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The Development of Taiwanese Folk Religion
1683-1945

by

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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Date

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The development of Taiwanese folk religion was intertwined with social and economic conditions through Taiwan's history. Since the 17th century, the new immigrant society favored the growth of economic crops to exchange the necessary goods from mainland. This started the long process of dynamic interaction between the folk religion and the economic development of Taiwan. As a result, the original roles of the deities, Ma-tsu (a protector of seamen) and T'ü-ti-kung (a protector of farmers) had changed and gradually emerged as commercial gods. The official culture did not root deeply in this new society, so the official temples without the local support, were doomed to decline.

Under the Japanese rule, the Taiwanese were barred from government positions but active in economic field. Hence, the content of folk religion, articulating their life, became more concerned with material gains. Without the involvement of high-culture elites in shaping the beliefs, moral or abstract
values were less emphasized in the religion. Although the religion is an important part of the cultural identity of the Taiwanese, there was no dramatic and violent confrontation between the folk religion and colonial rule. Only a few Taiwanese converted to the religions that the rulers promoted, although the folk religion adopted some new elements from the Japanese religions.

Another important aspect of this study is that the study of Taiwanese folk religion can offer an alternative view to the Western general theory of religious study, which assumes that state and religion are independent institutions, and is unworkable for some religions such as Taiwanese folk religion. Data for the temples of this study mainly come from three sources: (1) Ch’ing Gazetteers (written from 1694 to 1898), (2) The Survey of Temples (six volumes) (conducted by the colonial government in 1915-1916), (3) Appendix: Directory of Temples in Taiwan, in Taiwanese Religion and Superstitious Customs (So, Keirai, 1938).
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INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s, it was estimated that about 70 percentage of the Taiwanese population practiced Taiwanese Folk religion. Taiwanese Folk religion is not like the great traditions such as Christianity which have a very complete belief system. Taiwanese Folk religion is a belief combining mixture of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, with some indigenous beliefs. In addition, Taiwanese Folk religion is very this-worldly oriented. If one feels that the deity is no longer efficacious and can not satisfy an individual’s requests, then that person will switch his or her worship to other deities. In some extreme cases like lottery gamblers, some losers destroy the images of deities, just because they are furious with the gods that fail them on the lottery (Ch’en Wei-hsin, 1988:575).

The puzzles for Taiwanese Folk religion are: (1) If Taiwanese Folk religion has not developed as a very systematic belief over the past three hundred years, why has it not been replaced by other great religions? (2) Observers have often wondered "why ritual activities directed to gods in the form of Ch’ing bureaucrats continue and even flourish in Taiwan today despite the end of the Ch’ing dynasty and the introduction of substantial economic changes". "These rituals have been described as anachronistic, as if they continued to exist through a kind of inertia" (Ahern, 1981:106). (3) Why is
Taiwanese Folk religion so this-worldly oriented that people can shift their deities whenever they want to? What did this religion look like two hundred years ago? Was it very concerned with material gains in the 19th century? Some Taiwanese scholars even proposed that this-worldly oriented religion is an important factor to facilitate the economic development of Taiwan. In order to answer these questions, this study will trace back the historical course of Taiwanese Folk religion prior to 1945.

This study defines the Taiwanese folk religion in terms of several cults: the ancestor worship1, the worship of Heaven, natural subordinate deities under Heaven (grain, wind, cloud, mountain, river and rain gods etc.), the cults of deified people (Ma-tsu, Kuan-ti, Ch’eng-huang), the cults of Confucianism (Confucius, Wen-ch’ang), and the folk religiousionalized Buddhist cult (Kuan-yin). Given this operational definition, this study looks at the number of temples for each cult to trace the overall change in folk religion.

Data for the temples of this study mainly come from three sources: (1) Ch‘ing Gazetteers (written from 1694 to 1898), (2) The Survey of Temples (six volumes) (conducted by the colonial government in 1915-1916), (3) Appendix: The Directory of

1The ancestor worship is a little bit different from other cults. Also, this study does not have a sufficient data to do a full analysis on this worship through three hundred years. Hence, the ancestor worship will not be covered in this study.
Temples in Taiwan, in Taiwanese Religion and Superstitious Customs (So, Keirai, 1938).

Among these resources, the 1916 source is the most important. In order to gain full control over the folk-religion temples, the colonial government conducted a series of island-wide surveys on folk-religion temples (Huang Teshih, 1966:93-94). Most of the survey data were lost through time. Fortunately, this study contains most of the temple survey done in 1916. This study secures several hand-written volumes covering the folk-religion temples in six major counties of Taiwan. This study estimates that the temple data in these six major counties were made up 65% of the total Temple data in Taiwan. Since this was the first survey, although not a completed data set for the whole island, the data obtained for this study are still very valuable. The items listed on the survey include the construction date, the builders, the estimated number of supporters, and the devotional level of worshippers for each temple.

The main theme through this study is that the development of Taiwanese folk religion was intertwined with social and economic conditions through the history of Taiwan. Due to the characteristics of a new immigrant society (i.e., less state control from the central court, less condemnation from the orthodox [Confucian] values toward profit-pursing economic activities, and an export-oriented agriculture to trade the necessaries from the southeastern China), the folk religion,
originally articulating the life of the lower social class of southeastern China, was highly active during the Ch’ing period. The belief of pursuing wealth in folk religion might facilitate economic activities in the first place, and yet economic development might modify the content of folk religion. The result might be that the folk religion had become more this-worldly oriented, as the Taiwanese economy moved more toward profit pursuing activities.

During Japanese rule, the discrepancy between the ruling and the ruled made Taiwanese folk religion an important part of the cultural identity of Taiwanese people. Nevertheless, there was no dramatic and violent confrontation between the folk religion and colonial rule. Only a few Taiwanese people had converted to the religions that the rulers promoted, although the folk religion had adopted some new elements from the Japanese religions. In addition, Taiwanese people were barred from government positions, so they were highly active in the economic field. One important consequence of this discrimination is that the content of folk religion, articulating the lifestyle of the ruled, had shifted more toward a concern with economic or material gains.

Based on the general rationales presented above, this study expects to find that the folk temples constructed by the Ch’ing officials gradually declined, while the ones constructed by the wealthy local elites (mainly businessmen) continuously prospered. Next, as the Taiwanese economy moved
toward profit pursuing activities, some deities such as Ma-tsu and T’u-ti Kung, emerged as commercial gods. This study also argues that Kuan-ti did not enjoy a great degree of popularity as he did in the Northern China during the Ch’ing period. Kuan-ti in Taiwan was considered more as a military god than as a commercial god during this period.

This study also proposes that contrary to earlier studies of Chinese religion, the state did not have full control over Folk religion. For example, some temples regarded as inappropriate and unlawful by the Ch’ing court, were so popular that they forced Ch’ing officials to recognize and support their worship. In addition, Taiwanese Folk religion was very flexible to political change. For instance, because the colonial government advocated Japanese Buddhism, the worship of Buddhist goddess, Kuan-yin, though having been folk-religialonized by Taiwanese people long before, grew dramatically. Especially, when the colonial government went to great lengths to integrate Taiwanese people into the Japanese Empire during World War II, many folk temples simply changed their chief deities to Kuan-yin and Sakyamuni Buddha to disguise themselves as Buddhist temples.

In brief, this study attempts to argue that the economic development of Taiwan is highly linked with the development of folk religion, and the discrepancy between the ruling and the ruled makes the rituals of folk religion mainly endure intact and also makes it difficult for the ruled to convert to the
institutional religions promoted by the ruling. Also, due to a lack of involvement of literate (mainly from the rulers), the moral or abstract values are less emphasized, so a man can worship a terrible robber or a serial killer, if this deity can offer him a favor. The relationship toward the folk religion deities highly resembles the way of doing business. Another important aspect of this study is that the study of Taiwanese folk religion can offer an alternative view to the Western general theory of religious study, which assumes that state and religion are independent institutions, and thus when state and religion have different voices on some issues, there will be a direct and strong confrontation between them. This assumption is only right for some religions, such as Islam or Catholicism, which have been more inclined toward institutionalization, but is unworkable for some religions such as Chinese popular religion, Hinduism, and Japanese popular religion, which have been intertwined with secular institutions. Borrowing the ideal type and the terms from C.K. Yang, this study terms the latter diffused religion, and the former institutional religion. Like an institutional religion, a diffused religion also faces pressure from the changes in economic and political fields. However, diffused religion is more flexible than institutional religion, so it can change easily when economies and politics change.

Chapter One briefly reviews the general theories on the relationship between religion and social change, and
introduces two types of religion (institutional religion and diffused religion) and their interactions with polito-economic conditions. Chapter Two gives the ideal type approach to define Chinese diffused religion, and also examines its relationship with state and merchant class as portrayed in earlier studies of Chinese diffused religion. Chapter Three discusses some limitations in the previous studies of Taiwanese folk religion. Chapter Four describes the general history of Taiwan prior to 1945. The hypotheses and the methodology (including selection of data and definition of variables and measurement) are addressed in Chapter Five. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight present the findings of this study. Chapter Six presents the findings about different temple builders and their involvement in affecting the levels of temple prosperity. Chapter Seven demonstrates the emergence of the commercial deities of Taiwan. Chapter Eight presents the findings about the Taiwanese folk religion under the Japanese rule. Chapter Nine relates the findings in this study to some general issues in the study of religion.
CHAPTER I: REVIEW OF GENERAL THEORIES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

This study attempts to examine the change of Taiwanese folk religion over the past three centuries. How does the folk religion change? What factors influence its change? Why is the folk religion very this-worldly oriented? Does this-worldly tendency only reflect the economic conditions of Taiwan, or is the relationship between the folk religion and the social-economic conditions more complex? Since most studies about Taiwanese folk religion are case studies, they do not offer a comparative approach which is appropriate for analyzing the change of folk religion through time. In regard to the limits of these studies, this paper will give a detailed discussion in the next chapter. In this chapter, this study will first look at some other religious studies (classic and contemporary) to see how they dealt with the general questions about religious change: what is the relationship between religion and socio-economic conditions, and how are new religious elements incorporated into the existing religious beliefs? Next, this study also wants to point out that the assumption--state and religion are independent and separated institutions--may not be applied to the religious phenomena in some non-western societies. Some
religions are more diffused with secular institutions, and thus they appear to submit totally to state. This study is going to argue that these diffused religions use a different approach to confront with state.

1. THE GENERAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR RELIGIOUS CHANGE

Although religious studies abound in the field of social science, only a handful of them cover the questions of religion change. Even so, most of these authors did not address them directly, and often we need to find the answers implied in their studies. In this section, this study reviews some of the most important works and tries to establish an appropriate theoretical framework for the study of Taiwanese folk religion.

The first theory of religious change in social science is raised by Karl Marx (1818-1883), although the religious issue is only a by-product of his study. Marx's main interest is totally based on the argument that the human historical course is mainly determined by the material conditions of human being (i.e. the modes of production). Following this main argument, Marx simply regarded religion as a secondary factor, a dependent factor corresponding to the material conditions. Based on this thought, Marx declaimed that religion was a tool of control for the ruling class (Marx, 1964:88); religion offers a "universal ground for consolidation and
justification" (Marx, 1964:41); religion is nothing but "the opium" of the oppressed people (Marx, 1964:42). In brief, for Marx, religious change follows the change in material conditions.

In response to Marx's materialism, Max Weber (1864-1920) presented that religion could be a decisive force for economic change. The approach used in the book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, is "not from a purely economic view-point", but from a psychological one. Weber was interested in "the influence of psychological sanctions which originating in religious belief and the practice of religion, gave a direction to practical conduct and held the individual to it"¹ (Weber, 1958a:97). So, the next question for Weber's approach is when the religious change is going to happen?

In fact, Weber didn't present a complete explanation for religious change, but his later study implied that religious change was caused by multiple factors, and the direction of change was unpredictable and it led to an unanticipated consequence, as he did in his general theory of the rise of capitalism (see Collins, 1980). We can see this implication in the following paragraph:

"Neither religion nor men are open books. They

¹ Although Weber attacked Marx's materialism, he still believed that the material conditions have an impact on the formation of ideas. For instance, in the book, *Religion of China*, Weber mentioned: "To be sure the basic characteristics of the [economic] 'mentality', in this case the practical attitudes toward the world, were deeply co-determined by political and economic destinies" (Weber, 1968:249).
have been historical rather than logical or even psychological constructions without contradiction. Often they have borne within themselves a series of motives, each of which, if separately and consistently followed through, would have stood in the way of the others or run against them head-on. In religious matters 'consistency' has been the exception and not the rule" (Weber, 1958b:291).

Although Weber made this statement in his later work, many later researchers attacked Weber's hypothesis in his Protestant study. An alternative to Weber's hypothesis is that social condition of Calvinists rather than their religious belief encouraged their entrance into capitalistic ventures (Samuelsson, 1964:121-122; Tawney, 1926:316-317; Johnstone, 1988:148). "Calvinists constituted a religious minority almost everywhere except Geneva, and in some countries and communities they were barred from governmental positions and professions such as medicine and law. Where else to turn but to business enterprises?" This process is "similar to that affecting Jews during the Middle Ages, who undertook money-lending and money-handling positions partly by default -- because Christians did not want to 'dirty their hands' with such activities or break the church's laws against
usury" (Johnstone, 1988:148).

Inspired by Weber's study, Peter L. Berger attempted to develop a complete model to explain the religious phenomena (including religious change and the relationship among religion and social conditions). A basic assumption of Berger's theory is that the relationship between man and society is not a static but a dialectic process, composed of three "moments": externalization, objectivation and internalization. **Externalization** is the process in which man "makes a world for himself" (Berger, 1967:5). The purpose of this world-building activity is to "provide firm structures for human life that lacking biologically" (Berger, 1967:6). Here, we need to notice that the world-building activity is "a collective enterprise." "Men 'together' shape tools, invent languages, adhere to values, devise institutions, and so on" (Berger, 1967:7). In brief, men collectively produce society. Once society is established, it becomes an external facticity. Society has its own will, logic, and power. This refers to the concept to **objectivation**. In this state, society works back on its producers, men. That is, "society directs, sanctions, controls and punishes individual conduct" (Berger, 1967:11). However, man doesn't always recognize that he interacts with this giant, society, by which his ideas are shaped and behavior is confined. In fact, he even takes its

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²Bert F. Hoselitz had a brief critique about the study on Jewish usury (Hoselitz, 1962).
existence for granted because he has transformed the consciousness of society into his subjective consciousness. This reabsorbing process is called internalization.

When applying this basic assumption to the religious phenomenon, we can see both the static and the dynamic relationships between man and religion. The static aspect refers to the function and the dysfunction of religion. That is, on one hand, religion functions to maintain the world view and social order (that is, religion provides legitimation and meaning in individual lives); on the other hand, there is a potentially negative effect of religion on individuals, such as alienation. The dynamic aspect refers to the religious change. Man can shape the content of religion, and yet religion can pose strains on individual actions.

In addition, Berger holds the view that the dialectical relationship between religion and society is neither idealism nor materialism. Religious 'ideas,' can possibly lead to

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3This term is borrowed from Karl Marx. Alienation, Berger argued, is "the process whereby the dialectical relationship between the individual and his world is lost to consciousness". The individual "'forgets' that this world was and continues to be co-produced by him". Put differently, "alienation is an overextension of the process of objectivation, whereby the human ('living') objectivity of the social world is transformed into non-human ('dead') objectivity of nature" (Berger, 1967:85-86). Thus, religion, a human product, is transformed into supra- or non-human facticity. Religion becomes a destiny or fate. In other words, the individual, "who in fact has a choice between different courses of action," may tell himself that he has "no choice" but to follow "the program" set by the 'divine' force. In this regard, religion become a false consciousness and thus sometimes can be described as "bad faith" which may lead individuals into a miserable situation (Berger, 1967:93-95).
"empirically available changes in the social structure"; in some instances, empirically structural changes have effect on the level of religious ideation (Berger, 1967:128). Furthermore, Berger also believed that a historical event is "not amenable to any monicaused explanations", and that "most historical relationships are ironical in character" (Berger, 1967: 107-110).

Although Berger offered a model to address the dialectical relationship between man and society (or religion), and the relationship between religion and other social institutions, his model is too generalized to apply to an actual study of religious change. His answer is not very useful for the students of religious studies, because we don't know what we need to look for or examine, when looking at a process of change in an historical course. In this regard, Robert Wuthnow offered a more satisfactory answer.

Wuthnow's main concern is on a broader issue, relationship between ideas (including religious ideas) and social situations. Wuthnow argued that "ideas are shaped by their social situations and yet manage to disengage from these situations" (Wuthnow, 1989:5). This relation between ideas and social situations is involved in the process of articulation: "if cultural products do not articulate closely enough with their social settings, they are likely to be regarded by the potential audiences of which these settings are composed as irrelevant, unrealistic, artificial, and
overly abstract, or worse, their producers will be unlikely to receive the support necessary to carry on their work; but if cultural products articulate too closely with the specific social environment in which they are produced, they are likely to be thought of as esoteric, parochial, time bound, and fail to attract a wider and more lasting audience. The process of articulation is thus characterized by a delicate balance between the products of culture and the social environment in which they are produced" (Wuthnow, 1989:3).

Therefore, rather than viewing the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the socialism "as instances of long-term, unilineal, or deterministic tendencies associated with the general growth of modernization or capitalism", Wuthnow has made "an effort to suggest specific historical conjunctures that made cultural innovation possible." (Wuthnow, 1989:535). For Wuthnow, historical conjunctures include a series of (individual or collective) actions, the institutional contexts, and broad environmental conditions. In addition, because historical conjunctures are specific for one event, "what constitutes a relevant resource in one setting clearly may not be an important factor in another setting" (Wuthnow, 1989:545).

Another important point about cultural innovation is that although cultural innovations (or variants) abound, there is a selective process to decide which innovation is going to survive. "Certain variants gradually proved more successful
at securing resources under particular circumstances, while other contenders gradually fell by the wayside or became relegated to relatively small, marginalized niches. These processes were evident in the trajectories of Lutheranism, Calvinism, Catholicism, and the various Anabaptist sects during the Reformation. Local circumstances reinforced different religious tendencies in different parts of Europe" (Wuthnow, 1989:550). In brief, Cultural innovation is subject to processes of social selection.

In his recent book, Rediscovering the Sacred: Perspectives on Religion in Contemporary Society, Wuthnow restated his approach: "To understand how ideas change, we need to consider not only subjective needs and values but also the relations between actors who articulate ideas and actors who provide an audience for these ideas, the institutional contexts in which these dynamics take place, and the larger social resources that institutions have at their disposal" (Wuthnow, 1992:129). Thus, Wuthnow offers a model for studying religion as a cultural production, which includes "environmental conditions," "institutional contexts," and "action sequence."

In conclusion, the relationship between religion and other social and economic conditions is a dialectic process. That is, a change in socio-economic conditions could have an impact on the content of religion, but at the same time, religion could strengthen or weaken some aspect of socio-
economic conditions. Religion is not simply a reflection of social and economic conditions as Marx argued. Although religion is expressed by men to describe the existing socio-economic arrangement, the influence of socio-economic conditions on religion is never inclusive. Men have the capacity to invent new religious elements, although men's thoughts are often under the strain of environment. Innovations or variants abound, but only a handful of them survive through a process of selection. A selective process means a process where individuals make different choices and influence each other's choices; people make their own best 'rational' choices which are influenced by their social standings and constantly subject to environmental constraints. At the end some collective choices may emerge. Once new religious elements are formed and adopted into people's life, religion could have its own force to influence later socio-economic activities. Religion is not a static entity, but a constantly changing system. Man continuously creates new religious thoughts to articulate his life; through time, some new religious elements are added while some old ones are withered away.

In brief, this study follows Wuthnow's cultural theory

"For example, the present-day prostitution industry in Thailand is, in part, sustained by the popular religious belief that an individual suffering in this life is the result of bad Karma cumulated from countless previous lifetimes. Many girls simply accept prostitution as an occupation determined by fate."
and regards the religious change as a result of a conjuncture of many factors including a series of actions (individual or collective) actions, the institutional contexts (i.e. social, economic and political arrangements within a society), and broad environmental conditions (such as demographic factors, natural disasters, international trade or wars, new ideas or technology from other societies).

Beside this general framework presented above, there is another important issue which is worth our special attention. That is, what is the relationship between state and religion? From the theoretical framework discussed above, we can see that religion to a large extent reflects the existing political arrangement. But, if state and religion have different voices on some issues, how does religion react to the difference? Most religious studies regard that an inevitable result of the conflict is through sectarian movements or religious persecution. This view is based on the assumption that state and religion are independent and separated institutions, and thus religious change will bring the direct and strong confrontation with state. This assumption is only right for some religions, such as Islam or Catholicism, which have been more inclined toward institutionalization, but is unworkable for some religions, such as many popular religions in East and Southeast Asia, which have been intertwined with secular institutions. In the next section, this study will distinguish the two types of
religion, institutional religion and diffused religion, and discuss their relationship with state respectively.

2. INSTITUTIONAL RELIGION AND DIFFUSED RELIGION AND THEIR INTERACTIONS WITH POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The terms, "institutional religion" and "diffused religion" were used by C. K. Yang in his study of Chinese religions. According to his definition, institutional religion is a form of religion having an independent theology, an independent form of worship consisting of symbols (gods, spirits, and their images) and rituals, and an independent organization of personnel to facilitate the interpretation of theological views and to pursue cultic worship. On the other hand, "diffused religion is conceived of as a religion having its theology, cults, and personnel so intimately diffused into one or more secular social institutions that they become a part of the concept, rituals and structure of the latter, thus having no significant independent existence" (Yang, 1961:294-295).

It is very important to distinguish these two types of religion, because both have their own way, or logic, to interact with the political and economic institutions within a society. In an institutional religion such as Christianity and Islam, the Church has its own independent administrative
staff, so when church and state have different views toward one issue, the church is more likely to have a more obvious, stronger and more often violent confrontation with the state.  

There are two possible confrontations. One is that orthodox religious movements challenge the reform efforts of state as heterodox practices, practices which might shake off some religious privilege of dominant church. For instance, in the early twentieth century, some churches in the United States launched a movement to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment, which prohibited the sale of most intoxicating beverages in this country (Johnstone, 1988:126). The other example is the Iranian revolution in 1979, which emphasized the return of an orthodox, religious state.

The other possible confrontation is that heterodox religious movements challenge the orthodox principles that the state had used to justify its practices. That most famous example is Max Weber's study. Weber found that Western heterodox movements and sectarian ways of life had repeatedly challenged the supremacy of institutions based upon orthodox

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5 Peter H. Merkl also had a similar view as this study does. In regard to the interaction between religion and nationalist movement in modern world, he said that "[s]ome religions, such as Islam or Catholicism have been more inclined towards institutionalization and centralization. Others, such as Hinduism, have penetrated life almost without the formation of churches or canonic codes of law. Institutionalized religious authority usually has come under pressure to accommodate itself to the existing political regime as in a state church or union of throne and altar. Thus it may become part and parcel of the official patriotism or, more likely, an object of hatred of minority or rival nationalists" (Merkl, 1983:5).
principles (Weber, 1968). The religious movements in today's Latin America are another example. The liberal church in Latin America maintains that "the institutions bearing the Christian name must be dedicated to improving the conditions of society and providing for the welfare of its citizens by liberating them from economic and health deprivation" (Johnstone, 1988:116). Depending on other social factors, the heterodox religious challenge could end up with a successful reform or a failure with a lot of bloodshed.

Another important issue related to institutional religion is about nationalism. Since an institutional religion has its own priesthood, when a country is defeated and faces a foreign invasion, the church immediately becomes the cultural (or ethnic) identification of the country and also soon the priests will become the leaders of resistant movements. Because resistant movements are backed by the church, they can last for a very long period of time. For instance, Irish people supported by their cultural identification with Catholicism, had fought for their independence for three hundred years (Carey, 1983).

In contrast to institutional religion, it is hard to see a strong clash between politics and diffused religion. Nevertheless, it is not to say that there is no heterodox thoughts in diffused religion. Diffused religion simply takes a different form to interact with politics and economy. The interaction usually occurs smoothly.
Because diffused religion is diffused into political institution, when state is strong, diffused religion has a tendency to support the state orthodoxy. As a result, it often appears that state has a strong hand in shaping the content of diffused religion. However, in reality, state would never get a total control of diffused religion. For instance, in the mid 1940s to the late 1960s, the Chinese leader Mao wanted to ban the worship of folk religious gods and destroyed many wooden images of gods in temples. Many villagers simply put these god images in their houses and continued their worship. When the revolutionary storm was over, some gods were returned to the temples. In short, if the believers in diffused religion refuse to follow the state elites to make a change, the resentment does not emerge in an obvious and "violent" confrontation with state.

In regard to the issue of nationalism, diffused religion uses a different strategy to respond to a foreign invasion. The majority of people in an occupied area still hold on their religious belief which thus becomes the cultural (or ethnic) identification of these people. However, unlike institutional religion, diffused religion lacks of church organization to help the occupied people organize resistance movements. If there is any resistance movement, often it appears in a subtle and soft way such as non-cooperation with foreign regime, not bloody fights against foreign regime.

In addition, if an outside regime controls the political
arena and the ruled are barred from governmental positions, then the change in diffused religion mainly goes with the change in economic field. The reason is that diffused religion is very intimately diffused into secular institutions, and when the interaction with political field is blocked, diffused religion chiefly interacts with economic field. This is mainly because the diffused religion must articulate the lifestyle of the believers who now become the ruled and are only allowed to do well in economic field. Thus, under a foreign rule, the change in economic field has a strong impact on the content of diffused religion of the ruled. As a consequence of link with economic activities (business interests), diffused religion could remain or become very this-worldly oriented.
CHAPTER II: INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE DIFFUSED RELIGION

INTRODUCTION

It is hard to define what Taiwanese Folk religion is. In general, most scholars agree that Taiwanese Folk religion is a belief of combining mixture of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism with some indigenous beliefs. But, at the same time, the folk religion can not be reduced as a simple conglomerate of three religions; it has its own self-identity or autonomy (Pas, 1987:103; Lin Mei-jung, 1988:367). This general consensus, however, is only kept in the minds of scholars; it is seldom addressed explicitly. The main interest in most of the studies of Taiwanese Folk religion focussed on the study of rituals, or the worship of one specific deity, or the differences from one community to the next, or the change of Folk religion within one community. Although their interests save them from answering this basic question directly, the main reason for this reluctance lies in the fact that Taiwanese Folk religion does not have a very clear and complete belief system, not to mention the existence of its bible or bishop. Some scholars even thought that Taiwanese Folk religion is a new emerging religion, and every new religion in history always started with a vague form of belief system. In brief, there is no definition of Taiwanese folk religion so far, and every work of folk religion points out
the same thing -- the great difficulty in defining Taiwanese Folk religion.

