Europeans, as it did the Muslims, to explore distant parts of the globe. The voyages of discovery were entirely driven by mercantile ambitions. As time went on in Europe, mercantilism gradually evolved into economic practices that would eventually be called capitalism. Capitalism is based on the same principle as mercantilism: the large-scale realization of a profit by acquiring goods for lower prices than one sells them. But capitalism as a practice is characterized by the following: The accumulation of the means of production (materials, land, tools) as property into a few hands; this accumulated property is called "capital" and the property-owners of these means of production are called "capitalists."

Productive labor—the human work necessary to produce goods and distribute them—takes the form of wage labor. That is, humans work for wages rather than for product. One of the aspects of wage labor is that the laborer tends not to be invested in the product. Labor also becomes "efficient," that is, it becomes defined by its "productivity"; capitalism increases individual productivity through "the division of labor," which divides productive labor into its smallest components. The result of the division of labor is to lower the value (in terms of skill and wages) of the individual worker; this would create immense
social problems in Europe and America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The means of production and labor is manipulated by the capitalist using rational calculation in order to realize a profit. Capitalism as an economic activity is fundamentally teleological (Hooker, 1996).

What Hooker seems to be saying is that capitalism has an overall purpose and design. Its purpose is to realize a profit. Its design involves rational, instrumental calculation to achieve its purpose, a profit. As suggested in the next paragraph, economic activity is fundamentally an individual act. One of the tenets of capitalism is that the State must maintain a laissez faire or hands off policy towards economic activity. The capitalist, who controls the means of production and distribution of goods, then, is the primary vehicle by which the market economy is hierarchized. Ultimately he is the rational calculator as actor that creates and orders the means of production.

Capitalism as a way of thinking is fundamentally individualistic, that is, that the individual is the center of capitalist endeavor. This idea draws on all the Enlightenment concepts of individuality: that all individuals are different, that society is composed of individuals who pursue their own interests, that individuals should be free to pursue their own interests (this, in capitalism, is called "economic freedom"), and that, in a democratic sense, individuals pursuing their own interests will guarantee the interests of society as a whole (Hooker, 1996).

The fundamental unit of capitalism is the individual and his rights. The words of Locke and Adam Smith can be seen to underlie Hooker's description. The basis for the
professional project can also be seen here, professions in a system of professions, in
competition with each other for jurisdictions of practice. Each profession’s self-interest
involves a claim of turf. This is founded squarely in Smith’s thought, which when
hierarchized by capital, is an expression of both the cosmology of natural science and the
capitalization of the market economy.

Capitalism as a way of thinking is fundamentally based on the
Enlightenment idea of progress; the large-scale social goal of unregulated
capitalism is to produce wealth, that is, to make the national economy wealthier
and more affluent than it normally would be. Therefore, in a concept-derived
whole cloth from the idea of progress, the entire structure of capitalism as a way
of thinking is built on the idea of "economic growth." This economic growth has
no prescribed end; the purpose is for nations to grow steadily wealthier.

Economics, the analysis of the production and distribution of goods, has to be
abstracted out of other areas of knowledge. In other words, capitalism as a way of
thinking divorces the production and distribution of goods from other concerns,
such as politics, religion, ethics, etc., and treats production and distribution as
independent human endeavors. In this view, the fundamental purpose and
meaning of human life is productive labor. Marxism, which has more in
common with capitalism than it has differences, also bases itself on these ideas.

The economic worldview treats the economy as if it were mechanical, that
is, subject to certain predictable laws. This means that economic behavior can be
rationally calculated, and these rational calculations are always future-directed.
Therefore, the mechanistic view of the economy leads to an exclusively teleological world picture; capitalism as a manipulation of the "machine" of the economy is always directed to the future and intentionally regards the past as of no concern. This, in part, is one of the fundamental origins of modernity, the sense that the cultural present is discontinuous with the past (Hooker, 1996)

The kind of economic rationality Hooker discusses has no past. It operates within the cosmology of natural science. There are no historicist or humanistic threads to be found in this discourse. There is a mechanistic pattern of calculated regularities whose designed goal is to realize a profit at some point in the future. Touraine (1995) argues that modernity is not only discontinuous with the medieval past, but also actively annihilates it as part of its claim to describe reality. This annihilation too has no "past."

Rather, it is ongoing and is found in competition between professions, in the conflict between the professional and social justice projects and their missions. The professions assume only an ongoing present and a future that never arrives.

The fundamental unit of meaning in capitalist and economic thought is the object. That is, capitalism relies on the creation of a consumer culture, a large segment of the population that is not producing most of what it is consuming. Since capitalism, like mercantilism, is fundamentally based on distributing goods—moving goods from one place to another—consumers have no social relation to the people who produce the goods they consume. In non-capitalist societies, such as tribal societies, people have real social relations to the producers of the goods they consume. However, when people no longer have
social relations with others who make the objects they consume, that means that
the only relation they have is with: the object itself. So part of capitalism as a way
of thinking is that people become "consumers," that is, they define themselves by
the objects they purchase rather than the objects they produce.

One difference between the liberal and capitalist economies is in control of the
means of production. Locke’s integration of the ideas of natural law, labor, and property
is pre-industrial. The apprentice and artisan worked for the guild master in a specific
locale. The means of production was purely local and commerce between locales was
conducted by intermediaries, traders. When labor and the goods it produces are given
value in the form of money, the potential for capital emerges. Once labor is paid in
wages, raw materials paid for, and the goods are sold, there is a portion of value left over
in the form of a profit. This profit becomes capital when it finances further production of
goods and creates the possibility to branch and control the distribution of goods. When
distribution of goods is controlled by capital, it creates new markets. Capital can create
retail outlets for its products, thereby networking different locales and homogenizing
them by creating a market for its products. All of this increases the amount of capital
available for further investment. This investment constitutes control of the means of
production and distribution within a capitalist economy.

Another difference is that persons are socially constructed (produced or created)
into consumers by capitalism while in the liberal economy the person within his socially
constructed milieu produces and creates. The capitalist economy assumes the right to
create, to be free to create that in the liberal economy is assumed by the liberal Subject.
Combined with Western culture’s sedimented story of its own origin in “nature” and its privileged interpreters, natural and social scientists, capitalization of the market economy and creation of consumers can be seen as a powerful assumption of the rights of the Subject to be free and personally responsible for being free.

Of more specific interest to social workers, capital can be understood to be invested in seizing control of the State’s role in provision of welfare services.

Abramovitz (1986) argues that while privatization of social services is not new, its purpose, form, and content have changed over time. During the Reagan Administration, this meant a greater role for private enterprise in an ever-smaller welfare state. She says that State intervention in the economy has been historically conceived to modify the market in behalf of social justice. In the 1980s though, privatization has meant dismantling social welfare programs as part of a broader tax and spending strategy the intent of which is to direct more capital into the private sector. This has the consequence, Abramovitz argues, of an increase in the inequalities of the free market that government intervention in the economy was traditionally meant to reduce. Amplifying this trend was passage of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in 1996. This legislation can be seen to be a retreat by the State from its assumed duty during the New Deal years, to protect those least able to provide for, and protect themselves - children. The change in focus from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) on providing a safety net for children to TANF, which puts mothers to work, is an example of capital’s extension of private enterprise into the homes of poor families.
Warshawsky (1985) argues in a similar vein to Abramovitz. He says the gap is widening between the poor and the affluent within the welfare state. Poverty and affluence can exist together due to the operation of divergent goals. One is the goal of profit and the other the goal of meeting basic human need. The dissertation argues that these two goals are constituted by discourses with radically different assumptions about social reality and desired and undesired consequences. Warshawsky suggests that somehow they appear to co-exist. Here is another example of a conflated discourse organized within a domination/subjugation hierarchy.

Warshawsky also argues, in concert with Austin (1986) that current preferences for micro practice in social work may represent both an attempt on the part of the profession to accommodate current political ideology and, hence, maintains its status and legitimacy, and a preference on the part of students to acquire marketable skills.

The citations from the NASW Newsletter in Chapter 1 are examples of how capitalization of the market economy is extending its reach to structure what social workers do. Capitalism increasingly defines jurisdictions of practice for all the professions.

This second force of modernization, capitalization of the market economy, is dependent upon application of the knowledge generated by basic science in development of ever more efficient and rational technologies. In the 19th and first three quarters of the 20th centuries, the means of production were the factories, mills, and assembly lines of the industrial infrastructure. Labor in the information economy of the last 25 is more highly educated, and is more likely to participate in control of the means of production
and distribution by investing higher wages in the stock market. Smith's idea that wealth is generated by nations is also being transformed as corporations globalize their operations. The 1993 passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the attempts by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to pass the Multinational Agreement on Investment (MAI) is further evidence that globalization of capital is attempting to codify its rights in law. National boundaries and the laws that keep them in place are being supplanted by law privileging the globalization of the flow of capital.

**Differentiation of the Discourse of Rights.**

The third normalizing force of modernization is the differentiation of the discourse of rights. Freedom and responsibility for being free constitutes the Subject. Modernity is the dialogue between Subject and reason, the intertwining of rationalization and subjectivation. Each historical period had its own balance of these two forces. In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Subject was of central importance. During the 18th the Subject declined in importance as natural law, labor, and property aligned themselves with historical developmental processes. Touraine (1995) says that in the 19th century, historicism "absorbs the Subject into reason, freedom into historical necessity, and society into the State" (p. 79). Our current period sees the dominance of the eight distributive mechanisms assume a natural right that is the Subjects: the right to be-free and personally responsible for being-so.

The medieval discourse of rights, as discussed previously, was located in the physical body of the King. The King made law that it was the duty of his subjects to obey. With the emergence of society, contracts, and civil law setting in place standards
to which all were bound, property law codified the discourse of rights. Society consisted of citizens engaging in debate about the issues of the times, debates that were heard in the increasingly powerful legislative bodies.

Habermas (1962) charted the rise and decline of the public sphere. The public sphere consisted of private citizens engaging in rational-critical discourse. The primary functions of this discourse were to insure that the state remained separate from civil society, the market, and family, and to determine the common good. In the 17th and 18th centuries, this public sphere consisted primarily of bourgeoisie male property owners.

…the propertyless were excluded from the public of private people engaged in critical political debate without thereby violating the principle of publicity. In this sense they were not citizens at all, but persons who with talent, industry and luck some day might be able to attain that status; until then they merely had the same claim to protection under the law as the others, without being allowed to participate in legislation themselves (p. 111).

With the French Revolution, the public sphere was enlarged to include more citizens. For Habermas this signaled the beginning of a transformation that was a kind of degeneration. Class struggle polarized the public sphere and the State had to intervene to insure that the “rights” of different interest groups were protected against the increasingly brutal effects of technological progress, most evident in the 19th century factory. At the end of the 19th century, the welfare state emerged on the European continent, and in America, during the 1930s. The State and society, once distinctly separate entities with different purposes, became one. Habermas (1962) says that
The concentration of power in the private sphere of commodity exchange on the one hand, and in the public sphere with its institutionalized promise of universal accessibility (established as an organ of the state) on the other, strengthened the propensity of the economically weaker parties to use political means against those who were stronger by reason of their position in the market (p. 145).

Historicism and its class interests as a “process of development” occluded the Enlightenment ideal of the public sphere, for Habermas. The private and public spheres slowly penetrated each other in formation of the social-welfare state. Social legislation became the vehicle by which rights were codified.

Habermas describes the process as it occurred in Europe where class divisions were much stronger than in America. Voss (1993) asks why the labor movements in the United States are so ineffectual and politically conservative when compared to labor movements in Western Europe. She rejects the “American Exceptionalism” argument that says the United States had a set of characteristics that were different from Europe’s. She argues that the U.S. labor movement was similar to those in France and Europe up until the disintegration of the Knights of Labor in the late 19th century. Her argument is that Capital and Labor went to war during the two decades beginning in the mid-1870s, and Capital won.

The Knights of Labor organized neighborhoods of workers regardless of craft affiliation. Their intent was to organize horizontally around a common vision, regardless of a person’s social role within the economic hierarchy generated by capital. This was perceived by Capital as a threat to its hierarchization of the production process and its
need for docile workers. Capital mobilized in employer groups, imported workers from Europe, used federal and state troops to "maintain order," and defeated the Knights of Labor, thereby effectively forcing Labor to form in its own image. It wasn't until the 1930s during the Great Depression that Labor emerged as a political force fighting for the rights of the worker (Voss, 1993, p. 249). Nevertheless, the model of organization that the labor unions chose mirrored the hierarchies of corporations.

The discourse on rights was hierarchized and differentiated by capital and then codified by the State over the course of the 19th century and into the early decades of the 20th. The mechanism of this occurrence was the subjugation of the Subject – individual freedom and responsibility – by ever-larger progressive historical processes. These processes were all teleological. Whether Hegel's Spirit coming to know itself through the State, Marx's utopian vision of the State evolving to its final form, or Comte's law of three stages of social development: individual freedom and responsibility took on social ends in avowed historicism. The original Subject was God. Sovereign power depended upon the static nature of divine will. The Enlightenment Subject constituted an "idea." Liberal power, codified in law, differentiated the idea into social roles, the first being the citizen. The American Constitution and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man were the two supreme documents codifying the role of the citizen.

Then the landowner emerged, as did a whole body of law that codified property rights. The differentiation of the idea of the citizen, whose rights were codified by the legal State, became entwined with the market. John Locke's social contract and the
liberal idea of society were founded in the notion of private property. With the emergence of capital, the law codified the rights of corporations.

In the late 19th century, the corporation emerged as a more efficient means to do business than was the family business. Capitalization and hierarchization of the market produced the capitalist and worker. The relation between the two was a necessary one. Without the wage earning worker, production could not occur. Without the factory, there was no way for a majority of new immigrants and dispossessed agrarian workers to support themselves.

Capitalization of the market also finalized the completion of a trend first codified in the Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601. The church’s responsibility for the poor and dispossessed, the feeble and feeble-minded was hit and miss at best at the beginning of the 17th century. By the end of the 19th, the Church was overwhelmed by the need of America’s poor and unemployed. Capital transformed the marketplace into a money economy that recognized only production and consumption. If a person was not a worker of some sort, s/he didn’t exist. Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle gave voice to the inhumanity that capitalization of the marketplace perpetrated upon immigrants, the poor, and the dispossessed.

At the same time the capitalist and worker emerged so did the role of the bureaucrat. The State was the primary mechanism by which property law, and then corporate law, passed by legislators, was put in place. From the American Revolution to the end of the 19th century law “privileged” different economic realities. First, there was the privilege of the citizen and then landowner, then capitalist, and then in the 1930s, the
worker, children and the elderly. The great body of law that was generated had to be written, interpreted, and enforced. This was the primary role of the bureaucrat. The bureaucrat's role became as important as it did because liberal Society was slowly invested with historicist ideologies that emphasized the role of the State. The State consists of bureaucratic roles that implement and enforce policy created by legislators. The interests of legislators is aligned with those of capital that had financed their campaigns. Law that codified the rights of capital was enforced by the State, by bureaucrats.

The three forces of modernization had sedimented themselves within the social fabric of America by the end of the Civil War. The originary idea of the static social order of a divinely created universe was being transformed by the immediacy and stark reality of social problems generated by the War, urbanization and industrialization. The intertwining dialogue between Subject and reason, Touraine's modernity that had been slowly divorcing in the 19th century was now nearly complete. Industrialization had concentrated economic, political, social, and cultural power "for competitive advantage in a market economy" (Wenocur and Reisch. 1989, p. 24).

Reason was reduced to instrumental rationalization. The Subject, as creativity, freedom, and personal responsibility, was absorbed into competitive forces, into the destiny of companies, classes, capital and material reworking of both the physical and social landscapes, into evolutionism and Social Darwinism. The technologies developed by applied science within the market economy swept away Enlightenment ideas of the Subject, and the citizen. The expansion of the stock market allowed for exploitation of
technological inventions that in a matter of 30 years transformed the material conditions of American society. Whether the antebellum society of the South, or the industrial towns of the north, the reach of technology changed how people lived, how they related to one another, and who they were.

The differentiation of a discourse on rights was effected on two fronts. The first was the intertwining of the cosmology of natural science and the capitalization of the market economy in the creation of different populations as part of solving problems these two forces created. Differentiating social and work roles was part of modernization's solution to the problems it was creating. At the end of the 19th century, the consumer emerged as a dominant population category, divorced from both Subject as freedom and responsibility for being free and historical and cultural patterns of meaning. The consumer was a product of the rational decisions of capitalism to realize a profit. It assumed the cosmology of nature and its lawful patterns. If a market didn't exist, it could be created by generating a need and a consumer to identify with the need. Only the goods produced by hierarchizing capital could satisfy this need.

