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Majority Influence in Negotiation

by

Erika Peterson

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Psychology

Date ____________________

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Erika Peterson
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Abstract

Majority Influence in Negotiation

by Erika Peterson

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A social identity model of majority influence in negotiations is presented, which considers the effects of various social identifications on the processes of integrative and distributive bargaining. Two-faction negotiations were examined in a laboratory experiment: negotiation configuration was varied (negotiations were composed of either a majority faction and a minority faction or two equal-sized factions), as was social identity (negotiators were led to either identify with their own individual party or with the group of negotiators as a whole). Negotiators’ agreements were less integrative when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient, particularly in negotiations between a majority and a minority. Also, the majority faction had a significantly greater profit advantage over the minority faction when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient. However, although the majority’s relative advantage was greater when group identity was salient, majority members did not earn significantly more in an absolute sense when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient. The results of this study suggest that although group identity has been found to promote beneficial outcomes in other types of conflicts, its effects in negotiation are potentially negative, leading negotiators to miss opportunities for joint gain, particularly in negotiations between unequal factions.
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DEDICATION

The author wishes to dedicate this work to Frank E. Anderson.
INTRODUCTION

The three members of a self-managed work team are taking on a new project. They need to reach an agreement about issues such as the scheduling of their weekly meeting and the division of responsibilities for the project. Each member has specific preferences regarding these issues and hopes to influence the other team members to agree to what he or she wants. Influence attempts are an important component of negotiation (Jick, 1990; Kramer, 1991a; Walton & McKersie, 1965), and certainly one of the most colorful components. Negotiation is a joint decision-making process in which two or more people must make joint decisions regarding the allocation of scarce resources (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Conflict occurs when the parties prefer different allocations. The scarce resource at issue can be something of positive value, such as money or territory, in which case each party wants more of the resource, or something negative, such as a drain on one’s time, in which case each party wants less.

Someone accustomed to negotiating against a single opponent may need to use different influence tactics in multiperson negotiations like the example given above. A multiperson negotiation is any that includes more than two people at the bargaining table, whether as separate parties or as members of teams. Multiperson negotiations are more complex than dyadic negotiations in a number of ways (Kramer, 1991a); because of that complexity, not only may some influence tactics work differently in a multiperson conflict than in a dyadic conflict, there are also avenues of influence available that do not exist in dyadic conflicts. For example, it is commonly proposed that being part of a coalition or other subgroup will help a negotiator get what he or she wants in a multiperson negotiation (Mannix, 1993; Polzer, 1995; Polzer, Mannix, & Neale, 1995; Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996).

Many negotiations involving more than two participants do not require a unanimous agreement for a resolution, although they do require the joint agreement of at least several participants; in such negotiations, the power of subgroups is undisputable. For example, if negotiators decided to resolve their conflict via majority rule, then being part of the majority subgroup is clearly one way for negotiators to get what they want (Mannix, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Thompson, Mannix, &
Bazerman, 1988). As soon as a majority unites around some position, a vote can be held, and the subgroup can make a binding decision for the group as a whole. External circumstances, too, may dictate that subgroups have decisive power. For example, three social service providers might negotiate over government funding; the government agency will provide funds to whichever consortium of two or three providers approaches it first. In this case, any united subgroup of two negotiators has the power to get what they want despite any opposition offered by the third negotiator.

However, it is possible that subgroups wield influence even in negotiations that require a unanimous agreement. Although many negotiations do give decisive power to subgroups as in the examples above, there are also many negotiations that require unanimity. For example, if several warring countries decided to negotiate a peace treaty, the agreement of all countries would be necessary for any resolution, because any one country could plunge them back into war. In a negotiation such as this the question of the influence of subgroups is more complex, and has not been answered. Will being part of a subgroup still help a negotiator get what he or she wants in a negotiation that allows every participant to have veto power? And by what mechanism would such influence occur?

The influence of subgroups, particularly majority subgroups, has long been studied in other types of conflicts. The influence of the majority has often been documented in conflicts of opinion (for review see Levine & Russo, 1987), from the time of Asch’s demonstration that individuals would frequently conform to the majority on judgments of line length even when the majority opinion clearly contradicted the evidence of their own senses (1951). Conflicts over resources (of which negotiation is one example) differ of course from conflicts of opinion, but theories explaining majority influence in opinion conflict provide a starting point for analyzing possible mechanisms of majority influence in negotiation. The self-categorization explanation for majority influence is taken as a starting point in this dissertation. This explanation is rooted in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), a general theory of intragroup and intergroup behavior. The theory deals with the impact of group membership on social attitudes and behaviors, and from this
perspective, members of minority subgroups conform to the majority when the group membership that they share with the majority is salient to them. Someone conforms to the majority not necessarily because of direct pressure or persuasive argumentation from the majority, but as part of an automatic process of self-categorization and self-definition (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1991).

By taking a social identity approach to the study of majority influence in negotiation, we can not only learn about a specific avenue of influence in multiperson negotiations, but also examine such negotiations in their broader context. For example, social identity theory yields predictions about how majority/minority negotiations will differ in process and outcome from negotiations between equal-sized factions, and also about how the effects of group membership will differ in negotiation as compared to other types of resource conflicts. When people are in conflict, making them aware of their membership in a common group often reduces the conflict and leads to resolutions that benefit the group as a whole (Kramer & Brewer, 1984, 1986; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1988). However, it is also becoming apparent that under some circumstances, parties who have a stronger sense of group membership actually choose courses of action that are less beneficial for the group (Thompson, Kray, & Lind, 1996). Thus, this dissertation not only examines how group membership affects majority influence, but also considers the implications of those effects for the group as a whole, and for any larger organization in which the group is embedded.

Chapter 1 reviews social identity theory, with particular emphasis on the processes which should play a role in majority/minority negotiations. Two bodies of literature are examined for this purpose: the research on majority influence in opinion conflicts, and the research on social identity in resource conflicts. Chapter 2 defines the negotiation outcomes that are of interest, and presents a basic model that translates the processes from Chapter 1 into negotiation outcomes for majority/minority negotiations. Chapter 3 broadens the scope of the model in two ways: first, several specific types of majority/minority negotiation that occur in the real world are defined, and each type's path through the model is traced; second, the model is applied to
negotiations between equal-sized factions, and comparisons are drawn between these negotiations and majority/minority negotiations. Chapter 4 presents an empirical test of some aspects of the model, and Chapter 5 discusses conclusions drawn from the study.
CHAPTER 1: SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

One of the central ideas of social identity theory is that there is a distinction between personal identity and social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). An individual’s personal identity is her sense of herself as a unique individual. Her social identity is her sense of herself as a group member. The individual has a social identity to go with every group she sees herself as a member of -- these groups can range from broad social categories to small interacting groups. When social identity is salient, the individual’s primary definition of herself is as a group member. She sees herself as similar to, almost interchangeable with, all other members of the group (Hogg, 1992). Situational factors affect the relative salience of personal and social identity. For example, interacting with a close friend is likely to make one’s personal identity salient. Being the only person of one’s gender in a classroom is likely to make a particular social identity, one’s gender identity, salient.

Self-categorization theory expands upon the cognitive dimensions of social identity theory (Hogg, 1992). A key element of self-categorization theory is that the process of categorization and the perception of within-category similarity are reciprocal. That is, when we view a social situation, the pattern of similarities and differences that we perceive among people may lead us to categorize them (and ourselves, if we are part of the situation) in some way; if we do categorize people, as opposed to viewing them as a collection of unique individuals, a particular categorization scheme will naturally suggest itself to us, one that minimizes differences within categories and maximizes differences between categories (Turner, Wetherell, & Hogg, 1989). However, after a particular categorization becomes salient, it further exaggerates within-group similarities and between-group differences (Hogg, 1992). These processes apply not only to our perceptions of others, but also to our perceptions of ourselves; our own similarities to our fellow group members become accentuated after we define ourselves as members of a particular group. This process of accentuation of similarities is described in more detail below in the section reviewing the majority influence research.

A second central idea of social identity theory is somewhat less cognitive and more motivational; this is the idea that our social identities contribute to our overall
self-esteem (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Thus we are motivated to see any groups that we belong to as positive, as better than other groups. Some important effects of this motivation are that we view our fellow group members positively, feeling a depersonalized, group-based liking for them, and view members of other groups negatively and are competitive with them (Hogg, 1992). These motivational effects of social identity have been proposed to play a role in other types of resource conflicts (Kramer, 1993), and thus they should be considered in negotiation as well.

Social Identity Theory and Majority Influence

In the view of social identity theory, one effect of defining oneself as a member of a group is taking the opinions that are typical of the group (in other words, the majority’s opinions) as one’s own opinions. According to Hogg (1992), the steps of this influence process are: First, the individual categorizes himself as a member of the group -- that is, his group identity is made salient. Then the individual learns the norms of the group in regard to the matter in question; the norms are the behaviors and opinions that are subscribed to by a majority of the group. This normative information is used in forming a prototype of the ideal or representative group member. The group prototype defines what a member of the group is like, and the greater the extent to which the individual sees himself as a member of the group, the greater the extent to which the group prototype will define his behaviors and attitudes. Essentially, the individual stereotypes himself, by applying the group prototype to the self. The more salient his social identity, the more he conforms to the majority of the group. Importantly, it is possible that the attitudes and preferences one holds as a group member can be somewhat different than those one holds as an individual (Kramer, 1991b). For example, a graduate student might hold certain opinions about multiple choice testing when her identity as a student is salient, and hold somewhat different opinions when her identity as a teacher is salient.

Empirical support for this process comes from Hogg and Turner (1987). In their study, participants were either divided into two groups, or were left uncategorized. They were then asked to judge the value of various character traits (on a nine-point scale), and the responses of other participants (actually engineered by the
experimenters) were presented to the individual before he or she made a judgment. The most popular response to each item was determined through pre-testing. Participants were presented with the judgments of six other people, and these judgments formed two distinct clusters, one on the disapproval side of the scale (for example, the judgments 3, 4, and 5) and one on the approval side (for example, 7, 8, and 9). In the categorized condition, the cluster of responses attributed to fellow ingroup members always included the predetermined most popular answer, and this answer was the one closest to the outgroup cluster of judgments (if the "disapproval" cluster above came from the ingroup, the predetermined most popular answer would be "5"). When participants had been categorized, they shifted their judgments away from the most popular answer and toward the other answers in that cluster to a greater extent than did participants who were left uncategorized.

To summarize the self-categorization explanation for these results, in the uncategorized condition, the individual is presented with a broad range of judgments from people who are all more or less like the self. The individual's preferred judgment (the most popular judgment) falls near the norm of this diverse group, and so there is no impetus to change the judgment. In the ingroup/outgroup condition, a certain subset of the judgments are made relevant to the individual's identity. The individual's presumably preferred judgment does not represent the norm of the ingroup judgments, and so his or her stated judgment is revised to be in line with the group norm.