The second difficulty that this study must face is the continue change in religious phenomena through the course of history. Especially, this study covers the development of Taiwanese Folk religion over three hundred years. How to deal with the flood of changing without loosing the "essence" of Taiwanese Folk religion is a very important concern of this study.

Another problem in defining Taiwanese Folk religion comes from the possible argument that Taiwanese Folk religion is the same as the religious belief in mainland China, especially the religion in Fukien province. The reason this argument held is that most Taiwanese population in the 18th century were the immigrants from Fukien province and the eastern part of Kwantung province, and Ch'ing court had ruled Taiwan for 210 years, and also after the World War II, Taiwan was returned to Chinese hands. This possible argument would make the task of defining Taiwanese Folk religion even more difficult, because this means that the relationship with the religious belief in mainland also needs to be taken into account in constructing a definition of Taiwanese Folk religion.

The main argument of this study is that although Taiwanese Folk religion originated from the religious belief in the areas of Fukein and eastern part of Kwantung, its development was highly intertwined with the economic,
political, and social conditions of Taiwan. Therefore, the true concern is not on the question of whether Taiwanese Folk religion is the same as the Chinese popular belief (or the Fukien belief). Instead, the question needs to be addressed this way: how much Taiwanese Folk religion overlaps with the Fukien belief; how much the Fukien belief overlaps with the Chinese popular belief in general; how much Taiwanese Folk religion overlaps with the Chinese popular belief in general.

In order to combat the several difficulties mentioned above, this study, first of all, presents an "ideal type" of Chinese general popular belief. C. K. Yang used the term, Chinese diffused religion, to distinguish the phenomenon of general popular belief from religious Taoism and Buddhism. This study will discuss this later in detail. The data this study applies to establish the ideal type of Chinese diffused religion mainly comes from Yang's book, Religion in Chinese Society (1961). This book was considered as the latest of the

1In the field of religious study in Chinese society, there is a great debate over the issue of diverse or unified Chinese belief system. Maurice Freedman argued that in order to develop the sociological study of Chinese religion, we should begin with the assumption that "a Chinese religion exits". Freedman suggested that "we may start with two simple and connected propositions. First Chinese religion entered into the unity of a vast polity. Second, it was an intrinsic part of a hierarchized society" (Freedman, 1974:21). In contrast, some scholars, represented by Authur Wolf, argued for the opposite assumption. They were concerned with regional and class difference "in the beliefs of people who viewed the Chinese social landscape from different perspects" (Wolf, 1974:7).
very few works to "characterized Chinese religion as a whole." (Freedman, 1974). This is why I choose this work as a starting point. The other important reason to use this work is that the time period covered in this work is highly relevant to this study. This book was primarily concerned with the Chinese religion in the Ch'ing period and the early twentieth century. In Taiwan, the mass migration from mainland China took place in the 18th and the first half of 19th centuries, so it is very important to construct an ideal type of Chinese diffused religion close to this period for the purpose of comparison.

Once this ideal type is formed, we can see how much Taiwanese Folk religion deviated from the popular belief in mainland China at the beginning, and most importantly, we can see how much Taiwanese Folk religion had changed over three centuries. The second advantage of this ideal type approach is that this broad model could be also useful for the study of change in the religious phenomena in other Chinese societies such as Fukien area where the economic boom of 1980s made its religious belief more secular than before. Finally, this study also believed that the general principles for establishing "an ideal type" approach in this study can be applied to the study of religious change in other diffused religions.
THE IDEAL TYPE DEFINITION OF CHINESE DIFFUSED RELIGION

In China, institutional religion was represented by major universal religions such as Buddhism and Taoism. The majority of Chinese, "Han", people practiced the Chinese diffused religion. The development of this diffused religion was under the cloud of the dominant state ideology, Confucianism, and also its development heavily relied upon Taoism and Buddhism for the supply of gods and spirits, the worship symbols (rituals and sacrifice), and the priests.

Why did the development of this diffused religion look so complicated? The main reason for explaining this situation is that Confucianism was inadequate to the religious request from common people, but at the same time, for the most part of Chinese history, the state insisted that Confucianism was the only orthodoxy, because confucian doctrines offered detailed moral terms to consolidate the existing sociopolitical order.

Confucianism arose as state orthodoxy in the first century B.C. (i.e. early Han dynasty). Confucianism set up no god as the premise of its teachings, and its basic principles were developed mainly from pragmatic considerations-- how to be a good king, how to be a good official, and how to be a good father, etc. Even the infusion of Buddhist ideas into neo-Confucianism in the Sung dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) did not alter its basic this-worldly
orientation (Yang: 26). Confucianism did address itself to the ultimate meaning of life and death, but only in terms of moral responsibility to man, not to any supernatural power (Yang: 26). However, people always need the answers for the vast domain of unknown, to explain convincingly the extraordinary phenomena of society and nature and to deal with frustration and shock from tragedies in the crises of life. Confucianism did not address these question, and the vacuum left by it was filled with many other doctrines.

Before Confucianism became orthodox ideology, there was the original indigenous religion of China which has frequently been neglected in historical accounts. C. K. Yang called this the classical religion because it attained full development in the classic periods of Chou (1122-221 B.C.) and early Han before the foreign influence of Buddhism and the rise of Taoism as a religion. The core of this classical religion was the worship of Heaven and its pantheon of subordinate deities (such as gods of stars and gods of mountains), and the worship of ancestors. The worship of ancestors and the worship of Heaven were promoted by Confucianists in spite of their rationalistic view toward the world. Except for these two aspects of popular religion, Confucianists generally looked down upon the popular religion as "superstition"², but at the

²Some scholars such as C.K. Yong and Marice Freedman, argued that there are some supernatural elements in the thoughts of most confucianists. Therefore, their thoughts are not that far away from the public thoughts.
same time, they gave a great tolerance toward it, for they believed that the masses had no other means to turn to comforting their minds.

THE WORSHIP OF ANCESTORS

The purpose of ancestor worship according to Confucianists was to stabilize the kinship system, the basic unit of social organization in Confucian doctrines. Therefore, Confucianists designed many behavioral guidelines to cultivate the moral sentiments to strengthen this system. Among these guidelines, the ritual and offerings to the dead was interpreted "as an expression of longing for the continued existence of the dead" with a skeptical view toward the belief in the actual existence of the soul. But, these rationalist Confucianists were only a very handful of people in a non-industrial society where literacy was rather rare. Hence, Confucianists saw this ancient cult, the ancestor worship, as a very useful tool to strengthen the kinship value and family ties among common people (Yang:48-51).

There is no doubt that the ruling power of the past centuries also saw that the ancestor worship was good for stabilizing the kinship system, and hence maintaining the social order. As a result, the ancestor worship not only gained full acceptance from the state, but became a legal requirement to be conformed to. Under the Ch'ing code, even
the kinship-renouncing Buddhist monks were required to observe mourning rites for their parents\(^3\) (Yang:53 & 203).

THE WORSHIP OF HEAVEN

The worship of Heaven was also supported by Confucianists, who mainly used it to legitimatize the control of political power. Although Confucian classics abound with discussions of the qualities an ideal head of the state should possess, they did not present a theory of the origin of monarchical power, thus leaving this power without an ultimate secular justification.\(^4\) Hence, a supernatural explanation was needed to force popular acceptance of the new leader. "Such a supernatural explanation was supplied by the Will and Mandate of Heaven, which favored the winner; the outcome of the whole [political] struggle was part of the predetermined course of events, unalterable and unchallengeable by men" (Yang:132). Although the Mandate of Heaven, the symbol of legitimacy claimed by every dynastic power, was widely accepted by the common people, only the monarch could perform the worship of Heaven. Following this, it was natural to see that the state obtained the monopoly on the interpretation of

\(^3\)In the 1980s' Taiwan, the Catholic church also allowed its believers to practice ancestor worship.

\(^4\)The Confucian principle of government by men of merit through selection (the civil service examination system) was the basis for the authority of the administrative officials, but not for the power of the monarch (Yang:130).
heavenly portents. That is, the calamities could be explained by the state as expressions of Heaven’s anger toward the misconduct of a certain group of men.

There was another reason for retaining the worship of Heaven. In the middle of the Chou period (roughly from the fifth to the third century B.C.), Chinese culture and politics were rapidly expanding into "barbarian" territories which had their own indigenous traditions and beliefs. To build a lasting unified empire on the foundation of such a society required more than the success of power politics alone. Heaven thus represented a universalizing influence in the imperial unification of diverse local beliefs and traditions. In other words, this was accomplished by incorporating local spirits and deities under the belief in the supremacy of Heaven and its system of supernatural forces (Yang:109). And the unification of Han Empire was partially due to this religious vitality.

NATURAL SUBORDINATE DEITIES UNDER HEAVEN

Under Heaven, there were its natural subordinate deities: the creator of agriculture (Hsien-nung), the earth and grain god (She-chi), wind, cloud, mountain, river and rain gods etc. The altars of these deities were set up in every administrative center from county seat to national capital. The emperor, provincial governors, and county magistrates
plowed ceremonial fields and offered sacrifices to these deities at the altars in the spring and sometimes also in the fall, praying for assistance from the supernatural forces to bring "harmonious winds and timely rain" for the year (Yang:65).

THE CULTS OF DEIFIED PEOPLE

In addition to the worship of ancestors, the worship of Heaven and its subordinate deities, there was the cults of deified people. Heroes after death were worshiped as gods. This had been encouraged by Confucianists and the state, because it held up examples of good men for public emulation and encourages virtue by keeping alive the memory of great deed (Yang:159). Nevertheless, the masses were more interested in the magical power of a departed hero than the remembrance of his virtues. The masses believed that a man of unusual virtue would, after death, a spirit of extraordinary magical prowess, capable of performing a variety of miracles (Yang:166).

The cults of deified people fall into two categories: cults of nationally prominent personalities who were worshiped throughout the county, and local cults of figures whose temples were found only in certain localities. The cult of Kuan Yu was the most popular cult nationally. Kuan Yu, the third-century warrior, was best known to Western observers as
the god of war. He was the symbol of loyalty, bravery and righteousness. His role also had been broadened over time. By the end of nineteenth century, he was worshiped as the military god of wealth, Wu Ts'ai-shen at some areas. In the folklore interpretation, he was cast in this role "not merely by his might to bring wealth (as supernatural magical power could bring anything) but also by his spirit of justice and generosity, which should govern the dispensation of wealth" (Yang:79).

THE CULTS OF CONFUCIANISM

While it is true that Confucius was never deified as a god and revered only as a great man, it is unwise to dismiss all religious significance in this cult. The sacrificial rituals, with incense and candles, the kowtow, and formal prayer were very similar with those in the worship of deities. Confucian temples were found in every administrative center from county to national capital. However, the ceremony of this cult was only held by the government officials; the masses were not allowed to participate.

Around the Confucian temples developed a group of satellite cults: the cult of Wen-ch'ang, the patron god of literature, and the cult of K'uei-sheng, the star of literary success. These cults served the purpose of promoting literary tradition and bolstering scholars' hope of success in the
imperial examinations. In general, the cults of Confucianism were to "inspire awe and respect for literary learning, the heart of Confucianism, as a social and political tradition (Yang: 165).

As the readers can see the discussion from the above, the state and the state orthodoxy, Confucianism, played a very important role in shaping the content of Chinese diffused religion. This trend had been going on, even when the state and Confucianism faced the new challenge from the raise of religious Taoism and the foreign influence of Buddhism. With the constant intervention from the state, Chinese diffused religion was not replaced by religious Taoism and Buddhism. Instead, Chinese diffused religion absorbed some Taoist and Buddhist elements, and this made its belief system more complicated and completed.

THE RELIGIOUS TAOIST ELEMENTS IN CHINESE DIFFUSED RELIGION

The rise of religious Taoism took place at the close of the second century A.D. and it continued its development in the subsequent four centuries of continued sociopolitical disintegration. Toward the end of the second century, the once-powerful Han empire was torn by the violent struggle for power and wealth between rapacious groups of eunuchs and empresses' clans and the predatory strong families attached to either of the two groups. With the plight of the populace
unrelieved by an internally divided government and with the Confucian doctrine now rendered vacuous, increasing masses of people drifted into the Taoist religious communities which emphasized the Taoist ascetic tradition and its resignation and seclusion from secular struggle. During most of Chinese history after its inception as an organized religion, religious Taoism lived in peace under government recognition, because the nature of Taoist resignation enabled it to adjust its existence to the rule of temporal power.

It is no doubt that religious Taoism had an impact on the development of Chinese diffused religion. The first influence was the deification of legendary and historical personalities who symbolized the traditional moral and political ideals, thus lending religious support to the existing sociopolitical order. "Until the Han period, classical religion was limited largely to the worship of Heaven and its subordinate naturalistic deities, and, with the exception of the ancestor cult, the worship of departed secular men did not occupy an important place in the classical system" (Yang:114).

In addition to the influence of deifying personalities, religious Taoism also helped the systematization of the classical beliefs by "molding diverse classic beliefs into a corporate system and organizing the large number of national and local gods into a hierarchical pantheon" (Yang:115).

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5A hierarchical pantheon is an imitation of official hierarchy of imperial court. The Heaven god, like the empire, stands on the top of all deities. Under the Heaven, there are
Moreover, religious Taoism added the theology of the
Ying-yang (positive and negative forces) and the Five Elements
(metal, wood, water, fire and earth) to the religious thought
of common people. Furthermore, the rituals and magic
medicine, that Taoist monks used to lengthen their lives, were
also absorbed into Chinese diffused religion.

THE BUDDHIST ELEMENTS IN CHINESE DIFFUSED RELIGION

During the troubled years of the decline of Han,
Buddhism, like religious Taoism, found a fertile soil to grow
in. From the second to the sixth century, the people saw no
relief from the unending procession of wars and disasters. In
such a social setting, Buddhist doctrines had a strong appeal.
For example, the teaching of Karma, the transmigration of the
soul and the law of causal retribution, gave people the
encouragement to face the continuous suffering.

While the early development of Buddhism was characterized
by the Theravada school, which emphasized the salvation of the
individual, the expansion of Buddhism into a new movement
heavily depended on the growth of Mahayana (Greater Vehicle)
Buddhism, which "advocated pity for all creatures and
salvation for all humanity as the only possible means of
achieving personal salvation" (Yang:119). This emphasis on

a variety of deities. Depending on their worship spread in a
local area or a wider area like a province, they were assigned
to different ranks of deity hierarchy.
universal salvation was consonant with Confucian ideas and thus attracted many intellectuals with a Confucian background.

In addition to the appealing doctrines mentioned above, the support from the non-Chinese invaders also facilitated the expansion of Buddhism. For instance, during the early part of the fourth century, the monarch of the northern kingdom, the Later Chao, "rejected the suggestion of renouncing Buddhism as a non-Chinese religion by saying that he himself was of foreign origin, that Buddha was a foreign god, and therefore should be worshiped" (Yang:123).

In the T’ang dynasty the continued flourishing of Buddhism on a vast scale was partly due to the cosmopolitan character of the T’ang policy, which tolerated a variety of foreign influences. But with the rise of the Sung dynasty (960-1279 A.D.), there was a general resurgence of Chinese national culture against foreign influence. An expression of this nationalist tendency was the reassertion of Confucianism (called Neo-confucianism) which helped to renew faith in the classical religion as the spiritual support for the imperial political order. As a consequence, religious faith once again rested on the blessing of Heaven on the monarch and secular government (Yang:123). In the following thousand years, this general religious picture continued, with the exception of the century of Mongol rule (1260-1368), which was under considerable Buddhist influence. In subsequent times, although both Buddhism and religious Taoism were heterodoxies
by the classic definition, the essence of their teachings was formally and informally blended into Confucianism, with little objection from political authorities (Yang:193-194).

Like religious Taoism, Buddhism had some influence on the religious life of common people. First, the Buddhist concept of transmigration of the soul and the law of causal retribution had gained universal acceptance among the masses. One indication for this was that Buddhist Ten Courts of Hell, scenes of subterranean punishment of the dead for misdeeds during their lifetime, was depicted on the walls of Ch'eng-huang Miao, the temple of city god. Next, Buddhism, like religious Taoism, also had contributed many new deities to the diffused religion.

DISCUSSION ON CHINESE DIFFUSED RELIGION

In short, the Chinese diffused religion contains the elements of original indigenous religion, Confucianism, religious Taoism, and Buddhism; its manifestation includes the worship of several important cults: the ancestor worship, the worship of Heaven and its subordinate deities, the cults of deified men, the cults of Confucianism, and the cults of some Taoist and some Buddhist deities. This study will not discuss the ancestor worship for lack of sufficient data to analyze the change in the worship. Except for the ancestor cult, all other cults mentioned above will be covered in this study.
This study believes that the levels of emphasis on the worship among different cults are varied in different places at different time points. For instance, full-grown worship in Confucian cults is less likely to appear in a newly developing, or peripheral, area which is far away from the central state's influence. Hence, by studying the ups and downs in the popularity of each cult through time, we are able to see the trend of religious change in one area. In addition, the Chinese diffused religion has spread over a very huge region: mainland China, Taiwan, Hong kong, and many other Chinese communities in East and Southeast Asia, so how to find the similarity and explain the difference is a real challenge for researchers. Without such a great framework (or ideal type definition) of the folk religion, it is easy for a researcher to get lost at the sea of diversity in local beliefs and rituals. This study believes that this ideal type definition is very useful not only for the study of the religious change through time in one area, but also for the comparison study among different areas.

In addition, this study argues against the idea that Chinese diffused religion only belongs to lay people, in contrast to the group of educated elites. Since Confucianism did not address religious subject, an educated elite, if not an absolute atheist, would take many other doctrines to meet his religious needs. If his belief did not clearly stick to one great religion such as Buddhism or Taoism, it was more
likely for his belief to fall in the range of Chinese diffused religion. This study agrees with some scholars that many elites were not excluded from the diffused religion. However, this does not mean that every social group in China under the influence of diffused religion would have the same interaction with the secular institutions. Different social groups (e.g. elites, peasants, merchants) would emphasize different elements in the diffused religion. For instance, the elites were more likely to promote the worship of Confucian cults, which was an irrelevant activity for the peasants (Seiwert, 1985). Likewise, the elites would probably scorn the worship of an unknown spirit which was held dear in the eyes of local peasants. Even though they worshiped the same deity, their meanings attaching to the worship might be different. A good illustration is the worship of Kuan-ti which was considered by the ruling elites as the symbol of loyalty, while the masses worshiped him as the god of wealth in North China (Inoue, 1941; Duara, 1988). Different social groups stress different religious elements in the diffused religion, but even so, there are no rigid and clear-cut boundaries among their religious emphases, because the boundaries among social groups are not fixed. For example, it is less likely for an official from a humble peasant family to totally root out his parents' influence (worldview), but his new role requires him to stress more on the cults promoted by state. In brief, each group stresses the parts which closely articulate their life style,
while downplaying the parts which are trivial in their life.

Since it is not easy to spot the changes in the diffused religion, the interaction between the religion and the secular institutions is often overlooked. In the following two sections, this study is going to discuss how Chinese diffused religion interacts with state and merchant class.

(1) State and Chinese Diffused Religion

Because of the diffused characteristic of Chinese diffused religion, we can easily get an impression of strong involvement of the state in the affairs of Chinese religion. One result of the diffusion with the political institution was the existence of one popular belief that a living official had superior power over the gods and spirits of rank lower than his\(^6\). For example, in the time of persistent drought, a magistrate could thrash the city god under the hot sun, demonstrating his assumed temporal authority to force the god to give rain (Yang, 1961:92).

This impression that China emerges as a society with a strong state and with pacifying religions was also greatly reinforced by some well-known works such as De Groot's *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China* and Max Weber's *The Religion of China*. With the arrogance of a late-

\(^6\)This is because the hierarchy of supernatural powers was closely patterned after the structure of the temporal government.
19th-century Western European looking down upon the Chinese as a semicivilized people\textsuperscript{7}, De Groot showed his anger about both the imperial persecution of heterodox sects and the harassment of Christian missions (De Groot, 1903-4). He concluded that the religious intolerance was built in the imperial political control. In contrast, Max Weber had a softer opinion in regard to the religious persecution in China: "[i]n spite of all the heresy trials, there was extensive religious tolerance, at least compared to the intolerance of Calvinist Puritanism" (Weber, 1968:243). Nevertheless, Weber overemphasized the dominance of Confucianism in China\textsuperscript{8}. Also, without seeing the sort of 'religious affiliation' common in the Western world (Weber, 1968:217 & 225), Weber argued that the decisive influence of the educated stratum on the life of the masses has two negative effects: "blocking the emergence of any prophetic religiosity," and "eradicating almost all

\textsuperscript{7}This prejudice definitely biased De Groot's study on the Chinese religions. In regard to the problems in De Groot's works, Maurice Freedman had a more detailed discussion (Freedman, 1974:25-30). De Groot's prejudice was not an unique case in the religious studies of non-Western world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. E.E. Evans-Pritchard had once criticized that most information from European explorers, missionaries, administrators, and traders was not very reliable, because what they "liked to put on paper was what most struck them as curious, crude, and sensational" (Evans-Pritchard, 1965:8).

\textsuperscript{8}Weber also did not see that Confucianism had been changing through history. Eisenstadt argued that Weber ignored the existence of neo-confucianism emphasizing "very strongly a non-traditionalistic, reflexive definition of the nature of the cosmic order and of human existence"(Eisenstadt, 1985:49).

In sum, both De Groot and Max Weber overestimated the state’s ability to control the religious thoughts of the masses, thus ignoring the very flexible, diffused characteristic of Chinese folk religion to interact with other social institutions⁹. In addition, neither one treated the Chinese diffused religion as an entity undergoing a process of dynamic changes. Hence, they could not see any possible change in the religious content¹⁰, not to mention the changes which did not follow the state ideology. Nevertheless, their limited view that the state (or the elites) had strong control over the folk religion, had a great influence on many later works. This approach of viewing Chinese society from the top down was not challenged until the 1980s. In the first place, the studies in Taiwan portrayed a slightly different picture where the Taiwanese folk religion is the expression of Taiwanese ethnicity in face of the Nationalist opposition (Ahern, 1981a), and the local people seldom visited the Ma-tsu temples promoting the Ch’ing imperial ideology (Ts’ai Hsiang-hui, 1989). Later, the recent studies in China also depict a

⁹One serious problem in Weber’s study on the religion of China is that he conflates the philosophical Taoism, the religious Taoism, and the popular beliefs (i.e. the folk religion) as one single category, despite the important differences among them.

¹⁰Actually, in the book, The Religion of China, Weber once used the term "later Toaism" to refer to the Toaism in late Ch’ing period (Weber, 1968:196), but he soon switched his attention back to developing his theory about China which, he argued, lacks the capacity to respond for change.
prosperous picture for the Chinese folk religion (Dean, 1993), in spite of our impression that the Communist state had a strong hand in shaping the public beliefs.

In brief, the recent studies indicated that the state power was not so overwhelming in directing the development of the folk religion. Like any institutional religion, the Chinese diffused religion also cooperates with, rejects or reshapes state interests. Because of its diffused relationship with secular institutions, it is not easy for a researcher to see the interactions. The consequences of subtle interactions between state and the diffused religion sometimes can only be understood in a long historical context. The Ma-tsu cult is a good illustration for our understanding the state's concession to the new growth in the diffused religion. Ma-tsu, originally a local deity in Fukien area, had been steadily gaining her popularity from the 12th century on, and thus her worship was widely spread throughout the whole southeastern region which became an important source of imperial revenue after the 12th century. In response to the growth of this cult, the state granted honorific divine titles to this deity.

(2) Chinese Diffused Religion and Merchant Class

Except for Buddhists and some Taoist priests, there was no general Chinese religious condemnation of wealth and worldly possessions. It was not clear when the worship of
gods of wealth started\textsuperscript{11}. It is certain that by the end of 19th century, various gods of wealth existed in the provinces of Kuangtung, Chekiang, Chiangsu, Anhui, Hunan, Hupei, and Szechuan (Kuo Li-ch'eng, 1992:14-19; Day, 1975:39-45; Yang, 1961:446-447). The gods of wealth were supported by merchants believing that it was supernatural blessings in combination with their own efforts to bring them wealth.

However, merchants were not considered to be a dominant social class by state in Chinese history. Since the Han dynasty (206 BC.- 25 AD.), the state policy had long been promoting the status of peasants who grew products to sustain the survival of a society. In contrast, merchant class were scorned and considered as a group of people depending on the hard work of peasants to feed them. (see. Taiwan Shiho, vol.3, no.1, 1910:205-206). Merchants were listed at the bottom of the social scale (Wong King-kung, 1957:188). This disrespectful attitude toward merchants was repeatedly seen in many literary works.

As a consequence, most rich men, landlords or merchants, would reinvest their wealth in training their children for the

\textsuperscript{11}Basil M. Alexeiev in the book, The Chinese Gods of Wealth (published in 1928), collected popular folk pictures of various gods of Wealth, drawn by unknown folk artists. Unfortunately, except for one picture found in Canton, Alexeiev did not give any information about the finding locations and the possible drawing times of these pictures. Nowadays, we can learn from this book only the names of various gods of Wealth across China, no way knowing when and where these gods were worshiped. This is one of the typical earlier studies on the Chinese folk religion, which often treated the religion as a static, invariant entity.
examinations (Fei, 1946:11). The wealth of merchants was re-channeled into strengthening the officialdom. In short, the structural pattern of traditional Chinese society, which favored the sociopolitical dominance of the literacy class over the merchants, might curtail the growth of merchant class.