The story told in Chapter 2 about mapping the internal and external social worlds of the poor and dispossessed, and then the middle class, in large part was a process in service of capital. The more knowledge of populations capital has, the more finely they could create needs for products and the consumers to identify with these needs. Differentiation of the discourse of rights by capital utilized the knowledge that social work and the academic social sciences were generating about newly created populations. Capital depends on finding and exploiting natural resources and creating consumers
within new markets. The process by which capital extends its defining reach into populations is by differentiating types of consumers and their needs.

The second front was the energy invested by individuals within the newly forming populations in the identities being created for them and codified in law. The age-old desire to be free, at the end of the 19th century was perceived to exist in fighting for population rights. However, in America, this possibility had been lost when Capital defeated the Knights of Labor. Social justice was now a matter of working for legislation to recognize populations, not change the capitalized economic system from which the majority of America's population suffered. These newly emerging populations reproduced the economic and social conditions generated by hierarchized capital by identifying with the (1) professional and social scientific knowledge of populations and, (2) consumer categories created by capital. The energy committed to the fight for rights both plowed new ground and further instantiated the role played by capital differentiating the discourse of rights.

Chapter 4 discussed the appearance of new voices within society demanding to be recognized by law. The process of the One God becoming the many Subjects was motivated by the desire to be free of feudal burdens, to become a recognized actor as the person claiming Subject status defined it. The differentiation of the discourse of rights generated by the desire to achieve Subject status was co-opted by the first two forces of modernization over the course of the 19th century. The demand for recognition, for Subject status became a major vehicle by which social problems generated by education of women, freeing the slaves, migration and immigration, technological advancement,
urbanization, and Taylorism, to name a few, required solution if the emergent economic status quo was to maintain itself. Part of modernization's solution to emergent social problems was differentiation of new populations claiming rights as Subjects.

Codification of rights of newly created populations was a derivation of the rights assumed by those who owned property and controlled capital. The rights of orphans, criminals, the feebleminded or women – the rights of populations – were a product of rationalization, not subjectivation. Freedom and creativity were being absorbed and subsumed by capital and the corporation. Freedom involved creating new markets and consumers within those markets while capital created and organized social roles in the name of increased efficiency in the means of production.

Differentiation of the discourse of rights by professionals and social scientists believing in the cosmology of natural science, and by capital that emerged during the 19th century and continues today, can be seen as the crowning achievement of the first two normalizing forces of modernization. This achievement was an almost complete divorce between the reason and Subject making up modernity (Touraine, 1995). The Subject, freedom and personal responsibility for being free, is assumed by these two forces and is transformed into the consumer and populations with rights.

**Summary**

The dissertation's problem – social work's social justice discourse as an instrument of social injustice – now has a background. Professionalization is the mechanism that utilizes social justice discourse to generate social injustice. Professionalization is understood to be a primary vehicle by which the three forces
constituting modernization solve the social problems that modernization itself generates. Social work professionals and researchers create knowledge about "natural" populations in the service of modernization. Capital and corporations create consumers, their needs and the means to satisfy those needs. Over time these populations of consumers are sedimented to be part of nature, to be natural.

The ontology of nature was shown to be concerned with part-to-part, lawful relations stretching between the unknown and the known, agreed-upon knowledge by scientist peers. The history of nature was discussed to show how science replaced God and society replaced religion as the organizing value of nature. Modernization was discussed and its spiralic process and three forces defined. The idea of sedimentation was introduced to account for how a culture's story about its own origins over time became nature.

It is argued throughout this chapter that science does not describe an objectively real world, the simple view of nature; rather, it describes a vastly complex set of relations organized into disciplines within which there is no clear demarcation between the unknown and known. It is when agreed-upon knowledge and the criteria that validate is sedimented that the simple view of nature emerges and is sedimented into the common sense world. Capital from the time of Adam Smith wove its story into nature so that it too is common sense and natural. The hierarchizing role of capital and utilization of the technologies of applied science were part of the creating background in which discourses of right were differentiated to produce wage-earning workers from peasants, skilled from unskilled workers, and levels and qualities of skills. Children were differentiated from
adults, and the worthy poor in categories from the unworthy poor. Each differentiation was both a creation and a sedimentation of the creation into nature.

Reason was reduced to rationalization of the social order by the three forces of modernization. The freedom and personal responsibility for being free that constitutes the Subject and the heart of the American dream, was slowly assumed by the three forces of modernization. The social order, and population and individual roles were constructed by the capitalized market economy applying the findings of natural and social science. The prime example of this rationalization was the factory system and Taylorism, the reduction of the production process to as many individual steps as possible with one person to perform one step over and over and over. Modernization at the end of the 19th century was triumphant. Modernization today has moved into privatization of welfare, globalization of capital and a world economy that wants to be increasingly blind to national and local laws that impede or restrict the flow of capital.

The context of the first two forces of modernization allows the right to create populations and their desires, purposes and needs to be assumed by naturalized capital. The eight mechanisms that distribute opportunity unequally are the front line in the battle to define what is real, to generate “the world as it appears.” However, what is real is arbitrary, contingent, and intensely political.
Chapter 6

The Ontology of Critique

The ontology of the Subject has Being becoming being(s) where Being is assumed to exist, albeit formless and unknown. The ontology of natural science holds no position on the existence of Being. What is primary in natural science are the relations between being(s). Any concern with Being is outside of the purview of science and is viewed as speculation. The ontology of critique has a different position on Being than the other two ontologies. The only position it holds on Being, or an origin to things and their relations, is that any statement of existence is necessarily culturally determined and political. Such a statement is made within a set of assumptions about the nature of reality that says reality is unique to a culture, and is given in and through language.

The ontology of critique focuses on the cultural assumptions that undergird any positive statement. It is itself expressive of the historical period in which it is used. The dissertation argues that there have been three critiques of cultural assumptions over the course of Western history. These will be outlined and then a short history of the post-
structuralist intellectual tradition culminating in the work of Michel Foucault discussed. Foucault’s four kinds of power are outlined and their critical focus on the other two ontologies explored. Foucault’s discussion of power will serve to illuminate how the other two ontologies are rooted in systems of thought that serve political forces benefiting very few persons in the world.

The Three Critiques of Cultural Assumptions

The dissertation argues that since the Enlightenment or classical period of the history of the West, three historical forms of the critical gaze have emerged. The first was the critique performed by an emergent modernity during the Enlightenment period of the arbitrary and contingent cultural assumptions underlying the medieval social order. It was during this period that the citizen as Subject and society emerged, replacing the divine Subject and will. The second critique emerged in the early 19th century with the work of Marx, who gave voice to a critique of capitalism and its struggle to direct the productive forces by controlling the means of production. Marxism attempted to reveal the laws of history and society, to illuminate and define the primary site of social change, the economy, and the force majeur of social change, class conflict, the agent of change, the working class, and the future of humanity, communism (Seidman, 1994, p. 213). The third critique is that stretching from Nietzsche and Freud to current expressions of post-structuralism, and the critique of Jacque Derrida and Michel Foucault in particular. The third critique of cultural assumptions utilizes the methodology of reversal and the uncompromising critical vision of Foucault. An ironic support to the claim that the liberal, Marxist and post-structuralist critiques are expressions of the same critique in
different historical periods comes from Poster (1984) who says that “Foucault is Marx without metaphysics” (p. 159).

The key element to understanding the relationship between the three critiques is that each is historically contingent. What this means is the connective tissue between the critiques consists of a common (negational) focus. What is different between the three critiques is the historical context within which they emerge and are wielded. The first critique emerged with the Enlightenment. The second critique emerged in the mid-19th century, and the third is emerging currently. Each period described serves as an historical moment within which, what henceforth will be termed the critical gaze, emerges and challenges cultural assumptions.

The dissertation argues the critical gaze is the common thread linking historical periods that have nothing else in common. It is very much alive in constructionist discourses found in social work, although in a relatively incipient state. By this is meant that constructionist discourses continue to assume the realist position, first critiquing it and then offering an alternative view. Simon (1994) is perhaps one of the few that constructs a positive historical perspective that does not assume the existence of the dominant realist position. She portrays what she calls paternalistic practice as an almost sad afterthought to her main story.

The critical gaze negates what is positively asserted about “nature” and “reality.” The methodology of reversal the dissertation has used is rooted in the critical gaze. If A is asserted to be nature, then B is offered to show that A is a culture’s story of its own origins that has been sedimented over time into “nature.” Things could be different than
they are. The very proposition guiding the writing of this dissertation, that social work's social justice discourse is an instrument of social injustice, is "B" offered to the "A" story social work tells about itself and its origins, that its organizing value is social justice and professionalization is a way to achieve a just world.

The very idea that there are three ontologies at work in social work problematizes the naïve realism of common sense. and the part of the realist position within social work that contains vestiges of positivism. The idea that there are two projects at work within what social workers do, that they are conflated, and that the social justice project serves the ends of professionalization counters the dominant valorizing story social work tells about itself.

As will be discussed more fully in the final chapter, a core idea accompanying the assertion that there are three ontologies and their discourses at work within social work is that the three perspectives can co-exist without conflict or competition. One is not better or worse, right or wrong, or a vehicle of good or evil. The final chapter suggests that the three ontologies and the discourses that stem from them can be organized so that every person who chooses to work as a social worker can learn to be part of creating a just world, participate in it, and benefit from it. Each of the three worlds described by the ontologies has intrinsic value because each is a human world, worthy of consideration and respect.

Political forces stemming back to prehistory have been instrumental in distributing opportunity unequally. This does not mean that they will continue to do so. Modernization and the assumptions underlying its three forces that work through
professionalization is a political configuration of reality that is arbitrary and contingent. Twice before in the history of the west this realization has begun a cultural transformation from one worldview to another. The power effected by the critical gaze is the act of learning to see the threads within the pattern, the fabric, and following them to their origin/assumption. Nature is seen to be a political construct benefiting a few and generating suffering for many. The critical gaze destabilizes truth to open to uncertainty and the possibility things might be different than they are. Then, in a reflective turn, a person can rework discovered assumptions and order them as one chooses. Given the opportunity, each and every person is capable learning to be free and how to take responsibility for being so, to become a Subject. However, without access to opportunity, the reflective turn within the historical context remains a distant possibility, far removed from any actual application.

The final section of the next chapter suggests that the current use of the critical gaze that challenges the dominance of the professional project within social work is a harbinger of what might be a fifth period in social work’s history. Each of the four previous periods had method or inductively derived theory as its core jurisdiction. It is suggested that the positive side of the constructionist position will build upon the third critique of cultural assumptions and place the social justice project as social work’s core jurisdiction.

The following sections explore the intellectual background of the current use of the critical gaze. It explores difference from the perspective of Jacques Derrida and his binaries of opposition, and power from the perspective of Michel Foucault. The critical
gaze is used not to reverse relations of power but to dissolve boundaries. These boundaries are found in the mechanisms that distribute opportunity, the eight categories and the social locations they constitute. Within the discursive space created by “deconstructing” boundaries the possibility is generated for persons to speak from within their worlds and be heard. The actuality of being-heard constitutes participation in the social contract. But it is not the role of the critical gaze to suggest or explore what this might look like. The critical gaze is a tool with which to “take apart” discourses, texts and actions so that this discursive space of possibility is created.

If the world is at a stage where the “many” are to be given the opportunity to achieve Subject status, to be recognized in the rule of law and to participate in the social contract, then discourses such as this dissertation’s have as their purpose creation of this possibility. This is the role of the critical gaze. As soon as a positive statement is made about a specific context by someone not in that context the possibility to be part of generating this discursive space in which others are heard fades to the background at best, and at worst is lost. Those who have been given the opportunity and in some degree have achieved Subject status, can do nothing more than affect the social environment so that others are given the same opportunity. To do anything other than focus on creating this possibility participates in generation of categories of dominance and subjugation, not possibility.

As will be seen in discussion of the structural conditions of Foucault’s disciplinary power, the critical gaze illuminates the totalizing discourses and generalizing mechanisms within a social location that distributes opportunity to persons unequally.
What Foucault teaches us finally is that what he calls capillaries of power is each and every one of the many speaking and being heard. When one person’s discourse is taken up and generalized in any manner, s/he is in some degree subjugated and marginalized within the hierarchizing social order. How the social environment is created so that persons everywhere are routinely heard is the challenge the current iteration of the critical gaze presents for all who have been given Subject status by the current mechanisms of distribution. It is the contention of this dissertation that social work is uniquely situated to facilitate the social justice project. By judicious use of the three ontologies, what social work’s academicians and practitioners “do” can be part of providing the possibility within which social work’s students can speak and be-heard. It is cooperative creation of this possibility within the social environment that the possibility for a fifth period in social work’s history is also created.

Post-structuralism: Foucault’s Intellectual Background

The theoretical orientation for the ontology of critique is derived from the French Post-structuralist tradition of Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. This tradition is rooted in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857 – 1913) in structural linguistics. Saussure is credited to have provided the foundation for Structuralism, which emerged in the 1950s (Swingewood, 1984). Claude Levi-Strauss (1908 - ) adopted Saussure’s approach to language in his work in structural anthropology and is credited with translating structural linguistics into structural human studies (Seidmann, 1994). Michel Foucault’s Post-structuralism emerged within this Structuralist context.
Saussure changed the way intellectuals in Europe thought about language by arguing it did not originate in the psychology of individuals (nature), or the historical evolution of society (historicism), the dominant academic frames of reference at the end of the 19th century. The common sense view of language was thought to involve a necessary relation between word (the saying or uttering), concept (language or meaning context) and something real it signified. For example, the word "man" would acquire meaning by the concept it brought up in the mind. Both word and concept assumed the existence of "men." The saying of the word, the concept, and something real in the world constituted a relation of identity. The concept and word mirrored the thing in the real world it represented. The meaning of words and concepts did not change because they were fixed by the real man they represented. The relation between the three was a "necessary" relation. Concept and word could be understood in no other relation. The word man cannot signify anything other than a real man.

The view that language represents something fixed and obdurate outside of language is the simple pole of the realist position. This replicates the grammatical distinction made in the earlier discussion of relations of identity where existing and acting are separated from one another in the nominative case. It also reflects the perspective of a static, divinely created medieval social order.

Saussure looked at language as a system of signs. The meanings of these signs lie in relations of difference, not identity. The relation between the word and concept is arbitrary, not necessary. Any signifier can refer to anything signified. The concept of man, or what the concept means, is not necessarily related to the spoken word "man."
For Saussure, words may remain the same, but concepts and what they mean may change. There is no (necessary) relation of identity between world, concept, and word. The meaning of words and concepts is found in how they differ from other words and concepts in a language system, in relations of difference.

For example, the meaning of the word and concept "man" depends in part on the contrasts and differences it has with the word "woman." Such contrasts and differences may change with time. Thus, meaning is not fixed. Meaning is constituted in changing relations of difference. Differences are usually found in binaries such as man/woman, normal/abnormal, or black/white, and it is through the changing relation between poles of the binary that language actively shapes the world. Saussure's system of signs given in language is anchored in words that remain the same. The meaning these words have, which is given in concepts, is what changes. The binary itself doesn't change.

Claude Levi-Strauss applied Saussure's work in linguistics to anthropology. Levi-Strauss was a popular French anthropologist most well known for his development of structural anthropology. He investigated the relation between culture and nature. The human animal was distinguished from other animals by the use of language. He adopted Saussure's linguistic relations of difference as framework to understand kinship, marriage, and other social institutions. This model of language served to describe the working of society as a whole. Levi-Strauss went so far to argue that the rules governing relations of difference were embedded in the brain (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1984, p. 82).

Structuralism concerns itself with uncovering essential discursive structures as the means for understanding and explaining social reality. Swingewood (1984) says that
"structuralism defines reality in terms of the relations between elements, not in terms of things and social facts. Its basic principle is that the observable is meaningful only in so far as it can be related to an underlying structure or order" (p. 296).

This underlying order consists of rules and principles given in uniform linguistic patterns of language, which involve binaries such as man/woman. Underneath the vagaries of surface appearances are universal structures manifested in how the mind, knowledge, and human behavior are organized. Structuralism assumes there are "deep structures" to human reality that give coherence to the human universe. These structures are ordered by unconscious, rule-bound principles manifested in language.