Disagreement with similar others (such as ingroup members) produces subjective uncertainty; when group identity is salient, that uncertainty is resolved by referring to the group norms (Turner, 1991). Disagreement with outgroup members, in contrast, is not likely to produce uncertainty; in fact, one's prototypes of the ingroup and the outgroup are likely to dictate that one should disagree with the outgroup. In fact, a particularly serious disagreement between two factions of a group may actually lead the factions to regard each other as separate groups, alleviating any self-categorization pressures for conformity. Thus, when group identity is salient, members tend to conform to the majority. When individual identity is salient, conformity is less
likely, and when faction or subgroup identity is salient (such that each faction regards the other as the outgroup), conformity is less likely still. It is important to note that this proposed process for conformity to ingroup majorities (and lack of conformity to outgroup majorities) does not necessarily involve any of the interpersonal effects of group identity, such as liking for group members or dislike for outgroup members. It depends solely upon the cognitive effects, or what might be termed prototype effects. When group identity is salient, people act as group members, not as individuals; their attitudes and behaviors are shaped by the relevant group norms or prototypes.

Could such a process also produce conformity to the majority in negotiation? In some ways, the prospect seems unlikely. If one member of a work group wants to hold the group’s regularly scheduled meetings in the mornings because he likes to get his meetings out of the way before lunch, why would this preference change upon finding out that most group members prefer to meet in the afternoon? Would not morning still be the best time for him, regardless of how salient his group membership is to him? Yes, morning might still be the best time for the dissenter personally, but recall that when group identity is salient, people do not react to situations personally, but react to them as group members. As a group member, the dissenter may have other criteria to consider beyond his or her own preferences.

Negotiation researchers recognize that under some circumstances a negotiator’s personal outcomes are not the only criterion taken into account in evaluating whether a given resource division is acceptable or not. Sometimes negotiators take the other parties’ outcomes into account as well (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986); examples range from seeking good outcomes for one’s friends across the bargaining table (Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1996) to striving to maximize the difference in outcomes between oneself and one’s opponents (Polzer, 1995). Negotiators are also concerned with fairness (Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993), although what is fair can be ambiguous because there a number of different fairness norms which may dictate different allocations of resources (Deutsch, 1973).

So although negotiators’ personal preferences may not be malleable (that is, morning may always be the dissenter’s best time for a meeting), the set of criteria that
negotiators use in evaluating agreements may shift with a shift in identity. For example, a dissenter who views the conflict as an individual may define a fair and acceptable solution as one in which he or she gets the resources that he or she wants, needs, or deserves (a self-centered fairness norm). However, when he or she views the conflict as a group member, a fair and acceptable solution may be defined as one that satisfies the typical group member (a group-centered fairness norm).

To put this proposition more formally in the terms of self-categorization theory, when group identity is salient and a question of resource division comes up in the group, every member listens to the others' preferences and uses that information to form a group prototype, the preferences of the typical group member. That prototype (based on the majority's preferences) anchors the judgments of all group members, whether they are in the majority or the minority, as they evaluate possible solutions, just as in opinion conflicts the group prototype anchors every group member's opinions. The group prototype may be an example of a "focal point" solution (Schelling, 1960). Focal point solutions are those that stand out in some way from the surrounding continuum of possible outcomes; a solution may be prominent because there is precedent for it, or because it is simple to calculate (such as splitting the resources down the middle), or for many other reasons. Focal point solutions are appealing because whatever makes the solution stand out from the rest forms a convenient rationale for its acceptance, a rationale that is palatable to all parties, allowing a swift and less contentious resolution to the conflict (Kramer, 1991a). The group prototype fits the definition of a focal point; when group identity is salient, the prototype is prominent in the minds of all group members, and in reflecting the preferences of the typical group member, it includes a compelling rationale for its adoption.

In contrast, when negotiators' individual identities are salient, their individual preferences will serve as standards for evaluating possible solutions (Kramer, 1993); negotiators who are in the minority will no longer have the same standards as those in the majority, and thus conformity to the majority is less likely. Similarly, when majority and minority view each other as outgroups, they will in fact expect each other
to have different preferences and different standards, and conformity to the majority is unlikely.

Social Identity Theory and Resource Conflicts

In contrast to the conformity research reviewed above, the literature on social identity in resource conflicts has focused primarily on the interpersonal effects of social identity, rather than the prototype effects. Thus far, the effects of group identity have been examined in resource dilemmas (Kramer & Brewer, 1984, 1986) and in dyadic negotiation (Kramer et al., 1993, Thompson, 1993).

A resource dilemma is a type of resource conflict in which all parties are dependent on a common resource pool and are free to make withdrawals from it (Hardin, 1968). If the total withdrawals are below a certain level over a given time period, the pool renews itself; if too much is withdrawn at one time, the pool is destroyed. A series of studies (Kramer & Brewer, 1984, 1986) found that when participants’ group identity was made salient, they acted more cooperatively, withdrawing less per trial than they did when individual identity was salient, which over the long run would improve the outcomes of all group members. The researchers propose that when group identity is salient, the members are more likely to take into account the consequences of their actions for the group as a whole (Kramer, 1993); because one’s social identity contributes to one’s overall self-esteem, people want the groups that they are members of to succeed and do well. Also, because group identity leads to a depersonalized, group-based liking for fellow group members (Hogg, 1992), people should be more concerned about the individual welfare of the others in the conflict (as well as the welfare of the collective) when group identity is salient (Kramer, 1993).

Resource dilemmas allow very little scope for group prototype effects. A common feature of resource dilemmas, both in the laboratory and in the field, is that participants are not able to communicate with each other about how much they intend to withdraw. Group members may be completely lacking in any information about each other that could be used to form a group prototype or norm. However, when group identity is salient, members will still feel the interpersonal effects of increased
liking, trust, and concern for group members, as well as increased value placed on the
group, and these effects should steer their behavior.

Applying this same reasoning to dyadic negotiations, Kramer et al. (1993)
found that the negotiators divided the resources more equally when group identity was
salient than when individual identity was salient, which is indeed consistent with the
idea that group identity heightens concern for fellow group members. Turning now to
multiperson negotiations, if both majority and minority members feel more concern for
their fellow group members when group identity is salient, then the majority may be
paradoxically least likely to ask the minority to conform under the very conditions that
make the minority most likely to do so. This potential paradox points out a difference
between resources and opinions; although opinions may have symbolic value for the
people who hold them (Moscovici, 1985), only resources have tangible value. When
group identity is salient, negotiators may feel the pull of the group prototype just as
they do in opinion conflicts, but the additional factor of concern for each others’
welfare, not present in opinion conflicts, may lead them instead toward agreements that
give equal resources to all parties, just as was found in dyadic negotiation.

In summary, salient group identity has a number of different effects on group
members, including accentuating their similarity to each other (via prototype effects)
and increasing their trust, concern, and liking for each other (interpersonal effects). In
some conflicts, prototype effects play a larger role than interpersonal effects. For
example, in some laboratory studies of opinion conflicts (e.g. Hogg & Turner, 1987) a
particular group member may be aware of the others’ opinions, allowing for prototype
effects, but his or her actions (such as his or her answers on a questionnaire) will
never be known by other group members and will never have an impact on them,
making interpersonal effects less relevant. In such conflicts, group members have been
found to conform to the majority. In other conflicts, such as some resource dilemmas
(e.g. Kramer & Brewer, 1984, 1986), group members have no knowledge about each
other, preventing the formation of prototypes, but their actions will affect each other,
making interpersonal effects important. In such conflicts, group members have been
found to make choices that are better for all group members (including the self, over
the long run) when group identity is salient.

In negotiation, both prototype and interpersonal effects should play a role. Negotiators must communicate their preferences to each other in order to reach a joint decision; this information allows negotiators to discover what the prototypical group preferences are. Also, because scarce resources are being distributed, negotiators have every reason to be concerned about the outcomes of others. In negotiations that take place between a majority and a minority, prototype effects predict one set of negotiation outcomes and interpersonal effects predict another, as will be discussed further in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 2: A SOCIAL IDENTITY MODEL OF MAJORITY INFLUENCE IN NEGOTIATION

The vignette that opened the introduction described participants in a multiperson negotiation wondering how to influence the other negotiators, and the previous chapter focused on the majority’s ability to influence the minority. In both cases, some one or some faction is attempting to influence others to accept a particular distribution of resources. And indeed, this distributive component of negotiation is one of the two key outcomes examined in this paper.

The integrative component of negotiation must also be considered, however. In a multi-issue negotiation, when the parties have the same preferences on some issues and different preferences on others, or when they place different priorities on issues, the integration of parties’ interests is possible to some degree. For example, the parties can share information about which issues are most important to them, and if their priorities differ, they may decide that each party should get their most preferred alternative on their most important issue. This can yield a settlement that is more profitable for all parties than a straight compromise would have been. When the parties have different priorities, an integrative solution yields the greatest total value possible in the situation. Even in negotiations between a majority and a minority, if the difference in priorities is great enough then an integrative tradeoff will yield greater total value than any other solution, even the solution of majority domination. Integrative solutions are often described as pareto-efficient; if a given solution is pareto-efficient, it means that there are no other solutions available that could improve the outcomes of one or more parties without harming the outcomes of some other party. Not all pareto-efficient solutions are necessarily integrative (for example, if one party gets all the resources, there is no way to improve the outcomes of other parties without harming that party, but the total value of that solution may not necessarily equal the maximum possible), but all fully integrative solutions are pareto-efficient.

If the group in conflict is embedded in some larger organization, then those outside the group are surely interested in whether the resources being divided are used efficiently; a non-efficient solution leaves money on the table, in effect. Even within the subset of pareto-efficient agreements, some agreements may be more valuable to
the larger entity than others. For example, if one party or subgroup of parties is allowed to dominate, resources may not go to those who need them, deserve them, or are best able to use them (Mannix, 1993; Polzer et al., 1995). Integration, on the other hand, has many benefits beyond being an efficient use of resources. Not only can it dramatically improve the outcome of all parties, it can also increase the likelihood that negotiators will stand by the agreement and implement any aspects that need to be carried out in the future, strengthen the relationship between parties, and thus benefit the larger community of which the parties are members (Pruitt, 1981).

Two different types of effects of group identity in multiperson negotiations were outlined above. Prototype effects are the result of the tendency to accentuate similarities within groups and differences between groups; when group identity is salient, members' attitudes and behaviors reflect what is typical for the group. And thus when group identity is salient in negotiation, negotiators' judgments about what makes for an appropriate division should be strongly influenced by the typical preferences of group members. Interpersonal effects of group identity, in contrast, stem from group members' desire to see their group as better than others; because of this desire, ingroup members are regarded with trust, respect, and liking and outgroup members are regarded less positively. Thus in negotiation, participants will be more concerned with the welfare of the other members and the group as a whole when group identity is salient, than when the other members are seen either as individuals or as outgroup members. For negotiations that take place between a majority and a minority, these two processes yield very different predictions for both distributive and integrative bargaining. Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive; both processes could take place. But to the extent that one process is stronger than the other, only one set of the predictions below should hold.