Nevertheless, this study also wants to emphasize that the model outlined above is more like an official ideal view on how the society should run. In reality, the implement of this structural constraint on the expansion of merchant class was various across regions and through different time points.\(^2\)

Since the South Sung dynasty (1127-1279 A.D.), with its increasing urbanization, China had a substantial growth in commercial economy. In particular, the people of Eastern and the Southeastern coastal areas, except for the periods of the attacks from pirates in the middle of 16th century\(^3\), and the

\(^2\)Susan J. Mann's case study of Li Lineage in Shantung argued that boundaries between wealthy merchants and gentry were increasingly meaningless in late imperial China (Mann, 1987). The elite families in William Rowe's study in Hanyang region (Hupei) and Madeleine Zelin's study in Szechuan, also indicated the growing importance of mercantile activity, as national and regional trading networks expanded in the general commercialization of late imperial China (Rowe, 1990; Zelin, 1990).

\(^3\)The constant wars in Japan during the 15th and 16th centuries, forced many people out of land to become pirates, who frequently attacked the coast areas of China. Many Chinese pirates also joined the plundering. In the middle of 16th century (about 1547-1566), pirate attack was so severe that the Ming court had to close overseas trade on the coastline to ensure the safety of the regime (Ch'en Shao-hsin, 1964:74).
violent state resettlement plan in 1660s-1670s\(^4\), had long engaged many interregional and foreign trade activities. In the late 17th and 18th century when the West had a great interest in opening markets in the East, the expansion of commerce led to the rise of merchants in the coastal areas.

This study expects that there must have been some noticeable interaction between the Chineses diffused religion and the merchant class during the 18th and 19th centuries. Unfortunately, nowadays we do not have much information available to understand the interaction. Inoue Ichii, Huang Hua-chieh, and Prasenjit Duara discussed Kuan-ti, the most popular deity in North China, which was worshiped as a unity symbol among the members of a merchant association (Inoue, 1941; Huang Hua-chieh, 1967:213; Duara, 1988). Niida described various professional deities of merchant associations in Peking during the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Niida, 1950).

In the book, *The Religion of China*, Max Weber did have a

\(^4\)The Ch’ing army defeated the Ming regime in 1644. At her early rule, there were many resistant forces, one of which was Cheng Ch’eng-kung who occupied Taiwan in 1661 as his resistant base. In addition, the power of Ch’ing court, knowing little about the sea, was not interesting in expending the Empire overseas. Deeply frustrated by the threat of Cheng Ch’eng-kung, Ch’ing court took a very crude measure to gain the control over the Eastern coast—the implement of prohibition of fishing and trade activities in 1656, and the violent evacuation plan in the middle of 17th century, which forced all the residents along the coastline area to move inland. Ch’ing court believed that this evacuation plan would cut off Cheng's financial source, i.e. the trade with the coastal area (Su T’ung-ping, 1988; Cheng Chen-man, 1992:175; Ch’en Shao-hsin, 1964:112-113).
short description about the merchant class in the late Ch'ing period. Weber mainly argued that the merchant class was not a decisive social stratum in China, thus having little influence on the life of the masses; the Chinese businessmen only concerned the magic "works" and were lack of "rational" spirit; hence there was no rise of capitalism in China.

"The Chinese petty and middle class business man, as well as the big business man who adhered to the old tradition, ascribed success and failure, like the Puritan, to divine powers. The Chinese, however, ascribed them to the Taoistic god of wealth. For him success and failure in business were not symptomatic of a state of grace but of magically and ceremonially significant merit or offense, and compensation was sought in terms of ritually 'good' works. The Chinese lacked the central, religiously determined, and rational method of life which came from within and which was characteristic of the classic Puritan" (Weber, 1968:243).

The task of attacking Weber's broader argument--why there was no capitalism in China, is beyond the scope of this study. In this study, we are only interested in his analysis of the relationship between merchants and Taoism (this term Weber
used to include the Chinese folk religion). In brief, all what Weber saw in practicing Taoism by merchants is "the magic works," not a rational mentality.

A half century after Weber's study, some contemporary scholars drew a very different conclusion from Weber's. Stevan Harrell addressed that the Chinese would work hard if they saw possible long-term benefits, and the Chinese work ethnic (entrepreneurial ethic) could be traced in many Western writings in late 19th century. Hill Gates directly examined the class culture of Taiwan's numerous petty capitalists, including "virtually all its highly market-oriented rural population, as well as urban shopkeepers, craftspeople, and small-scale industrial producers". (Gates, 1987:259). She concluded that "a constrained but powerful capitalist worldview was reproduced constantly by the Chinese [i.e. Taiwanese] populace as an alternative to the bureaucratic/feudal vision enshrined in the formal structure and practice of the state" (Gates, 1987:260). Similarly, Rober Weller found "a commercial and competitive side to Chinese [i.e. Taiwanese] religion, which is paired against the more bureaucratic and Confucian model that has generally been better described" (Weller, 1994:141-2). However, the major limitation in both Gates' and Weller's studies is that their finding based on the contemporary field researches in Taiwan made us wonder whether the profit-oriented motive in the folk religion is a newly produced element.
In general, scholars have not paid a full attention to the subject on the relationship between the diffused religion and commercial activities. Much more work needs to be done on understanding this relationship.
CHAPTER III: A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE STUDY

OF TAIWANESE FOLK RELIGION

1. PERSPECTIVE: CHINA CENTER OR TAIWAN CENTER?

The earliest writing about Taiwanese folk religion can be scarcely found in the 18th century Gazetteers of Ch‘ing court. In addition to this official description, there were also some short journals written by travelers (Chinese or foreign), and Western missionaries to describe some brief scenery of the folk religion during the 18th and 19th centuries. At the turn of the 20th century, in order to get a total control of the island of Taiwan, the colonial government sent some Japanese scholars to study the phenomenon of Taiwanese folk religion. Although this research plan was initiated by political motivation, it turned out several very nice works in the 1910s-1930s (Marui, 1918; Masuda, 1935 & 1939; So Keirai, 1934; Suzuki, 1934). The World War II interrupted everything, and there was no studies conducted during the transition period of 1940s-1950s.

In the late 1950s, the study of Taiwanese Folk religion was picked up again mainly by Western anthropologists. There are two main reasons to explain this phenomenon. The first one is that there were only few social scientists, most of them coming from mainland China after World War II, and they
were inclined to study the subjects about China. The task of studying Taiwanese folk religion was left for the Western anthropologists. The second reason for attracting Western anthropologists to Taiwan is the isolation of communist China at that time, which made them need to find a substitute for their Chinese studies. Taiwan was a substitute for China. This substitute is not limited only in the field of religious study, but a general practice in the academic field. This "substitute" attitude had a great impact on many works (Murray & Hong, 1994). Douglas Fix, a historian, criticized that this attitude misled the study of Taiwanese history and the study of social science in general. Under this big framework of whole China, Western scholars assumed that Taiwan had every character of China, thus ignoring the unique character of Taiwan herself. One result of this attitude is to totally skip the history of Japanese rule which definitely had some influence on the social and economic conditions of Taiwan. (Fix, 1988). As a consequence, the historical picture is not a completed one, but somehow a disconnected picture.

Undoubtedly, this general problem in the study of Taiwanese history also had an impact on the study of Taiwanese folk religion. Most folk religious studies were case study based on the observation of field work. Most Western scholars spent one or two years to collect the field data, and if they

1There were some field studies about religion, but their focus was on the aboriginal religions in Taiwan (see. Murray & Hong, 1994).
needed to trace back some historical background for their cases, they tended to rely on the a disconnected (i.e. China-centered) history which focuses on the Ch'ing period and the post-war period, to do their research. In response to this problem, this study uses the Taiwan centered approach to study the change of the folk religion in Taiwan.

2. THE LIMITS OF CASE STUDY

In general, most case studies conducted by Western anthropologists were not interested in the historical change of Taiwanese folk religion. This is in part because the biased history blinded their theoretical interest. However, there are another two factors to contribute to the lack of historical depth in these case studies. One factor is that their research was done under the influence of functional approach, a dominant perspective in the 1960s and the early 1970s. This approach is concerned with how the rituals and beliefs integrate the whole community, and not interested in the issue of religious change. The other reason for this a-historical tendency in the case studies is that most Western scholars treated the Taiwanese folk religion as a religion in a primitive society which has no written language to record her history. Ch'en Ch'i-nan, an anthropologist, criticized

2One partial reason for this a-historical tendency is that it's also difficult for foreigners to read text Chinese.
that based on this mind-set, their field observation tended to scrub out much important information which can be found only in a historical content (Ch’en Ch’i-nan, 1989).

Another limit of case study is the lack of a holistic view toward the understanding of Taiwanese folk religion. A good case study is able to provide us very rich information about the religious life of one particular group during one particular period of time. Nevertheless, we usually find great difficulty in summarizing a large picture about the folk religion from a great diversity of case works bearing different study interests in various locations and times. Without a holistic view, it is difficult to spot the general trend of religious change.

Since the mid 1970s, beginning to be aware of the importance of historical background and also being under the influence of strong state approach\(^3\), a few works focussed on the relationship between state and the folk religion. For instance, Stephan Feuchtwang discussed city temples in Taipei under three regimes (Feuchtwang, 1974). Emily Ahern demonstrated that the religious activity of the huge pig sacrifices expressed Taiwanese ethnicity under the Nationalist rule (Ahern, 1981b). Ts’ai Hsiang-hui analyzed the promotion of T’ien Hou (Ma-tsu) worship by the state in the 18th and 19th centuries (Ts’ai Hsiang-hui, 1989). Hubert Seiwert

\(^3\) This is a popular academic view in the mid 1970s and the 1980s. This view regards that Taiwan has a strong economic development simply due to the strong state control.
studied the relationship between the official cult and popular religious practices during the Ch'ing period (Seiwert, 1985; Pas, 1987:104; Lin Mei-jung, 1988:363). Robert Weller discussed the ritual disguise of P'u-tu rite in face of state opposition at a town in northern Taiwan (Weller, 1987b). Ts'ai Chin-t'ang studied the suppression of household ancestor worship in the late colonial period (Ts'ai Chin-t'ang, 1991). In brief, some studies began to see that unlike the assumption implied in earlier studies on Chinese diffused religion, state did not enjoy overwhelming power in controlling the folk religion (Ahern, 1981b). In addition, some studies also recognized the flexibility within the folk religion in response to political opposition (Weller, 1987b; Hsu Mu-chu, 1976).

However, except for a very brief description in some case studies (Wang Shih-ch'ing, 1972; Feuchtwang, 1974; Baity, 1975; Hsu Mu-chu, 1976; Weller, 1987b) and the discussion on the religious suppression in the late colonial period (Ts'ai Chin-t'ang, 1991; Ch'en Ling-lung, 1992), there is no study systematically focusing on the interaction between state and the folk religious phenomena under the colonial rule. Without sufficient study on this period, many contemporary works simply assumed that the folk religion was very suppressed during the whole colonial period. This mind set also unintentionally leads to another misconception that Taiwanese folk religion in the colonial period did not go through any
change, and it simply preserved all the elements in the Ch'ing dynasty, a period in which the folk religion still needed much more research to explore. This assumption of no distinction between the Ch'ing period and the colonial period prevents the researchers from seeing the religious vital interaction with state and other secular institutions.

Only recently, scholars have begun to notice the link between the folk religion and the economic activities of Taiwan. This is mainly due to the outbreak of an incredibly popular, albeit illegal, lottery (Ta Chia Le) in the mid 1980s—for the players rely greatly on the folk religion for clues to the winning numbers. This surprising surge in the religious phenomenon attracted Taiwanese scholars' attention to the study of the folk religion.

Through the study of the lottery players, scholars found utilitarian and individualistic elements in the folk religion (Hu T'ai-li, 1986; Ch'en Wei-hsin, 1988). Another example related to the commerce of Taiwan is Hill Gates' work showing that the "use of money in funeral and death-related ceremonies derives from a belief in the important supernatural transactions between people and gods"; these transactions "imply that the creation of human life itself depends on capitalist principles" (Gates, 1987:267). Sung Kwang-yu analyzed the relationship between the ceremonies of Hsia-hai City-god and the commercial development in Ta-tao-ch'eng Taipei during the colonial period (Sung, 1993a). In a case
study on the recent flowing of the Eighteen Kings (an amoral cult in Taiwan), Robert Weller examined the close ties between the 'amoral' religious practices and the rapid development of small-scale entrepreneurial capitalism in the past two decades (Weller, 1994). Paul R. Katz found that the local leading families in Tung-kang (a town in the southwestern Taiwan) relied on diverse investment, intra-class marriage, and assuming leadership over the religious life of the community, to achieve their goals of social continuity (Katz, 1994).

Except for Sung's study and part of Katz' study, these works are the field researches conducted in contemporary Taiwan. The readers might wonder whether this profit-oriented element in the Taiwanese folk religion is a startlingly new product in recent years or not? If not, when did it appear? Without studying the past history of the folk religion, most Taiwanese scholars attributed the rise of utilitarian tendency in the folk religion to the rapid change of Taiwan's economic structure since the mid 1960s (Li Yi-yuan, 1992:117-138). Although Weller and Gates considered this utilitarian element not a new one, and assumed that it might appear in the late imperial time, their contemporary field observation failed them to provide any further explanation. In this regard, Sung Kwang-yu had a better attempt. He sensed that the strong interaction of the folk religion with commercial activities might appear in an earlier time (the colonial period). However, his case study focusing on one deity in one area has
its own limitation; the readers might want to know what happened to other deities in other areas of Taiwan.

In fact, among the diverse works on the folk religion, there are few studies using the whole island as the analytic scope and focusing on the issue of the religious development (Yu Kuang-hung, 1982; Yao Li-hsiang, 1984; Liu Chih-wan, 1987). Yao’s study is about the change from 1959 to 1980, and Liu’s study is concerned with the change in temple size and building materials through history. Yu’s study is the only article that intended to see the change in the folk religious cults in the Ch’ing period, the colonial period and the postwar period. In spite of his ambition, his emphasis is still on the postwar development for lack of data prior to 19454 (Yu Kuang-hung, 1982).

So far, there is no study to examine the dialectic process between the change of folk religion and the socio-economic development of Taiwan prior to 1945. In order to fully understand the recent phenomena in the folk religion, this study believes, we need to know its past development. This study argues that the folk religion did not totally submit itself to state, and we often ignored its flexibility in response to political opposition. In addition, this study

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4Yu’s analysis before 1945 only relied on two summary tables: the 1918 table is from the Marui Keijiro’s study, and the 1930 table is cited from Gazetteer of Taiwan (1971). In regard to the folk religion in Ch’ing period, he just assumed that the whole period was just a beginning stage for the folk religion to establish in Taiwan.
also argues that the profit-oriented element in the folk religion is not a newly developing phenomenon; we need to take into account the religious interaction with the economic development of Taiwan in the 18th, the 19th and the first half of 20th centuries. The detailed hypotheses about the change of Taiwanese folk religion will be presented in the Chapter 5.
CHAPTER IV: GENERAL HISTORY OF TAIWAN

INTRODUCTION

Taiwan is an island about 13,885 square miles, approximately 240 miles from north to south, and 90 miles from east to west at its broadest point\(^1\). The native people of this island were aborigines whose tranquil life was not disturbed until their contact with outside intruders in the 17th century. The island, from then on, was ruled by different regimes. First of all, the Dutch had occupied the Southern part of Taiwan in 1624–1661. In the meantime, Spain also once established two ports on the Northern seashore. In 1661, Cheng Ch’eng-kung, a supporter of Ming Dynasty, drove out the Dutch force and became the ruler of Taiwan. In 1683 the island fell into the hand of Ch’ing Court which then ruled Taiwan for two hundred and twelve years. The mass Chinese immigration took place in the 18th and the 19th centuries. In 1895, the Ch’ing court was defeated by Japan, and since then Taiwan was under colonial rule for 50 years. After World War II, the Nationalists from Mainland China came to take control over Taiwan. And, the scope of this study only covered the period prior to 1945.

Different regimes tend to emphasize or exaggerate

\(^1\)The size of Taiwan is about one fifth of the state of Washington.
different parts of history to fit new political needs. Thus, Taiwan's history, to some degree, was distorted by the shift in regimes. For instance, in order to boast of the Japanese rule, Japanese colonial scholars attempted to depict the 19th-century Taiwan as a backward society filled with violent conflicts. Similarly, the Nationalist regime tended to draw a depressing picture about Japanese rule. Another reason for the biased history is that the traditional historical works tended to portray great-men history (e.g. who are the political leaders and what they did under their administration), thus ignoring the continuity in the life of the masses. The continuity was demonstrated in three aspects: (1) As a bridge between Northeast Asia and Southeastern Asia, Taiwan has long been very active in the overseas trade. (2) As a new immigrant society before the second half of 19th century, the small ratio of population to land gave Taiwan an advantage to grow economic crops (mainly sugar and rice) to exchange the necessary goods from mainland. The commercialized agriculture and the regional division of labor have a great influence on the later history of Taiwan. (3) The rule by different regimes makes a clear parallel between the rulers and the ruled, and also a strong parallel or gap between the official culture and the culture of the masses. In addition to following these three major lines, this study also pays attention to the general factors such as demographic change, social stratification, and broad environmental
conditions such as the change in international trade.

EARLY HISTORY OF TAIWAN (pre-1662) AND DUTCH RULE 1624-1661

In the 15th and 16th centuries, Taiwan was a rest stop for Chinese and Japanese sailors. Since Chinese government was annoyed by Japanese pirates who frequently attacked the east coastline of China in 16th century, Japan was not allowed to trade with China (Ts‘ao Yung-ho, 1980:48-53). Therefore, when Portugal, Spain, and later Dutch wanted to expand their trade network in the Far East during the second half of 16th century, Chinese officials were not interested in their coming at all, and thus banned their ships from entering Chinese ports. This restriction made Taiwan a trading center for smugglers, and Chinese and Japanese pirates were highly active in the East China Sea (Eiseki, 1993).

Later in 1624-1661, the Dutch had occupied the Southern part of Taiwan as a transit stop in the Far East. The Europeans were very fond of Chinese silk and porcelain. The Dutch East India Company used silver from Europe and Japan, and spices from South Asia, to trade with silk and china, both smuggled from China coastline into Taiwan. Taiwan also exported deer leather to Japan, which the Japanese warrior class used to make armor (Eiseki, 1993). In order to increase trade revenue, the Dutch East India Company later produced sugar in the Tainan area. The sugar planting needed a more
skillful workforce which the Taiwan aborigines could not offer, so the company encouraged the Chinese peasants to immigrate to Taiwan. At the end of Dutch rule, the different populations within the island were: Chinese population about 50 thousand, the Dutch and other Westerners below 3 thousand, and the aboriginal population between 150 to 200 thousand (Ch’en Shao-hsin, 1964:111).

Although the Dutch established a colony in Tainan area (located at Southern part of Taiwan), they did not have full control over the island. Spain once established two ports on the Northern seashore (Ts’ao Yung-ho, 1980:57-58). Adventurers and pirates constantly visited the rest of the island. The Dutch also did not have free and direct trade with China, and depended on the supply from Chinese smugglers who were themselves sometimes pirates too. Among these smugglers and pirates in the East China Sea, the most powerful man was Cheng Chih-lung. In the first half of 17th century, a cargo ship had to buy a pass from him to ensure her safety in the East China Sea. In his heyday, he personally owned 3 thousand ships, and around 10 thousand ships were under his command (Ts’ai Yuan-ch’ieh, 1980:32). His son, Cheng Ch’eng-kung, drove out the Dutch force and became the ruler of Taiwan in 1661.

CHENG’S REGIME 1662-1683

Cheng’s regime (1662-1683) was established solely on the
basis of overseas trade. Cheng Ch'eng-kung, a supporter of Ming Dynasty, had several severe fights with Ch'ing force. Without the revenue from trade, it was impossible to pay for the huge military expenditure (Ts'ai Yuan-ch'ieh, 1980:32). The economy of Cheng's regime expanded what Dutch left. Sugar and leather were still two main exported items. But Britain became an important trade partner in this period. In addition, many new lands were opened for rice production\(^2\). In this period, the Chinese population was around 100 to 120 thousand (Ch'en K'ung-li, 1990:7), and the aboriginal population was about 100 thousand (Ch'en Shao-shin, 1964:117; Huang Fu-ts'ai, 1990:59). The successors of Cheng Ch'eng-kung did not hold this island for long. In 1683 the island fell into the hands of the Ch'ing Court.

CH'ING PERIOD, 1683-1945

Right after the end of the Cheng regime, many Chinese people, mainly Cheng's soilders and their families, were sent back to the mainland. Also, Ch'ing original plan was to desert the island and did not attempt to rule it, so the Chinese population in Taiwan declined dramatically at the beginning of Ch'ing rule (Teng K'ung-chao, 1991:356). It is

\(^2\)Ch'ing court took an extreme measure--removing coastline residents inland, to cut off the food supply of Cheng's regime. When Cheng's soilders, 25 thousand people, arrived in Taiwan, they faced the very serious problem of rice shortage (Huang Fu-ts'ai, 1990:58).
important to notice the Ch’ing court’s passive attitude toward the development of Taiwan. Her later motivation to rule Taiwan was to keep this island out of the hands of pirates who always came to attack the residents of Southeastern seashore (Chuang Ying-chang, 1987; Huang Fu-ts’ai, 1990:86). One result of this passive attitude was a rigid immigration law to prohibit single males from settling their mainland families in Taiwan, in spite of the fact that people continued to "illegally" move into Taiwan due to the hardship in their homeland. The immigration law was changed numerous times during the Ch’ing period; sometimes loosened and sometimes strengthened. It was until 1788 that the immigration restrictions were totally lifted (Teng, 1990:354).

One reason for the court’s inactive role is that the power of Ch’ing court was originated from Manchus who knew little about the sea and hence was not interested in expending the Empire overseas. It is until the second half of 19th century that Ch’ing court changed her attitude toward the development of Taiwan. In the 19th century, many foreign powers were eager to open the Chinese market. The frequent military conflicts with them forced the Ch’ing Court to become actively involved in the development of Taiwan for the sake of national defense.

Table 4.1 summarizes the growth of Chinese population during the Ch’ing period. For the purpose of tax collection, Ch’ing court had some rough population statistics. The
population figures for the years of 1782, 1811 and 1898 are assumed to be more accurate than other years. The figure for 1684 was an estimated one.

Table 4.1: The Growth of Chinese Population in Ch’ing Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Average Annual Rate of Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1684</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>912,920</td>
<td>2.655%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>1,901,833</td>
<td>2.563%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>2,545,731</td>
<td>0.356%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From this table, we can see that prior to 1811, the average annual population increase rate was above 2.50% which is far higher than that of Fukien at the same period, below 0.82% (Teng K’ung-chao, 1991:360). Before 1811, the population increase was mainly due to the influx of immigrants from Fukien province and the eastern part of Kwangtung province, where the level of population pressure was tremendously high (Ch’en Shao-hsin, 1964:165; Teng K’ung-chao, 1991:360). The mass Chinese immigration took place between 1782 and 1811, mainly because Ch’ing court had loosened her immigration law in 1788. Taiwan in the 17th and 18th centuries was a frontier or an immigrant society. After 1811,
population growth chiefly came from the natural increase of settled population, and the immigrants were no longer an important force for population growth of Taiwan.

(A) The period of immigrant society

Before the 19th century, the population composition was dominated by young males. The combination of this young and productive force with the small ratio of population to land, gave Taiwan an advantage to grow economic crops (mainly sugar and rice) to exchange the necessary goods with mainland. People were very concerned with investment return. When sugar price was better than rice one, people would change a rice field into a cane garden.

Compared to the residents of the Fukien area, these settlers were well-off for their economic gains. The gazetteers of Taiwan prior to the second half of 18th century often had a lengthy description about the luxurious life style of these settlers (Yu Yung-ho, 1736:30).

Under the influence of this economic structure, there were two kinds of social elites. The first one is K’en-hu who were awarded by the government land opening permits to enter the land on the tax rolls. And, at the same time, the government charged them with the duty of maintaining public safety (Chuang Ying-chang, 1987). A k’en-hu called in and organized peasants to open land and after the land was opened,
a fixed amount of rent was given by tenants to K'ên-hu. K'ên-hu did not necessarily refer to an individual leader. Several people could pull in their capital to form a K'ên-hu, and then take back their profit according their shares in the company (Sung Kwang-yu, 1993a:294-5; Wen Chen-hua, 1993:136-7). Unlike the landlords in mainland (Fei, 1946), most K'ên-hu actually participated in the hard-work of opening land, and had a strong spirit of adventure and risk-taking³ (Huang Fu-ts'ai, 1990:166-7). After opening an area, k'ên-hu would reinvest their money in opening another area, or building irrigation work to raise the productivity level of their land, or even joined the merchant business to handle the crops grown by their tenants.

Chiao merchants are another important type of social elites in the period of immigrant society. Chiao was a sort of business association formed by the trade companies doing similar business and having the same interests. Since Taiwan grew economic crops to trade with mainland, there had long been a very active trade network between mainland and Taiwan. The formation of Chiao came at the time when the competition was great and individual merchants felt a need in cooperation and protection. It was hard to pinpoint the exact time of

³Land opening was quite a dangerous task in the 17th and 18th centuries. Malaria was widespread, and the aborigines of Taiwan attacked these settlers constantly. Some of K’ên-ku, before their engagement in the land opening, were the trade dealers with aborigines. The money accumulated from the trading was the capital for their later investment in land opening (Ts’ai Yuan-chieh, 1985:56).
establishment of first Chiao in Taiwan. Most scholars agreed that Chiao appeared around 1760 (Huang Fu-ts'ai, 1990:116; Kurihara, 1984:17), when rice trading with mainland was very heavy (Wang Shih-ch'ing, 1958b:12).