Post-structuralism "takes apart" or negates these essential structures in order to reveal the political and social power relations of which they are vehicles. These structures are "not-essential." They are political. The Structuralist apriori primacy of "deep" structures of difference that are assumed to exist as foundation for understanding things and facts is brought into question. Fraser (1997, p. 32) claims that the fight against injustice in part consists of transforming the deep structures of both political economy and culture. In this statement at least, she is speaking from a structuralist position.

In post-structuralism, the verbal context is cultural and historical, and is given in and through language. There are no universal patterns for different historical moments. Each historical period has different assumptions about "what is." For that matter, each moment has no depths other than dominating discourses working through social locations to distribute opportunity. The "depth" can be seen as the assumption of Subject status by one group of persons over and against another. It is deep only because the "nature" that
privileges one cultural view over another's hides the view that nature is arbitrary and contingent, the function of a culture's story about its own origins. Post-structuralism negates any positive statement in order to reveal this very political foundation for "nature" and "reality." Probably the most well known mechanism of negation within the post-structuralist tradition is deconstruction.

Post-structuralism and Derrida's Deconstruction

When deconstructed, the assumed universal relation of difference exemplified by man/woman is revealed not to be universal, essential, and fixed. Rather, what the terms in the binary mean changes according to the varying and intersecting meanings of different cultures, nations, classes, ethnicities, ages, genders, and sexual orientations. The first term, man is constructed to be superior, and the second, woman, is defined as derivative and subordinate (Derrida, 1976).

The two terms exist within a language system in which their meaning is an intersection of political power in a hierarchical relation of domination and subordination. This understanding negates the Structuralist assumption that an underlying universal order exists within language apart from social and cultural context within which this order emerges. In the West, what dominates is an overarching, determining "nature."

The post-structuralists freed language from its Structuralist roots by questioning the assumption that structures of difference are essential, universal, or natural. Deconstruction focused on the assumed authority signified by the first term in a binary. There are two key points to the idea of deconstruction. First is that the post-structuralist still looks at systems or structures, rather than at individual concrete practices. The core
idea to this systems perspective is that every system or structure has a center, a point of origin. The second point is that all systems are created of binary pairs or oppositions; two terms placed in specific relation to one other. One term is origin and center of the system. The other known only in its relation to the center or origin (Derrida, 1976).

For example, the relation between man and woman is one of dominance and subordination. The first term in the binary is man, which forms the intersective center of the system. The second term is in the binary is woman, which is derivative, known only in her difference to man. “Man” is constituted by a set of attributes and characteristics that intersect and are set in place by historical, cultural, and social systems of meaning. Woman is known only in terms of man, and is derivate and secondary. The term man is the center and reference from which woman derives her meaning.

Another example of the center/margin relation can be seen in how the three forces of modernization work through professionalization. Social problems are created by modernization and professional practice identifies, names, and solves these problems. The cosmology of natural science assumes the center of the cultural system of the West. Capitalization of the market economy also assumes the center, and through the eight-fold intersection of a social location, creates individuals and the populations they belong to. Over time these social locations and the historical reality they express are sedimented to become “natural.” Both academic social workers developing and maintaining social work’s core jurisdiction and professional practitioners, working on the front lines where new social problems are first experienced assume the poles of privilege at the center of the social system, and the right to define the margins.
The binary of speech/writing. In *Of Grammatology* Derrida looks particularly at the opposition speech/writing, saying that speech is always seen as more important than writing. Speech is posited as the first or primary form of language, and writing is just the transcription of speech. Derrida argues that speech gets privileged over writing because speech is associated with presence. For there to be spoken language, someone has to be somewhere speaking.

The main idea Derrida develops is that the spoken word guarantees that someone speaking exists. This reinforces all the great Enlightenment ideas, that there is a real self that is the origin of what is being said. He calls this idea of the self that has to be there to speak part of the metaphysics of “presence.” Presence is part of a binary opposition; presence/absence. In this binary presence is always favored over absence. Speech gets associated with presence, and both are favored over writing and absence.

Floersch’s (2000) article discussed in chapter 3 is an example of how speech is privileged. He argued that what the dissertation calls the critical gaze that works in the ontology of critique is a “theoretical” perspective as opposed to “situated” perspective in which persons actually engage each other. The caseworker attempted the theoretical language of the strengths perspective with his client, and when it didn’t work, he reverted to acting within the medical model and its coercive techniques to get the client to do what prevailing wisdom said he should do. Floersch argued that what is said in a specific situation reveals far more about what caseworkers do than what caseworkers write about what they do. It is the caseworker that speaks and finds validation for this speaking in the client’s absence of speaking. The situation is defined according to the caseworker’s job
to manage client behavior. The client's presence is absent in Floersch's scenario. The client's own motivations, dreams, fears and anxieties are nowhere in evidence.

What Derrida does is to look at how a binary opposition functions within a system. He argues that a binary opposition is algebraic (a=\neg b, a equals not-b), and that two terms can't exist without reference to the other. Light as presence is defined as the absence of darkness, goodness the absence of evil, etc. He doesn't seek to reverse the hierarchy of the binary relation. He doesn't want to privilege evil over good, woman over man, feminine over masculine, or mental health client over caseworker. Rather, deconstruction wants to illuminate and erase the boundaries between oppositions.

The center of a system assumes its own origin. The arbitrary and contingent political reality of a historical period is sedimented into "nature." The cosmology of natural science assumes its own origin to be self-evident nature, and all knowledge flows from this center/origin. The natural categories forming the first terms in all binaries of opposition are the presence of the assumed natural origin as given in the cosmology of natural science, and its absence in the assertions of origin by other cultures.

This relation "between" cultures is replicated in intra-cultural relations. There are dominating "natural" categories forming the first term in a binary of opposition. The masculine is present only in its absence within the feminine. The ethnic category of Anglo-American is present only in its absence in all other ethnicities. The heterosexual is present only in its absence in trans-sexual or homosexual. The mentally healthy is present only in its absence in the mentally ill.
The hierarchy within binary oppositions has the first term dominate, a dominance that is purely political. Hence, deconstruction reveals that the assumed center has no natural claim to any privilege. What is accepted as commonsense comes under the scrutiny of deconstruction (the critical gaze) and is revealed to both privilege and subordinate different nations, genders, races, cultures, ages, sexual orientations, religions and classes.

The post-structuralist intellectual tradition of the 1990s is one among many examining the cultural assumption of essential differences. Others are semiotics, feminism, Queer Theory, Afrocentrism and Post-colonialism. What all have in common is a critical questioning of (1) universal “deep” binary structures of difference within language and (2), the authority and privilege assumed by the dominating first term of a hierarchizing binary. When this first term is a set of cultural assumptions, one culture and its assumptions about nature and what is normal are seen to subordinate another culture and its assumptions. When the first term is an identity category, all other identity categories are in some degree derivative, dependent and subordinate to it.

A central idea often lost in the complexity of a post-structuralist view is that the first term in a binary of opposition is as equally dependent on its own absence in the second term for identity. As Derrida says, deconstruction does not involve a reversal of dominance, but a dissolution or erasure of the boundaries between terms, boundaries that are cultural and political. This is the sense of Fraser’s (1997) statement that it would be necessary that “all people be weaned from their attachment to current cultural constructions of their interests and identities” if a just world is to be created (p. 31).
Whenever a constructionist begins by outlining a version of the realist position, s/he marginalizes her own discourse by validating the dominant center of social work's understanding of itself. The story of professionalization as mapping the internal and external worlds, and then boundaries of the two at the intersection of person and environment, assumes the professional project and modernization as "what is." The degree to which the professional project claims dominance in both core jurisdiction within the academy and in professional contestation of turf is the same degree that the social justice project is derivative and subordinate. In this sense, there is no social justice project. only the absence of the professional project.

Dominance and subordination are given in relations of difference spread along a continuum of social locations originating in the center of a system. The center can exist only so long as the margins define themselves within their difference from the center, the absence of which is difference at the margins.

The dissertation began with the proposition that social work's social justice discourses are instruments of the ends of the professional project. competition for jurisdictions of practice – turf – with other professions. In chapter 7 the possibility will be generated to reverse this relation. This is well beyond the scope of Derrida's project. He is painstakingly careful not make any positive, political claims about what might be or should be. He works solely within the ontology of critique. Some might consider this elitist or a luxury, given the raw presence of suffering in the world, the problem of social injustice. This reproduces the claims of social work's ancestors, those in the CC who voted to leave the ASSA and create the NCCC in 1879. What Derrida and other thinkers
in the post-structuralist tradition have given is an analytic tool unencumbered by unexamined beliefs about nature. What he attempts, perhaps more than any other post-WWII theorist, is to develop the tool of critique that takes apart the boundaries between center and margin of a system without reference to the specific contexts in which the tool is used.

This is a crucial point. If the social justice project is actually to define and become social work’s core jurisdiction, its “organizing value” as Wakefield (1988a) puts it, has to use the critical gaze and its ontological assumptions to ward off the unquestioned assumption of naïve realism that the world is as it appears. Common sense about nature and what is natural is a most powerful vehicle of social injustice because it is unquestioned.

The next section explores Foucault’s notion of power. Foucault, too, works within the boundaries of the critical gaze, however, he asserts the existence of disciplinary power. As shall be discussed, power is ineffable, as much absent as present. For Foucault, presence and absence of power in relations of domination and subjugation within the same moment is one of its defining characteristics. The moment of its appearance is also the moment of its disappearance. It is perhaps the clearest exemplar of deconstruction or boundary erasure. Disciplinary power is perhaps Foucault’s greatest contribution to Western thought.
Michel Foucault and Power

Deconstruction concerns itself with texts, with discourse, with politics and relations of dominance and subjugation. Michel Foucault's early work focused on texts and their historical and cultural backgrounds in what Foucault (1972) called epistemes.

By episteme, we mean... the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized systems... it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyzes them at the level of discursive regularities (p. 191).

What this dissertation has called historical periods can also be called epistemes. The key to the idea of episteme is that there is no necessary relation between one or another. Each is unique. In this sense, what the dissertation calls an ontology bears a loose relation to what Foucault means by episteme. The ontology of the Subject assumes a whole greater than any sum of the parts. The ontology of nature assumes only parts, their relations and their sums of parts and relations. There is no qualitatively different whole. The ontology of critique assumes only the language in which these two perspectives are given. The very idea that there is something behind or prior to language is a political exercise seeking to sediment cultures' stories of their own origins into nature in competition with other cultures' versions of nature.

With his development of the idea of disciplinary power, Foucault abandons the term episteme. In his later works, beginning in Discipline and Punish, he changed his focus from discourse to the role of nondiscursive practices in the formation of discourse.
He moved from the “idea” of episteme, which correlates with the idea of paradigm in the early work of Kuhn, and the discontinuities within historical continuities, to the relations of power and knowledge, institutional, discursive and non-discursive practices and their intersection in the body. Foucault’s last works concerned ethics and self-care, how the Subject turns herself into an object of study.

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982; p. 102) argue that there is no identifiable pattern or direction in Foucault’s work. At the same time, it can be claimed that Foucault’s career moved from examination of epistemes to examining the mechanisms and procedures by which the center of a cultural system defined itself by its absence at the margins of individuals and populations. What Touraine called the fragmentation of modernity Foucault calls the creation of individuals and populations. What this means will now be explored.

Foucault identifies four kinds of power. They are sovereign power, liberal power, economic power and disciplinary power. The following section discusses these four forms of power as understood by Foucault. This discussion sets the theoretical stage for understanding how any categorical representation of a person or group of persons at best can be no more than a way station on the path of the “One becoming the many ones,” and at worst, how such representation can annihilate local and personal voices configuring reality from within their own cultural locations.

**Sovereign Power.** In medieval or feudal societies, power functioned through signs and levies; signs of loyalty to feudal lords, rituals, ceremonies and so forth, and levies in the form of taxes, pillage, hunting, war, etc. (Bloch, 1967, p. 125). Historically,
the King arose from within "a sea of conflicting forces" (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 130). The monarchy sought to regulate, arbitrate, and demarcate local conflict. It sought to establish a more centralized order from the myriad of warring fiefdoms. The monarchy didn't just wield the law; it was its "mode of manifestation and the form of its acceptability" (Foucault, 1978, p. 87).

Faced with a myriad of clashing forces, these great forms of power functioned as a principle of right that transcended all the heterogeneous claims, manifesting the triple distinction of a unitary regime, of identifying its will with the law, and of acting through mechanisms of interdiction and sanction. (Foucault, 1978; p. 87)

Sovereign power concerned how existing forms at the higher end (center) of the social order influenced its use at the lower ends (margins). It would be as accurate to say that the assumption of privilege by the king and nobility constituted the presence that found its mirroring absence in the roles of the gentry, traders, and peasants further down the hierarchical social ladder. The locus of sovereign power is the body of the King. It is the center of the medieval social system. The sovereign notion of power had to do with the "totality of the social body" and could be defined in the relationship of sovereign to subject (Foucault, 1980, p. 104).

A key point is that right is codified in law. Legal thought focused on, and revolved around, royal power. For Foucault, "the King remains the central personage in the whole legal edifice of the West" (p. 94). The medieval social order was structured by a system of right that had two components, the legitimate assumption of sanguine rights by the King and the legal obligation to obey the King by his subjects. This twofold
relation is what Foucault calls a discourse of right. It can be seen to parallel Derrida’s
relation of center and margins of a system. It is eminently hierarchical, and hence, the
rule of law assumes this as its foundation.

The critical gaze focuses on the rule of law and discourse of rights discussed in
the chapter on the ontology of the Subject, and sees a means to ever more deeply
instantiate the hierarchical structure of the law. It is this Sovereign view of power and its
hierarchizing role in the rule of law that has to be illuminated in order that the law be a
vehicle of horizontal organization between cultural locations and an instrument of the
social justice project.

Liberal Power. In the 17th and 18th centuries a new form of power emerged that
was founded in rejection of the rule of Sovereign power, but not the principle that the law
"was the very form of power, and that power always had to be exercised in the form of
law" (Foucault, 1978, p. 88). The body of the King was separated from exercise of law,
which was now found capricious and arbitrary, abusive and unlawful, filled with
privileges and exceptions.

The liberal view of power emerged to eradicate the arbitrary and unjust form of
power located in the sovereign. A key component in this emergence was critical
reflection on the arbitrary and contingent assumptions of the medieval social order. This
critical reflection is the first critique of cultural assumptions. It has two focuses, the
divine cosmology given in Biblical scripture, and the privilege assumed by sanguinity.
By sanguinity is meant the inheritance of privilege through blood. The first son of the
King accedes to the throne upon the King’s death. Born a peasant, always a peasant.
The liberal conception of power stems from the Enlightenment and is codified in contracts, constitutions, bills of rights, laws, and regulations per the earlier discussion of Locke’s work.

...power is taken to be a right, which one is able to possess like a commodity, and which one can in consequence transfer or alienate, either wholly or partially, through a legal act or through some act that establishes a right, such as takes place through cession or contract. (Foucault, 1980, p. 88)

In other words, the discourse and techniques of right in the medieval period served the purpose of fixing the legitimacy of power in the King. Western culture’s story about itself has the liberal conception of power emerge to eradicate the force of sanguinity. The liberal view of power, emerging in the 18th century, alters the legitimacy of right, from residing in the King to a legitimacy of rights, residing in constitution, contract, and law. Society replaces God as the fount of reason and social order.

Liberal discourse established the Enlightenment Subject as its metaphysical standard, which over time was sedimented into the land owning citizen, a creation of juridical, or lawful discourse. The law was a normalizing process that in and of itself was pure and rational, to which all the mechanisms of power would conform. In contrast to monarchic exercise of rights, which often went outside its own prescribed boundaries, liberal law had no excesses or irregularities. The struggles of liberation that took place in the 18th century in Western Europe and America replaced the sovereign and his power with a society of social positions imbued with natural rights. The differentiation of the
discourse of rights was codified in the rule of law, which continued to hierarchize the social order.

In the *History of Sexuality* Foucault expands the liberal form of power to be founded in a set of standards for attitudes and behavior he called bourgeoisie norms, that in America today we think of as traditional, middle class values. These norms, codified in contract and law, established a standard for principles of right(s). For example, Foucault suggested that sex is not a biological given onto which different types of sexuality are attached. He argues that it is only recently having certain organs determines gender and "normal" behavior, as if sexuality and personality were determined by how those organs are used.