Table 1 provides a summary of the propositions below, tracing both the prototype and interpersonal effects of the three possible levels of identity -- group, subgroup, and individual -- in negotiations between a majority and minority, and examining the effects on both distributive and integrative bargaining.

**Distributive Bargaining.** Translating the prototype effect into distributive
outcomes, majority members should gain a larger share of the resources when group identity is salient than when individual identity is salient. The majority’s preferences determine the group prototype, and the prototype suggests itself to all members as an appropriate solution. In contrast, when individual identity is salient, majority and minority members each have their own preferences that they use to evaluate agreements; because a unanimous agreement is required, no one need settle for any agreement that earns less for themselves than for the other parties, and thus resources will tend to be distributed equally. The picture is much the same when subgroup identity is salient: each faction considers their own preferences to be prototypical, and thus the minority is unlikely to be swayed by the majority’s preferences.

The interpersonal effects of group identity lead to a different prediction: because negotiators are more concerned about each others’ welfare when group identity is salient, they will distribute resources as equally or more equally than they do when individual identity or subgroup identity is salient. In the first case, the equality results from everyone pursuing each others’ interests, and in the second from each negotiator pursuing his or her own interests. In both cases, agreements will tend toward equality; however, there may occasionally be more unequal distributions when individual or subgroup identity is salient because not all negotiators will pursue their own interests with equal skill. In contrast, skill is not a consideration when negotiators are focused on each others’ interests. To summarize the competing predictions:

Hypothesis 1a: When group identity is salient, the majority will have more of a profit advantage over the minority than they do when individual or subgroup identity is salient.

Hypothesis 1b: When group identity is salient, resources will be divided as equally or more equally between majority and minority members than they are when individual or subgroup identity is salient.

Integrative Bargaining. According to the proposed prototype effects, groups will tend to adopt agreements that resemble the group prototype when group identity is salient. Clearly, if the agreement is based on the majority’s preferences, then it cannot also be an integration of both factions’ preferences. There are several reasons why
negotiators might agree to group prototype solutions even when integrative potential is available. Social variables (such as group identity) can change both the process of negotiation and the values that negotiators place on various negotiation outcomes (Valley et al., 1996). One possible change in process might be that the prototypical preferences will dominate the decision process to such an extent that negotiators are prevented from either providing information about priorities or from understanding the importance of such information when it is provided. Without such information, they would not be able to recognize the negotiation's integrative potential. Lack of integration has been noted as a problem with focal points and other heuristic solutions (Kramer, 1991a); such solutions are readily accepted as a convenient end to conflict, but if conflict ends too quickly, more beneficial solutions may be overlooked. On the other hand, it is possible that negotiators could be well aware of the integrative potential but could still consider a group prototype solution to be more fair and satisfying.

In contrast, when individual identity is salient, negotiators are likely to integrate the two factions' interests whenever possible; previous research has demonstrated that multiperson negotiations excel at integrative bargaining, at least when there are only two set of preferences, such as a majority's and a minority's, to integrate (Rand & Carnevale, 1994; Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996). It is possible that prototype effects may depress integrative performance when subgroup identity is salient, although for very different reasons than the depression predicted for group identity. Recall that categorization not only accentuates similarities within groups, it accentuates differences between groups; people are likely to assume that because of the exaggerated difference between groups, solutions that satisfy the interests of both ingroup and outgroup do not exist, and so they are unlikely to seek opportunities for joint gain (Polzer et al., 1995).

The interpersonal effects of group identity predict instead that negotiators will be as integrative or more integrative when group identity is salient than when individual identity is salient. Kramer et al. (1993) did not find a significant effect of group identity on integrative performance in dyadic negotiations, but there are reasons
to believe that group identity could enhance integration. Integrative agreements would be the most satisfying agreements possible for negotiators who are concerned about the welfare of each other and of the group as a whole. Also, because salient group identity enhances trust among group members (Kramer, 1993), group identity may bring improved information exchange and thus improved integrative performance (Polzer et al., 1995).

The interpersonal effects that accompany subgroup identity may have a complicated impact on integrative performance. When dealing with outgroup members, the most notable interpersonal effects are increased hostility, mistrust, and competitiveness. Lack of trust hinders information exchange (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Polzer, 1995), as does a competitive focus on relative profits (Polzer, 1995); on the other hand, competitiveness can also lead to high aspirations, which encourage a thorough investigation of the issues, making the discovery of integrative potential more likely (Rand & Carnevale, 1994).

To summarize the competing predictions:

Hypothesis 2a: In majority/minority negotiations, agreements will be less integrative when group identity is salient than when individual identity is salient. Integrative performance may also suffer when subgroup identity is salient.

Hypthesis 2b: In majority/minority negotiations, agreements will be as integrative or more integrative when group identity is salient as when individual identity is salient. The effects of subgroup identity on integrative performance are indeterminate.
Table 1: A Social Identity Model of Majority Influence in Negotiation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Influencing</th>
<th>Salient Identity</th>
<th>Psychological Effects</th>
<th>Negotiation Processes</th>
<th>Negotiation Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salient Identity</td>
<td>Prototype Effects</td>
<td>Similarities accentuated within group; members use group prototype to define self.</td>
<td>Majority preferences become prototype; members see prototype as good solution.</td>
<td>Majority members get more resources; integration not likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Liking and trust for group members</td>
<td>All members concerned about each others’ welfare; trust may enhance information exchange.</td>
<td>Equal distribution of resources; enhanced integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiator behaviors; presence of relevant outgroup (outside the negotiation); salience of interdependence; etc.</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Prototype Effects</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Individuals pursue own interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interpersonal Effects</td>
<td>Idiosyncratic reactions to others</td>
<td>Tendency toward equal distribution and integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subgroup</td>
<td>Prototype Effects</td>
<td>Differences exaggerated between groups; each subgroup defined by own prototype.</td>
<td>Assumption that both subgroups’ interests cannot be simultaneously satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interpersonal Effects</td>
<td>Dislike, mistrust, competitiveness toward outgroup members</td>
<td>Equal distribution of resources; integration not likely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mistrust may hinder information exchange; competition may lead to high aspirations.</td>
<td>Equal distribution of resources; competing predictions for integration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 3: BROADENING THE SCOPE OF THE MODEL

Multiperson negotiations have been discussed in the abstract thus far, as if all negotiations with more than two participants were the same. In actuality, multiperson negotiations can differ along many dimensions, as can the majorities that occur in those negotiations. This chapter broadens the scope of the model in two ways: first, several different types of majority subgroups are defined and the path of each one through the model is traced; second, prototype and interpersonal effects in majority/minority negotiations are contrasted with the effects that should occur in negotiations between equal-sized factions.

Defining Majorities in Multiperson Negotiation

If one wanted to build a multiperson negotiation out of a basic dyadic negotiation, one could either add more parties to the dyadic negotiation, or add more representatives to each party, or both. In the first case, one would have a multiparty negotiation, formally defined as a negotiation involving three or more people, with each person representing his or her own separate interests (Bazerman, Mannix & Thompson, 1988). An example of a multiparty negotiation which has been used throughout this dissertation is the three coworkers who are negotiating their responsibilities for a joint project; there are more than two people in the negotiation, and each acts independently in his or her own interest.

The second approach, adding more representatives to each party in the dyad, would result in a team negotiation, formally defined as a negotiation in which at least one party is represented by a team of two or more people (Thompson et al., 1996). An example of a team negotiation would be a husband and wife negotiating with a salesperson over the purchase of a new car; the spouses are a team. Another example would be a team of lawyers representing their firm’s client in an out-of-court settlement negotiation.

The third possibility suggested above, with three or more parties at least one of which is represented by a team, could be called a multi-team negotiation. This is a little-researched negotiation configuration, and it will not be dealt with below. The model proposed in the previous chapter is designed to address negotiations that either begin with two clear factions or that eventually resolve into two factions, and it
focuses on influence processes between factions, rather than within factions. In a multi-team negotiation, one might find configurations such as a faction composed of a team plus several solo negotiators who began as separate parties; the intra-faction dynamics of such a complicated subgroup would undoubtedly affect their dealings with the other faction, and those dynamics are beyond the scope of this dissertation. The majority subgroups that occur in multiparty and team negotiations, on the other hand, will be examined in more detail below.

In negotiation, a subgroup, such as a majority or a minority, can be defined as any subset of negotiators who are united in advocating a particular allocation of resources. In that definition, "united" is somewhat ambiguous; it might be read as meaning either "united in preferences" or "united in their actions". In fact, both meanings of "united" are important to consider when examining the influence abilities of majorities.

Teams are subgroups that are united in both senses of the word. Brodt et al. (1996) say that a team consists of two or more people with the same interests in the negotiation who are all present at the bargaining table, and who are monolithic in their decision-making (that is, they must make and accept offers as a unit). Similarly, other researchers define a negotiation team as "a single negotiating entity" (Polzer, 1995) whose members make "collective decisions" ( Rand & Carnevale, 1994). The everyday conception of a team is that it is a group of people who are on the same side of a conflict who approach the conflict together; for example, a sports team is a unit from the outset of the game. Similarly, the couple who wants to buy a car and the team of lawyers in the out-of-court settlement case are coherent teams from the very beginning of their negotiations. In fact, one of the primary practical implications claimed for team negotiation research is that it should help people to decide when to send a team to negotiate rather than sending a solo individual. Nevertheless, there is disagreement about whether a team must be a team from the start (Thompson, personal communication, 1996); it could be argued that people who begin a round of negotiation as independent parties may begin to act like a team if they discover that they have the same interests. However, other researchers have considered such
subgroups to be coalitions (Polzer et al., 1995), and so they will be discussed in the context of multiparty negotiations; such subgroups should differ in certain ways from teams who begin the negotiation as single entities. As with any negotiators, the team members may represent no one but the team (as in the husband and wife example), or the team may represent some larger entity -- for example, the team of lawyers. Very simply, a team will be a majority subgroup whenever it faces a team with fewer members or an individual. In two-party team negotiations, subgroups are created before the negotiation even begins, and the study of majority influence becomes the study of the influence of larger teams over smaller teams or individuals.

The issue of majority subgroups in multiparty negotiations is more complicated than in team negotiations. A team enters the negotiation as a subgroup. In multiparty negotiations, each negotiator begins as a separate party; any subgroups must develop during the course of the conflict. There are a number of reasons why separate parties would unite in support of a particular position. The most obvious reason would be that this position is the true preference of all subgroup members (Polzer et al., 1995). Negotiators often do not have complete information about each others' preferences prior to their actual interaction (Polzer et al., 1995), and thus coalitions that are based on compatible preferences often do not come together until after the negotiation has commenced, when their common interests become apparent. An example would be the members of the work team discussed previously; when they sit down to decide when to hold their weekly meeting, they may not know ahead of time whether there will be a conflict of interest and if so what members' positions would be.