The geography of Taiwan is another contributor for the growth of Chiao. Two thirds of the island is covered by the mountains in the middle. The rivers westbound were very short and run too fast to carry cargo. The island was divided by these rivers which made it difficult for people to cross regions (Ts'ai Yuan-ch'ieh, 1985:55; Sung Kwang-yu, 1993a:326). It might cost less to have a direct trade with mainland than to move the cargoes from southern region to northern one (Lin Man-hung, 1985:56-7; Wang Shih-ch'ing, 1958a:25). Hence, several sea ports on the west coastline become the most important trade centers of Taiwan. The busy sea trade was an essential element for the prosperity of Chiao merchants.

The immigrants came to Taiwan mainly for economic gains, and most of them were the lower class in mainland, who knew little about the official culture. Without a sufficient number of people studying classical literature and attending official examinations, it was impossible to form a gentry class. It is until the 19th century that the gentry class of Taiwan gradually formed (Liu Ni-ling 1989:106). This study will cover this development in the next section.

Without the formation of gentry class and also the active
involvement of Ch'ing government, people in Taiwan often resolved their conflicts with force. This lack of adequate means to maintain social order inevitably led to several large social upheavals in 18th century (Liu Ni-ling, 1989).

(B) The period of a settled society

As the population of Taiwan steadily increased, more and more armed conflicts and inter-group fights occurred. The frequency of these fights reached to its highest point in the period of 1805-1860. After that, these conflicts gradually decreased. There are three explanations for this decrease. The first one is from the viewpoint of indigenization process. The early Ch'ing Taiwan was characterized by the group formation affiliated to immigrant's native county in mainland, and thus, local, ethnic, and dialectic differences easily led to conflicts, as the population of Taiwan increased. After a period of turmoil (i.e. 1805-1860), the settlers "gradually abandoned their ideological connection with the native mainland" and "developed new reference point of group identity" (Ch'en Ch'i-nan, 1980:145). Analyses of territorial affiliation and lineage organization were the important examples to support this viewpoint (Ch'en Ch'i-nan, 1980 & 1989; Chuang Ying-chang, 1989).

The second reason for this decline is an economic one. The inter-group fights, to a large extent, were a reflection
of economic conflicts (for land and water supply, etc.) (Lin Man-hung, 1980:257; Huang Lung-lo, 1989:119; Lamley, 1981:303). The opening four ports in Taiwan by foreign powers in 1860, created a new opportunity for Taiwan's economy. The production of tea, sugar and camphor to meet the foreign markets created a new source of wealth which was larger enough to sustain the continual population growth and thus, diminished the inter-group conflicts (Lin Man-hung, 1980: 256-257).

The third explanation is the most popular one. The formation of gentry class in the 19th century was the main force to reduce the inter-group conflicts. Especially in the second half of 19th century, more and more people attended the examinations. Scholars believed that the cultivation of Confucianism could transform a violent society to a cultivated one (Li Kuo-ch'i, 1978:155; Ts'ai Yuan-chieh, 1980). The gentry class was a stabilized force for maintaining social order (Lamley, 1981:305 & 312).

Each explanation has its own merits. However, the third explanation, the formation of gentry class, deserves a further discussion, because the general impression about the Chinese gentry class is their contempt toward merchant class (Weber,1968:246). How did the gentry class of Taiwan influence the economic development of Taiwan?

The history of formation of gentry class in Taiwan was
not very long, and its population and the degree of influence on Taiwan were much smaller than the mainland counterparts. In addition, the 17th and 18th century of Taiwan was characterized by an export-oriented economy, and social elites were engaged in either opening land or business. Therefore, it was quite natural that the majority of gentry class also came from the families of businessmen or land developers (i.e. K'en-hu), because it usually took a lot of financial burden for a family to support a family member not working but studying. Ts'ai Yuan-ch'ieh studied the origins of 103 influential families of Taiwan during the Ch'ing period. He found that more than 80% of these influential families were the families of wealthy businessmen or land developers, and about 70% of these wealthy families got their gentry titles, not through their outstanding performance in the Examinations, but through Ch'ing court's special awards for their tremendous donation or military aids (Ts'ai Yuan-ch'ieh, 1980:154-165).

For those getting their titles through the Examinations, they sometimes refused court's offers to fill the official

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4In the last quarter of 19th century, the number of people attending the Examinations had reached its highest point. The population attending the Examinations was estimated around seven thousand (Yin Chang-yi, 1989:552). The Chinese population of Taiwan in 1893 was 2,545 thousand, so the gentry population was about 0.27% of total Chinese population of Taiwan.

5After 1720, there were many social upheavals in Taiwan, and Ch'ing court heavily depended on the financial assistance from the wealthy and influential families. One way to encourage their donation was to award gentry titles (Ts'ai Yuan-chieh, 1980:114).
positions outside Taiwan, because the life style at home was more comfortable than elsewhere and also this newly developed society needed their leadership (Li Kuo-ch’i, 1978:150).

In brief, the boundary between the gentry class and merchants was somehow meaningless. Most of gentry class still practiced business, and hence, they were not an obstacle to the economic development of Taiwan. Unlike the strong resistance against new reform in mainland, throughout the last half of 19th century, there was no opposition against reform or modernization in Taiwan (Ts’ai Yuan-chieh, 1980:282).

The population increase also brought a change in the tenant system of farmland. In the second half of 18th century, there was a practice of turning dry field into wet-rice fields. "Not only did unit area production increase, enabling the same amount of land to support a larger population, it also rendered tenants incapable of looking after all of land" (Chuang Ying-chang, 1987:192). It became necessary for a tenant to sublease a portion of the cultivated land to other tenants. As the result, K’en-hu became ta-tsu-hu and the original tenant became hsiao-tsu-hu. This gave rise to the one field-two masters tenant system.

This tenant system was more popular in the Southern region of Taiwan than the Northern one where it was not until the last half of 19th century that the land was fully developed (Tai Kuo-hui, 1985:53). There were also many small K’en-hu who worked on their lands without having hsiao-tsu-hu
manage their lands. Actually, ta-tsu-hu did not enjoy a dominant position in this tenant system. Although a ta-tsu-hu received a portion of the crop from the tenants of his hsiao-tsu-hu as a rent, he did not have a say in the choice of the tenants of hsiao-tsu-hu. It was hsiao-tsu-hu that gained actual power over the land (Okamatsu, 1902:73-4). When some deceived tenants refused to pay rent to a Ta-tsu-hu, he usually could not do anything about it (Kurihara, 1984:23-6), because there was no strong law enforcement to back him up in spite of the fact that he was the person who paid tax to the government. This tended to weaken the economic power of ta-tsu-hu. Besides, the tax reform in 1843 requiring the cash payment further undermined the position of ta-tsu-hu. The Ch’ing court used to take rice crop as the tax payment, but it was too troublesome to ship the crop back to the mainland. Thus, an official price for one unit of rice was set up to trade for the crop payment. The official price was far more higher than the market price, so the reform actually took away a large amount of income from ta-tsu-hu. As a consequence, hsiao-tsu-hu (a real manager of land) replaced ta-tsu-hu position and became rich landlords of Taiwan (Li Kuo-ch’i, 1978:152-3). This change in the tenant system had a great impact on the later economic development of Taiwan. The land was not concentrated on a very few hands and thus to create a non-working ruling class. In addition, the creation of small-land owners also made the later private property right reform
in the colonial period easy to carry out.

Chiao merchants continued their prosperity in the first half of 19th century. As the amount of trade between Taiwan and mainland increased, their growing wealth made them more involved in public affairs such as building (or repairing) temples, bridges, cemeteries, and schools, and training local defensive forces against banditry (Huang Fu-ts'ai, 1990:137-141). Although some ports were gradually silted up and did not function well, thus showing a early sign of decline in trade, the prosperity of Chiao business of Taiwan, in general, reached its highest point during the period of 1810 to 1835. After the Opium war between China and Britian (1840-1842), the trade between China and Southeast Asia became more active than before. One consequence was that the rice from Southeast Asia were dumped into Fukien by British merchants. In the meantime, a large part of sugar market also was taken over by Szuchwan sugar. Both were the deadly hit for Taiwan economy. Taiwan economy fell into a serious decay in the 1850s, so did the Chiao trade (Kurihara, 1984:32-37; Tai Kuo-hui, 1985:40; Wang Shih-ch’ing, 1958a:23-4).

Ch’ing court was forced to open four treaty ports at Taiwan in 1860. Foreign merchants and capital moved in to find the products to meet the demand of international market. Although sugar was still an important product, the main exported items had shifted to camphor and later tea too.
Because of the expansion of market for Taiwan products, traditional sampans could not rival Western ships for speedy and cargo load. Hence, Chiao business was doomed to decline. After 1860, compradores and armed gentry families arose as new social elites.

Originally, compradores served as agents between foreign merchants and local businessmen or workers. After working for foreigners for several years, they would start their own businesses. In addition to compradores, the wealthy gentry families having private forces also found their way to arise. Because tea and camphor were produced in mountain areas of North Taiwan where some aborigines resided, constant fights took place between aborigines and Chinese exploiters. Ch'ing court depended on the private forces to drive the aborigines to move further east into the mountains, and in return for their private assistance, awarded them gentry titles and some business privilege. Some of compradores and armed gentry families became very successful entrepreneurs whose business skills and capital were the important source for the later development of Taiwanese business in Japanese colonial period (Lin Man-hung, 1980:251).

In addition to the creating of modern enterprises, this new economy also had shifted the economic center from the

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6There was still a small amount of trade going on among the small ports of Taiwan and Fukien by the merchants of small Chiao in the late 19th century and the very early 20th century.
south to the north. The new job opportunities in the north attracted people to move north. Taipei become the largest commercial center in Taiwan. In response to this new change and also to the need of national defense (Chang Shih-hsien, 1978:194), Ch'ing court, in 1887, upgraded Taiwan's administrative position, from a prefecture of Fukien province to a province, and moved the administrative center from Tainan to Taipei.

In sum, during the Ch'ing period, there is a strong parallel or gap between "great tradition" (i.e. official culture) and "little tradition" (i.e. the culture of the masses). The official culture introduced by officials and intellectuals did not root deeply in this new immigrant society. The masses lived their own life shaped by the new conditions of the island, although the customs of their previous homeland still had an influence on their behaviors. The export-oriented economy made most Taiwanese people very concerned with the economic gains. After 1860, the new production of tea and camphor brought a tremendous wealth to the Taiwanese people. Before Japanese occupation, Taiwan already had a very good economy. In 1893, the total value of export production of Taiwan was 16.2% of that of Japan (Tai Kuo-hui, 1985:46), considering that the size of Taiwan is less than one tenth of Japan.
TAIWAN UNDER THE JAPANESE COLONIZATION, 1895-1945

It is extremely difficult to summarize the general history of Taiwan under Japanese rule. Researches on this period often carried too much emotional burden or ideological burden. On one hand, the Nationalist government attempted to portray the colonial rulers as exploiters and suppressors. On the other hand, those not happy with the Nationalist rule, were unaware of their exaggerating the benign aspect of colonial rule. Nowadays, the success of Japanese economy also pushed some Japanese and American scholars to study Japanese past colonialism. Nevertheless, these studies did not treat Taiwan as a central theme, but a by-product of Japanese study, thus giving out an incomplete picture of Taiwan (Chang Yen-hsien, etc., 1993).

In the early years of colonial rule, the colonial government had a serious fiscal problem, mainly due to the huge military expenditure on controlling the island. Since Japan was not willing to pay for the cost of building her colony, the colonial government had to find ways to increase the revenue. One way to reach this goal was through a government monopoly on the sale of salt, opium, camphor and tobacco.\(^7\)

The other important way to raise the revenue was through

\(^7\)Later in 1922, alcoholic beverage production was also a government monopoly.
the land reform in 1904. The government first took a precise land survey in 1898-1903. Surprisingly, this survey uncovered many unclaimed fields, the total amount of which was 1.15 times of that claimed (K’e, 1989:14). By eliminating the claim of ta-tsu-hu, the land reform ensured the modern private ownership of hsiao-tsu-hu, and thus gave landowners strong incentives for raising the level of productivity (Ho, 1984:355). The land reform greatly increased land tax revenue, and made it possible for the colonial government to do a lot of public investment such as irrigation, transportation network, sanitation improvement, and education, etc.

The Production of Sugar and Rice:

Under Japanese rule, Taiwan agriculture was still export-oriented, and sugar and rice were the two largest exported items to Japan. Japan had long depended on imported sugar, and this cost Japan much of her foreign exchange earnings. For instance, "between 1896 and 1904, Japan annually used an average of 22 million (Japanese Yen) of its foreign earnings to finance its sugar imports, an amount that accounted for more than 50 percent of its trade deficit during this period" (Ho, 1984:348). Therefore, once Japan colonized Taiwan, her goal was to make Taiwan the supplier. Supported by favorable
regulations\textsuperscript{8}, Japanese sugar corporations quickly drove the traditional Taiwanese sugar mills out of the market\textsuperscript{9}.

In spite of their successful control, sugar corporations did not introduce a plantation system to replace the traditional family farms (i.e. household production). The two most plausible reasons are: (1) The land reform firmly established property rights. The introduction of a new system would have required a radical redistribution of rural assets, a change that might be too costly and disruptive (Ho, 1984:385). (2) The emotional binding to land made Taiwanese farmers unwilling to give up their lands, even when the amount of return from working on land was lower than the interest rate from lending people money by simply selling out land and doing nothing (K‘e, 1989:18). This simply made it impossible for sugar corporations to put together many small pieces of private lands into a large land for plantation\textsuperscript{10}.

\textsuperscript{8}For example, Taiwanese farmers could not process their own sugar crops which must be sold to a definite sugar corporation (K‘e, 1989:28; Yang Pi-ch‘uan, 1987:234).

\textsuperscript{9}Actually, some wealthy Taiwanese merchants also adopted new technology to establish several large modern factories, but they could not hold on long, and gradually were merged by Japanese sugar corporations (Chang Hung-mo, 1992:59-71).

\textsuperscript{10}In 1909, one sugar corporation owned by a wealthy Taiwanese family, attempting to form a large piece of land for sugar production, was confronted by a strong resistance from the small farm owners, and this event forced one Japanese official to resign (Yanaihara, 1929 (1956):23).
In contrast to the sugar industry, rice processing remained in the hands of Taiwanese people. The popular traditional small rice processing mills, Tu-lung-chien (owned by wealthy landlords or rice merchants), were family businesses. Usually, a landlord set up one machine and employed his family members to polish the grains which his tenants paid him as rent. He sometimes also processed rice for other farmers, and received a small amount of grains as a payment. Rice merchants also joined the rice processing business. They set up mills to attract farmers to sell them crops and also loaned money to farmers to further solidify their business relationship. In 1932, there were 3,051 rice processing mills in Taiwan, and only 37 mills belonged to Japanese merchants (K‘e, 1992:217). The distribution network within Taiwan was totally under the control of these traditional mills. Japanese merchants only dealt with the export business, because of their familiarity with Japanese market.

After World War I, the rice export to Japan increased greatly\(^1\). Since the rice market was closer to the mode of free market, the market price in Taiwan followed closely to that in Tokyo, although there was still a substantial gap

\(^1\)World War I created a great economic opportunity for Japan in Asian market, because Western powers were busy in war activities then. When more Japanese people moved into industrial sector, there was a rice shortage in Japanese urban areas. Also, a cheaper rice from colony could help maintain a lower wage level for manufacturing workers, which could add a competitive edge on Japanese industry.
between two (K’e, 1992:202). As a result, the farmers’ living standard in Taiwan had improved significantly around 1925-1935 (K’e, 1992:206-7).

However, the continuously rising rice price posed a serious threat to the sugar industry. Suagr corporations needed to pay a higher price to collect the raw material; otherwise, farmers would simply leave for rice production. A higher sugar price would force Japanese consumers to pay more. In addition, a higher rice price would drive up the level of manufacturing wages in Taiwan. This would slow down the growth in the industrial sector. After invading Manchuria in 1931, Japan was eager to turn Taiwan into a steppingstone for her military expansion to South Asia, so the development of heavy industry became the priority and needed more manufacturing workers. In order to press down the rice price, the colonial government in 1939 took a tremendous measure, the government monopoly on rice sale. Farmers had to sell their rice to the government at a price lower than market value. As a result, more rice fields were shifted to sugar planting. Another impact of rice monopoly is a decline in the economic power of landlords, because they no longer enjoyed a lucrative profit from selling rice with a market price, and now must accept cash as a rent payment from their tenants (K’e, 1922:234-247). As World War II was intensified in 1940s, gradually all the production and consumption was under the government plan.
Business Class:

In 1895-1897, most Chinese intellectuals moved back to the mainland, and few left to become lower rank officials. Merchants were the most influential social class in Taiwan (see. Taiwan Shiho, vol.3, 1910:206). Not surprisingly, once the colonial elementary schools for Taiwanese people were opened in 1898, many merchant families sent their kids to these schools. Table 4.2 is the survey summary on the fathers' occupations of Taiwanese pupils at the elementary schools in 1899. The majority of these pupils were from merchant families, 41.8%. The second dominant occupation was agriculture, 24.5%; this study suspects that these pupils in agriculture came from landlord families.

Merchants were very practical, and they knew how to adapt to a new situation quickly. Some wealthy merchants cooperating with the new regime, were given some business privilege. When the Japanese prince visited Taiwan in 1923,

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12According to E. P. Tsurumi's study on the colonical education of Taiwan, the overwhelming majority of the pupils came from homes of the well-to-do. "This was at least partly because only the salaries of teachers were paid from taxes collected by the regional administrators. All other expenses, including capital expenditures, had to be borne by the Taiwanese living in the city, town, or village in which a school was located. Wherever the people were unable or unwilling to maintain a common school, no such school was opened. To establish and to maintain a common school usually meant that wealthy Taiwanese in the district would have to make generous personal donations" (Tsurumi, 1977:46). It was until 1943 that the compulsory elementary education was inaugurated.
Table 4.2: The Fathers' Occupations of Taiwanese Students of the Public Elementary Schools, December 1899

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Occupation</th>
<th>Number of people</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>1.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>2.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>1.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2413</td>
<td>24.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>4113</td>
<td>41.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>6.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>11.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>10.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9839*</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taiwan Sotokufu Tokeisho (The Statistic Book of Government-General of Taiwan), no.3 (1899). p.129.

* This figure, 9839, includes 22 Japanese students.

Some Taiwanese, the majority of them very wealthy merchants, were awarded prizes for their good deeds on this society (see. Taiwan Nenkan, 1924:40-43). They also had a great enthusiasm in many cultural reform activities such as cutting queue and unfolding bound feet (Wu Wen-hsing, 1988). In short, Taiwanese merchants maintained a friendly relationship with the colonial government.

Since many earlier studies on the history of Taiwan tended to put their focus on the exploited aspect of colonial rule (Yanaihara, 1929; Grajdanzev, 1942), they had the tendency to ignore the phenomenon that the Taiwanese were
actively engaged in commercial activities. For example, the study of Yanaihara Tadao, a famous Japanese scholar, is bounded by his left-wing political view. He argued that the colonial government made the laws to favor Japanese firms, and also those firms backed by Japanese capitalists had plenty of capital to merge Taiwanese firms. Hence, he further declared that the Taiwanese economy was totally in Japanese hands and the Taiwanese people would eventually become the working class without the means of production. Yanaihara's sympathetic view about the injustice of colonial rule earned great respect from some postwar Taiwanese scholars.

13The law that Yanaihara referred to as an unequal treatment, is the one announced in 1912 by the Government-General, banning the operation of the modern corporations which capital was solely owned by Taiwanese people (or Chinese mainlanders). This law came at the time when more and more Taiwanese businessmen imitated the organization of a modern corporation to run their small business (Yanaihara 1929(1956): 49). This restriction did not ban the formation of traditional Taiwanese firms where a company capital was owned by a few partners (Wang T'ai-sheng, 1993:142). The ban was lifted in January 1923, when Taiwan was allowed to implement the same Japanese civil law. Based on the current available researches, it is hard to estimate the impact of this restriction on the growth of Taiwanese business. The Taiwanese firms are usually family firms, and the scale of business was inclined to be small. And, the Taiwanese firms might also form their capital through informal networking like that in the postwar period. (For the postwar period, please see Ch'en Chieh-ying, 1993). The ban might not have a serious impact on their survival. One evidence is that in 1923 many small Taiwanese firms came out to register as a modern corporation (see. Taiwan Nenkan, 1924:253-309). They might long exist before the lifting of ban. For those who know how to make friends with Japanese, they had no problems to start their business earlier. For instance, the data used to create Table 4.3 also indicated that 26 out of 58 Taiwanese corporations were set up before 1922, and 13 companias in 1922, a year before lifting the ban.
Unfortunately, his radical viewpoint misled many readers into thinking that the Taiwanese people played no active role in the economic activities of Taiwan, or that Taiwanese merchants were simply a group of petty shopowners. These authors totally neglected a strong private sector of Taiwan long existing before 1895. The saving from landlords (Mizoguchi, 1984:407-408) and campradore-entrepreneurs (Lin Man-hung, 1980:251) was an important source of capital formation for Taiwanese business in the colonial period.

In order to resolve this stereotype, this study applies information on the large corporation of Taiwan to create Table 4.3. The corporations listed here were modern firms, each with the capital over 500,000 Japanese yen. The distinction between Japanese corporations and Taiwanese ones is by the head of corporation. A head of corporation in most cases fell into the person who owned the largest share of company stocks. In addition, there was no exclusion for Taiwanese businessmen from buying the stock of Japanese corporations\(^4\).

Obviously, Japanese corporations took over most of the industries in the manufacturing sector, especially in sugar industry. Without looking over the whole picture of

\(^4\)One good illustration is Taiwan Shoko Kinko (The Commerce-Industry Bank of Taiwan). The head of the bank was a Japanese. Nevertheless, six out of eleven largest stock owners were Taiwanese, although the combination of their shares was less than the half of the combination of five other Japanese (Takemoto, 1935:144).
Table 4.3: The Corporation Main Activity By Japanese Head and Taiwanese Head

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
<th>JAPANESE HEAD</th>
<th>TAIWANESE HEAD</th>
<th>ROW TOTAL</th>
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<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>breading</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>forestry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISHING</td>
<td>fishing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINING</td>
<td>mining</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>quarrying</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANUFACTURE</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>camphor</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ceramics</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>textile</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>wood product</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hotel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TRANSPOR.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>railroad</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>storage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transportation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COLUMN (Cases)</strong></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (%)</strong></td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Taiwan Nenkan (Yearbook of Taiwan), 1930:345-355.

*The category of "development" refers to takushoku kaisha (in Japanese). This type of company is engaged in a variety of activities including trading agricultural lands, afforestation, cultivation, processing and selling products, transportation, loan to peasants for fertilizer, equipment and houses, etc., and trading other valuable securities.

corporations of Taiwan, this story of successfully controlling the sugar industry might lead us to think that Taiwanese businessmen were powerless and helpless.

The Taiwanese corporations were mainly concentrated in the sector of commerce. If we leave out the ten largest corporations in terms of capital, which were highly supported
by the colonial policy (see Table 4.4), the average capital of a Japanese corporation in 1930 was quite close to that of Taiwanese (Table 4.5).

Table 4.4: The Ten Largest Corporations in 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAPITAL</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15000</td>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63000</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48000</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29250</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28000</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18000</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>sugar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>camphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>quarrying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11000</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>agricultural development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36000</td>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Manufacture</td>
<td>electricity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CAPITAL = Japanese Yen

YEAR = The years for the corporations to establish
Table 4.5: The mean of capital by industry by different representatives in 1930 (excluding 10 largest corporations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>For Entire corporations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1341.8692</td>
<td>1209.2858</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>769.2308</td>
<td>438.5290</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>1166.6667</td>
<td>763.7626</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>650.0000</td>
<td>241.5229</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>742.6667</td>
<td>250.3225</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>614.0000</td>
<td>161.2203</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>1000.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Quarrying</td>
<td>1250.0000</td>
<td>534.5225</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1333.3333</td>
<td>605.5301</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>1000.0000</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1324.7826</td>
<td>1176.3441</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1387.8947</td>
<td>1240.8044</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>1025.0000</td>
<td>795.9720</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>1545.9184</td>
<td>1406.4523</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>1400.0000</td>
<td>1490.4458</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>1610.2941</td>
<td>1385.9566</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Transportation &
  communication         | 1411.3636 | 1395.6792 | 11    |
| Japanese                 | 1065.6250 | 828.6109 | 8     |
| Taiwanese                | 2333.3333 | 2362.9078 | 3     |

In regard to the smaller firms and shops, it's no doubt that the majority of them were run by Taiwanese people (see *Taiwan shoko meiroku*, 1927; Takemodo, 1935). In addition, one latest study also indicated that the investment of Taiwanese merchants was dominant in the Southeastern region of China, and Taiwanese merchants were highly active in the trade among China mainland, Taiwan, and Japan (Lin Man-hung, 1993).
Colonial Education & Other Social Elites:

With a great negative example of India's "educated unemployed" in mind (Tsurumi, 1977:46), the colonial government did not attempt to offer Taiwanese people the same education as in Japan. The elementary education was to make the Taiwanese children "accept the economic and social positions of their parents" and also give them "new skills and goals which would make them more efficient practitioners of their customary professions and trades" (Tsurumi, 1977:49). Hence, the schools were practical and vocational to the daily lives of the pupils. Agriculture and commerce were the compulsory subjects. Agriculture was taught in rural schools; commerce was directed at children in the town (Tsurumi, 1977:50).

The higher education for Taiwanese students were vocation-oriented too: medical school and teacher training. Due to the very limited opportunities, competition to enter higher education was very fierce. Unhappy about the education in Taiwan, well-to-do Taiwanese sent their children to Japan and few to other counties to study\(^5\).