This orientation emerged as a product of the totalizing schemas of science that were then codified into law. Sexual nature was thereby conceptualized to be a part of the nature in the cosmology of natural science. The male gender/sex is the dominant norm, and based in having a penis. The female gender known by its absence of a penis, and is therefore known only in what is absent within it that is male. This view very much parallels Derrida's binaries of difference. What is normal is the center of the system, and what is other than normal exists on the margins of the system, and derives its meaning from the normalizing center.

Legitimate rights were formed in the interplay of norms, the law, and social contract. This insured that sanguinity and the One Church lost their dominating role in structuring social relations. Power was now possessed by those signing contracts, or resided in
documents of states legitimizing individual rights, and later, population rights (suffrage and civil rights for example).

In the liberal view, power is held by social position, validated by law and contract. Liberal power is a commodity to be wielded, accumulated, and withheld. Sovereign power located solely in the body of the king was redistributed to be possessed by citizens within a rational society. Normalizing processes sedimented standards and ideals that only property owning, contract-signing citizens could attain. Foucault views liberal power itself as a normalizing force of disciplinary power, to be discussed shortly.

Economic Power.

Another type of criticism of political institutions appeared in the 19th century, a much more radical criticism in that it was concerned to show not only that real power escaped the rules of jurisprudence, but that the legal system itself was merely a way of exerting violence, of appropriating that violence for the benefit of a few, and of exploiting the dissymmetries and injustices of domination under cover of general law. But this critique of law is still carried out on the assumption that, ideally and by nature, power must be exercised in accordance with a fundamental lawfulness. (Foucault, 1978, p. 88)

This was the economic or Marxist view of power that emerged to contest the liberal version of power. This view of power is a result of the second critique of cultural assumptions. Foucault (1980) characterizes the economic understanding of power...
development and specific forms of the forces of production have rendered possible. (p. 88)

Capitalists control economic power and labor wants to control it. The second critique challenges the privilege that capital assumed in right and law to control the means of production and distribution. The idea of the market as a normalizing force balancing self-interests emerges alongside the idea of citizen and his rights. In the 19th century, the citizen is normalized into a hierarchy of social roles defined by their instrumental functions within the workplace that changes over time. The privilege of the citizen is assumed first by landowners, and then as production is increasingly centralized in the factory and subject to the rationalizing forces best expressed in Taylorism, by the capitalist.

Those who own property, write contracts, pass laws, and enforce them control liberal power. Common agreement and its constitution of the social order makes society the vehicle of freedom. The economic view of power has freedom tied to the forces of production – the labor involved in work – which is harnessed to the means of production, which are controlled by capitalists. The economic view wants to replace the liberal view so that capitalist society fades as the next stage of social evolution occurs, the egalitarian communistic society. Just as the liberal view sought to replace the sovereign exercise of power in the first critique of cultural assumptions, so the Marxist view of power sought to replace the liberal view as a consequence of the second critique of cultural assumptions.

The economic view of power as the second critique of cultural assumptions failed. In the categorical scheme of social injustice introduced in chapter 1, classism is one of
eight distributive mechanisms. In other configurations of injustice the Marxist critique and economic view of power may or may not appear.

One conception of power and right emerges from a previous one. Sovereign, liberal, and economic versions of power are all part of the same story. All three assume teleology, or a direction to history. Sovereign power assumes the social order is divinely created and God’s reward is imminent. Liberal and economic forms of power assume that cultural and social change is progressive, is heading towards some utopian, egalitarian future. All three assume a purpose and meaning to human existence, no matter how poorly it may be understood.

Disciplinary Power.

My general project over the past few years has been, in essence, to reverse the mode of analysis followed by the entire discourse of right from the time of the middle Ages. My aim, therefore, was to invert it, to give due weight, that is, to the fact of domination, to expose both its latent nature and its brutality.

I then wanted to show not only how right is, in a general way, the instrument of this domination – which scarcely needs saying – but also to show the extent to which, and the forms in which, right (not simply the laws but the whole complex of apparatuses, institutions and regulations responsible for their application) transmits and puts in motion relations that are not relations of sovereignty but of domination. The system of right, the domain of the law, are permanent agents of these relations of domination, these polymorphous techniques of subjugation. Right should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of a
legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods of subjugation that it instigates

Michel Foucault, *Power and Knowledge*, P. 95/96

Paralleling Derrida’s focus, Foucault wants to illuminate the role of law and the social contract not as the ontology of Subject describes it, but as a means by which relations of domination and subjugation are effected, much more the view on the ontology of nature offered in the previous chapter. Foucault, like Derrida, is very careful not to make positive statements that can be interpreted as a position from which to found a discourse that might reproduce relations of domination and subjugation. Foucault wants to erase the boundaries that these relations reproduce.

To summarize, power for Foucault, has taken four forms in the history of western culture. The first three are associated with different historical periods. Sovereign power is associated with the medieval period. Liberal power is associated with the Enlightenment and emerged in the 18th century. The “right” of the King became the “right of society.” The liberal version of power dominates how power is understood today. Economic power is associated with Marxism. It emerged in the middle of the 19th century. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the USSR, and China’s ongoing adoption of a market economy reifying capital, the economic view of power is fast disappearing from the world’s political landscape. The idea of disciplinary power can be seen to be Foucault’s major contribution to western culture’s understanding of itself. Disciplinary power emerged at the same time as did liberal power.
In the 17th and 18th centuries we have the production of an important phenomenon, the emergence, or rather the invention, of a new mechanism of power possessed of highly specific procedural techniques, completely novel instruments, quite different apparatuses, and which is also, I believe, absolutely incompatible with the relations of sovereignty. (Foucault, 1980. p.104)

Foucault can be interpreted to have generated two understandings of disciplinary power. One understanding is structural. This is an understanding in which power is seen to constitute a frame for process, a way to understand how relations of domination and subjugation, what might be called Derridaean boundaries, emerge and pass away. This understanding of disciplinary power is distinctly different from looking at it as a substance to be wielded or possessed. This is a non-traditional understanding of Foucault's disciplinary power. The other understanding views power as productive. The frame for process, the boundaries of inequality, are revealed in what persons do in maintaining and expanding the relations of domination and subjugation. The political inscription of the body by race, class, gender, sexual orientation, age, religion, and nation status is an effect of disciplinary power investing these categories with the status of being "natural."

**Structural Perspective of Power.**

Power in the substantive sense, *le pouvoir*, doesn't exist. What I mean is this. The idea that there is either located at - or emanating from - a given point something which is a 'power' seems to me to be based on a misguided analysis, one which at all events fails to account for a considerable number of phenomena.
In reality, power means relations, a more-or-less organized, hierarchical, coordinated cluster of relations (Foucault, 1980, p. 198).

Foucault has defined power in such a way that using it is a highly perilous endeavor. On one hand, he says it doesn’t exist in a “substantive” sense. By this, he can be read to mean that the liberal and economic views of power commit what Whitehead (1967, p. 51) called the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, the attribution of natural existence to an abstraction. At the same time, power “means” relations of a very specific kind. Elsewhere he says

But in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives. (Foucault, 1980; p. 39)

Power must be analyzed as something that circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization. (Foucault, 1980, p. 98)

Power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on
the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (Foucault, 1978, p. 92)

Power can be understood to flow in a capillary form, only in capillary action. Normally capillary action is thought of within the context of blood flow. The heart pumps blood through arteries, which branch into veins, which branch into capillaries. Capillaries then reform into vessels that become arteries taking the blood back to the heart. Power in this model comes from the pumping heart, its energy from the oxygenating action of the lungs. This is not what Foucault means. There is no originating engine or source of power, no causal force, no heart, arteries, veins, or vessels. The capillary flow of power is solely capillary. There are only capillaries and their relations with one another.

The very question of Being, and its becoming being(s) is one that is not examined within the ontology of critique. Rather, Foucault focuses on being(s) and their relations, as they occur within discursive and nondiscursive practices. There is no thingness for Foucault, no overarching organizing principle. He argues that the Truths assumed to exist as nature, for example, are so only because they have been sedimented over time into nature by a culture seeking dominance in relation to other cultures, or in the act of establishing a norm at the center of a system that stigmatizes the margins as abnormal.

Cultural assumptions are sedimented and are “articulated” through social practices. Social practices constitute the capillaries of power’s flow. It is by examining
"what is done" that the effects of power can be seen. For example, Floersch's (2000) caseworker "did" the client, invoking "natural" consequences for resisting to perform as the caseworker and the client's treatment plan wanted. The hierarchizing discourse of the medical model replaces the discourse of strengths in which the client as consumer becomes client as patient. Foucault, in the latter part of his life, has the reader focus on what is "done" in nondiscursive practices, not what is "said." It is in the doing that the interplay of dominating and subjugated (hierarchizing) social practices reveal themselves.

**Totalizing discourses.** In the largest sense, a totalizing discourse is the process by which a system's center assumes the privilege that its story of its own origin is "true."

To understand something is to frame it within the perspective's of one's own categories. Totalizing discourse makes one part central and then defines all other parts in terms of this center. Understanding something is to absorb it, to assimilate it, homogenize it. Totalizing discourse neutralizes, and in some cases annihilates other discourses, defining them in terms of the dominant center, what is absent within them, thereby erasing what is unique to the other.

The assumption is that there is a standpoint from which all flows. The consequence is that totalizing discourses can never get outside of themselves to perceive difference. The world can be comprehended only in and through its own categories, its own natural truths. Nature sees itself in all difference, because at heart, there is no difference, only the absence of the normalizing center, an absence that sediments the presence of nature. This is very much a tautology, a closed system. Natural categories
are sedimented in the spiralic, repetitious affirmation that its own categories of existence constitute existence.

The professional self is a totalizing discourse by which professionalization, itself a vehicle of the three forces of modernization, continues to identify, name and solve the problems generated by modernization. Students are proto-social workers whose local and indigenous knowledge is swept up by the dominant center of the system, marginalized, and subjugated as an absence. The professional self is part of what constitutes the center of privilege, and its use moves this center into the lives of poor people, persons of color, women, into the lives of gays and lesbians, the old and young, third world nations, and religious practices. To use the professional self is to extend the West’s view of one reality in a kind of discursive colonization.

A totalizing discourse is a cluster of relations between capillaries that assumes the privilege of occupying the center of a system. An example of a totalizing discourse is found in any text that champions the rights of a natural category, race, ethnicity, gender, age, etc. All persons who have the characteristic described in the natural category, who find identity within the natural category, are productions of a totalizing discourse.

A person’s perspective within their world, described in their own language at any given moment, can be considered a capillary of power. The act of a person moving in their world, engaging or not engaging others in activities articulates norms and standards that guides doing. Everything a person does is a chain of occurrences through which power articulates itself.
A cluster of capillary relations might be a religious congregation, a baseball little league, a family, classroom within a school, or the school itself. What distinguishes each of these groupings from one another are the nondiscursive practices that serve to organize capillaries into a cluster of capillaries. The religious congregation meets on Sundays and worships. There may be fund raising activities, confession, choir, Sunday school. These are all activities that persons do together. The little league has young persons show up at a prearranged time. Each child plays one or more positions on the field and according to rules that are commonly agreed upon. The MSW student shows up at a classroom on the first day of school, sits in a desk in rows or in a circle, or at a seminar table. A syllabus is handed out that lays out what s/he will be doing for the semester.

A totalizing discourse is the set of clusters of relations between the center and margins of a social system given through intersecting natural categories in social locations. It is the standpoint of God, of the King, of the citizen, then landowner, capitalist, educator, social worker, bureaucrat, etc. It is the standpoint of all the categories that derive their status within the system from their difference from the originating center. Again, a totalizing discourse is the set of rules structuring relations between the center and margins of a social system.

This structural view of Foucault’s idea of power argues that it is only by creating the possibility (social environment) for capillaries of power working through persons to emerge in the voice of the person, from within a person’s situation, that the “One” becomes the “many ones.” Persons within their cultural locations create clusters of capillaries that speak their unique views of reality. This does not mean that totalizing
discourses constituting social locations can be co-opted and transformed to originate within a cultural location. This simply continues the historical presence of a totalizing discourse in a more insidious, pervasive and invisible form. The clusters of capillaries that are given in the voice(s) of Young’s (1990) social groups are all expressive of local cultural and historical locations. Social locations form the boundaries of inequality or relations of domination and subjugation. Disciplinary power is articulated through both. What is different between the two is ontological. Cultural location is an outgrowth of the ontology of the Subject. Social location is an outgrowth of the ontology of nature and its cosmology of natural science.

**Disciplinary power.** Disciplinary power works by establishing knowledge as truths in totalizing discourses, e.g., nature, sex, or race. These truths over time are sedimented and integral to their sedimentation is their investment with juridical rights. These rights form the rules of engagement that guide social interaction. The historical force of differentiation of the discourse of rights braids itself with individual members of population’s passion to achieve Subject status. Right, truth and knowledge form a platform for disciplinary power to extend its defining reach further into the intersection of persons in their environments.

Truth is the final consequence of grammatical separation of existing and acting. Identity is a sedimented knowledge that denotes difference, an articulating mechanism that reproduces the effects of power as it produces new knowledge. Power is the creative force. Identity is the product of power.
While Foucault uses the term as a noun, power does not refer to any "real" phenomena. Again, power is exercised, and only exists in action. Power in Foucault’s schematic assumes the creative force in acting. He refers to power descriptively as being productive, as having a kind of agency. However, it is neither noun nor verb, thing nor process. Simply put, we do not know what power is. Yet, there is no getting outside of power. It is everywhere and courses through everything. In addition, it is the active force working through knowledge. Hence his discussions of the relation of power and knowledge.

Power is everywhere: not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere….Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society. (Foucault, 1990: pp. 93)

This idea of "complex strategic situation" appears to be the most concrete level of description in Foucault’s various discussions of power. His terminology, words like disciplinary mechanisms, techniques, tactics, etc., are all ways of understanding specific instances of the more general complex strategic situation. He wants the critical gaze to focus on specific capillaries in order to understand the more general situation. In order to understand how social work’s social justice discourse is an instrument of social and economic injustice. Foucault would focus on what social workers do, much as Margolin (1997) suggests.

It is in the term power that is found the clearest example of Foucault’s focus on the boundaries of reality as given in “nature” within the use of language. He, like
Derrida, wants to dissolve the boundaries between things, including the centrality of his notion of power.

For Foucault, there is no origin or metaphysic of power. Cause takes the form of a truth statement about origin. What has been called the sedimentation of cultural assumptions in the creation of nature is the mechanism by which power naturalizes the “complex strategic situation of a particular society.” What in his earlier work he called episteme is the most inclusive of these strategic situations.

In the modern era, this strategic situation can be thought of as the intertwining of the three normalizing forces of modernization. These forces produce individuals and populations having identity founded in difference, a difference spread across the Derridean center/margins of a social system.

There is no tracing of power’s flow to an energy source or engine, or an historical event, or set of events. It is not located in macrostructures, political (liberal) or economic (Marxist), or in an originary “Being.” Power cannot be grasped conceptually or as part of a “natural” system. It is diffused and ineffable. Power is not a thing-itself that can be identified and charted from without. Power cannot be grasped, owned, possessed, inflicted, held or withheld, conceptualized or wielded. Foucault says that in its moment of appearance is its disappearance. There is no monumental mass of power with momentum like the pull of gravity. Power displays itself only as effects, which are already “taken up” in discourses and “articulated” through social practices. However, an effect is not power. As soon as the effect is noticed, power is gone, if for no other reason than it is not substantial in any way.
Power for Foucault is part of a triumvirate of power, right, and truth (Foucault, 1980), where right and truth are bound up together in knowledge. The question that Foucault (1980) asks that serves as the beginning of discussion here, is, "what rules of right are implemented by the relations of power in the production of discourses of truth?" (p. 93). He suggests that "Truth" is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. "Truth" is linked in a circular relation with systems of power that produces and sustains it, and to effects of power that it induces and which extend it. (p. 133)

Both Truth and the statements declaring or claiming right that constitute knowledge are products or effects of power. Disciplinary power produces new knowledge, sediments the truth of this knowledge in a discourse of right, and then reproduces itself through this codification in production of new Truths. In chapter 5 this was portrayed as modernization creating social problems that the professions identified, named and solved, the spirallic process of problem generation and solution.