Once a subgroup of negotiators recognize that they are united in their interests, they must decide how united to be in their actions. Their choices can range from team-like coordination, conferring with each other prior to making or accepting offers for example, to near-total lack of coordination. One way to conceive of a non-coordinated subgroup is that the members, after discovering their common preferences, continue to interact with each other in a manner similar to their interactions with non-subgroup members. For example, they would be no more likely to communicate with members than with non-members. In fact, research on non-coordinated majorities in
opinion conflicts shows that majority members direct far fewer communications toward each other than toward the dissenting minority (Schachter, 1951). Such differences in negotiator behavior are likely to affect what identity is salient to negotiators, as will be discussed further below.

Subgroups come together for reasons other than compatible preferences as well. For example, a subgroup of negotiators with conflicting preferences may nevertheless come up with a solution that satisfies most of their desires (Thompson et al., 1988), and then seek to convince the rest of the negotiators to accept this solution. Also, negotiators who are in long-term relationships with other parties may support coalition members whose preferences differ, under the expectation that these same people will support their preferences in turn in a future interaction (Polzer et al., 1995). Finally, negotiators who are friends with each other may be willing to support agreements that yield high outcomes for their friends even if these outcomes are not the most preferable for the self, simply because they want their friends to be satisfied (Polzer et al., 1995). Again, influence processes take place within subgroups such as this, as parties with conflicting preferences converge on the position that will define them as a subgroup, but the details of this process are beyond the scope of this dissertation.

Subgroups whose members began with conflicting preferences must have coordinated themselves in some fashion to reach agreement on the position that all subgroup members now favor; in other words, they are likely to have displayed behaviors such as consulting with each other to the exclusion of other parties, etc. Thus, the other negotiators are likely to see the subgroup as at least somewhat united in their actions.

In summary, there are at least three important types of majorities to consider: teams and team-like coalitions, non-coordinated coalitions whose members have the same preferences, and coalitions whose members have conflicting underlying preferences. How does the social identity model of majority influence apply to these three types of majorities?

Applying the Model to Different Types of Majorities

What is notable about teams and team-like coalitions is that they are likely to prime subgroup identity (Polzer, 1995). Recall that the most salient level of
categorization tends to be the one that maximizes similarities within groups and differences between groups (Hogg, 1992). Because a team approaches the negotiation as a single entity, the team is likely to be perceived as its own group, not inclusive of the other negotiators. It is possible that other factors in the negotiation context could suggest a different categorization; for example, the presence of some relevant outgroup, outside of the negotiation altogether, may prime the negotiators’ common group identity. However, identity is dynamic; with the team constantly setting themselves apart from the other negotiators by their actions, any factor which would counteract the salience of subgroup identity would also have to be obvious throughout the negotiation. Coalitions which begin to act like teams as the negotiation progresses should also gradually prime negotiators’ subgroup identities.

If teams do make subgroup identity salient, then according to the model in Table 1, they should be among the less influential majorities. Following the subgroup identity path, the minority should not see the majority team’s preferences as prototypical, and the minority will feel competitive with them. Several studies of majority teams have been conducted: in two studies, the teams did actually claim a larger share of the resources than their minority opponents (Polzer, 1995; Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996 Study 2), although in another study they failed to do so (Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996 Study 1). Thus, contrary to prediction, majority teams have been found to wield at least some influence over minorities, although it remains to be seen whether other types of majorities are even more influential.

Coalitions whose members have conflicting underlying preferences may also have problems with influence, for a very different reason. Notice that the only path on Table 1 that predicts the majority to have a profit advantage over the minority is the path for prototype effects when group identity is salient. When majority members have conflicting underlying preferences, this may interfere with the formation of a clear group prototype. Even though the majority members are united in support of some position that is satisfactory to all of them, if the minority is aware of the majority members’ various original preferences, the majority’s current position may not seem like a valid expression of what is typical of the group. Coalitions in
organizations often organize behind the scenes (Murnighan & Brass, 1991); not only does such secrecy prevent possible opponents from mustering resistance, it also allows the coalition to present a unanimous, consistent face when they do make their presence known, increasing their influence via prototype effects.

Coalitions whose members have compatible preferences but who do not coordinate their actions may be the most influential majorities. They present a clear group prototype, but unlike teams they do not do anything which might encourage the perception of themselves as a separate group. An interesting example of such a majority occurs in the famous good cop, bad cop routine (the "cops" are actually a team, but all their coordination is hidden from their opponent). Current theorizing on the good cop, bad cop strategy focuses on the team’s persuasive abilities (Brodt & Duncan, 1995). The strategy is often used in situations in which the minority (the prisoner) is dependent on the team to some degree for information; the cops typically know more than the prisoner about what will happen to the prisoner and how bad or good those things will be. The good cop and the bad cop each target different branches of the prisoner's decision tree, the good cop focusing on the happy results of cooperation, and the bad cop focusing on the negative results of resistance (Brodt & Duncan, 1995). The social contrast between the two cops, however, may greatly assist their persuasion. They very clearly agree on the majority position to which they want the minority to conform: "Cooperation is better". However, they go out of their way to be disunited in nearly all other respects, even making disparaging remarks about each other. These tactics should break down the salience of the "cops vs. prisoner" subgroup identities to some extent, bringing the prisoner closer instead to the perception of one group with three members.

Of course, according to the model presented here, any type of majority would have to be successful in making the negotiators’ common group identity salient if they wanted to maximize their chance of claiming a large share of the resources. A sense of common group identity may not be the norm between negotiators. Instead, subgroup or individual identities may more commonly be salient. Suggestive evidence for this claim comes from the work on the "incompatibility bias" in negotiation
(Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Negotiators have a strong tendency to assume, at least in dyadic negotiations, that their opponent’s interests are directly opposed to their own on every issue under discussion; they often do not recognize areas of compatibility from which they both could profit (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). If negotiators were viewing each other as ingroup members, they should be overestimating their similarities, not overestimating their differences (Polzer et al., 1995).

Although negotiators may not typically perceive each other as group members, they nevertheless form a group according to many definitions of what constitutes a group. Specifically, negotiators interact with each other, and are interdependent with each other, which are the most common criteria given in definitions of "group" (Forsyth, 1991). There are conditions under which this latent group membership should become salient. Researchers have found a number of different context variables that increase the salience of group identity, including: (1) adding or making salient an outgroup (Abrams, Wetherall, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990; Hogg & Turner, 1987); (2) adding or making salient a superordinate goal (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1988); and (3) emphasizing the group's interdependence (Kramer & Brewer, 1984, 1986). Any of these could plausibly be emphasized in negotiation by either a negotiator or an outside party who was interested in highlighting the group’s social identity. In fact, all of these tactics have been mentioned by Walton and McKersie (1965) as tactics that are effective in creating a more positive relationship between negotiation parties, a goal which they believe can have important strategic value. To give an example of one such variable, assume that the three members of the work team in our ongoing example know that they will have to defend their final agreement to their division manager. The presence of this outgroup member (the manager) may increase the sense of group identity among the team members. The existence of context variables such as this may be beyond the control of the negotiators (that is, one member of the work team probably cannot create a division manager out of thin air), but they can choose to draw attention to or de-emphasize such factors according to the perceptions they wish to create in their fellow negotiators.
Applying the Model to Other Multiperson Negotiations

The social identity model of influence presents the possibility that in majority/minority negotiations, outcomes will actually be worse for the group as a whole when group identity is salient than when individual identity is salient. If prototype effects outweigh interpersonal effects when group identity is salient, negotiators may reach agreements that deprive some parties of resources and that fail to take advantage of opportunities for maximum joint gain. Whether such outcomes bring any real harm to the group or not depends on the group’s task and context, but in many organizational contexts, such outcomes are definitely not optimal (Mannix, 1993; Polzer et al., 1995). The positive effects of group identity in other conflicts are well-known; for example, entrenched and hostile intergroup conflicts can be ameliorated when a superordinate group identity is made salient (Sherif et al., 1988), group identity increases cooperation in resource dilemmas (Kramer & Brewer, 1984, 1986; Thompson, Kray, & Lind, 1996), and researchers have also speculated that salient organizational identity can enhance cooperation in organizations in a number of ways (Kramer, 1991b, 1993). However, negative effects of group identity are also coming to light; for example, under some circumstances groups with a salient identity continue to commit resources to a losing course of action longer than groups that lack such an identity (Thompson, Kray, & Lind, 1996). Drawing a distinction between prototype effects and interpersonal effects of group identity and examining them separately may provide one way to determine ahead of time whether group identity will have positive or negative effects in a given conflict.

For example, within multiperson negotiations, something as simple as the distribution of preferences may determine whether group identity benefits or harms the group, because different distributions will affect the relative importance of prototype and interpersonal effects. In the predictions developed above for majority/minority negotiations, the interpersonal effects of group identity were proposed to improve negotiation outcomes. It was the group prototype effects that were proposed to be detrimental. In negotiations between two factions of equal size, in contrast, there should be no clear group prototype because neither faction’s preferences are typical of
the entire group. In such negotiations, only the interpersonal effects of group identity should play a role, yielding predictions of more integrative and equal agreements at best, and at worst no effect of group identity.
CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

Overview of Experiment

The study reported here tests several components of the model presented above. The effects of group identity versus individual identity were examined both in negotiations between a majority and a minority and in negotiations between two equal factions. The negotiation outcomes of interest were the distribution of profits between factions and the integrativeness and pareto-efficiency of the negotiated agreements. It was predicted that among majority/minority negotiations, the majority would claim a larger share of the resources and the agreements would be less integrative when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient. Several mechanisms for the predicted lack of integration were examined: it was predicted that minority members would consider majority-dominant solutions to be more fair and satisfying when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient, and that negotiators would exchange less information about priorities when group identity was salient. Information exchange was represented by the accuracy of negotiators’ judgments about the other faction’s priorities.

In negotiations between equal factions, in contrast, it was predicted that outcomes would be as integrative and equal or more so when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient, and that information exchange would not suffer when group identity was salient. In short, an interaction was predicted between identity and negotiation configuration, both for integrative performance and for information exchange. Because different distributive variables are of interest in the two configurations (in majority/minority negotiations, the difference between the majority’s profits and the minority’s profits; in equal-faction negotiations, the absolute difference between the two factions’ profits) an interaction will not be computed for distributive bargaining, but in essence an interaction was predicted: for majority/minority negotiations, resources would be distributed less equally when group identity was salient, whereas for equal-faction negotiations, resources would be distributed more equally when group identity was salient.

The predictions above assume that prototype effects will outweigh the interpersonal effects of group identity in the majority/minority negotiations. It is
possible that interpersonal effects would predominate instead, leading to very different outcomes. If group identity were found to lead to a more equal distribution of resources and more integrative agreements than individual identity in majority/minority negotiations, there would be no way to know whether the interpersonal effects of group identity were simply more powerful than the prototype effects, or whether group prototype effects do not exist at all in negotiation. One further condition was added to the design described above in order to disentangle those two possibilities. A mixed social identity condition was included in the majority/minority negotiations, in which the majority members were focused on their individual identities but the minority was focused on the group identity. This manipulation should release the majority members from any interpersonal concerns, leaving them willing to pursue their own interests. Thus, if the group-focused minority were found to concede to the majority, it would support that the group prototype is an appealing solution to negotiators whose group identity is salient. In contrast, if resources were distributed equally in this condition, the existence of group prototype effects in negotiation would not be supported.