\(^5\)Although some students went to mainland China, the United States, and some European countries, the overwhelming majority went to Japan to study. In 1908, there were 60 Taiwanese studying at schools of various levels in Japan. The number had increased to 327 in 1915, 747 in 1922, 2185 in 1935, and 7091 in 1942 (Wu Wen-hsing, 1992:120). In 1937, there were 1091 Taiwanese college students in Japan; 57% of them were in medical school, 18% in law school, and 14% in commerce and economics (Wu Wen-hsing, 1992:122). Although we
Physicians, teachers, and those studying aboard were the new rising social elites. Especially those having experience aboard brought back many new ideas. Under the strong influence of socialist ideas in the 1920s, these social elites also campaign for political reform within legal channels. Probably because of their well-to-do family origin\(^\text{16}\), the majority in reform movement were genuinely more interested in acquiring bigger shares of existing economic, political, and social rewards than in fundamentally destroying the status quo (Tai Kuo-hui, 1985:75-6; Wang Chao-wen, 1992). This reform movement was dismissed in 1934, after Japan invaded Northern China and needed to tighten her control over her colonies.

The population of these new social elites were quite small. As we can see from Table 4.6, there were only a very small number of students attending vocational colleges and university in Taiwan. If the number of students studying aboard (see footnote 15) was added to the Table 4.6, there was not much change in the percentage of Taiwanese population receiving modern education.

\(^{16}\)According to Wu Wen-hsing’s study, most of the students in medical school and teacher training also came from well-to-do families (landlords or merchants). It is not necessary for a teacher training graduate to make living by being a teacher; some run their family business, and attending teacher training school simply gave them the opportunity to master the Japanese language (Wu Wen-hsing, 1992:131-196).
Table 4.6: Taiwanese Students at Different Educational Levels in Taiwan in 1922, 1932, and 1943.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>200,583</td>
<td>280,714</td>
<td>805,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle school</td>
<td>5,249</td>
<td>9,435</td>
<td>36,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational college</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>206,216</td>
<td>290,556</td>
<td>842,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Taiwanese</td>
<td>3,697</td>
<td>4,639</td>
<td>6,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (per 1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to the Taiwanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>5.6 %</td>
<td>6.3 %</td>
<td>13.7 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ch'en Shao-hsin, 1964:296, Table XV-4.

Suppression during the Wartime (1937-1945):

After controlling Manchuria in 1931, Japan showed a very bold interest in conquering the whole East Asia (Nakamura, 1988:24-25). In 1936, the new Governor General of Taiwan, Kobayashi Seizo in his inaugural speech outlined three major policies: industrializing Taiwan, expanding the influence to Southeast Asia, and making the Taiwanese imperial subjects (Chou Wan-yao, 1994:121). The development of heavy industry
in Taiwan was intended to support Japan's military aggression in Southeast Asia. To mobilize Taiwan's resources also required the full-hearted support of Taiwanese people.

After the war with China broke out in July 1937, it became an urgent task for the colonial government to ensure the loyalty of the Taiwanese to Japan. Several severe measures were taken to achieve this goal: forcing Shintoism upon the Taiwanese, suppressing Taiwanese folk religion, campaigning for the use of the Japanese language, forcing the Taiwanese to change their names into Japanese ones, and, brainwashing and recruiting Taiwanese youth to die for the Japanese Emperor.

This study will give a detailed discussion about the religious measures in Chapter 8. The campaign for national (Japanese) language was very effective; "the total population of the Japanese speakers increased from 37% in 1937 to more than 80% in 1945"(Chou Wan-yao, 1991:220). The name-change program starting in April 1940, was less impressive but still involved "about 7% of the total population"(Chou Wan-yao, 1991:220). The military recruitment program implemented in 1942, had a far-reaching impact on the Taiwanese youth who had a confused national identity and later found themselves a sort of outcast under Nationalist rule (Chou Wan-yao, 1991:215-219). In brief, most of these measures were used to suppress what was distinctly Taiwanese.

In addition, the Taiwanese also endured economic
hardship. Since the government monopoly on rice sales in 1939, the colonial government gradually controlled all the food production and consumption. As the war was intensified in 1944, so the food control became tighter, and many Taiwanese starved (Wu Chu-liu, 1987:131). Another indicator of wartime hardship was the increasing government spending. The annual expenditure of colonial government in 1936 was about 134 million (Japanese Yen), and the annual budget was 416 million in 1942, and 691 million in 1944 (Kou Shou-dou, 1981:166 & 185). Taiwanese people endured the tremendous burden for Japanese military aggressions.

In sum, this section attempts to argue that business was an important outlet for the ambitious to express their talent, when Taiwanese people were not allowed to join political arena. Under the Governor General, the government employees were divided into four ranks. According to the 1944 government statistics, there were 124 positions in the highest rank, and only one was Taiwanese (a medical professor in Imperial University at Taipei); 2049 in the second rank, 22 of them Taiwanese; 29,904 in the third rank, 6,061 of them Taiwanese (most of them were elementary school teachers); 5,131 in the lowest rank, 4,131 of them Taiwanese (most of them were assistants in public organizations) (see. T'ai-wan ming-cheng ti-i chi (Civil Affairs Administration), 1946:71-72). This biased structure encourged the growth of merchants as social elites among Taiwanese people.
CHAPTER V: HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY

HYPOTHESES:

According to the ideal type definition of Chinese diffused religion in the 19th century, presented in the previous chapter, there are two main features of this ideal type: on the one hand, the state seemed to have a strong hand in shaping the content of diffused religion; on the other hand, the diffused religion that was widely practiced by the public, to a large extent reflected the daily concerns of the public, that is, happiness, long life, and wealth.

These two features went through some changes, when Chinese immigrants came to Taiwan to face a new environment. Due to the characteristics of a new immigrant society (i.e. less state control from the central court, less condemnation from the orthodox (Confucianist) values toward profit-pursuing economic activities, and an export-oriented agriculture to trade the necessaries from southeastern China), folk religion enjoyed a lot more freedom than her counterpart in the mainland. The belief of pursuing wealth in folk religion might facilitate economic activities in the 18th and 19th centuries of Taiwan, and yet the economic development might modify the content of folk religion. The result might be that the folk religion had become more this-worldly oriented.

Under Japanese rule, the discrepancy between the rulers
and the ruled made Taiwanese folk religion become the cultural identity of Taiwanese people. Nevertheless, there was no dramatic and violent confrontation between the folk religion and the colonial rule. Few Taiwanese people converted to the religions that the rulers promoted, although the folk religion adopted some new elements from the Japanese religions. In addition, Taiwanese people were barred from government positions, so they were highly active in the economic field. This too had an impact on the development of folk religion.

To make this general argument above able to be tested, this paper develops a series of propositions to address explicitly the interaction between the diffused religion and the changes in the secular institutions¹, hoping that these propositions too could be used by researchers studying other times and places.

(1) When there was a substantial discrepancy between the rulers and the ruled, the official cults (ideology) would not root deeply in diffused religion. Hence, the temples constructed by officials would stand for a while, but would gradually decline. If a temple constructed by officials wanted to survive, it must adopt itself to the needs of the public. In contrast, the temples constructed by local residents and local elites (i.e. more connected to local interests) would be more likely to survive and prosper. Sometimes, a very

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¹This study did not discuss ancestor worship, the belief fused with the family institution.
influential local temple with a belief that might be strange to the orthodox view, would force the state to recognize its existence, especially when the state needed the help from local people.

(2) As the economy changed, some traditional deities would change their original characteristics to meet the new requirements. Therefore, as the economy of a society became more commercialized, some deities would gradually emerge as commercial gods.

(3) Diffused religion responded to the rule of an outside regime in a subtle way, not a dramatical refusal. The diffused characteristic with secular institutions made it easy for the religion to drop some elements and add some new ones, usually the ones promoted by the new regime. This change posed a less threatening posture to the new regime, thus saving the religion from the immediate political suppression. Without the religious personnel and bibles to spread the beliefs, the beliefs and practices were learned from following family members or community members in family or public religious activities. Hence, even when diffused religion was under serious suppression, the public religious activities might be suspended but the private ones would continue within family realm. In addition, if local people were barred from government positions, diffused religion would more interact with the economic activities where the local people were highly active.
(4) The changes in diffused religion occurred smoothly. Because a variety of cults were fused into various secular institutions, and a believer often joined different cults in various temples at one time, it was easy for a believer to stop going to one temple and join another one, without a big disturbance in his belief system. With a sense of continuity of his world view, an individual would adapt to a new situation quickly. On a collective level, through the selective process by numerous believers, the survival temples were the ones meeting new demand in a new situation.

Following these propositions above, this study expects to find:

(1) During the Ch'ing period, the Taiwanese folk religion temples constructed by local elites (mainly business elites) had a higher level of prosperity than those constructed by officials.

(2) Any temples constructed by Ch'ing officials, which nevertheless still enjoyed a high level of prosperity in 1916, must have gained the support from local interests (measured by the first temple repair from local elites).

(3) While promoting the state ideology through some cults, the Ch'ing court sometimes needed to recognize the existence of "inappropriate" cults in order to get the

\[\text{2The definition of temple prosperity will be presented in the following section.}\]
military or financial assistance from local people.

(4) Due to the economic condition of Taiwan (i.e., the intensive trade with mainland and commercial agriculture), Matsu (a protector of seamen) and T’u-ti-kung (a tutelary god of the earth; a protector of farmers) gradually emerged as commercial deities.

(5) After the Ch’ing court left, the cults directly associated with the imperial interests must face a great challenge under the new political arrangement: the cults related to imperial Examination Institution declined; some cults were in a awkward position, because the special meanings attached to these cults were not fit for the change of the rulers; some cults promoted by the colonial government were gaining their popularity.

(6) After the Ch’ing court left, the cults associated with the immigrants’ original counties on mainland, would decline, because the boundaries of sub-ethnic groups among Taiwanese people were further weakened, and the reference point of group identity on Taiwan strengthened in opposition to the new "other" group, the Japanese.

(7) The folk religion was very flexible under the colonial rule. Although it became the culture identity of Taiwanese people, it was willing to add foreign elements to enrich its content.

(8) The folk religion was fused with secular life. On one hand, because Taiwanese people were active in economic
field, the content of folk religion, articulating their life, was more concerned with material gains. As a result, there were some cults supported by gamblers, and a notorious serial killer could become a popular deity too. On the other hand, without violent confrontation with the colonial rule, the hierarchy of folk religion deities resembled the official hierarchy of colonial government. And, when the colonial government suppressed the temples severely in the mid 1930s, the folk religious activities were suspended but did not die out.

METHODOLOGY:

1. Selection of Data Set

Data for Taiwanese folk religion temples of this study comes from several sources:

(1) Gazetteers\(^3\) (written from 1694 to 1895)

(2) The Survey of Temples (six volumes) (1916)

(3) Report of Religion Survey in Taiwan (1918)

(4) Taiwanese Religion and Superstitious Customs
   (Appendix: The Directory of Temples in Taiwan) (1938)

(5) Religion in Taiwan (1939)

\(^3\) The Gazetteers used to compile the temple data during the Ch’ing period, are listed in Appendix A.
A local gazetteer in Ch'ing period usually listed the information about the contemporary customs and the locations of temples in one area. This information would be revised in later gazetteers. However, the levels of accuracy among these gazetteers are varied. Some only offered very brief descriptions, while some had more lengthy information including the dates of construction and repairs, and the names of main sponsors. In addition, the confucian mentality of gazetteer authors might also, to various degrees, bias them against recording information objectively (Pai, 1987:102). Nevertheless, gazetteers are still the most important primary source for the study of Taiwanese folk religion during the Ch'ing period (Liu Chih-wan, 1994:16-19; Lin Mei-jung, 1988:365).

This study compiled 36 gazetteers to form a list of the temples in Ch'ing period. This was a very painstaking task. Fortunately, Liu Chih-wan had already compiled a temple list of Ch'ing period based on 34 gazetteers (Liu Chih-wan, 1963). His pioneer work saved this study from the hard work of locating a temple with various addresses through different time points. These gazetteers contain about 900 cases. This study computerized the 338 cases including the cults of Ma-tsu, Kuan-yin, Kuan-ti, Shen-nung, Yu-huang Ta-ti, Ch'eng-huang, and few Buddhist deities⁴.

⁴Since locating a temple with different street names through the time is a very time consuming task, this study can not afford computerlizing all the temples appeared in the
The 1916 data are the most important to this study. During the early colonial rule, there were other more important tasks needed to be dealt with immediately, so the government attitude toward the folk religion was more relaxed and tolerant. This attitude was changed, when Hsi-lai-an, a folk religion temple in Tainan area, was associated with a rebellion against colonial rule in 1915. In order to gain full control over the folk-religion temples, the colonial government had conducted a series of island-wide surveys in 1915-1916, 1916, and 1917-1918\(^5\) (Liu Chih-wan, 1994:21-22). The tremendous amount of survey information was briefly summarized in *The Report of Religion Survey in Taiwan vol. 1*, written by Marui Keijiyo in 1918\(^6\). Since then, the survey gazetteers at this stage of my study. Hence, this study must select some major cults to examine them first. There are two main reasons for selecting these cults first: (1) These cults attracted both officials and local residents in various areas, so with this diversity, this study could test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section. This is also a more conservative approach. Because the other cults were mainly supported by local residents, the statistics including all cults would be weighted to favor the support of local residents. (2) The size of the temples of these cults is usually larger than that of the others. Therefore, it is more likely that the gazetteers' authors would not miss recording them. An accurate recording of temple information would be helpful for testing the hypotheses.

\(^5\)The 1915-1916 survey was carried out in a very hasty way, so the effort was in vain. With a careful plan, another survey was held in 1916. With the encouragement of the 1916 survey, the government expanded the survey content with more detailed items in 1917-1918 (Liu Chih-wan, 1994:21-22).

\(^6\)The result of the 1917-1918 survey was very impressive. The length of compiling all survey books together was more than 20 meters. Marui Keijiyo was one of the supervisors of this survey. He might plan to supplement the first volum
data was revised each year, because whenever there was a change in local temples, a local county needed to make a report to the government. This survey provided a very rich data base for the scholarly works during the colonial period.

After the end of Japanese rule, most of the data was lost through the time. Fortunately, this study contains most of the temple survey done in 1916. This study secured several hand-written volumes covering the folk-religion temples in six major counties of Taiwan: Taipei, Taoyuan, Hsinchu, Nantou, Chiayi, and Tainan. If excluding the Penghu area\(^7\), this study estimates that the temple data in these six major counties make up 66% of the total temple data of the island\(^8\). Since this was the first survey, although not a completed data for the whole island, the data this study obtains are still very valuable. The items listed on the survey include the construction date, the builders, the geographical boundary of temple supporters, and the level of temple prosperity for each temple. This study computerized the 1916 data and obtained

with another book, because the label of vol. 1 was listed on the book published in 1918. Unfortunately, the vol. 2 never came out (Liu Chih-wan, 1994:22).

\(^7\)Penghu area refers to Pescadore archipelago located at the Taiwan Straits. Its development by Chinese settlers was much earlier than that of Taiwan. The people on small Pescadore archipelago made a living in fishing, and hardly any new temples were constructed during the colonial period.

\(^8\)According to The Report of Religion Survey in Taiwan, the temples on these six counties were made up 66% of the total all temples of the island (Marui Keijiro, 1918:6). Comparing the figures in 1918, this study also noticed that the 1916 data did not record the very small temples.
1302 cases.

To compensate for the loss of the survey data, this study also utilized the part of original survey data listed in *Religion of Taiwan* (Masuda Fukutaro, 1939. Pp.108-185), and the temple directory compiled based on the government data, in *Taiwanese Religion and Superstitious Customs* (So Keirai, 1938, Pp.335-415). After computerizing this 1938 temple directory, this study found 3774 temples.

In addition to the sources listed above, this study also includes several travelers' reports in the 18th and 19th centuries and the scholarly works in the 20th century as references.

2. Defining Variables and Measurement

(1) The Level of Temple Prosperity

The variable of the level of temple prosperity was used to measure the degree of success in attracting worshippers toward a temple. The item of temple prosperity was listed in 1916 data by interviewers. The interviewers used the following terms, "ruin", "decay", "weakness", "ordinariness", "prosperity", and "great prosperity" to describe the various levels of temple prosperity. In respond to these terms above, this study coded them on the scale of 0 to 5 points. Because these terms were applied by different interviewers, this study was very concerned about the problem of subjective judgement.
There are two other more objective items related to the level of prosperity in the 1916 data: the boundary of temple supporters, and the Taiwanese drama performance. The boundary of supporters refers to the fact that some temples were more popular than the others and thus were able to attract the worshippers outside a village or a town. The boundary of supporters for these temples would be larger than the others. And, usually Taiwanese dramas were performed on the birthday of a chief deity in a more successful temple than a poor one.

However, these two items have their own deficits too. These two items have more missing cases than the item of prosperity level. In addition, other factors, not limited to the factor of the direct support from local residents, would also influence the level of supporters' boundary and the frequency of drama performance. For instance, a village temple in a remote mountain area could have strong support from the local and neighboring villages, but might have difficulty attracting worshippers outside the mountain area. Geographic convenience played an important role in deciding the supporters' boundary. Similarly, a very poor village which could not afford a drama performance annually, did not mean that the villages were less devoted to their temple.

In order to select a better indicator, the correlation coefficients among these three items were calculated. This study coded the item of supporters' boundary on the 1 to 5 point scale. The item of drama performance was coded as 0 (no
performance), and 1 (at least one performance). The result was listed in Table 5.1. As we can see these correlation coefficients, the item of temple prosperity is still the best item among these three.

Table 5.1 Correlation Matrix for Temple Prosperity, Supporter Boundary, and Drama Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prosperity</th>
<th>Boundary</th>
<th>Drama</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boundary</td>
<td>.438**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>.307**</td>
<td>.166**</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of cases: 973  2-tailed Signifi: ** -.001.

In Ch’ing data (i.e. gazetteers), this study included the item of temple prosperity with three different levels, "decay", "ordinariness", and "prosperity", coded as 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Since gazetteers were written by various authors, this study needed to set up a concrete criterion to create the item on temple prosperity. When the words, "a ruined temple now", appeared in the gazetteers, this temple was coded in the lowest level of temple prosperity. The temple with the descriptions like "a magnificent temple with many worshippers", or "wonderful festivals to attract many
worshippers", was coded to have the highest level of prosperity. For those with no special description, this study simply put them in the category of ordinariness.

Some potential arguments might raise against using "the ruined situation" of a temple as an indicator for lower temple prosperity, which are worth our special attention here. People might argue that a ruined situation is not an indicator for lower temple prosperity (public support); a ruined situation is probably caused by other factors such as inconvenient temple location or lack of permanent temple organization to maintain a temple. The argument for inconvenient temple location goes like this: for military purpose or some other reasons, official temples might be constructed in some strategic points which might be somehow difficult for worshippers to reach. Although not having done the task of locating each temple on the Taiwan's maps of 18th and 19th centuries, this study has the general impression that the majority of official temples were not far away from the temples supported by the local people. For instance, the official Ma-tsu temple in Lukang, just a few streets away from the unofficial Ma-tsu temple, had hardly been used by local people; in Taipei, the official Ma-tsu temple built inside the old walled city, was not popular as the unofficial temple outside the city (Watson, 1985:300-301). In 18th century, a Ch'ing official in Tainan city also noticed that the (official) Ma-tsu temple was in bad shape, in contrast to the
other magnificent (unofficial) Ma-tsu temples in nearby districts (see. Hsu hsiu Tai-wa hsien chih, 1807:502). These examples all demonstrate that the temple location might not play an essential role in explaining the less attractiveness of official temples.

Another argument against coding the ruined stage as lower temple prosperity is: unlike some temples constructed by large trade companies (Chiao), an official temples did not have a permanent temple organization to maintain it, so the ruined situation is simply the reflection of lack of maintaining organization, not the public support toward the temple; a magnificent temple constructed by Chiao merchants might have attracted only a handful of worshipper, while an old, "ruined" official temple might still have attracted many worshippers.

In regard to this argument, this study went through the data listed Chiao merchants as temple builders in Ch‘ing gazetteers, and found 9 cases. Only 5 out of these 9 temples were solely constructed by Chiao merchants, and the rest of 4 temples were co-constructed with local residents. The fates of these 5 temples are described as the following: One Ma-tsu temple in Ta-tao-ch‘eng (Taipei) and one Shui-hsien tsung-wang temple in Tainan⁹ were public temples, and still attracted many worshippers in 1916; one Ma-tsu temple in Tainan and one Shui-hsien tsung-wang temple (the headquarter of one Chiao

⁹The business headquarter of one Chiao company was built next to the temple.
company) in Hsinchu had a modest amount of worshippers in 1916 data; one Shui-hsien tsung-wang temple in Wan-hua (Taipei) disappeared¹. These examples present that a permanent organization (a trade company) could not promise the prosperity of a temple. Like any folk temple, the survival of these temples depends on the support of local people.

In most cases, Chiao merchants were more willing to participate in the temple affairs of existing large local temples than to construct a new temples solely by their own effffors. The continuous endorsement by different merchants (not confined to Chiao merchants) help maintain a temple. Some merchants endorsed "official temples" too, but in general they had less enthusiasm to "official temples" than to "unofficial" ones. Perhaps, merchants felt more comfortable to decorate the local temples in their own ways, than simply to give away the money to officials without having their viewpoints displayed.

Except for few very large temples, the majority of folk temples, during the Ch'ing period, did not have permanent organizations to do the maintenance. Only when local people felt the need of repairing a local temple (usually after a serious earthquake or typhoon), a temporary committee was set up for the work. Therefore, this study considers "a ruined situation" of a temple as a indicator of less local support

¹The 1916 data, and data dated after 1916, do not list the temple.
lower temple prosperity).

(2) Construction Year

The second important variable for this study is the construction year of a temple. Gazetteers and 1916 data both have listed the item of construction year, but the information accuracy for each temple is variable. In order to reduce the marginal error on the construction year to the minimum, this study also checked the following data resources: (1) the partial data in Religion in Taiwan (1939); (2) Gazetteer of Taiwan (1971); (3) Temples and Gods of Taiwan (1983). For instance, one piece of information in 1916 data vaguely stated that the temple was built around 90 years ago. Using these extra pieces of information, this study was able to locate the year as accurately as possible. If the information was inconsistent among the gazetteers, the 1916 data, and other reference sources, this study simply coded such a case as "unknown".

(3) Main Contributors to Temple Construction and Repair

In addition to the construction year, the gazetteers and the 1916 data also listed the main contributors to the temple construction. In the gazetteers, the contributors included non-military officers, military officers, soldiers, K’en-hu
(land developers), T'ung-shih (trade dealers with aborigines),
large and small store owners, Chiao merchants, the people with
gentry titles, and local residents”. 

The terms, "local residents", was used by gazetteer
authors as a convenient term to describe the "unknown" temple
builders. If a temple was constructed right after a local
gazetteer was completed, it might wait fifty or sixty years to
have the following revised gazetteer record this temple. It
was more likely that only the very well-known contributors
could catch the authors' attention.

This study divided the contributors into three
categories: (1) officials (non-military officers, military
officers, and soldiers); (2) local business elites (K'en-shou,
T'ung-shih, large and small store owners, and Chiao
merchants); (3) local residents (the people with gentry titles
and local residents). These three categories were coded by
this study as three different variables. Sometimes, wealthy
merchants would help officials or join local residents to
build a temple. Coding as three different variables is able
for us to understand the relationships among these three
variables.

In regard to "the people with gentry titles", this study
wants to emphasize that these people were the lower-rank

"Actually, there were two cases where the main
contributors also included monks. In these two cases, the
temples were chiefly constructed by officials."
gentry, and the majority of them were wealthy merchants\textsuperscript{12}. In a typical gazetteer description, instead of the title of a wealthy merchant, a gentry title (if a person has), was listed in front of his name. Actually, he was a well-known merchant, gaining his gentry title through public donation or military assistance. Only 13 cases have the people with gentry titles as one of the main contributors among the 337 computerized cases. And, 3 out of these 13 cases have one gentry name with a long list of merchant names. And, for the rest of 10 cases\textsuperscript{13}, this study was not exactly sure whether they were wealthy merchants or not. In addition, 8 out of these 13 cases were also co-constructed by local residents. Therefore, this study took a more conservative approach and coded them together with local residents\textsuperscript{14}.

Similarly, the contributors to the first temple repair was also divided into three variables: officials, local business elites, and local residents. Finally, this study also planned to do a cross-time analysis between the Ch'ing data and the 1916 data. Abe Kiyoshi's \textit{The Study of Local Place Names in Taiwan} (1987), and \textit{Gazetteer of Taiwan, (1970 Version), vol. 1: The Document in the Change of Administrative}

\textsuperscript{12}Also see the detailed discussion in Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{13}These ten cases include four cases of Kung-sheng, four cases of Chien-sheng, and two cases of Sheng-yuan.

\textsuperscript{14}Some people might argue that the ideology of the gentry was closer to the official ideology, so it might be better to code these cases with officials. This study will also do a different coding to test this in the following chapter.
Units, were utilized to locate the temples with different stree names through the time.
CHAPTER VI: FINDINGS (I): DIFFERENT TEMPLE BUILDERS AND TEMPLE PROSPERITY

DIFFERENT TEMPLE CULTS CONSTRUCTING BY VARIOUS TYPES OF OFFICIALS AND LOCAL BUSINESS ELITES

Before testing the hypotheses in Chapter 5, this study first of all presents Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 to describe the various types of officials and local business elites as main contributors to the construction of a temple. During the Ch’ing period, the official cults in Taiwan included Confucius and Wen-ch’ang (the patron god of literature), Ma-tsu (a protector of seamen), Kuan-ti (the god of war), Ch’eng-huang (city god) and Shen-nung (agricultural god). Table 6.1 illustrates how the different types of officials promoted various cults. The majority of officials contributing to a temple construction in Taiwan were non-military officers. In Table 6.2, except for Ken-hu who were more close to agricultural activities, the rest of the elites had a direct link to commerce.