This production of truth is one of the primary functions of modernization. It is particularly evident in the creation of population categories, both in Subject's claiming its lawful right to have Subject status, and in the demographic variables used by the social sciences such as gender, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, nationality, etc. Identity relations of difference forming the core identity of individuals within populations are both products and reproductive vehicles of the totalizing discourses of disciplinary power. The "rights" of a social location are codified in law, which then becomes a
platform upon which power extends its reach to generate new knowledge, the intersection of truth and rights. Again, this is another way of describing the tripartite process modernization effects to transform the material and social world. A problem is identified, named, and solved. All three components of the process are part of producing new knowledge.

**Normalization.** Rabinow, one of Foucault’s intellectual biographers, says

Normalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age. For the marks that once indicated status, privilege and affiliation were increasingly replaced – or at least supplemented – by a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogeneous social body, but also playing a part in classification, hierarchization, and the distribution of rank.

(Rabinow, 1984; p. 196)


Normalization refers to establishing the normal as a standard for judgment and against which to distinguish the pathological. Normalization implies the development of forms of knowledge that set standards and ideals for human thought and human conduct and against which individuals are assessed, measured, and judged. It implies processes by which society (specifically the human sciences and the helping professions) acts upon individuals and groups to regulate, shape, or make them conform to a norm. Normalization also requires that one render one’s self normal. Individuals being transformed should desire and participate in the process of their own free will (p. 276).
The law was the primary vehicle by which classification, hierarchization, and distribution of rank occurred, for it was within law that the norms for society, rational and orderly, were articulated. Normalization was a key process in the establishment of society, for it allowed a shift in the center of the system from dominance by the King and clergy to the Enlightenment Subject within a society of citizens. However, Foucault argues that hierarchical relations of dominance and subjugation of sovereign law and its discourses of right were carried over into liberal society. The new form of law covered over these hierarchical relations with totalizing discourses of freedom such as those found in the ontology of the Subject. As has been argued, the landowner and then capitalist benefited from this system, while most others suffered from it.

One of the arenas in social work where normalization and the use of totalizing discourses is particularly obvious is found the relations between educator and student. Social work's core jurisdiction is the arena of academic researchers many of whom also teach. This core jurisdiction provides professional practice with its foundational legitimacy. It is the center of the center/margin system in its representation of "nature" that researchers interpret for students. The role of educator within the larger system of the university has the characteristics and qualities that are vehicles of normalization. The educator is part of preparing the curriculum for a BSW or MSW program. She teaches specific classes within the sequence of classes making up the curriculum. She prepares a syllabus that not only says where and when the class meets, but outlines what students are to read, the day they are to have read the material. She models how classroom interaction is performed. She assigns projects and tests that students complete and receive a ranking
grade on. She acts in the role of expert educator, transmitting the standards and protocols
of the professional project so that when students become social workers, they fit right
into a hierarchized social welfare system that has clients look vertically to the hierarchy
for relief of their personal problems and suffering.

At best she teaches empowerment practice and the strengths perspective, but
cannot practice with students what “doing” within them looks like. Larger institutional
norms preclude the educator from addressing larger institutional norms. At best she can
throw out the syllabus and ask students how they want to conduct the class. But this is
one class among a sequence of classes, one person’s act of resistance amidst other
educators complicit acceptance of the professional project.

The policies and procedures, knowledge and values taught in professional schools
of social work can be seen to be vehicles that assess, measure and judge students’
attitudes, speech and behaviors against the normalizing center of the educational system.
To be successful a student must internalize the norms of the school or department, the
larger university, and CSWE.

Social work education can be seen to produce docile bodies: bodies that sit when
and where they are told to sit, that speak when told it is appropriate to speak, that write
when told to write, to be silent when it is appropriate to be silent. It is at this level of
following the rules, internalizing the institutional practices of the department or school
that the processes of normalization are most visible. There is little, if any discourse in
social work education’s texts – syllabi, textbooks, manuals, and journal articles – that ask
students to explore what it means to be free and responsible for being-free, and then
apply it to the context in which they are actually living. Students are not asked to create their own educational experience; rather they are asked to internalize norms that move them to the center of the social system and have them reproduce the world as it is, all under the umbrella discourse of working for social justice.

Modernization at its heart is the process of normalization. One cosmology is sedimented over time to be “nature.” Capitalization of the market economy divides, ranks, orders and distributes according to relations of dominance/subordination given in social locations. The differentiation of the discourse of rights is a normalizing process that creates individuals and populations according to “natural categories.” These categories are not historical or cultural, but constructs within which presence and absence, domination and subordination, are arrayed along a continuum of social locations. Every person has place in this continuum which is made up of intersecting natural categories, what in chapter 1 were called mechanisms by which opportunity is unequally distributed to persons. S/he has relative “place” within the normalizing, modernizing social order.

The most telling text in social work education can be understood to be the syllabus. It is the document that sets the parameters for what constitutes all of the above, as well as listing overall educational objectives as laid out by CSWE and the particular school’s unique interpretation and application of these objectives. The syllabus says where students are to be and when to be there. It tells students what they will read, week by week, and what will be discussed in each class. It mandates the writing that a student will do, when it is to be completed, and the style in which it is to be written. It lays out a
grading schema that will rank students according to criteria established by the educator within the context of the school or department.

Students learn to develop a professional self, to use research, theory, professional ethics, and the wisdom of their mentors as part of learning the parameters of practice. This self is a construct that has 100 years of history. The story told in chapter 2 could have had a sub-theme that told this history. The mapping of the external and internal worlds, and then the mapping of the intersection of person and environment were conducted according to normalizing and professionalizing standards. Codification of standards, practice modalities, ethics, etc., all assumed the right to define just what a professional self is, and how to use it. The student’s experience is constructed so that she becomes a vehicle of norms she had no say in creating, mirroring the experience of educators who to be successful within the academic hierarchy, developed an academic, professional self when they are students according to norms they had no say in creating. The development of a professional self involves mastering techniques and practicing application of them. Both the professional academic and professional practitioner are experts in use of inference. In order that this very unjust system is reproduced students are taught to believe that the social justice and professional projects are one and the same, that they work hand in hand. This conflation is what Foucault called a totalizing discourse.

Modernization is one of the mechanisms of disciplinary power that develops and maintains totalizing discourses. It organizes capillaries of power so that persons are transformed into individuals belonging to a population belonging to a social location.
Individuals are instrumental vehicles of modernization's assumptions about the world, that nature is objective, that capitalization of the market economy is a part of nature, and that the social roles generated by nature and capital are natural as well. The fulcrum of the intersection of these three forces and where the effects of disciplinary power are noticed are natural categories.

**Natural Categories.** A natural category is the discursive vehicle through which nature is known. It is a political construct that serves to distribute opportunity unequally amongst members of the human race. The eight mechanisms of distribution discussed in chapter one are natural categories. A natural category can be understood to be a discourse of truth in so far that it is accepted without question, as somehow part of nature, which includes human nature. A white, middle class male is such a category, as is a black, old lesbian. Each natural category is an historical construct through which opportunity and suffering are distributed. As discussed above, the grammatical prefiguration of a natural category denotes a relation of identity, existence without action. The sentence, "She is an old, black, lesbian" involves no action. The grammatical form establishes a relation of identity that is dissociated from acting. When opportunity is distributed unequally, when individual persons or groups of persons live with relative lack of opportunity, suffering is created. When a child doesn't have enough to eat, adequate clothing or shelter, or access to health care or education, preventable suffering is generated for her.

The consequences of unequal distribution of opportunity are not only the visible suffering of starvation, disease, illiteracy, homelessness, or early death. Suffering is not
limited to those for whom material poverty limits choice. The forms of suffering those
who benefit from unequal distribution of opportunity include mental and emotional
illness, a socialized sense of “missing something,” amidst the ever faster pace of modern
life. What material culture can be said to generate are lives of quiet desperation and a
despair of the spirit that consumerism seeks to mask. It is for this reason it would be a
mistake to vilify those who benefit from unequal distribution of opportunity. The point is
not to work to reverse the distributive mechanisms, but to dissolve the boundaries that are
the articulating mechanisms of opportunity distribution. Social injustice is defined as the
unequal distribution of opportunity. Social justice is defined as the equal distribution of
opportunity.

A natural category as identity relation of difference insures that whenever it is
invoked as a vehicle for expression of passion or desire for freedom, that the passion is
used as a vehicle to reproduce the status quo of social injustice.Because there can be no
acting by a Subject when a relation of identity is assumed to be natural, the relation
necessarily serves as a reproductive vehicle of social injustice. It cannot be a productive,
or transformative vehicle of injustice because the grammatical form precludes this
possibility. It is the totalizing discourse given in a relation of identity that forms the
intersection of power, right and truth in knowledge of natural populations and their
members.

A natural category is one that has been created by the three forces of
modernization; the cosmology of natural science, the capitalization of the market
economy, and differentiation of a discourse of rights. The relation between natural
categories along a continuum is constituted by a set of rules that determines distribution of opportunity.

As stated in chapter one, there are eight primary natural categories. This list is not exhaustive, nor exclusive. These eight natural categories are: class, gender, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, nation status, physical and mental ability and religion. Each category defines a continuum determining how opportunity is distributed. On one end of the continuum is a pole that distributes an excess of opportunity to a person and on the other end is a pole that distributes a dearth of opportunity to a person.

**Social Location.** The intersection of these eight natural categories constitutes a social location. In the West, every human being develops from conception to death within a social milieu that ascribes an identity based on natural categories. This identity is a social location. Opportunity is unequally distributed through a continua of social locations. A person’s place on this continuum is the intersection of specific locations on the eight categorical continua. Classism, sexism, heterosexism, ageism, racism, nationalism, ableism, and religionism insure that opportunity is distributed unequally. The black man does not act within a social location. He is constructed by it, given an identity by the world into which he is born and develops. To the degree he is not white, this absence constructs him to always be the second term in a binary of opposition, of difference. Not only are these natural categories imposed from without as part of socialization, any identification with them precludes the person who has the absence of whiteness from acting. Using Derrida’s frame, it is the center that speaks and the margins are defined by the absence of voice.
The intersection of natural categories qualifies existence, but because it is imposed from without, by forces not originating in the “cultural location” of a person, it has no agency. A cultural location is the ongoing, historical moment in which a person speaks, the arena of Subject status, of being-free and taking personal responsibility for being-so. A cultural location is local and the knowledge it produces is local knowledge. Relations between subjects speaking from within their cultural locations do not generate totalizing discourses, or hierarchizing center/margin relations. When a person identifies with her hierarchizing social location, the possibility of speaking from her cultural location is distilled.

The person inhabiting the social location constituted by the intersection reproduces the social location but cannot produce within it. Any acting performed from within the grammatical framing of “I am xxx” necessarily deepens and instantiates difference within the hierarchical continuum of social locations of dominance/subordination. To say “I am white and fight for the rights of white people,” necessarily reproduces the dominance/subjugation hierarchical continuum.

The “idea” of a natural world has been sedimented by the tripartite process of modernization - problem generation, identification, and solution. The knowledge generated by this process is “valid knowledge.” Categorical variables and their attributes are the agreed upon means by which populations are differentiated hierarchically. Each of the natural categories listed above has a parallel form in the work of social work's researchers who use demographic variables to define populations from which to draw
samples. All eight of the natural categories in varying combinations are used to define populations of interest. Again the question becomes, "who gets to determine "what is?"

We no longer have any faith in progress. We no longer believe that greater prosperity will lead to democratization and happiness. The liberating image of reason has given way to the disturbing theme of a rationalization that concentrates the power to take decisions at the top (Touraine, 1988, p. 371).

This discussion of natural categories and their role in reproducing the hierarchizing center/margin relation is conducted within the ontology of critique. To work within this ontology is to cast the positive as political, to offer counter-narratives, to say that if A, then ~A. The perspective that says that these identity categories are way stations in the process of the One becoming the many ones comes from the ontology of the Subject. It can be argued that these way stations are necessary, that the process of learning to take responsibility for being given Subject status is a long one with many stops along the way. Furthermore, the voice of a person developing a cultural location can only be spoken by him or her. The critical gaze that offers the Foucauldian counter-narrative is one perspective having the intent to destabilize totalizing discourses, not the fragile cultural location of a person struggling to be free. The same comment can be made about the following discussion.

**The creation of social locations by social work’s researchers.** The act of creating knowledge about individuals and populations within social research also creates these individuals and populations by differentiating global categories into ever-finer categories and the knowledge they contain. Modernization assumes the cosmology of nature as
"Truth as its foundation, and so the categories it uses to understand social behavior are sedimented to be natural expressions of this "true nature."

The primary vehicle of social research is the ongoing establishment of the quantifiable validity of social science knowledge. This validity is based in the tradition of agreement among scientists. Elemental to this agreement is the establishment of population categories from which to sample. While individual attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors may be surveyed or their changes followed in longitudinal research designs, no one individual's input is used to understand a social location. No one individual tells a story about his or her own history with the discrimination inherent within the eight categories and his or her social location. This is not scientific knowledge. Qualitative research is gaining credibility in the academy, but it has not yet achieved the status where its knowledge is said to be "scientific." Scientific knowledge is always based on an aggregation of cases, is ahistorical, acontextual, and some would argue, ahuman.

Social science research, which social work has embraced wholeheartedly as part of its legitimizing path to status as a profession, is a vehicle of modernization. It can have no foundation in the social justice project because it is a vehicle of the binary of difference as it dominates by assuming the right to interpret nature and human nature. The knowledge generated by social work's researchers enables interventions to be generated that address problems populations known only by their social location. the unique intersection of the eight natural categories. The more that is known about gay, sexually promiscuous working class adolescents, for example, the greater is social work's ability to address their needs. The critical gaze sees this as the workings of disciplinary
power, extending its reach into the private lives of persons, marginalizing them according to natural categories they have no say in creating. This is the process of re-establishing the norm, the center, abnormality and margins.

Social work’s researchers that partition populations according to the eight natural categories are part of imposing identity relations of difference within the domination/subordination hierarchy. Researchers create knowledge about social locations. Persons generate local knowledge of their own cultural locations. Researchers might ask persons about their worlds, purpose and meaning, but unless it meets peer review standards that maintain the integrity of valid, scientific knowledge, these voices will not be heard. The whole edifice of modernization works through the professions. Maintaining the world as it appears precludes generation of a social environment in which a discursive space is cleared so suborned voices can speak.

When social work’s interventions encourage persons to identify with their social locations, to feel passion as a gay person, as a woman, as a Chinese or Uruguayan or Texan male, the social location is that much more sedimented as part of nature. Sedimentation of a social location into nature deepens and extends the center/margin boundaries that guide how humans encounter each other. This marginalization also re-establishes the legitimacy and right of the dominant natural categories to occupy the center of the system. The King’s body was the center of the medieval social system and the unquestioned “duty” of subjects to obey his law legitimized it. In a similar manner, the hierarchizing workings of totalizing discourses assume the right to occupy the center that marginalize persons in their worlds and have them identify with the categories of
marginalization. The edifice of juridical power originating in sovereign law continues today as vehicle for the workings of disciplinary power.

Another example of the productive function of disciplinary power are marketing strategies that create new consumers by generating new intersections of the eight categories, new social locations to generate demand for a company's products. A 14-year-old girl from middle class, Midwestern suburbs is a social location that companies can target to create a need and demand for products not yet on the market. A 45-year-old Black father working as an accountant who lives in a gentrified urban setting might also be a social location a company would target. Modernization works through the market to ever more finely define social locations within which to create consumer need and the products to satisfy this need. The creations of a consumer and creation of a white, gay, poor, old man have different content, but the same function. Modernization creates problems and solutions to these problems by creating new populations.

...that society is governed not so much by legally- and ethically-based institutions as by the demands of economic competition, the programmes of the planners, and advertising campaigns. ... The idea of a mass or consumer society has replaced that of industrial society because it acknowledges the divorce between the worlds of production and consumption, whereas industrial society still defined human beings as workers, and in that sense, defined them in the same terms as the system of production (Touraine, 1995, p. 373)

Personal identity. When a person identifies with a specific intersection of the eight categories within a social location she participates in the hierarchizing
differentiation of the discourse of rights. From the perspective of the critical gaze, any identification by a person with their social location is a perpetuation of social injustice. I am a white, middle aged, middle class, straight American, able-bodied male. The degree to which my identity is founded in this social location is the degree to which I am fundamentally different from others from different social locations. I benefit from the distribution of opportunity through my social location. Others suffer from their social location.

To found one’s personal identity in a social location is to separate identity from acting. The best a person can do is reproduce the world as it is. The best that can be hoped for is that mechanisms that distribute opportunity, in particular the law, can be generated that codify the rights of a social location. However, changing the rule of law does not necessarily change the institutional practices within which the reality of the social contract is most visible. Personal identity founded in a social location cannot address the larger undergirding system in which center/margin relations of dominance and subordination normalize how humans encounter each other. Law that codifies social locations necessarily reproduces social injustice.

Foucault at the end of his life was exploring the idea of self-care as a means by which the willing Subject turns herself into an object that both reproduces and extends the reach of disciplinary power. Self-care involves an ethics that guides action, an ethics that assumes the historically given world of difference, an ethics that reproduces this world in a discourse that ostensibly buffers the social worker from situational stressors.
Because conflated and totalizing discourses make up the world as it appears the only location professional identity can be grounded is in the institutional practices that serve as vehicles of modernization and relations of domination and subordination. Stress is generated not only by large caseloads, low pay, lack of appreciation and respect, but by the unstated, but felt disjuncture between the discourses of social justice and professional practices on the job. These practices lead to different degrees of burnout. Social work literature is filled with advice on how to cope with burnout and stress. The message is that a social worker needs to be present for a client in order to do the best work, and stress removes presence. Self-care might involve backrubs by colleagues, using gallows humor, exercise, or nurturing by a partner at home. In the worst of cases a social worker feels what she does is a thankless job and begins to wonder why she does it. Professional identity founded in this context can do little if anything to actualize the principles of social justice. The social worker struggles to cope with the effects of totalizing discourses, her own stress, that of clients and colleagues. She is taught to cope with the consequences of totalizing discourses and their assumption of creation and freedom, not with the system that continues the center/margin organization of how humans encounter each other.

Professional identity is a construct modernization uses to insure that persons who suffer from the status quo social order don’t organize horizontally and demand Subject status. The social worker almost always represents the hierarchized social service system, whether it be a governmental child welfare agency, a non-profit agency, or a for profit, private agency. Whether it be policies legislated by politicians whose campaign
funds are financed by capital, or agencies such as United Way that gather charitable
donations and distribute them, the person who needs support from the social environment
usually finds it within the hierarchized system of relief. Because the lifeblood of these
organizations depend on the existence of social injustice, they have no mission that seeks
to end it. There are few social service agencies that demonstrate they have acknowledged
they have been given Subject status, and that they are working as part of the social
environment to extend this possibility to others. regardless of natural category.
Resources simply don’t exist to fund this effort. Hence, there are top-down strictures
imposed on what social workers do, and it is this imposition that generates burn-out.

Summary

In this dissertation to call something political - an idea, an opinion or judgment, or
a group or population category, or even the body itself - is to attribute to natural
categories the role of distributing opportunity. Opportunity is environmental. By this is
meant that opportunity at its most basic consists of material resources in the form of food,
housing, clothing, education, and health care. Opportunity is distributed within the
environment according to “social location.” A person’s social location is determined by
the intersection of eight major distributive mechanisms; class, ethnicity, gender, age,
sexual orientation, nation status, physical and mental ability and religion. Each of these
categories is political. The distributive mechanisms making up social location over time
have been sedimented into “natural categories.” Distribution of opportunity determines
the range of choices available to persons living within these social locations. Those
persons whose social location is privileged by natural categories is offered a greater array
of choices at any given point in the lifespan than is a person whose social location distributes relatively fewer choices to them.

Social work's championing of the rights of the oppressed, those persons who suffer from the natural categories, instantiates ever more deeply the system in which binaries of opposition/difference and a hierarchy of dominance and subordination serve as mechanisms to distribute opportunity. Social work's realist position and the research conducted within it assume the privilege of presence and dominance. Social work's view of power in the liberal mode covers over the workings of disciplinary power and the creation of populations and individual members of those populations. The assumptions underlying social work's professional project make any relation between social worker and client system into one that is prefigured by hierarchizing dominance/subordination. The social worker is dominant. The client system is suborned. This is not a contingent relation but a necessary one. In other words, no matter what discourses are marshaled or arguments made, if the capillaries of "what is done" are examined through the critical gaze, a relationship of domination/subordination is a necessary condition for professional action.

The passion of social work's students is captured in the social justice discourses they are taught. This passion becomes an instrumental vehicle of the professional self that is one of modernization's vehicles to solve the problems it has created. Modernization and professionalism act through social workers who identify with their professional roles, with their job descriptions, who accept the world as it is given to them. The implicit agreement among professionals is not that the unjust social order needs
transformation; rather, it is that as professionals, we benefit from the way things are, that we are beneficiaries of the unequal distribution of opportunity. It is for this reason social workers are satisfied with the conflation of projects and missions and the tension and confusion it generates. Rather than structuring what is done from the foundation of the social justice mission through the instrument of professionalization, what is done by professional social workers is an instrument of modernization and its assumption of the right to create the world as it appears.

The critical gaze of the ontology of critique can be read to have a harsh tone. The statements made about what social workers do are highly confrontational and subject to contestation. The critical gaze examines the totality of the center/margin system and the hierarchy of dominance and subordination. It offers a counter-narrative to the valorizing story social work often tells about itself and the world as it appears. The argument using the methodology of reversal can be more easily discounted when the tone of critique is perceived as harsh. What harshness exists is acknowledged to lessen the power of the argument Derrida and Foucault present that has the purpose to destabilize the unquestioned world as it appears. That this tone is present is acknowledged. What the author hopes is that the perspective offered within the ontology of critique can be seen as a means to work toward creating the discursive space in all voices can speak, and not a vendetta against an unjust world.
Chapter 7

The Frame for Reversing the Professional and Social Justice Missions

Introduction

The overarching purpose of the dissertation is to clear a discursive space so that the silent thought of conflation, the "world as it appears." is destabilized enough to reverse the relation between professional and social justice projects. Section 1 of the dissertation developed the proposition that social work's professional and social justice discourses are conflated, and that the consequence of this conflation is that the social justice discourse can be understood to be an instrument of social injustice. Section 2 addressed this problem by proposing there are three different ontologies that are conflated in social work's discourses: the ontologies of Subject, nature and critique. The ontological analysis made a number of points. One is that there is a legitimate
perspective that says the three ontologies have nothing in common with each other. A second is that the three ontologies are related to one another in conflated discourses at the level of idea and assumption. A third is that this conflation is organized within a purely political hierarchy of dominance/subordination in the "world as it appears" so that the professional project dominates the social justice project. Discursive space was cleared so that it is now possible to explore what reversal of the professional and social justice projects might look like, and how this reversal might be effected.

This chapter will perform a number of tasks. The first is to clarify the relation between the three ontologies and the social justice and professional projects. The second is to show how the two projects can be reversed. The third is to offer some examples of what this reversal might look like in different social work contexts. The fourth is to explore some of the factors that militate against adopting the position advocated by the dissertation.

The relation between the three ontologies.

The ontology of the Subject assumes a universe in which there is a whole that includes and is qualitatively different than any part or sum of parts. In western culture, this whole begins with the medieval God. This "One" Subject over time is becoming the "many Subjects." The ontology of nature assumes a universe in which there are only parts, relations of parts, sums of parts, and relations between sums of parts. These might be the laws of nature, atoms, or sub-atomic particles. The ontology of critique assumes only that any assertion of something real, whether in the ontology of nature or Subject, is a function of a culture's story of its own origins that over time have been sedimented to
be "T"rue. Within the ontology of critique these stories are always changing, are arbitrary and historically contingent, and are necessarily political. If there is reality outside of language and human perception, we can’t know it right now because language provides the shape and meaning of things and their contexts.

The ontology of nature. The dissertation has argued that the discourses stemming from these three ontologies are conflated, and that an age-old hierarchy of dominance/subordination, stemming from the divine and sovereign law, framed in Derrida’s center/margin relation and Foucault’s idea of totalizing discourses has shaped how these discourses relate to one another. The most concrete expression of this hierarchy is assumption of the privilege to say what the facts are, to say what the rules of human engagement are. The dominant facts for social workers are primarily those stemming from the ontology of nature as given in the three forces of modernization; the cosmology of natural science, capitalization of the market economy and differentiation of the discourse of rights. The professional project assumes the facts and the processes by which they are generated are constructed by modernization. The goal of the professional project is to claim and possess turf in competition with other professions in a system of professions in furtherance of the goals of modernization.

The professional project originates within the ontology of nature. There is no "Being," only being(s) and their relations. The three forces of modernization assume nature as their background. Professionalization is the primary means by which modernization solves the social problems it generates.
Human nature is part of nature. To understand human nature is to use the language of science, mathematics, and its tools as given in the scientific method, to not only generate knowledge of individuals and populations, but perhaps to actually create populations. In the ontology of nature the power to create lies in the replicable protocols and instrumental mechanisms of the scientific method.

The ontology of the Subject. The social justice project originates within the ontology of the Subject. "Being" is becoming being(s). The "One" God/Subject is becoming the "many Subjects." Every human being eventually will have been given the opportunity to achieve Subject status, participate in the social contract, and benefit from it and the rule of law as well. What God and each and every person who has been given Subject status has in common is the capacity to create their worlds. The ontology of the Subject can include any culture and society's configuration of the Subject. What all have in common is some form/process of the relation between Being and being(s).

Defined from within the ontology of the Subject, human nature is the belief that each and every human being is inherently capable of making healthy choices for herself. given the opportunity. When all persons are given the opportunity — material and social resources — to participate in and benefit from the social contract, then, and only then, will human nature have matured so that there will be no caveat. Every person will have the opportunity to make healthy choices for herself. In the ontology of the Subject the power to create lies in the Subject, being-free and being-responsible for being-free.

The ontology of critique. The ontology of critique is a tool facilitating the projects of the other two ontologies. It always emerges and is wielded within a historical
context, hence the three critiques of cultural assumptions. When utilized within the ontology of nature, the critical gaze focuses on the arbitrary and contingent workings of the feudal social order, religion, historicist perspectives, and any metaphysical claim there is a Subject, divine or human. The naïve realist’s position, grounded in the ontology of nature, wielded the historically contingent first critique of cultural assumptions. This position uses the critical gaze as a tool to annihilate the sacred and historicist stories about reality’s origin offered in the ontology of the Subject.

The constructionist position wields the third critique. It has two foci; the first is the reality assumed by the ontology of nature and the second is the tendency for the process of the “One becoming the many ones” within the ontology of the Subject to sediment itself within natural categories. In the first use, the focus is on the arbitrary and contingent assumptions of “One” nature, the West’s story of its own origins that over time has sedimented into the cosmology of natural science and the other two forces of modernization, capitalization of the market and differentiation of the discourse of rights. The critical gaze is used by the constructionist position to challenge the assumption of “T”-truth held by the three forces of modernization. This “T”-truth is given in the assumption the world is as it appears. The constructionist says, “NO, the world is not as it appears. “T”-truth is political and is hierarchically organized in relations of dominance and subordination. Hence, what one person or culture believes is “T”-true has another side that at best is in competition with other “T”-truths, and at worst attempts to annihilate them. Chapter six made use of this form of the critical gaze.
The second focus of the critical gaze within the constructionist position is the sedimenting categories originating within the ontology of the Subject. It focuses on the progress of the “One becoming the many ones” that a person or social group of persons make in their achieving Subject status. The gaze is used in anticipation of the learned tendency for identity categories to sediment and reproduce the center/margin relation. This use of the critical gaze insures that what new categories that emerge from within a cultural location do not sediment and begin to colonize or subordinate other perspectives. Rather than focusing on totalizing discourses and how they structure doing, this use of the critical gaze is smaller, is used by a person or group of persons to focus on their own, local experience.

Both foci attempt to destabilize the dominance/subordination hierarchy. Destabilization of this hierarchy creates the discursive space that is the social environment within which individuals and social groups can develop their cultural locations. New and fragile cultural locations slowly transform historically given social locations. This transforming serves as a model for others so that the possibility emerges that they may do the same thing.

The first part of Subject status, achieving and maintaining being-free, necessarily depends on having been given enough opportunity to destabilize a social location and create a cultural location. The second part of Subject status is taking personal responsibility for being-free. At some point a person realizes that her own self-interest is best served by being part of redirecting resources to persons whose social locations have
not distributed them enough opportunity to achieve Subject status. This realization is rooted in the ontology of the Subject and the social justice project.

To maintain one's own being-free requires a person actively create a just world, moment-to-moment, routine-to-routine. This does not mean the annihilation of historically constructed social roles, job descriptions, marriage vows, etc.; rather it means a re-founding roles and institutional practices in the ontology of the Subject and social justice project. To maintain Subject status requires a person to actively be part of transforming the norms within the social environment and by doing, model for others and encourage them to do the same. To be free without welcoming the opportunity to take personal responsibility for being-free is no freedom at all, but a continuation and reproduction of the mechanisms of social injustice.

In summary, the social justice project is founded in the ontology of the Subject and the professional project in the ontology of nature. The constructionist position has two functions. The first is to use the third critique of assumptions founded in the ontology of critique to destabilize the political dominance/subordination framework that underlies the relation between the ontologies of Subject and nature. The second function is to work from within the ontology of the Subject and be part of creating a social environment in which persons are given the opportunity to make healthy choices for themselves. The task of the constructionist is to destabilize dominating discourses found in the professional project so that the social justice project can use these same discourses to achieve its own ends, a just world. This is one casting of the reversal of the two projects.
The Reversal: Fact and Action

The dissertation has argued that the "world as it appears" is unjust. Concretely, injustice can be seen in the existence of poverty, for example, unequal pay between the sexes, more black men in prison than white men and more children in poverty than adults. For social workers these are the facts of social reality with which we must deal. It is the intensity and prevalence of facts such as these that led the CCC to leave the ASSA in 1879 and form the NCCC. These facts led Mary Richmond to develop a "retail" as opposed to "wholesale" casework method. By gathering and organizing "facts" about a person's situation, the social worker was better able to recommend a course of intervention. The facts of the psychodynamic perspective were the laws and drives that served to undergird individual human motivation. Today the intersection of person and environment constitutes a field that academic researchers explore to both determine the facts (variables and their patterns of relations) of psycho-social functioning as well as means to maintain legitimacy within the academy.

To assume that poverty, unequal pay based on gender, or any such obvious fact exists is in some degree to organize action based on this assumption. The point the dissertation has been attempting to make is that the "world as it appears" has these facts be "T"rue. From a critical perspective they are not "T"rue. Rather, they are examples illuminating how opportunity has been unequally distributed according to political constructs (totalizing discourses maintaining center/margin relations of domination and subordination) that benefit a few and generate suffering for many. A question asked throughout the dissertation is "who gets to determine what the facts are?"
From a Foucauldian perspective it is all of us in our complicit acceptance and reproduction of the relations of power, right and truth in the production of knowledge. There is no sense of taking or giving up power. Rather, it is totalizing discourses (center/margin relations) that generate the fact of poverty, and for Foucault, this stems back to sovereign power and the hierarchizing rule of law. The existence of poverty, or any concrete social problem for that matter, is both a consequence of totalizing discourses and a fact around which social action is organized. When poverty is treated as a fact it reproduces the whole totalizing discursive edifice beginning with the ontology of nature and working through the normalizing forces of modernization. The fact of poverty in its stark reality covers over and hides its role as a consequence of totalizing discourses. Social action that focuses on alleviating “real” poverty focuses on the effect of totalizing discourses, not the discourses and what they assume to be “T”rue. Much of what social workers do can be interpreted to not only reproduce the center/margin relations social justice discourses say are the target of change, but to deepen and broaden the reach of these relations.

The dissertation argues that by de-conflating social work’s totalizing discourses at the level of ontology, the world as it appears and all the facts that make up its “T”ruth will be revealed to be political constructs that benefit a few and create suffering for many. The focus on ontology in the previous three chapters has led to the understanding that there are no facts without an undergirding political agenda. The ‘world as it appears,” even the nature of trees, sky, and wind, is a function of sedimented cultural, social and shared experiences of persons in different historical epochs. There is no obvious, overt,
and concrete nature to the exclusion of other understandings of nature. For one culture to claim its vision of nature is “true” inevitably leads to generation of suffering as it seeks to dominate another vision with its own version of the facts. By de-conflicting and clarifying the three ontologies and their discourses the possibility of reversing how “facts” are understood is generated. The question emerges is, “are there any facts to begin with that don’t reproduce historically given totalizing discourses in center/margin relations?”

The answer to this question is yes. The primary fact the dissertation suggests is that of human nature, “that each and every one of us is inherently capable of making healthy choices for ourselves, given the opportunity.” This fact is also the social justice project’s key organizing principle. The ontology of the Subject, with its assumption of historical movement from “One to many ones” finds concrete place in this fact. Human nature is not a concept abstract and ephemeral, pointing to a possible way of being, although it may be cast as a desired outcome for social action. Rather, it is the most basic description of humans being in our worlds. It is not located in individual character or in socio-cultural normative structures. It is the foundational fact of what it means to be with which begin all efforts to create a just world.

The reversal comes in understanding just what a concrete fact is. Within the ontology of nature, three forces of modernization and social work’s professional project evidence of poverty is a concrete fact. Within the social justice project, human nature is the most concrete fact. The facts of nature are at best trans-human. the coldness of an infinite universe known in billions of light years, or the micro processes of electrons or
quarks. At worst the facts of nature are inhumane as they are undergirded by the political reality of totalizing discourses given in center/margin relations that generate suffering for a vast majority of the world’s people. The fact of human nature is founded in the idea of the Subject and being-free. At its worst, the fact of human nature supports identity politics and individuals within their social locations speaking. This is a transitional phase, and often a necessary one. The first step to speaking and being-heard is declaring identity apart from the dominating, defining center of one’s world. Even when marginalized persons speak from within their own difference and absence of characteristics defining the center, eventually a new cultural location emerges that links with other cultural locations in the social justice project. This is the best the fact of human nature offers: the grounding of acting in being-free and generation of cultural location in taking responsibility for being-free.

Human nature is a function of the ontology of Subject, and undergirds the ideational movement of the “One God the Subject to the many human Subjects.” In no way does human nature refer to concrete facts or contexts for its definition. exemplification or justification. Human nature is the most concrete element in being-human. The most naïve way of viewing facts in the West is a function of very abstract totalizing discourses that have us believe “nature” is independent of our perception of it. and hence unquestioned because it is “T”rue. Reverse this and what becomes concrete is the idea of freedom and being personally responsible for being-free as given in human nature, the capacity to make healthy choices for oneself, given the opportunity.
What is given in the "world as it appears" is a set of unquestioned assumptions constituting the truth of nature. When these assumptions are questioned, de-conflicted and examined, the possibility for reversal emerges. The reversal occurs when a person or social group decides to be responsible for being-free and then act differently from a different assumption, the fact of human nature.

Foucault’s idea that power is capillary can be used to insure that acting is clearly structured by human nature and not the facts of the world as it appears. Unquestioned assumptions are conflated, totalizing discourses constituting social locations within the world as it appears. These assumptions include a set of prescriptive norms that guide human action. These norms manifest themselves in rules that determine what is acceptable and unacceptable behavior. When assumptions are questioned and de-conflicted and the world as it appears in nature is revealed to be highly political, totalizing discourses are taken apart. A cultural location is founded in one’s own being a Subject, and the Subject status of others with whom one interacts, and the fact of human nature. The capillaries of totalizing discourses can be chosen among, cast aside, redefined, reformulated, etc., as part of constructing a cultural location. The key component of this process can be seen to be construction of one’s own actions (or a social group’s actions) as one capillary of the fact of human nature. The following paragraphs restate the dissertation’s argument in order to clarify how being a capillary of the fact of human nature can be understood.

The dissertation has argued that social justice discourses are instruments of the professional project, they are the “saying” that covers over and hides the “doing.”
What professionalizing efforts "do" is participate in competition for turf with other professions in a system of professions. This is the driving force of professionalization in social work. In the act of reversing this relation, the "doing" is given priority and examined. Assumptions have been questioned and de-conflated, and a hitherto nonexistent discursive space created. This space is maintained by keeping the three ontologies separate at the level of idea, of assumption.

If the "world as it appears" is appealed to for facts, then it is the political reality of totalizing, hierarchizing discourses that distributes opportunity unequally that is appealed to. Once the boundaries that place persons at the center/margins of the social system are seen as arbitrary political constructs contingent on an historical moment, then discursive space opens up for persons to determine what their own facts are, from within their own cultural locations.

The fact of human nature has been positioned within the ontology of the Subject. The Subject knowingly uses the technologies and innovations produced within the ontology of nature, but from a radically different political foundation. It knowingly examines its own sedimenting categories with the critical gaze. The products and functions of the two worlds assumed by these other two ontologies are instruments of the ends of the social justice project, the historical movement from the One to the many ones, a just world. This movement of the "One to the many ones" is founded in the fact of human nature. No longer is the world as it appears. As one of the many, each person is given the opportunity to achieve Subject status as a capillary of human nature.
The term capillary comes from Foucault’s discussion of disciplinary power, which is productive and assumes the creative force of the Subject. The normalizing function of modernization and its three forces given in totalizing discourses produces solutions to problems in the form of ever more refined individual and population categories, social locations. This is disciplinary power’s creative or productive function. Power’s products are visible, the natural categories constituting social locations, for example. Even more visible are the consequences of unequal distribution of power through natural categories, poverty, unequal pay rates according to gender, etc.

What the dissertation suggests is that because power is not a thing or substance, assertion of its existence serves to de-stabilize things and substances, e.g., facts given in natural categories. It can be seen as a tool in Foucault’s methodology of reversal. The methodology of reversal has generated the possibility for an actual reversal. The dissertation is arguing that this reversal is from totalizing discourses and their facts, to the fact of human nature and achievement of a just world.

Once this reversal is performed, Foucault’s idea of disciplinary power as core to the method of reversal is no longer necessary. Destabilization of totalizing discourses required a method powerful enough to reach assumptive foundations and reveal the quicksand upon which they rest. Once destabilization is routinized and discourses de-conflicted, the fact of human nature can be posited as foundation for social work’s social justice project and the tools of nature and critique wielded as part of creating a just world.

In an important sense, the fact of human nature takes on the role of power after the reversal. It is neither here nor there, substance or insubstantial. It is the foundational
fact in being-human. and as an idea emerging from its facticity, it is also the possible
criteria by which to judge and interpret doing. It is visible only in its micro-processes,
behaviors and their consequences, and like disciplinary power, is absent when these
processes and consequences are the focus for trying to ascertain evidence of the fact of
human nature. Use of the critical gaze insures that the attempt to place the fact of human
nature in one of its consequences is unsuccessful. This is the path to generating new
totalizing discourses and generation of a new form of the center/margin relation. The fact
of human nature, like power, focuses on “doing,” on the silences. glances. words,
gestures and their iterations. The fact of human nature is not found in grand discourses
such as this dissertation; rather it is found in the smallest of venues. persons acting in
their worlds. But. for human nature to structure doing, the totalizing form of grand
discourses must be de-conflated and the different ontologies clarified. Otherwise the fact
of human nature is nothing more than another idea serving as reproductive vehicle of
disciplinary power.

Is what I do as a social worker founded in totalizing discourses of nature or the
fact of human nature? Is what I do a function of the totalizing discourses of disciplinary
power working through me so that I am complicit in reproducing and expanding natural
categories? Or is what I do a function of the fact of human nature. where I am a capillary
of human nature. the One becoming the many ones, and institutionalization of the social
justice project? These questions are illustrative of a different use of the critical gaze.
The critical gaze is not abandoned. Rather it is put to a much smaller. local. and perhaps
more important use.
The either/or framework of the above questions is a beginning for turning the critical gaze upon "doing" and its patterns. The idea that there are two different worlds that are conflated for social workers allows for the use of "critical thinking," the act of de-conflating professional attitudes, beliefs and actions so they originate either from the ontology of Subject or nature. From within the critical perspective, there are two worlds for professional social workers: the world of the Subject and multiple cultures, meanings and perspectives, and the world of nature, undiscovered yet obdurate and concrete in its assumption of apriori reality. The purposeful use of the critical gaze is to understand the workings of disciplinary power and center/margin relations in one's own professional actions so that they may be re-founded in the fact of human nature. Another purpose of the critical gaze is to insure that it is the fact of human nature and social justice project that serves as foundation for using the tools and technologies of the ontology of nature in effect to maintain the reversal.

The section that follows describes some examples of acting from the fact of human nature within the social justice project and ontology of the Subject within professional social work contexts.

**Acting from the Fact of Human Nature**

What follows assumes the fact of human nature, both as foundation for seeing humans being in our worlds, and what is seen, the consequences of this fact. Contexts and professional actions within them are described within the ontology of the Subject and the "One becoming the many ones" of the social justice project, both of which articulate
the fact of human nature. The reversal has been accomplished at the level of discourse, and the following examples show how it can be accomplished at the level of doing.

The classroom. The most common context that professional social workers experience is the department or school of social work. All social workers pass through these halls within academia. The larger parameters determining how social work education is conducted is the current CSWE EPAS for professional programs and the relation between the school or department of social work and the larger university. Given these constraints, which affect required content areas and admissions procedures, what happens in the classroom can be seen to stem from the fact of human nature.

Rather than organizing classes in areas and in sequences determined by the school or department to achieve vertical and horizontal integration, a CSWE accreditation standard, acting from the fact of human nature involves trusting that students and faculty will make the appropriate choices to meet this and other standards. Assumption of the fact of human nature is performed within an already existing historical and social context given in institutional practices. The choice by a faculty to work within the social justice project would probably involve much strategizing to anticipate objections and overt resistance to conducting professional education in the manner suggested below.

For example, a class size in this model would likely be one faculty member to 8 to 12 students. This class size would allow each student to fully participate in constructing a common framework for the two year MSW program. Many schools and departments are increasing the size of classes rather than decreasing them due to increasingly scarce
educational resources. Faculty would need to work through this issue and perhaps redefine the traditional approach to determining faculty workload. Again, the fact of human nature has faculty believe that working together will result in a set of institutional practices that take into account CSWE and university parameters as well as allow MSW education to be conducted within the social justice project.

A faculty might decide that the only structure a class might have is that it meets at a time and place listed in the university schedule, and that if there are 15 semester or quarter units a student signs up for, that there is that many contact hours each week. Where and when the class meets after that is a choice that the class as a whole makes. Rather than having faculty meetings to decide curriculum, faculty would meet with their classes and the class would decide how to construct the curriculum. The faculty member asks questions guided by the assumption that the persons in her class, learning the role of student, can make healthy choices for themselves. Because there are always institutional guidelines, the faculty member serves as a resource that offers information on these constraints while at the same time encouraging brainstorming about how the class wants to structure its education. The faculty member trusts in the fact of human nature and that given the opportunity, the students in her class will learn how to work together and make healthy choices for themselves, as a person, class and cohort. There is also the trust that a student who is unable to work within this kind of creative environment will self-select out of the program, with guidance of course.

The faculty member might begin by asking her class how they want to structure their education. Do students want to develop individual plans of study, a class course of
study, or work with other classes to develop a cohort plan for the two years they spend in the program? One class might decide to develop individual plans of study, once they understand content areas that must be covered. Contact other classes to see how they are constructing their education. If there are 100 students in an MSW class, there may be 10 classes in a cohort. The classes may decide to form a council of classes where, based on input from all ten classes, a cohort decision is made about how the two years will progress. The council, in concert with the faculty, might decide how to allocate faculty resources, who will work with what class or classes of students and in what sequence. Individual members of the cohort find other students with similar interests and form working groups that may or may not last the duration of the MSW experience. They speak up and advocate for a course of study and request the resources to make it happen. If this process takes the full 15 weeks of a normal semester, or 10 weeks of a normal quarter, then it takes this long. The faculty member might both encourage students to be as creative as possible about allocating institutional resources as well as making sure that CSWE and university parameters are accounted for. The possible permutations of how an MSW education is constructed are practically endless.

Faculty members ask questions that guide students to look at what they are doing as part of developing the critical gaze. They constantly and consistently ask students to ground what they choose to do in their own clarifying set of assumptions, to examine the process in which they are engaged. This process parallels empowerment models for education at the level of discourse. What is different about the proposed educational model is that students and faculty in concert construct a common educational experience
that focuses on what is happening in the ongoing moment. Students do not walk into an already existing curriculum. They are asked to create one.

Within the current model, empowerment practice is talked about within the context of a syllabus defined classroom experience that can be seen to ignore the very context of learning in which a student is participating. In contrast to this ignoring, the discourses of empowerment, the strengths-perspective, multi-culturalism, and diversity are allowed to develop as a creative function of students' and faculty members' interaction from the fact of human nature. Rather than imposing discourses about these topics within a pre-conceived two-year curriculum, faculty can ask questions that encourage discussion and incorporation of these ideas into how the two year education is constructed. Students begin to ask these questions themselves. They learn from faculty member modeling.

For example, after a particularly tense class interaction the faculty member might ask how student's understood what just happened. A discussion about group dynamics might ensue. The faculty member might ask if it would be worth the classes time to understand what the literature says about group dynamics. The class might decide it is and develop a learning module on group dynamics around disagreement and confrontation. The next time the class interaction becomes tense a student might ask what just happened. The class might then apply what was learned in the module on group dynamics and conflict. They could discuss different strategies to deepen the sense of safety members of the class feel with each other, how to work through conflict without running away from it, and how this process might work with different populations of
clients. The focus of already existing discourses such as empowerment and strengths perspectives are developed within the context of the class, classes, and cohort as a whole.

The fact of human nature leads to the assumption that students will learn the institutional norms and guidelines for an MSW education within the university and begin to organize their own educational experience with them in mind. They will begin to suggest areas to research, and consult with one another about where such research fits into the larger curriculum. Faculty members become resource and referral persons, modeling how to act from the fact of human nature and how to maintain the discursive space within which student’s practice speaking and doing.

The faculty. The sort of trust and faith faculty members have in themselves and students that working within the social justice project necessitates is not something that happens easily. The difficulty of this change process cannot be overemphasized. At the same time, a full faculty needs to agree to work from within the social justice project for institutional norms to be grounded in the fact of human nature. Regardless of where individual faculty members are in their own process of reversal, faculty has to agree as a group to effect the proposed changes. To recognize the syllabus is a vehicle of professionalization and no longer use it is difficult to do. To trust that someone will make healthy choices for themselves, given the opportunity is difficult to do when personal experience within the world as it appears says otherwise.

Educators can teach themselves to use the critical gaze to examine their own gift of Subject status. Every academic social worker has been given the opportunity to work for and achieve Subject status. In order to create a social environment within the
university in which the student feels she is heard, feel that she participates in and benefits from the social contract, there have to be persons who have given up their socially constructed identities and have developed their own narratives within which to speak and be heard, persons that model the process.

The fact of human nature says that every faculty member, tenured, tenure track, or adjunct, is capable of making healthy choices for herself, and that given the opportunity and her understanding of this opportunity, is struggling to do so. Social work’s literature cited in chapter three exemplifies how individual educators struggle to achieve their own vision of the social justice project. It is doubtful that there is a social worker, educator or practitioner, that is not at some level struggling with the issues raised in the dissertation. The fact of human nature assumes this is so.

What this section of the chapter is attempting to affirm is a perspective that can serve as a common platform or language, that assumes all of us are in this together, that we care about what we do, and are individually struggling to find a way to make the world a better place in which to live. It would be easy and misguided to say that a person is either working within the context of the social project or working within the context of the professional project, that the realist and constructionist positions are somehow expressive of how the world is.

Use of these two terms is no longer necessary. They served as definitional waypoints to understand the work of totalizing discourses within what is done. When the reversal has been effected, there are only persons in dialogue with one another at the level of idea and assumption. The complexity of all person’s worlds is affirmed. The critical
gaze allows complexity to exist without having to dismiss it into polarizing and reductive simplicity. The fact of human nature, the fact of science’s nature, and the presence of the critical gaze encourages exploration of complexity. The dichotomy of realist and constructionist positions is a fluid, temporary frame marking one step towards common foundation in the fact of human nature, the social justice project, and the common effort as expressed in social work’s mission to be part of creating a just world. The dichotomy does not define the parameters of competition or conflict or truth. Rather, it represents one step in a long process of steps leading to the reality of a just world.

There are likely social work educators who find it nearly impossible to envision her identity apart from the social location of gendered educator, researcher and scholar. for example. or any other intersection of the eight natural categories. The struggle she feels comes from understanding that continuing to assume the speaking presence that is absent in the roles of persons acting as students is an act that maintains the center/margin relations of domination and subordination. Regardless of a person’s own struggle, the fact of human nature has this struggle be supported. no matter where in the process a person is. To say that every educator has been given more than enough opportunity to become aware of the possibility of working for Subject status covers over the very difficulty that effecting the reversal involves. This does not affirm a person’s inherent capacity to make healthy choices. Rather, it affirms that a person has not made use of the gift given. This point is fine when it is totalizing discourses that are being targeted. But when it is a person struggling to make meaning in her world, it is inappropriate.
Knowing what is entailed in choosing to be free and responsible for so being can create great turmoil. There is logic internal to the dissertation's argument that while not having the status of "T"ruth or even truth that logic can have enough force to destabilize and foment uncertainty. What the dissertation suggests is that the foundation already exists in each and every one of us, the capacity to be free and responsible for being so. The possibility exists for every faculty member and social worker to recognize how to refound institutional practices in the social justice project, being part of effecting the reversal. Each of us is inherently capable of being part of changing institutional practices to originate in the ontology of the Subject. The resistance to doing so each faculty member feels is a step on the way to accepting responsibility for being-free. No one person can understand the struggle dealing with uncertainty brings forth for another person. What we can understand about each other is the capacity to be successful in dealing with uncertainty, and validate both the struggle and capacity.

When a faculty works together and institutionalizes some form of the suggested model, the institutional environment is created in which students are given the opportunity to learn what it means and feels like to achieve Subject status themselves, and to take this experience into agencies and model it for colleagues and clients.

The agency. Agency based social workers work on the front lines of extending the social environment so that others can work to achieve Subject status. Every social worker can believe the client system, fellow employees, supervisors and administrators with whom s/he works are capable of making healthy choices for themselves, given the opportunity. When working with clients the social worker encourages clients to organize
horizontally with persons of like experience and background as preface to forming cultural locations, much as faculty organized horizontally to decide to change institutional practices, and students actually organized horizontally. If single mothers are the client base, then they might be encouraged to come together and learn to speak amongst their own group, tell their own stories, to learn to advocate for themselves, and eventually demand to be heard in the rule of law so they can participate as equals within the social contract.

Social workers can treat colleagues in a similar manner. Regardless of whether a colleague wants to be-free and take personal responsibility for being-free, s/he is treated as if she does. To work within the social justice project suggests that social workers organize horizontally to define the problems they face, to take huge, seemingly insurmountable problems such as large caseloads, organizational hierarchies, or entrenched bureaucratization, and frame them in manageable sizes. What practicing social workers do is educate, each other, clients, supervisors, administrators, friends, family and acquaintances. The first phase of education is to destabilize the world as it appears by asking questions that lead to emergence of the discursive space in which others learn to de-conflate what they have been told is “T”rue, if they so choose.

Most social work agencies are organized hierarchically in line with capitalization of the market economy. Agency parameters that serve as norms for what social workers do often serve the social worker more than clients. The agency director and his board of directors make policy. It is delivered to management and line staff. In contrast to this, after reversal the role of administration and management might be to support the layers of
organization underneath them. The focus of the agency’s effort is to support the social worker on the line. The question that managers and administrators might consistently ask is, “what can I do to support you in your efforts to work with your client system?” Agency policy supports the most effective means to give opportunity to those from whom it is withheld by the eight natural categories. An agency’s mission might have as its focal point supporting the social worker who works most closely with the agency’s target client system.

The issues described that face social work faculty are the same that agency social workers face, but perhaps with the added dimension that agency social workers organizing horizontally and advocating for change in institutional practices might be subject to censure or firing. If agency-based social workers are to organize horizontally much dialogue anticipating resistance and strategy development to work through or around such resistance would be necessary. Just how the fact of human nature guides building a strategic approach to transforming business as usual in the world as it appears within agencies is a question that needs exploring.

NASW. Social work’s professional organization has been shown to overtly promote the professional project in its search for increased status, salary and jurisdictions of practice for social workers. As part of agency-based social workers seeking to organize horizontally, one strategy might have NASW serve as the organizational milieu in which horizontal organization is explored and institutionalized. The major impediment could be NASW’s commitment to advocating solely for social workers and their claim to jurisdictions of practice. NASW could expand its commitment to horizontal organization
by encouraging professionals from other helping professions to join and work for change in how agencies are structured and services delivered. All practitioners could help create, participate in and expand a network of helping professionals dedicated to de-conflating totalizing discourses and the center/margin relations that continue them. This de-conflation takes place when the assumptive foundation for what professionals “do” changes from the professional project and its inhering competition, to the social justice project and its fact of human nature. A network of helping professions founded in the fact of human nature would go a long way towards transforming the social welfare system in America.

Field instructors. Field instructors have a foot in both the academy and agency. They are educators preparing students to work autonomously as social workers within an agency setting. They are also agency employees. It is this group of social workers that perhaps have the least understood and hence most important role in developing the social justice project. The field instructor teaches on many levels. On one hand she teaches basic skills in how to perform a job. This involves the student “shadowing” until she has begun to learn the scripts of that particular job well enough to try them for herself with client systems. On the other the field instructor introduces a student to agency culture, communication patterns, their strengths and weaknesses. She facilitates the student’s questions and use of the critical gaze. If the field instructor does not herself critically examine institutional norms and practices, then the student is not likely to learn to do so. It is the field instructor’s “doing” that the student learns from. Without field instructors actively participating in the social justice project, with all persons she comes in contact,
the fact of human nature will likely remain at the level of discourse and be absorbed by modernization as one of the problems it generated that the professions need to solve.

The field instructor models acting from the fact of human nature in all contexts. The student, in the process of constructing her own education, has to learn a new set of institutional norms and practices. More than likely these norms and practices are instrumental vehicles of totalizing discourses and center/margin relations. Thus, it is crucial the field instructor be firmly grounded in the fact of human nature and social justice project, and participate in a professional network of helping professionals actively transforming the world as it appears.

Foucault has argued that to understand cultural and social norms at work in institutional practices, the critical gaze should focus on what people do in the most routine and mundane of environments, not on the great missions and texts institutions say they are vehicles of. It is the jagged glance, the shrug of shoulders, the raise of the eyebrows or moment of silence within the hierarchized setting of the agency and classroom that can clearly articulate the flow of disciplinary power. When the field instructor is either engaged in utilizing the methodology of reversal in the critical gaze and examining how she is a vehicle of disciplinary power, or is acting from her vision of the fact of human nature, the student takes what was learned in constructing her education and sees it modeled by a practicing social worker. This affords her the opportunity to practice applying her classroom experience to institutional practices and norms founded in totalizing discourses in a different setting.
Researchers. The first section of the dissertation showed just how heavily social work has invested in developing its core jurisdiction within the academy. To follow the dissertation's argument to its logical conclusion might lead researchers working in the world of nature to understand that their efforts are nothing more than the workings of disciplinary power, a distasteful way of looking at one's professional life.

De-conflation is a method to illuminate the mechanisms that maintain and extend social injustice as a political system that uses the nature of science as one of its articulating vehicles. The scientific endeavor itself is not in question. Its utility and worth is too obvious. What is not obvious is the politics that use science to maintain and extend the center/margin relations that generates suffering for a vast majority of the world's people. Once the three ontologies are clarified and shown to be distinct from one another, social science research can be viewed as an instrument of the ends of the social justice project. Science and its methods are not the focus of the critical gaze. Rather, it is the political system that uses the technologies science develops that is clarified. Once the social science research achieves this clarification, and social science is grounded in the professional project, it becomes even more important as a way to create a just world.

Once the research scientist has herself made the reversal, her professional work becomes a means by which various contexts structured by center/margin relations can be destabilized. Multi-method approaches can create a discursive space in which the voices of research subjects offer perspective on the research process. The point here is to suggest that the core jurisdiction of social work is no longer (the usable) classificatory
schemas of the sciences, but the social justice project that directs social science to achieve the end of a just world.

For example, intervention research can avowedly ground itself in the fact of human nature as a theoretical perspective which guides how interventions are constructed and delivered. Basic research can be done to attempt to answer the question, "what are the patterns of attitudes, acting and behaviors that stem from the fact of human nature?" How can the "doing" structured by the fact that everyone is inherently capable of making healthy choices for themselves, given the opportunity, be made visible? What do parents need to do to learn to see each other and their children within the social justice project? What pedagogies do teachers need to learn so students in elementary, middle, junior and high school classrooms have the fact of human nature modeled for them?

Inductively derived theories such as attachment theory or social learning theory can be grounded in the larger, more inclusive fact of human nature and the social justice project. Interventions created according to these theories can be very amenable to empirical testing. Rather than generating findings about social problems, and devising interventions that address them, social work research can be used as a powerful tool to develop interventions based in the fact of human nature. Further, social work research can determine if interventions are effective in helping to create a social environment in which opportunity is more equally distributed to persons in their worlds. The awesome, creative power that is social science's can be a tool of the social justice project.
Interpretation and Dismissal: Objections to the Dissertation's Argument

The dissertation's argument is fairly straightforward and logical. However, it does not claim to be true. It is a perspective on what social workers do and the political assumptions undergirding this doing. As such, it is open to judgment and interpretation, and at worst, dismissal.

Interpretation. To declare the foundational fact of human nature begs to be judged and interpreted, to be challenged. The perspective developed is very Western, very much a creature of Enlightenment thinking within an American context. Despite the fact that Young's (1990) and Fraser's (1997) arguments are accounted for in the construction of the social justice project, there are any number of interpretations that this discourse has not addressed and accounted for. The fact of human nature can serve as focus for endless discussion and debate. This is the point of making such a declaration. For it to remain a fluid, un-sedimented fact, it has to live in discourse, and discourse has to structure what is done, which then feeds back to deepen and broaden understanding of this fact. The point is that social workers engage each other in dialogue and reverse the assumption of "T"ruth by declaring a different fact to be foundational, and then from this foundation, act in the world.

The fact of human nature can become a concept that stands apart from any role in acting. This is always a danger. If this happens, it will be so due to the center/margin relations reasserting themselves. It can become an articulating vehicle of disciplinary power and lose whatever role it has in facilitating a person's opportunity to achieve Subject status. This is a vulnerability that inheres in the fact of human nature. When
examined, like power. it is not there. What is there are its products, its consequences, things in a world of things. The world as it appears understands only the liberal view of power. seeing that the fact of human nature is a thing among things to be traded, wielded, and legislated. When the fact of human nature is understood as a concept and not a living process, a way of being in the world, then it sediments as something distinct within the world as it appears. Key to the viability and very existence of the social justice project is the dialogue in which this fundamental fact is questioned, discussed, dismissed, reformulated, altered and transformed. There are as many ways to express this fundamental fact of human nature as there are persons on the earth. When the fact is dismissed and not brought back into dialogue, then it no longer serves as possible or actual foundation for acting.

Dismissal. There are a number of ways that the dissertation’s argument can be dismissed. Perhaps the most persuasive is that asserting the fact of human nature along with the expectation that it can actually serve as foundation for professional acting is Pollyannaish. A strain of naivety can be seen in the argument that establishes the fact of nature and social justice project. The practicality of the course of action suggested can not only be in doubt, it can be seen to be nothing more than wishful thinking.

This perspective that seems to dismiss the dissertation’s argument is not the end of dialogue. It makes a strong point that is worthy of respectful questioning. At best continued dialogue between two seemingly disjunctive perspectives can lead to a re-envisioning of the fact of human nature so that it anticipates the charge of naivety. At worst the agreement to disagree can be reached and common understanding of different
perspectives can serve as bridge rather than functioning to separate. This kind of discourse is absolutely necessary to maintaining the vitality of the fact of human nature.

Another argument might be that the dissertation is a long tome of nothing more than speculation. While the ideas here within might be nice and have an internal logic that holds together, ultimately they are not based in any valid knowledge of the world. The kind of resistance such a charge is indicative of speaks not to the impracticality of what the dissertation proposes, but to the validity of its assumptions. The very idea of three ontologies and their distinctly different worldviews may not be accepted.

In one sense the dissertation's purpose is fulfilled when two or more persons engage in dialogue at the level of assumption and idea, when the "fact of human nature" is contested. If the dissertation does nothing more than outline the parameters of this level or dimension, then it will at least have been part of creating the possibility of a discursive space where assumptions can be discussed without the conflated baggage that it is "T"ruth that is being decided. For someone to disagree that there are three different realities means s/he is engaging in dialogue about the assumptions underlying the world as it appears. De-conflation and clarification of assumptions is a destabilizing process. What any one person decides to do amidst the destabilizing process is up to them.

When this person is a practicing social worker, then the profession's mission comes into play, and whatever fact of reality is decided, even tentatively, it might be realized that the fact needs to be in concert with this mission. What the dissertation has attempted to do is mark out the territory within which the reality of being-free and taking personal responsibility for being-free can happen. If this is contested, then this territory
becomes alive. To clarify assumptions and how they relate to "doing" is a worthy goal in itself.

The dismissals of naivety and speculation are but two examples of what very well might be a long list of questions that challenge and contest the dissertation's argument. For the discursive space to remain open at the level of idea and assumption, this contestation is necessary and welcome.

Conclusion

Carel Germain ended her (1971) dissertation with the following paragraphs.

In Znaniecki's view every theory is both an end and a beginning. As it reaches the limit of its own validity, it opens the way for discovering new problems and creating a more valid theory. Thus inductive explorers create new systems of relative truth, founded on the less valid system of their predecessors and leading to the creation of more valid systems by their successors. In this way, knowledge is a dynamic totality of theoretic systems growing through the ages, each only relatively true, but all of them together embodying a supreme form of validity which the term "truth" in its scholarly meaning is quite unfit to express...

Such a conception shows the only way to escape the dilemma of dogmatic certainty and skeptical doubt and makes the identification of relativism with subjectivism and objective validity with absolutism impossible.

And so it is with casework. It, too, is a system of thought constantly evolving and potentially adaptive to its environment – its past structure was valid for solving the problems for which it was designed. Seeming now to be less fit
for new kinds of problems in a new kind of environment, it may need to make
room for a new system of thought that both arises from the old and departs from it
and that can solve the new problems. While most likely a new system cannot
solve the old problems in the old way, it may be able to help in its own valid way.
Each system of thought makes its own unique contributions and has its own
unique limitations. Hopefully both will be considered significant and honored
parts of the historical development – past and future – of a continually evolving
casework (p. 275-276)

What the dissertation has proposed is that the organizing framework for social
work practice and education be reversed from the professional to the social justice
project. In an important sense what the dissertation suggests – clarification of
assumptions and constant dialogue within this now clarified dimension – is an affirmation
of both the liberal arts perspective that traditionally undergirds social work education and
practice and social work’s overarching social justice mission.

Germain’s notion of validity in the paragraphs above is one that comes from
clarification of assumptions within theoretic systems and recognition of the unique value
each historically given theoretic has offered social work. When new problems cannot be
solved within current theoretical frames, new frames emerge.

The dissertation argued that one of the main problems that the profession of social
work faces is that it has situated itself so that it is unable to move in ways that address
how to solve pressing social problems. The fact of human nature and social justice
project very well might contribute to developing a new core jurisdiction for social work.
that allows practitioners to move effectively to solve problems current modes of practice are unable to address, let alone solve.

Chapter 2 developed the idea that social work has had four periods in its history, each demarcated by a different core jurisdiction. The first was the moral period with its righteousness in the clarity of God’s will. The second was the fact gathering/practice wisdom period and its core emphasis on social evidence and methods to gather it. The third was the psychodynamic period and Freudian/Rankian theory and the methods derived from theory. The fourth is the empirical period and its core jurisdiction of the methods and theories of the academic social sciences.

The proposition the dissertation makes is that this cleared discursive space within classroom and agency is the framework for emergence of the fifth period in social work’s history. The core jurisdiction of this fifth period is the knowledge of what it means to be free, and the methods chronicling how to become free, how to maintain one’s being-free, and how to enable others to create their own freedom. To this end, the discourses of professional, academic social work can be utilized, bent, shaped, and declined in service of generating a just world.

Whether or not there is enough uncertainty within social work about current theories and practices to warrant consideration of adopting a new core jurisdiction is itself uncertain. It is hoped that what uncertainty does exist is extended and deepened by the dissertation’s argument. If social work is indeed ready to once again examine what it does in light of what it says it does, then the hope there might be a fifth period in our history is not unwarranted.
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