Method

Design

The predictions were tested in a 2 X 2 design that manipulated the identity that was salient to negotiators (either group or individual) and the negotiation configuration (either majority versus minority or evenly balanced). Participants role-played a conflict among four geographical divisions of a corporation. Either their identity as members of the same corporation was made salient to them, or their individual division identity was made salient. In the conflict, either three divisions had the same preferences with one division opposing, or two divisions had one set of preferences with the other two divisions opposing. The basic 2 X 2 was augmented with an additional condition of mixed identity majority/minority negotiations, in which the majority members were focused on their individual division identities and the minority was focused on the overall corporate identity.

Participants

Participants were 356 undergraduates participating in exchange for extra credit.
in their psychology courses.

Materials and procedure

Negotiation task. Because the task needed to include only two sets of preferences for the two factions, a dyadic negotiation task was adapted. The "novelty item" negotiation used by Thompson (1993) was chosen. In a four-party version, this task involves four geographical divisions of a novelty-manufacturing company, negotiating the specifics of a new novelty item for office reception areas. Participants received an introduction to the negotiation and a payoff chart listing the various issues (qualities of the novelty item such as "color" and "size"), the alternatives for each issue, and the profit their division would earn from each alternative. This particular negotiation has an appropriate level of abstractness. It provides enough detail to build a framework for the negotiation and the manipulated variables, and to give the negotiators something concrete to talk about, without providing other potentially distracting information. The task included integrative potential: two pairs of issues that were differentially valued by the two factions, which could be traded off to increase joint profit. For the issues that could be traded, values were assigned in such a way that the integrative solution yielded the greatest total value even in the majority/minority negotiations. The negotiation also included two issues of equal importance to all parties. The two payoff charts are presented in Appendix A.

Procedure. Groups of four participants were randomly assigned to a configuration and a social identity condition. The configuration was either majority versus minority (3/1) or evenly-balanced (2/2). The social identity conditions were group identity (making salient the identity of the company as a whole), individual identity (making salient the identity of individual divisions), or, for majority/minority negotiations only, mixed identity.¹

All negotiators received an introduction that read:

Alphatec Co. is a manufacturer of decorative and novelty items (inspirational

¹ There were 17 negotiations in the 3/1 company focus cell, 17 in 3/1 division focus, 18 in the 3/1 mixed focus cell, 19 in 2/2 company focus, and 18 in 2/2 division focus.
posters, T-shirts with company logos, etc.). There are four geographical division of Alphatec: Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, and Southwest. Representatives of the four divisions need to reach agreement about the specifications of an innovative novelty item they are developing for display in office reception areas. You are here representing the [Southwest] division. The four divisions have somewhat different resources, capabilities, and preferred customer bases, so there may be some disagreement as to the preferred specifications. The different options for the novelty item are listed on the chart on this next page, along with the profits that your division will earn from the various options if they are selected. Your job is to negotiate the best agreement you can.

Negotiators were also given the payoff chart at this time. The introduction deliberately did not specify whether "best agreement" meant "best for all divisions" or "best for my division" (cf. Kramer et al., 1993). The social identity manipulation, described next, should suggest one frame or the other.

After reading the introduction and payoff chart, negotiators were presented with a written "role-playing exercise" which served as the social identity manipulation (see Appendix B). For all negotiators, the instructions began: "This role-playing exercise will help you get into the character of the division representative. We're going to ask you to make up some background for the negotiation. We realize you have very little information to start with -- you don't have to worry about the background you make up is realistic or not. What you write will not be shown to the other negotiators at any time, and you don't need to use the background you make up in the negotiation itself. This is just an exercise to help you feel comfortable with your role. Please spend the next 5 minutes writing about the following topic:". The topics that followed contained the social identity manipulation. In group identity condition, the topic read: "What sets Alphatec apart from other companies, particularly from others in the novelty industry? You can talk about anything that makes Alphatec different, from its sales performance to the skills of its managers to the food served in the cafeteria. Use your imagination." In the individual identity condition, the topic read: "What sets your
division apart from the other three divisions of Alphatec? You can talk about anything that makes your division different, from its sales performance to the skills of its managers to the food served in its cafeteria. Use your imagination".

This manipulation draws elements from other successful social identity manipulations (e.g. Kramer et al, 1993; Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992). For example, Kramer et al. asked students to either list ways in which they were similar to other MBA students in their program (group identity) or ways in which they were different from their fellow students (individual identity); this was found to influence outcomes in negotiations between fellow students. This manipulation is similar, except that it manipulates the salient level of the organization (company vs. division) rather than making salient similarities vs. differences.

After negotiators completed this exercise, they completed a questionnaire which primarily served as a manipulation check, to insure that the social identity manipulation did shift the participants' focus (see Appendix C). There were three items related specifically to perceptions of shared identity: "I think of the other division representatives as pretty similar to myself", "I feel like the other division representatives and I are a group", and "I think of the other representatives as possible opponents"; and three items related to goals: "I plan to work hard toward reaching a settlement that benefits my own division", "I plan to work hard toward reaching a settlement that benefits Alphatec as a whole", and "I plan to work hard toward reaching a settlement that benefits the other divisions".

After completing the questionnaire, participants were given 30 minutes to negotiate, in a face-to-face unconstrained fashion. Participants had no communication with each other prior to negotiation, although they were in each others' presence while reading and completing questionnaires. After indicating the agreement reached, subjects completed a second questionnaire\(^2\) (see Appendix D). This measure included the same goal and perception items as the pre-negotiation questionnaire (with the tense

\(^2\) One negotiation in the 2/2 configuration did not receive the post-negotiation questionnaire.
changed for the goal items), as well as questions about how satisfied they were with their agreement, how fair it was, and how much it benefitted the company as a whole. Finally, each negotiator was presented with a blank payoff chart labelled with the name of one of the divisions in the opposing faction; participants were asked to fill in what they thought that division's payoff chart looked like. This measure was used to determine judgment accuracy regarding the opponents’ priorities.

Results

The results are divided into several sections: (1) manipulation checks, (2) effects of configuration and focus condition on the outcomes achieved by the negotiators, (3) relationships between negotiation performance and measured group identity, (4) judgments of fairness and satisfaction, (5) judgment accuracy, and (6) a separate analysis of the mixed focus negotiations.

Manipulation Checks

The level-of-focus manipulation was successful in inducing a greater sense of common group identity in the company focused condition. There were three perception items and three goal items that were expected to be related to group identity. The three perception items, "I think of the other division representatives as similar to myself", "I feel like the other division representatives and I are a group", and "I think of the other division representatives as possible opponents" (reverse scored), and two of the goal items, "I plan to work hard toward a settlement that benefits Alphatec as a whole" and "I plan to work hard toward a settlement that benefits the other divisions" were highly intercorrelated. These five items were averaged for an index of group identity (GID; alpha = .81). The remaining goal item, "I plan to work hard toward a settlement that benefits my own division" was not correlated with the GID index (r=.15, n.s.). The GID scores of the four participants in each negotiation were averaged to yield a group-level score, to avoid questions of dependence in the observations. Participants in the company focused negotiations felt more of a common group identity (M=6.62 sd=.73) than participants in the division focused negotiations (M=6.18 sd=.74), F(1,67)=6.68 p<.05. Although the difference between GID means is small, the variance around those means is also small; the effect
size for the focus manipulation is .60, typically interpreted as a moderate effect size. There was no effect on GID of configuration and no interaction; neither would be expected, because participants were not yet aware of the division of opinion in their particular negotiation.

There was a significant effect of focus condition for each individual item in the scale, as well, with the exception of the item regarding seeing the others as possible opponents ("benefit company as a whole": F(1,67)=6.26 p<.05; "benefit other divisions": F(1,67)=3.98 p=.05; "see others as similar": F(1,67)=8.08 p<.01; "see us as a group": F(1,67)=7.04 p=.01; "see others as possible opponents": F<1). Also, there was no effect of focus on the "benefit own division" item (F<1).

In the mixed focus negotiations, minority members were given the company focused manipulation while majority members were given the division focused manipulation. In these negotiations, the company focus did not appear to have the desired impact. The GID reported by minority members (M=5.98 sd=1.49) was not significantly different from that reported by the majority members (M=6.16 sd=.80), F<1; in fact, the minority's mean GID was slightly lower. Potential reasons for this are discussed later in a separate section devoted to the mixed focus negotiations. Because the possibility exists that the manipulation was not effective for these participants, their results are not discussed in the main body of the results. Their data were not included in any of the analyses reported below; however the results remain the same regardless of whether their data are allowed to contribute to the overall variance or not.

**Outcome Measures**

**Integrative Performance.** It was predicted that salient group identity would result in lower integrative performance in majority/minority negotiations, but would not negatively affect integration in negotiations between equal factions -- in other words, there should be an interaction between configuration and focus. This hypothesis was partially supported. Recall that the negotiation task provided two opportunities for integrative trade-offs; in 3/1 negotiations, in the company focused condition only 35% of the agreements included at least one complete trade-off,
whereas in the division focused condition, 82% of the agreements included at least one trade-off. In the 2/2 negotiations, in contrast, 52% of the agreements reached in the company focused condition included at least one trade-off, whereas 67% of the agreements in the division focused condition did so (see Figure 1). Although the difference between focus conditions appears to be greater for 3/1 negotiations than for 2/2, the predicted interaction between configuration and focus was not significant ($z=1.37$ n.s.). However, in terms of simple main effects, there were significantly fewer trade-offs in the company focused 3/1 negotiations than the division focused 3/1 negotiations ($z=2.85$ $p<.05$), whereas the difference between company and division focus was not significant for 2/2 negotiations ($z=0.92$ n.s.), as predicted. Also, there was a significant main effect for focus (across both configurations), $z=2.55$ $p<.05$. There was no effect of configuration ($z = 0.06$ n.s.).

The sum of points earned by both factions on the trade-off issues provides a different kind of measure of integrative performance; it is more sensitive to some aspects of performance and less sensitive to others. For example, one of the trade-offs was worth more points than the other; a measure of joint profit would detect differences in which trade-off was made, for those negotiations that made only one. On the other hand, it is possible to achieve reasonably high joint profit on the trade-off issues without actually making any complete trade-offs. For this measure, the points earned on these issues by a single member of each faction were summed. Note that this measure does not take into account how many people were in each faction; it is purely a measure of how well the two factions’ interests were integrated. For 3/1 negotiations the joint profit was $8923^3$ (sd=1962) in company focused negotiations, and $10,624$ (sd=1584) in division focused negotiations. For 2/2 negotiations, the joint profit was $9731$ (sd=1528) in the company focus, and $9975$ (sd=1492) in the division focus (see Figure 2). The predicted interaction was not significant ($F(1, 67)=1.97$ n.s.), but the hypothesis was supported in the simple main effects. Integrative

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$^3$The maximum possible joint profit, which could be obtained only in fully integrative negotiations, was 11,200; the minimum possible was 2,800.
performance was significantly lower in company focused 3/1 negotiations than in division focused 3/1 negotiations \( (t(30.6)=-2.19 \quad p<.05) \), whereas the difference was not significant in 2/2 negotiations \( (t<1) \). There was also a main effect of focus such that integrative performance was lower in the company focused negotiations overall than in the division focused negotiations overall, \( F(1,67)=4.10 \quad p<.05 \). There was not a significant effect of configuration \( (F<1) \). Altogether, the effects of the independent variables accounted for 12\% of the total sum of squares for joint profit.