Yu-huang ta-ti (Jade Emperor) is the god of Heaven. According to Ch’ing code, the worship of Heaven could only be carried out by the Emperor, and the public was not allowed to conduct this worship. Hence, it was quite natural that Ch’ing officials did not build the temples (see. Table 6.1). Because Taiwan was far away from the central control of Ch’ing court,
it was not unusual to see Taiwanese people worship the Heaven. As we can see from Table 6.2, some local elites contributed the construction of the temples. However, some gazetteer writers, probably fearing for having an insult to the Emperor, were unwilling to record the temples directly. For instance, the Yu-huang ta-ti temple in today's Changhua city was very popular in the 19th century. The 1830 gazetteer had a very good description about the temple prosperity, but this worship was put under the name of another deity (see. Chang-hua hsien chih, 1830:157).

Table 6.1: The Involvement of Different Types of Officials in Temple Construction during the Ch'ing period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deity Names</th>
<th>Non-Military Officers</th>
<th>Military Officers</th>
<th>Soldiers</th>
<th>Uncertain cases</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yu-huang ta-ti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma-tsu</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen-nung</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-ti</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shui-hsien tsun-wang</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch'eng-huang</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-yin</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist deities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6.2: The Involvement of Various Types of Local Business Elites in Temple Construction during the Ch’ing period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deity Names</th>
<th>Ken-hu</th>
<th>Tung-shih (a trade dealer with aborigines)</th>
<th>Small Store Owner</th>
<th>Large Store Owner</th>
<th>Chiao (a large trade association)</th>
<th>Uncategorized Wealthy Elites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yu-huang ta-ti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma-tsu</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen-nung</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-ti</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shui-hsien tsun-wang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’eng-huang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-yin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist Deities</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 59 cases (temples)

Ma-tsu (a protector of seamen) was widely worshiped by the people in the Southeastern region of China. The state had been granting honorific divine titles to this deity, hoping
the promotion of Ma-tsu worship by the state would help legitimize the state rule in the Southeastern region. The settlers of Taiwan were mainly from the Southeastern region. It is no doubt that the construction of Ma-tsu temples would help Ch'ing rule over Taiwan. Thus, in Table 6.1, Ma-tsu is the most dominant cult constructed by officials. We can also see the similar dominant figure in Table 6.2. Ma-tsu cult gained a strong support from local elites.

Following the centuries old state policy emphasizing the importance on agricultural production, Ch'ing court also promoted the worship of Shen-nung (agricultural god). The figure in Table 6.1 is 10. Since most of the ordinary Taiwanese worshiped another agricultural deity, T'u-ti kung (a tutelary god of the earth), the number of the temples in Table 6.2 is quite small, 2, which were solely constructed by Ken-hu (a leader who organized peasants to open a new land).

Kuan-ti was promoted by the imperial court as the god of war and served as the symbol of loyalty to the empire. For Ch'ing officials, Taiwan was a new developing area, so it was important to cultivate the loyal idea in the minds of Taiwanese people. The figure in Table 6.1 is very high. In contrast, Kuan-ti did not gain a very large support from local elites (see. Table 6.2). This study will give a more detailed explanation for this cult in the next chapter.

Shui-hsien tsun-wang (water god) was worshiped by sailors to ensure the safety across the Taiwan Strait. In Table 6.1,
two shui-hsien tsun-wang temples were constructed by the navy officials. Especially, Chiao merchants trading regularly with the mainland liked to build the temples too (see. Table 6.2). Before Ma-tsu was widely worshiped by the Chiao merchants in the early Ch’ing rule, the Shui-hsien tsun-wang temples were the most glorious ones in Taiwan (see. Tai-hai shih chieh lu, 1736:44; Gazetteer of Taiwan Fu, 1760).

Ch’eng-huang was recognized by the imperical court as a city god. Like her counterpart in mainland, Taiwan had the temple of city god found in every major locality during the Ch’ing period. The role of city god functioned as a local judge and a chief policeman in an area. People believed that this deity prevented the good people from mis-trial and indicated the bad people for their crime. A city magistrate usually went to the temple twince a month to worship the city god to insure a peaceful year under his administration (Suzuki, 1934[1981]:464-465). For some difficult criminal cases, a city magistrate even would ask help from the city god (Suzuki, 1934[1981]:421). As a result, in each major county, usually there was a Ch’eng-huang temple constructed by Ch’ing officials (see. Table 6.1). Some local elites also joined the construction of the temples (see. Table 6.2).

One final interesting point in Table 6.1 is that Ch’ing officials liked to build Buddhist temples¹. Although the

¹The average term for a non-military officer to stay in Taiwan was about three years (Chang Sheng-yen, 1993:95). And, the majority of non-military officers were from the northern
proceeding officials continued repairing these temples, they could not keep up the pace of ruining, because the public were not interested in "pure" Buddhist doctrines. The Kuan-yi temples in Table 6.2 were the folk-religionized ones. This deity was worshiped to bring the worshippers a great wealth, a belief obviously contradictory to the Buddhist core. This study will give a more detailed discussion on this deity in Chapter 8.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 3 TYPES OF BUILDERS AND TEMPLE PROSPERITY

After getting a general idea on the different builders and various cults, this section examines whether different builders had various impacts on the temple prosperity. Table 6.3 is the correlation matrix between the involvement of temple construction from three types of builders (local business elites, officials and local residents), and the temple prosperity level. After removing 6 uncertain cases, this study has 332 cases for calculating Table 6.3. These three types of builders are coded as dichotomy variables (0, 1). There are 59 cases of "local business elites" coded as 1 (see. Table 6.2 for the frequencies over various business elites), versus the rest of 273 cases coded as 0. There are

and the middle parts of China, where the influence of Buddhism was stronger than that of the southern China.
87 cases of "officials" coded as 1 (see. Table 6.1 for the frequencies over various officials), versus 245 cases coded as 0. The people with gentry titles are added together with local residents, and 235 cases are coded as 1 and 97 cases are coded as 0 for "the category of local residents." The temple prosperity is coded as 1, 2, and 3, and their frequencies are 25, 258, and 49 respectively.

In Table 6.3, correlation coefficients between local business elites and the prosperity level, and between local residents and the prosperity level are positive, r=.250 and r=.227, while that between officials and the prosperity level is negative, r=-.225. These figures support the hypothesis (1) that the Taiwanese folk religion temples constructed by local business elites and local people had a higher level of prosperity than those constructed by officials.

Table 6.3: Correlation Matrix for Various Temple Builders (Local business elites, Officials and Local residents) and Prosperity Level in Ch'ing period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Businessmen</th>
<th>Officials</th>
<th>Local Residents</th>
<th>Prosperity Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.152*</td>
<td>-.083</td>
<td>.250**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.777**</td>
<td>-.225**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Residents</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>.227**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of cases(temples):332 2-tailed Signif: * - .01  ** - .001
The correlation coefficient between officials and local residents is very negative ($r=-.777$). This means that officials were very alien to local people. The correlation coefficient between officials and local business elites is less negative ($r=-.152$) than that between officials and local residents. This explains the fact that sometimes local elites would donate money to help build a temple promoted by officials. Some very wealthy elites were able to construct a temple solely by their own effort, and some joined the ordinary folks in completing a temple. Hence, the correlation coefficient between local business elites and local residents is not significant ($r=-.083$).

This study also calculates the other two correlation matrixes, adding the people with gentry titles into the categories of "businessmen" and "officials," respectively. This calculation will help us understand whether coding the people with gentry titles differently will lead to different results. The findings for these two matrixes are presented in Appendix B. They are very much the same as the figures in Table 6.3.

After a temple was established, it took a lot of energy and expense to maintain a temple. If a deity in one temple was very efficacious, the story that a deity helped a person become rich, would attract more worshippers to the temple. In return, the successful worshippers would donate more money to maintain the temple. Repairing a temple often was a very
important local affair. The local wealthy elites contributing their fortune to the blessing of the deity, would devote themselves to the task of repairing the temple. Similarly, if a temple constructed by officials could meet the local interest and demand, it was more likely that the local wealthy elites would also actively get involved in reconstructing the temple. Therefore, the involvement of local wealthy elites in the temple repairing is a good indicator for the future survival and the prosperity of a temple.

Table 6.4 is the correlation matrix among various temple re-builders (the first reconstruction) in Ch’ing period and prosperity level in 1916. This table includes 127 cases which had both the information available on the first temple reconstruction in gazetters and the temple prosperity level in 1916 data. The numbers of cases for "business," "official," and "local residents" are 31, 40, and 78, and they are coded as 1, versus the rest of cases as 0. The 1916 temple prosperity is coded on the 0 through 5 scale. The frequencies from the lowest to the highest are 19, 8, 6, 41, 40 and 13.

Table 6.4 clearly demonstrates that the involvement of local business elites in the first temple reconstruction in the Ch’ing period has the great impact on the later temple prosperity in 1916. The correlation between the local business elites and the temple prosperity in 1916 is strongly positive (r=.384). In contrast, a temple which was still reconstructed by officials, would have a great chance to fail
in 1916. The coefficient is negative (r = -0.418). The correlation coefficient between local business elites and officials in the first temple reconstruction is -0.346. This figure probably indicates that if the temple promoted by officials still did not fit the local interest at a later time, the local elites were less likely to join with officials in reconstructing a temple. Also, in Table 6.4, these are a strong negative correlation between local residents and officials (r = -0.461), and a week correlation between local residents and business elites (r = -0.09).

Table 6.4. Correlation Matrix for Various Temple Rebuilders (the First reconstruction) in Ch'ing period and Prosperity Level in 1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Businessmen</th>
<th>Officials</th>
<th>Local Residents</th>
<th>Prosperity Level 1916</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.346**</td>
<td>-0.090</td>
<td>0.384**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.461**</td>
<td>-0.418**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Residents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of cases: 127  1-tailed Signif: * -0.01  ** -0.001

So far, this study has presented the statistic results based on the Ch'ing gazetteers. With the 1916 data, this study is also able to re-check the relationships between the different kinds of temple builders and the temple prosperity levels.
Table 6.5 is the correlation matrix for various temple builders and prosperity level in 1916 data, which excludes the temples constructed after 1895. 89 cases for the variable of "businessmen" are coded as 1, versus the rest of 878 cases (non-businessmen) as 0. In regard to the variable of "officials", 57 cases are coded as 1, and 910 cases as 0. The variable of "local residents" has 882 cases coded as 1, and 85 cases as 0. As we can see from these numbers, the distribution of frequencies for each of these variables is very uneven. This is due to the fact that most of folk temples did not keep the temple records. As time passed by, local people would replace their memory about a wealthy contributor (a local business elite) with "local residents". Hence, the majority of temple builders for the 1916 data are "local residents". The variable of temple prosperity is on the 0 through 5 scale. The frequencies from the lowest level to the highest one are 8, 52, 110, 537, 208, and 52.

In Table 6.5, the relationships (positive or negative) among variables are much the same as those in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, except for the weak correlation between officials and the local business elites. Unlike the strong negative correlations in Table 6.3 and 6.4, the correlation coefficient is quite weak (r=-.004). As this study mentioned earlier, on some occasions the Ch'ing officials would persuade local wealthy elites to join the task of building a new temple. It is possible that some official temples existing in 1916 were
also the ones able to gain the support of local elites. Thus, the coefficient between the variable of officials and the variable of local business elites is less negative than those in Table 6.3 and Table 6.4.

Table 6.5: Correlation Matrix for Different Temple Builders and Prosperity Level in 1916 data (Excluding the temples constructed after 1895)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Businessmen</th>
<th>Officials</th>
<th>Local Residents</th>
<th>Prosperity Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.190**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-0.481**</td>
<td>-0.132**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Residents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.106**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of cases: 967  2-tailed Signif: * -.01  ** -.001

# Unlike the Ch‘ing gazetteers, the 1916 survey data usually use a more general term such as "a very wealthy merchant named XXX" to describe some of the temple contributors.

RECOGNITION OF THE WANG-YEH WORSHIP BY CH‘ING OFFICIALS

As this study mentioned above, Ch‘ing court only promoted a limited number of cults. Because the rest of cults were worshipped by the masses, Ch‘ing court simply let them alone with a tolerant attitude. Though in Taiwan there was no suppression on the cults solely worshipped by the masses, some cults were regarded by the Ch‘ing officials as very "improper"
worship. One of these improper cults is Wang-yeh.

Wang-yeh originally referred to a group of spirits bringing out a serious epidemic. In the 18th and 19th centuries, when a village was struck by an epidemic, villagers would perform some ritual activities and send away to the sea a wooden icon of Wang-yeh sitting in a ship loaded with foods and clothes. Usually, a Wang-yeh ship would be drifted to the shore by the tides. Wherever this ship visited, the villagers must perform ritual activities to welcome Wang-yeh. If this village did not have an appropriate temple to host the Wan-yen, the villagers might build a new temple for him (Ino Kanori, 1928:451-454). In a later time, the role of Wang-yeh had changed; many became the deities for preventing an epidemic spreading. Besides, the close connection with the waters in the rituals of Wang-yeh worship also made Wang-yeh a protective deity for fishermen (Liu Chih-wan, 1983:232-233). Since Taiwan was a newly developed area, and the people were constantly under threat of plague, the Wang-yeh worship was very popular during the Ch'ing period (see. Table 8.1 in Chapter 8).

In the middle of 19th century, the Wang-yeh temple at Nan-K'un Shen became the largest religious center on the Southwestern coastline area of Taiwan. In 1823 and 1845, the deity was honored with the honorific plates by two military generals in Taiwan (Ts'ai Hsien-hui, 1989:69). Although at the present time, there is no available temple data to address
why the generals honored the deity, we can still sketch out a
general picture by some other related information. In the
first quarter of 19th century, there were a series of pirate
attacks on the West coast of Taiwan (Wang Shih-ch’ing,
1983:43-46). It seemed that with the help of local people and
the blessing from the deity\(^2\), the Ch’ing navy were able to win
the wars in a nearby area. Hence, after quelling down the
attacks, the naval commander honored the deity in 1823. The
1845 honorific plate was probably given to establish a
friendly relationship with the local people and also draw
close the local people’s loyalty to Ch’ing court, after there
was an uprising against the rice taxation in 1843 at the
nearby village (Yang Pi-ch’uan, 1987:139-141). This case
indicates that in spite of the "improper" worship, the Ch’ing
officials could not ignore the existence of influential
temples.

CONCLUSION

In sum, this chapter described the various temple
builders, and also demonstrated the relationships among the
different types of temple builders and the temple prosperity
level. Both the Ch’ing gazetteers and the 1916 survey data
supported our hypotheses: (1) The Folk religion temples

\(^2\)There is another important honorific writing provided by
Chiao merchants in this temple in 1835, describing that the
deity safeguarded the surrounding region and helped to win the
critical war (Ts’ai Hsiang-hui, 189:69).
constructed by local elites (mainly business elites) had a higher level of temple prosperity than those constructed by Ch'ing officials. (2) The temples constructed by Ch'ing officials, which could still enjoy a high level of prosperity in 1916, must gain the support from the local interests (measured by the first temple repair from local elites). (3) While promoting the state ideology through some cults, Ch'ing court could not ignore the powerful "inappropriate" cults solely supported by the masses, especially when the military or financial assistance from local people were needed.
CHAPTER VII: FINDINGS (II): EMERGENCE OF COMMERCIAL DEITIES

In the previous chapter, this study discussed the important role of local business elites in the temple affairs of construction and repairs. This chapter is going to test hypothesis (4) and discuss the interaction between change in economic conditions of Taiwan and the worship of Ma-tsu and T’u-ti-kung. Originally, Ma-tsu was worshiped as a protector of seamen and T’u-ti-kung a tutelary god of the earth. The intensive trade with the mainland and the commercial agriculture during the Ch’ing period gradually made these two deities the commercial deities of Taiwan.

In 1916 survey data, some deities were described as the deities for commercial prosperity (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Deities Worshipped as a Commercial Deity in 1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deity Name</th>
<th>Average Prosperity Level</th>
<th>Total number of temples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ma-tsu</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T’u-ti-kung</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-ti</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shui-hsien tsun-wang</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch’eng-huang</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-yin</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire temple population of 1916 data</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>1281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ma-tsu and T'u-ti-kung were at the top of Table 7.1. Although Kuan-ti (the god of war), Shui-hsien tsun-wang (water god), Ch'eng-huang (city god), and Kuan-yin (goddess of mercy) also appear on this list, their numbers are quite small. The change in the role of a deity did not occur overnight, but took years to evolve gradually. From Table 7.2 and Table 7.3, we can see that Ma-tsu was still a dominant deity at sea and T'u-ti-kung in agriculture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deity Name</th>
<th>Average Prosperity Level</th>
<th>Total number of temples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ma-tsu</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang-yeh</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsuan-t'ien shang-ti</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shui-hsien tsun-wang</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire temple population of 1916 data</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>1281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.3: Deities Worshipped as a Agricultural Deity in 1916

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deity Name</th>
<th>Average Prosperity Level</th>
<th>Total number of temples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T’u-ti-kung</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen-nung</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma-tsu</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San-kuan ta-ti</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsuan-t’ien shang-ti</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K’ai-chang sheng-wang</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San-shan Kuo-wang</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entire temple population of 1916 data</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>1281</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MA-TSU WORSHIP

Ma-tsu used to be a popular female deity along the Southeastern coast of China. In order to legitimize their military action against Cheng regime, the chief commander of the Ch’ing army, Shih Lang created the following story:

When his troops arrived at Penghu, he went to the Ma-tsu temple to worship. To his surprise, he saw that the face and the robe of Ma-tsu icon were wet. It was certain that the deity was in the water a short while earlier to help them on shore safely
(Lu Chia-hsing, 1983:54).

After defeating Cheng regime, Shih Lang converted the palace of Ning Ching Wang (the last "close" heir of Ming dynasty) into a great Ma-tsu temple. Since then, many Ma-tsu temples were constructed by officials (see. Table 6.1). This promotion also explains why the other deities playing the similar role as a protector of sea and sailors (see. Table 7.2) could not compete with Ma-tsu (Ts’ai Hsiaang-hui, 1989). The special recognition from the imperial court indeed added to the popularity of Ma-tsu during the Ch’ing period.

However, only the state promotion could not promise the success of Ma-tsu worship; the growth of Ma-tsu worship, to a very large extent, came from the support of Chiao merchants. Because of the trade with the mainland by sea, many trade companies (Chiao) worshiped Ma-tsu as the protector of their business voyages. Many Ma-tsu temples were constructed at the port cities of Taiwan (Masuda, 1935:69). In order to demonstrate the close relationship between the Ma-tsu temples and the export business of Taiwan, this study depicts Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 are the probability density for the construction years of Ma-tsu temples based on Ch’ing gazetteers and 1916 data respectively. Figure 7.1 contains every Ma-tsu temple which has ever appeared in gazetteers, with an accurate recording on the temples built by officials.
Figure 7.1 Probability Density for the Construction year, Ma-tsu temples, Ch'ing Gazetteers, cases=119

Figure 7.2 Probability Density for the Construction year, Ma-tsu temples, 1916 data (six major counties), cases=122
In contrast, Figure 7.2 contains the Ma-tsu temples which existed at the six counties of Taiwan in 1916, with a better recording on the temples constructed by the masses. Both figures complement each other and help us have a better understanding about the fluctuation in building new Ma-tsu temples through the time.

It is interesting to notice that this fluctuation concurred with the rising and falling trend of the Chiao business (trade) of Taiwan. After the first promotion by the state in building new Ma-tsu temples around 1684 (see. Figure 7.2), there was a slight increase in the numbers of new temples around 1715. Following that, there was a dramatic decrease in the number of the new temples, because of a series of bad harvests in 1723-1735 (see. Figure 7.2). Since 1746, Taiwan had exported rice to Fukien regularly at the request of Ch'ing court. The rice export remained prosperous in the 1750s and 1760s. During this period, many new temples were constructed. Then, the natural disasters in the mid 1770s and the huge rebellion of 1786-1788 had a severe impact on rice production; hence, people suspended the construction of new Ma-tsu temples for a while. In 1795, there was a great demand on Taiwanese rice in Fukien, and since then, Chiao merchants were more active than before. One document recorded the successful picture of Chiao business at the port city, Tainan, in 1807 (see. Taiwan Shiho Fukoku Sankosho, vol.3, no.1, 1910: 51). This was the golden age of constructing Ma-tsu temples.
After the 1810s, intermittent natural disasters and ethnic conflicts had slowed down the rice production, but the export still remained strong until the war between China and Britain broke out in 1840-1842. Britain blockaded the Taiwan Straits, and the amount of trade between Taiwan and China decreased tremendously. After the war, the rice from South Asia was dumped into Fukien by British merchants. In the meantime, a part of sugar market was taken over by Szuchwan sugar. Taiwan economy fell into a serious decay in the 1850s, so did the Chiao trade. The four treaty ports were opened at Taiwan in 1860, and the overseas trade of Taiwan expanded. At this stage, the number of new Ma-tsu temples increased rapidly. However, Chiao business was doomed to decline gradually, mainly because traditional sampans could not compete with Western ships for speedy and cargo load. After Japan colonized Taiwan in 1895, the decline of Chiao trade reached vanishing point. And, only few new Ma-tsu temples were constructed after 1895.

In brief, there was a close relationship between Chiao business and the worship of Ma-tsu. Due to the geographic condition of Taiwan, Chiao trade was the most dominant commercial activity in the 18th and 19th centuries. Not only did the prosperity of Chiao trade promote the Ma-tsu worship but also added the new role to Ma-tsu, a commercial deity.
After presenting the probability density for the construction years of Ma-tsu temples above, the readers might want to know what happened to the worship of Kuan-ti in Taiwan, which was the most popular commercial deity in mainland China, especially the northern China, during the Ch'ing period. Kuan-ti failed to develop his dominant position as a commercial deity in Taiwan, in spite of the same state promotion as Ma-tsu had.

Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 are the portraits of the construction years of new kuan-ti temples based on the Ch'ing gazetteers and the 1916 data respectively. The early Kuan-ti temples were built under Cheng regime (1662-1683) (see. Figure 7.3). Because most of the residents of Cheng regime were soldiers, Kuan-ti (the god of war) was worshiped to boost up the military morale. During the Ch'ing period, half of Kuan-ti temples were constructed by officials to promote a sense of loyalty to the empire. There were two small surges of the temple construction around 1840s and 1880s (see. Figure 7.4). The surge of 1840s might be due to the increase of the temples in Miao-li area where the majority of Chinese settlers spoke Hakka. The development of Miao-li area was later than those of southern and middle parts of Taiwan. To open land requires a lot of effort. Kuan-ti was worshiped to imitate his famous act to pledge in a sworn brotherhood with his two
best friends and treat them as his blood brothers. The worship of Kuan-ti could serve as a consolidated bond for their cooperation. After a land was opened, some meeting halls were converted into Kuan-ti temples (see. Jibyo Chosasho, Hsinchu Prefecture, 1916). The growth of Kuan-ti temples in the 1880s was mainly because of the war with France in 1884; people needed the blessing from Kuan-ti to ward off the foreign invasion.

At the turn of this century (i.e. before the colonial government took full control over Taiwan), there was a tremendous increase in new Kuan-ti temples. This great increase is highly related with a religious movement, although non-organized, among Taiwanese people to revive the Chinese culture and cure the opium addicts. This movement originated from Kuangtung province (see. Taiwan Kanshu Kiji, vol.1, no.5, 1901:86), and emphasized the spiritual writing activities where the spirit of Kuan-ti expressed his ideas on how to save the society through the writings of mediums (see. Taiwan Kanshu Kiji, vol.1, no.11, 1901:90-93). The change of regimes created some unhappy and unemployed literate men. The colonial government accused them as the activists (Marui, 1918:157). In this movement, Kuan-ti was considered as a main deity to help the addicts quit smoking opium. It was said that Japanese people disliked Kuan-ti, because he fought back Japanese people in Taiwan with the plague (Marui, 1918:158). Although the colonial government soon successfully suppressed
this movement (Marui, 1918:159), there was a significant symbolic meaning for this movement. That is, Kuan-ti, a general of third century and traditionally the god of war, at this critical historical moment came forward to fight for the interest of Taiwanese people. His main character, a combat general, was appreciated again under the early foreign rule.

In short, this study attempts to argue that Taiwanese people were more likely to worship Kuan-ti as the god of war than as a commercial deity before the early twentieth century, although there was little evidence indicating the link with business. For example, one trade association, Liu-ho, in Tainan city during the Ch‘ing period, set up its business office in Tainan Kuan-ti temple (Lin Heng-tao, 1975:98); the temple affairs of this temple were supported by both officials and local businessmen (see. Taiwan Shiho Furoku Sankosho, vol.2, no.1, 1910:224-226). Besides, in Tainan area, Kuan-ti, along with T‘u-ti-kung and Ma-tsu, were worshiped by merchants, especially small retailers, at the end of 19th century. (see. An-p‘ing Hsien Tsa-chi, 189?:2-8 & 19; Taiwan Shiho, vol.3, no.1, 1910:177). Nevertheless, except for Tainan area and very few other cases, there was no sufficient information to indicate that Kuan-ti was widely accepted as a commercial deity at other places in Taiwan. In addition, the number of Kuan-ti temples during the whole Ch‘ing period was far less than those of several other major cults. (The
detailed statistics are in Chapter 8, Table 8.1).

In our 1916 data, there are only two cases describing Kuan-ti as a commercial god because he invented the daily account book. This short and similar description was also seen in the later scholarly works (Kataoka, 1920:1026; Matsuda, 1935:52; Suzuki, 1934[1981]:429). But evidence like this is still scarce in comparison with that for T'u-ti-kung.

The new growth of kuan-ti worship in the mid colonial period might be due to the rise of spiritual writing sects. This study crosschecked the temple data of Ch'ing period, 1916, 1938 and 1966, and found the existence of three congregate areas of new Kuan-ti temples: Nan-chuang (in Miaoli area), Tou-nan (in Yun-lin area), and Mei-nung (in Kaoshiung area). At present, it is not clear why there was an increase in these spiritual writing sects at these areas after the 1910s. Was this the residual force left from the early religious movement at the turn of this century? This study needs additional information to answer this question.¹

¹Our impression about Kuan-ti as a very popular commercial deity in Taiwan might take place in the postwar period. One of the probable reasons for this rising is: the great emphasis on the northern Chinese culture by the Nationalists would help the worship of Kuan-ti, a very popular deity in North China. Since the postwar period is beyond the scope of this study, the author will discuss this postwar phenomenon in another article in the near future. Prior to 1945, it is T'u-ti-kung (a tutelary god of the earth) that Taiwanese people widely favored as the god of wealth.
T’U-TI-KUNG WORSHIP

Originally, Taiwanese farmers worshiped T’u-ti-kung as a protector of their own territories, and believed that he would bring them a good harvest each year. In the early days, farmers conducted two regular ceremonies annually, one in early spring (on the second day of the second lunar month) and the other in the mid autumn (on the 15th day of the eighth lunar month), to mark the agricultural rhythms (see. Taiwan_Fu chih, 1695:191-192; Chu-lo Hsien chih, 1717:151-153; Feng-shan Hsien chih, 1720:86-87). At the same time, people offered plenty of food to worship gods in temples on the 15th day of the first lunar month, and right after the ceremony people got together to enjoy the foods (see. Taiwan_Fu chih, 1695:191; Chu-lo Hsien chih, 1717:151; Feng-shan Hsien-chih, 1720:86). Later, in some marketplaces, this gathering was held on the 16th day of each month, the first gathering in the first lunar month called T’ou-ya (First Business Gathering) and the last one in the last month called Wei-ya (Last Business Gathering) (see. Tai_hai shih chieh lu, 1736:40-41). In the early 19th century, merchants, along with farmers, also worshiped T’u-ti-kung on the second day of the second lunar month (see. Chang-hua Hsien-chih, 1830:286). The close link with merchants was further indicated by the change: in the middle of last century, the day of T’ou-ya (First Business Gathering) had shifted to the second day of the second month, while the day
of Wei-ya (Last Business Gathering) still remained on the 16th day of the last lunar month (see. Ko-ma-lan ting chih, 1852:193). Since then, T’ou-ya and Wei-ya have been the most important days for Taiwanese merchants to worship T’u-ti-Kung and enjoy the foods together².

In addition to the gradual development of T’ou-ya and Wei-ya customs, the circulation of T’u-ti-kung coin in the second half of 19th century was another important sign to indicate the close relationship between T’u-ti-kung and the business interest. During the Ch’ing period, the currency at the island was the combination of several kinds: most of them were foreign currencies and some were Ch’ing currency. Usually Ch’ing court paid her servicemen at Taiwan with Ch’ing currency, which would later circulate in the private sector

²This study suspected that T’ou-ya and Wei-ya were the unique customs of Taiwan, and they were evolved to respond to the growth of commercial activities of Taiwan. This study had crosschecked the gazetteers of Ch’uan-chou and Chang-chou, that most Taiwanese settlers were from. Although Ch’uan-chou Fu chih had a very brief sentence about the worship of T’u-ti by merchants on the 16th day of the last lunar month (Ch’uan-chou Fu chih, 1763, vol.20, p.23), it did not mention any terms like T’ou-ya and Wei-ya. Chang-chou Fu chih had ya custom and recorded that merchants worshipped gods on the 2nd and the 16th days of each lunar month, but it did not mention the terms, T’ou-ya and Wei-ya, and also what they worship (Chang-chou Fu chih, 1877, vol.38, p.7). Hsia-men island which used to have a very intensive trade with Taiwan during the Ch’ing period, had the customs of T’ou-ya and Wei-ya too. However, her T’ou-ya was on the second day of the last lunar month (Hsia-men Hsien chih, 1839, vol.15, p.4), which was different from that of Taiwan. In addition, unlike the lengthy descriptions in the various gazetteers of Taiwan, the gazetteer of Hsia-men simply used two short sentences to list T’ou-ya and Wei-ya, and say this gathering was for relatives and friends.
(Taiwan Shiho, vol.3, no.1, 1910:283). The rebellion of T’aiiping T’ien-kuo in the mainland had interrupted the money supply for a while, so the local Taiwanese government had to issue Taiwanese currency around 1853 to solve the immediate payroll problem. The money issued at this time actually included three types of coins among which the T’u-ti-kung coin was the most popular.  

The issue of T’u-ti-kung coin conveyed an important message that this deity was widely accepted by Taiwanese people, and probably the majority of wealthy men worshiped this deity as their tutelary god in 1850s. This message and the timing indeed are consistent with our previous discussion about the evolution of T’ou-ya and Wei-ya.

It is also interesting to notice the image of T’u-ti-kung on the coin: an old, bald-headed man with a long beard and a staff in his right hand (see. Taiwan Shiho, vol.3, no.1, 1910:285). But, as late as the first quarter of 20th century, this figure had undergone some changes at many places in Taiwan: a hat was added on the top of his head, and instead of a staff, a large ingot of gold was held in his right hand (Ino, 1928:426; Masuda, 1935:29; So Keirai, 1938:265). Definitely, this image truely reflects the main characteristic

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These three types of coins were Shuang ju-i (double short swords signifying good wishes for the prosperity of the recipient), Pi-pao (pens), and T’u-ti-kung. One very early study had listed 39 major coins circulated in Taiwan during the period of 1860-1895 (Taiwan Shiho, vol.3, no.1, 1910:286-287). T’u-ti-kung coin was on the list, but the other two were not.
of T’u-ti-kung in Taiwan, that is, the god of wealth.

CONCLUSION

In sum, this chapter argued that the intensive trade with the mainland and the commercial agriculture during the Ch’ing period had contributed to the rise in the worship of Ma-tsu and T’u-ti-kung. Both gradually emerged as commercial deities over two centuries. In contrast, Kuan-ti who was a very popular deity in the mainland, especially the northern China, did not gain a strong public support in Taiwan during the Ch’ing period. His popularity was steadily increasing after the turn of this century, but still could not compete with those of Ma-tsu and T’u-ti-kung prior to 1945.
CHAPTER VIII: FINDINGS (III), TAIWANESE FOLK RELIGION UNDER COLONIAL RULE

After discussing the discrepancy between the official cults and the popular cults during the Ch’ing period, and the evolution of commercial deities in previous chapters, this chapter is going to examine how Taiwanese Folk religion interacted with colonial rule, and test the rest of our hypotheses (5), (6), (7) and (8).

In order to see a clearer trend of change, this study created Table 8.1 to list the ten largest cults, and also a few cults which are theoretically important to this study. The first column of Table 8.1 summarizes the temple numbers that appeared in Ch’ing gazetteers. Since small temples were more likely to be missed by the gazetteer writers, the figures in the first column are smaller than the real numbers. Hence, this study ranked these figures to make a comparison between the Ch’ing period and the colonial period. The numbers in the second and third columns are the summary results taken from the scholarly works (Marui, 1918:17-19; Gazetteer of Taiwan, 1971:302-308). These works basically utilize the same data source, the government survey data which were completed in 1918 and were revised annually since then. The figures in the last column are the computerized result done by this study based on the temple directory listed as the Appendix of the book, Taiwan Religion and Superstitious Customs (So Keirai, 1938:335-415).
Table 8.1: The Numbers of Temples for Major Cults at Various Time Points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deity Names</th>
<th>Ching era (Rank)</th>
<th>1918* (Rank)</th>
<th>1930**</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T’u-ti Kung#</td>
<td>106 (2)</td>
<td>669 (1)</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang-yeh</td>
<td>73 (4)</td>
<td>447 (2)</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma-tsu</td>
<td>132 (1)</td>
<td>320 (3)</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-yin</td>
<td>83 (3)</td>
<td>304 (4)</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsuan-tien shang-ti</td>
<td>46 (8)</td>
<td>172 (5)</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu-ying Kung# &amp; Ta-chung Yeh</td>
<td>51 (6)</td>
<td>143 (6)</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuan-ti</td>
<td>42 (9)</td>
<td>132 (7)</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San-shan kuo-wang</td>
<td>49 (7)</td>
<td>119 (8)</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pao-sheng ta-ti</td>
<td>53 (5)</td>
<td>109 (9)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San-kuan ta-ti</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>72 (10)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shen-nung</td>
<td>34 (10)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakyamuni</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K’ai-chang sheng-wang</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu-huang ta-ti</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheng Ch’en-kung</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-min Yeh</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wen-ch’ang</td>
<td>27++</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>Ch’eng-huang</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confucius</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>Shui-hsien tsun-wang</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
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</table>

# The temples of Tu-ti Kung and Yu-ying Kung usually are quite small, so it is easy for a researcher to miss them. Thus, the figures here are far more smaller than the actual numbers.
++ Wen-ch’ang was worshiped in many traditional
schools. This study did not include the ones in traditional schools.

THE CULTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CH'ING IMPERIAL INTERESTS

As this study mentioned in Chapter 6, the Ch'ing official cults got less support from the masses. Thus, when Taiwan was under foreign rule, the degrees of closeness with the Ch'ing state interests for each cult would have an important influence on its chance of survival.

The cult of Wen-ch'ang (the patron god of literature), was highly related to the imperial examination institution. The literati worshiped Wen-ch'ang to bolster their hope of success in the imperial examinations. This deity was often placed in the traditional schools to encourage students to study hard. The departure of Ch'ing court meant the end of examination institution in Taiwan. So, when the Ch'ing court was defeated by Japan, many of the literary men moved to mainland. Besides, the fact that the colonial government discouraged Taiwanese people from learning Chinese classics also contributed to the decline of Wen-ch'ang worship.

Similarly, the Confucius cult was also supported by the literati class. This cult was expected to promote the official ideology, Confucianism, among the masses, but the ceremony of this cult was only held by the government officials and the masses were not allowed to participate. Since this cult was never really involved in the life of the
masses, the withdrawal of Ch’ing power led to the immediate decline of confucian temples (see Table 8.1). In our 1916 data, there was description about decaying Confucius temples surrounded by wildly growing weeds (see. Jibyo Chosasho, 1916, Chiayi Prefecture).

However, it is unwise to make such an assertion that Confucius temples would gradually be extinct under the colonial rule. Before encountering Western powers, the Japanese culture was strongly influenced by Chinese culture. In spite of the adaptation of Western ideas to reform starting at the second half of 19th century, Japanese intellectuals still revered Confucius as a great man. Therefore, in the middle of colonial rule, a handful of Confucius temples were allowed to rebuilt in some cities such as Tainan and Taipei. The fund for reconstructing these temples came from the donation of rich Taiwanese people (Suzuki, 1934(1981):340), and thus the reconstruction effort could be also viewed as the political act to pacify the minds of Taiwanese people.

In addition to Confucius temples and Wen-ch’ang temples, the cult of Ch’eng-huang (city god) was also supported by the imperial court. As this study discussed in Chapter 6, the imperial court supported this cult, because this cult served as an efficient means for crime control. In addition to officials, the public also worshiped the city god for personal justice in private life, or sometimes for the direction to find one’s lost stuff.
However, not all the temples of city god were constructed by Ch‘ing officials. Some temples started as an individual protector in a private home; they later attracted crowds of supporters, so the "private" worship became the public one. The Hsia-hai Ch‘eng-huang in Taipei area and Chu-shan Ch‘eng-huang in Nantou area are the examples of this type. With the great emphasis on efficacy, these temples were more likely to attract businessmen. The Hsia-hai Ch‘eng-huang temple located in Ta-tao-ch‘eng, the most important commercial center of Taiwan in 1870-1930, had become the second largest religious center in Taiwan, and its annual religious parade attracted several hundred thousand observers. During the recession years following the World War I, the merchants in Ta-tao-ch‘eng, expanded the traditional religious parade into a commercial parade to raise their retail sales.

Nevertheless, the temples of city god solely constructed by local builders were not the majority during the Ch‘ing period, and most of the temples were established by officials. As the traditional judicial system was replaced by the modern

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1 The largest religious center in Taiwan was Pei-Kang Mats. This Ma-tsu temple attracted four to seven hundred thousand worshippers annually (Kataoka, 1920:1029).

2 The merchants in Ta-tao-ch‘eng were the strong supporters of Hsia-hai ch‘eng-huang. Usually, a large store owner voluntarily provided a parade scene to celebrate the deity’s birthday. In 1920, the contest for the parade scenes with commercial advertisements was held to attract observers and boost the local business. Since then, the commercial parade was the dominant scene in the annual celebration for the deity (Institute of History and Philology, 1989; Sung kwang-yu, 1993a:319-323).
court system, and the religious function of city god to serve as a means of maintaining social order disappeared in the colonial period, the cult of city god did not grow after 1918 (see. Table 8.1). For those remained, the content of their worship was more likely to follow suit of Hsia-hai ch’eng-huang, i.e. to link with business interest to survive.

The cult of Kuan-ti (the god of war), and the cult of I-min-yeh (the loyal people to the Ch’ing court) were related to the military interest of Ch’ing Empire. The Kuan-ti worship had been discussed in the previous chapter, so only the I-min-yeh worship will be covered here. Originally, the term, I-min-yeh, solely referred to the Hakka people who died on battlefields for the Ch’ing Emperor. In the early days, when the settlers, the majority of them Hoklo people, were against Ch’ing officials in Taiwan, Ch’ing court often used Hakka force to repress the uprisings. Hence, it was quite natural that most of I-min temples were built in Hakka areas. Later, this term, I-min, was applied in a broader sense to cover whoever died for public good.

It should be interesting for us to know how the colonial government responded to the worship of I-min-yeh which symbolized Hakka loyalty to Ch’ing court. In 1900, the colonial government hung a written sign (Long Live [Japanese] Emperor) inside the most famous I-min temple, Liu-tui I-min
Miao in Pingtung area. Another new sign (The Spirit of Meiji Emperor) was added in 1913, after Meiji Emperor passed away (Suzuki, 1934[1981]:345). Without further information, we did not know how the local people responded to the imposed change from the state. This case, however, indicates that the state do have a strong hand over the folk religion which is seldom against the state's will directly.

In another way, the temple of Shih San I-min (i.e. thirteen heroes) in Changhua area showed how rapidly a I-min temple could adjust itself to a foreign rule. The temple was built to worship thirteen great men around 1830. It was said that one official then treated the local people badly and continuously raised tax without concerning people’s hardship, so thirteen brave men went to Fukien to bring a charge against the official. On the way home, they were murdered and only one escaped death. The temple was constructed to remember their good deeds. In 1901, three Japanese men were added to the temple worship. The flood of 1900 destroyed the local irrigation works, and without water the crops would soon dry out. With farmers' petition, the Japanese officials allowed them to use another water source in the neighboring area to

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*Liu-tui means "six teams". In 1721, Hakka people from six major areas helped Ch’ing court to defeat the rebels. The I-min temple was constructed to honor the Hakka soldiers killed in the war. From then on, the Hakka people continued to serve as a loyal force for Ch’ing court. In 1895, the people from these six major areas also resisted Japanese landing, but failed (Ch’en Wen-hai & Liao Su-hsiang, 1986:121)."
relieve the emergency. In order to express their gratitude to the Japanese officials, the local residents also worshipped them as heroes (Suzuki, 1934[1981]:349-350).

Although this case indicates how fast a temple could adopt itself to the new regime, there was no ideological need to build new I-min temples. The colonial government had already constructed several Shinto shrines for loyal souls. The slight increase in the number of I-min temples on Table 8.1, is mainly due to the change in the scope of definition. This study crosschecked several data sources and found that the 1918 statistics counted only the temples with the name "I-min", while the 1930 and the 1938 statistics applied a more general scope to define "I-min" temples; therefore, some previously categorized as "Yu-ying Kung and Ta-chung Yeh"\(^4\), were later defined as "I-min" temple.

In great contrast to the cults of Kuan-ti and I-min-yeh, the cult of Cheng Ch'eng-kung was extremely welcomed by the colonial government. After the Ch'ing forces defeated the Cheng regime, Cheng Ch'eng-kung (the founder of Cheng regime)

\(^4\)Yu-ying Kung and Ta-chung Yeh refer to the wandering spirits. Taiwanese people believe that after a man dies, his descendants worship him to provide the food and money needed in the afterlife. A spirit without anyone's worship would become a hungry ghost haunting people all the time. Hence, there was a custom to gather the corpses of unknown men to one place and build a small and simple temple for their rest. According to the folk belief, these spirits grant the worshippers any requests, good or evil, because they desperately need men's worship. As a result, many gamblers like to worship them (Taiwan Kanshu Kiji, vol.1, no.4, 1901:43; Marui, 1918: 4-5; So keirai, 1938:111).
became a disgraced loser. Although there were few temples constructed by his followers, his worship was too dim to be noticed during the Ch‘ing period. Cheng’s reputation was not restored until the Ch‘ing court granted him an honorable title in 1875 (see. Taiwan Shiho Furoku Sankosho, vol.2, no.1, 1910:222-224; Ino, 1928:415-418). History is an ironic twist. The status of Cheng Ch‘eng-kung was strongly promoted by the colonial government, because Cheng’s natural mother was a Japanese. His half Japanese blood helped legitimize the Japanese rule over Taiwan (see. Jibyo Chosasho, 1916, Nantou Prefecture; Yokomori, 1982:192).

In 1897, the colonial government honored him as a Shintoist deity (Ino, 1928:419). But, after a rapid increase in the number of Cheng Ch‘eng-kung temples at the early colonial years, the numbers of the temples remained the same for the rest of colonial period (see. Table 8.1). This also reconfirms our hypothesis that state intervention to the content of folk religion can only force the change to some point; the power of selection and changes still comes from the masses.

Another cult related to Ch‘ing imperial rule is the worship of Yu-huang Ta-ti (the god of Heaven). Taiwanese people worshiped the Heaven god during the Ch‘ing period in spite of the Ch‘ing code stating that the common people were banned from worshiping Heaven. The worship of Heaven was still popular at the turn of 20th century when there was a
political vacuum left by Ch'ing court and Japanese rule had not yet gained full control of Taiwan (see. Table 8.1). In the 1920s, the number of the temples decreased. The reason for this drop is not clear. This drop took place before the colonial government implemented more repressive religious policies in the 1930s, which will be discussed later in this chapter. According to the 1938 data, except for the two Yu-huang Ta-ti temples in Tainan city, most of the temples were located in rural areas. In addition, comparing the 1918 summary table divided by regions and the 1930 one, this study also found that there was a great decrease in the number of the temples in Changhua area, the core area for the distribution of the Yu-huang Ta-ti temples. Marui Kejiro, a Japanese scholar in the study of Taiwanese folk religion, visited the most famous Yu-huang Ta-ti temple at Changhua city in 1929 and 1934, and found that the wooden image of the deity in the temple was covered with dust, and only very few worshippers came to worship (Marui, 1938:108). Without additional information, it was hard to explain this phenomenon.

The cult of San-kuan Ta-ti was closely associated with the Heaven worship, and the importance of San-kuan Ta-ti in the hierarchy of folk religious deities was only next to the Heaven god. Chang-chou people and Hakka people liked to

\footnote{One Yu-huang Ta-ti temple in Hsinchu city was decayed and the temple land was used for a public school (see. Jibyo Chosasho, 1916, Hsinchu Prefecture).}
construct the San-kuan Ta-ti temples, instead of the temples to the Heaven god, because they believed that the Heaven god was so majestic that any physical form of temple might not fit for his noble residence. The slight increase in the number of San-kuan Ta-ti temples during the colonial period (see. Table 8.1) was mainly due to the new construction in the Hakka areas within T’aoyuan and Hsinchu counties. Probably to avoid the potential religious suppression from the colonial government, the most famous San-kuan Ta-ti temple in today’s Kuan-hsi (in Hsinchu county), changed her temple name into "The Temple of Great Harmony" (Ta Ho Miao). The same Chinese characters for great harmony, however, in Japanese had another meaning, "Japan" (Yamato). The colonial government seemed to appreciate this name (see. Jibyo Chosacho, 1916 Hsinchu Prefecture). This new name might creat some leeway to build the San-kuan ta-ti temples in the surrounding region.

So far, this chapter had discussed the cults which have close links with the state ideology. The cults supporting the traditional Examination Institution and the cults providing the specific loyal sentiment to Ch’ing court, were more likely to stop growing. On the other hand, there was new growth in the cults which fit the new political demand, although their growth was limited by the fact that the masses usually showed less interest in the state cults. Finally, the worship of Heaven was quite popular at the early colonial rule when there was a political vacuum. However, it was not clear why there
was a decline of the Heaven temples in 1920s.

THE CULTS AFFILIATED TO THE SETTLERS' NATIVE PLACES

The colonial rule also continued the declining trend in the worship of the cults affiliated to the immigrants' native counties in the mainland China. After Chinese settlers had stayed in Taiwan for several generations, it was natural that they would develop "new reference point of group identity" (Ch'en Ch'i-nan, 1980:145), so there were less inter-group fights in the last half of 19th century. The colonial rule continued to strengthen the reference point of group identity on Taiwan (Lamely, 1981:312 & 314). The colonial government often used these two terms to distinguish between Japanese people and Taiwanese people: Naichi-jin (the people of the homeland) and Hondo-jin (the people of this island). This action definitely drew close the sub-ethnic groups of Taiwan to form a large in-group to oppose to the new out-group, Japanese people. Therefore, the worship emphasizing their different origins in the mainland China became less important. The table 8.1 showed no new growth in the cult of San-shan Kuo-wang, worshiped by Hakka group, and the cult of K'ai-chang Sheng-wang, worshiped by part of Chang-chou group. Pao-sheng Ta-ti, originally worshiped by Ch'uan-chou group, was the deity of medicine, so the worship spread across group boundary, and thus there was a continuous growth in this cult.
THE INFLUENCE OF JAPANESE BUDDHISM

The colonial rule also brought in the Japanese Buddhism. As this study mentioned in Chapter 6, throughout the Ch'ing period, there were only few Buddhist temples, mainly donated by some government officials who were Buddhist devotees. The masses were not interested in "pure" Buddhist doctrines at all. The Kuan-yin temples in Table 6.2 were the folk-religionlized ones, and Kuan-yin was worshiped to bring the worshippers a great wealth. After 1835, there was a tremendous growth in Kuan-yin temples (see. Figure 8.1).

This increase was mainly due to the establishment of many vegetarian halls. In our 1916 survey data, there are 57 temples constructed between 1830 and 1895, and 24 out of these 57 temples were vegetarian halls. Most scholars called them vegetarian cults. These people had vegetarian meals, observed some Buddhist doctrines, and chanted Buddhist scriptures. However, unlike Buddhist monks, the members of vegetarian cults neither shaved off their hair nor wore religious robes (Marui, 1918:79-82). And, the most distinctive thing from Buddhist monks is that they made living in secular world (Ino, 1928:461). The vegetarian cults served as an indicator of the compromise of Buddhism with the secular world, and the social-economic structure of Taiwan welcomed this-worldly religious cults.

Although some earlier evidences suggested that vegetarian
Figure 8.1 Probability Density for the Construction year, Kuan-yin temples, 1916 data (six major counties), cases=114
cults started their activities in Taiwan in the 17th century, their great entrance to Taiwan occurred after 1830. The T'aira T'ien-kuo rebellion (1850-1864) in China further contributed to the growth of vegetarian cults in Taiwan, because many cult members simply moved out of Fukien and came to Taiwan to spread their beliefs. In brief, the vegetarian cults facilitated the worship of some Buddhist deities in Taiwan during the Ch'ing period.

The vegetarian cults continued their influence under the colonial rule. After Hsi-lai-an, a folk religion temple in Tainan area, was associated with a rebellion against the colonial rule in 1915, many vegetarian cults joined Japanese Buddhist associations to seek protection, and thus added more Buddhist color to their religious practice. One the other hand, various Japanese religious groups also liked to use a vegetarian hall or a popular temple as a convenient mission station. Moreover, Kuan-yin was also worshiped in Japan as a Buddhist deity, so Kuan-yin was regarded as a friendly and convenient bridge to connect Taiwanese people and Japanese people (Tanaka, 1913:147-148; also see. Jibyo Chosasho, 1916, Taoyuan Prefecture).

As a result of the influence of Japanese Buddhism, the Kuan-yin temples had increased in great number, and were on a par with the Ma-tsu temples. In addition, Sakyamuni (Buddha), became the fast growing cult (see. Table 8.1).
Although Taiwanese folk religion was very flexible to the new situations and adopted many foreign elements, it was not conquered by foreign religions and it was the cultural (or ethnic) identification of Taiwanese people. Before the colonial government tightened her religious policy in 1930s, there were many occasions where the folk religion served the Taiwanese pride and preserved their culture passed down from their ancestors.

For instance, in the 1916 data, there were two cases where the folk religious deities punished the Japanese men who mocked them⁶. In one case, the punishment was the severe stomachache for the offender. It was not until the offender worshiped the deity to apologize for the wrong doing that the ache stopped. After this event, some Japanese men also joined in worship (see. Jibyo Chosacho, 1916, Taipei Prefecture).

This must be a widely circulated story, because it was kept on the government record. This story might help Taiwanese people relieve their inferior feelings, when they were constantly mocked by the new rulers.

The religious parade of Hsia-hai Ch’eng-huang is another good example of the folk religion as the cultural (ethnic) identification of Taiwanese people. The parade was held

⁶These two events took place in today’s Min-hsiung (in Chiayi county), and Wan-hua (in Taipei city).
annually to celebrate the deity's birthday. It consisted of many religious scenes, traditional music bands, dancing groups, singing groups, and many other entertaining performances. Since 1920, the commercial advertisements had been added to the parade. This parade was so interesting and attractive that in 1923 some Japanese officials came to watch it. And, in 1924, some higher rank officials were invited by the local wealthy Taiwanese merchants to attend. Besides, the parade brought in a very huge crowd of people (and thus buyers too), so in 1932 some Japanese merchants wanted to utilize this great opportunity to sell their products, and the local merchants (Taiwanese) offered very good discount prices to counter the "invasion" of Japanese merchants. Moreover, in the parade, the people serving the religious purpose wore the same traditional clothes as their ancestors did in Ch'ing dynasty. The rituals were the same too. For example, three to five thousand people joined the parade, and put on the ritual paper handcuffs to redeem their sins (Institute of History and Philology, 1989)\(^7\).