**Distributive Performance.** Although it is apparent that full integration was not taking place in the company focused 3/1 negotiations, the measures above do not indicate what was taking place on these issues instead; for example, on the integrative performance measure above, a compromise solution would receive just as low a score as a solution of complete domination by one faction. It was predicted that in company focused 3/1 negotiations, the majority would have a profit advantage over the minority, to a greater extent than in division focused 3/1 negotiations. To assess this, the points earned by the minority member on the four trade-off issues were subtracted from the points earned by a majority member. The difference between majority and minority profits was significantly greater in the company focused negotiations \( (M=1882^5 \quad sd=2507) \) than in the division focused negotiations \( (M=294 \quad sd=735) \), \( t(18.7)=2.51 \quad p<.05 \), as predicted (see Figure 3). The effect of focus accounted for 10\% of the total sum of squares for relative profit. In the company focused negotiations, the majority members earned an average of 5402 points (each), while the minority earned an average of 3520 points. In division focused negotiations, the majority members earned an average of 5279 points, while the minority earned 4985 points. In addition to testing whether the magnitude of the majority advantage differed by focus condition,

\[^4\] Welch's separate variance t-test was used whenever the difference in standard deviations between conditions warranted it. This test compensates for heterogeneity of variances by adjusting the degrees of freedom of the test.

\[^5\] The maximum possible majority advantage was 7,000 and the minimum possible was -7,000.
the effects of focus on majority profit and minority profit were also tested separately, to determine in more detail where the difference in advantage lay. Focus did not have a significant effect on the profit of majority members (t<1), but it did have a significant effect on the profit of the minority (t(22.8)=2.70 p<.05).

These analyses have examined the four integrative issues which could be traded off. There were also two issues of equal importance to both factions, which could not be traded off. Obviously, all six issues need to be considered in determining whether the majority had an advantage over the minority, but it is important to examine the two types separately as well, because negotiators may approach them differently. For the integrative issues, the agreements which were worth the greatest total to the company as a whole (the trade-offs) were also agreements which yielded the same profit to both majority and minority members. For the equal-importance issues, both of these goals could not be met at the same time. Compromise on these two issues was the only way to achieve equal profits for all, yet majority domination was the only way to gain the greatest profit for the company as a whole. For these issues, the majority advantage was greater but not significantly so (t(32)=1.28 n.s.) in the company focused negotiations (M=1129 sd=1317) than in the division focused negotiations (M=588 sd=1145). Summing up over all six issues, the majority advantage was significantly greater in company focused negotiations (M=3011 sd=3417) than in division focused negotiations (M=882 sd=1026), t(18.9)=2.46 p<.05.

Finally, in the 2/2 negotiations, it was predicted that the division of profits would be more equal in the company focused negotiations than in the division focused. The data did not support this. The average absolute difference between the profit of a member of one faction and the profit of a member of another was higher in the company focused negotiations (M=326 sd=527) than in the division focused negotiations (M=247 sd=337), although this difference was not significant (t<1).

**Pareto-Efficiency.** Surprisingly, in the 3/1 negotiations, most of the non-integrative agreements in the company focused condition were not pareto-efficient. It

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6 The maximum possible majority advantage was 2,800 and the minimum was -2.800.
was expected that, rather than choosing integrative agreements, these negotiators would
give the majority members more resources than they could earn in an integrative
agreement. In general, if the majority members were to end up with all the resources,
that might not be the best use of the resources (the total value of the agreement would
be lower than the maximum possible), but at least it would be a pareto-efficient use of
resources, in that there would be no possible agreement that could benefit one party
more without hurting another party. However, this is not the type of agreement that
was found in the company focused negotiations. Only three of the 11 non-integrative
agreements were pareto-efficient. Although the majority had a significant advantage
(M=1906 sd=1936; t(7)=2.78 p<.05) over the minority in the remaining eight
negotiations, neither the majority nor the minority earned as much as they could have
through integration. In the 3/1 configuration, there were significantly more
non-pareto-efficient negotiations in the company focused condition (47% of the
negotiations were inefficient) than in the division focused condition (17% of
negotiations were inefficient), z=2.64 p<.05.

Relationships Between Outcomes and Measured Group Identity

As reported above, participants in the company focused negotiations reported
higher GID prior to negotiation than participants in the division focused negotiations.
The company focused negotiators were also less likely to take advantage of the
conflict’s integrative potential. However, negotiators’ actual reported level of GID
was not correlated with their integrative performance (as measured by the joint profit
on the integrative issues), either for the sample as a whole (r = -.02), or for the 3/1
negotiations (r = .09) or 2/2 negotiations (r=-.03). It was also found, as predicted, that
the majority had a greater profit advantage in the company focused negotiations than
in the division focused negotiations, but again, the correlation between measured GID
and size of majority advantage was not significant (r=.07). Finally, it was predicted
that 2/2 negotiations in the company focus would have a more equal division of profit
than those in the division focus; the means were not in the predicted direction.
However, there was a significant correlation in the predicted direction; the greater the
GID prior to negotiation, the lower the profit difference between parties (r = -.37
p<.05).

Judgments of Fairness and Satisfaction

There was no effect of focus (F(1,66)=2.58 n.s.), configuration (F(1,66)=1.34 n.s.), or their interaction (F(1,66)=2.10 n.s.) on negotiators’ overall satisfaction with their agreements. Within 3/1 negotiations, majority members were more satisfied (M=7.72 sd=.77) than minority members (M=6.55 sd=1.80; t(33)=3.53 p=.001), and this difference was not significantly affected by focus (t<1). The difference between majority and minority satisfaction in the company focus was 1.39 (sd=1.86) and in the division focus it was 0.92 (sd=1.98).

Negotiators in 2/2 negotiations felt more strongly that their agreements were fair (M=8.10 sd=0.80) than did those in 3/1 negotiations (M=7.38 sd=0.95; F(1,66)=13.72 p<.001). There was no effect of focus (F<1) and no interaction (F<1). In the 3/1 negotiations, majority members felt somewhat but not significantly more that the agreement reached was fair (M=7.44 sd=0.81), as compared to minority members (M=7.06 sd=1.67; t(33)=1.51 n.s.), and the difference was not significantly affected by focus (t<1).

It was predicted that minority members in company focused negotiations would find agreements that gave an advantage to the majority to be more satisfying and fair than would minority members in division focused negotiations. Minority judgments of satisfaction and fairness were examined in those negotiations that gave an advantage to the majority. In such negotiations, minority satisfaction and fairness were higher in the company focus (satisfaction: M=6.31 sd=2.06; fairness: M=7.15 sd=2.07) than in the division focus (satisfaction: M=6.08 sd=1.25; fairness: M=6.54 sd=0.87), but not significantly higher (ts<1).

Judgment Accuracy

The results above indicate that a sense of common group identity may not change how negotiators value different outcomes. Agreements that gave an advantage to the majority were not perceived as significantly more fair or satisfying when group identity was salient. Furthermore, in both focus conditions, more integrative solutions were seen as more beneficial for the company (company focus: r=.66 p<.005; division
focus: $r = .69 \ p < .005$). Nevertheless, the company focused negotiations were significantly less likely to integrate the two factions' interests and gave a significantly greater profit advantage to the majority. If negotiators' values did not change, then a change in negotiation process may have been responsible for this difference in outcomes. If, as predicted, negotiators in the company focused negotiations simply did not exchange the information necessary for discovering profitable trade-offs, that would explain their poor integrative performance. Following negotiation, participants were asked to fill in the point values on a payoff chart for someone of the opposing faction. These charts were coded for accuracy of priorities. For each pair of issues that could be traded off, negotiators received a "1." if they were correct about the opponent's priorities, "0" if they said that both issues were equal in importance, and "-1" if they reversed the priorities. Each person's accuracy for the two pairs of issues was averaged, and then two group-level measures were derived for each negotiation: the average accuracy of the negotiators, and the accuracy of the most accurate person.

Negotiators were on average less accurate in company focused (M=0.00, sd=0.66) than division focused negotiations (M=0.31, sd=0.50; F(1,62)=4.94, p<.05), and marginally less accurate in 3/1 negotiations (M=0.21, sd=0.64) than 2/2 negotiations (M=0.28, sd=0.52; F(1,62)=3.25, p<.08). This was qualified by a marginally significant interaction (F(1,62)=3.31, p<.08); that is, the difference between company focus (M= -0.25, sd=0.68) and division focus (M=0.31, sd=0.53) was marginally greater in 3/1 negotiations than in 2/2 negotiations (company: M=0.25, sd=0.55; division: M=0.31, sd=0.49). The pattern of means was similar for the most accurate person in the negotiation, and all three effects were significant (focus: F(1,62)=7.37, p<.01; configuration: F(1,62)=8.20, p<.01; interaction: F(1,62)=5.90, p<.05). Focus made a greater difference in the accuracy of the most accurate member in 3/1 negotiations (company: M=0.13, sd=0.83; division: M=0.82, sd=0.53) than in 2/2 negotiations (company: M=0.84, sd=0.45; division: M=0.88, sd=0.28), see Figure 4.

7 In 5 negotiations, participants did not complete the payoff charts according to the instructions, so they are not included in the analyses below.
Altogether, the effects of the independent variables accounted for 25% of the total sum of squares for this judgment accuracy measure.

If information exchange plays a role in determining integrative performance, then judgment accuracy should be correlated with integrative performance. Indeed, integrative performance is correlated with accuracy of both the average negotiator ($r = .58 \ p < .001$) and of the most accurate negotiator ($r = .67 \ p < .001$) for 3/1 negotiations. However, these correlations do not hold for 2/2 negotiations (accuracy of average negotiator: $r = -.01 \ n.s.$; accuracy of most accurate negotiator: $r = .16 \ n.s.$). The distribution of accuracy is more highly skewed in 2/2 negotiations than in 3/1 negotiations; for example, 85% of the 2/2 negotiations included at least one person with perfect accuracy, whereas only 63% of the 3/1 negotiations included at least one person with perfect accuracy. However, although the distribution of accuracy was skewed in 2/2 negotiations as compared to 3/1 negotiations, the distribution of integrative performance was not. In other words, whereas in 3/1 negotiations, more accurate negotiations were more integrative, there were many highly accurate 2/2 negotiations that were not fully integrative. To explore this idea further, negotiations were dichotomized on accuracy (whether or not the negotiation included at least one member with perfect accuracy) and integrative performance (whether the negotiation was fully integrative or not).\footnote{Perfect accuracy for the most accurate member and perfect integration for integrative performance were in fact the medians for those measures.} In the 3/1 configuration, 76% of the negotiations fell into the congruent cells (either one or more accurate members and fully integrative performance, or no accurate members and less-than-full integration), and 24% fell in the incongruent cells (either accurate but not integrative, or integrative but not accurate). In contrast, in the 2/2 configuration, only 48% fell into the congruent cells; over half were incongruent (either accurate but not integrative, or integrative but not accurate). The difference in percentage of incongruent negotiations is significant ($z = 2.06 \ p < .05$).