The readers might be curious about who organized the

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\(^7\)The information used to form the above paragraph comes from the book, *Jih-chu shih-tai Ta-tao-ch'eng tsung-chiao huo-tung pien nien chi, 1898-1936* (List of Religious Activities at Ta-tao-ch'eng, 1898-1936), published by the Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica. This book compiles the information about the religious activities at Ta-tao-ch'eng area, listed in Taiwan Nichinichi News (*Nichinichi Shinpō*) during the colonial period. This study looked through the news and found that the 1930 parade had a Japanese scene, *Momo-Daro*.```
parade, and whether such an organization posed a threat to the colonial rule. The local people set up a temporary committee, usually two months before the deity's birthday, to take charge of the ceremonial affairs and the parade and also another religious event on the 15th day of the seventh lunar month. After these religious events were over, this temporary committee would be automatically dismissed. Since it was a great honor to serve Hsia-hai Ch'eng-huang⁸ and also a wonderful opportunity to demonstrate individual leadership, many influential and wealthy merchants competed for the limited committee positions⁹. In 1918, two major local rival powers could not agree on the candidates, and the dispute was so severe that Japanese officials had to step in to help settle it (Institute of History and Philology, 1989).

Since the committee members were the secular leaders (business leaders) and also the committee was only a temporary organization, they would not risk their secular interests to pose an unfriendly gesture against the state. For example, when the performance of Taiwanese operas ('Ko-a-hi, [Hoklo dialect]), the essential celebrating activities in religious festivals, was banned by the colonial government in 1930, the committee members said nothing about it. Besides, in 1935, the committee cooperated with the government to prohibit the

⁸According to the folk religious belief, the strong supporters of a deity will be blessed more by the deity.

⁹In 1918, the committee was composed of one chair and six managers.
wear of ritual paper handcuffs and the dressing up in traditional soldier costumes.

SHINTOISM AND THE RELIGIOUS POLICY

Shintoism (Japanese state religion) actually could not rival Japanese Buddhism in the first half of 20th century. Before Shintoism became the state religion in the late 19th century, the most popular religion in Japan then was Buddhism (Ts’ai Chin-t’ang, 1992:108; Ch’en Ling-lung, 1992:20). Like the Confucianism in Ch’ing period, Shintoism did not go deep into the life of the Taiwanese masses. Nevertheless, Taiwanese folk religion somehow also absorbed some Shintoist practices. The most obvious influence was the establishment of a money donation box in front of a deity. At the very early colonial rule, one very different religious practice between Taiwan and Japan was that Taiwanese people burnt paper money, while Japanese people put the money in the donation box to show their reverence to god (see. Taiwan Kanshu kiji, vol.1, no.11, 1901:81). After two decades of colonial rule, many folk religious temples had the donation box, along with the custom of burning ritual paper money (Suzuki, 1934[1981]:60).

The early government attitude toward the Taiwanese folk religion was tolerant and relaxing. In 1896, the colonial government even issued a special order to restore the folk
religion temples used as temporary military stations or hospitals (see. The Gazetteer of Taiwan, 1971:288). This relaxing policy was changed because of the occurrence of Hsi-lai-an event in 1915. In respond to this incident, the government conducted a series of surveys on the folk religious temples\textsuperscript{10}, and also established a religion bureau to take charge of religious affairs.

After Japan occupied Manchuria in 1931, the Japanese military faction arose and took control of the Japanese government. Under the cloud of Japanese fascism to build a strong nation, it became very important for the colonial government to take some measures to thoroughly transform the Taiwanese people into the loyal subjects of Japanese Emperor. One of the measures was the suppression of Taiwanese folk religion, which was viewed as an inferior and superstitious belief\textsuperscript{11}, an obstacle to transforming the minds of Taiwanese people (So Keirai, 1938:19).

Figure 8.2 plots the annual rate of increase of the folk religious temples between 1918 and 1942. In order to get a

\textsuperscript{10}This study had a brief introduction about the surveys in Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{11}The performance of T'ung-chi (a spiritual medium) was regarded as the most inferior element in the folk religious practices, so the colonial government banned the T'ung-chi performance in 1908 (So Keirai, 1938:130). In spite of the restriction, the T'ung-chi activies still existed. Because T'ung-chi was highly active in the Wang-yeh cult (So Keirai, 1938:129-134 & 142-144), as T'ung-chi activities were severely suppressed in the late 1930s, the Wang-yeh cult also declined (see. Table 8.1).
Figure 8.2 Annual Increasing Rates for the Folk religion temples, 1918-1943

Figure 8.3 Annual Increasing Rates for Taiwanese Population, 1918-1943
better understanding that the temple rates were not influenced by the population growth, this study also plotted the annual population increase rates of Taiwanese people in Figure 8.3\textsuperscript{12}. The fluctuation of the temple rates prior to 1931 followed closely the economic growth of Taiwan. The sudden drop of the 1920 temple rate was due to the mass destruction of the temples caused by a huge earthquake and several storms in that year. Obviously, the growth after 1931 was stagnant. When the war with China broke out in 1937, the religious policy became more repressive than before, because the colonial government regarded the folk religion as a constant reminder of Taiwan's old past as part of China.

In December 1938, the local officials of Chung-li county took action to reduce the 29 temples in the county to 4 temples. In the next year, after the county Shinto shrine was completed, a ceremony called "the deities ascending to heaven" was held to send away the folk religion deities to where the Sun Goddess (Amaterasu-omikami), the highest Shintoist deity, resided (Yokomori, 1982:205; Chou Wan-yao, 1991:42-43; Ch’en Ling-lung, 1992:266-267). The theory behind this ceremony was that the regime in Heaven had the same operational logic as the regime on the earth, so after Taiwan became part of Japan, the folk religion deities became Japanese ones too; they all subordinated to the Sun Goddess, and thus through the

\textsuperscript{12}The original data for drawing Figures 8.2 and 8.3 were attached in Appendix C.
worship at the county shrine, people could still connect with them (Ts‘ai Chin-t‘ang, 1992:129).

Other counties started to follow the act of Chung-li county, but soon this severe measure was halted by the colonial government, because of the harsh criticism from the home government13. Figure 8.2 clearly reflected the policy change. After a deep drop of the temple rate in 1940, soon in the following two years, the rates of decreasing bounced back close to zero.

Although the measure of demolishing the folk religion temples was not carried out thoroughly, the colonial government tried harder with its other measure, forcing Taiwanese people to worship the paper amulet of Sun Goddess at home. In 1941, the number of all households in Taiwan was 1,075,498, and 739,378 households received the paper amulets (Ch‘en Ling-lung, 1992:233; Yokomori, 1982:200). That is, seven out of ten households in Taiwan received the paper amulets. Receiving them is one thing, but worshiping them is another thing14. Traditionally, a typical Taiwanese house has

13At that time, Britain, the Japan’s opponent, widely spread the terrible message of demolishing the Taiwanese folk religion temples among the Southeast Asian countries to mobilize them against Japan’s aggression. In addition, the act of destroying the temples also caused a great fear among the Taiwanese farmers, the main rice producers for Japan Empire; thus, it was still very important to consider their emotional (religious) needs (Ts‘ai Chin-t‘ang, 1992:131).

14Being afraid of polic harassment, Taiwanese people were reluctant to buy the paper amulets (Yokomori, 1982:202). Wu Cho-liu, a Taiwanese writer, recalled that he never worshiped it (Wu Chu-liu, 1987:82). A Japanese scholar also commented
a small family shrine inside the main room of a house, where people set up their family ancestral tablets and the picture of some important deities such as T‘u-ti-kung, Ma-tsu, and Kuan-yin. The campaign of worshiping the paper amulet, had advocated abolishing the picture of folk religious deities and also simplifying the arrangement of ancestral tablets to make room for settling the paper amulet. Some Taiwanese houses still follow this simplifying ancestral tablets in the post-war period (Ts‘ai Chin-t‘ang, 1991). Soon the war was ended in 1945 and the Taiwanese folk religion flourished again.

CONCLUSION

The folk religion was fused with secular life. The change of regimes unavoidably made some things in people’s life obsolete, so did some elements in the folk religion. The cults supporting Ch‘ing imperial interests declined unless they could fit into the new interests of the colonial rule. The separation from China also contributed to the continuous decline in the cults associated with the Chinese settlers’ native counties in the mainland. Meanwhile, the flexible nature made it easier for the folk religion to absorb some new elements from Japanese Buddhism and Shintoism, and also to bend over when the repressive religious policies were

that Taiwanaese people followed the government policy only in appearance (Ihara, 1988:355-356).
implemented. Although Taiwanese folk religion was the culture identification of Taiwanese people, it never acted against the colonial rule directly, probably because the leaders for organizing religious affairs were secular leaders (wealthy merchants) who enjoyed the status quo.

Moreover, the folk religion articulated the life of Taiwanese people. Since most Taiwanese elites engaged in business, the business interests reinforced the existing belief of pursuing wealth through folk religion. As a result of the interaction between business interests and the belief of pursuing wealth, the content of folk religion became more secular than before, and thus was less concerned with abstract moral values. Therefore, gamblers could worship Kuan-yin to improve their lots (Marui, 1918:41; Suzuki, 1934[1981]:354). And, the main criterion for being a city god, which traditionally focussed on a man's virtue, now shifted to the amount of wealth a man possessed. The spirit of a millionaire could become a city god\textsuperscript{15}. Moreover, without the formation of a large Taiwanese intellectual class to promote the abstract moral values, a notorious killer after his death could become a folk religious

\textsuperscript{15}Traditionally, the city god was composed of a group of spirits. Usually a man with good deeds after his death became a candidate of city god. Or, a ghost in waters doing no harm on human beings for three years, could become a candidate of city god. In July, 1901, the spiritual writing in the Ma-tsu temple at Ta-tao-ch'eng area claimed that the current office holder of city god was a millionaire (Institute of History and Philology, 1989).
deity, simply because people believed in his efficacy to bring them wealth (see. *Jibyo Chosacho*, 1916, Tainan Prefecture).
CHAPTER IX: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

A BRIEF SUMMARY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAIWANESE FOLK RELIGION

The main theme of this study is that the development of Taiwanese Folk religion was intertwined with the social and economic conditions through the history of Taiwan. Chinese folk religion was widely practiced by the masses, and it articulated the life of the masses. Unlike Buddhist and some Taoist doctrines, there was no general condemnation of wealth and worldly possessions in the folk beliefs. As the Chinese immigrants came to Taiwan in the 17th and 18th centuries, they brought their folk deities with them to begin a new life. The new environment favored the growth of economic crops (mainly sugar and rice) to exchange the necessary goods from mainland. This started the long process of dynamic interaction between the folk religion and the economic development of Taiwan. The belief of pursuing wealth in folk religion might facilitate economic activities in the first place; the new growth or expansion in economy, in turn, further modify the content of folk religion to become more profit-oriented. As this dialectic process continued, the original roles of the deities, Ma-tsu (a protector of seamen) and T’u-ti-kung (a protector of farmers) had changed and gradually emerged as commercial gods of Taiwan.

Another important aspect of Taiwan's history is Ch'ing
court's long indifferent rule which leads to a strong parallel or gap between the official culture and the culture of the masses. The official culture introduced by officials and the literati did not root deeply in this new immigrant society. The masses lived their own life shaped by the new conditions of the island. Hence, the official temples without getting support from local residents, were doomed to decline.

Under the Japanese rule, the discrepancy between the rulers and the ruled was deepened. As Taiwanese people were barred from government positions but allowed to be active in economic field, the content of folk religion, articulating their life, became more concerned with material gains. The way of worship resembled the way of doing business. If a deity failed an individual requests, he would simply switch his worship to other deities as he liked. In addition, without the involvement of high-culture elites in shaping the beliefs, moral or abstract values were less emphasized in the folk religion. As a consequence, a notorious killer could become a folk religious deity and gamblers were blessed by some deities.

Moreover, under the Japanese rule the folk religion became the cultural identity of Taiwanese people. Only few Taiwanese people converted to the religions that the rulers promoted. However, these was no dramatic and violent confrontation between the folk religion and the colonial rule. The flexible nature made it easier for the folk religion to
absorb some new elements from Japanese Buddhism and Shintoism, and also to bend over when the repressive religious policies were implemented in late colonial period.

Furthermore, the deity hierarchy very much resembled state bureaucracy. This phenomenon seems contradictory to our earlier finding that the majority of official temples declined through time. The decline in official temples explained the fact that the official cults (ideology) did not root deeply in the life of settlers. On the other hand, the hierarchy resemblance actually articulated the political experience of Taiwanese people. That is, they were ruled by Ch’ing court and then the colonial government. Because the colonial government also adopted the system of state (governor-general) centered control, the bureaucracy of colonial government was similar with the Ch’ing one. Nevertheless, the colonial government bureaucracy was more organized than the Ch’ing one, so was the deity hierarchy between these two periods. This resemblance often misled researchers to leap into the hasty conclusion that state had full control over the folk religion. But, the development of the folk religion indicated that both the Ch’ing officials and the colonial government failed to stop the religious trend moving toward the belief more concerned with material gains.

REFLECTION ON SOME PRESENT-DAY RELIGIOUS PUZZLES:

Although this study analyzes the development of Taiwanese
folk religion prior to 1945, the findings actually help us understand some religious puzzles at the present time. The discrepancy between the rulers and the ruled roughly continued until the political reform in the 1980s. While Nationalist leaders and their mainland supporters like to believe in Christianity, Taiwanese folk religion serves as an identity of Taiwanese people. If the rulers were from the same group of the ruled, it might be possible for the ruled to voluntarily convert their belief to the one that the rulers advocated. Today’s South Korea is a good example of conversion to Christianity, although there is a strong tone of Shamanism in their belief. This is not the case for Taiwan. This discrepancy is the most important factor for explaining why the "market" of folk religion is not chopped off by other great religions, even if the folk religion has not yet developed into a very systematic belief.

In addition, when Taiwanese people were not allowed to participate in political arena, the religious interaction with the political institution was blocked or stagnant. As a consequence, the content of folk religion solely interacted with the economic development of Taiwan, so the ritual activities in the form of Ch’ing bureaucrats, to a large extent, continue despite the end of dynasty. This study expects that with more Taiwanese people in government positions in the future, the ritual activities will gradually change to articulate the new political arrangement.
THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STUDY OF CHINESE DIFFUSED RELIGION

The readers might wonder whether the findings in this study can be applied to explaining the folk religious phenomena in other Chinese societies. It is certain that different ecologies and historical experiences might lead to various developing courses in the folk religion. Nevertheless, this study suspects an approximate development pattern in the southeastern coastline area in China, because this area was the homeland of early Taiwanese immigrants, was somehow far away from central state control, was active in overseas trade, and was less devastated by wars from the late 19th century to the first half of 20th century. This study hopes that some comparable studies about the area will be soon conducted, so it will be possible for us to make a comparison.

Next, the methods applied to this study are very useful for analyzing the folk religious phenomena in other Chinese societies, especially China. China has great regional variation and a long history. Therefore, it is not an easy task to trace the folk religious development in each region, not to mention to the comparison studies among regions.

This study believes that the ideal type approach is a

\[\text{From the late 19th century to the first half of 20th century, China was devastated by constant wars, first with foreign powers, later among malicious warlords, and finally with Japan. This might bring about the massive destruction of the folk religious temples in some areas, and thus affect people's beliefs. In contrast, Taiwan was in a more table situation. Except for the small resistant fights in the earlier colonial rule, Taiwan was in peace.}\]
good starting point for the study of the religious change in one region. Take the official cults as an example. By studying their establishment and maintenance, and their increase or decline in one area, we can learn about the development of official ideology in that area. And, by comparing the number of official cults with that of other cults, we can also sense the degree of local acceptance of official ideology.

Another interesting example the author encountered recently is Hsu Hsiao-wang's study on the folk religion in Fukien. Although using a little bit different categories, Hsu also defined the Fukien folk religion into several cults. He found that there was no worship in deified men in the ancient indigenous beliefs, and the rise in the cults of deified men in the 6th to 10th centuries in Fukien was the indication of rapid absorbing "Han" culture into the indigenous culture (Hsu, 1993). His study reminds us that through comparing the emergence of different major cults, it might be possible for us to trace the local ancient beliefs. Once we understand the indigenous trace in each region, we might figure out how the configuration of Chinese folk religion was formed and developed through history. In brief, the ideal type approach is a powerful tool to study the religious variation across regions and the religious change among different time points.

In addition to the ideal type approach, understanding the diffused religious nature and how this interacts with secular
social institutions, would also help researchers make more sense on their observation. For instance, James Watson noticed that the temples in Hong Kong is less organized into a hierarchical order as that in Taiwan (Watson, 1985:313). This difference could be partially explained by the fact that Taiwan had a more strict and centralized government bureaucracy than Hong Kong in the 20th century.

In contrast, without paying attention to the diffused religious nature, researcher sometimes could make an unwise judgment to screen out the valuable information. For example, Kuo Li-ch'eng had a short article on the god of wealth, Hsuan-t'an, in the imperial China. She found a brief sentence in a book written in Ch'ing dynasty: "in Su-chou, local people worshipped Hsuan-t'an with beef, because the deity was a Moslem." Since most data she gathered were consistent with the Chinese tradition (such as Taoist influence), this short description was sort of out of line and thus she regarded it as a "joke" (Kuo Li-ch'eng, 1992:14-15). This study was surprised by this "joke"; it might be an evidence that Su-chou area had an active trade with the Moslem before Ch'ing dynasty, and this connection was presented in the folk beliefs. This suspicion is confirmed by a similar description in another book: in Szechwan, one of the gods of wealth was a Mohammedan god of wealth, dressed like a Tibetan, at whose alter beef is offered (Hutson, 1921:134). It is no doubt that in some regions, the development on the god of wealth was
really related with the Moslem trade.

SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ABOUT THIS STUDY

The rise of trade since Ch'ing dynasty and the minority status under the colonial rule are the two important factors for the development of Taiwan folk religion. It is interesting to see similar parallels in the development of other religions such as Protestant belief and Jewish religion (Hoselitz, 1962; Samuelsson, 1964).

Nevertheless, it is not to say that "materialistic" forces are superior to "idealistic" forces. The interaction between socio-economic structure and religion is far more complicated than it appears. In a historical analysis, it is usually difficult for a researcher to attain the data about religious ideas than the one about socio-economic activities. The data about religious ideas often lost through time. In addition, if there was no strong written tradition to record them, the situation was worsen. Lack of sufficient data on religious side would lead us to think the interaction between two as one-way direction.

Another important aspect of this study is the attempt to offer an alternative view to the Western theory of religious study. The Western theory assumes that state and religion are
independent institutions\textsuperscript{2}. When state and religion have different voices on some issues, there will be a direct and strong confrontation between both. This assumption might be right for some religions such as Islam and Catholicism, which have been more inclined toward institutionalization; it is unworkable for some religions such as Hinduism, Shintoism, and other popular religions in East and Southeast Asia, which have been intertwined with secular institutions. Borrowing the term from C. K. Yang, this study named the latter as diffused religion. There are other terms used by different scholars to describe the same diffused nature too: "endemic religion" (Foard, 1987), and "civil religion" (Bellah, 1980; Freedman, 1974:40).

Using the traditional Western view to look at the interaction between diffused religion and secular institutions might create more confusion than understanding. Because of the emphasis on the absolute truth in the Bible and the competition for the right to interpret it, the Western history was full of heterodox movements or sectarian ways of life to challenge to orthodox interpretation. Unlike Christianity, there is no bible or orthodox view in the diffused religion.

\textsuperscript{2}This is probably due to the absolute duality between human being and superhuman being in Christian tradition. God is all mighty; there is no way for a man to become a god. In the case of Chinese diffused religion, the boundary between human being and superhuman being is not a clear separation. A man or a ghost in good deeds could become a deity; a deity with any wrongdoing would descend as a man. There was no strong dichotomy between the sacred and the profane.
An individual learns his worship by modeling his family members or other people in his surrounding environment. This modeling process unavoidably leaves some room for individual creation. An individual, consciously or unconsciously, adds or drops something to make the worship satisfy his needs or the needs of his community. In the collective level, the change in diffused religion takes place in a smoothly long process, not a dramatic jump to conflict with secular arrangement.

As this study demonstrated in earlier chapters, the change in the religious content is through constantly creating new gods, giving some gods new meanings, and ignoring obsolete ones. Because the religious interaction with politics and economy occurs smoothly, it is easy for us to miss the vital force of the folk religion itself. This vital force which could not be totally controlled by state, facilitated the economic development of Taiwan.
GLOSSARY

CHINESE:

Names of gods and goddesses:
Cheng Ch‘eng-kung 鄭成功
Ch‘eng-huang 城隍
Hsia-hai Ch‘eng-huang 霞海城隍
Hsuan-t‘an 玄壇
Hsuan-tien Shang-ti 玄天上帝
K‘ai-chang Sheng-wang 關漳聖王
Kuan-ti (Kuan-yu) 關帝(關羽)
Kuan-yin 観音
K‘uei-sheng 魁神
Ma-tsu 媽祖
Pao-sheng ta-ti 保生大帝
Sakya (Sakyamuni) 釋迦
San-kuan ta-ti 三官大帝
San-shan Kuo-wang 三山國王
Shen-nung 神農
Shih San I-min 十三義民
Shui-hsien tsun-wang 水仙尊王
T‘u-ti Kung 土地公
Wang-yeh 王爺
Wen-ch‘ang 文昌
I-min Yeh 義民爺
Yu-huang Ta-ti 玉皇大帝
Yu-ying kung 有應公
& Ta-Chung Yeh

Others:
Chang-chou
Chiao
Chien-sheng
Ch'uan-chou
Hsiao-tsu-hu
Hsi-lai An
Ken-hu (Ken-shou)
'ko-a-hi [Hoklo dalect]
Kuan-hsi
Kung-sheng
Liu-ho
Liu-tui I-min Miao
Min-hsiung
Nan-k'un shen
Pei-kang
Pi-pao
Sheng-yuan
Shuang ju-i
Su-chou
Ta'i-p'ing Tien-kuo
Tao-ch'eng
Ta-tsu-hu
T'ou-ya
T'u-lung-chien
T’ung-chi 童乩
T’ung-shih 達事
Wan-hua 萬華
Wei-ya 尾牙

JAPANESE:

Amaterasu-omikami 天照大神
Hondo-jin 本島人
Kobayashi Seizo 小林誠造
Momo-daro 桃太郎
Naichi-jin 内地人
Takushoku 拓殖
Taiwan Sotokufu 台湾總督府
Yamato 太和
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF CH'ING GAZETTEERS FOR COMPILING THE TEMPLE DATA (Ch'ing Gazetteers’ Data)

This study used the following Ch'ing gazetteers to compile the temple data prior to 1895. These gazetteers are reprinted by T'ai-wan yin-hang ching-chi yen-chiu shih (Economy Research Department in Taiwan Bank).

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<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Tan-shui t’ing chih</td>
<td>Ch’en P’ei-kuei</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>T’ai yang chien wen lu</td>
<td>T’ang Tsan-kun</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>P’eng-hu t’ing chih</td>
<td>Lin Hao</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>Miao-li hsien chih</td>
<td>Shen Mao-yin</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Heng-ch’un hsien chih</td>
<td>T’u Chi-shan</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>T’ai-tung chou ts’ai fang ts’e</td>
<td>Hu Ch’uan</td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Yun-lin hsien ts’ai fang ts’e</td>
<td>Ni Tsan-yuan</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>Fang-shan hsien ts’ai fang ts’e</td>
<td>Lu Te-chia</td>
<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>T’ai-wan t’ung chih</td>
<td></td>
<td>1962</td>
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<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Hsin-chu hsien chih ch’u kao</td>
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<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Yuan-li chih</td>
<td>Ts’ai Chen-feng</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Shu-ch’i lin chih</td>
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<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Chia-yi kuan-nei ts’ai fang ts’e</td>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>T’ai-wan t’ung shih</td>
<td>Lien Heng</td>
<td>1962</td>
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</table>
APPENDIX B: TWO CORRELATION MATRIXES FOR CODING THE PEOPLE
WITH GENTRY TITLES INTO DIFFERENT CATEGORIES

(1) Correlation Matrix for Various Temple Builders and Temple
Prosperity Level in Ch'ing period (Coding the people with
gentry titles with local businessmen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Businessmen</th>
<th>Officials</th>
<th>Local Residents</th>
<th>Prosperity level 1916</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.170*</td>
<td>-.093</td>
<td>.239**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-.761**</td>
<td>-.225**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Residents</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>.215**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N of cases: 332  2-tailed Signif:  * -.01  ** -.001

(2) Correlation Matrix for Various Temple Builders and Temple
Prosperity Level in Ch'ing period (Coding the people with
gentry titles with officials)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Businessmen</th>
<th>Officials</th>
<th>Local Residents</th>
<th>Prosperity level 1916</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Businessmen</td>
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<td>-.0662</td>
<td>.249**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
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<td>-.743**</td>
<td>-.214**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Residents</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td>.215**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity level</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
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</table>

N of cases: 338  2-tailed Signif:  * -.01  ** -.001
### APPENDIX C: THE DATA FOR FOLK RELIGIOUS TEMPLES AND TAIWANESE POPULATION, 1918-1942

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3) = (1) + (2)</th>
<th>(4) = Annual Increase rate for (3) (%)</th>
<th>(5) = Annual Increase rate for (5) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
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<td>3292</td>
<td>3467</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>3499706</td>
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<td>3488</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3296</td>
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<td>-0.23</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3297</td>
<td>3481</td>
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<tr>
<td>1922</td>
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<td>190</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1929</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>3443</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4639226</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1935</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
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<td>3466</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>236</td>
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<td>3705</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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<td>3394</td>
<td>3625</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
(1) The number of temples for vegetarian cults
(2) The number of other folk religious temples
(3) All folk religious temples, i.e. the sum of (1) and (2)
(4) Annual increase rate for all folk religious temples
(5) The population of Taiwanese people (excluding the Japanese in Taiwan)
(6) Annual increase rate for the population of Taiwanese people

The original data for the folk religious temples (including the temples for vegetarian cults) and the population of Taiwanese people, are from Statistic of Taiwan 1895-1945, published by R.O.C. Bureau of Statistics, 1946, p.76 & p.1306.
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