\textbf{Analyses for the Mixed Social Identity Negotiations}
As described above, the company focus manipulation did not appear to be successful in the mixed social identity condition; minorities did not report higher GID prior to negotiation than did majority members. There are several possible reasons for why the manipulation did not appear to be successful in this condition even though it was successful in creating higher GID in the company focused condition as compared to the division focused. The most likely explanation is lower reliability in the mixed negotiations; in comparing the company focused negotiations to the division focused negotiations, four participants' scores went into each negotiation average and there were 36 negotiations per condition. In the mixed negotiations, the comparison is made between 18 single scores on the one side and 18 three-person factions on the other. Thus, it is possible that the majority and minority were focused on different identities, but the pre-negotiation GID measure was simply not reliable enough to pick it up. However, other interpretations are possible as well. Although negotiators had not yet interacted with each other when filling out the pre-negotiation measures, they had spent approximately 10 minutes in each others' presence, including 5 minutes of writing an answer to the social identity manipulation. It is possible that negotiators' non-verbal behaviors were influenced by the manipulation (more eye contact and smiles in the company focus, for example). In the conditions in which all members received the same manipulation, perception of these non-verbal cues would tend to strengthen the effect of the manipulation. In the mixed focus negotiations, in contrast, the division focused cues emitted by three participants may have overwhelmed the company focused cues coming from the minority. This may seem somewhat farfetched as an explanation for lack of pre-negotiation differences, but such a process would almost assuredly have taken place after the negotiation began. One can speculate on whether a mix of different salient identities could ever be stable in such an interaction, or whether negotiators would eventually converge on one level of identity (be it group, subgroup, or individual).

The pre-negotiation GID of these negotiations resembled that of division focused negotiations (mixed focus: M=6.12 sd=0.76; vs. division focus: t<1; vs. company focus: t(31.5)=2.33 p<.05) and they performed like division focused
negotiations in nearly all respects. For all the analyses reported above, the mixed focus negotiations were compared individually to the division and company focused negotiations, and then the mixed and division focused conditions were collapsed, to see if the effects reported above still held. Any differences from the previous analyses are reported below. In terms of integrative performance, 94% of the mixed focus negotiations made at least one complete tradeoff, and their average joint profit on the trade-off issues was 10,766 (sd=691). If these negotiations are grouped with the 3/1 division focused negotiations, the interaction between configuration and focus becomes significant, both for percentage of negotiations that made trade-offs (z=2.43 p<.05) and for the joint profit measure (t(51.1)=2.32 p<.05). In other words, the difference between the company focus and the division or mixed focus is greater in the 3/1 negotiations than the 2/2 negotiations.

The majority did not have a significant profit advantage over the minority on integrative issues in the mixed focus negotiations (M=277 sd=826; t(17)=1.43 n.s.). Majority members here earned slightly more than in the other two conditions (M=5522 sd=358), but the differences are not significant (ts<1). Minorities earned on average 5244 (sd=675), significantly more than in the company focused condition (t(19.3)=3.32 p<.005), but not significantly different from the division focus (t<1).

For the issues of equal importance to all parties, the average majority advantage in mixed focus negotiations was 444 (sd=1098), not significantly different from the majority advantage in either company focused (t(31.2)=1.67 n.s.) or division focused negotiations (t<1).

In terms of negotiator measures, the overall prenegotiation GID in mixed focus negotiations was 6.12 (sd=0.76), significantly lower than in company focused negotiations (t(31.5)=2.33 p<.05) and not significantly different than in division focused negotiations (t<1). After negotiation, the average GID was 7.17 (sd=0.68), in this case not significantly different from the company focused negotiations (t<1), and significantly higher than division focused (t(31.7)=2.87 p<.01). This is the only measure for which division focused and mixed focus negotiations differed.

Negotiators were more accurate in their judgments of the other faction's
priorities in the mixed focus condition than in the company focused condition (average negotiator accuracy: \(M=0.44, t(28.8)=3.02 \ p<.001\); accuracy of most accurate negotiator: \(M=0.87, t(23.5)=3.13 \ p<.005\)). Judgment accuracy did not differ significantly between the mixed focus and division focused conditions (average negotiator accuracy: \(t(33)=1.38 \ n.s.;\) accuracy of most accurate negotiator: \(t<1\)).
Figure 1: Proportion of Negotiations Making at Least One Integrative Trade-off as a Function of Social Identity and Configuration
Figure 2: Joint Profit as a Function of Social Identity and Configuration
Figure 3: Profit of Majority and Minority Members as a Function of Social Identity
Figure 4: Judgment Accuracy of Most Accurate Negotiator as a Function of Social Identity and Configuration
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS

This study examined negotiations taking place between two factions of a group, factions which did not become apparent to the negotiators until discussions actually began. In this context, making the overall group identity salient was found to decrease the amount of integration that took place between factions, particularly in negotiations between majority and minority factions. Also, when group identity was salient, the majority members had a greater profit advantage over the minority, as compared to when individual identity was salient. However, in many of those salient group identity negotiations, participants needlessly sacrificed the interests of the minority in agreements that were not as beneficial to the majority as integration would have been. In majority versus minority negotiations, there were more non-pareto-efficient agreements when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient.

These findings for majority/minority negotiations seem somewhat paradoxical. Although participants in group-focused negotiations reported more concern for reaching an agreement that benefitted the group as a whole, their agreements were less pareto-efficient. Although they reported more concern for reaching an agreement that benefitted their fellow group members, they were more likely than individual-focused negotiators to reach agreements that left one group member at a significant disadvantage.

Thus, both the group prototype effects and interpersonal effects predicted by social identity theory were supported, although for different measures. Negotiators reported the predicted interpersonal effects of increased concern for the group and for each other when group identity was salient, but their negotiation outcomes instead represented the predicted group prototype effects of majority advantage, lack of integration, and lack of information exchange.

Two possible mechanisms were proposed for the lack of integration in majority/minority negotiations: (1) minority members perceive the group prototype (the majority preferences) to be more fair and satisfying when group identity is salient than when individual identity is salient, and thus are more willing to concede to the majority; and (2) negotiators exchange less information about priorities when group identity is salient, and thus are not able to discover integrative opportunities.
The first mechanism was not well supported; for judgments of both fairness and satisfaction the means were in the predicted directions but the difference between identity conditions was not significant. It is important to note that in this study, this mechanism was tested using negotiators’ reactions to the agreements that they themselves had crafted. For example, the reactions of group-focused minority members who agreed to majority advantage solutions were compared to the reactions of individual-focused minority members who agreed to majority advantage solutions. This is perhaps not the most powerful test of these proposed mechanisms. Because these negotiations required unanimous decisions, no minority member had to agree to anything he or she found truly dissatisfying or unfair. Getting negotiators’ reactions to a wide range of possible agreements to their conflict might provide more useful information. Nevertheless, it was not unreasonable to expect some variation in judgments of satisfaction and fairness even when restricted to agreements that were generally acceptable to the participants who crafted them. Indeed, significant differences were found for other comparisons involving satisfaction (majority members were more satisfied that minorities) and fairness (participants in evenly-balanced negotiations saw their agreements as more fair than did participants in majority/minority negotiations).

The information exchange mechanism, in contrast, received more support. Information exchange was measured via the accuracy of negotiators’ judgments about the other faction’s priorities. Participants in group-focused majority/minority negotiations were on average far less accurate about the other faction’s priorities than were negotiators in any other condition. However, even within this condition, the more accurate the negotiators were, the more integrative their agreements were. The same relationship holds true for the other majority/minority negotiations. Although average accuracy was much higher in the individual identity negotiations, still, the more accurate negotiators were the more integrative their agreements were. This suggests that negotiators in the different social identity conditions did not differ so much in their opinions of various kinds of agreements as in their ability to discover various kind of agreements. This is further supported by the fact that in all
majority/minority conditions, the more integrative an agreement was, the more negotiators perceived their agreement to benefit the group as a whole.

Turning to equal-faction negotiations, they were predicted to show only the interpersonal effects of group identity, because such negotiations would presumably lack a clear group prototype. These negotiators also reported that they were more concerned for the group and each other when group identity was salient, but the effects of group identity on negotiation outcomes were modest. The equality of outcomes did not differ significantly between the two identity conditions, although there was a significant correlation between measured salience of group identity and equality of outcomes. And although there was an overall main effect of identity on integrative performance and on judgment accuracy, tests of simple main effects indicated that within the equal-faction negotiations, neither of these effects was significant. Thus, these results are quite comparable to those found for dyadic negotiation (Kramer et al., 1993).

Given the many interpersonal effects of group identity that should enhance integration, why did integrative performance not improve in equal-faction negotiations when group identity was salient? Kramer et al. (1993) suggest that group identity has potentially negative interpersonal effects as well, such as increasing negotiators' reluctance to press for their own interests. Negotiators in this study were asked to what extent they planned to pursue the benefit of their own division, and their response to this question did not differ significantly between the two identity conditions, but this possibility needs further research. It is also possible that a group prototype was operating even in the equal-faction negotiations. Self-categorization theorists caution that a group prototype is not necessarily a simple average of group member opinions (Hogg, 1992); it is instead an expression of the characteristics, opinions, or preferences of the typical or ideal group member. When a group is evenly divided on some issue, members may or may not consider a compromise position to be typical of their group. However, if they do consider the point midway between the opposing preferences to be their group prototype, it will anchor their decision, and negotiators who are too quick to accept compromise do not discover

Overall, the findings of this study support the relevance of social identity theory for negotiation, and yielded several important insights. In addition to demonstrating the effects of group identity in several multiperson configurations, this study demonstrated that, as is the case in other types of conflict, drawing attention to a relevant outgroup increased the salience of group identity. Previous manipulations of social identity in negotiation have relied on either explicitly labelling negotiators as ingroup or outgroup members (Thompson, 1993) or have asked negotiators to generate lists of similarities to their opponent to heighten group identity (Kramer et al., 1993). In this study, asking negotiators to focus on how the group as a whole differed from some other group appeared to be successful in making their group identity salient. From a practical standpoint, this manipulation is useful because it seems to have few demand characteristics. Recall that participants were asked to invent differences on dimensions such as managerial style and cafeteria food, either contrasting their own division to the others (for individual identity) or contrasting the whole company to other companies (for group identity). This manipulation is unlikely to have revealed the experimental hypotheses to negotiators; that is, spending five minutes writing about how Alphatec's pension plan and benefits are better than the competitor's (a common topic chosen in the group identity condition) should not have signalled to negotiators that they were expected to give in to the majority in the upcoming negotiation.

The study reported here tests only a few components of the larger model presented in the earlier chapters. Components that need further attention include the processes and outcomes that result from salient subgroup identity. For example, it is unclear whether the interpersonal effects of subgroup identity should help integrative performance (by heightening negotiator aspirations) or hinder it (by creating mistrust), making outcome predictions even more complicated in these negotiations. Also, there is another negotiation outcome not addressed in this model that may be important when subgroup identity is salient, and that is the rate of impasse. Because of the hostility and competitiveness that can accompany intergroup conflict, such negotiations may have trouble reaching any agreement at all. Thus, although in this study groups
reached inferior agreements when group identity was salient as compared to when individual identity was salient, particularly in majority/minority negotiations, future research might find that group identity still leads to better outcomes than subgroup identity.

Although a social identity perspective on majority influence proved useful in this study, social identity is not the only lens through which to examine the dynamics of the majority and the minority. Future research could also be inspired by the normative and informational influence literatures. Although social identity theory is closely intertwined with the theories of normative and informational influence, these theories have something to offer on their own as well; they draw attention to other variables that may be potentially important in negotiation but which may not play a major role in social identity theory. For example, research on informational influence has demonstrated that majorities whose members have come to a conclusion through group discussion are less influential than majorities whose members have independently come to the same conclusion (Wilder, 1977). This finding implies that when it comes to persuasive argumentation in negotiation, a subgroup that is perceived as a single negotiating entity (such as a team) will be less influential than a subgroup composed of separate parties, because the first subgroup’s information will be seen as coming from a single source rather than multiple independent sources.

From a theoretical perspective, the study reported here provides useful information; predictions derived from social identity theory regarding the process and outcomes of negotiation were supported. From a practical standpoint, this study suggests some recommendations both for people involved in multiperson conflicts and for the groups or organizations within which these conflicts take place. The first chapter opened with a vignette of a work group negotiating over project responsibilities; the broad question was, what do these workers need to know about influence in multiperson negotiations in order to get the outcomes they want? Researchers have suggested that power in multiperson negotiations comes from having a subgroup of fellow negotiators on one’s side (Polzer et al., 1995), so this study examined some aspects of the influence of majority subgroups. What should the
results of this study suggest to the self-interested negotiator? First, it suggests that
when a conflict has integrative potential, the majority advantage that comes with a
sense of salient group identity is a dubious advantage. Majorities earned significantly
more than their minority opponents on the integrative issues in this condition, but not
significantly more than majority members in negotiations where individual identity was
salient. Although there were a few instances of complete majority domination when
group identity was salient, an outcome that did not occur in other conditions, there
were also significantly more non-pareto-efficient agreements, in which majority
members settled for less than they could have earned in a fully integrative agreement.

The savvy negotiator might argue that, having been made aware of this
potential pitfall, she can now go forth and take advantage of the apparent compliance
of a group-focused minority. However, it is not clear to what extent such a mix of
goals and identities could be sustained throughout an interaction. Given that group
members’ interactions with each other certainly must play a role in determining what
identity is salient at any point in time, a self-interested person hoping to take
advantage of the group focus of others would have to play a pretty subtle game and
not give off any signals that were inconsistent with group identity. Majority members
whose individual identities were salient did not succeed in gaining an advantage over
group-focused minorities in the mixed identity condition of this study, but there is
some question of whether the identity salience manipulations were effective even at the
outset of negotiation in this condition.

The outlook for majorities when the conflict does not include integrative
potential is somewhat different. For the two issues that were equal in importance to
all parties, the majority had an advantage over the minority in general, and this
advantage was somewhat, although not significantly, larger when group identity was
salient. In this case, being part of a majority subgroup was indeed a source of power
for negotiators.

It is likely that, in the business world at least, people are going to be involved
in more and more multiperson negotiations on an everyday basis. Organizations are
continuing to increase their use of groups and teams in the workplace. Sixty percent
of organizations surveyed in 1992 said they planned to use more teams and groups in the future (Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 1992), and a recent poll of over 1,800 employers found that 67% of them use teams to conduct at least some of their work (Wall Street Journal, 1995). Many of these teams find themselves making important decisions, including decisions about the distribution of scarce resources. In such cases, not only do the team members have a stake in their decision, the organization as a whole does, too. Clearly, it is to the organization’s advantage for groups to maximize their use of available resources -- in other words, for groups to take advantage of integrative potential. Also, it is to the organization’s advantage to make sure that resources go to group members who need them and can best use them (Mannix, 1993; Polzer et al., 1995), so solutions that leave some parties at a resource disadvantage may be problematic. Depending on the group’s task, it may be best for the group to divide resources equally among members. For some interdependent tasks (termed conjunctive tasks), for example, group performance is limited by the performance of the weakest member. In such cases, an unequal division of resources can hamper the accomplishment of the group’s mission, even if the division is satisfying to a majority of the members. This study provides further evidence that group identity can be a drawback in some group decision contexts, such as negotiations between unequal factions. A focus on the group can lead to the sacrifice of minority interests, a sacrifice which may not in fact be beneficial for the group as a whole.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Kramer, R.M. (1991a). The more the merrier? Social psychological aspects of multiparty negotiations in organizations. In M. Bazerman, R. Lewicki, & B. Sheppard (Eds.), Research on negotiation in organizations: vol. 3 Handbook of
negotiation research (pp. 307-332). Greenwich, CT: JAI.


APPENDIX A: BACKGROUND READINGS FOR PARTICIPANTS

Alphatec Negotiation

Alphatec Co. is a manufacturer of decorative and novelty items (inspirational posters, funny keychains, T-shirts with company logos, etc.). There are four geographical divisions of Alphatec: Northeast, Southeast, Midwest, and Southwest. Representatives of the four divisions need to reach agreement about the specifications of an innovative novelty item they are developing for display in office reception areas.

You are here representing the [ ] division.

The four divisions have somewhat different resources, capabilities, and preferred customer bases, so there may be some disagreement as to the preferred specifications. The different options for the novelty item are listed on the chart on the next page, along with the profits that your division will earn from the various options. In other words, the more points an option is worth on your chart, the more your division will earn if that option is selected.

Your job is to negotiate the best agreement you can.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLOR</th>
<th>What color will the item be?</th>
<th>SIZE</th>
<th>What size will the item be?</th>
<th>PITCH</th>
<th>What will the item sound like?</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<th>SCENT</th>
<th>What will the item smell like?</th>
<th>MATERIAL</th>
<th>What will it be made of?</th>
<th>MESSAGE</th>
<th>What will the message be about?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Floral</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Cloth</td>
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<td>Happiness</td>
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## PAYOFF CHART
for [ ] Division

<table>
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<td>What will the message be about?</td>
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APPENDIX B: SOCIAL IDENTITY MANIPULATION

Role-Playing Exercise

- This role-playing exercise will help you get into the character of the [ ] division representative.

- We'd like you to make up some background for the negotiation.

- We realize you have very little information to start with -- you don't have to worry about whether the background that you make up is realistic or not.

- What you write will NOT be shown to the other negotiators at any time, and you don't need to refer to what you made up in the actual negotiation itself.

- This is an exercise to help you feel comfortable with your role.

INSTRUCTIONS: Please spend the next five minutes writing about the following topic (you may use the back of this sheet).

[group identity version]

What sets Alphatec apart from other companies, particularly from others in the novelty industry? You can talk about anything that makes Alphatec different, from its sales performance to the skills of its managers to the food served in the cafeteria. Use your imagination.

[individual identity version]

What sets the [ ] division apart from the other divisions of Alphatec? You can talk about anything that makes the [ ] division different, from its sales performance to the skills of its managers to the food served in the cafeteria. Use your imagination.
APPENDIX C: PRE-NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire

1) Looking at the issue of “Color” on your chart, circle the option below that will be most profitable for your division:

BLUE GREEN RED YELLOW WHITE

2) Looking at your chart, circle the issue below that is most important in determining your division’s profits:

COLOR SIZE PITCH SCENT MATERIAL MESSAGE

Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement below by circling an appropriate number for each statement:

3) I plan to work hard toward reaching a settlement that benefits my division.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

4) I plan to work hard toward reaching a settlement that benefits Alphatec as a whole.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

5) I plan to work hard toward reaching a settlement that benefits the other divisions.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

6) When I think about the other division representatives, I think of them as pretty similar to myself.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

7) I feel like the other division representatives and I are a group.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

8) When I think about the other division representatives, I think of them as possible opponents.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
APPENDIX D: POST-NEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Post-Negotiation Questionnaire

1) How satisfied are you with the final agreement reached in your negotiation?

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Very</td>
<td>Satisfied</td>
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2) How fair do you think the final agreement was?

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<tr>
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3) How much do you think the final agreement benefits Alphatec as a whole?

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4) For each of the four divisions of the company listed below, how much do you think the final agreement benefits that division? PLEASE CIRCLE THE NAME OF THE DIVISION YOU REPRESENT.

a) NORTHEAST

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b) SOUTHEAST

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c) MIDWEST

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d) SOUTHWEST

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Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement below by circling an appropriate number for each statement:

5) I tried hard to reach a settlement that benefitted my division.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly</td>
<td>Agree</td>
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</table>
6) I tried hard to reach a settlement that benefitted Alphatec as a whole.

1: Strongly Agree
2: Agree
3: Neutral
4: Disagree
5: Strongly Disagree

7) I tried hard to reach a settlement that benefitted the other divisions.

1: Strongly Agree
2: Agree
3: Neutral
4: Disagree
5: Strongly Disagree

8) When I think about the other division representatives, I think of them as pretty similar to myself.

1: Strongly Agree
2: Agree
3: Neutral
4: Disagree
5: Strongly Disagree

9) I feel like the other division representatives and I are a group.

1: Strongly Agree
2: Agree
3: Neutral
4: Disagree
5: Strongly Disagree

10) When I think about the other division representatives, I think of them as opponents.

1: Strongly Agree
2: Agree
3: Neutral
4: Disagree
5: Strongly Disagree
Finally, we are interested in your perceptions of what other divisions’ preferences and priorities were in the negotiation you just completed. Fill in the values in blank payoff chart below according to what you think the [ ] division representative wanted. We realize this task may be difficult, but please give it your best try. As with your payoff chart, the largest point value anywhere on this chart is 3200, and the lowest point value is 0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLOR</th>
<th>SIZE</th>
<th>PITCH</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Citrus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Floral</td>
<td>Cloth</td>
<td>Happiness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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ERIKA PETERSON

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B.S. (with High Distinction) in Psychology (1991), University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

PUBLICATIONS:
