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THE SYNECDOCHIC PROSPECT: A RHETORICAL VIEW OF THE EMERGENCE OF A MODERN POETIC FROM THE ROMANTIC SYMBOL TO HART CRANE'S "THE BRIDGE"

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The Synecdochic Prospect: A Rhetorical View of the

Emergence of a Modern Poetic from the Romantic

Symbol to Hart Crane's The Bridge

by

Richard C. Katz

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

1980

Approved by Charles P. Alteri
(Chairperson of Supervisory Committee)

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I wish to express sincere appreciation to Professors Charles Altieri and Leroy Searle for their insistence on analytical rigor and for their unwavering patience with my own efforts. In addition, I am especially grateful to Olivia Spence whom I took for granted in the preparation of this manuscript.
CHAPTER I: The Synechocic Prospect

Synechoche, as it is commonly understood, is the name of a literary trope often identified and/or confused with metonymy and metaphor.\(^1\) My first task, therefore, will be to explain this identification and/or confusion. But my primary purpose here is to propose how an extended sense of the term serves as a rhetorical definition for the poetic symbol beginning with the Romantics. In explaining my definition of synechociche I hope to show how Aristotle's first two kinds of metaphor are synechocches, an understanding first elucidated by Quintillian and one which most translators of Aristotle now recognize.\(^2\) But a more significant recognition is the less precedented claim that Aristotle's proportional metaphor is composed of two synechocches\(^3\)--two part-whole relationships--with one of the constituent elements of one of the synechocches suppressed. Once this claim is established, it is then possible to see a structural similarity between old English kenning and Aristotle's proportional metaphor, an observation already given currency in recent linguistic studies of metaphor. Because this structural similarity is based upon the synechocic aspects of metaphor and kenning, it then becomes possible to substantiate the central claim of this dissertation. If the Romantic symbol is distinct from metaphor and allegory--an understanding which has remained surprisingly consistent
despite the shifting perspectives and changing vocabularies of literary history—the most illuminating way to credit and apply this understanding is to define symbol as synecdoche, a proportional metaphor one half of which is implied but remains indefinite, a kind of riddle like a kenning, but a riddle whose ground becomes provisional, subject to supplementary predication.

I propose all this not in the spirit of substituting one nest of terms (synecdoches) for another (symbols) in the way that meters are coming to replace inches as units for measurement, but to suggest an analytical approach to the problem of tracing the growth of the modern symbolic mode of representation from the Romantic symbol. My thesis corresponds in a rough way to Tindall's theory that the Romantic symbol is the first clear demarcation of a break from allegorical modes of representation that were traditional since the medieval period. The "dissociation of sensibility" Eliot laments after Milton is another sign of this break. And as Marjorie Nicholson points out in *Breaking the Circle*, as the medieval order died, with it the system of analogies that represented its structure lost its appeal for poets. The bridge between the medieval and romantic modes is, then, the extended metaphorical mode which characterizes the metaphysical poets.

Tindall suggests that the symbolic mode in Romantic poetry breaks with allegorical and metaphoric modes of representation.
But while it is possible to justify such a claim theoretically, a practical application and exemplification of it would soon reveal that a clean distinction among medieval, metaphysical and Romantic poetry is as problematic as a clean distinction between allegory, metaphor and symbol and their modes of representation. Such distinctions are, in practice, finally best treated as differences in degree, emphasis, and point of view. And any theoretical defense and justification, upon which practical and historical exemplification rests, must resist rigid distinctions among related terms or it will lack explanatory power.

Indeed, the further implications of Tindall's corollary claim that "symbol seems a metaphor one half of which remains unstated and indefinite" begins to argue against a clean fracture between symbolic and metaphoric modes, when we say that that metaphor itself is composed of two synecdoches. The specifics of this claim are adumbrated above and will be detailed in my preliminary definition of synecdoche in Chapter II. But the notion that symbol is a "kind of synecdoche" is not news. Tindall himself, Kenneth Burke, Angus Fletcher and Coleridge all note the synecdochic basis of the Romantic symbol. The application of this notion that I want to make extends this insight to modern poetry, rooting the structure of the modern symbol in Romantic soil. And by suggesting that synecdoche is the common essential constituent of allegory, metaphor and symbol, I anticipate the relatedness as
well as the distinction among these modes of representation and therefore the relationship between modern poetry, Romantic poetry and the poetry that preceded.

The famous example of Melville's white whale illustrates the claim that distinctions among symbol, metaphor and allegory are differences in degree, emphasis and point of view. It seems to me quite possible that the white whale becomes a symbol for interpreters precisely because Ishmael Ahab, Starbuck and Stubb's allegorical and metaphorical modes of apprehension are finally partial, inadequate points of view. It is the failure of allegory and metaphor to explain the great white phenomenon that results in Ishmael's ambivalence and Pip's madness, and our willingness to call Moby Dick a symbol. But as Lawrence asks, a symbol of what? Lawrence answers his own question by doubting whether Melville himself knew what his great symbol was a symbol of. But then Lawrence goes on to say that the whale is a symbol of doom:

Doom of our white day. We are doomed, doomed. And the doom is America. The Doom of our white day.

Ah, well, if my day is doomed, and I am doomed with my day, it is something greater than I which dooms me, so I accept my doom as a sign of the greatness which is more than I am.

Melville knew. He knew his race was doomed. His white soul, doomed. His great white epoch, doomed. Himself doomed. The idealist, doomed.⁶

What one critic calls "the instability of metaphor"⁷ and allegory in Moby Dick, produces in Lawrence and in many of the best critics
of 19th century symbolism, an interpretive hysteria. But to turn away from such madness is to neglect a critical feature of what Buckler calls "Victorian anxiety," an anxiety that is bred from the sense that somehow the parts imply a powerful but indefinable and threatening whole, like conflicting symptoms of some greater disease. But it is anxiety that holds within it heroism that Arnold's *Empedocles*, Tennyson's *In Memoriam* and Browning's *Roland to the Dark Tower Came* and for Lawrence, *Moby Dick* all imply: "It is something greater than I which dooms me, so I accept my doom as a sign of the greatness which is more than me."

The rhetorical counterpart to this psychologically anxious heroism is, I suggest, synecdoche, that trope whereby parts represent wholes, causes stand for their effects and vice versa. Lawrence's assessment of *Moby Dick* turns upon a reversal of cause and effect. The whiteness of the whale comes to represent the whiteness of the race it dooms, the whale's greatness becomes man's greatness, the whole which resists an allegorical interpretation nevertheless becomes an attribute of the parts which are inadequate to it.

What I am emphasizing here is that the force of such symbols as Moby Dick depends upon the inadequacy of metaphoric and allegorical modes of apprehending them. The anxiety produced by the indefinite nature of the symbol, the magnitude of its impact--what some critics call an "excess of signification"--corresponds
to a lack of explanatory power, measured by the erosion of the
metaphoric and allegoric system of apprehension. The anxiety,
excess, would not be recognizable as excess, as anxiety without
the standard they are felt to exceed. This particular sort of
anxiety is peculiar to certain historical times or historical
attitudes of mind. Because Arnold looked back to a time when
"the sea of faith was at its full" he could measure his estrange-
ment, his pain.

But how did this peculiarly Victorian state of mind occur? Surely the Romantics had faith in figurative language. And how then can the symbol result in both excess and lack, faith and faithlessness, security and insecurity, confidence and anxiety? How is the Victorian sense of the symbol related to the Romantic sense of it?

A redefinition of symbol as synecdoche would recognize this erosion in an instructive tropological form. The essentially
synecdochic basis of all figurative language comes to the fore in the symbol. For Arnold, this is an insecure state that begins to undermine faith in figurative modes of explanation.

But for the Romantics who repudiated the decoratively alle-
gorical language, and the homeric figures of Milton, the symbol emerges as a counterstroke to allegoric representation. Cole-
ridge's subordination of fancy to imagination corresponds to the emergence of a symbolic mode of representation. And as W. J.
Bate points out "Coleridge's use of A. W. Schlegel's distinction between 'organic' and 'mechanical' form falls into place as a further ramification of this standpoint." 8 The symbol is organic because, for Coleridge, it is a universal "idea" within the individual, and particular. Coleridge's confidence in the unifying power of the symbol corresponds to his faith in synecdochic modes of representation. His definition of the symbol assumes that parts are organically included in the whole they represent,

a sign included in the idea it represents; that is an actual part chosen to represent the whole, as a lip with a chin prominent is a symbol of a man; or a lower form of species of a higher in the same kind; thus magnetism is the symbol of vegetation, and of the vegetative and reproductive power in animals; the instinct of the ant tribe or the bee is a symbol of human understanding. (Aids to Reflection) 9

The examples Coleridge adduces are taken from biology, physiognomy, the physical world whose organic laws and relations are taken to be intrinsic and inevitable. This comfortable faith in organic parts to represent their whole underlies the optimism that the process, growth and development of literary works, like plants, culminated in a unified product. The partial representations (symbols) within a literary work all represent aspects of an "organic" unity. But a significant problem emerges when we realize that this organically unified whole is not a picture of something--as in Coleridge's example of the lip and chin symbolizing man--nor a taxonomic or totemic classification--as in Coleridge's last two examples. It is, rather, a poetic work
whose "organic" unity develops temporally and is immanent in each particular. Again the vegetative process offers the best metaphor.

In his essay, "The Intentionality of the Romantic Image," Paul DeMan notes that the Romantics' repudiation of "decorative allegorization" in favor of an imaginative use of figural diction is concomitant with an abundant use of natural imagery. The theme of imagination [is] linked closely to the theme of nature. This type of imagery, DeMan suggests, is "grounded in the intrinsic ontological primacy of the natural object." DeMan points to Wordsworth and Holderlin as examples. And Coleridge's definition of the symbol, above, also illustrates the Romantics' proclivity for a poetic language that "originates in a desire to draw closer and closer to the ontological status of the natural object." But DeMan asserts that this project is paradoxical and doomed in advance to failure because words are not flowers, they do not share the same ontological status. This, according to DeMan, is the "fundamental ambiguity," the "central tension" that characterizes the poetics of Romanticism. DeMan goes on to extrapolate what is by now the common opposition of consciousness to nature. He goes on to show how this incompatibility of language (consciousness) and the sensory object (nature) results "in the possibility for consciousness to exist entirely by and for itself, independently of all relationship with the outside
world, without being moved by an intent aimed at a part of this world.\textsuperscript{14} So, according to DeMan, the Romantic desire that language share the ontological status of the natural object goes the way of "merely decorative and mechanistic allegorization" with the advent of Romanticism. This desire has been "negated" in the process of DeMan's self-proclaimed dialectic.

Whether or not we accept DeMan's Hegelian methodology and the direction this approach signals for consciousness, it is less difficult to agree that for the Romantics, consciousness is grounded in the intrinsic "organic" laws of nature, is part of that world. In an important sense, what are perceived as the intrinsic laws and logic of the organic world replaced the mechanistic logic of what were perceived to be rationalistic abstractions of superimposed orders, ideologies and beliefs as animating principles of imaginative consciousness. Why this poetic orientation results in a symbolic rather than metaphoric and allegorical mode of representing consciousness becomes obvious when we remember that for the Romantics, the natural world does not mirror consciousness like an allegory of reflecting likenesses; nor is the natural world a metaphysical treasure chest of metaphoric vehicles like Donne's "gold to airy thinessse beate." The natural world for Coleridge, Wordsworth, represents an imaginative ground and point of departure. I choose the word departure, to emphasize the contrast between a symbolic, synecdochic mode and
an allegorical and metaphoric mode. Language and consciousness
do not reach out or arrive at the natural world. It is part of
it already "included in the idea it represents," as Coleridge
says. If we follow out this theory of symbolic language, we
first must ask how we can recover "the idea a symbol represents"?
In other words if the natural world is a point of departure what
is the point of arrival? This is the question that invites DeMan
and others of less arch vocabularies and methodologies to de-
scribe Romantic poetry as in flight from the earthly concrete
world of natural objects toward some transcendent, "superideal-
ist" sphere the poet echoes with his esemplastic imagination. Or
to use another metaphor, the Romantic poet is caught between the
concrete and the abstract, two realms which, for DeMan, are in-
compatible. Wimsatt asserts "The Romantic poets want to have
it and not have it, too":

Poetic structure is always a fusion of ideas with material,
a statement in which the solidity of symbol and the sensory
verbal qualities are somehow not washed out by the abstrac-
tion. For this effect the iconic or directly imitative
powers of language are important. . . . Neoclassical icon-
icity is of a whole a highly ordered, formal, or intellec-
tual sort, that of the "figures of speech," such as antith-
esis, isocolon, homoeoteluhon, or chiasmus. But romantic
poetry tends to achieve iconicity by a more direct sensory
imitation of something headlong and impassioned, less or-
dered, nearer perhaps to the subrational.15

Poetic consciousness, it seems, motivated by the subrational,
arrives at an "iconicity," by which I take it Wimsatt means rep-
resentative perception.
Curious in all this critical positioning toward Romantic theories of the poetic imagination--of which practice DeMan and Wimsatt are prominent examples--is that despite differences among a particular critic's positions toward the relationship of the natural world to the language that represents that world and the consciousness that uses that language, all critics seem to concur that when the natural world replaces an allegorical landscape as the ground of departure for figural language, what is sought after when critics try to recover a poem's or author's intention is a transcendent sphere called the symbolic. This sphere is, by presupposition, not allegorical, although DeMan argues that the point of departure for the symbolic in Romantic poetry is an organic allegory. Most commonly this transcendent sphere is "theophanic" to use Geoffrey Hartman's phrase, or "the Supernatural," which has its "origin in theological concepts, images, and plot patterns" to quote M. H. Abrams. Not only the Romantic poets but critics of Romantic poetry want to "have it and not have it, too." The transcendent is symbolic but it is not too far from allegory. For Abrams and Hartman, Romantic symbolism is constituted out of bits and pieces, "concepts," "images" and "plot patterns" of conventional allegory, although the final meaning or significance of a Romantic poem is, they assure us, "an undivided unity, which having overcome yet preserved all preceding individuation, incorporates in itself not less
than everything."

Following Coleridge's insistence that the *esemplastic imagination* eschews allegorical modes of representation and granting the primacy of the natural sensory world as the ground of figurative representation for the Romantic poets, critics are impelled to leap to a transcendent sphere where the manifold of sensory particulars achieve an "undivided unity." That this sphere is made up out of pieces of allegory reveals a nostalgia for allegory that the Romantics repudiate. Where Coleridge claims his definition of the symbol "is distinguished *toto genre* from the allegoric and metaphorical," Hartman, Wimsatt, Abrams want to reconstitute an allegoric level. These critics ignore Coleridge's crucial notion that the symbolic idea inheres in, is immanent in, is included by the concrete image, i.e., there is no separation of literal and figurative levels. And hence, no need for a leap to a transcendent sphere of "undivided unity."

But more importantly, such a leap of faith conceals a failure to develop a critical strategy that relates the particulars of the natural world to a unified whole. To assert a unified whole is not a demonstration of how such a whole is constituted. An emphasis on the synecdochic basis of Coleridge's definition of symbol affords a means to negotiate between Coleridge's claim that the organic unity of a symbolic mode of representation inheres in the concrete and particular and the critical problem of
apprehending, describing and accounting for that unity and relatedness in terms that are consistent with Coleridge's theory of the symbolic imagination.

In his definition of symbol, Coleridge's examples are recognizable particulars, concrete aspects of static identifiable wholes. These are compelling examples of Coleridge's notion that "symbols are signs included in the ideas they represent" because the relationship between sign and idea is clear, fixed, and "organic." We have no problem inferring a man from lips and a chin prominent. However, The Mariner's "glittering eye" in Coleridge's Ancient Rime is a particular sign whose aspect forces a particular connotation on the whole it is included by or represents. We want to know why his eye is glittering and what kind of man holds us listeners with it. The power of the glittering eye depends upon the listener's interest in what accounts for this glittering condition. That account is, of course, the narrative the mariner relates, itself a history of particulars. In any event, we want to know how this glittering aspect fits in with the other particulars that comprise the whole story. In this literary example, in contrast to Coleridge's definitional examples, the relationship of part to whole, sign to conceptual idea, becomes active, predicative. Ideas are determined by the particulars that represent them. Thus, an emphasis on the particular and concrete, the abundance of natural imagery DeMan notes, in
Romantic poetry results in an interpretive problem in determining the effects of these particulars; that is, any critical generalization or attempt to organize a conceptual whole depends on a heightened sensitivity to the effects of particulars on the wholes they represent.

This synecdochic relationship of part to whole in the Coleridgean symbol reverses the priority given to the whole in allegory. As Angus Fletcher asserts:

With the symbol the mind perceives the rational order of things directly, by an "unmediated vision" without any logical extrapolation from the phenomena of our material world. Whereas in allegory there is always (as Coleridge sees it) an attempt to categorize logical orders first, and fit them to convenient phenomena second, to set forth ideal systems first, and illustrate them second.17

For Fletcher, synecdoche underlies both symbol and allegory. And he includes symbol as an element in allegory by arguing that allegory is an extended figure that dominates the isolated trope. Thus, he affords a distinction between allegoric and symbolic by identifying allegory with the kind of synecdoche in which the whole, "the total figure . . . gives particular symbolic force to the part. The whole may determine the sense of the parts, and the parts by governed by the intention of the whole." The symbolic process as opposed to the allegorical, then, could be identified with the kind of synecdoche in which the part gives particular symbolic force to the whole. Such a whole, Fletcher argues, is governed by unconscious intentions and "tempts a
Freudian reinterpretation" of Coleridge's view of the symbolic. And Fletcher admits that he is dubious about psychoanalytic approaches to literary imagination, and is more concerned with mechanical quality of allegory as Coleridge defines it. But curiously, Fletcher's masterwork on allegory is based on Coleridge's implicitly critical definition of the term.

Fletcher's notion that symbol and allegory are related by their synecdochic characteristics does help clarify, however, the relations and distinctions between these commonly opposed figurative modes. And it becomes possible to account for the historical generalization that the symbolic mode of Romantic poetry is concomitant with poets' increasing attention to the particular and individual, the dangers of which are foreseen by Dr. Johnson:

The business of the poet is to examine, not the individual, but the species; to remark the general properties and large appearances; he does not number the streaks of the tulip, or describe the different shades in the verdure of the forest. He is to exhibit in his portraits of nature such prominent and striking features as recall the original to every mind; and he must neglect the minuter discriminations, which one may have remarked, and another neglected, for those characteristics which are alike obvious to vigilance and neglect.18

For Dr. Johnson, a poetry which examines the individual and particular, remarking upon "those characteristics which are ob-

vious alike to the vigilance and neglect" does so at the expense of the general. An instructive cinematic parallel is to imagine
a movie made up only of details from larger scenes which are never fully disclosed. It would assuredly be difficult to weave a plot from such disconnected strands. A conventional narrative under such conditions is impossible. But we do, not two hundred years after Johnson's statement, have experimental cinema which works precisely by focusing on details at the expense of the larger scene. And the isolated detail is by now a commonplace photographic subject. Part of the cognitive pleasure of these photos is often akin to that of solving a riddle, a synecdochic mode of inference whereby A is explained as B in the frame of reference C which is implied. A photo of an elongated rounded light shape with a thin penumbra of darkening along the edges of its length might be a human arm if we supply the appropriate frame of reference.

An emphasis on the particular, the individual detail demands an inductive synecdochic mode of inference, a riddling, symbolic activity in contrast to the deductive synecdochic mode of an allegoric logic in which "the sense of the whole determines the sense of the parts." In the allegoric mode, the whole is always in view, in the symbolic the whole is always disclosed and modified by the particular.

Although the cinematic and photographic examples above indicate how far certain arts have moved from Dr. Johnson's dictates, it is best to remember with Fletcher that the radical distinction
between symbolic and allegoric modes is best seen from the point of view of the synecdochic characteristics of each, as a difference in emphasis on and attention given to one aspect of the part/whole relationship underlying all figurative representation: neither exists as a pure modality. But both Dr. Johnson and Coleridge assume a radical distinction between allegory and symbol when they argue for opposing emphases.

By suggesting that the relationship and points of connection between these two commonly opposed modes, as well as the points of distinction emerge when we recognize the synecdochic basis of these figurative modes, we then see an historical literary development as a shift in emphasis and degree, rather than a clean fracture between modes. What permits Coleridge's confidence in partial representations that are included in the ideas they represent is a tacit belief in the ready inferability of that idea. In the definition of symbol, we remember, the relationship of partial representation to idea (whole) is fixed by an organic relationship. For Coleridge these general ideas, wholes, already exist in the world by virtue of fixed or organic relationships. But because these abstract ideas are fixed like allegory,

how often they haunt us, just like problems given by the Mind, which after long struggle it at length solves, and demonstrates by an Image, or Individual Object.19

For Coleridge then, the particular demonstrates the whole that haunts it; in theory an emphasis on the individual is not at the
expense of the whole as Dr. Johnson fears. Rather we find that
the allegoric force of the whole is a penumbral presence, like the
Mariner's glittering eye, which is demonstrated by the particular
distinct image that symbolizes it.

The Romantics' repudiation of the mechanical, abstract and
merely decorative qualities of an allegorical mode in favor of a
particularizing concrete symbolic mode--again, Coleridge's sub-
ordination of fancy to imagination--does not entail a rejection
of the force of the allegoric. Rather, the allegoric haunts the
symbolic in two ways. First, as evidenced by Coleridge's def-
inition of the symbol and supported by DeMans's contention that
the Romantic imagination begins in organic allegory, the particu-
lar depends upon the whole it represents to make it intelligible.
In this sense the early Romantic image can be viewed as a partial
representation that easily implies the whole it is included by.
Wordsworth's "sounding cataracts" and Coleridge's "sea/with some
fair bark, perhaps, whose sails light up/ The slip of smooth
clear blue" come to mind as examples. The associations whereby
these partial aspects bring recognizable whole contexts to mind
are conventional, natural to the reader, "organic" for Coleridge
and Wordsworth. Indeed, these synecdoches are comprised of
"broad" enough "strokes" to satisfy Dr. Johnson. For Fletcher,
these images are synecdoches which appear in both predominantly
allegoric and symbolic modes. So the emphasis on the part here
does not override the whole but implies it. The allegoric and symbolic can be said to coincide as neither the part nor the whole dominate in the figure, although the partial aspects are foregrounded in the two examples above, and can be said to be given emphasis but not in a privative sense, not at the expense of the whole.

This results in the second way in which the allegoric haunts the symbolic, inviting critics like Hartman, Abrams and Wimsatt to use the words "theophanic," "supernatural," "subrational," and "transcendent" to describe the symbolic, and accounts for the "bits and pieces of allegory" these critics detect in Romantic imagery. Thus, while the emphasis on the individual and the particular in the static image generally does not modify the whole sufficiently in disclosing it to alter or distort its inferability beyond recognition, a succession of specific particulars does begin to create problems for critics.

"Imagination," according to Coleridge, is the "power of modifying one image or feeling by the precedent or following ones--. So often afterwards to be illustrated." 20

Because what is "to be illustrated" is predicated upon a succession of images and feelings which modify one another, the more or less total contexts, of which the particulars are aspects, also begin to modify each other. Hence, the critical problem of describing a single conceptual center governing the manifold of
particulars. Because there is nonetheless an interpretive pull
towards closure, an allegorizing tendency to find a center that
totalizes the particulars subsists in criticisms of literature
in a symbolic mode. And, of course, the most enduring nineteenth
century literature is that which frustrates just such attempts
at closure. The Albatross in The Ancient Mariner is a symbol
which in the course of the poem seems a Daemon, or an allegorical
agent governed by several competing allegorical systems. And
the characters in the poem, like the crew in Moby Dick, act toward
the Albatross as if it were such an agent. The frustration that
no single system serves to explain the phenomenal appearance of
the bird compounds the efficacy of its symbolic power. It is in
this sense, then, that the Romantics' emphasis on partial aspects
begins to undermine the governing force of totalizing systems
which initially render the particular intelligible.

Once we recognize the synecdochic character of both allegory
and symbol it then becomes possible to trace the historical evolu-
tion of one out of the other within a consistent rhetorical
vocabulary. The early Romantics' tendency to approach allegory,
implicit in Coleridge's definitions of both symbol and allegory,
is then viewed as a necessary component of the power of the Romani-
tic symbol. But as the Romantics pursue their emphasis on the
particular with their faith in the immanence of the whole, the
governing force of those totalizing systems begins to erode.
Thus, the Victorians received the Romantics' tendency to emphasize the particulars of the natural world. But because of their historical distance from the allegorical mode, upon which the Romantic synecdoche of immanence depends, the Victorians' faith in totalizing systems is obscured by the proliferation of particulars. The Romantic faith in figurative language can then be said to correspond with a faith in a synecdochic mode of inference to imply wholes; and the consequent Victorian crisis of faith can be said to correspond to an anxiety about parts to imply wholes. A distinction between the Romantic and Victorian views of the symbol can be formulated as a difference in perspective and attitude toward the synecdochic aspects of figurative language. For the Romantics the symbol can be termed a "synecdoche of immanence" whereby the whole is inherent in the part. For the Victorian the symbol can be termed a "synecdoche of privation" or absence by which view the manifold of partial aspects of the symbol overwhelm a single totalizing system and disperse a governing systematization among relationships between partial aspects, a differential distribution of the whole along the predicative axis of syntax.

The Romantic theory of the symbolic with its emphasis on the concrete particular promised an "unmediated vision," a direct perception of the order of things. But this promise rests on the theoretical assumption that wholes are inherent in particulars,
universals in the individual, that the concrete particular participates in the idea it represents for consciousness. From a Victorian point of view, this assumption, a participation mystique, is finally at odds with the practice of a figurative mode that emphasizes the particular. For Arnold a governing systematization has been obscured by the mediations among partial aspects of concrete particulars; the proliferation and force of the particulars seem inadequate to the powers of the mind to systematize, resulting in a crisis of consciousness and faith:

We might have joy, blent with the all bathing air,  
Or with the nimble, radiant life of fire.

But mind, but thought--  
If these have been the master part of us--  
Where will they find their parent element?  
What will receive them, who will call them home?  
But we shall still be in them, and they in us  
And we shall be the strangers of the world,  
And they will be our lords, as they are now;  
And keep us prisoners of our consciousness,  
And never let us clasp and feel the All  
But through their forms, and modes, and stifling veils.  

Here the concrete particular is not included in the idea it represents. The Romantic repudiation of the allegoric and merely decorative language has deepened into a mistrust of all figurative forms. The abstracting systematizing functions of consciousness are now "modes" and "stifling veils" that obscure the All. The concrete particulars are not controlled by systematizing abstractions because they seem parentless, rootless, without direction. A totalizing systematization cannot govern the concrete particular
because figurative modes are only projections of consciousness, not a direct participation into the order of things. For Arnold the concrete particular expressed as a symbol is a figure, a projection of the mind. Thus, the expression of symbolic thought endangers itself by substituting a figure, a "stifling veil," for a living idea. The abstract orders the mind projects are incommensurate with direct experience.

There persists, despite Arnold's recognition of the gulf between part and whole, concrete and abstract, a nostalgia for the All. But that unity lies "buried," available only to unthinking unconsciousness that "he thinks he knows." The unity then inheres in the concrete particular as it does for Coleridge, but because that unity is not represented to consciousness as anything but a "mode" or projected order, it is already mediated, no longer a direct perception into the order of things. The Victorian experiences that unity in moments of unconsciousness, like the moments of love when the "bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast/And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again." And such moments of fullness, life, connection with the All, become finally, less moments of fulfillment than signifiers of the absence of such fulfillment for ordinary consciousness. Because the totalizing unity inheres in the unclaspable concrete, any conceptual representation of that whole is a phantom. Hence, figurative representation of that unity will signify its absence and privation.
for consciousness.

A good example of the Victorian symbol—the resulting synecdoche of privation when the concrete particular is raised to the level of figure—is found in Tennyson's *In Memoriam A H H*:

Dark house, by which once more I stand
Here in the long unlovely street,
Doors, where my heart used to beat
So quickly, waiting for a hand,

A hand that can be clasped no more—

The particulars Tennyson isolates for attention represent a presence, Hallam, who like his hand, "can be clasped no more." The immanence promised by "can be clasped" is denied by the adverbial "no more." But the hand as an isolated particular does represent a whole, and is, in Coleridge's sense, a "sign included in the idea it represents." And the whole here is more or less a unified picture of something as in Coleridge's examples figure. And hand along with heart and doors are also symbols in a love tradition as in Fletcher's sense of the allegoric as the extended figure or theme dominating the isolated trope. But here the emphasis on the concrete particular overturns this priority. The symbols within the love tradition, the partial aspects of which also represent the lost friend, dominate the scene and receive a morbid magnification.

Like the Romantic, the Victorian use of the symbol exploits the synecdochic dynamics of figurative representation by emphasizing the part while implying a whole. But the Romantic emphasis
on the particular promises a direct grasp of the whole, while
the Victorian views the partial representation itself as a media-
tion which stifles access to the whole. On the thematic level
then, the Victorian emphasis of the concrete particular as in
the Tennyson stanza above, magnifies the partiality of the fig-
urative representation in order to symbolize the privation of the
whole. This is not to deny the whole, but it exists beyond the
clasp of feeling which except in flashes is mediated by its con-
scious expression in language. The figurative representation of
Victorian language, then, can thematically be related to its
failure as an immediate expression of the living idea. And in
the Tennyson stanza and the Arnold lines quoted above, the partial
aspects, the concrete particulars, are dominated by a mood, an
atmosphere of loss and privation, alienation from feeling. I say
they are dominated by rather than correspond to a mood by way of
emphasizing the Victorian poet's sense of the self which remains
a repository for a consistent perspective and a dominant mood. It
is not until the twentieth century that the self can be said to
undergo division into partial aspects that stem from an increasing
emphasis on the particular within a synecdochic mode of represen-
tation.

I have termed the Romantic symbol a synecdoche of immanence
in order to emphasize that "the sign is included in the idea it
represents," the whole inherent in the part.
I have described how the Romantic symbol can be said to evolve out of a dependence on allegory once the synecdochic basis of each mode is recognized. Thus, although the Romantic emphasis on the particular announces itself as a repudiation of allegorical modes of expression, a redefinition of symbol as synecdoche with an emphasis on the particular allows us to see this repudiation as a shift in emphasis and perspective, rather than a pure opposition. The Victorian, however, inherits this emphasis on the particular as an erosion of a sense of the whole, of the inability of consciousness to clasp the All. The Romantic repudiation of fanciful figurative forms depends into a mistrust of all figurative language. Victorian anxiety can then be said to have a rhetorical counterpart in the concrete particular raised to the level of the symbolic—what I have termed a synecdoche of privation.

But as I announce early on in this introduction, my primary purpose for redefining the literary symbol in the nineteenth century as synecdoche is to provide a consistent rhetorical vocabulary by which to root certain features of twentieth century poetics in nineteenth century soil. By focusing on the poetry of Hart Crane, whose synecdochic style is, I believe, exemplary of a modern poetic, I hope to serve a dual purpose. First, attention to the predominantly synecdochic style of Crane's poetry and to his particular lyric epic, The Bridge, can begin to provide an
adequate critical approach to an innovative poet whose contribution to modern poetics has been largely obscured by a sensationalist concern with his troubled life. In this way I hope to establish Crane within the modern poetic tradition of Pound, Eliot, Williams and Stevens. By placing him at the center rather than at the fringes of the modern tradition and supplying a rhetorical analysis of his work I hope to fulfill the second purpose—to initiate a poetic and rhetorical analysis at the level of image, figure, syntax and diction for twentieth century poetry.

In tracing a synecdoche of immanence and a synecdoche of privation out of an allegorical mode of representation, I have suggested how the Romantic symbolic mode can be said to depend on conceptual wholes that exist outside the particulars of the text. For the Romantic this extra-textual dimension is assumed and exploited with confidence. For the Victorian this extra-textual dimension is perceived nostalgically as beyond the clasp of the mediations of language. If for Tennyson and Arnold mediations among partial aspects of concrete particulars signalled the inability of the mind to clasp the All, for Crane and his contemporary moderns, mediations among partial aspects of figurative representations are seen less as distortions of the verities of the eternal world than constitutive of acts of mind toward that world. In Crane's words:

Poetry, in so far as the metaphysics of any absolute knowledge extends, is simply the concrete evidence of the
experience of a recognition (knowledge if you like). It can give you a ratio of fact and experience, and in this sense it is both perception and thing perceived. . . . When you attempt to ask more of poetry—the fact of man's relationship to a hypothetical god, be it Osiris, Zeus or Indra, you will get as variant terms even from the abstract terminology of philosophy as you will get from poetry; whereas poetry, without attempting to logically enunciate such a problem or its solution, may well give you the real connective experience, the very "sign manifest" on which rests the assumption of a godhead.23

A poetry that is at once the "perception and the thing perceived" yields "a ratio of fact and experience." Here the mind is not separated from the unclaspable All because there is no attempt to enunciate such a problem or its solution. But Crane here is not speaking as a Romantic. Poetry is not signs included in the idea they represent, rather poetry is the "concrete evidence of the experience of recognition." The sign is the idea it represents. Notice, too, that Crane's vocabulary is neither the immanentist organicism of Coleridge and the Romantics nor the nostalgic sentiment of the Victorians. The language here—"evidence," "fact," and "ratio"—is clinical, mathematical and abstract, similar to Eliot's scientific metaphors for the creative imagination. It is a language suited to mediation and modulations of represented perception because it is not at odds with what it represents. Poetry by this description expresses a relationship (a ratio) of consciousness to world, and the language by which it articulates such a relationship is constitutive, the "concrete evidence" of that "real connective experience." Language is not
deprived of that experience, as it is for Arnold and Tennyson, but it should be stressed that Crane does not claim that poetry is direct experience. He uses the word "connective" to signal poetry's mediated status and its potential by that mediation for expressing the relationship, and relatedness of mind to world.

This aspect of Crane's reorientation toward a symbolic synecdochic mode is worth noting. Because poetry is "concrete evidence," expressive of the ratio of fact and experience, and thus "both perception and the thing perceived," Crane's imagery in a sense collapses agency into subject, subject into agency simultaneously. Consequently, partial (synecdochic) aspects and subject coincide to form the image.

The image as a "connective" nexus of perception and thing perceived is necessarily an amalgam of associations. Crane comments on this characteristic in an image in Voyages II:

Adagios of islands, O my Prodigal,
Complete the dark confessions her veins spell. 24

"Adagios of islands," Crane tells us,

refers to the motion of a boat through islands clustered thickly, the rhythm of the motion, etc. And it seems a much more direct and creative statement than any more logical employment of words such as "coasting slowly through the islands," besides ushering in a whole world of music. 25

The density of such imagery, a density characteristic of much modern poetry, prompts one critic of Crane's to plead:

The range of associations is so daring that it becomes at times simply puzzling. The transitions are so abrupt that they tend to mystify. 26
Attention to synecdoche in Crane's poetry provides access to the source of this mystification. "Adagios," for example, is an abstraction made substantive by its nominative syntactic position and a plural noun ending. But it lacks specificity in and of itself. The connotation is vague, a kind of floating universal in need of a concrete ground. As with kenning the ground is implied in the context. In this case, the context is maritime and "Adagios," which ushers in a whole world of music, gains specificity by implication as Crane explains above. What causes mystification is the lack of a discursive base, an explicit employment of words to point the logic of association. In place of a discursive base Crane argues for a genetic logic of metaphor which, because it is "genetic," is universal. This represents a return to a faith in figurative language, a faith similar to Coleridge's belief in partial aspects to imply their wholes, but with a crucial difference. For Coleridge that faith is raised on the belief in fixed organic principles at work in nature at large which both mind and matter share. For Crane, and for the moderns, a faith in the logic of metaphor is a belief in a formal property of mind by which imaginative structures (poems) are raised and communicated to other minds. In Crane's terms, a poem is "concrete evidence" of an imaginative experience, raised on a logic of implication communicable to those who have had a similar experience. Where the Romantic symbol is a sign included in the idea it
represents, the immanence it discloses and thus, a partial aspect that refers to an idea, the modern symbol, exemplified here by Crane, is a partial aspect that evokes a recognition, a ratio of fact and experience.

Where the Romantic theory of the symbol promised a direct and immediate relationship between part and whole and where the Victorian perceived the part as itself a mediated expression and therefore incapable of a direct grasp of the whole, the Modern appreciates the mediated status of the partial aspect as expressive of the ratio of mind to world, perception to thing perceived.

Unlike the Romantic symbol which freezes perception in a static image--Coeridge's nose and chin prominent symbolizing man--the modern symbol defers conceptual closure at the level of image in an attempt to capture the fluidity of experience by exploiting the mediated status of partial aspects of figurative expressions, the essentially synecdochic basis of figurative language.

In this sense, then, modern synecdoche is constitutive, not of the world, but of experience of the world, constitutive of acts of mind toward that world.

To summarize: the constitutive image is concrete evidence of the ratio of mind and world (experience), collapsing perceiver and thing perceived, agent and subject, thus promoting a figurative density raised on a logic of implication--Crane's "genetic
logic of metaphor"—in place of a discursive base.

At the close of chapter II I will demonstrate in a close reading of an early poem of Crane's how constitutive synecdoche dominates his poetic, and how an understanding of this rhetorical practice is useful in developing a critical ground from which to appreciate Crane's central position in modern poetry. As such this initial close reading serves as an introduction to my methodology for the exemplary analysis of Crane's "Proem: To Brooklyn Bridge."
END NOTES:  CHAPTER I


20. Coleridge, #3756.


25. 

CHAPTER II: A Model of Synecdoche

So far I have shown how an extended sense of the term serves as a rhetorical description of a symbolic mode beginning with the Romantics. I have characterized the Romantics' use of synecdoche as a "synecdoche of immanence," signalling its close dependence on allegory. The Victorian "synecdoche of privation" characterizes in rhetorical terms the Victorian anxiety that synecdochic parts are themselves mediated and thus distort the reality they represent. The modern "constitutive synecdoche" establishes the mediated status of synecdochic parts as essential evidence for the relationship of mind toward world.

This three-stage transition from synecdoche of immanence to synecdoche of privation to a constitutive synecdoche parallels what in conventional terms is described as a shift away from an allegorical mode of representation toward a symbolic mode. The redefinition of a symbolic mode as a synecdochic mode of inference views this shift as the result of an increasing emphasis on the partial aspects of the synecdochic part/whole relationship. Thus, the figurative point of departure is more and more the partial detail, the particular and individual; the larger context seems almost to recede into a vague background, or to disappear altogether as in a movie closeup. The mediated status of the particular comes to the fore. The ability to read and critically
analyze this style is, I have suggested, akin to the ability to read a riddle, a *kenning*, i.e., to read A as B in the context of C. As such, it is essentially the ability to read a synecdochic logic of implication, the logical basis of most theories of figurative representation beginning with Aristotle.

In chapter 20 of the *Poetics*, Aristotle defines metaphor as the alteration of the proper sense of a word by means of a transference "either from genus to species, species to genus, from one species to another, or by way of analogy." Aristotle demonstrates each of these four types by example. Translators and interpreters have noted that Aristotle's first two types of metaphor—transference from genus to species and species to genus—are synecdoches. In his 1867 translation, E. M. Cope, the first English translator of the *Poetics* to regard the first two types of metaphor as synecdoche, cites earlier testimony as well, beginning with Quintillian.

More recently, *le groupe mu* of Liege offer a systematic defense for their claim that Aristotle's fourth type of metaphor, by means of analogy, is composed of two synecdoches, a doubling of the first two types. This argument is neatly summed up by Samuel R. Levin in *The Semantics of Metaphor*. Levin points out that synecdochic relations take one of two forms: part/whole or member/class. Furthermore, the relations among terms in a part/whole ensemble are said to be material, those in a member/class
ensemble semantic:

An apple, for example, can be viewed as an object comprised (or composed of) a stem, a skin, a pulp, pits, etc, or as standing for a class of objects, thus comprising (or consisting of) Winesaps, McIntoshes, Romes, Delicious, etc.²

Material properties or physical attributes are partial aspects of a whole; whereas members of semantic classes of objects are themselves wholes included in a class of objects denoted by a particular attribute or aspect. In addition, le groupe mu distinguish two modes of member/class and part/whole synecdoches: a generalizing synecdoche and a particularizing synecdoche, both of which are necessary in combination to effect a metaphoric transformation. According to Levin:

Generalization works by suppression—of semantic elements from the meanings of words or of material parts from the totality of objects; particularization works by adjunction of these factors.³

The following schema is offered on the basis of these distinctions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schema General</th>
<th>D---(I)----A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) (Sg + Sp)Sem</td>
<td>bouleau—flexible—jeaune fille</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) (Sg + Sp)Mat</td>
<td>main—homme—tête</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) (Sp + Sg)Sem</td>
<td>vert—bouleau—flexible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) (Sp + Sg)Mat</td>
<td>bateau—voiles—veuve</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Fig. 1. Le groupe mu scheme of metaphor.)
In this scheme "D" is the term of departure, "I" is the intermediary term and "A" is the term arrived at; or in I. A.

Richards' vocabulary "D" is the vehicle, "I" is the ground and "A" is the tenor.

Of the four varieties of metaphor schematized above, only (a) and (d) are possible. In (a) *bouleau* is generalized to *flexible*, on the basis of a member/class ensemble, by suppressing a semantic feature. This constitutes the *Sg* component of the metaphor. *Flexible* is then particularized to *jeune fille* by adding a semantic feature, the *Sp* component. In (d) the process moves from a whole, *bateau*, to part, *voile*, and then to whole, *veuve*.

As Levin points out, in order for the two-stage synecdochic transition to work, the mediating term "I" must be common to the two terminals either as a common property as in (a) or in a common part as in (d). In (b) the parts are common to the mediating term, in (c) they are properties of it.

Based on this model, then, Aristotle's fourth class of metaphor-by-analogy--occurs either as two semantic member/class ensembles or as two material part/whole ensembles, each a two-stage synecdochic transition combining a particularizing and generalizing mode. We can test the adequacy of this model against Aristotle's examples for metaphor by analogy and then offer emendations for the model where they are needed.
According to Aristotle, metaphor by analogy occurs when there are four terms so related that the second is to the first as the fourth is to the third: B is to A as D is to C. Thus a cup (B) is in relation to Dionysus (A) what a shield (D) is to Ares (C). This analogy can be represented by le groupe mu schema as follows:

(Sp + Sg) Mat Dionysus—cups—shield—Ares

(Fig. 2. Aristotle's proportional metaphor no. 1)

As such we can describe this as a two-stage synecdochic process involving two part/whole ensembles like possibility (d) in Figure 1.

An example of type (a) is found in Aristotle in the expression "sowing around a God-created flame."

(Sg + Sp) Sem sunlight—sowing—casting sun's rays—seed

(Fig. 3. Aristotle's proportional metaphor no. 2)

In this schema seed and sunlight are included in the class of things that are sown or cast.

Le groupe mu scheme then exposes the synecdochic basis of the four-part structure of Aristotle's fourth species of metaphor. In our first example (fig. 2) which is a material type (d) metaphor either Dionysus or Ares can be considered vehicle or tenor depending on whether the expression in question is "shield of
Dionysus" or "cup of Ares." In either case "cup"/"shield" constitute the ground. The terms constituting the ground are considered to be parts of wholes (tenor and vehicle). As such Aristotle's B is to A as D is to C relationship is consistent with le groupe mu schema. B and D are either tenor or vehicle; and A/C represent the ground. The part/whole relationship that obtains between ground/vehicle, tenor depends upon a factual knowledge of the complete ensemble. One needs to know about the cup of Dionysus and the shield of Ares and the contexts surrounding those ensembles in order to make sense of the metaphoric expression. Thus, the synecdochic relations among terms of a type (d) metaphor are considered to be material or factual, based on encyclopedic knowledge.

The relations among terms in a type (a) metaphor, on the other hand, are supposedly semantic in nature, based on member/class classifications as opposed to factual part/whole relations. But a closer inspection of the type (a) metaphor reveals that terms of member/class ensembles are themselves dependent on factual information. We can see, for example, that the ground or class term in the type (a) semantic metaphor, like the type (d) variety, is a partial aspect of both tenor and vehicle. It is a characteristic aspect of sunlight and seeds that they are cast or thrown. And while this information is not subjective in nature—it is available to anyone who knows certain facts about
agriculture— it is not entirely semantic in nature. Like the
type (d) variety, semantic metaphors depend upon a context of
facts that exceed semantic information.

At this point it is necessary to ask what the difference
between the two types of metaphor could be. And the corollary
question is to ask whether there is a difference between member/
class and part/whole ensembles for the purposes of our dis cus-
sion of synecdoche.

Recent linguistic studies into the nature of figurative lan-
guage have wrestled with the problem of developing a unified the-
ory that relates the syntactic component of language to the se-
mantic component, a division which is common to most linguistic
studies of language following Chomsky. This distinction between
the semantics of language and syntax or grammar of language is
echoed in Levin's study of the Semantics of Metaphor. This is
reflected in his analysis of le groupe mu's distinction between
the material or factual metaphor and the semantic metaphor
wherein he faults their scheme "because their account of the meta-
phoric process treats the phenomena of experience in a framework
of cognitive organizations rather than in terms of a semantic
theory." There Levin classes le groupe mu approach with chom-
skian analysis. Curiously, Levin concludes his discussion of le
groupe mu analysis by observing that le groupe mu is, indeed,
successful in dealing with the semantic or type (a) metaphor
which coincides with his own construal theory of a metaphor but
fails with the type (d) variety which is factual or encyclopedic
in nature and therefore falls outside a strict semantic analysis
of metaphor. Yet Levin also asserts that the semantic metaphor
is itself not entirely free of the factual relations among de-
pendent terms in a metaphoric construct. Perhaps because Levin
analyzes le groupe mu schema through the blinders of his own
semantic theory he overlooks the applicability of le groupe mu's
greatest insight—the synecdochic basis of metaphor.

Le groupe mu reduction of analogical metaphor to synec-
doche allows us to see that a semantic metaphor, a type (a) is
most usefully distinguished from a material metaphor on the basis
of the direction of the mode of operation, that is, either gen-
eralizing plus particularizing or vice versa. And later on in
this chapter I hope to show that this reduction of metaphor to
synecdoche helps to show that metaphor is distinguished from
metonymy and kenning on the basis of the completeness of this
two-stage synecdochic operation, whole to part/from part to
whole, and the mode of operation.

At this point, however, I want to proceed with an examina-
tion of the differences between the semantic and material types
of metaphor. Corollary to the difference in the mode between
the two types there is a difference in level of generality or
specificity. The type (a) metaphor which begins with a
generalizing synecdoche is abstract, whereas the type (d) variety begins with the particularizing mode and is concrete. The terms in a type (d) metaphor are concrete. Ares, Dionysus, shield and cup refer to particular objects. The ground or class term in type (a) metaphors, on the other hand, are abstract attributes or aspects of objects. In this sense, then, we can see that the so-called semantic metaphor is in fact a conceptual or abstract figure and the so-called material type employs concrete terms. There is no need to distinguish between the semantic and material component.

In both types there is a semantic and material component. The initial operation in a class/member taxonomy is a synecdochic separating out of partial attributes of objects. Seeds and sunlight fall together under the class of objects that can be cast or sown. It is the need to decipher an initial semantic impertinence that constrains a particular class inclusion. This operation is, as I have suggested previously, similar to that of solving a riddle, itself a synecdochic process, but also a defamiliarizing of typical class relations.

In the material or type (d) metaphor the relations among concrete terms, parts and wholes, are at once subject to the laws that govern the whole of the semantic context brought into play by a figure or series of related figures.

But regardless of whether the mode of articulate metaphor is
abstracting or concretizing, a type (a) or a type (d), the purely synecdochic function is common to both.

And significantly, regardless of the mode, the ground or middle terms in both varieties are partial aspects of the tenor/vehicle terms. Thus, the whole/part, part/whole sequence is the same for both varieties, although the sequence of mode for each is the reverse of the other.

We have allowed, then, that while each type of possible metaphor employs different modes, one generalizing and abstract, the other a particularizing concrete mode, the supervening function is identical in both. Member/class ensembles then require an implicit material synecdochic (part-whole) operation upon which class inclusion rests. Whole/part ensembles merely make this synecdochic function explicit in the figure itself, the relations among the material terms of which are bound by the formal laws governing the semantic universe of that figure.

In this sense a reduction of metaphor to synecdoche restores to a rhetorical process its specificity to a purely semantic process, by giving us a single operation from which a number of different modes and strategies are possible. Rather than saying then one kind of synecdoche and one variety of metaphor is semantic and the other kind material, we can treat each as a difference in mode. Le groupe mu schema has survived my analysis intact with exception of the elimination of the confusing
assignations of "semantic" and "material" for the two possible types of metaphor. The substitute terms conceptual or abstract for variety (a) and particular or concrete for variety (d) are used provisionally here.

As I have claimed previously, the reduction of metaphor to two synecdoches yields a common rhetorical operation by which to describe the relationship and difference between metaphor and the related trope metonymy. In his discussion of *le groupe mu* Paul Ricoeur states that their theory of the synecdochic basis of metaphor shows that the difference between metaphor and metonymy reduces to a difference between the partial and the total character of the self same addition-suppression operation.

For "addition-suppression" we may use *le groupe mu* terms particularizing-generalizing, both of which are necessary in combination to effect the two-stage synecdochic transition involved in metaphoric transference. Ricoeur goes on to say that the difference between metaphor and metonymy is not a difference of operation as is the case between resemblance and extrinsic relation. There is a move in both of them from a starting term to a destination via an intermediate term. In metaphor this intermediate term constitutes a semic intersection of the two classes; therefore it belongs to the semantic field of each of them. This is why the supplementary addition of semes is partial. In the well worn case of contiguity, there is no such semic intersection. From this point of view metonymy "rests on a void"; one can speak of a null intersection. Nevertheless there is a common inclusion, but of the two terms in a larger domain, whether of semes in the case of conceptual decomposition or of things in the case of material decomposition. In short "in metaphor the intermediate term is encompassed,
whereas in metonymy it is encompassing. To put it differently, the third, absent, term is to be sought in a contiguous region of semes and of things. One can say in this sense, that metaphor calls upon only denotative semes, that is nuclear semes, while metonymy calls upon connotative semes, that is, "contiguous to the array of a larger grouping and combining to define this grouping."\(^6\)

For Ricoeur a synecdochic operation is common to metaphor and metonymy, but he notes that in metaphor the intermediate or ground term is a partial aspect of both tenor and vehicle, whereas in metonymy the intermediate or ground term is a larger domain of which the terminals are part.

This definition of metaphor coincides with types (b) and (c) within *le groupe mu* schema, impossible varieties according to their analysis; but ones in which the synecdochic part/whole relationship obtains and in which the ground term is the larger domain. Similarly, metonymy can be described as a part-part transference of meaning among disparate species by means of their synecdochic relationship to a larger whole, or, in Aristotle's terms a species-species transference of meaning, his third kind of metaphor.

For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that metonymy is a transference of the name of one thing to another by means of synecdoche. To take an example, we could, I have suggested, construe the example for type (b) variety in *le groupe mu* schema as metonymy, rather than "metaphore impossible." Indeed, a "handlike head" is a strained concept, but a simple reversal of
other strategy, which Levin develops from Martin Joos, describes kenning as a figure that combines metaphor and metonymy in concentrated form. By this view "gem" is a simile for "sun" which is metonymically determined by the context "heaven." If we press the notion of metonymic determination we see at once that "sun" is a synecdochic aspect of "heaven," not a direct determination of it in the cause-effect mode. Rather the substitution of "gem" for "sun" is determined by an understanding of a previous synecdochic relation between "gem" and an unknown "X" equivalent to "heaven."

We might better adapt Joos' suggestion in light of le groupe mu analysis by saying that kenning combines a type (a) metaphor with a type (d).

![Diagram](Fig. 4. Kenning no. 1)

The fully elaborated figure here is a type (d) or material metaphor containing a type (a) within it. In fact we see here in schematized form the possibility that all type (d) or material figures are extensions of type (a) or conceptual figures. And as such, this confirms the claim that the distinction between type (a) and type (d) metaphors, like Ricoeur's distinction between metaphor and metonymy, is a difference in completeness of
presentation of terms and the mode of operation, not an absolute difference in kind, or operation.

And if we add the further specification that in kenning the final term receives no emphasis (in our example body) is absorbed into the initial term (heaven), it then becomes clear that kenning occupies a middle territory between type (a) and type (d).

(Fig. 5, Kenning no. 2)

To complete our scheme the markers (-) and (+) are offered to signal semantic impertinence (-) and semantic pertinence (+).

The final semantic impertinence at Sg (-) body is a generalizing move already resolved in working out the first three synecdochic steps. The Sg (-) is balanced by Sp (-) at stage one. Another more general description of this state of affairs would be that the generalizing allegory (one-to-one relationship) between (body and heaven) is overridden by an emphasis on the ground terms or partial aspects of the sun-gem relationship.

We should at this point be reminded of Coleridge's definition of symbol, its emphasis on the particular with a tacit assumption of an implied whole. The structure of kenning and
tenor and vehicle yields a concept not far from current, a "heady hand" or a "brainy hand." Placekickers in the NFL have "educated toes" by means of the same metonymic transference.

A more literary example is William Gass' "There are gray hairs growing from the nose of my mind." The semantic impertinence at "nose of my mind" is resolved by the inclusion of both terms within the larger domain of human physiognomy and biology. The grayness of the hair, associated conventionally with old age and wisdom, here becomes a direct effect of the mind by means of a contiguous metonymic contagion.

It should be noted too, that this variety of synecdoche is usually of the cause-effect mode, one mode in which parts are often conceptually related to parts. An easily recognizable example is the common "roar of thunder" wherein "roar" and "thunder," both names for the same phenomenon, are related by means of cause and effect. The "thunder" here causes the "roar."

The usefulness of synecdoche as the basic unit of semantic transference is further demonstrated by a look at kenning, a characteristic anglo-saxon trope.

In the Semantics of Metaphor Levin entertains two analyses to describe the structure of kenning. The kenning heofencs gīm (heaven's gem) for example, can be unpacked into Aristotle's formula for proportional metaphor, B is to A as D is to C. The
metaphor in the particularizing mode coincide with Coleridge's definition of symbol. In his article, "The Old English Kenning," Thomas Gardner helps extend this insight by noting the similarity between the structure of kenning and riddle.

Two objects with some common features but with no essential similarity (A & B) are compared and the comparison is made plausible by means of a word serving to link the universes of discourse of the two objects together (C). Object B is compared to A and substituted for it in the frame of reference of C.\(^7\)

Worth noting in this definition is the absence of the fourth term (D) resulting from the collapse of the final term into the initial term (see fig. 3 above). Gardner traces the origin of this structure to the "Question-Answer" dialogues of the Byzantine period which were made popular as instruments of instruction by Alcuin who introduced the form to England.

The examples Gardner cites readily demonstrate his thesis:

Q. What is the sea? A. An uncertain road.
Q. What is a body? A. Domesticated spirit.

On the basis of these structural similarities Gardner's thesis helps substantiate the earlier claim of this dissertation that symbol is a kind of riddle but with the tenor or final term subject to supplementary predication and consequent modification. Coleridge's static example of symbol can be formulated as a riddle of the question-answer type.

Q. What is a man? A. An animal with a prominent chin and lips.
But we cannot yet represent this example within *le groupe mu* scheme because Coleridge's examples are definitional, not fully contextualized or predicated tropes or even instances of tropes. Rather, the definitional examples reveal the structure of symbol as distinguished from allegory. For our purposes *le groupe mu* scheme offers a formal way to represent this rhetorical difference.

We have already noted that *kenning* is a foreshortened form of a type (d) metaphor containing a type (a) within it. As such *kenning* occupies a middle territory between type (d) and type (a). Coleridge's definition of symbol shares with *kenning* its emphasis on the ground term or partial aspect of the wholes in view, the terms of departure and tenor. We are now in a position to propose that symbol as Coleridge defines it is a foreshortened form of *kenning* wherein not only the final term is absorbed into the initial term of departure but the initial term of departure is itself collapsed into the partial aspect or ground. Thus, Coleridge's assertion that symbol is "a sign included in the idea it represents." And, as I suggested in chapter one, this collapse of departure term into partial aspect is an incipient rhetorical form of the collapse of agent into subject that critics note begins with the Romantics and informs the density of a modern poetic characteristic of Crane's work. This formula also helps provide a formal notation for the hermeneutic status often ascribed to symbol.
Simply stated, symbol or synecdoche is a movement from part to whole or from whole to part in a generalizing or particularizing mode. Coleridge’s examples can be represented as such:

Lips and Chin

\[\text{Man}\]

(Fig. 6. Coleridge's Symbol no. 1)

In this form, symbol, as Coleridge defines it, can be taken as a simple synecdochic move from part to whole, the latter half of a type (d) metaphor. However, if type (d) metaphors are extensions of type (a) as our analysis of kenning reveals, then we are licensed to look for an implied ground term (partial aspect of lips and chin) of which lips and chin (themselves partial aspects or ground terms of the explicit symbolic representation in Coleridge's example, fig. 6) are the implied tenor. Clearly Coleridge's example demands such an implication:

outward organs
of speech

\[\text{Man}\]

\[\text{lips and chin}\]

(Fig. 7. Coleridge's Symbol no. 2)

From here we see that the primacy of the partial aspect (lips and chin) in Coleridge's example is determined by the conceptual
category (type (a) ground term) which they imply and of which they become the tenor. The relationship between outward organs of speech and lips and chin is identical to that of ground and tenor in a type (a) or conceptual metaphor.

By this schematization Coleridge's simple example for symbol takes on its full semantic power. Man as symbolized by lips and chin is an articulate animal, a beast of speech. In this sense, by dint of a previous implied ground of which it is a determination, the partial aspect determines the force of the whole. The usefulness of this insight is not that I am licensed by le groupe mu approach to supply this specific reading of the Coleridge example, but that any particular reading of the example proceeds by such a synecdochic operation in the generalizing or particularizing mode.

This schematization of Coleridge's example of symbol represents the combined latter halves of type (a) and type (d) metaphors. On this basis the schematization confirms Fletcher's distinction between allegory and symbol. While both proceed by the same synecdochic operation, in symbol the partial aspect, dominates the total figure, whereas in allegory the whole figure or tenor term dominates the partial aspect. The foreshortening of tenor and departure terms as we move from a type (d) to kenning to symbol to type (a) parallels the move from allegory to symbol.

As I have argued earlier, with the Romantics the partial
aspect receives a new emphasis but cannot be said to dominate tenor and departure terms. While for the Victorians who inherited the Romantic emphasis on the partial aspect, the tenor (whole) term becomes less readily inferable as the predicative function of the partial aspect comes to the fore.

In chapter 3 and 4 I will give a detailed analysis of this shift by applying le groupe mu model to several representative poems of the Romantic and Victorian periods. The heart of the dissertation, however, is the role of synecdoche in modern poetry. And chapter 5 will be a synecdochally attuned analysis of Hart Crane's The Bridge. As an introduction to my method of analysis I offer here a reading of a short Crane poem, "Lachrymae Christi." This close analysis should serve two purposes. First, I hope to demonstrate in a concrete way the usefulness of le groupe mu approach I have developed so far. And second, I want to intimate the ultimate reach of my thesis that an analysis of modes of synecdoche will provide a rhetorical index for the shift from the Romantic to the Modern mode in poetry.

In the first book length treatment of Crane's work, Samuel Hazo devotes no more than 100 words to "Lachrymae Christi," demurring that the poem's "range of association is so daring that it becomes at times simply puzzling. The transitions are so abrupt that they tend to mystify." Hazo's analysis of the poem consists of reprinting the final three stanzas and sending the
reader off to a journal article. Hazo closes his brief discussion of the poem with the comment that Crane "never wrote another poem exactly like it." Despite Hazo's precise language here which successfully screens any objection to the statement, the daring range of association and abrupt transitions in "Lachrymae Christi" promise much of what is characteristic of Crane's later work, particularly The Bridge.

Lachrymae Christi

Whitely, while benzine
Rinsings from the moon
Dissolve all but the windows of the mills
(Inside the sure machinery
Is still
And curdled only where a sill
Sluices its one unyielding smile)

Immaculate venom binds
The fox's teeth, and swart
Thorns freshen on the year's
First blood. From flanks unfended,
Twanged red perfidies of spring
Are trillion on the hill.

And the nights opening
Chant pyramids,—
Anoint with innocence—recall
To music and retrieve what perjuries
Had galvanized the eyes.

While chime
Beneath and all around
Distilling clemencies,—worms'
inaudible whistle, tunneling
Not penitence
But song, as these
Perpetual fountains, vines,—

Thy Nazarene and tender eyes.
(Let sphinxes from the ripe
Borage of death have cleared my tongue
Once and again; vermin and rod
No longer bind. Some sentient cloud
Of tears flocks through the tendoned loam:
Betrayed stones slowly speak.)

Names peeling from Thine eyes
And their undimming lattices of flame,
Spell out in palm and pain
Compulsion of the year, O Nazarene.

Lean long from sable, slender boughs,
Unstanched and luminous. And as the nights
Strike from Thee perfect spheres,
Lift up in lilac-emerald breath the grail
Of earth again--

Thy face
From charred and riven stakes, O
Dionysus, Thy
Unmangled target smile.10

My purpose here is not to render a full paraphrase of the poem; such a summarization is not possible with Crane's poetry. Rather I want to simulate the discovering activity of accounting for relations among partial aspects. In this short lyric, as in The Bridge, language and images from discrete cultural contexts communicate with one another through the relations among the partial aspects that constitute the basis of Crane's dense poetic.

The difficulty such poetic density presents for the reader stems from the lack of a discursive base that either explicitly connects the partial aspects or supplies a whole from which the partial aspects are derived. In its place Crane educes a conceptual form and an organizational principle constituted out of the relations among particulars. The mode of such a poetic is
the inductive, inferential mode of synecdoche.

The title, Lachrymae Christi, is itself a synecdoche for the Passion, a partial aspect that stands for a whole. Rather than elaborating that whole, the poem focuses on the details of the partial aspect from the point of view of someone who knows the story of the Passion, but who stands with the technology of the twentieth century. Understood as a partial aspect, the title introduces a mode of implication (part-whole and effect-cause) and a focus that organize the relations among disparate particulars.

For example, like the tears of the title, "benzine rinsings" are a colorless liquid. And the denotative properties of benzine--an inflammable solvent--become connotative attributes of Christ's tears. The categorical similarity of the partial aspects implies a further metaphor between the Moon, the source of 'benzine rinsings' and Christ, the source of tears. We may go one step further by implication to grant the unstated analogy between the Sun and the Father whose light Christ reflects. Thus, the potential flammability of Christ's tears, which erupts in stanza six--"undimmed lattices of flame"--and again in the concluding two stanzas, is generated on one hand out of a property of benzine already metaphorically allied to the image of tears in the title, and on the other hand out of the extended analogy between The father and The Sun. Here, too, the pun on "sun"
signals an overlap of cause and effect, father-son, a figu-
ra-tive device characteristic of Crane.

In the first stanza, Crane's part-whole, cause-effect modes
of implication introduced with 'benzine rinsings,' metaphorically
allied to Christ's tears, prepare a full system of relations
that establishes an analogy between the Mill and human facial
features--windows: eyes, sure machinery: brains and sill:
mouth, confirmed in the final partial aspect educed (sluiced)
by the sill--smile.

This final aspect is a focus of organization throughout the
poem. As well as confirming the facial aspects of the Mill, it
is the first explicit instance of the numerous images of aperture
and eduction we find. The first image of aperture are the eyes
of Christ implied by the tears of the title. The images of aper-
ture that occur in each stanza educe particulars which are re-
lated to one another by a network of transformations. The meta-
phoric 'smile' educed by the 'sill' in stanza one serves to focus
the transition to stanza II. The effect of the transition is
similar to that of a cinematic dissolve. In stanza II Crane
transforms the window sill 'smile' to 'Fox's teeth' which like,
"swart thorns" "freshen on the year's first blood." Out of the
aperture made by the fox's teeth flow 'Twanged red perfidies of
spring" which in turn 'are trillion on the hill.'

Both the blood of the lamb transformed to music by means of
a partial aspect of 'trillion' and by means of a close focus on the detail, the magnification of flank to 'hill,'--the site of Christ's crucifixion--provide metaprophic links to the themes of stanza III, the poem's most difficult stanza.

Here, Crane's close focus and logic of connective detail shifts to a wider and more abstract perspective. The detailed play of music, light and machinery in stanza I and the violent intercourse of predator and prey in the pastoral drama of stanza II are retrieved in the abstractions of a nocturnal Egyptian scene. Crane introduces the scene in flat categorical tones: "And the nights," "Opening," here, is the most abstract instance of aperture in the poem. "Chant" recalls the earlier music of stanza II in general terms. And the concept of eduction is presented in an instance of surface syntax which violates conventions of lexical relation. We have the noun "Nights" taking the verb "Chant," which requires a human agent, predicating a substantive plural noun, "pyramids."

But while the lexical impertinence is striking and problematic in stanza III, two previous instances of aperture and eduction also parallel this structure but do not seem to present a problem. In stanza I, "sill sluices/its one unyielding smile" and in stanza II "flanks unfended" educe "red perfidies of spring." In these instances, however, the impertinence is naturalized by a metaporphic context and a discursive whole which
the partial aspects imply. In stanza I the categorical similarities of aspects of the mill and human facial features provides a metalogic; in stanza II we read "red perfidies" as 'blood' by means of a synecdochic reversal of cause and effect. Perfidy, the cause or mode of the blood letting here appears as an effect, allied to the blood itself. In stanza III, the abstract diction does not imply a set of metaphoric structures by which the impertinence is naturalized. No a priori discursive whole or metalogical system is at hand to contextualize or specify relations among aspects of the clause. In this stanza we are confronted with a pure eduction, the flowing out of substance from a source. And thus we must look forward as well as backward for contextualization and specification.

"Anoint with innocence" links the tears and benzine of stanza I with the innocence of the lamb in stanza II. Taken as a passive participle 'Anoint' modifies 'pyramids,' and parallels "had galvanized the eyes." Taken as an active verb 'Anoint' parallels the verb 'chant' and the succeeding verbs 'recall' and 'retrieve.' Having set the phrase off in dashes, Crane forestalls the possibility of taking "Anoint" in the active sense, although the parallel to the active verbs pulls the reader in that direction as well.

Crane's bifocal vision, or more specifically 'revision' in Stanza III grounds Christ's death in Egyptian 'pyramids' by
establishing the structural similarity of pyramids 'anoint with innocence' and industrial mills dissolved in benzine. The windows of the mills resist the action of benzine; the eyes of the pyramids are galvanized against rust, shocked against time. Both images of aperture recall the eyes of Christ, the initial source of eduction.

Crane has exchanged a discursive whole for a conceptual form—the chief among which is what I have termed the structure of aperture and eduction—that establishes a uniform structural similarity among Christ's death, the annual perfidies of spring, Egyptian burial practice and modern technology.

The related themes of death and music appear in stanza IV. 'Pyramids' become the site for "worms' inaudible whistle, tunneling/Not penitence/ But song," another image of aperture and eduction characterized by synaesthetic impertinence. In this instance "worms' inaudible whistle" "chime" "song." Here the eduction, whistle/song, becomes the cause of aperture, implicit in 'tunneling.' The contraction and reversal of cause and effect, opening and eduction, is syntactically evidenced by the displacement of the main verb in the stanza—'chime.' Aperture is implied in the verbal idea of 'tunneling' which modifies 'song.'

Not only does Crane exchange linear narrative for predicative structures such as aperture and eduction, but the structure
itself, constituted out of the syntactic relations of subject verb-object, contracts subject and object (whistle and song) until the verb is squeezed out and normal predicative sequence is reversed: 'tunnel,' already a substantive noun used as a verb, becomes a participle modifying song.

At the close of stanza IV Crane makes an uncharacteristic explicit parallel between worms' silent song and 'perpetual fountains' that flow from the eyes of Christ. The parallel, stated explicitly here, is not gratuitous, it has been grounded in the uniform structure of aperture/eduction established almost inductively out of the particulars of the poem. Crane has confidence in the simple metaphoric link 'as' because the lineaments of this metaphoric relation--organized in the conventional relations of syntax, implicit in the relations among partial aspects of particulars organized by that syntax--are grounded in a structural principle of aperture/eduction.

It is essential to note here that what establishes the metaphoric relationship between the silent tears of Christ and the silent song of death is a structural principle or function generated out of the particulars of the lyric itself. We do not have a simple a priori pattern of ritual death and cyclical rebirth imposed on the disordered fragments of a modern lyric in order to facilitate interpretive order.

Unlike The Waste Land, which some readers have noted
presents similar difficulties, Lachrymae Christi does not require appended footnotes to explicate connections among disparate particulars. To make sense of "Nazarene and tinder eyes," for example, one has only to look at the logic of images to discover that 'tinder' is a precondition of flammability, already a connotative attribute lent to Christ's tears by 'benzine' in the first stanza. An aural cue, 'Nazarene,' prompts the association.

In the following stanza Crane speaks from within parentheses, but without a tongue:

(Let Sphinxes from the ripe
Borage of death have cleared my tongue
Once again; . . .

The silent eduction of music out of the aperture of death, here the poet's own mouth, recalls the unyielding smile of the mills within which the twentieth century poet stands. The parentheses, a kind of aperture, in both stanzas signal the voice of the poet. Crane's own lyric is the most concrete eduction of music out of death. The silent music of poetry, like "Betrayed stones [that] slowly speak," sings a riddling oracular wisdom. The rhetorical mode of such riddling wisdom, is, I have shown, synecdoche.

For Crane, this sleight-of-hand logic is allied to the sacramental:

Names peeling from Thine eyes
And their undimming lattices of flame
Spell out in palm and pain
Compulsion of the year, O Nazarene.
'Names peeling from [Christ's] eyes' 'spell out in palm and pain' the compulsion of the year. Palm and pain implicitly refer to the blood of the crucifixion and is evidence for the ability of parts to speak for larger wholes. The secondary sense Crane picks out in palm is the mute language of the palmist and the trickster.

The 'grail of earth' Christ lifts up in lilac-emerald breath is his own face, a face which, like the earth, is fertile with "some sentient cloud of tears that flocks through the tendoned loam" and is freshened with the year's first blood that flows "unstanned and luminous," the sacramental wine of both the Christian and Dionysian.

I have termed Crane's use of synecdoche, "constitutive synecdoche," a mode that on the one hand depends upon and grows out of the Romantics' notion that the idea is immanent in the sign (exemplified by Coleridge), and on the other hand depends upon the Victorian sense that language is itself a mediation of experience. What is constituted therefore is not an entity or an idea, but a relation that organizes partial aspects, a relation which for Crane expresses a "ratio of fact to experience" because the mind itself is implicit in the organization that relates particulars. Another way to see this is to say that what is constituted is not an allegorical relation of each particular to a general abstract concept, but an organization or ground
that makes possible relations among discrete particulars in terms of the structure of those relations themselves, rather than in terms of an a priori abstraction or category of which the particulars are concrete signs or tokens. In this way, the particulars themselves can be said to constitute the structural category in the same way in which the particulars constitute the ratio of fact to experience.

An implication of this poetic mode is that we cannot clearly distinguish denotative meaning from the connotative because the denotative/connotative distinction is not recoverable as a distinction but as a differential ratio. We can exemplify this by tracing the way in which Crane deploys the term 'smile.' We first encounter the term in its metaphorical use. Certain denotative attributes of a human facial feature become connotative aspects of the window sill. In the course of the poem both an opened window, sill and smile are retrieved as versions of the larger structure of aperture which they constitute. In the last stanza 'smile' can then be said to be a partial aspect which recovers both the partial aspects of which smile is a connotative attribute within the larger category of aperture and the denotive or more or less literal attributes conventionally associated with a human facial feature. We cannot say clearly whether this last instance of 'smile' is connotative or denotive, but we can say it is constitutive of the larger structure, aperture, of
which it is the final variation. We may then go back to relate this final variation to the first in terms of the aperture/education structure.

The proliferation of perspectives and contexts, the tight focus on the particular detail, the juxtaposition of discrete dictions and the riddling lexical impertinence are characteristics of Crane's poetic that are also found in many other modern poems. But Crane's place in modern poetry has been unclear. For some Crane is the Romantic symbolist like Eliot, for whom synecdoche characterizes his despair. For others Crane is the hard edged objectivist of a Pound or a Williams for whom synecdoche is a positive mode for the mind that wishes if not for an objective image of the mind's relation to the fluidity of experience, at least an image that satisfies the mind's relation to itself in that world, to the structures by which the mind constitutes its experience of the world. Crane's poetry, which is at once readily acclaimed and then retreated from by critics, is, I think, a nexus of the modern. And if attention to synecdoche in Crane helps clarify our understanding of his dense poetic, a similar scrutiny applied to other modern poets would help break ground toward establishing a critical base for reading modern poetry at its most characteristically modern.

In the next chapter I return to an historical exemplification of the roots of modern constitutive synecdoche in the
Romantic symbol, a synecdoche of immanence. As such, an historical exemplification of the Romantic synecdoche of immanence, synecdoche with an emphasis on the particular, establishes evidence for the initial step in my argument that the historical fracture between symbolic and an earlier allegoric mode is best understood, in rhetorical terms, as a shift in emphasis from the whole to the part in the essentially synedochic function that is the basis of all metaphoric language.
END NOTES: CHAPTER II


2. Levin, p. 100.

3. Levin, p. 102.

4. Levin, p. 103.


10. Hart Crane, "Lachrymae Christi" in *The Collected Poems of Hart Crane*, ed. Waldo Frank (New York: Liveright, 1933), pp. 84-85. All further references to "Lachrymae Christi" will be incorporated in the text.
CHAPTER III: The Romantic Synecdoche of Immanence

To Generalize is to be an Idiot. To Particularize is the Alone distinction of Merit. General Knowledges are those Knowledges that Idiots possess.\(^1\)

* * * * * *

He who would see the Divinity must see him in his Children One first, in friendship & love, then a Divine family, & in the midst Jesus will appear; so he who wishes to see a Vision, a Perfect Whole, Must see it in its Minute Particulars, & every Particular is a Man, a Divine Member of the Divine Jesus.\(^2\)

* * * * * *

To see a world in a grain of sand
And a heaven in a wild flower,
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
And eternity in an hour.\(^3\)

Blake's attack upon generality is a characteristic Romantic response to what were perceived as the mechanical abstractions of eighteenth century critics and aestheticians like Edmund Burke, Joshua Reynolds and Dr. Johnson. The Romantic answers with an emphasis on the particular and individual. But this emphasis is not a rejection of the organizational and systematizing function of the general. Instead it insists on organizational principles clearly constituted by relations among particulars rather than those elicited by analogous or generic categorical patterns.

Many critics acknowledge an emphasis on the particular in Romantic poetry,\(^4\) and those critics who follow Coleridge's
theoretical leads relate an emphasis on the particular to a "symbolic" mode as distinct from an allegoric mode. But none address the issue of how the relations among emphasized particulars constitute organizational principles. In this chapter I want to address this issue by applying the terms of the model of synecdoche developed so far, to a number of instances of symbol in exemplary Romantic poets principally, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, Prometheus Unbound and Adonais. In doing so, I will demonstrate how a synecdoche of immanence--synecdoche with an emphasis on the particular but with a dependence on an intimated whole--is a basic rhetorical operation whereby the Romantics sought to constitute organizational principles from relations among emphasized particulars. I use the metaphoric verb "seek" here to suggest that what we call the Romantic mode, characterized by an emphasis on the particular, is the result of a pursuit or project rather than an enactment of a theory. And the variety of approaches within the general Romantic project reflect a number of strategies which a synecdoche of immanence makes possible. Among those strategies I will distinguish three main types of synecdoche of Immanence. The first, predominant in what we call a realistic style, is defined in Coleridge's first example of his theory of symbol, a nose and chin prominent representing man. This synecdochic inference of whole from part is grounded in the conventional laws of ordinary reality. And though this form
appears in all poetry at some point, it is not characteristically Romantic and will only concern us here as the initial step for the second type usually associated with what Hartman calls the "theophanic," Abrams the "supernatural," and Penn Warren, "the symbolic." In this second kind of synecdoche of immanence, the emphasis on the particular exceeds the familiar law of ordinary reality. Such instances of emphasized particulars of this type are the most recognizable Romantic symbols: Coleridge's Albatross, the watersnakes that enchant the Mariner, Keats' Nightingale, Shelley's Frankenstein. The synecdochic inference from part to whole is less sure than with the first type which is evidenced in the interpretive problems critics confront in Coleridge, particularly, and in Coleridge's own attempt to provide a gloss to the Mariner.

In the first half of the chapter I will focus on Coleridge to show how the shift from the first type to the second type of synecdoche of immanence is accompanied by a shift in ground term caused by an increasing emphasis on the particular. Using the model of synecdoche developed in chapter two, it will first be possible to picture an increasing emphasis on the particular and the shift in ground term due to an emphasis on the particular. But it is enough to say here that the shift in ground term is determined by the need to resolve differences among emphasized particulars. The desire for resolution of these differences,
which are felt as oppositions (are the watersnakes the Mariner blesses "sacred" or "evil"?) parallels the search for organizational principles constituted out of relations among particulars. It will then be possible to demonstrate how the shift in ground opens up a space between the emphasized particular and dominating organization (the universal or whole). Interpretation fills this space created by the force of the particular on the ground term, by attempting to account for relations among emphasized particulars within a consistent organization. This account is various, ranging from psychological readings of Keats and Coleridge to secular versions of the religious symbol. Although my interests here are not interpretive but rhetorical, the instances of symbol brought into focus are also the focus of many critical arguments. And I situate my analysis within traditional and current critical contexts. At most points this context brings a familiar orientation to my own rhetorical purposes, at other points relevant criticism serves as counter-example.

My discussion will both distinguish the two types from one another and show the relation between the two types, a relation felt as opposition from the point of view of the particular. The Coleridgean solution to shifting ground, what will be seen as an effect of synecdoche, with an emphasis on the particular, defines one limit of the Romantic project. This form of Romanticism in which I include Keats, some of Wordsworth, some of
Byron, is the subject of a number of schools of criticism, most notably "New Criticism" and more recently the French structuralist and American secular symbolists (Burke, Adams, J. Robert Barth). In one sense, then, my aims are subordinate to the larger claims of these critical approaches, for I am operating from within, or, from under, their larger historical and aesthetic generalizations about Romanticism in my attempt to develop a rhetorical model for the figurative operation most characteristic of a Romantic poetic. Once this model is in place it can be viewed as a rhetorical index for the transition from the allegoric metaphoric mode of the eighteenth century (the whole dominating the part) to the symbolic metaphoric mode of the Romantics who emphasize the particular. In this sense my model will serve some of the larger generalizations about Romanticism by demonstrating the structure of a rhetorical dynamic underlying a Romantic poetic from which a number of strategies are made possible.

The second half of this chapter focuses on Shelley's "Ozymandias," Prometheus Unbound and Adonais as well as examples from Wordsworth, The Prelude, and "After-Thought." I will define and exemplify a third type of synecdoche of immanence, characteristic of visionary or large scale lyric poetry as in Shelley's mythic drama and his elegy for Keats, Wordsworth's Prelude or the short poems I will deal with her. This third type
is best described as it is distinguished from the second type. Where Coleridge's supernatural synecdoche of immanence begins with and finally returns to the realistic first type, Shelley's use of synecdoche begins with Coleridge's second type. The shift in ground term due to the force of a particular, what I will term a difference felt as an opposition, is already completed and assumed in the Shelleyean third type. For the reader this is felt in the setting and characterization as a pan-historical mythic realm, what for Shelley is the "ideal," or from the point of critics like Frye, the "archetypal." Shelley's characters, or spirit/characters are amalgams of aspects of conventional western mythology. In this sense, Shelley's world comes already particularized, differences and oppositions already forged into relation in terms of relational structure. The character of Prometheus, for example, is a combination of Aeschylus's Prometheus, Milton's Satan and aspects of (Shelley's own version of) Christ.

This third type then, begins with a shift in ground and Shelley's attempt to constitute the "ideal" from this ground can be seen as his attempt to find an organizational principle clearly constituted by relations among particulars. Often, as in Coleridge's second type, this organizational principle is not pictured. "To a Skylark" is an instance. But where the relations among particulars become dramatic as in Prometheus or in
the Romantic elegaic mode, what Bloom calls the "Visionary" mode, the organizational principles are pictured in the interactions of character or glimpsed in what Wordsworth calls the "form" and "function" of a universal process discoverable in relations among particulars. As will be demonstrated in working with Shelley's *Adonais* and the Wordsworth poems, this third kind of synecdoche of immanence offers a second approach as distinguished from Coleridge's attempt, to constitute an organizational principle from relations among particulars. Where Coleridge's interest in and emphasis upon the particular creates a problem of shifting ground which is resolved by a return to a realistic ground, Shelley assumes a shift in ground as a point of departure for a further emphasis on the already emphasized particular. The subsequent shift in ground results in the reworking of the initial pan-historical or mythic realm in terms of a personal lyric perspective. This large scale personal lyric or "visionary" perspective can be distinguished from Coleridge's sacramental return to an ordinary realistic ground. The Shelleyan third type attempts to constitute a new organizational principle; the Coleridgean second type seeks to expand the organizational principle of the initial realistic ground to include the oppositions generated by the shift in ground to the second type. In this sense Coleridge is conservative where Shelley is radical. At the close of the chapter I anticipate the influence of these two rhetorical
strategies, use of the Romantic synecdoche of immanence, on the early Victorians, who continue the Romantic emphasis on the particular, but without the characteristic Romantic faith in the immanence of the universal. From the rhetorical point of view the transition from a Romantic to a Victorian poetic is a transition from a synecdoche of immanence to what I term a synecdoche of privation. From the Victorian standpoint, Coleridge's resolution to the search for an organizational principle results in vagueness, and Shelley's personal lyric myth appears solipsistic. What has been lost is a sense of the universal as distinguished from the merely subjective. The Victorian response to the loss of an objective universal, a characteristically Victorian loss of faith, most evident in Tennyson and Arnold, can be viewed as a growing recognition of the mediated status of the emphasized particular as the distance between the emphasized particular and the totalizing domain increases with each shift in ground. The Victorian response to this situation is further complicated by the recognition that the ground term by which the emphasized particular is understood is itself a projection of the expressive consciousness rather than a stable element of the universal. Thus, for example, the distorted perceptions of the speaker in Tennyson's Maud, are grounded not in a universal condition, but are seen to be the products of his own madness. Similarly, the expressions of the historical personages in Browning's monologues
are grounded in partial and idiosyncratic world views which reflect a limited and circumscribed consciousness rather than a universal One Mind or Spirit.

In simple terms, the Romantic faith in the participation of individual consciousness in the Universal Mind is undermined by the increasing emphasis on the individual and particular. In rhetorical terms the Romantic confidence in the synecdochic basis of figurative language evolves into an anxiety that emphasized particulars fail to imply universals. At this point I want to return to the germination of this unease, to what Hazard Adams calls the secularization of the religious symbol.

In his much anthologized lecture, "The Ancient Mariner," Humphrey House criticizes Robert Penn Warren's discursive reading of the symbol in Coleridge's poem of pure imagination. He warns against Penn Warren's application of Coleridge's own critical theories for interpreting the poem:

It is, for instance, tempting to use Coleridge's later distinction between allegory and symbol in interpreting "The Ancient Mariner"; but they had not been expressed in 1797-8. In fact, we may be misled if we start the critique of the "Mariner" and "Kubla Khan" with this disjunction of allegory from symbol in mind. For all allegory involves symbolism, and in proportion as symbolism becomes developed and coherent it tends towards allegory. This is one of the problems involved in Mr. Penn Warren's exciting essay: he starts as a "symbolist" criticizing all the "allegorisers" and ends up something so organized and precise that Coleridge, anyway, would probably have called it allegorization. But Mr. Penn Warren would be quite willing to accept that, provided only that his kind of allegory is seen to be distinct from simple "two dimensional" allegory.
The poem's very richness at once tempts and defeats definiteness of interpretation; as we commit ourselves to the development of one strand of meaning we find that in the very act of doing so we are excluding something else of importance. House argues against applying Coleridge's theoretical disjunction between symbol and allegory to an analysis of "The Mariner" by pointing out that "all allegory involves symbolism, and in proportion as symbolism becomes developed and coherent it tends toward allegory, a notion implicit in Angus Fletcher's analysis of Allegory. And in the short paragraph House suggests that the "Ancient Mariner" both invites and resists the tendency toward allegorical definiteness of interpretation. And like Fletcher, House implies that this shading of symbol into allegory is a practical exception to Coleridge's own theoretical distinction "toto genere" between the two terms. This, then, is Penn Warren's error in applying Coleridge's theories to his poetry, not the historical dagge of expanding a poem in light of an author's subsequent theory.

In one sense, House is attacking new criticism's anti-historical impulse and attempts to check the habit of "new criticism" to take its Coleridge straight. House himself is willing to follow Coleridge in spirit by recognizing that the richness of a symbolic mode is somewhat at odds with the definiteness of the allegoric. But he also perceives that an overly systematic reading of the symbolic would seem to overturn the distinction,
as well as deprive the poem of the full range of its variety. For the very act of committing an analysis to one strand of meaning excludes others. Here House anticipates DeMan's demystifying notion of critical Blindness and Insight when dealing with the structural intentionality of Romantic texts.\(^9\)

For the purposes of this dissertation, a redefinition of Coleridge's notion of symbol as a synecdoche of immanence, synecdoche with an emphasis on the part, but dependent on a sense of the whole--realizes that the critical problem House and DeMan confront is the result of a rhetorical feature of the Romantic shift in emphasis on and interest in the particular. It is this emphasis on the particular that distinguishes the symbolic from the allegoric for Coleridge: "if the allegoric personage be strongly individualized so as to interest us, we cease to think of it as allegory."\(^{10}\) In the following pages I want to explore Coleridge's interest in the individual and particular as it is reflected in The Ancient Mariner. Specifically, I will exemplify the understanding of synecdoche developed in chapter one with several images in the poem where Coleridge's interest in the particular begins to create the interpretive problems for critics that House and DeMan note. And then I want to offer an account for the marginal gloss in The Ancient Mariner that explains the relation of the gloss to the poem in terms of the synecdochic part/whole structure.
Every analysis of Coleridge's *Rime* deals at some point with what one critic calls the "watershed" image of the watersnakes, the "happy living things!" the Mariner "blessed unaware." It is at this moment in the voyage that the Albatross drops from the Mariner's neck and

the terrible spell snaps, the dead natural elements "burst into life" and, benign again, move the Mariner along on his own circular journey. . . .\[ll

Abrams' brief account of *The Mariner* begins with the statement that the poem is "neither an allegorical fable nor a symbolist poem." He then goes on to add that the glosses which Coleridge supplied to "assist the bewildered readers" do "invite us to take the Mariner's experience as an instance of the Christian plot of moral error, the discipline of suffering, and a consequent change of heart." Abrams would seem to have accepted the invitation himself, no questions asked. But Abrams' view of the poem as a conventional "spiritual journey" is not shared by others. James D. Boulger, D. W. Harding, Edward Bostetter and A. M. Buchan, among others, read the Mariner's experience not as purposive quest but a voyage riddled by chance, unexplained cause-effect relations, "accidents (appearances) without substance," aspects of Coleridge's poem that resist neat and tidy readings such as those offered by Abrams and Penn Warren. And like strongly individualized particulars, such occurrences in the poem obscure a singular and consistent logical and rational
allegorical reading, and produce, instead, a multitude of possible readings. The psychological effect of this intellectual and moral vertigo on the reader is often the subject of successful analyses of the poem.\textsuperscript{12} And the activity of mind necessary to stay afloat in the uncertain currents of the poem is akin to that of sorting out "disordered patterns of dream."\textsuperscript{13} How such an analysis works is evidenced in A. M. Buchan's account of the watersnakes:

> When the Mariner next abandons his inaction to bless the water-snakes, the act, done "unaware" takes its meaning from the mood of despair preceding it. After the disappearance of the spectre-ship, the Mariner lives through a week of horror, disgust, and loneliness. His two hundred crew mates drop dead, and the corpses lie sweating on the deck as if life still flowed through them. . . . Only he and lothsome creatures in the ocean live on in the solitude. He pities himself, wishing he too were dead. As he watches the moon rise, he becomes aware of a brilliant panorama of light around him, the white gleam of the moon on the sea, the charmed red of the water in the ship's shadow, the spectral colors of the snakes.

> Blue, glossy green, and velvet black
> They coiled and swam; and every track
> Was a flash of golden fire
> and, in a flash as bright and golden within himself, he finds the snakes no longer loathsome but "happy living things." From the death of self-pity he moves into a love for the beautiful creatures around him, and, in blessing them, loses the burden of the Albatross.\textsuperscript{14}

The striking and particularized beauty of the snakes that absorb the Mariner's horrified attention is seen by Buchan to overturn their conventional Christian association with evil. But what meaning the act of blessing the snakes holds out is taken "from the mood of despair preceding it." Buchan then goes on to
explain the effect of the beauty of the snakes on what follows
the incident. For, according to Buchan, the "ruling genius" of
the poem, the ghastly figure of 'Life-In-Death, takes her force
from aspects of the snakes:

Her lips were red, her looks were free,
Her locks were yellow as gold
Her skin was white as leprosy,

--a passionate woman, seductive, loathsome in her loveli-
ness, and free as all things in nature of the moral scruple
that haunts mankind.15

Both the spectral woman and the snakes are free of the "moral
scruple that haunts mankind," but less free of the fixed alle-
gorical abstractions that initiate that moral scruple. For if
the snakes and Life-in-Death are free as all things in nature
are, our perceptions of them, as the Mariner's, are not. Conse-
quently, the snakes and Life-in-Death are seen finally by Buchan
and by most critics as images that reconcile polar oppositions.
Buchan brings back the conventional association of snakes with
evil which is now a concomitant with beauty:

Yet lurking in every flash of light, bright spot of color,
seductive motion and angelic sound is a sinister hint of
evil. 'The bride hath paced into the hall/ Red as a rose
is she,'--but red also are the lips of Life-in-Death. . . .16

And the bride, conventionally associated with purity, beauty and
innocence picks up the taint of evil lent to her by an aspect of
the Death-in-Life image.

The operation by which such contamination by association is
possible is synecdoche. Kenneth Burke asserts that synecdoche
is the rhetorical basis of a description for an interpretive methodology that accounts for motives and situations in poetic strategies that relate images across moments of unexpected transition:

... we consider synecdoche to be the basic process of representation, as approached from the standpoint of "equations" or "clusters" of what goes with what." To say that one can substitute part for whole, whole for part, container for the thing contained, thing contained for the container, cause for effect, or effect for cause, is simply to say that both members of these pairs belong to the same associational cluster. The Hegelian formula that 'everything is its other' can be applied here in two ways: We have the polar kind of otherness, as a certain kind of villainy is implicit in a certain kind of heroism, and vice versa. And we have synecdochic otherness, as the beloved's house may represent the beloved (or, as the ship on which the Mariner voyages represents the Mariner's own mental and bodily symptoms). Polar otherness unites things that are opposite to one another; synecdochic otherness unites things that are simply different from one another. ... Under dialectical pressures however any difference may come to be felt as an antithesis. ... 17

Thus, Buchan's notion that the act of blessing the snakes takes its meaning from the "mood of despair that preceded it" and the following claim that beauty of the snakes moves the Mariner to a love for beautiful creatures and, finally, to the consummate idea of Buchan's thesis that the image of Life-in-Death contains both the christian mood of despair and the seductiveness of striking individual beauty.

That, for Burke, synecdoche is the basis of both kinds of Hegelian "otherness" is underscored by the comment that "under dialectical pressures . . . any difference may be felt as
antithesis." I emphasize *felt* here because it is just such an
intimation of dialectical pressure that moves critics (even
Burke himself) to regard evil and beauty as opposites and hence,
to regard the watersnakes and Life-in-Death as reconciliations
of that polar opposition. At the level of interpretation this
pressure may be viewed as a tendency to apply *a priori* allegori-
cal schemes to a differential synecdochic structure.

Such a tendency occurs in the poem itself, as evidenced by
the crew's reaction to the Mariner's deed:

And I had done a hellish thing,
And it would work em woe:
For all averred, I had killed the bird
That made the breeze to blow.
Ah wretch! said they, such birds to slay
That made the breeze to blow!18

Because the crew assumes the appearance of the Albatross had a
causal relationship to the breeze that accompanied it, the Mariner's deed appears "hellish," endangering the ship's good luck.

But when the fair breeze prevails the crew reverses its judgement:

Nor dim nor red, like God's own head,
The glorious Sun uprist:
Then all averred, I had killed the bird
That brought the fog and mist.
'Twas right, said they, such birds to slay,
That bring the fog and mist.

The fair breeze blew, the white foam flew,
The furrow followed free;
We were the first that ever burst
Into that silent sea. (11:96-106)

The reversal, however, depends upon a similar misreading of a
cause-effect relationship. Here, the disappointment of an
expected effect necessitates a revision of the previously determined causal chain, and from there a new attribution of meaning to the assumed initial cause—the Albatross. The bird is now seen to have caused the "fog" that temporally preceded its appearance and the "mist" that surrounded it; thus "such birds that bring the fog and mist" are rightfully slain. An empty appearance, an "accident without substance," absorbs the aspects of phenomena allied to it in some way, phenomena, which, for Burke, belong to the same "associative cluster." The tendency to read temporally associated phenomena in terms of a cause-effect scheme always runs the risk of committing what Burke calls the "synecdochic fallacy," mistaking an effect for a cause or a part for a whole.

A synecdochally attuned analysis recognizes that this danger occurs with fairly high degree of frequency in Romantic texts because of an emphasis on (an interest in) the particular and individual. Thus, the informing force of the whole appears weakened at moments when relations among emphasized particulars violate expectations engendered by an informing assumption. But because we do begin with the assumption that the whole is immanent in the part, the attempt to reconcile differences among particulars manifests itself as a dialectical pressure to reconcile competing allegorical systems.

If, as I have claimed and as many analyses of The Ancient
Mariner imply, Coleridge's interest in the individual and particular frustrates consistent connection or relation between those particulars and an informing whole, the Marginal gloss paralleling the poem anticipates this interpretive problem. Lawrence Lipking points out that for the first time in English poetry "the bizarre and seemingly arbitrary happenings of the ballad were interpreted by a civilized scholastic voice: a marginal gloss" and that this marginal voice speaks for Coleridge's need to explain his ballad, "affirm" the relation of the bizarre and interesting particulars to a larger interpretive order. Whether or not the gloss does "affirm" the relation of poetic text to interpretive order, we can agree that Coleridge thought the text needed explanation.

If the general function of the gloss is to explain and interpret the text, a look at a few instances of the gloss should reveal a more specific notion of what characterizes the special symbiotic relationship of text to interpretation, what pressures each exerts upon the other. What should emerge is a representative instance, writ large, of the Romantic symbol, a synecdoche of immanence, a new rhetorical and poetic stance towards the dependence of part and whole that emphasizes the particular and individual.

At the outset the gloss gives a sense of the larger world in which the Mariner's act (the telling of the tale) takes place.
In the place of the gloss, Lipking tells us "actions have causes, and consequences, parts fit into wholes, and human actions are not arbitrary." This world is, in other words, ordinary reality. But Lipking mistakes, I think, the gloss itself for the world, commits a synecdochic fallacy himself. The gloss is not a whole, but itself a part of the world it invokes. The function the gloss performs is essentially a riddle solving activity, an inference from particulars, a deduction that is based in, grounded in the world of ordinary facts. In line 25 the Mariner tells us

    The Sun came up upon the left
    Out of the sea came he!
    And he shone bright, and on the right
    Went down into the sea. (I, 25-8)

The gloss solves the riddle--"the ship sailed southward"--for those who are ignorant of the ground: the sun rises in the east. The information necessary to supplying the ground that mediates the text and the gloss, exists in the ordinary world. The gloss carries the authority of that ordinary world, but it is itself contained within it, like the functions of the cognitive machine it speaks for, the mind.

But Lipking's and most readers' willingness at the outset of the Mariner's tale to mistake the authority of the ordinary world itself is an effect of the ease with which we can infer a larger world from the particulars of the text. For this reason, also, some readers feel the gloss at this point is unnecessary. The
text does not seem to need interpretation when the relation of part to whole is complementary and unproblematic. We willingly suspend our disbelief when our faith in the inferability of wholes from parts is nestled in the comfortable facts of the ordinary world.

The ordinary world then is the point of departure or ground for the Romantic symbol, a synecdoche of immanence; the force of the particular is cushioned by the certainties of a world of natural causes and explanations for their effects.

But as Coleridge's interest in and emphasis on the particular increases in the process of the Mariner's narration, the force of the part problematizes its relation to the whole. As was shown above with the instances of watersnakes and the albatross, the crew's and the Mariner's initial assumptions about the significance of these bizarre phenomena are undermined by subsequent events, and the abstract schema from which these assumptions are suspended (like disbelief) also undergo a revision. The escalating force of the particular, the unexplained effect, expose the increasingly uncertain authority of the interpretive order the gloss speaks for. For the gloss affirms, takes as proven, the crew's initial assumptions about the significance of the albatross:

And lo! the
Albatross
proveth a bird
of good omen,
And the gloss judges the Mariner's act:

The ancient
Mariner
inhospitably
killeth the
pious bird of
good omen.

And allies itself with the crew:

His shipmates
cry out against
the ancient
Mariner, for
killing the
bird of good
luck.

When the crew reverses its judgement in light of the failure of
t heir prediction about the effects of killing the bird of good
luck, the gloss condemns them:

But when the
fog cleared
off, they
justify the
same, and
thus make
themselves
accomplices
in the crime.

As the gloss maintains its earlier explanations, committed to its
earlier deductions, the bizarre, supernatural happenings of the
Mariner's poetic narrative, Coleridge's emphasis on the particu-
lar, force the gloss to seek its ground of explanation beyond the
realm of the ordinary. Lipking argues for the consistency of the
gloss' power of interpretation:
The gloss familiarizes every supernatural event; it assures us, in spite of the wedding guests' fears, that the mariner is alive, sustained by a world of facts.²⁰

But the world of facts necessary to explain the text after the ship bursts "into that silent sea" is not the ordinary world of facts; in fact, the gloss must resort to a transcendent world of nonphysical beings and theological relations. The assumptions that sustain that order of relations are not familiar commonplace places like the sun's rising in the east, but the assumptions of esoteric theological speculation:

A Spirit had followed them; of the spirit that plagued us so;
one of the Nine fathom deep he had followed us
visible inhabitants of this From the land of mist and snow.
planet, neither
departed souls nor angels; concerning whom the learned
jew, Josephus, and the Platonic Constantinopolitan,
Michael Psellus, may be consulted. They are very numerous,
and there is no climate or element without one or more.

Whether or not we grant the efficacy of such assumptions to sustain the explanatory power of the interpretive gloss, the critical need for a totalizing interpretive order in the face of an emphasis on the particular is reflected in the text by the appearance of the gloss itself, and motivates critics in their willingness to accept its interpretive invitations. Some critics even appropriate the language of the gloss for their own interpretation, using what language Coleridge provides to flesh out their own interpretive landscapes. But the best critics amongst those who follow Coleridge's marginal direction acknowledge that while the
interpretive realm that is constituted is not allegoric but symbolic, or "theophanic," the raw stuff of that world are bits and pieces of allegorical schema. Thus, the Mariner's supernatural journey is seen to be contained within a larger totalizing frame, for most critics a religious, if not Christian landscape.

But it is because the Mariner's narrative, like his journey, begins and ends in the natural landscape of the ordinary world, that critics are able to argue that the division between the natural and supernatural, the real and the imaginary, the concrete and the abstract has been reconciled:

As a divided consciousness might be healed by a moment of prayer so a divided text is healed by a moral intelligible to the wise and simple heart alike. And the reader joins in that union. No longer stunned by the wonders, he should rise from the ordeal of this serpentine text exhausted, perhaps, but sadder and wiser.21

As the Mariner's ship approaches land, the particulars are again familiar aspects of the ordinary world:

And the ancient Mariner beholdeth his native country.

Oh! dream of Joy! is this indeed The lighthouse top I see?
Is this the hill? is this the kirk?
Is this mine own countree? (VI, 404-7)

Once again, the gloss seems unnecessary but to tell us that the Mariner's vision here, a "dream of joy," is in fact his own countree. Like an awakening from a dream, the ground that mediates text and gloss is that of the comfortable ordinary world that supports our confidence in the immanence of the whole, and in the
significance of the Mariner's journey. As text and gloss come together, the forces of each balance the other, the relationship between them seems less part/whole than a parallel.

And to teach, Farewell, Farewell! but this I tell
by his own to thee, thou Wedding-Guest!
example, love He prayeth well, who loveth well
and reverence Both man and bird and beast.
to all things He prayeth best, who loveth best
that God made All things both great and small;
and loveth. For the dear God who loveth us,

The gloss does not interpret the text either in the esoteric sense or in the more common sense inferences we find at the beginning of the narrative. At the close of the poem the gloss seems to restate the text rather than interpret, a standoff that for Lipking speaks for the unification of a divided consciousness. But to take Coleridge's unification of the poetic and interpretive acts as proven is to have accepted the fact that both text and gloss are partial aspects of even larger frames which sustain the shifting grounds that mediate text and gloss. The gloss is not a whole, but itself a deduction from particulars grounded in an appeal to the assumptions of a larger frame.

At the outset of the Mariner's narrative the larger frame is the ordinary world, a familiar context, the authority, or gloss, for which is easily taken for that totalizing interpretive order itself. In response to the supernatural events of the Mariner's bizarre journey the mediating ground shifts to esoteric
theological assumptions, sustained by a less familiar context, the authority of which must be taken on faith. And because the larger frame that sustains these mediating assumptions is less recognizable than the ordinary world, the gloss which speaks for deductions based on these assumptions is itself now seen not as a whole but as "bits and pieces" of a larger schema. But when the Mariner returns to his "own countree" the gloss again grounds its assumptions in the ordinary world and seems once again to speak for a recognizable authoritative order. The order at the close of the poem is also now a moral order derived from the supernatural theologic frame, but because the moral is also familiar, the bizarre aspects of the Mariner's journey now seem less strange. Their highly individualized appearance, which once seemed alien and outside the informing assumptions of a christian moral order, if not opposed to those assumptions, now seem part of a larger totalizing scheme that reconciles by containing oppositions and differences. This larger totalizing scheme is, at its far reaches, an indefinite if not vague, esoteric theophanic landscape, but what in its ordinary moral expression is, for some, Coleridge's view of christian moral order. For M. H. Abrams the subject matter, imagery and ordannance of the Ancient Mariner are consonant with

Coleridge's view of man's fall as division and isolation and redemption as a reconciliation, together with his related conception of the circuitous movement of the
organizing imagination and the circular shape of the organic poem. . . .22

The "circular shape" Abrams refers to describes the plot structure of the Mariner's voyage: a departure from the familiar context of the ordinary world, a supernatural experience, and a return to the familiar. If the gloss speaks for the "organizing imagination," Abrams' choice of the word "circuitous" to characterize its movement suggests an approximate parallel to the "circular shape" of the poem. But the parallel must be merely approximate because the larger context for the gloss' theological speculation appears vague and indefinite at the very moments when the force of the flow or play of particulars escape an informing assumption based on a previous deduction. But Abrams, like Lipking, has faith in the final coherence of text and gloss because they restate or parallel one another at the end of the poem. However, between the initial ordinary ground of departure that seems to link text and gloss in a part/whole dynamic and the final parallel of text and gloss that seems a "unification" and a kind of interpretive stasis, characteristically a middle space exists which appears vague on the side of the whole the gloss speaks for, and over-determined on the side of the particulars in the text. This middle space, characterized by an increased emphasis on the particular whose ground term is an abstract category, coincides with the model of symbol developed in chapter two (fig. 7). This figure it will be remembered combines the
latter halves of a type (a), an abstract metaphor, and a type (d), a concrete metaphor in _le groupe mu_ schema. The model is helpful here in distinguishing the force of the particular in the Romantic synecdoche of immanence from the dominance of the world in allegory.

For example the allegorical interpretation of the watersnakes is grounded in their function as agents of Satan

![Diagram](Fig. 8. Coleridge's Water-Snakes Symbol no. 2)

In this case the vehicle and tenor terms are equated on the basis of their inclusion in a class of Satanic aspects. In the case of Coleridge's use of the watersnakes in _The Ancient Mariner_, the tenor term (Evil) is absorbed into the initial term of departure signalling that it is conventional, a process modeled in fig. 5. In the Coleridge instance the vehicle term receives an emphasis, individuated description, by which partial aspects of the snakes themselves are seen as members of the class of beautiful and happy living things.

![Diagram](Fig. 9. Coleridge's Water-Snakes Symbol no. 2)
By this scheme the shift in ground term from agents of Satan to "beautiful and happy living things" renders a tenor, "Sacred," that contradicts the conventional tenor associated with snakes. This conventional term is overturned on the basis of a partial aspect of the snakes, the force of a particular. We can then show how Coleridge supplements this scheme with a further ground term to resolve the latent contradiction between competing tenors:

(Fig. 10. Coleridge's Water-Snakes Symbol no. 3)

We can also now see an increased distance between the initial term of departure, the partial aspect, and the dominating ground (Life-In-Death), a function of the need to resolve contradictory tenors derived from what are felt to be competing allegorical systems. This scheme demonstrates that the competing allegorical systems are themselves felt or intimated by the ground terms, not fully elaborated as in conventional allegory. Thus what creates the intimation of contradiction (polar opposition, for Burke) is the shift in ground term, an effect of the emphasis on a partial aspect or particular.
Therefore, a Romantic symbolic mode, a synecdoche of immanence demands a confidence in a totalizing order that comprehends differences and oppositions in the shifting grounds of emphasized particulars. And unlike allegory which accepts a given correspondence between the concrete and a known totalizing order, a symbolic mode seeks an intimation of a totalizing order—"an infinite mystery"—within the particular. Such confidence in the intimation of the whole within the particular is seen by many critics to invite a sacramental view of Coleridge's understanding of symbol.

The resurgence of interest in the religious context of Coleridge's work has reemphasized the importance of faith in Coleridge's definition of symbol. Like Penn Warren, J. Robert Barth views the symbol as sacrament: "the symbol asks us to trust that it is truly part of a whole experience of reality larger than itself."23 That Coleridge himself invites the sacramental view of the symbol is indisputable. His best theoretical definition of symbol begins in a discussion of biblical interpretation. But attention to the part/whole dynamics of his definition, which Barth, Lipking, Abrams and Penn Warren all assume, recognizes that while the force of the particular "depends upon the whole that makes it intelligible," an increasing emphasis on the particular renders that whole itself less intelligible, more indefinite, vague.
It is a whole that must be taken on faith, a whole of which the Romantics have "intimations" as Wordsworth says. Thus, for the Romantics an emphasis on the particular is not at odds with the whole, which is intimated. Yet, the force of an interest in the particular weakens the whole, or is at least at the expense of an allegorical consistency. Coleridge himself sees the danger of the situation when he reacts to the "evil" streamy side of synecdochic association—when associated particulars contaminate each other, as in the watersnake instance—with a post-kantian faith in a totalizing geist that contains and inheres in perceiving consciousness and the particulars of the external world. That Coleridge himself terms the streamy association of synecdochic contamination "evil," implies that like the Mariner's unconscious blessing of the eerily beautiful watersnakes, an absorption in the particular is itself somewhat evil, at odds with the spirit of the whole. But it is an evil that, for the Romantics is finally checked or negated by the organizing spirit of the whole in which it participates. In this sense, the Mariner's absorption in the individual beauty of the watersnakes is an unconscious blessing, a recognition, for Coleridge, or immanence of (God's) spirit in "all living things."

The Romantic synecdoche of immanence of which Coleridge's Ancient Rime gives some representative examples begins with a confidence in the organic laws of the natural world. This is
the most common form of synecdoche, one which because it
so common, so familiar is often not seen as synecdoche. It is
a synecdochic operation by which we infer a man from prominent
lips and chin or the Mariner by his "long grey beard and glitter-
ing eye." We find this form of synecdoche in many poems Romantic
or otherwise and is an index to what is called a realistic
style. Because this kind of synecdoche is so common there is
no need for a demonstration here. I refer the reader to the
brief examples in chapter one. Although, it is not necessary
to provide a host of examples, I do not mean to underemphasize
the importance of this form of synecdoche of immanence as a
rhetorical basis for a realistic style; but more importantly
this conventional or realistic synecdoche of immanence antici-
pates the next form, a more characteristically Romantic form
of synecdoche of immanence.

In the second kind of synecdoche of immanence, the total-
izing domain or larger context is a theophanic or supernatural
realm which sustains the ground for an emphasis on the particu-
lar that is seen to exceed the familiar laws of the organic
world. Like the more familiar form of synecdoche of immanence,
the whole is inferred from the partial aspect, but it is a
whole constituted by historical religious myths, christian, or
classical. Strictly speaking this is an historical realm which
like an a priori schematization is a backdrop or larger scene
from which the particulars are seen to be derived. But unlike an allegorization, this realm is never fully constituted nor is it fully elaborated. It is intimated by the particular, to be inferred. This kind of synecdoche is usually associated in Romantic poetry with a transcendent vision, of which the Mariner's supernatural voyage is an initiating example. Other examples of this kind of synecdoche are found in Keats whose notion of negative capability is another theoretical version of an emphasis on the particular.

Like Coleridge's Mariner, the poetic persona in "Ode to a Nightingale" becomes absorbed in a particular, again, a natural object, whose synecdochic aspects speak for a larger esoteric domain, a domain for Keats associated with Death but also with historical time. Another Keatsian example, "Ode of Psyche," interests itself in the particulars of an older myth of which we have only fragmented knowledge. Both Coleridge and Keats exploit the partiality of a totalizing realm to allow more space for an elaboration of the particular. But in the absence of a fully realized totalizing realm a more fully elaborated realm on the side of the perceiver emerges on the side of the particular which gives rise to psychological readings by critics of the perceiving consciousness state of mind. In this way aspects of Keats' Nightingale are seen to stand for the psychological states of the perceiver. And likewise, the Mariner's
environment is seen to have been permeated by the Mariner's consciousness. The ship, crew and eerily supernatural surroundings reflect, synecdochally, the Mariner's morbid and guilt-ridden state of mind. Like the realistic form of synecdoche, this more psychological mode, a result of an increasing interest and absorption in the particular by perceiving consciousness—is an index of a shift toward a poetry of experiences of the individual minds. In such a poetic isolated particulars, what for Dr. Johnson are inessential, trivial and accidental, become indexes to the consciousness whose attention is absorbed by them, rather than particular tokens of the types of objects they "represent."

Kenneth Burke has noted the correspondence between the emergence of a synecdochic mode and the increasing proportion of fragmentary lyric poems in the beginning of the nineteenth century. 24 We have already extended Burke's insight by suggesting that Keats' use of what I have termed synecdoche of immanence in a lyric mode produces a psychological landscape in the same way that, in isolated moments in Coleridge's Ancient Mariner, the seascape seems the symbolic terrain of a dream, the inner psychological region of the Mariner's mind. In the rhetorical terms of this analysis, this kind of Romantic poetic employs synecdoches of immanence of the first two types, the first a realistic type, grounded in conventional organic laws of
the ordinary world, and the second a religious type, grounded in the esoteric realm of the supernatural or theophanic. The shift in ground from the first type to the second is the characteristic operational dynamic, one that requires an act of faith in the immanence of a totalizing domain to reconcile differences among emphasized particulars. These differences, often felt as oppositions, as in the albatross or watersnake instances, are most often resolved by critics either in psychological or theological interpretations of the poems in which they appear.

It has not been my purpose here to argue or compare these interpretations, but to specify certain rhetorical operations and the strategies these operations make possible, characteristic of Romantic poetry that result in the kinds of interpretive positions critics have taken. The third type of synecdoche of immanence, a visionary type, characteristic of large scale lyric epic or Romantic elegy, falls within the purview of another critical perspective usually associated with mythic or archetypal interpretation. Here too, I will not argue these interpretations but demonstrate the rhetorical dynamics of the poetic that invites such interpretive approaches.

If, for example we accept the interpretive assignation "archetype" to describe certain figures in Romantic and post Romantic poetry, it often leads to an allegorization of particular symbolic figures. This reversion to allegory occurs
because the archetype is thought to precede the particular derivative instance, a situation parallel to Angus Fletcher's definition of allegory wherein the total figure dominates the isolated trope. Rather we should say that what precedes are the particular aspects of conventional myths. This reverses Fletcher's definition of allegory so that the isolated aspect determines the newly constituted whole figure. It is in this way that the Shelleyean archetype is constituted out of relations among emphasized particulars, aspects of conventional myths. The character/spirits Prometheus, and Adonais, for example, are collations of many different aspects of various and sometimes contrasting myths. Shelley draws on Homer, Aeschylus, Hesiod, Milton, and the Bible, for his archetypal Prometheus and on classical hellenistic and hebraic texts for Adonais. The relations among the texts from which Shelley's figures are drawn form the structural pretext for many critical arguments in the archetypal or mythic school. From the point of view of the claims I have made for synecdoche, "archetype" is a name given to a totalizing figure by which constituent details or aspects of traditional myths are seen to be capable of interrelation.

Like Coleridge's second type of synecdoche, a shift in ground occurs due to an emphasized particular or difference felt as an opposition. In Coleridge, the reader and the Mariner are witness to the shift which creates an interpretive vertigo. Is
the Albatross an omen of good or evil? In Shelley the relation of differences, felt as opposition, has already occurred, as has the shift in ground. Prometheus comes to us a collation of Milton's Satan and the Bible's Christ and Aeschylus' trespassing hero. The shift in ground necessary to comprehend this aggregate character is a fait accompli. What Shelley assumes is akin to what Coleridge would have us witness and perform and an index to a characteristic Romantic faith in the immanence of the universal in the particular. For Shelley that faith is a confidence in the structural interchangeability of various and sometimes competing myths. Earl Wasserman has pointed out that in this sense Shelley operates within the tradition of syncretic mythology, a belief in the interconvertibility of all myths, by which assumption the constituent details of these become capable of relation. Wasserman goes on to say that in the Prometheus instance "The syncretic assimilation of Christ (and Satan) to Prometheus obliterates the specificity of the two myths to form the archetype." In this way, the universal is induced by the relations among partial aspects of previous myths which are obliterated in the new totalizing pattern. Thus, what is "obliterated" is not the specificity of the particular or partial aspect, but the specificity of the previous myth from which the aspect is culled. Thus, the larger totalizing pattern which comprehends the differences among various myths, or "archetype"
which seems to take the place of the obliterated myths and therefore to contain them, is actually "formed" by the constituent details of the obliterated previous wholes. The Shelleyan situation, as Wasserman accounts for it, may appear to approach a kind of Platonism, if we assume the Archetype "contains" or precedes the obliterated myths, but if we note that in fact the archetype is determined by the relations among emphasized particulars of previous myths, the notion of universal a priori forms must be discounted. Rather what needs to be accounted for is not the transcendence of the archetypal, but the process by which the constituent details become capable of relation, and thereby constitute the universal. In one sense, Shelley, like most Romantics, does assume a structural inconvertibility of all faiths, what Wasserman calls a syncretic tradition, a belief that is also a rhetorical faith in allegory in the analogical mode. But in a more important sense, the assumption is an initiating move that in Shelley is obliterated in the ground shift that posits a structural relativity among partial aspects. In Coleridge's Mariner however, we sense an attempt to recover the initial ground along with a sacramental faith. To locate the dynamics of the Shelleyean archetype or our third kind of synecdoche of immanence, we must look to the relations among emphasized particulars. But we must begin by accounting for how emphasized aspects become capable of relation in the first place.
In his Preface to *Prometheus Unbound*, Shelley states that his poetic abstractions are beautiful and new, not because the portions of which they are composed had no previous existence in the mind of man or in nature, but because the whole produced by their combination has some intelligible and beautiful analogy with those sources of emotion and thought and with the contemporary condition of them. Shelley acknowledges the previous existence of the "portions of which" his new poetical abstractions are composed. And he sees the whole produced by the new combination of those portions to have an analogous relation with "those sources of emotion and thought" that produced the previous ones. In this sense, Shelly is, as Wasserman points out, neither an assimilator of beautiful mythic forms nor an inventor of new ones. By reconstituting portions of previous mythic forms Shelley dramatizes the sources of emotion and thought that are seen to exist potentially in the given materials he combines or recombines. The implicit assumption here, that there is a structural similarity among mythic forms, allows their constituent parts to be substituted for one another and become capable of interrelation. The relational potential of constituent details of isomorphic myths is a function of the use of the detail in the previous myth or whole which is obliterated in the constitution of the Shelleyean archetype or whole. But because the obliterated previous myth shares a structural similarity with the Shelleyean archetype, it is implied by the synecdochic inference from the constituent detail
(part for whole); and structural characteristics of the previous myth are preserved in the syntactic or relational potential inherent in the Shelleyean detail. In this dual sense, then, relational or syntactic potential is a function of the universal "sources" of emotion and thought that sustain a poetical abstraction and of the usage of a particular recombined constituent detail in the previous myth from which it is culled. Wasserman maintains that reading Prometheus Unbound we are not supposed to be aware of the specific previous myths from which Shelley draws his details, although awareness of a particular myth will permit the "reader to recognize the patterning source."

Rather, Wasserman argues that the end product of this recognition is, paradoxically, that the reader think as though no myth were present, but only the perfect archetypal arrangement, of which the legendary sources are limited instances.²⁸

It is in this way that the specificity of a previous myth is obliterated in the constitution of the Shelleyan archetype; but the structural pattern of that obliterated myth is recognizable in the Shelleyean archetype constituted out of details of inherent syntactic or relational potential.

In terms of the synecdochic dynamic developed here, Shelley's emphasis on the constituent detail depends upon the structural universality of mythic patterns and the consequent inherent relational potential of the particulars of an instance of myth.
The Shelleyean synecdoche of immanence, our third kind of synecdoche of immanence, emphasizes a particular that depends upon a previous whole, of which the particular is not a sacramental part as in Coleridge, but a syntactic part. Shelley's emphasis on the particular, then, is an emphasis on the particular for its relational potential rather than its referential or representational potential. Shelley does begin the passage quoted above by saying that poetry is a mimetic art that creates by combination and representation.

Shelley's "Ozymandias" provides a familiar compact example of the kind of dynamic Wasserman describes, a dynamic which I have argued is in rhetorical terms a property of synecdoche. In this case, Wasserman is clearly correct in asserting that the reader need not have specific information about Ozymandias to understand the poem. In fact, the reader need not even know beforehand that Ozymandias was an Egyptian Pharoah. The opening words of the traveller from the antique land provide synecdochic details that imply locale and historical distance:

Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the desert. . . . Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, . . .

These details, the shattered ruins of an ancient civilization speak more for a universal condition, than a specific one. As emphasized particulars, the constituent details of what was a previous whole system of daily lived relations, stand out for
Shelley and for us under a different light. They are seen from a changed perspective as ruins. This change, the effects of time and decay, is a literal historical shift in ground as well as a rhetorical one. The magisterial boast that appears on the pedestal of the fractured statue now speaks an ironic truth:

"My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!" (10-11)

Shelley elaborates this shift in ground, expands the perspective.

Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away. (12-14)

Like the shattered sculpted ruins, the words of the ancient king retain their syntactic potential by virtue of their contemporary usage and by virtue of the universality of the condition under which Shelley sees them. This perceived condition is, for Shelley, an instance of a universal structure, the effect of the force of mutability on civilization. As such the condition becomes a source of emotion and thought which is inherently communicable because it is universal.

Shelley's focus on the particulars of ruin is in one sense ironic. The kingly boast is contradicted by time. In our rhetorical terms, we can say that Ozymandias' contemporary statement, and the passions his sculptor read so well, are brought into relation (by Shelley's ruined perception of them, the effects of a shift in ground) with a larger pattern, one which for Shelley is the larger or ideal truth. This larger pattern is the
product of a shift in ground by which portions or aspects of previous larger wholes are seen to be transformed. This transformation, here a ruination, is a change in status of the emphasized particular which weakens the previous systematizing pattern in favor of a larger ideal pattern. The emphasized particulars retain relational potential by virtue of their previous specific contemporary status and by virtue of their changed status as sources for a universal emotion and thought. The difference between the initial status of the particular and the altered universal status is felt as an opposition, evident in the ironic transformation of Ozymandias' utterance. But the poem's irony is not simple contradiction. In one the shift in historical and rhetorical ground alters the force of Ozymandias' imprimatur in the same way that a stormy day belies the assertion that the weather is fair. But Shelley seeks to establish more than a polar opposition to Ozymandias' claim. The irony, if we can call it that, is at once more reflexive and more universal than a simple contradiction of a specific speech act. The irony here is seen to be an inherent potential of the statement itself. Ozymandias' statement is not brought into an opposing polar relation with a set of external pressures. Rather Ozymandias' statement has a synecdochic relation to its two grounds and an inherent ironic relation to itself under the aegis of the two grounds. Yet, this ironic potential is seen
to be an inherent property of the emphasized particular itself partly because the initial whole supported by initial ground term is seen to be an instance of a larger structure which the shift to a second ground term supports, i.e., the force of mutability on the works of man. In this way Shelley has not denied the Ozymandias' words or the passions his sculptor read and stamped upon his visage. Rather, Shelley renders the partial aspect, Ozymandias' statement as a synecdoche for two temporally related instances of a larger structure, one instance of which is related to the other as difference but felt as opposition: the first, a flowering of a civilization, the second, the decay of that civilization. These two temporal instances constitute in a concrete way the pattern of the larger ideal structure, and as such the instances are not to be treated separately nor felt as a polar opposition. Nor is one instance privileged over the other as in simple irony. What does emerge is the pattern of a larger organization constituted out of relations among emphasized particulars.

At this point it is helpful to distinguish in simple terms the dynamics of this third type of synecdoche of immanence from Coleridge's use of the first two types. We have seen how Coleridge's use of the emphasized particular under the aegis of a shift in ground from a kind of realism to a supernatural or theophanic realm invites either a psychological or sacramental
understanding of symbol, both of which tend toward allegorical interpretation. In the Coleridgean synecdoche of immanence the shift in ground terms from the ordinary world to a theophanic sphere due to the force of the particular demands a faith in an unpictured indefinite totalizing domain which reconciles differences and differences felt as oppositions. For Shelley the ground of departure is a previous legendary world whose specificity has been obliterated but whose constituent details retain their inherent because universal, relational potential. A crucial difference between the two types of synecdoche of immanence is the status of the shift in ground and its place in the overall dynamic of synecdoche of immanence. The reader witnesses the shift in ground as it occurs in *The Ancient Mariner*. We follow the course of the supernatural encroaching upon the ordinary, distorting the Mariner's and our perception of the isolated particular. The sacramental or psychological security with which Mariner and reader emerge depends upon a faith in the inclusivity of the supernatural within the conventional. The reader of Shelley does not witness this shift in ground as it occurs. We confront the evidence that it has already occurred. And, in Shelley the accomplished shift in ground is seen as shift from the legendary and historically distant to the familiar, an inversion of the Coleridgean strategy. Thus, in Coleridge the shift in ground precedes the totalizing act of faith
that comprehends the differences and oppositions generated by the shift in ground. In Shelley, the shift in ground itself is seen to be evidence for a larger pattern of organization of which the emphasized particular is a constitutive instance. In simple terms, where the shift in ground is visited upon the initial ordinary Coleridgean world, like the acts of an external agent, the consequent distortion of the familiar is understood by a sacramental act of faith that explains synecdochic aspects, emphasized particulars, in terms of a received but now expanded system. It is in this way that Coleridge checks what he calls the "evil" "streamy" side of synecdochic association, which is concomitant with a shift in ground. For Shelley, on the other hand, the streamy side of synecdochic association—whereby the albatross can seem to be both an omen of good and an omen of ill, or Ozymandias’ statement can seem to be the imperial voice of the authority of civilization or an echo of the despair of that imperialism—is not an evil to be checked, but an inherent relational property of partial aspects that if properly recognized is the dynamic by which a larger pattern of organization can be demonstrated, or instanced, and in this sense, constituted. The two strategies, the Coleridgean and the Shelleyean, representing two types of synecdoche of immanence, reflect differing attitudes toward the synecdochic dynamic of figurative language. For Coleridge it is seen to be a potential
unleashed by an unexpected shift in ground. For Shelley the synecdochic dynamic is an assumed inherent potential that can be manipulated by a shift in ground. Shelley's confidence in the relational potential of emphasized particulars is index to a radical (political) faith in the possibility of a realization of the ideal and abstract in the ordinary world by means of the mediating potential of figurative language. Coleridge, who seems to discover the relational potential inherent in synecdochic particulars under the pressure of a shift in ground, resists the streamy nature of this potential with a faith in an unpictured, indefinite theophanic realm. Although, where Shelley has confidence in his manipulation of the relations among emphasized particulars, Coleridge fears the unmanagability of synecdochic contamination, both focus on the particular within the part/whole synecdochic dynamic, or the effect of the cause/effect synecdoche. And both assume a faith in a totalizing pattern of which the partial aspect is a portion or instance. The difference is in the placement of this confidence. For Shelley it inheres in the particular by virtue of its prior association with a specific totalizing system which is itself an isomorphic instance of an ideal larger pattern. For Coleridge this confidence is a sacramental potential of the partial aspect to recover an initial faith unsettled by a shift in ground. The difference in the placement of this confidence is the difference
between the visionary who sees himself in control of the shift in ground because he has working knowledge of the principles of the ideal, and the orthodox who must adjust his initial vision to account for the unanticipated.

In his classic visionary work, *Prometheus Unbound*, Shelley's use of synecdoche complements the examples of the third kind of synecdoche of immanence we find in "Ozymandias." In both works Shelley consciously exploits the syntactic or relational potential of aspects of partial details of previous totalizing systems to constitute an ideal system which comprehends the obliterated prehending instances. And in both works, the shift in ground which necessitates the ideal vision and obliterates the previous totalization, has already taken place. The reader does not witness the shift as it occurs as in Coleridge's *Ancient Mariner*. The reader of Shelley is characteristically confronted with the ruins of "cancelled cycles." In *Prometheus Unbound*, we do not see the liberation of Prometheus, but are told that the "vast beams" of lightning attendant upon his freedom "make bare the secrets of the earth's deep heart":

The beams flash on
And make appear the melancholy ruins
Of cancelled cycles; anchors, beaks of ships;
Planks turned to marble; quivers, helms, and spears,
And gorgon-headed targes, and the wheels
Of scythed chariots, and the emblazonry
Of trophies, standards, and armorial beasts,
Round which death laughed, sepulchred emblems
Of dead destruction, ruin within ruin.30
The ruins, here, parts of obliterated wholes, like the "trunkless legs of stone" that stand in the African desert, are a kind of revelation made possible by the liberation of Prometheus, a liberation which is itself not seen, but felt as a shift in ground and perspective. In both poems, this shift in ground leads to an ironic undermining of the previous totalizing systems. For Shelley these previous "cancelled" cycles are usually militaristic and imperial in nature, whose broken remnants are evidence for a greater force. In this way Shelley's ideal supervening power is to be inferred rather than identified by name.

But in *Prometheus Unbound*, Shelley does envision a celestial force at work: a "chariot like a thinnest boat,/ In which the Mother of Months is borne/ By ebbing light into her western cave, . . ." and "A sphere, which is as many thousand spheres,/ Solid as crystal, . . ." Shelley's animating forces are neither specific mythic gods nor the indefinite esoteric powers Coleridge would have us put our confidence in. Rather these forces are pictured as machines. Time, here, a classical chariot, and mass, a crystal sphere, whose combined energies animate and illumine Shelley's visionary world. As such these machine-like forces are, if not man made, man conceived and they function for his benefit. Shelley's vision is not finally so much a vision of the infinite, but a revelation of the secrets
of the earth, the discoverable mysteries. By Shelley's poetic logic, the energies of the machine-like celestial forces, are lightnings and electrical discharges:

    Vast beams like spokes of some invisible wheel
    Which whirl as the orb whirls, swifter than thought,
    Filling the abyss with sun-like lightnings,
    And perpendicular now, and now, transverse.
    Pierce the dark soil, and as they pierce
    Make bare the secrets of the earth's deep heart. (IV, 274-9)

And these lightnings which reveal the earth

    Leave man, who was a many-sided mirror
    Which could distort to many a shape of error
    This true fair world of things, a sea reflecting love;
    (IV, 382-5)

And from the point of view of the Earth,

    The lightning is [Man's] slave; heaven's utmost deep
    Gives up her stars, and like a flock of sheep
    They pass before his eye, are numbered and roll on!
    The tempest is his steed, he strides the air;
    And the abyss shouts from her depth laid bare,
    Heaven, hast thou secrets? Man unveils me; I have none.
    (IV, 918-23)

The dramatic presences who speak for Shelley's vision, Asia, Panthea and Earth, above, are neither characters, nor attitudes of mind that can be allegorized, although they have qualities of each. Asia, for example, along with Panthea stand in one sense for Venus and the spirit of Spring respectively who attend the rebirth of the world in Act IV. And as wife to Prometheus in Shelley's mythic drama, Asia takes the place of the Oceanid Hesione in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound. By virtue of the identification of Asia with Venus, the spirit of the Earth,
who addresses her as "Mother, dearest Mother" is derived as the
mythic Eros, the son of Venus. Wasserman points out that Earth
is further identified with Eros by the torch it carries. Earth
becomes identified with Prometheus by the controlling reference
of the torch race, if lampadephoria in which runners carried
the torch from the Altar of Prometheus to the Acropolis in
Athens. In Shelley's Prometheus Unbound, Earth guides Asia
Panthea and Ione to the temple and Cave of Prometheus at the
close of the drama. The Cave itself is identified with the
cave at Delphi where Earth's spirit "Was panted forth in
anguish." By exploiting the possibilities for substitution and
recombination among constituent elements of isomorphic mythic
structures, Shelley attempts to constitute what Wasserman calls
an "archetypal shape for a group of the poet's thoughts." 31
The account Wasserman gives of this "archetypal shape" is the
fullest of the generally unsystematic attempts to account for
the precise network of implied relationships among Shelley's
mythic presences. But the point that Shelley's dramatic pres-
ences are amalgams of previous mythic characters is made by all.
From our point of view, Shelley's characters are amalgams of
synecdochic aspects or constituent details of previous wholes.
As characters these synecdochic amalgams appear as wholes them-
selves, but within Shelley's ideal order they are single aspects
of the whole. As perceivers and reporters of the Shelleyean
world, they offer contrasting but complementary perspectives which together constitute Shelley's vision. In this sense, Panthea, Asia Earth, are less characters or allegorical states of mind than simply perspectives which complement or contradict one another.

One such perspective is Apollo's report of Jupiter's Fall in Act III, Scene ii:

An eagle so caught in some bursting cloud
On Caucasus, his thunder baffled wings
Entangled in the whirlwind, and his eyes
Which gazed on the dazzling sun, now blinded
By the white lightning, while the ponderous hail
Beats on his struggling form, which sinks at length
Prone, and the aereal ice clings over it. (II:11-17)

By representing Jupiter as the bird classically associated with Aeschylus' Zeus, the eagle who daily tore at the bound Prometheus' liver, Apollo, in effect, reduces the stature of Shelley's antagonist. Interestingly, this reduction in scale reverses the strategy of Milton in Book I of Paradise Lost where the Fallen Archangel is compared to the leviathan of the sea, "in bulk as huge as Whom the Fables name of monstrous size." Where Milton wants to overwhelm with the magnitude of evil, Shelley's perspective, here Apollo's, weakens the force of Jupiter's power. Not only does the reduction in scale have this effect, but the choice of the eagle, a synecdochic aspect of the Jupiter/Zeus myth, also contributes to Shelley's strategy. The eagle, the lightning bearing minister of Zeus, who according to myth "gazed
on the dazzling sun" and was impervious to its blinding light 
is by Apollo's report blinded by white lightning. In this way 
two associated aspects of the Jupiter/Zeus myth war with one 
another, by which, according to Wasserman,

Shelley has not merely denied the legend of the eagle, 
he causes it to contradict itself because Jupiter, like 
all forms of evil, error and ugliness, wields a power which 
is only mistakenly thought to be a fearsome weapon against 
others and is fundamentally suicidal. This reflexive mode 
of irony is the central mode of representing evil throughout 
the drama, . . . 32

At this point it should be clear how synecdoche with an emphasis 
in the particular preserves the relational properties of con-
stituent details of received myths. In the example from "Ozy-
mendias" and the report of Jupiter's fall above, a limited focus 
on the particular detail enables a reflexive reworking of and 
unraveling of a previous erroneous totalization in favor of an 
"archetypal" arrangement.

The mythic dramatic presences do not behave like dramatic 
characters. Although the voices of Shelley's presences are ani-
mate and have affective qualities, they lack intentions of their 
own. And any palpable quality of individual character they may 
have is derived from a previous legendary source, an allegorical 
attribute. But what these presences do provide is perspective on 
a shift in ground by which the reader is given a measure of the 
difference between the cancelled cycles and Shelley's ideal 
vision. Because there are many dramatic presences with different
perspectives, this measure varies. For Panthea, associated with the rejuvenation of Spring, the liberation of Prometheus is viewed as the approach of the chariot of Time, in which is borne the Mother of Months. For Asia, a collation of Hesione and Venus, the Promethean shift in ground electrifies the atmosphere and pierces the earth. The Earth undergoes this shift in ground in most literal terms, and "laid bare" breathes forth its "secrets" to man. Like dramatic characters their perspectives are interlinked and complement one another in their elementary relational manner. And no one perspective is primary. What is primary is the shift in ground itself, the effect of the liberation of Prometheus, an act the reader does not witness, but an act whose effects are perceived, felt through perspective.

If there is a final authority among the presences and perspectives of Prometheus Unbound it is not Johnsonian authority: "observation with extensive view" that can "survey mankind from China to Peru." Shelley's Demogorgon is a mythic volcano (Bocaccio and Virgil) whose eruptions breathe forth the potential "patient power" at the heart of the Earth: "Love" that "from the slippery, steep,/And narrow verge of crag-like agony, springs/ And folds over the earth its healing wings." In terms of the volcanic metaphor, Love is an inherent property of the earth itself, like the spring "It wakes a life in the forgotten dead":
As the dissolving warmth of dawn may fold
A half unfrozen dew-globe, green and gold,
And crystalline, till it becomes a winged mist,
And wanders up the vault of the blue day,
Outlives the moon, and on the sun's last ray
Hangs o'er the sea, a fleece of fire and amethyst. (IV, 431-6)

An all pervasive, surrounding atmosphere, Shelley's sublime force,
transforms the Earth for man, who, now transformed, is a "Sea
reflecting Love." Like the relational potential of constituent
details of iso-morphic myths, the patient potential that lies
at the Earth's heart emerges from within when the "stagnant chaos"
of Jupiter's tyrannous reign is driven from the world, an effect
of shift in ground and an altered perspective. This potential
emerges as a negation of the obliterated totality. Love takes
the place of "hate, and fear, and pain" in a manner similar to
the transformation of Ozymandias' caveat. And this principle of
negation, transformation/shift in ground is seen as active in
opposition to the stagnation of Jupiter's reign and Prometheus'
bondage:

No change, no pause, no hope! Yet I endure.
I ask the Earth, have not the mountains felt?
I ask you Heaven, the all-beholding Sun,
Has it not seen? The Sea, in storm or calm,
Heaven's ever-changing Shadow, spread below,
Have its deaf waves not heard my agony?
Ah me! alas, pain, pain ever, for ever! (I, 74-30)

The transforming activity is linked to the power of language:

Language, is a perceptual Orphic song,
Which rules with Deadal harmony a throng
Of thoughts and forms, which else senseless and shapeless were.
(IV, 415-17)
But the harmony emerges out of struggle and Promethean suffering, a defiance of a previous "stagnant chaos":

To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;  
To love, and bear; to hope, till Hope creates  
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates. (IV, 573-5)

This abstract mechanism parallels Shelley's poetic obliteration or "wreck" of specific previous myths in favor of an iso-morphic ideal structure which lends an inherent relational property to details of these previous obliterated wholes. Hope with a small "h" is an inherent creative potential of constituent details which, when manipulated by a shift in ground, the act of language, emerges as the ideal "Hope" which creates the thing it contemplates, an earthly love. The ideal abstractions by which this "thing" is known are less important for Shelley than the process by which it is created: "To suffer woes," "To forgive wrongs," "To defy Power," "To love, and bear; to hope."

The "deadal harmony" which rules this process is a labyrinthine one, "a doubtful river, / Flowing and looping back [that] sends its waters/ Either to source or sea, so," Ovid tells us, "Daedalus/Made those innumerable windings wander. . . ." 33 In the allusive maze through which the reader of Prometheus Unbound makes his way, each turn and shift in perspective opens on to others which partially mirror or duplicate, each perspective partial. Unlike the landscape of an allegorical perspective in which the whole is always in view, the unity and totality of
Shelley's landscape, "the deep truth" is imageless. In Shelley's mythic drama we hear reports of transforming events whose effects are synecdochic inferences of their immanence. But because the "form" and "function" of this deep truth inheres in these effects, Shelley assumes a confidence in the particular detail to evoke a universal pattern, beyond the limited perspective in which it appears. The ruined statue of Ozymandias and the words on its truncated pedestal survive their original intention and echo the larger truth of which it is inherently a part. By the same synecdochic dynamic "Adonais is made one with nature;

there is heard
His voice is all her music; from the moan
Of thunder to the song of night's sweet bird;
He is a presence to be felt and known
In darkness and in light, from herb and stone,
Spreading itself where'er that Power may move
Which has withdrawn his being into his own;
Which wields the world with never wearied love,
Sustains it from beneath and kindles it above.\(^3\)

The synecdoche by which Adonais is to be inferred, "His voice," and the synecdochic effects which embody that aspect of the transformed Adonais parallel Shelley's obliteration of iso-morphic myths in favor of a focus on a constituent detail for its relational potential in terms of a larger totality. The "moan/Of thunder" and "the song of night's sweet bird" are either acts of agents or effects of causes that are themselves seen to be determined by the "voice" of Adonais. The voice gives nature

like a many-coloured dome of glass, Stains the white radiance of eternity. "In trampling the dome to fragments, Death allows the soul to "outsoar" its earthly shadow and spread itself "where'er that Power may move." What appears from the point of life to be physical destruction is, from the point of view of spirit, the liberation of the soul.

The rhetorical operation by which both perspectives are possible is synecdoche. From the point of view of manifold particulars, "Life" in Shelley's logic, Death is antithetical; from the point of view of the universal, "white/Eternity/The One, for Shelley, Death permits the individual spirit access to the greater Power by trampling particular differences "to fragments," an even further particularization, as in Adonais' "voice." Death the trampler is also Death the mediator. By representing Adonais by his voice, Shelley retains a quality of Adonais, his voice, whose "syntactic potential" permits it to participate--by force of its interchangeability with the "moan/Of Thunder" and the "song of night's sweet bird"--in that universal Power "Which has withdrawn [Adonais'] being to its own."

Death in its mediating capacity is, of course, Shelley's own poetic at work, trampling differences into further particulars. Death performs a transforming function similar to the liberation of Prometheus in obliterating previous totalities in exchange for particulars of inherent relational potential. These
emphasized aspects, constituent details, retain their syntactic potential by virtue of their previous contemporary use and gain relational potential in terms of the iso-morphic structure of the obliterated initial whole of which the details (Adonais' voice, Jupiter's lightning, Ozymandias' trunkless legs of stone) are aspects. In this sense, the Romantic symbols we have looked at are synecdochic aspects, transformed parts of legendary wholes which, when brought into relation with parts of other legendary wholes under the pressure of a shift in ground, recombine to form a universal pattern.

Geoffrey Hartman notes that the Adonais Shelley laments is strangely like [Wordsworth's] own conception of himself because "he feels he must personally fasten or new create the links between nature and the human mind." The occasion for Hartman's remark is the River Duddon sonnet, "After-Thought." In both Adonais and the Wordsworth poem the poets confront the transforming power of Death. And for both this transformation, a resolution to death, provides a figurative confirmation of the relation of individual to universal: Wordsworth's elegy for the River begins with the fear that nature itself is passing away:

I thought of Thee, my partner and my guide,
As being past away.

But as Hartman recognizes, Wordsworth's deep fear is that his own death "may mean the passing away of nature from the human mind,", a relationship to which Wordsworth himself is dying.
Wordsworth's own recognition is that his fears are "Vain sympathies!" because nature outlives the individual man:

---Vain sympathies!
For, backward Duddon as I cast my eyes,
I see what was, and is, and will abide;
Still glides the Stream, and shall for ever glide;
The Form remains, the function never dies;
While we, the brave, the mighty, and the wise,
We Men, who in our morn of youth defied
The elements, must vanish;--be it so! (2-9)

If Wordsworth is finally resigned to a separation of immutable "Form" and "Function" from Men who "must vanish," he concludes the poem with a conviction similar to Demogorgon's in the creative power of the work of man:

Enough, if something from our hands have power
To live, and act, and serve the future hour;
And if, as toward the silent tomb we go,
Through love, through hope, and faith's transcendent dower,
We feel that we are greater than we know. (10-14)

By Wordsworth's figurative logic, it is sufficient for Man to "feel" that he is greater than he knows, to have a synecdochic inference of his greater power. This feeling is itself based upon the synecdochic power of effects, "something from our hands" that has "power/To live, and act, and serve the future hour; . . ." In an analogue to his "partner," River Duddon, the persistence that "never dies" in the "form" Man is the creative power of the productive function. Like Demogorgon in his final speech in Prometheus Unbound, Wordsworth acknowledges that defiance of authority is the mode of such creativity. And though we often see this defiance enacted in Wordsworth, its
effects are Wordsworth's prime concern, much as in the Shelley we have looked at, the transforming act is not seen, but its effects are pervasive.

In early Wordsworth the moments of transformation are characteristically perceptions of natural occurrences, the sounding cataracts that haunted the boy, moments "that perplexed the bodily sense." As in both Coleridge and Shelley those moments are reported in shifts of perspective by which the partial aspect is seen to change: as in the familiar row boat scene in Book I of the Prelude:

I fixed my view
Upon the summit of a craggy ridge,
The horizon's utmost boundary; far above
Was nothing but the stars and the grey sky.
She was an elfin pinnacle; lustily
I slipped my oars into the silent lake
And, as I rose upon the stroke, my boat
Went heaving through the water like a swan;
When, from behind that craggy steep till then
The horizon's bound, a huge peak, black and huge,
As if with voluntary power instinct
Upreared its head. I struck and struck again,
And growing still in stature the grim shape
Towered up between me and the stars, and still
For so it seemed, with a purpose of its own
And measured motion like a living thing
Strode after me.38

The experience leaves the young Wordswoth in "a serious mood"
And the unsettling distortion of the familiar works on the lad "with a dim and undetermined sense/ Of Unknown modes of being;
..." The effect of the serious mood is an emptying of the familiar ground of experience: "There hung a darkness, call it
solitude/Or blank desertion. . . ." The effect is pervasive and unpleasant:

No familiar shapes
Remained, no pleasant images of trees,
Of sea or sky, no colours of green fields;
But huge and mighty forms, that do not live
Like living men, moved slowly through the mind
By day, and were a trouble to my dreams. (394-99)

As in Coleridge's Mariner, we witness the unexpected shift in ground that overturns the conventional significance of the particulars of experience. And the young boy's experience like the Mariner's leaves him perplexed and troubled like a restless dreamer. But as in Coleridge again, this incomprehension suddenly gives way to understanding:

Wisdom and Spirit of the Universe!
Thou Soul that art the eternity of thought,
That givest to forms and images a breath
And everlasting motion, not in vain
By day or starlight thus from my first dawn
Of childhood didst thou intertwine for me
The passions that build up our human soul;
Not with mean and vulgar works of man,
But with high objects, with enduring things--
With life and nature, purifying thus
The elements of feeling and of thought,
And sanctifying, by such discipline,
Both pain and fear, until we recognise
A grandeur in the beatings of the heart. (I, 400-13)

If as in The Ancient Mariner, the distorting spectacle finally falls too easily within the comprehension of a conventional if vague understanding of the "spirit of the universe," unlike Coleridge, Wordsworth locates the process of transformation as a relation between nature and human mind. The spectacle of the
Towering Crag is a lesson of perception itself, rather than a visitation of the supernatural into the realm of the familiar. Where in Coleridge the Albatross and the watersnakes become synecdochic sacraments of the transforming power of a universal spirit in "all living things," Wordsworth's more earth bound vision makes "living" symbols of inanimate aspects of nature. For Wordsworth what breathes this life into nature is a potential in the soul of nature "that givest to forms and images a breath/And everlasting motion." As in Shelley this potential is linked to "the eternity of thought" whose functional properties, like perception itself, breathe motion and life into forms. Thus, while "no familiar shapes/Remained" in the mind of the young Wordsworth, the power of the functional properties of perception itself transform his vision. In this sense, Wordsworth's discovery that the functional, relational mechanism of perceptive consciousness breathes life into forms and images parallels the constitutive, creative priority Shelley gives to the relational potential of the particular. The difference between the Wordsworth and Shelley on this point is not where they locate this potential. For both it is an inherent potential of nature, figured in Shelley as the breath at the core of the Earth's heart, and in Wordsworth as the "Soul" and "Spirit of the universal." For Shelley it is a potential that when liberated is reflected in Man and is linked to the Deadalean shaping,
forming and relating capacity of language. For Wordsworth the "Soul" of the universe "That givest to forms and images a breath and everlasting motion" is linked to an "eternity of thought" that "intertwine[s]" "The passions that build up the human soul" with "high objects, with enduring things." And for both these poets this relational capacity ties man to nature in two ways. In both Shelley and Wordsworth this capacity is thought to appear in parallel ways in man and in the natural world. For Shelley it is most in evidence in Man in his capacity for language. In Wordsworth it is most evident in man in his consciousness of his own perceptive function. For both, this capacity is revealed under the pressure of a shift in ground. For Wordsworth this shift is often literal shift in perspective, spatial and temporal. In Shelley it is the perspective of a dramatic presence upon an accomplished shift in ground. In Ozymandias this shift is the effect of a literal temporal transition; in Prometheus Unbound, the shift is the result of the liberation of repressed conscious Mind; in Adonais, the shift is an effect of Death.

The other way in which this relational capacity ties man to nature is not in their parallel occurrences in each, but in the working of the function itself. In Wordsworth the object of perception is often nature, this perceptual capacity at work creates the relationship between the world of natural
things and consciousness. This is emphatically revealed at moments when perception is freed of its habitual grasp on the forms of the external world. A physiological description of this state is vertigo, a recurrent Romantic motif from Keats to Coleridge, a more general description is disorientation. This relationship of Mind to Nature, often pictured as a Subject/Object polarity, is, in a sense, set in motion under the pressure of this vertiginous shift in ground and its functional and operative characteristics come to the fore. For Shelley this disorienting state, while not pictured physiologically in "Ozymandias" and Prometheus Unbound, is reflected in history and in the obliteration of previous legendary or historical states of culture. In Adonais, this potential is Death itself. Where in Shelley this transformation happens off-stage so to speak, in Wordsworth and Coleridge it is experienced and felt by the reader. It is in this sense that Wordsworth and Coleridge are described as poets of experience or what J. Robert Barth called Poets of "encounter." Shelley, on the other hand is seen as more idealistic and purely visionary.

By the account offered here of Romantic symbol as synecdoche of immanence, we can now clearly delineate the different uses each of these three poets make of the synecdochic function of figurative language. Coleridge and Wordsworth each begin with the realistic world of ordinary experience, employ what I call
the first kind of synecdoche of immanence, a realistic mode wherein sounding cataracts infer a larger landscape and whereby the River Duddon may stand for Nature writ large. But where a shift in ground appears to intrude upon the Coleridgean land/seascape like a supernatural force that undermines comfortable familiarity, the shift in ground in Wordsworth is seen to be an effect of the perceptive mind itself, but which to the child may appear to be an animate property of nature. In this sense, Wordsworth is closer to the Shelleyean third kind of synecdoche of immanence which roots productive, transforming capacity in the relational potential of the constituent detail under the pressure of an explainable shift in ground. For Shelley this shifting, transforming capacity to forge details into relation is an assumed characteristic of consciousness. And among the Romantics he is the most comfortable with this potential. Shelley, perhaps the most adventurous of the Romantics, chided Wordsworth for his timidity, his willingness to bind his vision too closely with earthly nature. In contrast, Coleridge is perhaps the most uncomfortable with what he called the "streamy" "evil" nature of synecdochic contamination. This anxiety, as I have pointed out, is reflected in the Mariner's ghastly vision. Somewhere between Coleridgean anxiety and Shelleyean idealism, perhaps arrogance, is Wordsworth who avoids Coleridgean supernaturalism; but grounding his perceptions initially in the natural world,
Wordsworth eschews Shelley's abstract idealism in favor of a revelation vision of Man's "fit" relation to nature.

At the risk of oversimplifying but in the hope of making clear the kinds of synecdoche of immanence each of these three poets employs, and how each kind is distinguished from and related to the other, I offer the following schematization. Modeled are three dominant Romantic strategies that seek to constitute an organizational principle out of relations among emphasized particulars, rather than those elicited by allegorical patterns and their attendant themes. These strategies are represented by the poets of whom each strategy is, to my mind, most characteristic. Other Romantic poets employ similar strategies. Blake, for example, would seem very close to Shelley by this scheme. And all of these strategies can be recognized in the works of Keats. With this model, I do not intend to erect barriers between poets who generally share a common motive of their age. Rather the model brings a kind of clarity to what is often a confused picture of the relations among various poetics that come under the name Romantic.

I have demonstrated in the examples above how the Romantic emphasis on the particular does not entail a rejection of allegorical function, per se, although in Shelley especially we do see a rejection of particular allegorical ideologies. Rather, the Romantic emphasis on the particular necessarily intimates a
KINDS OF SYNECDOCHES OF IMMANENCE

1) REALISTIC
   - Coleridge
     - Mysterious Visitation
     - Coleridge (Parable of Imagination disorientation)
   - Sacramental

2) LEGENDARY
   - Shelley
     - Corrective Mythic obliteraction
     - Shelley (Myth of Social Man)

3) VISIONARY
   - Wordsworth
     - Perceptual vertigo
   - Revelatory
     - Wordsworth (Myth of Self)

(Fig. 11. Romantic Modes of Synecdoche)
whole. The essentially synecdochic operation basic to this Romantic project is easily recognizable in the realistic synecdoches of the first kind. Noses and chins do imply faces once we recognize those parts as such. It is less easy to recognize in the second kind of legendary synecdoche, by which the part is a sacrament for a whole. Shelley's dramatic mythic presences and Coleridge's Albatross are examples. Here the emphasized particular is a constituent part of a one or a number of previous wholes. In Shelley we have a more or less definite idea of what these legendary sources are; the more familiar we become with them, the better we are able to perceive, as Earl Wasserman has, the pattern of the related particulars Shelley derives from them. In Coleridge we have a less definite notion of precisely what the sources are for his supernatural characters and phenomenal events. The third kind or Visionary synecdoche by which I define the limit of the Romantic project is a characteristic Romantic revelation of the functional potential inherent in the emphasized particular. We see this in Wordsworth's recognition of an eternal "Form and function" at work in Nature and in Man, and in the further recognition that in one sense this function itself binds man to his world. Shelley perceives this potential inherent in the isolated particular which, made manifest by a shift in ground, reveals the pattern of an ideal.
The shift in ground from one kind of synecdoche of immanence to another that occurs in each of the strategies results initially from an emphasis on the particular itself. In Coleridge this close focus inspection is itself a shift in perspective which is seen to distort the particular. In the *Ancient Mariner* this occurs in two ways. The first is the distortion of the cause/effect synecdoche by which phenomena associated with the Albatross are seen to be determined by it. Is it the Bird that brought wind and ice or made the breeze to blow? The other way in which the particular is distorted in Coleridge's *Ancient Rime* is the visual magnification of the particular, a further particularization of the emphasized particular by which the watersnakes at the close of part III of the *Mariner* appear happy despite their conventional association with evil. A similar visual distortion occurs for the haunted boy in Book I of Wordsworth's Prelude by which the conventionally benign aspects of Nature appear to have malignant "purposes of their own." Where in Wordsworth we are aware that this visual phenomenon is a function of perception itself, the Mariner, on the other hand, seems genuinely haunted and possessed by the supernatural, the victim of some mysterious visitation. Both the Mariner and the haunted boy are seen to have learned from the phenomenal experience. The Mariner's lesson is, Coleridge tells us in the gloss, a moral
one; for the young boy the experience "purifies" "The ele-
ments of feeling and of thought" "by such discipline" that he
recognizes "A grandeur in the beatings of the heart." In the
examples we looked at in Shelley's work, the shift in ground
appears as an obliteration of a previous legendary totality of
which preserved constituent details are emphasized for their
inherent relational potential.

For all three poets, a shift in ground appears necessary
to their strategies for an organizational principle immanent in
the emphasized particular. For Wordsworth and Coleridge this
shift appears phenomenal and inexplicable. In Coleridge it re-
mains so, whereas in Wordsworth this shift is understood as an
effect of the function of perception itself. By contrast,
Shelley anticipates and controls the shift in ground necessary
to his poetic strategy in Prometheus Unbound by obliterating
a number of previous myths in favor of his corrective reformula-
tion of the ideal. And by a similar logic, death for "Adonais"
corrects his previously lively state as Death tramples life's
dome of many colored glass "to fragments." For Shelley a shift
in ground is appears to be an inherent function of an universal
process pictured historically in "Ozymandias" and personally and
individually in "Adonais." And in this sense the Shelleyean
shift in ground is a universal function immanent in the particu-
lar as a potential which is revealed by an altered perspective.
By this description Shelley's strategy appears to lie between Wordsworth's sense of shift in ground as innate to to perceptual function and Coleridge's sense that shift in ground is a visitation of a greater universal force. But for all three poets, shift in ground is linked to perception and consciousness as change in perspective. Thus, the mediation of the emphasized particular, its shift in status from the member of one class to its inclusion in another or from the part of a specific whole to part of another whole is seen to be to some extent an effect of consciousness itself. The Romantic faith that this process of shifting ground is an intimation of a universal function and that synecdochic parts do finally infer stable wholes is itself dependent upon a prior faith that conscious mind is part of a universal consciousness, what Shelley calls "One Mind." Harold Bloom has pointed out that this assumption is an intrinsically "lyric" stance wherein the poet appropriates a single personal voice with the confidence that in Blake's terms, "every particular is a Man, a Divine Member of the Divine Jesus."

Without the faith that the single individual voice is a portion of the whole, the perspectival shift in ground expresses the mediating force, not of the universal but of individual consciousness itself. This is precisely the view of the Victorian for whom the mediated status of the emphasized
particular,--what for the Romantics is a synecdoche of immanence--, undermines confidence in language to be anything more than what Arnold calls "a stifling veil," a mediated "Form of thought." The Shelleyean archetype appears to the Victorian to be not a picture of "The One," but an idiosyncratic mode. An emphasis on the particular without the Romantic faith in the immanence of the whole results in an emphasis on the particular which speaks nostalgically for the whole. In the famous stanza from "Adonais" quoted earlier, Shelley himself is weak-kneed at the prospect:

Die,
If thou would'st be with that which thou doest seek!
Follow where all is fled!--Rome's azure sky,
Flowers, ruins, statues, music, words, are wek
The Glory they transfuse with fitting truth to speak.

Like Wordsworth's child in the "Intimation" ode, the Romantic synecdoche of immanence comes "trailing clouds of glory." But without the prevenience of "the "glory they transfuse," words, like the list of particulars Shelley associates with them, are mediated fragments of consciousness which sadly evoke their ruined contexts. Without Shelley's characteristic faith in the immanence of iso-morphic structures or Wordsworth's belief in an anterior "glory," a figurative language which obliterates the specificity of totalizing myths while emphasizing their constituent details makes poets "prisoners of consciousness" rather than "the unacknowledged legislators of the world."
The faith on which the Romantic attempt to constitute an organizational principle out of relations among emphasized particulars depends, appears to the Victorian to be "a product of personal impresion and private mood rather than a deduction from general experience." For Tennyson, Shelley "is often too much in the clouds." For Carlyle, he "always was, and is, a kind of ghastly object; colorless, pallid, tuneless, without health or warmth or vigour."

In the rhetorical terms developed here, Victorian rejection of the Romantic "Kantean haze-world" can be viewed as distrust of the immanence of an objectively universal totalizing pattern or whole within the emphasized particular when the ground term that serves to link the two parts of the synecdochic relation is seen to be the result of an expression of private consciousness rather than a general or universal constant. A. N. Whitehead speaks directly to this problem of "symbolic reference." Whitehead argues that symbolic reference is "a mixed mode of perception" combining the "presentational immediacy of the "presented locus" and the perceptive mode of causal efficacy into which the presented locus enters. In our terms, symbolic reference combines the emphasized particular and the perceptions of consciousness which instantiate the particular in a causal context. The Mariner's conflicting perceptions of the causal efficacy of the Albatross illustrate
the potential problem when the emphasized particular enters into contradictory modes of causal efficacy. Whitehead goes on to say that any notion of what the presented locus or emphasized particular discloses is recoverable as a common ground unifying these two modes. And the two main elements of this common ground are the emphasized particular itself and the connection between the presented locus (emphasized particular) and the mode of causal efficacy effected by the identity of an "eternal ingredient" in both the presentational mode and the causal mode.\(^{45}\) By such a ground, Whitehead states that a "con-crescent unity arises in which the prehensions in the two modes are brought into a higher unity of feeling."\(^{46}\) In simple terms, the ground term is a unity of the particular and the "eternal" or universal formed by virtue of an "identity relation" between the two. What should be emphasized here is that the unity or common ground is not the identity of a thing, but an identity relation."

What is striking about Whitehead's post Romantic, late Victorian understanding of the problem of symbolic reference is the diminished status of the universal and the augmented status of the ground term due to the emphasis on the presentational immediacy of the presented locus, what I have termed the emphasized particular. Indeed, the ground term itself is composed of the emphasized particular itself and the "connec-
tion" or relation between the presented locus and its causal context effected by an identity of an "eternal" ingredient" between them. The universal is now an "eternal ingredient" which is itself formed by the relation perceiving consciousness discovers between the emphasized particular and its context. For Whitehead the discovery of this "eternal" ingredient is itself dependent upon the mediations of consciousness. For our purposes, Whitehead voices the Victorian recognition that the Romantic emphasis on the particular highlights the mediated status of the part/whole relation basic to symbolic reference. The emergence of the importance of the functional mediating properties of a common ground coincides with the recognition that the main elements of this ground are the emphasized particular and perceiving consciousness which identifies an "eternal ingredient." As such, the Romantic emphasis on the particular results in the mediation of the universal by consciousness. In this way, Shelley's ideal vision becomes for the Victorians a loss of objective clarity and Coleridge's faith in the representability of spectral ideas is regarded as an "ex-crescence of mind rather than an imitation of life." In response to what they perceived as the Romantic's cloudy subjectivism, the Victorian demanded a return to the concrete but, as Carol Christ notes,

By the end of the century the faculty for truth was no longer as it had been for Coleridge, the power of seeing
the universal in the particular, but in the words of Pater, 'a power of distinguishing and fixing delicate and fugitive detail merely for the sake of the experience itself.47

For Pater, the figurative expression of the emphasized particular is not an access to the universal, but an expression of conscious experience itself. For the earlier Victorians between Coleridge's idealism and Pater's optimistic relativism, the emphasized particular sometimes conveys "a sensitivity morbid in its emotional intensity."48

With blackest moss the flower-pots
   Were thickly crusted, one and all:
The rusted nails fell from their knots
   That held the pear to the gable-wall.
The broken sheds looked sad and strange:
   Unlifted was the clinking latch;
   Weeded and worn the ancient thatch
   Upon the lonely moated grange.49

Tennyson's emphasis on the particular is so precise as to distort normal perception. The sharply focused objects fill up the frame of perception; the sense of a continuous background recedes. In this way, the Victorian sense of the particular—what I shall term a synecdoche of privation or loss—can be related to a Victorian crisis of consciousness and faith. Emphasized particulars outstrip the mind's ability to systematize related particulars and the figurative expression of concrete particulars suggests their distance from the whole from which they are declined. And human agency, too, is withdrawn from the scene in Tennyson's poem: "Unlifted was the clinking
latch." The lyric voice of the Romantic here records in passive sentences the particulars of loss. "The clinking of the latch," a sound recalled in omission. The operation of synecdochic inference remains, but its function signifies a privation, a loss of immanence.
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III


20. Lipking, p. 615.


34. Percy Bysshe Shelley, *Adonais* in *Poems by Percy Bysshe Shelley*, p. 98. All further references to *Adonais* will be incorporated in the text.
37. Hartman, p. 337.
38. Wordsworth, *The Prelude* in *Selected Poems and Prefaces*, p. 201. All further references to *The Prelude* will be incorporated in the text.
42. Buckley, p. 22.
43. Buckley, p. 18.
45. Whitehead, p. 196.
46. Whitehead, p. 196.

CHAPTER IV: Immanence Lost: The Victorian Synecdoche of Privation

Flower in the cranned wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower—but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all, in all,
I should know what God and man is.

--Tennyson

In the little flower he examines, Tennyson does not see a heaven. The impossibility of holding Blake's "infinity" in the palm of his hand is seen to be the result of not understanding what the flower is "root and all, and all, in all." To "understand" the particular in all its aspects--"root and all"--is, for Tennyson to "know" the universal. Like the Romantics who looked to the organic particular for an intimation of the universal, Tennyson's knowledge of the universal depends upon understanding the particular. The difference between Tennyson and the Romantics is one of increasing emphasis on the particular. Where the Romantics presuppose a universal of which the particular is a partial representation, the Victorian scrutiny of partial aspects, "root and all," fails to provide knowledge of man's relation to God. In the rhetorical terms developed here, the Victorian emphasis on the particular frustrates the constitution of a ground term by which the universal and the particular come into relation. Rather, the scrutiny and focus
on the particular which necessarily plucks the flower from its crannied wall precludes a simultaneous view of the context from which it is detached for observation.

Entranced by their beauty the Mariner blesses the watersnakes "unaware." Tennyson trains his conscious attention on the particular, a thorough understanding of which should lead to a knowledge of the universal. Tennyson's problem is not primarily a failure to know the universal, but an inability to understand the particular. The precedence of the particular coincides with the loss of perspective Dr. Johnson warns against in Rasselas and Pope responds to in Essay on Man:

Why has not man a microscopic eye?  
For this plain reason, Man is not a Fly.  
Say what the use, were finer optics giv'n,  
T'inspect a mite, not comprehend the heav'n?²

With faith that the universal is immanent in minutest particular, in the part of parts, the Romantic never loses sight of the larger picture; but though Victorian attention to the minutest particulars, the parts of parts, begins with a presupposition of the immanence of the whole, there is no clear mediation to it. Tennyson looks to the relations among particulars themselves for "understanding" and in so searching, he, in effect, overstands the particular, an index of obsessive absorption of consciousness, and finds instead that the ground relating universal and particular is not inherent in the particular, but is a projection or construct of the self:
Am I to be overawed
By what I cannot but know
Is a juggler of the brain?  

An absorption in and scrutiny of the particular tends to express states of consciousness rather than universals. For Tennyson and the early Victorians this state of consciousness, which implies a loss of a sense of the universal, is often morbid as in "Mariana" or Maud.

I hate the dreadful hollow behind the little wood;
Its lips in the field above are dabbed with blood-red heath,
The red ribb'd ledges drip with a silent horror of blood,
And Echo there, whatever is ask'd her, answers 'Death.'

(Maud, I, i, 11: 1-4)

The speakers' depressed state of mind is expressed in his description of the landscape, the "ghastly pit" where his father's suicide took place. Unlike the supernatural seascape of Coleridge's Ancient Rime, the distortions, the morbid emphasis on the particularity of the natural world haunted by spectral forces here is a direct expression of the speaker's consciousness. The effect of such emphasis is not unconscious liberation like that of the Mariner's blessing of the watersnakes, whose beauty becomes evidence of the immanence of the universal spirit within the conventionally evil. The speaker in Tennyson's poem is imprisoned by the limitation of his consciousness, for whom the "Perfectly beautiful" promises a "curse."

Describing Maud's beauty, Tennyson's persona dwells too deeply in the detail, finding in the particularization of the beautiful an overripeness:
she has neither savor nor salt
But a cold and clear-cut face, as I found when her carriage past
Perfectly beautiful; let it be granted her; where is the fault?
All that I saw—for her eyes were downcast, not to be seen—
Faultily faultless, icily regular, splendidly null,
Dead perfection, no more, nothing more, if it had not been
For a chance of travel, a paleness, an hour’s defect of the rose,
Or an underlip, you may call it a little too ripe, too full,
Or the least little delicate aquiline curve in a sensitive nose,
From which I escaped heart-free, with the least little touch of spleen.
(I,II:78-87)

The course of the speaker's attraction/repulsion to the perfect
beauty "and not seventeen" is routed through his changing per-
spective. Maud's "clear-cut face," from which the speaker synec-
dochally infers her character, "neither savor nor salt," is the
basis for an aesthetic generalization: "Perfectly beautiful."
But he admits he did not see her whole face, "for her eyes were
cast down, not to be seen." But what he did see was "Faultily
faultless, icily regular, splendidly null." It is only a defect
in this "dead perfection" the effects of travel that attracts:

    a paleness, an hour's defect of the rose
Or an underlip, you may call it a little too ripe, too full
Or the least little delicate aquiline curve in a sensitive nose.

In dwelling on the particularity of the generally beautiful which
repulses, a distortion like the effects of a microscopic focus
renders the particular less regular, less "splendidly null."
And it is the defect which attracts and from which the speaker
escapes with his heart.

    Under Maud's influence Tennyson's hero reads the symptoms
of spring with a morbid eye:
[I] arose, and all by myself in my own dark garden ground,
Listening now to the tide in its broad-flung shipwrecking roar,
Now to the scream of a madden'd beach dragg’d down by the wave,
Walked in a wintry wind by a ghastly glimmer, and found
The shining daffodil dead, and Orion low in his grave.

(III,11:97-101)

And watching Maud's house from her "garden of roses" where he
waits with a lover's patience, the speaker mistakes the curtains
drawn at bed time for the veils of death:

But I look'd, and round, all round the house I beheld
The death-white curtain drawn,
Felt a horror over me creep,
Prickle my skin and catch my breath,
Knew that the death-white curtain meant but sleep,
Yet I shudder'd and thought like a fool of the sleep of death.

(XIV,iv,11:521-26)

Like the paranoid who comprehends each particular as evidence of
an overarching design, Tennyson's speaker overloads the particu-
lar with significance. But he is aware that the explanation is
foolish, a "juggle of the brain." Tennyson gives us the reactions
of a mind on the brink of madness. The language of such conscious-
ness is expressive neither of the verities of the external world,
nor the archetypal relations of the ideal. Rather such language
expresses the mediations cast by a certain, in this case, morbid,
consciousness. To reemploy Wasserman's terms for Shelley's man-
ipulation of the particular, the "syntactic potential" inherent
in the constituent detail for Tennyson's unhappy speaker is a
reflex of consciousness itself by which the phenomenal events
of the world are experienced in terms of a prior cast of mind.

For Shelley, the "syntactic potential" of the constituent
detail of the use of that detail in prior myths. For the Victorian, who lacks the Romantic faith in the immanence of the universal in the particular, the "syntactic potential" inheres in the prior state of mind of the expressive consciousness. The speaker's subjectivity is seen to veil his relation to the particular rather than speak for the immanence of the universal mind.

For the Victorian, the individual consciousness takes the place of the universal as the second main element of the ground term relation between part and whole. And because the Victorian does not begin with the assumption that the individual mind is part of the universal one mind, the subjectivity of that mind is isolated and self conscious. For Tennyson this is a "sad astrology," a decline from the belief that the Stars ruled man's fate. Even at the moment when Tennyson's hero is most happy, the stars do not sympathize, but brand "nothingness into man."

Here will I lie while these long branches sway,  
And you fair stars that crown a happy day  
Go in and out as if at merry play.  
Who am no more so forlorn  
As when it seem'd far better to be born  
To labor and the mattock-harden'd hand  
Than nurs'd at ease and brought to understand  
A sad astrology, the boundless plan  
That makes you tyrants in your iron skies,  
Innumerable, pitiless, passionless eyes  
Cold fires, yet with power to burn and brand  
His nothingness into man.

(XVIII, iv, 11:627-38)
Carol Christ notes that in Part II, after the speaker has killed Maud's brother, his sensitivity to the landscape changes:

He becomes acutely conscious of minute detail. He stares at the wild flower on the hill immediately after the murder; he notices a ring on the brother's finger as he lies dying; he becomes transfixed by a shell lying on the Breton shore.⁴

Despite the enormity of the act he has committed, the speaker's attention becomes absorbed in the minute workings of detail:

I

See what a lovely shell
Small and pure as a pearl,
Lying close to my foot,
Frail, but a work divine,
Made so fairly well
With delicate spire and whorl,
How exquisitely minute,
A miracle of design!

II

What is it? a learned man
Could give it a name.
Let him name it who can
The beauty would be the same. (11:49-60)

Unlike Keats or Coleridge for whom partial aspects of the natural world provide consciousness access to a universal, rich depiction of detail in Tennyson is often an analogue for vulnerable consciousness whose fragility is also read synecdochally as strength:

III

The tiny cell is forlorn
Void of the little living will
That made it stir on the shore.
Did he stand at the diamond door
Of his house in a rainbow frill?
Did he push, when he was uncurled
A golden foot or a fairy horn
Thro' his dim water world?

IV
Slight to be crushed with a tap
Of my finger nail on the sand,
Small, but a work divine,
Frail, but of force to withstand,
Year upon year, the shock
Of cataract seas that snap
The three decker's oaken spine
Athwart the ledges of rock
here on the Breton strand! (ll:61-77)

Characteristically, the strength the frail work of divinity possesses is an attribute of the past, not a vision of potential. The anterior implication looks back to a time when, as Arnold says, the "Sea of Faith was at the full." This nostalgic look back is a contrast to Shelley's synecdochic implication of previous mythic and historical contexts whose particulars, constituent details or ruins of previous obliterated systems, carry a relational and visionary potential for present consciousness.

Carol Christ attributes this difference between the Romantic and Victorian view of the particular, as well as the common notion that the Victorian gradually lost the Romantic faith that universal correspondences existed among individual minds to "a developing sense of the particularity both of the individual perception and of sensible objects." We can make this observation more precise by noting that along with an
increasing emphasis on the particular within the part/whole synechochic dynamic, the ground term becomes increasingly a function of the particular expressive consciousness and less a function of a universal. In this way, figurative expression of the particular, as in Tennyson above, is an index not to a universal but to an individual consciousness.

Nowhere in Victorian poetry does figurative expression of the particular imply loss more strongly than in Tennyson's In Memoriam A.H.H. With the death of his friend, Arthur Hallam, Tennyson feels the loss not only of an individual man, but the decline of the certainty of an entire tradition of knowledge that linked the human and the divine.

Our little systems have their day
They have their day and cease to be:
They are but broken lights of thee,
And thou, O Lord, art more than they.

We have but faith: we cannot know,
For knowledge is of things we see;
And yet we trust it comes from thee
A beam in darkness: let it grow.

(In Memoriam A H H, Obit., 17-24)

In Tennyson's elegy the conventional pathetic fallacy of a sympathetic connection between individual man and nature is a self-conscious connection rather than a spontaneous one. When Sor- row, "Prestess in the Vaults of Death" (III,2) whispers her inter- pretation of the response of universal nature to the death of Hallam, Tennyson questions her report:
"The Stars," she whispers, "blindly run;
A Web is woven across the sky;
From out waste places comes a cry,
And murmurs from the dying son;

"And all the phantom, Nature stands--
With all the music in her tone,
A hollow echo of my own,—
A hollow form with empty hands."

And shall I take a thing so blind,
Embrace her as my natural good;
Or crush her, like a vice of blood,
Upon the threshold of the mind?

(III, 5-16)

The emptying out of Nature Sorrow describes is similar to the vision of Wordsworth's haunted boy for whom Nature seemed formless and void of shape in the wake of his experience on the lake. And for the more adult Tennyson, like the reader of Wordsworth's Prelude, this hollowness is seen to be more an effect of perspective rather than an expression of "blind" nature itself. But the difference between the Wordsworthian and Tennysonian understanding of the relation between mind and nature points to the mounting Victorian sense that the forces of the mediations of consciousness itself "crush" the interpretations shifting perspectives make possible. While, the Wordsworthian boy's perspective is seen as a pure function of mind, Tennyson's grief at the death of Hallam numbs the register of language:

I sometimes hold it half a sin
To put in words the grief I feel
For words, like Nature, half reveal
And half conceal the Soul within.
But, for the unquiet heart and brain
   A use in measured language lies;
The sad mechanic exercise,
Like dull narcotics numbing pain
In words, like Weeds, I'll wrap me o'er
   Like coarsest clothes against the cold
But that large grief which these enfold
Is given in outline and no more.
   (V, 1-12)

Words, like protective garments, enfold and conceal the large
animating emotion, a property language shares with Nature which
"half reveal[s] and half conceal[s] the Soul Within." What for
the Romantic is the power of language to intimate universals
through particulars becomes for Tennyson a privative function.
Words express the rough and approximate "outline" of Tennyson's
emotion, an emotion which, though he tells us in the next stanza
is "common to the race" is not one present in universal nature
or even an emotion by which "blind" nature is touched: "Never
morning wore/To evening, but some heart did break." (VI, 7-8)
Unlike Adonais whom for Shelley is "presence" in Nature "to be
felt and known," Hallman's death is for Tennyson a grief, whose
music is reflected in Nature as a "hollow echo" (III, 11).

As Carol Christ and others have noted, "the Victorians lost
the transcendental sense of nature that allowed the Romantics to
perceive significance in the most minute grain of sand." The
external world exists for the bereaved Victorian elegist as a
rough particularization of subjective consciousness rather
than a symbolic (synecdochic) access to a universal. And without
the Romantic lyricist's faith that the individual mind is a portion of a universal One Mind, the single voice harmonizing with the whole, the lyric utterance becomes isolated, self conscious, what Charles Altieri calls a "desperate cry."

Altieri views Tennyson's great elegy as an attempt to move "from the cries of isolated speakers to a condition of prayer." Exemplifying his claims, Altieri contrasts two well known lyric stanzas on Hallam's house. In the first, stanza VII, a kind of desperate cry, Altieri points to a "metonymic movement" that reverses the "Romantic dialectic" of "the relationship between presence and absence." In the terms of the analysis of synecdoche offered here, the stanza overturns the Romantic faith in the immanence of the whole in favor of a nostalgia for a lost immanence:

Dark House, by which once more I stand
Here, in the long unlovely street,
Doors, where my heart was used to beat
So quickly, waiting for a hand,

A hand that can be clasped no more.
Behold me, for I cannot sleep,
And like a guilty thing I creep
At earliest morning to the door.

He is not here; but far away
The noise of life begins again
And ghastly thro' the drizzling rain
On the bald street breaks the blank day. (VII)

As Altieri notes, the first stanza is dominated by (synecdochic) references to Hallam, his house, the doors of that house and Hallam's hand, and by references to the speaker himself in "active states of memory and expectation." Although the
synechochic function implies the wholes referred to by the parts, we are told that Hallam, the implied absence, "is not here." Thus, the synechochic parts Tennyson raises to the level of figure appear as remnants or ruins of an immanence separated from grieving consciousness.

Synechochic parts stand for the absence of the wholes they represent—what I term synechoches of privation. This privation is expressed directly in the first lines of the second and third stanzas:

A hand that can be clasped no more. (5)

He is not here; ... (9)

Reflecting upon this loss the speaker himself becomes progressively objectified to himself, "guilty":

Behold me for I cannot sleep
And like a guilty thing I creep
At earliest morning to the door. (8.8)

What the speaker here is guilty of seems to be his need to seek out this experience of privation, a compulsion to return to the site of immanence banished. In the abstract terms of analysis presented in chapter three, Tennyson's motive here can be described as a fixation on a shift in ground of the second synechochic type wherein realistic synechoches pass into the realm of the legendary or sacramental. Tennyson unlike Coleridge cannot yet make sacramental the transformed particular, render it included within a familiar category of moral experience. In Altieri's terms, the
cry has not yet become "prayer." And unlike Shelley's use, the particular as remnant is not, from another perspective, an instance of a transcendent pattern. Rather, for the self conscious Victorian, who lacks the visionary's faith in a priori allegoric and metaphoric correspondences among interchangeable aspects of analogic patterns, the transformed world is ghastly for its sympathetic coincidences of mind and external nature:

He is not here; but far away
The noise of life begins again
And ghastly thro' the drizzling rain
On the bald street breaks the blank day. (10-12)

With the word "but" in line 10 Tennyson makes clear that he does not perceive the coincidence of his mood and the weather as evidence for a transcendental correspondence of Mind and Nature, but a hollow echo of his private consciousness in a world of absences: "bald streets" and "blank days."

In contrast to the desperation of this early section, Altieri asserts that the second "dark house" section, late in the elegy, marks a return to the "dialectics of Romantic poetry:"

... 7 The "full affirmation" of Hallam's "presence" produced by memory in this section appears to be a prayerful return to the Romantic synecdoche of immanence:

Doors where my heart was used to beat
So quickly, not as one that weeps
I come once more; the city sleeps;
I smell the meadow in the street;

I hear the chirp of birds; I see
Betwixt the black fronts long withdrawn
A light-blue lane of early dawn,
And think of early days and thee,
And bless thee, for thy lips are bland
And bright the friendship of thine eye
And in my thoughts with scarce a sigh
I take the pressure of thine hand. (CXIX)

The rediscovered plentitude coincides with the cheerful aspect of the natural landscape reversing the negative parallels between mood and nature in section VII; but here too, Tennyson makes clear that this coincidence does not indicate an immediate connection between consciousness and the world or an immediate, immanent and inherent relation between part and whole. Rather consciousness itself mediates these relations. For example, in line 4, the meadow is not immanent in the street,

I smell the meadow in the street. (4)

And the immanence of Hallam is a presence "in" the speaker's "thoughts," rather than as Adonais, "a presence in Nature to be felt in known." The act of blessing, Altieri notes, seems to perform the high Romantic act associated with Coleridge and Shelley. But where that act is unconscious in those Romantics, a spontaneous effect of a shift in ground, Tennyson's Victorian sacramentalism is an effect of self consciousness:

I hear the chirp of birds; I see
Betwixt the black fronts long withdrawn
A light-blue lane of early dawn,
And think of early days and thee

And bless thee, for thy lips are bland
And bright the friendship of thine eye
And in my thoughts, with scarce a sigh
I take the pressure of thine hand. (5-12)

To modify Altieri's claims somewhat in light of my model for synecdoche in nineteenth century poetry, Tennyson's use of synecdoche does not so much mark a return to the Romantic synecdoche of immanence, but a strategy for overcoming the loss of immanence that results from the recognition that the ground term mediating part and whole is an effect of consciousness rather than a trace of a universal, a loss of faith. This recognition results initially in what I have termed a synecdoche of privation, a mode of isolated consciousness fixated on an alien landscape, noted in "Mariana," "Maud" and section VII of In Memoriam. Section CXIV, above, promises a more positive mode for the self conscious mind wherein intense personal experience itself becomes a way of re-deeming a loss of immanence by the awareness of the force of consciousness itself, or self consciousness at home with itself, and with "faith that comes of self control." (CXXXI, 9).

Tennyson's solution to the problem of isolated self consciousness' recovery of a lost immanence through a series of desperate lyric cries by which consciousness becomes aware of finally gains control of itself in one strategy for overcoming what Altieri calls "the plight of Victorian lyricism": the growing distance between lyric self expression and an objective universal that provides a ground for personal experience and for the public expression of that experience. 11 While the Romantic emphasis on the
particular did not announce a rejection of the Universal, but retained an intimation of the whole, we have seen that this Romantic posture results in the loss of the immanence of the universal once this strategy goes beyond a synecdoche of the first type, a realistic mode grounded in the familiar laws and accompanying allegories of the organic kind. Hence, natural landscape provides the most compelling ground of departure for the Romantic desire for an immediate and immanent sense of the universal within the particular. Here, the correspondences between mind and nature seem universal, and evidence for the workings of a universal spirit that all the Romantics assume. But when the Romantic project extends this part/whole strategy beyond realistic and organically grounded experience, into the less stable legendary and visionary grounds of the sacramental and revelatory, poetic expression appears solipsistic, a product of individual lyric consciousness, rather than an expression of universals. For the Victorians, a characteristic response is a distrust of a universal immanence connecting mind and nature. As we have seen in the examples from Tennyson that connection is perceived as gratuitous or a mere projection of consciousness. If there is a context of significance for the relation of mind to nature for the Victorian, it is emotion, not a universal. This response and the resulting loss of faith in the immanence of universals is intensified when the alienation of mind from nature throws the poet back into an
isolated consciousness which grows aware of and increasingly objectifies itself, for Tennyson, a "guilty thing."

This dilemma of Victorian consciousness is exemplified most painfully in Arnold's *Empedocles on Etna*. For Arnold, who desires an ideal cultural order to perform the metaphysical function of religion and replace superstitious myths whose allegories are seen to constitute a trap for the self, the isolated speaker can neither give public expression to his private self, nor articulate an objective social discourse that allows for the authentic self expression of various and sometimes incompatible interpretive rationalities:

the descriptive and judgmental acts pull against one another, leaving as ground for lyric emotion only an Empedoclean sense of despairing isolation from any secure order of community.13

Altieri provides a careful and systematic analysis of this tension in *Empedocles* and in Arnold's literary career in general. The particulars of the philosophical portrait Altieri renders are less important for my rhetorical purpose than the general claims that for Arnold, recognition of the mediating force of consciousness within the part/whole dynamic of figurative representation results in

an acute tension between personal cries and a distanced public language which effectively muffles those cries while coming to seem more self defensive than genuinely analytic. Arnold leaves modern poetry the difficult task of needing to reconcile public and private voices.14

The priority Arnold gives to a public language grounded in an
objective cultural order dominate his expressive lyric voice:

But often, in the world's most crowded streets,
But often, in the din of strife,
There rises an unspeakable desire
After the knowledge of our buried life. 15
(The Buried Life, 45-8)

Though in contrast to Tennyson's desperate self expression, Arnold's muffled lyric voice is the result of a similar perception of the isolation of consciousness from the natural world and from the public world of men and culture. If Arnold's plight is more severe than Tennyson's, it is because his ambitions for language are greater. The dual role Arnold would have language perform as moral and critical tool and lyric instrument weakens the intensity necessary to lyric expression while at the same time the isolated status and mediating force of rational consciousness perceives any single objective cultural order capable of sustaining a public discourse to be finally incommensurate with the relativism bred by post enlightenment dreams of pure lucidity. As Altieri has it, the dream has become partial nightmare.

The Romantic synecdoche of immanence results in the Victorian synecdoche of Privation when subjective consciousness and personality are seen to mediate the relation between part and whole. The consequent distance between the emphasized particular and the objective universal Arnold laments deepens for Arnold into a distrust of figurative expression of the emphasized particular, a distrust of all expression of thought and mind whose figures and
logics are "forms, and modes, and stifling veils." which deny access to a universal, "never let us clasp and feel the All" (Empedocles, II, 353). By this description man is a prisoner of a delimiting consciousness. The Empedoclean solution to this situation is to plunge into Etna's sea of fire in pursuit of a moment of unconsciousness.

If for Arnold the Romantic dream of immanence becomes a nightmare, the Victorian plight of consciousness in restless turmoil with itself, this is in part due to the role consciousness is made to perform. While post enlightenment rationality began to strip away the superstitious garments of universalizing myths to reveal a structural relativism among competing allegories of religious ideologies, the Romantic poets emphasized the particulars of these divested patterns while obliterating the specificity of the whole. The Romantic practice of this strategy left consciousness the task of recovering the obliterated universal in terms other than those which it or time has obliterated. Although the universal is necessarily recovered in terms of consciousness itself, the Romantic dream of immanence retains the faith that individual consciousness does speak for a universal Mind. But for Arnold, the individual mind speaks for itself, rejecting not only specific superstitious ideologies, but rejecting an enslavement to argument itself, and finally repudiating the breeder of these "modes" and "forms"--consciousness itself.
The Empdeoclean nihilism that is a consequence of this plight represents one terminal point of a poetic practice which began with the Romantic emphasis on the particular. The Empdeoclean posture is a characteristic Victorian nihilism that comes of the desire to see the world steadily and see it whole, or, as Hawthorne said of Melville, gazing too long into the fire. This condition is sung early by Empedocles: "the winde-borne mirroring soul/ A thousand glimpses win, but never sees a whole." (I, ii, 84-5) The whole Empedocles desires beyond the glimpses of subjective perspectives—an objective universal capable of grounding culture and sustaining a public discourse—is a version of Shelley's archetypal or ideal mythic universal which brings partial aspects and perspectives into relation. But Arnold does not assume with Shelley that the conscious mind is a reflex of an absolute Mind, rather the individual mind is isolated and bound by the veils and forms of thought. Thus, Arnold's search for an objective universal beyond the partial perspectives of mediating consciousness is thereby doomed. "The deep truth" for Shelley, is "imageless" known by its effects, and the synecdochic inferences one makes of them. For Arnold the deep truth is also imageless. But the force of the particulars in which the Romantic mind, perceived the immanence of a universal appears to the Victorian to be a function of consciousness itself, isolated from any immediate sense of the universal. Thus, the remnants of previous obliterated
cycles that for Shelley speak for the passing of a stagnant tyranny and make possible the liberation of a new promethean consciousness, a new age of man, appear to Arnold as they later appear to Eliot and Pound. The ruined world with which post Romantic consciousness is confronted yet alienated from evokes a nostalgia for cultures able to see themselves whole. Thus the retreat of Romantic faith whose "long withdrawing roar . . . down the vast edges drear/And naked shingles of the world"

leaves Arnold a visionary without a faith:

    for the world, which seems
    To lie before us like a land of dreams,
    So various, so beautiful, so new,
    Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light,
    Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help from pain;
    (Dover Beach, 30-24)

Even human love, through whose eyes the world can seem so beautiful, cannot supply the certitude Arnold is looking for. What in psychological terms can be described as a fixation of obsessive consciousness, Arnold's single minded need for an objective universal to redress the subjective view of the world, is linked to a paralysis of perspective. For the Romantics we looked at in Chapter III, a shift in ground is an inherent function of their poetics, necessary to the emergence of a new vision and an altered perspective. Coleridge's haunted Mariner, Wordsworth's perplexed boy and Shelley's transformed heroes each undergo changes of perspective. And though for all the shift is disorienting, awful, in a general sense destructive, each emerges with a renewed sense
of their relation to a universal order. Behind the act of faith Arnold cannot share, is of course, the Romantic belief in the universality of analogical structures of organization: in organic form, for Coleridge and Wordsworth, and in Mythic form for Shelley. Because these structures are for Arnold projections of Mind that veil an objective view, each partial subjective glimpse is equally suspect. 16

If as Altieri argues, the most enduring result of this Victorian crisis of language and consciousness exemplified in Arnold and Tennyson is "the need to invent new ways of conceptualizing personality, especially in relation to the problems of lyric voice and lyric structures," 17 the poetry of Robert Browning marks the beginning of the transition from the early Victorians privative understanding of the synecdochic basis of figurative representation.

Once the mediating force of subjective consciousness is seen to crush the objective status of the represented particular, the early Victorians lose the Romantic faith in the immanence of a universal in Mind and Nature. The resulting perception of the isolation and alienation of Mind from Nature and the disappearance of an objective universal by which Mind and Nature come into relation, weakens the power of poetic expression to proclaim with certainty the general truths both the eighteenth century poets and early nineteenth century Romantics believed they had authority
to express. While it can be argued that by the end of the
nineteenth century, the aesthetes had given up the quest for
general truths in favor of a further emphasis on the particular
and intensely experienced emotion, in Browning the quest for
an absolute vision of order persists. But rather than searching
for it in a single flash of vision that comprehends each sub-
jective and incomplete perspective, Browning, like Paraceleus,
can only approach truth after entertaining and relinquishing di-
vergent perspectives. This basic acceptance of the variety of
points of view along with Browning's implicit assumption that the
represented world gains added significance from being incomplete
establishes Browning as a pivotal figure in the development of an
increasingly synecdochic poetic that began with the Romantic em-
phasis on the particular and results in the self conscious modern
aesthetic of subjective particularity of Pound, Eliot, Yeats,
Stevens, Williams and Crane. The modernist debt to Browning,
first acknowledged by Pound, has been well established within the
discourse of literary criticism beginning early in the twentieth
century. My purpose here will not be to rehearse this critical
tradition in which there is a good deal of agreement and much
repetition, but to point to the importance of Browning's use of
synecdoche for his ground breaking poetic.

In the abstract terms of the claims I have made for synec-
doche thus far, Browning's poetry is exemplary of a positive
strategy for a lyric poetic in the synecdochic mode of privation. If the negative lyric strategies of Arnold and Tennyson that result in the "plight" Alitieri analyzes are identified with fixation, alienation and paralysis of perspective, Browning tends to diffuseness, shiftiness of perspective, changes of mind. Although Browning shares an emphasis on the particular with his contemporaries, his interest in the relation of the particular to subjective consciousness is greater than his interest in the relation of the particular to an objective universal. Where Tennyson's interest is to "know" the universal, Browning prefers to preserve its mystery and concentrates instead on the individual soul, subjective personality. For Browning the only subject of poetry is the study of the soul. 21 In Browning the Victorian recognition that consciousness mediates expression of the particular results in a reorientation toward the subject of poetry and the nature of poetic expression. If poetry will not do what Arnold desires--give expression to an objective universal by which to ground subjective private expression in public discourse--, poetry can express what Browning in his 1852 "Essay on Percy Bysshe Shelley" calls "the doings of men." 22

In his essay on Shelley, Browning distinguishes the visionary seer of which Shelley is Browning's exemplar from the objective "fashioner" or reproducer of the world of men of which Shakespeare 23 is the chief example. And according to Browning a
poet is generally a poet of the one kind or the other and never both in the same poem. Where Browning situates himself with respect to his distinction is a matter of some critical debate, an issue which I will return to in a moment. But we will need to have Browning's distinction more firmly in mind before we take on the matter of situating Browning with respect it.

In defining the subjective poet Browning recalls the Romantics' renunciation of the general in favor of an emphasis on the particular:

There is a time when the general eye has, so to speak, absorbed its fill of the phenomena around it, whether spiritual or material, and desires rather to learn the exacter significance of what it possesses, than to receive any augmentation of what is possessed. Then is the opportunity for the poet of loftier vision, to lift his fellows, with their half-apprehensions, up to his own sphere, by intensifying the import of details and rounding the universal meaning.25

And further, the subjective poet

is impelled to embody the thing he perceives not so much with reference to the many below as to the One above him, the supreme intelligence which apprehends all things in their absolute truth,—an ultimate view ever aspired to, if but partially attained by the poet's own soul.26

The objective poet, on the other hand endeavors

to reproduce things external (whether the phenomena of the scenic universe, or the manifested action of the human heart and brain) with an immediate reference, in every case, to the common eye and apprehension of his fellow men, assumed capable of receiving and profiting by this reproduction.27

Of these two kinds of poetic faculty Browning shrinks from proclaiming one of higher value than the other. And because one or
the other predominates in each poet, Browning would have to involve himself in an evaluative comparison of Shelley and Shakespeare. Thus, if Browning does not inquire into an evaluation of these two poetic faculties, he does want to keep the distinction.

For Browning a particular poem may be classed as of one kind or another and while a poet may write either kind, one faculty will predominate. But both faculties can not be present in a single poem. Although Browning does not demonstrate why this must be so, the distinctions between the subjective and objective faculty lend themselves to an explanation. Once this explanation becomes clear it will then be possible to see where Browning situates himself, as a poet who can do both, and where we can situate Arnold, a poet who attempts to do both. The necessity of bringing both of these faculties to bear will emerge as a characteristic Victorian need, "according to," what Browning says, "are now considered the exigencies of art." 28

In the terms of Browning's distinction, the subjective poet "intensifies the import of details" while "rounding out the universal,"

getting at new substance by breaking up the assumed wholes into parts of independent and unclassed value, careless of the unknown laws for recombing them . . ., prodigal of objects for man's outer nor inner sight, shaping for their uses a new and different creation from the last which it displaces by the right of life over death. 29

And because the "soul" of the subjective poet is "the nearest reflex of that absolute Mind, according to the intuitions of which
he desires to perceive and speak, the subjective poet is "prod-
igal of objects for men's outer sight." In a paragraph that
clearly resonates with Shelley's "Preface to Prometheus Unbound,
cited in the preceding chapter, Browning's description of the
activity of the subjective poet of "loftier" if not more highly
valued vision assumes a faith that Wasserman, Bloom and Carol
Christ all attribute to the Romantic sense that the Divine is im-
manent in the Human, the lyric speaker's voice in harmony with the
whole. With his intuitive faith, the subjective poet's expression
produces "less a work than an effluence." And Browning tells
us that "effluence cannot be easily considered in abstraction from
his personality."

The objective poet, on the other hand, reproduces "external
things . . . with an immediate reference, in every case, to the
common eye and apprehension of his fellow men." Where the
subjective poet is guided by a private divine and absolute stand-
ard, the objective poet's vision is reined in by a public con-
sensus. The danger of combining these two faculties for a poet
like Arnold who lacks the subjective poet's faith in an intuited
divine absolute Mind and the objective poet's certain knowledge
of a public consensus is in

issuing in poetry, false under whatever form, which shows a
thing not as it is to mankind generally, nor as it is to the
particular describer, but as it is supposed to be for some
unreal neutral mood, midway between both and of value to
neither. . . .
But if Browning implicitly warns against the danger of combining the two faculties he contrasts, he also tells us:

Nor is there any reason why these two modes of poetic faculty may not issue hereafter from the same poet in successive perfect works, examples of which are now considered the exigencies of art, we have hitherto possessed in distinct individuals only.  

Browning's stated resolution of the need he feels in his time for an expression of both these faculties is to show these faculties in successive works rather than combine them in a single work which dilutes the power of either faculty. Whether or not Browning has Arnold specifically in mind where he warns against producing a poetry midway between both modes, it is certainly a fear that has currency for Browning. If Browning rejects the Arnoldian search for a vision of the way things are "supposed to be," it is because for Browning this view is "neutral and "unreal," a product of a "false" mood. Better to show things as they seem to a real view, a particular mood, the perspectives of the "doings of men" whose "reach exceeds their grasp."

In his dramatic monologues Browning gives us the perspectives and moods of men whose view is limited, often eccentric or peculiar. We do not generally encounter Browning characters who like Empedocles are in search of an objective ideal. In this sense, Browning is more the objective poet who reproduces, the fashioner, rather than the visionary. And Browning himself relates the objective poets' activity to the form of dramatic
poetry, consistent with his choice of Shakespeare as the exemplar of this mode. But Browning's dramatic poetry is not a poetry of dramatic action, nor is it primarily concerned with the reproduction of things external. Rather Browning is interested mostly in the study of man's soul, his character. Curiously, these characters behave like subjective poets whose expressions are an effluence of their inner minds, but whose minds are not necessarily themselves a reflex of the Divine mind. And one persuasive critic of Browning would have us read his dramatic monologues much as Browning himself would read Shelley. Where Browning tells us it is impossible to consider the effluence of a subjective poet in abstraction from his personality, Ralph Rader asserts that we perceive Browning's characters from the outside in, we encounter them as we encounter natural persons, inferring from externals, appearances and verbal gestures, an inner self. 36

Thus, by bringing the objective faculty to bear on the subjective, Browning is able to preserve the intensity the subjective poet brings to the detail while at the same time, the import of this intensity is grounded within a public measure of the speaking character's expression. This combination of pathos and critical distance, what Robert Langbaum calls "sympathy and judgment" 37 enables the reader/interpreter to sympathize with the character Browning presents by reading his character synecdochically, from external gestures to a sense of the inner soul, from effects
to causes, while bringing a more critically informed standard to bear on this synecdochic inference, a larger context by which the speaker's character is judged. As both Langbaum and Rader agree, this critical judgment brought to bear is a faculty which the reader shares with Browning and is, in this sense, more public than the speaker's own understanding of himself, his self consciousness.

By this description Browning is the objective poet who reproduces things external with immediate reference to the common eye; although Browning's characters exercise the faculties of the subjective poet though imperfect rather than perfect. However, the general standard by which the judgmental faculty of Browning and the reader agree, is less an objective universal than the privilege of knowing there is another perspective than that of the character in question. In this way, Browning's objective universal is the knowledge gained through the experience of other perspectives, as one critic says,

Men look upon events from different angles, and the difference of view may throw light upon the events, but, most of all, the differences of view reveal what men are in themselves.\(^{38}\)

Thus, although Browning's universal is not necessarily the ideal objective universal Arnold seeks, it is nevertheless quite functional and "real" in Browning's sense. That is, despite a specific critic or reader's own particular evaluation of one of Browning's characters, there is no question that a judgment of
some sort is involved and it is not surprising that there is a
great consensus of agreement among these evaluation. All crit-
ics agree that the Duke who manipulates the agent in "My Last
Duchess" is an unsavory character, as is Porphyria's Lover, re-
gardless of the sympathy the critic might admit to having for
that character's reaction to his perceived situation.

We come to Browning's characters with a mixture of sym-
pathy and judgment, working together, and we do not feel as we
do in reading Arnold that the judgemental and expressive facul-
ties pull against one another. The difference between the priv-
ative tension Arnold perceives between these two faculties and
the functional use Browning is able to make of these contrasting
modes together results from a reorientation toward the nature of
synecdoche. Where for Arnold an emphasis on the particular sug-
gests the privation of the whole, for Browning a subjective and
consciously mediated emphasis on the particular reveals something
about the mediator, the material for the study of the soul."
And most importantly, Browning's interest in the study of the
human legitimizes the shiftiness of perspective Arnold associates
with the partiality of subjectivity, its isolation from the
"All." Browning accepts what Coleridge early called the evil
streamy side of synecdochic association whereby an emphasis on a
particular aspect of a thing can transform it from the class of
evil to that of the sacred. In the model I have offered on page
136, this streamy function of synecdoche under the pressure of a shift in perspective and ground parallels the sense of vertigo Wordsworth and Keats experience in the shifts of perspective with respect to the natural landscape. It is the same function of synecdoche that permits Shelley his corrective obliteration. And for all the poets we have looked at thus far, this streamy quality of synecdoche under a shift in perspective is initially perceived as destructive, an emptying out of previous categories and the assumptions associated with those categories.

For Arnold and Tennyson this shiftiness is viewed as a necessary limitation of vision because it calls into question the mind's authority to generate anything beyond mediating expressions of points of view. These Victorians resist as Coleridge earlier resisted the streamy nature of synecdoche. But perhaps knowing its dangers more fully than Coleridge, Arnold and Tennyson do not permit the synecdochic stream to flow as far or as quickly. Coleridge's ventures into the supernatural do not reemerge until Browning for whom the flow of synecdochic particulars becomes a positive and operable part of his aesthetic.

Browning's acceptance of the streamy, shifting nature of the emphasized particular is antipathetic to the fixed perspective. This aesthetic and finally moral stance is reflected in his poetry by Browning's implicit condemnation of those characters who attempt to stop the stream of particulars with a fixed and
finalizing perspective, those who "judge" and "who only see[]
one way at once/One mind-point and no other at a time."39 Such
characters are Porphyria's Lover who seizes the "perfect" "mo-
ment" and the Duke who makes "all smiles stop[ ] together."

A closer look at the Duke's fixation on the particular il-
lustrates the point. Midway through the presentation to his vis-
itor, Ferrara makes clear the source of his dissatisfaction with
his last Duchess:

She had
A heart--how shall I say?--too soon made glad,
Too easily impressed; she liked whate'er
She looked on, and her looks went everywhere.
(My Last Duchess, 21-24)

Her roving eye which refused to anchor itself to one view, im-
plicitly "ranked" the Duke's "nine-hundred-years-old name/with
anybody's gift" (33-4). As he moves toward his conclusion, the
Duke's own contrived casualness, marked by feigned hesitations
in speech, gains a concentrated momentum:

Oh Sir, she smiled, no doubt,
Whene'er I passed her, but who passed without
Much the same smile? This grew; I gave commands;
Then all smiles stopped together. There she stands
As if alive. Wilt please you rise? (43-7)

The Duke's desire to fix life in one pose, to preserve the mind's
ideal is, for, Browning a kind of insanity. Porphyria's lover is,
like the Duke, a contriver of circumstance who seeks to preserve
life in a moment:

So, she was come through wind and rain.
Be sure I looked up at her eyes
Happy and proud; at last I knew
Porphyria's worshipped me; surprise
Made my heart swell, and still it grew
While I debated what to do. (30-35)

That moment she was mine, mine, fair,
Perfectly pure and good: I found
A thing to do, and all her hair
In one long yellow string I wound
Three times her little throat around
And strangled her. (30-41)

If in Arnold's view the Empedoclean obsession for a fixed and objective view terminates in the death of consciousness, a tragic moment for the perceiver, this dark romanticism does not appear majestic in Browning's work, but simply evil. In Browning the victim of the obsession for an objective view is not the perceiver but the perceived. Browning raises the stakes of Arnoldian fixation by presenting the crisis Empedocles confronts in sensual rather than philosophical or metaphysical terms. In "Porphyria's Lover" the metaphysical world is darkly but comically untouched by the lover's deed:

And all night long we have not stirred,
And yet God has not said a word! (59-60)

Because the cost of the lover's singlemindedness is greater and more palpable in human than transcendent terms, the dangers to man of a single minded search for the perfect universal is strong in Browning.

In Tennyson's "Maud" the cure for the speaker's madness is a fanatical rush to the call of war:
'It is time, it is time, O passionate heart,' said I,— For I cleaved to a cause that I felt to be pure and true,— 'It is time, O passionate heart and morbid eye, That old hysterical mock-disease should die.' And I stood on a giant deck and mixt my breath With a loyal people shouting a battle cry, Till I saw the dreary phantom arise and fly Far into the North, and battle, and sease of death. (III,iii) But if, as the speaker claims the war "awaked" him "to the better mind," he is also replacing one form of morbid fixation for another: It is better to fight for the good than to rail at the ill I have felt with my native land, I am one with my kind, I embrace the purpose of God, and the doom assigned. (III,v,57-9) The speaker in "Maud," Empedocles and the speakers in the Browning monologues considered here are what Wallace Stevens calls "lunatic[s] of one idea" (Esthetique du Mal") whose extremes of logic are illogical because inhuman, palpably evil. And for Browning like Stevens The greatest poverty is not to live In a physical world, to feel that one's desire Is too difficult to tell from despair.40 The Duke and the lover are examples of characters whose extremes of logic injure others, but there are also Browning characters who are themselves limited by their over subtle logic. Cleon's extreme sanity of logic prevents him from accepting Christ's faith which is only available to those men that "make no step beyond the natural man, the better beast, / Using his senses, not the sense of sense." (223-4) The Göttingen professor
in "Christmas-Eve" is a bloodless Strausian biblical exegete for whom

Whether 't were best opine Christ was,
Or never was at all, or whether
He was and was not, both together--
It matters little for the name,
So the idea he left the same.

(Christmas-Eve, XV, 863-7)

If Browning rejects the empty abstractions of extreme reason and the paralyzing effect of obsessive fixation, it is primarily because they are seen to be the issue of unreal ideal perspectives that spurn connections with life.

Together with "Christmas-Eve," "Easter-Day" establishes Browning's most deliberate treatment of the relation of the Divine to lived experience, the manner of faith's relation of the universal to the particular. As such the two poems taken together represent Browning's personal autobiographical reaction to the perceived decline of faith in an objectively grounded universal linked to the growing awareness of the force of subjective consciousness.

A necessary consequence of Browning's reaction and reorientation is the critical problem of isolating one moment in a Browning work that will stand for the poem as a whole, since each moment for Browning is provisional, modified by others. But the only way to fully acknowledge Browning's aesthetic is to demonstrate it at work in a long poem where each view is partial and subject to another perspective. And because "Christmas-Eve" and "Easter-Day" are long, composed of extended discourses on faith
from shifting perspectives, a simple overview is not possible.

As a point of orientation, "Christmas Eve" is a first person narrative vision of Christ wherein the speaker is abandoned several times by his saviour. The points of abandonment mark moments when Browning rationalizes his distance from the Divine. He is left holding the hem of Christ's white robe, a synecdoche that functions as a metaphor for partial faith. Together "Christmas Eve" and its companion poem, "Easter Day" parallel the progress of the isolation of consciousness in the face of a receding sense of the universal. Browning's perspective at the close of both poems affirms a commitment to a worldly view of the Divine with the knowledge that the perspective is necessarily partial but adequate. It enables further perspectives among the infinity of those possible. In this way the process of moving from partial view to view replaces the now problematic move of relating part to ideal whole. For Browning the universal ideal is not objectively knowable because not directly approachable. In terms of the argument developed here, the process of shifting from part to part and from mood to mood renders the universal a process rather than content with interpretive dimensions.

In "Easter Day" Browning identifies the nature of this process with love and mercy. It contrasts with the nature of fixed perspective and the desire to capture change in single image that "no love will change." "If Porphyria's Lover," "My Last
Duchess," "The Statue and the Bust" give us examples of what love is not, "Easter-Day" demonstrates an opposing acceptance of change and shifts of perspective. This, for Browning, is the nature of love and mercy which are infinite.

"Christmas-Eve" begins in a driving rainstorm. Browning stands protected in the doorway of the Mount Zion Church looking out onto a piazza. He is reluctant to enter, but his curiosity about the odd people filing past him on their way into the Christmas Eve service and the severity of the storm compel him to enter. Finding he cannot bear "the hot smell and human noises (III, 140)" for long, he rejects the "taste" of the chapel. He likewise rejects the language of the Pastor whose "truths, quite true if stated succinctly (IV, 220) "looked false" to Browning's eyes, "his provings and parallels twisted and twined,...(IV,223)."

But if Browning rejects the Pastor's style and "taste" of this mode of christianity, he does not reject their faith:

But wherefore be harsh on a single case?
   After how many modes, this Christmas-Eve,
   Does the self same weary thing take place?
   The same endeavour to make you believe,
   The with much the same effect, no more;
   Each method abundantly convincing,
   As I say, to those convinced before,
   But scarce to be swallowed without wincing
   By the not-as-yet-convinced. (V, 253-271)

Browning merely seeks to be convinced. Browning's has his own faith in the church of nature whose humanist doctrine like Christ's is "love." And for this sense Browning feels himself
prepared to accept Christian faith, if only it would offer itself to him, appeal to his sense of style.

Christ then appears to Browning as one who "left the chapel, then as I." And Browning registers the natural human fear that Christ will reject an iconoclastic Christian, as one who has "despised thy friends." Browning then makes the inevitable excuse that his own personal mode of worship is the proper "spirit" in which to show devotion, "Not in the forms burlesque, uncouth (VIII,470)." But while Christ does not appeal to the human sense of taste Browning is looking for in the institutionalized form of worship, he feels "terror, not surprise (VIII,440)." And as Christ turns his "whole face" upon him, Browning "spread[s] himself "beneath it (IX,487-8)." At this point Browning dispenses

'From seeking to be influenced
'By all the less immediate ways
'That earth in worships manifold,
'Adopts to reach by prayer and praise,
'The garment's hem, which, lo, I hold!' (IX,418-22)

And holding onto the hem of Christ's garment Browning "crossed the world and stopped. . . (X,523)" he knew not where, the "miraculous Dome of God?" (X,529). The dome turns out to be the dome of the Basilica in Rome outside of which Christ leaves Browning, still holding onto the hem of Christ's garment. At this point in the poem Browning, abandoned by Christ, loses his immediate vision of faith. Awaiting Christ's reemergence from the Basilica he attempts to recreate the feeling of unmediated vision by pressing the hem to his breast,
Until, afresh its light suffusing me,  
My heart cried—What has been abusing me  
That I should wait here lonely and coldly,  
Instead of rising, entering boldly,  
Baring truth's face, and letting drift  
Her veils of lies as they chose it shift? (XI, 639-44)

Browning does not follow through on this intention to rise and  
boldly bare "truth's face; rather, for the remainder of the poem,  
Browning entertains two related synecdochic approaches to "the  
truth" that are available to consciousness. The first is chris-

tian love that


was the startling thing, the new:  
Love was the all-sufficient too;  
And seeing that you can see the rest:  
As a babe can find its mother's breast  
As well in darkness as in light.  
Love shut our eyes, and all seemed right. (XI, 687-92)

The sufficiency of this early christian faith which lovingly shuts  
our eyes depends upon an instinctive synecdochic reflex whereby  
knowledge of the part conducts to the whole. But because "the  
world's eyes are open now (XI, 693)," Browning urges that the now  
grown childish faith of early christian love by which blind in-

stinct conducts from part to whole, be replaced by the similarly  
synecdochic but ambitious self conscious attempt of great art.  
Browning compares the sculpture of the consummate artist to the  
practice of the contemporary man of faith who


... uses the whole of his block for the bust  
Leaving the mind of the public to finish it,  
Since cut it ruefully short he must:  
On the face alone he expends his devotion,  
He rather would mar than resolve to diminish it,
This self-conscious aesthetic attempt to represent "truth's face" is, for Browning, finally as laughable as the naive Christian's faith is childish. The task of representing the whole in concrete form merely distorts the particular and renders the whole a "grand notion" to be completed by the "mind of the public." And since it is the whole the artist seeks to image, any part can equally stand for it, as Browning's invidious comparison demonstrates:

Some artist of another ambition
Who having a block to carve, no bigger,
Has spent his power on the opposite quest,
And believed to begin at the feet were best—
For so many I see, ere I die, the whole figure! (XII,764-8)

The conscious attempt to image "the whole figure" in art, not only fails where childish faith succeeded in having an instinctive reflex by which part conducts to an immanent whole, but the aesthetic attempt produces a privation by which the "whole figure" is impossible to see. The synecdochic emphasis on the part common to both early Christian love and colossal art seems at this juncture in the poem to frustrate a knowledge of the whole. But if these emotional and aesthetic synecdochic strategies are insufficient, Browning's treatment of the generalizing rationalist approach is equally condemnatory.

Following the demonstration of the insufficiency of a synecdochic faith, Browning becomes aware of the possible insufficiency
of his own synecdochic hold on faith, the hem of Christ's gar-
ment:

    Alone! I am left alone once more--
    (Save for the garment's extreme fold
    Abandoned still to bless my hold) . . . (XIV, 781-3)

At this juncture in the poem Browning enters a lecture hall at
Gottingen. He hears the lecture of a rationalist theologian
whose abstract generalities dismiss concrete particulars as of
no importance: "It matters little for the name,/So the idea he
left the same (XV,863-4)." Browning resolves that though a syn-
ecdochic faith in the part may distort the particular and fail to
picture the whole and thereby "poison" the pure air "for healthy
breathing," the bloodless rationalist "leaves no air to poison
(XVI, 910-11)." The Gottingen professor's "loveless learning"
leaves the faithful a dry husk of a myth to venerate:

    'Go home and venerate the myth,
    'I thus have experimented with--
    'This man, continue to adore him,
    'Rather than all who went before him,
    'And all who ever followed after! (XVIII,1088-92)

At the close of "Christmas-Eve" Browning cannot rationally
justify his experience nor proclaim his vision of Christ to the
world:

    Have I been sure, this Christmas-Eve,
    God's own hand did the rainbow weave,
    Whereby the truth from heaven slid
    Into my soul?--I cannot bid
    The world admit he stooped to heal
    My soul, as if in a thunder-peal
    Where one heard noise, and one saw flame,
    I only knew he named my name: (XX,1203-10)
The hem of Christ's vesture then conducts Browning to the small independent chapel where he finds himself bolt upright on his bench. And despite an enumerated list of complaints with this particular church (XXII,1253-75), Browning resolves that on pain of fear of death ("the still recurring fear" (XXII,1338):

Lest myself, at unawares, be found
While attacking the choice of my neighbor's round,
With none of my own made--I choose here.

That Browning's choice is final is not certain. His reversion to the simple faith of the French Independent church of his mother has confounded many interpretations of the poem. As Thomas Hardy wrote to Emund Gosse of Browning:

'How could smug Christian optimism worthy of a dissenting grocer find a place inside a man who was so vast a seer and feeler when on neutral ground?'

In her Portrait of Browning, Betty Miller sheds some light on Hardy's perplexity by noting "Christmas-Eve"'s relation to the essay on Shelley Browning had just then completed. In Miller's view, Browning's self condemning opinion of himself as the objective poet who lacks Shelley's innate reflex of the divine and absolute impels him to pull himself up to God. And as Miller points out, though Shelley died without modifying his critical views of "existing religion," Browning attempts to rescue him from the charges of unorthodoxy, by contending that "had he lived," Shelley "would have finally ranged himself with the Christians."

If we agree with Miller that Browning is over defensive for
Shelley and insecure about his own spiritual status and poetic abilities, we would I think be mistaking both Browning's tone and the possible legitimacy of his claims for Shelley. But more importantly, if we take the ending of "Christmas-Eve" for the easy resolution of a prodigal soul, we neglect the central feature of Browning's achievement, the relation of faith to lived experience. As Browning states simply in the opening lines of "Easter-Day":

How very hard it is to be
A Christian! Hard for you and me
--Not the mere task of making real
That duty up to its ideal,
Effecting thus, complete and whole,
A purpose of the human soul--
For that is always hard to do;
But hard, I mean, for me and you
To realize it, more or less,
With even the moderate success
Which commonly repays our strife
To carry out the aims of life (I,1-12)

Like Ishmael who has intimations of some things heavenly and doubts of some things earthly, Browning here is concerned with the human scale of events. He admits belief is the "point/Whereon all turns:"

or could you joint
This flexile finite life once tight
Into the fixed and infinite,
You, safe inside, would spurn what's out,
With carelessness enough, no doubt--
Would spurn mere life:..

But for Browning certainty of faith results in inertia of a kind linked to that of the sleepy childishness of the christians of
"Christmas-Eve," for whom the part conducts blindly to the whole.
In "Easter-Day," wide-eyed faith, like the self contained world
of the hallucinator, is for Browning an unsteady landscape:

but when the time brings
To their next stage your reasonings
Your eyes, late wide, begin to wink
Nor see the path so well, I think.

In the course of the first half of the poem Browning approaches
the question of faith from the point of view of science and con-
cludes "a scientific faith's absurd." Pursuing a number of ab-
stract rationales for faith, Browning is able to prove only what
he begins with: "How hard it is/To be a Christian!" (X, 320-1)
At this point Browning recalls the perverse taunting's of a
childhood nurse whose superstitious form of Christianity filled
him with dread of Judgment Day. As Browning returns to his waking
consciousness (XV), a darkening storm breaks out which produces
an infernal sky (XV).

As Browning's vision of Judgment Day unfolds, he is accused
by a voice of having chosen earth over heaven (XX,679). For his
belief the voice condemns him to "glut [his] sense upon the
world: 't is thine/Forever--take it." In response Browning re-
pudiates earthly nature for art:

'What matter though my trust were gone
'From natural things? Henceforth my part
'Be less with nature than with art!
'For art supplants, gives manly worth
'To nature; 't is man stamps the earth--
'And I will seek his impress, seek
'The statuary of the Greek,
'Italy's painting--there my choice
'Shall fix!'

To this point, Browning's vision parallels the progress of the isolation of consciousness in the face of a receding sense of the universal, and as such represents Browning's autobiographical parable of how difficult it is to be a post Romantic Victorian whose reason drives him from faith. Rejecting Coleridge's wide eyed faith and Wordsworth's earth bound sense of the transcendent, Browning arrives at vision of art that attempts to reconcile the earthly with the divine, but this is quickly discounted by the voice for synecdochic pretensions:

'--The one form with its single act,
'Which sculptors laboured to abstract,
'The one face painters tried to draw,
'With it one look from throngs they saw
'And that perfection in their soul,
'Those only hinted at? The whole,
'They were but parts of? (XXVI, 784-90)

With the failure of the aesthetic attempt to find an objective and universal faith, Browning's tone and language recalls the desperation of Empedocles (II, 345-55):

I cried in anguish, 'Mind, the mind,
'So miserably cast behind,
'To gain what had been wisely lost! (XXVII, 864-6)

Here Browning, like Arnold, recognizes that the cost of increasing subjectivity is a loss of an objective universal and an isolation of consciousness. But Browning's response to what for Empedocles is a final, fatal recognition is to
But Browning discovers that earthly pursuits of the mind are themselves delusive goals, "a ruin like the rest!" (XXVII, 901):

'Those intuitions, grasps of guess
'Which pull the more into the less,
'Making the finite comprehend
'Infinity.--' (XXVIII, 905-8)

Browning's final posture is to propose that love is his means for connecting the part to the whole, lived experience to faith. The voice at this moment smites the now prostrate Browning:

Is this thy final choice?
'Love is the best? 'T is somewhat late! (XXX, 958-9)

And here Browning modifies his language as he "cower[s] deprecat-ingly" (XXV, 991):"

'Thou love of God! Or let me die,
'Or grant what shall seem heaven almost!
'Let me not know that all is lost,
'Though lost it be--leave me not tied to
'To this despair, this corpse-like bride! ..'
(XXXI, 992-6)

In the following section, the briefest of the poem, Browning writes:

Then did the form expand, expand--
I knew Him through his dread disguise
As the whole God within His eyes
Embraced me. (XXXII, 1003-5)

Browning's vision of Judgment Day breaks off at this point and he
asks like Keats at the close of the "Nightingale" Ode--"Was this a vision? False or true? (XXXIII, 1010)" In the final section of the poem Browning answers his own question, stating that since that vision three years before he has decided it was a dream:

And so I live, you see Go through the world, try, prove, reject Prefer, still struggling to effect My warfare; happy that I can Be crossed and thwarted as a man, Not left in God's contempt apart With ghastly smooth life, dead at heart, Tame in earth's paddock as her prize. (XXXIII, 1018-25)

Browning emerges from his vision "happy" to be railed against and resisted by man in the world of men, to have his perspective challenged. This acceptance of the imperfectly human is not a naive or easily earned position. Rather, for Browning, it is seen as the only alternative to the perception that man stands apart from God, and "in his contempt." Fallenness in this Protestant sense for Browning parallels Arnold's despair for the gap between mediating and mediated thought and the "All." But for Browning, Man's distance from God need not breed a consequent isolation from man, if subjective consciousness is permitted its provisionality. It is only when incompleteness is not tolerated that a vision beyond despair becomes impossible.

The closing "happy" mood as the sun rises at the close of "Easter-Day," is broken momentarily by the thought of being judged:
Thank God, no paradise stands barred
To entry, and I find it hard
To be a Christian, as I said!
Still every now and then my head grows drear
Spite of the sunshine, while I fear
And think, 'How dreadful to be grudged
'No ease henceforth, as one that's judged.'

The dreadful judgment Browning fears is not finally the wrath of
God but the limitation of being judged absolutely by men of com-
monly subjective perspectives. For it is man who by his extremes
of logic has cut himself off from God, denied the paradise he
sits outside. In the final lines of "Easter-Day," Browning pre-
fers to keep the question of paradise open and the perspective
provisional because perspectives, like tolerance and mercy, are
man's infinite:

But Easter-Day Breaks! But
Christ rises! Mercy every way
Is infinite,—and who can say? (XXXIII,1038-40)

In this way Browning discovers a universal function in place of
Arnold's objective universal by an acceptance of subjectivity
and its inevitable partiality. If the universal is nameless for
Browning as it is imageless for Shelley and endlessly veiled and
mediated for Arnold, Browning accepts the infinite partiality of
shifting perspectives as itself a functional universal. The per-
sistent optimism of Browning's vision is bred out of a skeptical
acceptance of the provisional nature of perspectives and it is
an optimism tempered by a recognition of this inheritance.
Browning does not side-step the dilemma of Empedoclean despair,
but works through it by showing that skepticism in its extreme form denies the real, as well as the visionary.

As Browning makes clear in "Cleon," only to the intolerant and single-minded does the contemporary age appear a decline from past glory:

We of these latter days, with greater mind
Than our forerunners, since more composite,
Look not so great, beside their simple way,
To a judge who only sees one way at once,
One mind-point and no other at a time,—
Compares a small part of a man of us
With some whole man of the heroic age,
Great in his way—not ours, nor meant for ours.
("Cleon," 64-71)

The false mood of despair issues from a fixed perspective that is seen to be linked to a nostalgia for an anterior heroic age. This nostalgic posture commits itself to a false comparison that overlooks a synecdochic reality:

Compares a small part of man of us
With some whole man of the heroic age
Great in his way, not ours, nor meant for ours. (69-71)

By Browning's logic the present age is greater, because more "composite." One man of his age is potentially many heroes; and to compare the large and singular heroism of the past to the multifarious and complex heroism of the present is to deny the virtue of the contemporary mode.

The greatness of the present age for Browning inheres in its multiplicity and consequent partiality:

And ours is greater, had we skill to know
For, what we call this life of man on earth
This sequence of the soul's achievements here
Being, as I find much reason to conceive,
Intended to be viewed eventually
As a great whole, not analyzed to parts,
But each part having reference to all,—
How shall a certain part, pronounced complete,
Endure effacement by another part?
How was the thing done?—then, what's to do again?
(Cleon, 72-80)

It is a multiplicity "Intended to be viewed eventually/As a
great whole, not analyzed to parts." But this eventual per-
pective, lodged in the passive voice, is not a contemporary in-
tention of man but a comprehensive agentless purpose. Browning's
focus is rather on the necessity of partiality if the soul is to
achieve anything at all, else

How shall a certain part, pronounced complete,
Endure effacement by another part?
How was the thing done?—then, what's to do again?

For Browning the purpose of contemporary man is to persist with
his composite knowledge and partial vision, for, to accept one
man's view as complete, intractable and resistant to modification
by another perspective results in purposelessness, an Empedoclean
inertia. But Browning's tone is not the strong willed militarism
of Tennyson in "Ulysses"

Made weak by time and fate, but string in will
To strive to seek to find, and not yield. (69-70)

Rather Browning's vision depends upon a kind of yielding, a tone
closer to that of his subjective hero, Shelley:

To love, and bear; to hope, till Hope creates
from its own wreck the thing it contemplates.

(Prometheus Unbound, IV, 573-5)
And like Shelley, Browning's focus is less on the transcendent than the human, less militaristic dream than a hope:

Long since, I imaged, wrote the fiction out,
That [Zeus] or other god descended here
And, once for all, showed simultaneously
What, in its nature, never can be shown,
Piecemeal or in succession;—showed, I say
The worth both absolute and relative
Of all his children from the birth of time,
His instruments for all appointed work.
I now go to image,—might we hear
The judgment which should give the due to each,
Show where the labor lay and where the ease,
And prove Zeus' self the latent everywhere!
This is a dream:—but no dream, let us hope,..."
(Cleon, 115-27)

The nature and worth of the divine for Browning "can never be shown piecemeal or in succession." To image the worth both absolute and relative" is not possible. But what can be hoped for is an image that proves "the latent everywhere." Partiality itself is the face of this image and synecdoche with an emphasis on the subjective particular is the mode of this representation.

Cleon's hope for a "latent" of Zeus everywhere, a vision of a society of Zeus' divine children who each know their worth both relative and absolute and of a perfect judgment which should give the "due to each" parallels Blake's vision of each man a Divine Jesus. Both Browning and Blake accept the necessity of the synecdochic partiality of representing such a divine genealogical classification. But where Blake like his fellow Romantics emphasize the particular to intimate an abstract and transcendent universal, Browning's emphasis on the concrete
particular and individually subjective consciousness represents a study of personal gestures and subjective expressions, by which to infer the inner person, the external materials necessary to the study of the soul. But as David Bergman points out Browning produces "only as much historical detail as a background requires." For Browning historical detail is "decoration," his "stress lay on the incidents in the development of a soul." In this way Browning's emphasis on particulars and concrete effects is neither a means for intimating an organic or transcendent immanence like the Romantics, nor the private representation of a lost universal of his contemporary Victorians. Rather Browning emphasizes the particular because it is a subjective index to differences of character, among people of diverse natures whose souls are at distinct points in their development. The stress Browning lays on differences among subjective consciousness is evident when we look at the differences between a Caliban and an Abt Vogler, a Cleon and a Ferrara, a Fra Lippo Lippi and an Andrea del Sarto.

The use Browning makes of synecdochic particulars bequeaths a legacy to Modern poetry which permits an exploration of subjective consciousness. The public expression of the lyric self which for Arnold and Tennyson is stifled and crushed by the perceived alienation of self from an objective universal order is, in Browning, freed to expand into the realm of the public. The
differences among self expressive consciousnesses and the variety of perspectives each expression offers becomes for Browning "the latent" of whatever universal is at work in Man. As for the identity of that universal Browning can only offer "Who can say?,"

And thus our soul, misconstrued, cries out to Zeus
To vindicate his purpose in our life;
Why stay we on earth unless to grow? (Cleon, 112-4)

Whatever name is given to the god that descended here
And once and for all, showed simultaneously
What, in its nature, never can be shown, (Cleon, 116-8)

the expression of subjective consciousness with its self limiting perspective is the mode by which to "show where the labour lay and where the ease," and prove Zeus' self, the latent everywhere." (Cleon, 125-7)

If Browning suspends the question of an objective and identifiable universal in favor of a sliding scale of the soul's development, the points at which the character and nature of the soul reveal itself are publically manifest by the private expression of the self. Browning relies on a public consensus, itself a composite of varying perspectives, to provide a valua-
tive standard by which to judge Ferrara ruthless and Porphyria's Lover insane. But as more than one critic has pointed out Browning's poems are most successful when dealing with eccentric characters. Thus the ease with which the reader can make an
interpretive judgment about Browning's characters is a function of the disparity between the character and other perspectives which compose public consensus. As Bergman points out it is of the same order of sympathy and judgment by which we understand the behavior of a child at a certain stage in its growth. 46

In this way Browning's interest in "common humanity" is, as A. A. Brockington says, "disguised by the apparent remoteness and unusualness of his subjects." 47 But as more recent theoretical criticism has shown this apparent paradox is a necessary dynamic of the way in which similarity and commonality reveal themselves in contexts of different perspectives. Max Black's frame theory of metaphor makes this assumption as does Nelson Goodman in Languages of Art. 48 Both Black and Goodman assert that similarity, the classifying function of metaphor, is not an antecedent property of the things classified, but created by metaphor itself. 49 But whether or not similarity is revealed by or created by the function of different perspectives, the effect in Browning is that similarity appears to emerge out of differences. In this way, Paracelsus comes to accept a single truth only after entertaining and relinquishing varying points of view and Browning himself in "Christmas Eve" and "Easter Day" comes to terms with multiplicity and relative differences by suspending the quest for a direct confrontation with the "All" in favor of accepting a provisional and partial association with a particular
church with a distinct and "Independent" point of view.

Browning's acceptance of shifting points of view which for Arnold signalled the inaccessibility of an objective view of the "absolute all" and his interest in the expression of subjective consciousness which for Arnold is isolated and endlessly trapped within its own mediations left Browning susceptible to charges of superficiality and eccentricity in his own time as F. R. G. Duckworth makes clear in his treatment of the contemporary response to Browning. But for the moderns Browning along with Whitman are the legitimate fathers.

The link between Browning and Whitman has been forged by both poets and critics in the twentieth century. In concluding this chapter on the Victorian use of synecdoche, I want to place Whitman next to Browning as a poet who moves beyond the crisis of Victorian lyricism by means of a different strategy. The analysis of synecdoche offered here will demonstrate that both Browning and Whitman accept the multitudinousness of the world and the variety of perspectives, and in this sense, accept the streamy and shifting nature of synecdochic representation. But where Browning's active pursuit of divergent perspectives obviates a direct confrontation with a transcendent absolute, Whitman as a lyric poet, readdresses the Arnoldian dilemma. Where Browning chooses the dramatic mode by which to present the varying expressive consciousness of his characters, this
indirect mode is not available to the lyric poet who seeks direct access to the absolute. The lyric poet, like Browning's subjective poet, must have a mind that is an innate reflex of the absolute Mind: a portion of the One Mind. In one sense, then, Whitman marks a return to the subjective poet, a revolution in Browning's cycle of alternating poetic faculties. The lyric mode which is perceived to be endangered in Tennyson and Arnold makes a strong resurgence in Whitman.

Like Browning, Whitman moves beyond the Arnoldian despair that "the all mirroring soul a thousand glimpses win but never sees a whole" by accepting the expanded force of subjective consciousness, the variety of perspectives among different consciousness and the varying perspectives within a single consciousness. But Whitman expands the force of subjective consciousness further by celebrating the individual self, promoting the individual self to a universal that contains multitudes, a version of Cleon's composite modern hero:

I celebrate myself, 
And what I assume you shall assume, 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. 51

Whitman's grand lyric gesture assumes with Shelley the interchangeability of synecdochic parts and a faith in the innate harmony of among individual minds, but Whitman falls short of proclaiming a myth that articulates an absolute cosmic and social order. This is because Whitman's mythic self, though celebrated
in "Song of Myself" is also threatening to and threatened by a prior universal principle at work in the America, the principle of democracy.

For the purposes of my argument at this point, it will be necessary to assume that Whitman's poetry is as highly synecdochic as his more abstract metaphysic enunciated in Democratic Vistas which is a less obvious claim. Because I feel the synecdochic nature of his poetic is clear, an extended illustration is not called for. However, a brief instance form "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry" will serve as a touchstone. Whitman's catalogues of particular are not simply lists, but synecdochic aspects of a larger mass:

Crowds of men and women attired in the usual costumes how curious you are to me! On the ferry-boats the hundreds and hundreds that cross, returning home, are more curious to me than you suppose. ("Crossing Brooklyn Ferry," 4-7)

Sheer mass built out of numbers "attired in the usual costumes," are like "dumb, beautiful ministers" whose parts are toward eternity: "Great or small, you furnish your parts toward the soul ("Crossing Brooklyn Ferry"). A synecdochic disintegration and emphasis on the "dumb" particular is for Whitman a way of reducing the individual and singular into further particulars, a kind of most common denominator of a larger scheme:

The simple, compact, well-joined scheme, myself disintegrated, every one disintegrated yet part of the scheme. ("Crossing Brooklyn Ferry," 2:3-5)
Whitman's disintegrating emphasis on the particular is not a simple mystic emphasis, a kind of sacramentalization of the Victorian fixation on the particular. Whitman's prospect is closer to the Shellyean "obliteration" of previous wholes into further particulars capable of "integration" to another scheme. This scheme is not identified and pictured as much as asserted in Whitman's poetry. And Whitman's authority to proclaim this scheme is a function of Whitman's Shelleyean faith that the single lyric voice speaks for a larger "deadal" harmony.

As it is for Shelley, Browning's "subjective poet," so it is that Whitman's totalizing scheme is imageless. But like Browning's "objective poet," Whitman's lyric emphasis is on "the doings of man. Whitman's task, therefore, is to reconcile these two Browningian faculties and their alternate synecdochic strategies. Arnold feels this same disparity as a growing separation between private expression and public discourse. But where Arnold seeks in his prose to establish a reconciliation in "Culture," Whitman rejects culture for its debilitation of the self (Democratic Vistas, 351-3), seeking instead an expansion of the private into the public. Whitman's strategy not only differs from Arnold's, but from Browning's who shares Whitman's emphasis on subjective consciousness. For it is the difference between Browning's strategy of dramatic character and Whitman's lyric self that will appear later in Eliot and Crane. Eliot and Crane
both call for an escape from personality in poetic expression, though Eliot follows the Browningian strategy of personae and mask personae, while Crane answers Whitman's charge for a "composite" lyric self whose "special personalism" works through and encircles the material world of "irreconcilable interiors" and points of view. What Whitman proposes for future poetic expression emerges in Democratic Vistas which Robert Lowell asserts Crane "knew" "like a book." 53

In Democratic Vistas Whitman acknowledges that the authority of lyric consciousness to emphasize the particular for purposes of asserting a totalizing "scheme" is resisted by the "counter-principle" of Democracy. This perception parallels the Victorian sense that lyric emphasizes the particular at the expense of the whole. In his prose Whitman makes it clear that Individualism and Democracy "are contradictory, but our task is to reconcile them" (D.V.329). In an extended footnote to the contradiction, Whitman continues:

The question hinted here is one which only time can answer. Must not the virtue of modern Individualism, continually enlarging, usurping all, seriously affect, perhaps keep down entirely, in America, the like of the ancient virtue of Patriotism, the fervid and absorbing love of general country? I have no doubt myself that the two will merge, and will mutually profit and brace each other, and that from them a greater product, a third, will arise. But I feel at present they and their oppositions form a serious problem and paradox in the United States. (Democratic Vistas, p. 320).

On one hand Whitman hopes that the acquisitive expanding American
Self will not threaten the stability of the general good. And on the other hand, in a later mood in *Democratic Vistas*, from a different perspective, Whitman warns against the dangers of the individual self being overwhelmed by the leveling force of the democratic average. What Whitman hopes for is a counter balance between the two dominating principles of American life. In this way the Arnoldian tension between the private self and public order persists in the American grain, yet Whitman hopes that the tension, which appears to be built into the American structure will become productive. But in *Democratic Vistas* he is mainly concerned with warning against the dangers of this endemic American paradox:

For to democracy, the leveler, the unyielding principle of the average, surely joined another principle, equally unyielding, closely tracking the first, indispensible to it, opposite (as the sexes are opposite), and whose existence, confronting and ever modifying the other, often clashing and paradoxical, yet neither of highest avail without the other, plainly supplies to these grand cosmic politics of ours, and to the launched forth mortal dangers of republicanism, to-day, or any day, the counterpart of all her first class laws. This second principle is individuality, the pride and centripetal isolation of a human being in himself--identity--personalism. Whatever the name, its acceptance and thorough infusions through the organizations of political commonality now shooting Aurora-like about the world, are of utmost importance, as the principle itself is needed for very life's sake. It forms, in a sort, or is to form, the compensating balance wheel of the successful working machinery of aggregate America. (my italics) (*Democratic Vistas*, p. 3)

If Whitman's strong sense of the self announced in *Song of Myself* and held up as a counter part to the "deadly" force of
leveling democracy, appears more robust than the Arnoldian buried self, this American self is similarly isolated and threatened. The danger to the self becomes particularly acute when Democracy is coupled with vast material wealth and the cultural refinements that come of material satisfaction:

The quality of Being, in the object's self, according to its own central idea and purpose, and of growing therefrom and thereto—not criticism from other standards, and adjustments thereto—is the lesson of Nature. True, the full man wisely gathers, culls, absorbs; but if engaged disproportionately in that, he slight or overlays the precious idiocracy and special nativity and intention that he is, the man's self, the main thing, is a failure, however wide his general cultivation. Thus, in our times refinement and delicatess are not only attended to sufficiently, but threaten to eat us up like a cancer... a little healthy rudeness, savage virtue justification of what one has in one's self, whatever it is, is demanded. Negative qualities, even deficiencies, would be a relief. Singleness and normal simplicity and separation, amid this more and more complex, more and more artificialized state of society—how pensively we yearn for them! how we would welcome their return!

(Democratic Vistas, p.348-9)

Striking a chord which has been largely ignored by the tradition of criticism that has stressed Whitman's celebration of the self that contains multitudes, we hear Whitman here arguing for a singular character of a rude simplicity that can withstand the artificial refinements of a complex society. But Whitman's call for a savage simplicity is not without precedent. In his essay "The Poet," some thirty years earlier, Emerson proposed that poetry use defects and deformities to a sacred purpose, so expressing our sense that the evils of the world are such only to the
evil eye. In the old mythology, mythologists observe, defects are attributed to divine natures, as lameness to Vulcan, blindness to Cupid, and the like, to signify exuberances.54

Like Whitman Emerson warns against the seductive refinements of artificial culture, "the music-box of delicate tunes (The Poet, 225)." Emerson looks for a poet "with tyrannous eye" who knows "the value of our incomparable materials," and sees "in the barbarism and materialism of the times, another carnival of the same gods whose picture he so much admires in Homer (The Poet, 230)."

Emerson and Whitman seek an American poet whose soul is large enough to contain the myriad of material particulars, both natural and artificial, a poet of "centered mind (The Poet, 230)," who can accept contradiction, "the poet who re-attaches things to nature and the Whole. (The Poet 229)."

Whitman is haunted by the "fear of conflicting and irreconcilable interiors, and the lack of a common skeleton, knitting all close" (DV,324). And in response to this need Whitman proposes for treatment in his Vistas, "the important question of character, of an American stock-personality." The prototype American character Whitman advances is, in fact, a composite of regional American traits, a character than can contain multitudes, but within a singular American spirit:

A giant growth, composite from the rest, getting their contribution, absorbing it, to make it more illustrious. From the north, intellect, the sun of things, also the idea of unswayable justice, anchor amid the last, the wild
tempests. From the south the living soul, the animus of
good and bad, haughtily admitting no demonstration but its
own. While from the west itself comes solid personality,
with blood and brawn, and the deep quality of all-accepting
fusion. \(\text{(DV, 340)}\)

Whitman's program for a stock composite American character com-
mensurate with the multitudinousness and diversity of American
material life is dependent on

the aggregation of a cluster of mighty poets, artists, teach-
ers fit for us, national expressers, comprehending and ef-
fusing for the men and women of the States, what is univer-
sal, native, common to all, inland and seaboard, northern
and southern. \(\text{(DV,323)}\)

For Whitman,

The literature, songs, aesthetics, etc., of a country are of
importance principally because they furnish the materials
and suggestions of personality for the women and men of
that country, and enforce them in a thousand effective ways.
\(\text{(DV,346-7)}\)

A subtle difference emerges here between Browning's concep-
tion of a poetry that provides materials for the study of the
soul and Whitman's call for a poetry that furnishes materials
and suggestions of personality for women and men and enforces
those guidelines in a myriad of ways. Where Browning seeks an
understanding of divergent characters through a study of their
expressions, Whitman seeks to proscribe a typical character by
example. Browning's faith in an unseen but latent sliding uni-
versal accepts divergency among subjective consciousnesses, but
Whitman's expanded composite self, capable of multi-perspectives
needs to be checked by and built from "the formation of a typical
personality of character (DV, 350)." An abstract understanding of the relation of Browning and Whitman's to the plight of Victorian lyricism views Browning's acceptance of the force of subjective consciousness as an unbinding of Arnold's buried self, if poetry is to issue in anything other than a false and unreal mood. Whitman's celebration of subjective consciousness, "man's free play of special Personalism," (DV, 351), then introduces the new danger that the expanded private self will either threaten social cohesion or be overwhelmed by the deadly leveling of the democratic average. In this sense, Whitman's unbounded subjective individualism compounds Arnold's dilemma of the buried stifled self with the opposite dilemma of an anarchic acquisitive self. Whitman's hoped for solution is "a new and greater literatus order" upon which politics theology and art are founded (DV, 379) by which

the tremendous and dominant play of solely materialistic bearings upon current life in the United States . . . [is] met by an equally subtle force-infusion for the purposes of spiritualization (380).

The task of the spiritualization of the "intense practical energy, . . . and the business materialism (DV, 374)" of America falls to the poet who "while remaining fully poet, will absorb whatever science indicates, with spiritualism (DV, 376) . . ." In this way poetry will restore "Faith, very old now, scared away by science," bring faith back by the same power that caused her departure." (DV 376). The new alliance of science and faith
Whitman proposes for the program of the "great literatus" was anticipated by Emerson who also saw science as a way of grounding the flux of local particulars that goes beyond "the religious error" of "making the symbol too stark and solid" (The Poet, 237):

Mysticism consists in the mistake of an accidental and individual symbol for an universal one. The morning-redness happens to be the favourite meteor to the eyes of Jacob Behman, and comes to stand to him for truth and faith; and, he believes, should stand for the same realities to every reader. But the first reader prefers as naturally the symbol of a mother and child, or a gardener and his bulb, or a jeweler polishing a gem. Either of these, or of a myriad more, are equally good to the person to whom they are significant. Only they must be held lightly, and be very willingly translated into equivalent terms which others use. And the mystic must be steadily told,—All that you say is just as true without the tedious use of that symbol as with it. Let us have a little algebra, instead of this trite rhetoric,—universal signs, instead of village symbols,—and we shall both be gainers. (The Poet, 237)

Emerson's criticism of mysticism's mistake of the accidental and particular for the universal is a rejection of the Romantic synecdoche of immanence. Emerson's objection to mysticism

Browning's version of early christian faith ("Easter-Day") which blindly accepts the immanence of the whole to which the part seems to conduct, or Coleridge's Mariner and crew who accept the association of fog and ice with the albatross only to discover that fair breeze is also associated with the great bird. For Emerson as for Browning and Whitman, the emphasized particular is "a village symbol," a provisional emphasis on the concrete particular which provides perhaps a glimpse of the All, at best
an incomplete and partial view. For the Victorian the emphasized particular reveals most about the subjective consciousness who emphasizes and mediates the partial aspect, the Jacob Behmans, the Duke Ferraras. And though like Browning, Emerson does not reject the partial and subjectively mediated symbol, with Whitman, his fellow American, Emerson insists on a universalizing science or algebra by which to measure the play of local particulars.

The privative force of the mediated and emphasized synecdochic particular, the symbol, which for Browning appears as both necessary and productive, reemerges as a dilemma for Emerson and Whitman but with a force that compounds the Arnoldian fear of the alienated and buried self. Because they regard that faith as a religious error, Whitman and Emerson do not share the early Victorian nostalgia for a time when the "Sea of Faith was at its full." The American Victorians attempt to discover a universal that allows for the force of expressive and necessarily mediated and subjective consciousness, the expansive American self. They hope for an algebra or science of symbols, to provide a spiritual "over soul" for the American love of the material and provisional particulars.

Though neither Emerson nor Whitman embark upon this project themselves, the issues they articulate and their plea for a literature that performs a spiritual and thereby ethical and social
function forms a modern American inheritance. By 1900 the vast materialism Whitman both celebrated and wished to temper had expanded with all the terrible energy and speed he had foreseen. But the call remained out for a lyric expression of "special personalism" that not only withstands the counter-principles of materialism and democracy, but a lyric expression that infuses those counter principles with a spiritual algebra by which to provide the provisional and local "village symbols" with their full meaning.

Because the structural relationship of tension between democratic materialism and the individual, in effect, builds into the American culture a compounded version of the Arnoldian crisis of self in search of a public ground for lyric expression, the intensification of this crisis of self under the pressure of an increasingly complex materialism in the twentieth century most characteristically results in the pessimism that the only self commensurate with an increasingly complex and fractioned material world is the divided, un-integrated self. A related response to the crisis of self in the modern world is the affirmative and direct response of Hart Crane, a response that is routed through Emerson and Whitman. Not sharing Eliot's Arnoldian view of the self divided against itself, Crane follows Whitman's directive that it is only through a "composite" personalism that a spiritual counter force to materialism and the deadly force of democracy can
find expression. As such Crane's composite self is opposed to
Eliot's "depersonalized" lyric self, yet they share the same
structure. And while both Eliot and Crane announce in their prose
the need for a poetry that escapes from personality, for Crane,
unlike Eliot's Prufrock, an escape from personality is less a
retreat from the engagement with the material world than a means
of reengaging it in universal terms.

In "The Three Voices of Poetry" Eliot makes clear that
the "depersonalized" poetic voice both he and Pound term "persona"
is adopted from Browning's dramatic characters who speak for
the voice of the poet, who has put on the costume and
make-up either of some historical character or one out
of fiction.55

In this way, according to Eliot, the poet overcomes the "divided
loyalties" of characters in a play. The Browning strategy of
persona and mask persona is, for Eliot, one way of working around
Arnold's "thousand glimpses" that never sees a whole." The other
Eliotic strategy, stated most explicitly in "Tradition and the
Individual Talent" and The Waste Land modifies Arnold's notion of
Culture to allow for an expanded expressive self consciousness.
This second synecdochic strategy does not with Browning, suspend
the quest for the whole as means of overcoming divided perspec-
tives (as in the first "depersonalized" strategy), but reengages
the universal for consciousness in terms of the Romantic part/
whole synecdoche of Immanence we saw in Shelley. It will be
necessary to develop this second synecdochic strategy later in the chapter. But it is useful to bear in mind at this point that both Eliot and Crane adopt Romantic strategies of synecdoche which I have first identified with Shelley. But Eliot and Crane find their modifications of this Romantic position through different Victorian synthesizers. For Eliot the route to Shelley is the prose Arnold, for Crane, the prose Whitman.

Echoing Emerson and Whitman's desire for a spiritual force that works through and encircles the provisional and fluxional nature of the material, a poetry that "reattaches things to nature and the Whole" ("The Poet," 237) Crane states:

It is my hope to go through the combined materials of the poem, using our "real" world somewhat as a springboard, and to give the poem as a whole, an orbit and predetermined direction of its own. I would like to establish it as free from my own personality as from any chance evaluation on the reader's part. (This is, of course, an impossibility, but it is a characteristic worth mentioning.) Such a poem is at least a stab at the truth, and to such an extent may be differentiated from other kinds of poetry and called "absolute." (Crane's italics) 56

Crane acknowledges with Emerson the error of mistaking a personal and provisional perspective for the universal, but Crane understands the impossibility of escaping from his own subjectivity.

Yet Crane makes this stab at the truth because:

In this condition there may be discoverable under new forms certain spiritual illuminations, shining with a morality essentialized from experience directly and not from previous precepts or preconceptions. ("General Aims and Theories," 221) 57

From one view Crane's attempt to discover "under new forms
certain spiritual illuminations shining with a morality essentialized from experience directly" is a Romantic attempt to find a universal immanent in the particular. But unlike the Romantics, Crane attempts to do this by an escape from subjective personality rather than a commitment to it. In this way, Crane like Eliot, adapts the Arnoldian rejection of the subjective self, but to different modes. Both Crane and Eliot seek an abstract scientific language or algebra by which to escape the subjective personality. 52 Ironically, though Eliot's Prufrockian stifled sense of consciousness appears closer to Arnold's buried self, it is the more ecstatic Crane, closer to Whitman, who commits the fatal Empedoclean escape from personality. And it is perhaps this apparent contradiction that has doomed his great epic to critical disparagement. This is not to say that Allen Tate's precedent setting evaluation of The Bridge foreshaw Crane's suicide, but Tate's perception that the mode of ecstasy to voice a perceived decline in spirituality was at cross purposes for Crane's epic, formed the kernel of his critical rejection of The Bridge. In his Life of Hart Crane, Unterecker writes,

Almost as often as they talked about The Bridge, Tate and Crane talked about what Crane insisted was T. S. Eliot's death orientation, his 'pessimism,' pessimism that Crane felt most of his friends--Tate included--shared. 58

Tate corrects Crane's diagnosis of Eliot by pointing out that Eliot is consistent with the truth Tate shared:

Eliot's 'pessimism grows out of an awareness of the decay
of individual consciousness and its fixed relations to the world.\textsuperscript{59}

Cane's rejection of this awareness did not alter the final fatal fact of his biography, but the contradiction between Crane's ecstatic sense of self and his suicide is understandable in more than terms of psychology. Whitman himself, who was to become the guiding father of Crane's epic, proclaimed that the great modern American poem will be "the great poem of death."

Then will man indeed confront Nature, and confront time and space, both with science, and con amore, and take his right place, prepared for life, master of fortune and misfortune. And then that which was long wanted will be supplied, and the ship that had it not before in all her voyages, will have an anchor. \textit{(DV, 377)}

And it is for Crane's comprehensive debt to Whitman that Tate rebuked his project in \textit{The Bridge}. But in a stinging letter to Crane, Tate clearly misunderstands the Whitman Crane acknowledges:

I too felt your tribute to Whitman was, while not excessive, certainly, sentimental in places, particularly at the end of Cape Hatteras. But more than this I could not say except that in some larger and vaguer sense your vision of American life comes from Whitman, or from the same sources in the American consciousness as his. I am unsympathetic to this tradition, and it seems to me that you should be too. The equivalent of Whitmanism in the economic and moral aspect of America in the last sixty years is the high powered industrialism that you, no less than I, feel is a menace to the spiritual life in this country. In the end this is all I can see in him; though he did write some great poetry.\textsuperscript{60}

Crane's response to Tate justifies his debt to Whitman. On grounds Tate and most of Crane's detractors following Tate fail to consider:
It's true that my rhapsodic address to [Whitman] in the Bridge exceeds any exact evaluation of the man. I realized that in the midst of the composition. But since you and I hold such divergent prejudices regarding the value of the materials and events that W. responded to, and especially as you, like so many others, never seem to have read his Democratic Vistas and others of his statements decrying the materialism, industrialism, etc. of which you name him the guilty and hysterical spokesman, there isn't much use in my tabulating the qualified, yet persistent reasons I have for my admiration of him, and my allegiance to the positive and universal tendencies implicit in nearly all his best work. You've heard me roar at too many of his lines to doubt that I can spot his worst, I'm sure.61

Crane's even handed and tempered view of the Whitman to whom he is indebted for his visionary epic embraces both the ecstatic American self at home with vast material resources and the potentially deathly forces of individual and material expansion. The twentieth century American poet has confronted this paradox which Whitman set forth as "the over-arching problem of humanity all over the civilized world" (DV,321) in a variety of strategies. The central claim to which this study has been pointing is that synecdoche with an emphasis on the particular becomes the dominant twentieth century poetic for addressing the problem of finding a universal that grounds the manifold of particulars with which mediating and mediated modern consciousness is confronted.

In the American tradition Whitman offers one synecdochic strategy which Crane, Williams and Stevens acknowledge and variously adapt for their own purposes. Tate, Eliot and Pound unconsciously share Whitman's pessimism regarding the glut of American materialism, but reject his expanded mythic lyric self
as a vestige of failed Romanticism. Rather these American moderns acknowledge the contracted and decaying Arnoldian self consistent with the perception of a declining culture unable to find an objective public standard by which to ground personal expression. For Eliot and Pound, Browning rather than Whitman becomes the poet who offers a synecdochic strategy by which poetic expression might work through the Arnoldian dilemma. Eliot adopts Browning's dramatic lyric form in "Prufrock" and The Wasteland as does Pound in his "Villanelle: The Psychological Hour." And because Eliot and Pound accept Browning's formal poetic but retain the Arnoldian desire for an objective cultural order by which to ground lyric expression, Eliot and Pound seek to establish the authority of self conscious lyric expression over the shifting glimpses of partial aspects by "the attempt to make suffice a self diffused into selves, roles, and varied modes of attention." 62

This modern poetic of persona and mask persona which accepts a lyric voice as provisional character in changing dramatic situations has been viewed by critics of this century as the dominant modern poetic. Not only Eliot and Pound, but Stevens and Williams have been treated as part of this tradition for their attempts to ground self conscious lyric expression within a universal order commensurate with the play of differences among varying perspectives on the emphasized particular. My attempt in the final chapter will not be to disturb this widely held critical
classification, but to suggest that a counter strategy, of which Hart Crane is the examplar, is equally vital to modern poetics. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, Eliot's notion of the relation of the individual talent to tradition seeks to reconcile differences among particular points of view within a totalizing scheme:

No poet, no artist of any art has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead. I mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical criticism. The necessity that he shall conform, that he shall cohere, is not one-sided; what happens when a new work of art is created is something that happens simultaneously to all the works of art that preceded it. The existing monuments form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them. The existing order is complete before the new work arrives; for the order to persist after the supervision of novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the relations, proportions, values of each work of art are readjusted; and this is conformity between the old and the new.63

For Eliot the poet and his work have a synecdochic relation to the "ideal order" of tradition. The single work of poetry does not, for Eliot, exist as a significant articulation unless it both conforms to and modifies the "whole existing" order." That "whole" is for Eliot an ideal order in which the previous great works are ranged. It is an ideal order whose parts and proportions are readjusted by the introduction of the "really new" work of art. As Eliot is aware, in order for this synecdochic dynamic to work the individual artist must "know" what this ideal order
is that is so remote from him, in fact for Eliot:

'The dead writers are remote from us because we know so much more than they did.' Precisely, and they are that which we know. 64

Eliot's posture here is very close to Shelley who must know the syncretic tradition of mythology in order to rework that system for his own Promethean purpose. In the abstract rhetorical terms offered in this study, both Eliot and Shelley must assume an ideal totalizing order for emphasized "new" individual parts to become capable of integration with previous emphasized parts. This mythic dynamic by which the vital and new and particular both recasts and is integrated by the existing "dead" order is evident in Prometheus Unbound. And Adonais' voice is made one with nature by virtue of its potential for integration within that remote order. Keats enters the Pantheon for Shelley by the same synecdochic dynamic Eliot enunciates.

For Eliot, however, this Romantic strategy does not lead to a visionary revelation of that order. In The Waste Land the existing ideal order of tradition has what Harold Bloom calls a "conspicuous" relation to the parts of that order Eliot instates in his text. What Bloom calls "conspicuous allusion" is one synecdochic dynamic for consciousness become self-conscious. Where, as Wasserman, points out, Shelley intends to obliterate and render unrecognizable the previous wholes of which his emphasized particulars are aspects, Eliot wants to preserve the
previous structures and save them from obliteration by consciousness which is only "distracted from distraction by distraction."

It is by surrendering the creative self to tradition by "extinction of personality" that the self is able to touch something greater than itself, which for Eliot is tradition:

What happens is a continual surrender of himself as he is at the moment to something which is more valuable. The progress of an artist is continual self sacrifice, a continual extinction of personality.\(^{65}\)

Eliot states explicitly that this depersonalization renders consciousness itself not expressive of character or personality as for Browning but, following Arnold, escapes emotion by viewing consciousness itself as a medium:

The point of view which I am struggling to attack is perhaps related to the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul: for my meaning is, that the poet has, not a 'personality' to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways.\(^{66}\)

Both Eliot and Crane, to whom Eliot sounds very similar here, see the necessity of escape from distracted and provisional consciousness, Eliot employs a chemical vocabulary and Crane, mathematical and biological. But where Eliot, with Arnold, promotes tradition as the essential unity by which the individual and particular is integrated with other particulars within an ideal order, Crane emphasizes, with Whitman the universality and productive genius of consciousness itself. Eliot's notion of tradition and the individual relies upon the "conspicuous" knowledge
of consciousness aware of specific history, while the dynamic of consciousness itself is merely a medium which is organized by its knowledge of that history. Crane reverses Eliot's emphasis by asserting that consciousness itself is an organizational medium by which the "surface phenomena" of experience are idealized. The reader of Crane must be as sensitively well read and experienced as Eliot's, but he need rely less on the particulars of that previous experience than on the dynamic of consciousness by which those particulars are apprehended. Another way of viewing the difference is to see Crane as a poet who gives priority to the perceptual aspect of consciousness and Eliot to the conceptual.

In the larger terms of this study, Eliot's Shelleyean strategy of synecdoche resists, with Coleridge and Arnold, the streamy nature of synecdoche under a shift in perspective, where Crane's Shelleyean strategy accepts, with Wordsworth and Whitman, this shiftiness as a productive dynamic of consciousness' engagement with the world. This distinction becomes crucial for readers of the epics Eliot and Crane produced in the nineteen twenties. The Waste Land and The Bridge represent the grandest modern poetic attempts to find a totalizing systematization within which lyric self consciousness comes to terms with itself and its culture. Both poems employ highly synecdochic strategies that can be traced to the Romantic emphasis on the particular, and both have
been read as monuments to the impossibility of visionary poetry in the twentieth century. I focus on Crane at the close of this study of synecdochic prospect because his poetry is not only more committed to the full effects of synecdoche that emphasizes the particular by shifts in perspective but because Crane's radically synecdochic poetic remains a vital part of the modernist tradition a tradition that Pound announced had struggled to make its "pact" with Walt Whitman. Because the medium of exchange of the commerce between nineteenth and twentieth century poetry is primarily language itself rather than prejudices of poets toward their literary fathers, this study has attempted to provide a rhetorical currency to trace this commerce.

In this way Whitman's legacy to twentieth century poetics as proclaimed and practiced by Hart Crane can be established in rhetorical as well as thematic and psychological terms. And one prejudice of this study is that in Whitman's reorientation to the synecdochic nature of language his influence is most felt in modern poetry through Crane. Because Crane looked to Whitman's confidence in the comprehensiveness of consciousness to sustain a faith in a transitional vision ("Cape Hatteras," The Bridge), he was able to make his "stab at the truth." For Crane as for Whitman and Emerson, the streamy nature of shifting perspective is correlated with the "fluxional" nature of the symbol and the vehicular and transitive status of figurative language. For Pound
and Eliot this awareness, not only licenses the excesses of Whit- 
mans, but threatens to obliterate the existing ideal order on which 
individual consciousness is seen to depend. But if Eliot fights 
off the privative aspect of synecdochic emphasis on the particu-
lar, by means of tradition it is only through a synecdochic em-
phasis on the particular that Eliot's ideal order is preserved 
at all. Crane's counter strategy assumes that it is not tradi-
tion upon which consciousness depends for shared experience and 
assimilation to the culture, but vehicular and transitional syn-
ecdochic language.

And it is by means of a highly synecdochic poetic at home 
with its transitional status that Crane attempts in The Bridge to 
discover a mythic American tradition that answers Eliot.

I will use Hart Crane's The Bridge as a touchstone for this 
counter strategy, because it is illustrative of a synecdochic 
poetic that is at home with varied modes of attention, the pro-
visional nature of perspective, as is the part of Browning Eliot 
and Pound ignore and the Whitman they decry. And it is a stra-
egry that because it is comfortable with the provisional nature 
of perspective as the Arnold tradition is not, can accept the 
expanded lyric self of Whitman, which, because it is universal, 
can range freely over differences of place and time and still 
feel itself whole. In this sense I am suggesting that Crane's 
poetic provides a strategy for lyric expression that perceives
synechdoche as a positive operable mode for constituting a visionary poetic that is an alternative to the Arnoldian strategies which persist in Eliot and Pound. What I have described as a synechdoche of privation, the Victorian poetic associated with Arnold and Tennyson, informs those moderns, of which Eliot and Pound are strongest examples, with the sense that figurative expression of the particular by individual consciousness is correlated with the necessary incapacity of seeing the world whole and signals the alienation of consciousness from the objective view it desires. For such a modern poetic The Wasteland is the monumental example of the impossibility of a visionary poetry.

Accepting both Whitman's enthusiasm for the material world, along with his charge for spiritualization of this materiality, Crane also accepts the artificial and manufactured nature of the material world which in its way is as great as Natural world:

Always and more and more, as I cross the East and North rivers, the ferries, or with the pilots in their pilot-houses, or pass an hour in Wall Street, or the Gold Exchange, I realize (if we must admit such partialisms) that not Nature alone is great in her fields of freedom and the open air, in her storms, the shows of night and day, the mountains, forests, sea—but in the artificial, the work of man too is equally great—in this profusion of teeming humanity—in these ingenuities, streets, goods, houses, ships—these hurrying, feverish electric crowds and men, their complicated business genius (not least among the geniuses), and all this mighty, many-threaded wealth and industry concentrated here. (DV,327)

Because Crane shares this American fascination with, and respect
for the man made and artificial, the material of machine technology is not a threat to nature as it is for Eliot. Prufrock's despair that "I should have been a pair of ragged claws/scuttling across the floors of silent seas" breaks natural wholes into emphasized mechanical parts. Machine psychology here is implicitly at odds with nature and remakes nature in an image of fragmented articulation. Nature, for Eliot is likewise "etherized" by technology; but for Crane as for Whitman, the technologically manufactured becomes the chief symbolic synecdoche for man's relation to himself and his society.

In choosing the Bridge for his chief symbol, Crane is aware of its inherent synecdochic potential for relation and connection. Defending his choice of the Brooklyn Bridge from Tate's charge that it represents nothing more than "a fine piece of 'mechanics','" Crane writes back:

But granting your accuracy—I shall be humbly grateful if The Bridge can fulfill simply the metaphoric inferences of its title... You will admit our age (at least our predicament) to be one of transition. If The Bridge, embodying as many anomalies as you find in it, yet contains as much authentic poetry here and there as even Winters grants,—then perhaps it can serve as least the function of a link connecting certain chains of the past to certain chains and tendencies of the future.67

Tate criticizes Crane's choice of the Bridge as a spiritual symbol for the transition from past to future for its "romanticism."

In fact Tate places The Bridge at the end of the Romantic tradition, an evaluation which has remained largely unchallenged.
However, Crane's innovative poetic entails acceptance of the streamy and shifting nature of the emphasized synecdochic part which Coleridge was the first to discover and resist. If there is a kind of romanticism that persists with Crane, it is the romanticism Crane himself identifies with a poetry that resists "the strain to sum up the universe in one impressive little pellet." As such, this is a Romanticism that rejects the Victorian strain after "some cure-all" (Letter to Allen Tate, 13 July 1930), it is an American Romanticism better identified with Whitman and Emerson:

> For all symbols are fluxional; all language is vehicular and transitive, and is good, as ferries and horses are for conveyance, not as farms and houses are, for homestead. (Emerson, The Poet, 237)

The fluxional or streamy nature of the emphasized particular demands that Emerson, Whitman and Crane treat the mode of that representation as "vehicular" rather than as a permanent dwelling. In this way Crane seeks not an immanence of the universal, nor a nostalgic glimpse of an anterior universal order. For Crane as for Whitman American poetry must be a literature that serves the aesthetic of the future, what Whitman called "The Open Road." Crane views the shifting and transitive nature of the emphasized particular and the changing nature of such a perspective as constitutive of vision rather than a hinderance.

The constitutive mode of modern synecdoche, exemplified by Crane, is a visionary lyric mode which as Thomas Vogler points out
views the problem of "an epic synthesis of life"

as no longer that of recreating the outward history of man
or a nation, but of creating the inward history of man,
by moving to levels of generality through the concept of
individual as psyche rather than the individual as action. 69

For Vogler, "the subject of the [lyric] epic story becomes the
history of the poet's attempts to find a vision." 70 The flux-
tional and transitive nature of the attempt to find a personal
 visionary perspective results, then, not in a vision per se but in
 what Vogler calls a "Prelude to Vision." In Vogler's terms the
personal and lyric nature of the visionary epic seems suited to
Crane's purposes in answering Whitman's call for an archetypal
modern American poem. And Vogler includes Crane as the most
modern of the four visionary poets he analyzes precisely because
Crane heeds Whitman's charge. The attempt to overcome the
structural American tension between the individual and the demo-
cratic in a world of increasing material richness and complexity
and the need to spiritualize the material and manufactured world
parallels Crane's lyric quest in The Bridge. Contrasting him-
self with Eliot who "ignores certain spiritual events and possi-
bilities as real and powerful now as . . . in the time of Blake," 71
Crane assumes the authority of the lyric voice to express powerful
spiritual possibilities endemic in American life.

Both Eliot and Crane extend the rhetorical possibilities of
synecdoche with an emphasis on the particular beyond the Romantic
and Victorian strategies of Immanence and Privation we have
considered thus far. It is true that the influences of nineteenth century synecdochic strategies are, with differing emphases, resisted or absorbed by the other moderns I have not focused on here. But of the major modern poets, no poet, to my mind, is more radically committed to the productive and integrative possibilities of synecdochic representation than Crane.

The best way to begin to feel at home with Crane's commitment to synecdoche, its provisionality and shifts in aspect is to follow his instructions in his "Proem": "To Brooklyn Bridge" to

... think of cinemas, panoramic sleights
With Multitudes bent toward some flashing scene
Never disclosed, but hastened to again,
Foretold to other eyes on the same screen; 72

To view Crane's use of synecdoche in The Bridge, what I call a constitutive synecdoche, in light of the cinematic image Crane associated with his mode The Bridge involves a useful understanding of the cinematic technique of montage:

The juxtaposition of two separate shots by splicing them together resembles not so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot--as it does a creation... What is essentially involved in such an understanding of montage? In such a case, each montage piece exists no longer as something unrelated, but as a given particular representation of the general theme that in equal measure penetrates all the shot-pieces. The juxtaposition of these partial details in a given montage construction calls to life and forces into the light that general quality in which each detail has participated and which binds together all the details into a whole, namely that generalized image, wherein the creator, followed by the spectator, experiences the them. (Sergei Eisenstein, The Image in Process) 73
Crane's commitment to shifts in perspectives and partial representations of a general theme "Never disclosed, but hastened to again" parallels the cinematic process of montage; Crane's lyric directorial vision has for its generalized image, The Bridge and for its theme the process of connection and a spanning of differences by which the past is connected with the future, the material to the spiritual, the ecstatic lyric self to the democratic. These are Crane's announced themes, most of which are aims Whitman proclaims in Democratic Vistas.

The great unannounced theme of The Bridge is a version of Whitman's theme of the connection of vitality and death. But if Crane does not explicitly propose to write Whitman's "great poem of death," in the Cape Hatteras section of The Bridge, Crane invokes Whitman to help him see "Easters of speeding light" in an airplane's plunge to destruction. A second apostrophe in "Cape Hatteras" also calls upon Whitman to reclaim his vision:

But who has held the heights more sure than thou, O Walt!--Ascensions of thee hover in me now
As thou at junctions elegaic, there, of speed
With vast eternity, doest wield the rebound seed!
The competent loam, the probable grass,—travail
Of tides awash the pedestal of Everest, fail
not less than thou in pure impulse inbred
To answer deepest soundings! O, upward from the dead
Thou bringest tally, and a pact, new bound
Of living brotherhood! (Cape Hatteras)

Whether or not Crane fails or succeeds in writing Whitman's great poem of death, implicit in following Whitman is the danger of destruction as Whitman himself warns in "Calamus":
Who is he that would become my follower?
Who would sign himself a candidate for my affections?
The way is suspicious, the result uncertain, perhaps destructive.74

Uncertainty, and the fear of possible failure haunted Crane from the start of his project to write The Bridge, but this possibility did not prevent Crane's "stab at the truth." In fact, failure of expectation and the emergence of unforeseen truths from improbable vistas is for Crane a characteristic American pattern that appears repeatedly in The Bridge beginning in the opening section with Columbus whose attempt to reach the East by going west succeeded in proving an abstract truth, and in failing to reach China brings back a new vision under an old name:

For I have seen now what no perjured breath
Of clown nor sage can riddle or gainsay;--
to You, too, Juan Perze, whose counsel fear
And greed adjourned,--I bring you back Cathay!
(The Bridge, "Ave Maria, 5-8)

Columbus' Cathay was the Puritans "Promised Land," the Indians' earth bride, "Powhatan's Daughter," Pocohontas in Book II of The Bridge. As Crane's vision descends with increasing familiarity with this continent "from the hawk's far stemming view" to the "worm's eye to construe," in "Quaker Hill," Book VI, the twentieth century asserts its own mythology: where "the Czars/ Of golf, by twos and threes in plaid plus fours/ Alight with sticks abristle and cigars. . :"

This was the Promised Land, and still it is
To the persuasive suburban land agent
In bootleg road houses where the gin fizz
Bubbles in time to Hollywood's new love-nest pageant.
Fresh from the radio in the old Meeting House
(Now the New Avalon Hotel) volcanoes roar
A welcome to highsteppers that no mouse
Who saw the Friends there ever heard before.
(Quaker Hill," 30-40)

The metamorphosis of the emphasized particular under the pressure of shift in perspective, an attribute of the synecdochic poetic of figurative representation we have traced from Coleridge becomes in Crane's hands a poetic suited to the "Open Road" of uncertain futures, expectations tendered without guarantee, rich with promise as well as destruction. Crane's Bridge is a synecdochic link in Whitman's Open Road that attempts to connect the various transformations that have occurred in America from Geological through the pre-columbian and post cumbrian historical periods to Crane's own Machine Age. The nature of Crane's visionary epic, like Emerson's notion of language, is vehicular and transitive, at home in motion and flux. Synecdoche with a subjective emphasis on the particular becomes for Crane a way of imageing these transformations commensurate with the suspended and provisional nature of consciousness' recognition of the absolute:

Poetry, in so far as the metaphysics of any absolute knowledge extends, is simply the concrete evidence of the experience of a recognition (knowledge if you like). It can give you a ratio of fact and experience, and in this case it is both perception and the thing perceived.75

The mediation of the emphasized particular which for the Victorians signals the privation of the whole and the isolation of
consciousness within itself, is for Crane's ecstatic purposes a positive synecdochic dynamic by which consciousness and fact come into relation, or ratio. Because this ratio is provisional, subject to changes in perspective and mind, the constitutive force of Crane's epic poetry, the concrete evidence, "is not the recreation of a consistent history or myth of America, but the creation of what Thomas Vogler calls "the inward history of man," the epic quest of consciousness to find a personal visionary perspective by which to discover the spiritual possibilities at Work in America, to "lend a myth to [America's] God ("To Brooklyn Bridge").
END NOTES  Chapter IV


3. Tennyson, p. 422. All further references to Tennyson will be incorporated in the text.


10. Altieri, p. 243.

11. Altieri, p. 299.


17. Altieri, p. 300.


38. Brockington, p. 12.


40. Wallace Stevens, "Esthetique du Mal" in The Palm at the End of the Mind


42. Miller, p. 164.

43. Miller, p. 163.


45. Bergman.

46. Bergman.

47. Brockington, p. 40.


52. Walt Whitman, "Democratic Vistas" in The Portable Walt Whitman, pp. 351-3. All further references to Whitman will be incorporated in the text.

54. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "The Poet" in Selections from Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen E. Whitcher (Boston: Houghton Miffling, 1957), p. 229. All further references to Emerson will be incorporated in the text.


59. Unterecker, p. 431.


70. Vogler, p. 13.

72. Hart Crane, "Proem: To Brooklyn Bridge" in The Collected Poems of Hart Crane ed. Waldo Frank (New York: Liveright, 1933), p. 3. All further references to Crane will be incorporated in the text.


CHAPTER V: An Unfractioned Idiom: Hart Crane's Constitutive Synecdoche

My purpose in this final chapter is not to explicate or interpret Crane's epic, but to bring to a focus the rhetorical and theoretical claims I have made for situating Crane's highly synecdochic poetic within a poetic modernism characterized by synecdochic figure. In this way, the study should predispose readers to the unusual demands of Crane's lyric epic. I do not offer a reading of Crane's densely figurative style as I do with "Lachyrmae Christi" in chapter two, nor do I propose a key to the symbology of The Bridge. But I do assume that an understanding of how Crane pursues a synecdochic mode and why he raises synecdoche to a principle of logic will aid in making The Bridge viable on its own terms. The chapter concludes with an exemplary reading of the "Proem: to Brooklyn Bridge" which previews the structural patterns, modes of organization and movements of perspective throughout the epic which take the place of allegorical and narrative strategies.

A recent essay on "John Ashbery and the Modernist Long Poem" opens with the statement that

The most distinctive feature of the modernist long poem is the desire to achieve epic breadth by relying on structural principles inherent in lyric rather than narrative modes.¹

For Altieri the intensity of the lyric provides a more purely "poetic logic" that could free the poem from the distorting surfaces and ideological frameworks created by traditional representational
and dramatic narrative structures. This lyric poetic logic—what will in the terms of this analysis emerge as a constitutive synec-
dochic logic—is pursued more radically by Crane in The Bridge than by Eliot in The Waste Land or Pound in The Cantos. And conse-
quently the interpretive problems are perhaps greater in The Bridge.
But I would like to suggest that an understanding of modern constit-
tutive synecdoche clarifies many of the interpretive difficulties in Crane's epic and might also relieve other modern epics of distorting critical approaches.

By using the work "constitutive" to characterize modern synecdoche I am risking an initial misapprehension of the poetic mode I am attempting to describe. I am not suggesting that a mere reference to a concrete particular implies the whole from it is derived as in Coleridge's definition of symbol: a lip and chin prominent represent a man, although this realistic kind of synec-
doche plays a part in modern constitutive synecdoche. Nor am I suggesting that particular aspects of various wholes become members of a larger and more inclusive class as in Shelley's visionary Synecdoche of Immanence, although this too plays a part in the modern constitutive mode. Rather the moderns seek to present by means of a highly synecdochic poetic, the actions of mind by which the synecdochic dependency of part upon whole and whole upon part is seen to be provisional and subject to a further disclosure which alters previous part/whole relations. This modern stance is evident
in Eliot's prose analysis of the relation of the individual to
tradition, a synecdochic relationship whose stability derives from
its symbiotic dynamic.\(^3\)

In *The Waste Land* this stability is undermined by an emphasis
on particulars which are both realistic synecdoches as in
Coleridge's organic relation of lip and chin to man and visionary
synecdoches which derive from previous conetual orders. But unlike
Shelley, the previous systematizing orders are not obliterated or
abased in terms of a revelation of a new order. Nor are the
previous systematizing orders preserved as a tacit standard by
which realistic synecdochic parts are allegorized as in the great
Elizabethan and Renaissance epics. Rather the provisionality and
possible insufficiency of these symbiotic synecdochic relationships
comes to the fore.

Son of man,
You cannot say or guess, for you know only
A heap of broken images where the sun beats,
And the dead tree gives no shelter, the cricket no relief
And the dry stone no sound of water.\(^4\)

The dead orders from which broken images are derived fail to
provide shelter from the glare of present reality; concrete partic-
ulars are dry and do not resonate with the fluidity of transitional
vitality. And the pastoral lyric sings a staccato chirp. For
Eliot the only relief is the "shadow under this red rock" where the
lyric voice can
show you something different from either
Your shadow at morning striding behind you
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you; . . .
(The Waste Land, I:27-30)

For Eliot, the barrenness of the modern visionary landscape and the
unreality of urban modernity bereft of vision beyond the toe of
one's shoe on the sidewalk, leaves the lyric imagination at the
"shores" of culture, "with the arid plain behind." There the lyric
imagination may 'fish' to set its lands in order. The limitation
of vision and the guessing nature of Eliot's lyric imagination in
The Waste Land also characterizes "the most important personage in
the poem," Tiresias who is blind:

Tiresias, although a mere spectator and not indeed a
"character" is yet the most important personage in the poem,
uniting all the rest. . . . What Tiresias sees, in fact, is
the substance of the poem.\(^5\) (Eliot's emphasis)

As Thomas Vogler points out, Eliot wants to have it both ways:
"unity within a single consciousness, but also one 'other' than
the poet."\(^6\) In this way Eliot's strategy is a continuation of
Arnold's attempt to resist the allegory of the poet's mind as the
substance of a poem and is comparable to Browning's strategy of
presenting "so many utterances of so many imaginary persons, not
mine."\(^7\) A similar strategy is pursued by Pound in the Cantos
wherein deeper unifying structures emerge through the distant
voices of historical rather than imaginary or mythic personages.
In Paterson, Williams alternates between direct lyric expression
and the indirections of historical chronicle voices and the voices
of typical personalities of stock American characters, again voices other than the poet's own.

In Stevens, the dilemma of the authority of solitary lyric consciousness to create order beyond its own singing accepts the provisional lyric solipsism of expanded consciousness inherent in any attempt to re-center or re-order man's concept of the world:

For she was the maker of the song she sang.
The ever hooded tragic-gestured sea
Was merely a place by which she walked to sing.
Whose spirit is this? we sought and knew
That we should ask this often as she sang. 8

Harold Bloom opposes Stevens' lyric strategy to those of Eliot and Pound who work in an opposing mode of "conspicuous allusion." 9
Bloom traces the Stevens' strategy to the tradition of Emersonian optimism:

... in Emerson dialectical thought does not fulfill the primary function of fighting off the idealistic drive of an expanding consciousness. Both in his Transcendental and Necessitarian phases, Emerson does not worry about ending in solipsism; he is only too happy to reach the transparency of solipsism whenever he can. 10

If for Bloom the Emersonian-Whitmanian tradition finds its completion in the last phase of Stevens, it finds its fullest and most epic expression in Crane's The Bridge. In the terms of the argument offered in this study, the strategy Bloom calls conspicuous allusion" associated with Eliot and Pound is a synecdochic poetic that works under the shadow of Arnoldian skepticism and its alter strategy of Browningian dramatization of character. While the solipsistic lyric strategy Bloom calls "transpicuous allusion" is a
synechdochic poetic that accepts the mediations of consciousness as a necessary but provisional dynamic of a figurative language committed to the authority of expanded lyric imagination. This strategy, of which, I argue, Crane is the most forceful exponent, does derive from Whitman and Emerson as Bloom asserts. But if we see this inheritance in poetic and rhetorical terms rather than in terms of overly prejudiced generalizing abstraction it becomes clear that both the conspicuously allusive and the transpiciously allusive strategies are modern synechdochic poetics best distinguished as modes of constitutive or modern synechoche. Both modes recognize the mediated status of the synechdochic particular and the shiftiness of the emphasized particular as a member of an inclusive class.

Nowhere is the inability to place the synechdochic particular within a stable class, to know the objective status of a particular given a subjective mediation more a problem of lyric consciousness than in The Waste Land:

'What is that noise'

The wind under the door.

'What is that noise now? What is the wind doing?'

Nothing again nothing. 'Do

'You know nothing? Do you see nothing? Do you remember 'Nothing?'

I remember

Those are pearls that were his eyes.

'Are you alive, or not? Is there nothing in your head?'

(II:117-126)

Bloom asserts that one strategy by which Eliot seeks to stabilize lyric consciousness is "conspicuous allusion" to previous myths of
literary culture. But this synecdochic allusiveness tends to further emphasize the dispersive nature of lyric mediation of the particular. Thus, for Eliot because the constitutive force of synecdochic emphasis is provisional, an objective order is available to lyric consciousness only in "fragments" consciousness shores against ruin (The Waste Land, 430).

By concluding this study with a focus on Hart Crane's The Bridge, I will show how an alternate constitutive use of synecdoche is integrative in contrast to Eliot's dispersive use of constitutive synecdoche. But before I go on to specify the difference between Crane and Eliot's use of synecdoche, I want to emphasize their similarity which becomes apparent when a Crane synecdoche is compared to an Eliot synecdoche. In fact Crane himself used Eliot in defense of his own poetic technique. For comparison sake I offer a passage from The Waste Land and a similar passage from The Bridge. But out of the similarity a difference emerges:

At the violet hour, when the eyes and back
Turn upward from the desk, when the human engine waits
Like a taxi, throbbing, waiting, (The Waste Land, 215-17)

Then with inviolate curve, forsake our eyes
As apparitional as sails that cross
Some page of figures to be filed away;
Till elevators drop us from our day. . . .

In both poems this day dreaming semiconsciousness is a state that immediately precedes the introduction of a first person lyric voice. In The Waste Land, Tiresias, who Eliot asserts is the unifying substance of the poem, "foretells" the daily routine of
the office workers of the modern world. And in The Bridge Crane "thinks of cinemas" "with multitudes bent toward some flashing scene / Never disclosed, but hastened to again, / Foretold to other eyes on the same screen" (The Bridge, 9-12). Where Tiresias "perceived the scene" of the typist home at tea time and based on a synecdochic inference can foretell the rest, Crane's "flashing" cinematic scene is "never disclosed, but hastened to again." Eliot's blind lyric singer can too easily infer the rest from the part, while Crane's cinema audience is blinded by a flashing scene.

Despite Tiresias blindness, or one might say because of it, he sees too much, like a blind prophet of doom. And in this sense the urban scene Eliot synecdochically presents has already been "perceived," it is already in the past. For Crane too, the present is "never disclosed" in terms of itself, but is "hastened to again; . . ." And here a crucial distinction between the two constitutive modes emerges. For Eliot the unreal present receives its modification in terms of the past like the sudden appearance of a symptom of chronic disease that has been latent all along whose course can be predicted on the basis of a diagnosis of the symptom. For Crane the flashing present receives its modification in terms of a future which is itself never finally disclosed. For Crane the course of the synecdochic particular cannot be predicted because the synecdochic particular is itself a flashing, provisional disclosure whose blinding revelation is imcomplete and must be
hastened to again. In The Bridge the provisional and necessarily blinding status of the synecdochic particular is welcomed as an alternative to the overly constitutive force of synecdochic particulars to the all seeing blind eye that can be blinded no further, can see no more than its own prophecy. What Crane's necessary blindness to the predictable course of events allows him is a transitional vision that can shift levels of organizing class by means of shifting provisional perspectives on synecdochic particular. Although the transitional quality of Crane's epic parallels Eliot's dispersive and fragmented poetic in The Waste Land, a difference in their synecdochic strategies can be understood by comparing the vision of a clairvoyant witnessing a scene already foretold with the perspective of a subjectively limited consciousness whose expectations are always at the mercy of events, and whose understanding is always in need of another view. For someone who wishes to be clairvoyant the transitional appears to be empty like the listener in line 117 in The Waste Land who asks 'What is that noise?' Because he is not able to identify the sound, connect it to a synecdochic chain of events that explains, the noise seems empty. His question receives no reply beyond a metaphor that is also non sequitor.

Thus where the transitional is a shifting ground of revelation for Crane, it is empty for Eliot. This contrast is readily apparent in terms of the nature of the difficulty the two epics present to
the reader. The reader of The Waste Land is jolted by the suddenness of transition, the lack of connectives other than those which are repetitive. The reader of The Bridge must negotiate passages which seem only transitional, on their way to disclosure. Because Crane's perspective shifts with a mazy fluidity, synecdochic parts are mediated by a consciousness that will not rest with a single class inclusion by which the particular has synecdochic significance. And thus because final significance is never disclosed, simple metaphor or simile is never sufficient, and allegorical closure is never attained. Crane is more interested in the underlying, what he calls "genetic logic of metaphor." In terms of this study it is the fundamental synecdochic function whereby classes are constituted by members who share aspects.

With this understanding Crane can be understood not as a poet of strained latinate diction who is naively interested in the surface particulars of modern experience, but as a poet whose commitment to a constitutive synecdochic mode for the purposes of integrating consciousness with experience results in increasing abstraction as the transitional status of the synecdochic part is maintained. The Waste Land is relieved of this abstraction by distractions of intrusive shifts in attention to the concrete and mundane. The Bridge is rarely distracted by shifts in perspective. On the contrary, the fresh reader of Crane often fails to notice that shifts in levels of abstraction are shifts in perspective as
well. Interestingly, as Editor of Criterion, Eliot published the only section of The Bridge in which changes in perspective are abrupt and intrusive.

Crane's own theoretical statements about the status of the particular in his poetic make clear a synecdochic strategy by which the mediations of consciousness on synecdochic particulars can arrive at provisional "absolute experience" by the assimilation of consciousness of the organic effects of those particulars on itself:

to fool one's self that definitions are being reached by merely referring frequently to skyscrapers, radio antennae, steam whistles, or other surface phenomena of our time is merely to paint a photograph. I think that what is interesting and significant will emerge only under the conditions of our submission to, and examination and assimilation of the organic effects on us of these and other fundamental factors of our experience. It can certainly not be an organic expression otherwise. And the expression of such values may often be as well accomplished with the vocabulary and blank verse of the Elizabethans as with the calligraphic tricks and slang used so brilliantly by an impressionist like Cummings.

It may not be possible to say that there is, strictly speaking, any 'absolute' experience. But it seems evident that certain aesthetic experience (and this may for a time engross the total faculties of the spectator) can be called absolute, inasmuch as it approximates a formally convincing statement of a conception or apprehension of life that gains our unquestioning assent, and under the conditions of which our imagination is unable to suggest a further detail consistent with the design of the aesthetic whole.12

For Crane, the mere mention of "surface" particulars is not poetry. And here one thinks of the cataloguing of Whitman and the naive imagism of the lesser poets of the Pound school. Rather for Crane, and for Whitman in Democratic Vistas, the surface phenomena of the
manufactured and natural material world only become significant under the conditions of submission to, assimilation and examination of, the "organic effects" on consciousness of these factors. As such, this understanding of the representation of the physical world assumes an engagement of consciousness and world that the Arnoldian tradition resists for its inherent idealism and solipsism.

But in assuming that significant poetry can result from an organic assimilation of the material world, Crane is not in the naive version of the Whitmanian tradition of the sentimental expanded self that accepts all and is itself a vague all-encircling cloud. Rather Crane is aware of the improbability of "any 'absolute' experience." With Whitman and Emerson, Crane assumes that consciousness is itself a universal condition of human experience, and therefore a poetic that represents not "surface phenomena" itself, but the effects of those phenomena on consciousness, can "make a stab at" an absolute "aesthetic experience." As is evidenced by the language Crane uses above, the conceptual and perceptual modes appear for him to be either interchangeable or complementary. Their relationship is clarified by Crane's understanding of "the metaphysics" of "absolute" poetry as "evidence of the experience of a recognition . . .";

It can give you a ratio of a fact and experience, and in this sense, it is both perception and thing perceived, according as it approaches a significant articulation or not.¹⁴
The poetic image, then, for Crane, is itself a "conception" in so far as the image, itself represents a significant apprehension of the ratio of perceiver and thing perceived. In this way, the image itself is a synecdoche not only for the whole of which the detail is a part, but of the consciousness that apprehends it.

Crane emphasized synecdochic parts not only for their implication of a material whole, although Crane also intends this, but for their relationship to consciousness which is itself in transit, shifting perspectives. Thus what results is a figurative density, an understanding of which appears to depend upon an unannounced symbology. This in fact was the major technical obstacle to an understanding of Crane's work.

Today, however as Altieri, and others have pointed out, we have a poetry that operates by just such an understanding of the potential for lyric expression. Crane's lyric poetic at work in an epic form demonstrates that the density Crane's poetic need not lead to the search for a code of meaning that lies outside the work, as Eliot feared for The Waste Land. In fact, it is my argument here, as it was Crane's in 1927, that there is as much if not more internal coherence and logical rigor in The Bridge than in Eliot's epic of cultural despair. As such, while there is less need to go outside the text to trace "conspicuous allusions" as we do with Eliot and Pound, one is forced by Crane to get "into" the text, that is, because Crane's metaphysics of poetry assumes that
the conceptual is grounded in perception the reader must adopt the "perspective" by which the thing perceived is viewed. It is Crane's notion that, a thing perceived from a certain point of view can be represented to others who share the same perspective, to the extent the representation is a "significant articulation."

Where they exist standards for evaluating whether or not Crane's poetry is a significant articulation, have not been applied to The Bridge. Those analyses of Crane's work which are willing to treat his poetry on Crane's own terms have generally not ventured beyond the "Voyages" series. In the best treatments of Crane's shorter works, the importance of shifts in perspective, the condensation of metaphoric structure, disjunctive syntax and a diction that is a radical mixture of high latinate abstraction and the concrete substantives of anglo saxon, have been noted as characteristic of his poetic. The primary reason The Bridge has not received the critical attention it warrants even from those critics who are sympathetic to Crane is that perspective and shifts in perspective are seen to be integral to Crane's poetic. But most analyses focus on the effects of these shifts, the image as seen. And to the extent that these effects are recognized to be the result of a perception from a certain perspective, they are consented to as a formal conception. But in doing so--and usually quite successfully clearing up a seeming some confusion about what Crane means by a certain image--these critics tend to be satisfied with
that insight and fear what a multiplication of such points of view in *The Bridge* might entail.

But if we attend to the very dynamic which creates the effects critics are often at pains to account for, we will find it easier to enter into *The Bridge* and thereby consent more readily to the effects Crane creates.

With his contemporary moderns, Crane shares the Romantic and Victorian legacy of the emphasized particular, but Crane's synecdochic poetic is most at home with the shifting nature of the emphasized particular under the pressure of a shift in perspective. And since Crane is more interested in the play of particulars on consciousness from a certain perspective than in the individual consciousness as dramatic character isolated from the world, a subtle but crucial distinction, he will accept with Emerson and Whitman and Stevens the necessary provisional solipsism of this vision. For it is the music we strain to hear, not the instrument it must be played upon, not the sea by which it's played.

But in introducing *The Bridge* it will be useful to recall how Crane's plays his instrument, the synecdochic dynamic that Crane sees operating in his use of figurative language. I refer the reader to pages 28-32 for a specification of the following summary: Crane's constitutive synecdoche is concrete evidence of the ratio of mind and world (experience), collapsing perceiver and thing perceived agent and subject, thus promoting a figurative density
raised on a synecdochic logic of implication—Crane's genetic logic of metaphor—in place of a discursive base.

In the terms developed in chapters three and four, the collapse of agent and subject, appears now to be the necessary result of a modern lyric epic expression that does not resist an engagement with the material world nor fight off its own idealistic drive for expansion. In some contemporary poetry the collapse of agent and subject appears to be the result of an inability to fight off the idealistic drive of expanding consciousness as in the work of Berryman, Lowell and Ashbery. For Crane the collapse of perceiver and perceived in the image assumes "a previous or prepared receptivity to its stimulus on the part of the reader."\(^1\) The reader must, in this sense, share not only Crane's visual perspective with regard to the image in order to discern the "logic" of the image, but the reader must also have "accumulated a sufficient series of reflections to perceive the relations" involved in Crane's highly synecdochic logic of figurative implication. In chapter two, the analysis of "Lachyrmae Christi," exemplifies the coherence of Crane's synecdochic logic despite its figurative density once the reader is willing to put himself in Crane's place, share his perspective and Crane's level of abstraction. The tacit relationships implied among the synecdochic parts Crane's emphasizes in that poem are available to ordinary consciousness. The reader does
not need to have in mind a deciphering code or a prepared systematic logic to understand Crane's poetry precisely because, as Crane states:

the rationale of metaphor belongs to another order to experience than science, and is not limited by a scientific and arbitrary code of relationships either in verbal inflections or concepts.19 (Crane's italics)

Rather, the terms of expression Crane employs are often selected less for their logical (literal) significance than for their associational meanings. Via this and their metaphorical inter-relationships, the entire construction of the poem is raised on the organic principle of a 'logic of metaphor,' which antedates our so called pure logic, and which is the genetic basis of all speech, hence consciousness and thought-extension.20

Crane acknowledges in the next paragraph that "these dynamics" tend to result in certain difficulties for the reader. But Crane asserts that these difficulties are often necessary for "expressing certain concepts in any forceful or direct way whatever."21 Responding to Harriet Monroe's perplexity about the seeming illogicality of the "Voyages" poems, Crane asks "how Eliot can possibly believe that 'Every street lamp I pass beats like a fatalistic drum!'?" Crane's defense of the Eliot line speaks for his own cause as well:

There are plenty of people who have never accumulated a sufficient series of reflections (and these of a rather special nature) to perceive the relations between a drum and a street lamp-via the unmentioned throbbing of the heart and nerves in a distraught man which tacitly creates the reason and 'logic' of the Eliot metaphor. They will always have a perfect justification for ignoring those lines and to claim them obscure, excessive, etc., until by some experience of their own the words accumulate the necessary connotations to complete their connection. It is the same with the 'patient etherized upon a
table,' isn't it? Surely that line must lack all eloquence to many people who, for instance, would delight in agreeing that the sky was like a dome of many-colored glass. Crane's conviction that the relations between disparate metaphoric terms are understandable in terms of an "unmentioned" category of which the terms are members is a conviction committed to the dynamics of synecdoche described here. It is also a belief which requires the mediated relation of emphasized particulars (synecdoches) to consciousness in order that the metaphoric terms "tacitly" create their own rationale. By Crane's theoretical description, the full tenor or class term by which synecdochic particulars gain significance is an unmentioned and tacit category. But in The Bridge this tacit status of the classifying term is not only tacit, but never fully disclosed because in the transitional process of Crane's epic synecdochic particulars or vehicle terms receive modification from each other before a class inclusion is reached in terms of one perspective. Thus, the level of abstraction necessary to ground a series of linked synecdochic particulars makes it impossible for a simple metaphor to serve Crane's transitional purposes. In contrast, while the unmentioned category by which a drum and a streetlamp come into relation is also the result of a tacit understanding of the mediations of the expressive consciousness of the poet--an understanding not only of his perspective but emotional attitude--that understanding, once arrived at is sufficient. But because in The Bridge perspective is transitional,
expressive consciousness itself displaces the classifying ground and renders even highly abstract simile, as in the Eliot example, an insufficient metaphoric logic. And because Crane is as interested in synecdochic particulars as vehicles for mediations of transitional consciousness in assimilation to the material world as in their provisional and abstract classifying force, the privative function of synecdochic particulars becomes subsumed in service to the transitional perspective. In The Waste Land the privative function of synecdochic particulars comes to the fore at moments of failure of transition. Crane is well aware that not every reader has a "sufficient series of reflections" or the open mindedness to accept a vision not already mapped out, but Crane asks:

In the minds of people who have sensitively read, seen, and experienced a great deal, isn't there a terminology something like short-hand as compared to usual description and dialectics, which the artist ought to be right in trusting as a reasonable connective agent toward fresh concepts, more inclusive evaluations? . . . as long as poetry is written, an audience, however small, is implied, and there remains the question of an active or an inactive imagination as a characteristic.23

The dynamics of the "short-hand" "terminology" Crane trusts to are the dynamics of synecdoche, what Crane calls "the organic principle of a logic of metaphor., . . . which is the genetic basis of all speech, hence consciousness. . . ." That synecdoche is the rhetorical name of this basic genetic principle is a twentieth century
insight first elucidated by Kenneth Burke. Of synecdoche Burke states:

The more I examine the structure of poetry and the structure of human relations outside of poetry, the more I become convinced that this is the 'basic' figure of speech, and that it occurs in many more modes besides that of the formal trope. 24

In The Bridge, Crane's reliance on synecdoche approaches an act of faith that particulars are understood by virtue of their mediation by consciousness once the perspective and direction of perception is established. For Crane this act of faith is of the same order as the faith a Mariner puts in his compass:

A needle in the sight, suspended north,—
Yielding by inference and discard, faith
And true appointment from the hidden shoal: . . .
("Ave Maria")

The magnetic force by which a compass needle points North parallels Crane's faith in the genetic universal basis of consciousness without which neither inference nor shared perspective are possible. And because the synecdochic reflex by which inference and shared perspective are possible is an innate human capacity, the "genetic basis of speech, hence consciousness," we are safe in assuming with Crane that the uncharted voyage he embarks upon in The Bridge requires of us only the ability to attend to our own mental compasses and the willingness to follow Crane's tack.

But it is still useful to acclimatize ourselves to Crane in the way that Crane sought to submit and assimilate himself to the "surface phenomena" of the machine age. Crane's task was not to
sentimentalize, celebrate or sacramentalize The Bridge, but he saw in the Brooklyn Bridge a figurative potential to give poetic expression to the culture of which the physical bridge of granite steel and cable is also an expression.

Crane himself lived in the apartment taken in the 1870's by Washington Roebling who supervised the building of the bridge. From there, Crane, like Roebling, had a daily view of the bridge. Margaret Foster Le Claire's descriptive history of its building puts us in mind of the human terms in which Crane saw the structure:

... Washington Roebling, paralyzed, his sight and hearing impaired supervised the building of the bridge. He was the son of John Roebling, who designed the Bridge and whose persistence over a decade had gradually convinced skeptical business men and incredulous state senators that a suspension bridge one mile and 709 feet long was not an impossible dream --that it was feasible to sink supports 75 feet deep in the sticky mud of the East River to bear a weight of 80,000 tons. We must remember, as his son must have remembered, the accident that took the life of John Roebling in the early days of the project. We must hear the screams of men permanently paralyzed as they returned to the normal air from the pressurized caissons in which they had to work under the river--among them Washington Roebling himself. ... We must hear a disastrous explosion and watch the flame of a careless torch all but destroy the work of months. We must see a breaking cable lash 900 feet through the air to kill two men; we must watch eighteen others die during the thirteen years it took to translate John Roebling's dream into reality through the toil of many hands and the strength of will. ...25

The Bridge itself appears only twice in the epic. At the beginning of the epic, the bridge is the focus of the "Proem: To Brooklyn Bridge." And the last section, "Atlantis," is an exalted coda to the "Tall Vision-of-the-Voyage." The true bridge is the
epic Crane suspends between. The "Proem" introduces the primary structural patterns and related themes that critics have traced through the bridge. But while most acknowledge that the "proem clearly announces the intention of the entire poem," few are willing to see that intention as anything beyond a "celebration of the bridge as a symbol." The proem does a good deal more than this, it shows us how to read The Bridge.

"Proem" begins at dawn as do the first two sections of the epic. The first dawn of the "Proem" is seen from the widest temporal and spatial angle, an almost inhuman perspective:

How many dawns, chill from his rippling rest  
The seagull's wings shall dip and pivot him,  
Shedding white rings of tumult, building high  
Over the chained bay waters Liberty-- ("Proem," 1-4)

The question with which the poem begins becomes an exclamation by the time the sixteen line sentence completes its course. The seagull will disappear in line five. And the perspective Crane sets up is not reestablished until the end of the epic when the seagull reappears as a metaphor for the organs of perception:

Sheerly the eyes, like seagulls stung with rime--  
Slit and propelled by glistening fins of light--  
Pick biting way up towering looms  
(Atlantis, 25-7)

The "Atlantis" image of the eyes as "seagulls stung with rime" biting their way up the granite tower of the bridge reverses the tone of unstaying flight and "Liberty" in the opening of the proem. But the vision of the seagull in the proem itself is only momentary:
Then, with inviolate curve, forsake our eyes
As apparitional as sails that cross
Some page of figures to be filed away;
--Till elevators drop us from our day. . . .
("Proem," 5-8)

The vertiginous perspective of the opening of the poem is now seen
to have been the view from a Manhattan skyscraper. The perceiver
is identified synecdochally (eyes) as is the seagull (wings). With
the reappearance of the seagull in the Atlantis section of the
poem, quoted above, these synecdochic attributes are exchanged.
The seagulls become the eyes which are "propelled by glistening
fins of light." This mirroring and reversing of imagery is
consistent with their place in the structure of Crane's epic. The
Bridge that appears at the close of the poem mirrors and reverses
its first appearance in the same way the two towers of the bridge
itself mirror and reverse each other. And the question with which
the poem seems to begin finally becomes a question at the end of
Crane's epic where one expects exclamations to be most final.

But the point to be made here is that Crane did not fail to
write an epic of affirmation as critics beginning with Tate have
charged him. Crane's epic is as Vogler is correct in saying a
"quest" for vision. But even Vogler asserts that Crane failed
to live up to his own expressed intentions, though Vogler fails to
show in which of the letters Crane's disappointed intentions are
stated. This is perhaps true for Vogler because he sees Crane's
quest for a vision as an ultimately unsuccessful one. But he
ranges Crane with Blake Keats and Wordsworth for his singular attempt. The view I am suggesting is that Crane's quest for vision is not a quest after some satisfying and restful view, but a vision in transit. This is made literal in the "River" section of the poem where the view is from a train going west and in "The Tunnel" section, a subway ride under the river from Manhattan to Brooklyn.

The transitional movement Crane establishes in the Poem preserves its provisional perspectives in synecdoches like those of the seagull's wings and the viewer's eyes. The fleeting nature of the transitional perspective itself necessitates a synecdochic mode of perception. And Crane attempts to make this function of perception work conceptually as well. The directions of the major transitional movements of the poem are expressed in the curving structure of the suspension bridge itself: the horizontal and the parabolic movement forward by descent. And because Crane situates himself both literally and figuratively "Under" the "shadow" of the bridge at the close of the poem, the hoped for ascent synecdochically implied by the parabolic descent is never attained in the poem. Like "some flashing scene" on the cinema screen in stanza three of the poem the ascent is "Foretold" but "never disclosed." Cinema's panoramic sleights of hand like synecdochic implications are also "slights" of expectation. The introduction of the cinema follows the descent of the elevator and forms its own bridge to the first appearance of the bridge:
I think of cinemas, panoramic sleights
With multitudes bent toward some flashing scene
Never disclosed, but hastened to again,
Foretold to other eyes on the same screen;

And Thee, across the harbor, silver-paced
As though the sun took step of thee, yet left
Some motion ever unspent in thy stride--
Implicitly thy freedom staying thee! ("Proem," 9-16)

In contrast to the synecdochic apparition of the seagull who sheds
"white rings of tumult, building high/Over the chained bay waters
Liberty--" the bridge itself appears to take on the motion of the
sun which takes "step" of it, leaving "Some motion ever unspent."
The Bridge itself synecdochally preserves the motion of heavenly
bodies. Here Crane's perception is the literal one of the sun's
rays reflecting at changing angles on the parabolic cables through
the course of its daily journey from east to west. The time frame
of the "Proem" itself is from dawn to midnight as is the extended
temporal frame of the epic. The "freedom" of the bridge is an
inherent function of its "chained" structure of vertical and para-
abolic cables, another expression of the dominant movements in the
epic. This paradoxical freedom like the "chained bay waters
Liberty--" of stanza one is also a paradox of the language Crane
employs. Synecdochic language, like chains, either restrain and
prevent vision by fixation on the particular or serve to connect by
a transitional perspective on the emphasized particular.

In the following stanza Crane's focus is still on the bridge
where
Out of some subway scuttle, cell or loft
A bedlamite speeds to thy parapets,
Tilting there momentarily, shrill shirt balooning,
A jest falls from the speechless caravan.
("Proem," 17-20)

The suicide's descent is abrupt and final, but the ballooning shirt holds him aloft for us "tilting there momentarily" like a sudden image retained in the mind after its passing. The pattern of descent into the sea is repeated in the "Ave Maria" section where a record of Columbus' voyage to America is lowered into the sea in a casque in order to preserve "word" of the voyage. The water of the Atlantic "tests the word" of the ship's log as the water tests the bedlamite who falls "from the speechless caravan" in the "Proem."

Stanza six gives us the view of the city out of which the bedlamite of the previous stanza sped to the parapets of the Bridge. And the glare of the noon day sun on the city seems to Crane as it might have seemed to the bedlamite who speeds to the bridge for salvation:

Down Wall, from girder into street noon leaks,
A rip-tooth of the sky's acetylene;
All afternoon the cloud-flown derricks turn. . . .
Thy cables breathe the North Atlantic still.

And obscure as that heaven of the Jews,
Thy guerdon. . . . Accolade thou doest bestow
Of anonymity time cannot raise;
Vibrant reprieve and pardon thou dost show.
("Proem," 21-28)

The reprieve the bridge offers from the oppression of the city is a requital as obscure "as that heaven of the Jews." For the bridge
offers no vision of a transcendent paradise, but expresses the
vision of men:

O harp and altar of the fury fused,
(How could mere toil align thy choiring strings!)
Terrific threshold of the prophet's pledge,
Prayer of pariah, and the lover's cry,—

Again the traffic lights skim thy swift
Unfractioned idiom, immaculate sigh of stars
Beading thy path—condense eternity:
And we have seen night lifted in thine arms.
("Proem," 29-36)

All critics of The Bridge have read the exclamative line in
parenthesis above as a question whose answer is negative, but to
deny Crane's assertion here sentimentalizes Crane's entire project
and ignores the vitality of the "fury fused" by "mere" human
"toil." Choirs, like prophets, pariahs and lovers are primarily
human not divine as are the "traffic lights" that "skim" the
bridge's "swift/unfractioned idiom" and appear to be "an immaculate
sigh of stars" "beading its path" and that "condense eternity: . . . ."
I emphasize the word condense because this is what the bridge does
for Crane and what Crane wants of The Bridge as well. The poetic
mode of this condensation is synecdoche which attempts to consti-
tute a transitional vision by which the twentieth century human,
not the divine, can be expressed. And Crane is not interested in
merely exalting the human. The traffic lights that bead the
swift/unfractioned idiom" of the bridge appear as a bead of pearls
that whip a stripper's hip in the "National Winter Garden" song of
section V. As Hazo was the first to point out, line 36, above,
suggests the transformation of the bridge into a woman who maternally lifts night in her arms. For Hazo The Bridge is a mediation of past and present, the spiritual and the material, the human and the divine. And Hazo's understanding the bridge as a woman is consistent with Crane's invocation of Mary in "Ave Maria" who serves as a "mediatrix or bridge between God and man." The coherences in the poem do not argue against Hazo's reading which has been echoed in subsequent criticism of The Bridge. But Hazo's attempt to thematize these coherences in terms of the "Ave Maria" section leads to a needlessly sacramental perspective whereby Crane appears to compromise his commitment to a divine feminine vision with the "burlesque" and "parody" of the stripper in "National Winter Garden." Hazo links Crane's "failure" to envision a divine mediatrix to his failure to find a vision in The Bridge. Reason tells us, however, that if Crane wanted a figure of a divine mediatrix, a poet with Crane's imagination certainly should have succeeded.

Crane is not interested in freezing his symbolism at any point, for to do so would terminate in an allegorization he theoretically eschewed. Crane in this weak allegorical sense would be Emerson's mystic who mistakes village symbols for the transcendent or the Pastor in "Christmas Eve" whose truths are sound but whose "provings are twisted and twined." Rather, as Richard Sugg has recently stated: "the very structure of the Bridge
"depends upon the movement of the imagination..." 36 Suggs treatment of Crane's epic stands with Hazo's as the most comprehensive attempts to explicate the coherences of the poem. And their studies argue convincingly against the contemporary response to Crane in the thirties that the poem lacked the coherences of the Waste Land. And because Sugg is committed to Crane's own poetic rather than Tate's preconceived notion of what an epic poem should provide, his analysis avoids the easy allegorization of Hazo, Dembo and Cambon.

Closing the "Proem: To Brooklyn Bridge," Crane explicitly enunciates his own personal perspective, human and earth bound:

Under thy shadow by the piers I waited;  
Only in darkness is thy shadow clear.  
The city's fiery parcels all undone  
Already snow submerges an iron iron year. . . .

O sleepless as the river under thee,  
Vaulting the sea, the prairies' dreaming sod,  
Unto us lowliest sometime sweep, descend  
And of the curveship lend a myth to God.

As in the cinemas stanza, Crane speaks in the first person. And as those in the cool darkened movie houses of the city who in escaping from the acetylene sky of the city streets "bend toward some flashing scene / Never disclosed, but hastened to again," Crane, at the close of the Proem, looks up to ask that the bridge "sometime sweep, descend / And of the curveship lend a myth to God." Where in line 10 the word "some" seems to impoverish the power of the "flashing scene" of the movie screen, and thus render the movie
image a privation. The word "sometime" in line 43 is a prayerful request, not a commonplace demonstrative of loose conversation. But if critics have preferred to see the cinema image as a chord of "anxiety, or strain in Crane's music, which the epic attempts to overcome, their rush to a theme of despair, overlooks the crucial positive operative dynamic of cinema logic to Crane's visual quest. Crane does not see the bridge as an embodiment of a mythic scene that discloses itself, rather he asks that its "sweep" and movement "descend" to man who hastens to it and "of the curveship" lend a myth to God. Movement itself is what Crane perceives in the bridge's "curveship." This movement is a figurative property of the bridge, but a physical property of the movement of Crane's imaginative consciousness as in cinema. The movement imparted to moving pictures is not only that of the images themselves moving on a screen, but a property of the camera eye itself whose shifts of perspective necessitate provisional focus on the synecdochic detail.

In The Ringers in the Tower, Harold Bloom has pointed out the importance of "visionary cinema" in Romantic poetry from "Wordsworth to Stevens, Yeats and Crane. And though, Bloom acknowledges Eisenstein's essays on Milton and Shelly, as a starting point for his own argument about visionary romanticism, he falls short of accounting for the synecdochic dynamic of montage and shift in perspective that is common to both lyric poetry and cinema. And
Bloom has been chary of fully establishing Crane's position within the high Romantic tradition he traces in *The Ringers in the Tower*, although the epigram that introduces the study is Crane's. I should like to reverse Bloom's emphasis by asserting that the cinematic dynamic operative in Romantic poetry from Coleridge, Wordsworth and Shelley is a rhetorical potential of poetic language itself. This potential emerges in Romantic poetry because of an emphasis on the particular within the part/whole synecdochic function that is the basic dynamic of figurative representation. The problems created for representing consciousness by the Romantics' strategical choice have been severally accounted in studies of the Romantic, Victorian and modern poetic traditions. And this present study has acknowledged many of these arguments. But the point here is that an understanding of the synecdochic rhetorical dynamic underlying the relationship between "Romanticism and Consciousness" establishes a rhetorical and poetic ground for the thematization of the problems created by the poetic deployment of synecdoche with an emphasis on the particular. Hart Crane, more clearly and self consciously than any other modern poet, recognized the poetic basis of consciousness in the "genetic logic of metaphor." *The Bridge* is Crane's synecdochic epic to the totality of imaginative consciousness. *The Bridge* is Crane's "parable of man.-- / Inquisitor!" ("Ave Maria," 60-61).
The Bridge that follows the "Proem" has always attracted its admirers. Each section except "Atlantis" was published in one of the leading journals of Crane's day. Eliot accepted "The Tunnel" for The Criterion. But the contemporary response to The Bridge as an epic charged that it lacked coherence and a proper subject. Since Hazo's book length treatment appeared in 1963 criticism has found increasing coherence in Crane's epic. This criticism has to a large extent vindicated Crane's claim that

with time and familiarity with The Bridge you will come to envisage it more as one poem with a clearer and more integrated unity and development than was at first evident. At least if my own experience in reading and rereading Eliot's Waste Land has any relation to the circumstances this may be found to be the case. It took me five years, with innumerable readings, to convince myself of the central unity of that poem. And the Bridge is at least as complicated as The Wasteland--perhaps more so.

Eliot's epic, too, is committed to a synecdochic poetic "of inference and discard." And its complications are a necessity of this modern poetic. But because Crane was more at home with transition, the provisional perspective, he pushed the possibilities of synecdoche with an emphasis on the subjective particular further. Crane's attempt at an integrative andconstitutive use of synecdoche enables the ventures of subjective consciousness we find in Ashbery, Kinnell, Barryman and Lowell. Lowell elegized Crane as the "Shelley of my age," for whom the reader "must lay out his heart." In the larger terms of this study, Crane's use of synecdoche serves a Browningesque function in giving consciousness
a mode of pursuing an emphasis on the subjective particular beyond the "neutral and unreal moods" of consciousness. But where Browning is a poet of Dramatic character, Crane is a lyric poet who awakens to a "dream of act." The action is that of lyric self consciousness giving imaginative shape to experience. But Crane's poetry is not a Romantic unbinding and liberation of consciousness; Crane is not Shelley's Prometheous.

As Angus Fletcher⁴¹ and Robert A. Day⁴² have asserted, Crane is an ecstatic poet willing to pursue the metaphoric logic of consciousness wherever it will arrive at the most significant articulation. Both Fletcher and Day also recognize the importance of Crane's "genetic" logic of metaphor guaranteeing a short hand metaphysic terminology. Day characterizes Crane's metaphysic as a literary "principle of relativity" which remains unexplained. But Day goes on to say that Crane presents

The results of processes of thought and emotion after leaving out, for the sake of condensation, several links in the chain of thinking.⁴³

Day identifies the dual synecdochic character of Crane's poetic and the "condensation" that informs Crane's mode. And his reading of on "Voyages II" in light of his recognition of the synecdochic basis of Crane's poetic remains a neglected work among those that came out with the Crane resurgence in the mid nineteen sixties. Few attempts followed Day's lead toward a consideration of Crane's formal poetic. And as recently as 1979 in "The Bridge over the
Wasteland" Angus Fletcher called for a serious attempt to articulate a formal poetics of Crane's integrative genetic theory of metaphor. This study has taken on this formal task and in doing so may offer readers a way of erecting a bridge over The Waste Land.

My own purposes have not been to pin point the relations among the coherences of Crane's epic, nor to offer an explication and thematization of the coherences that are there to be perceived. What I have proposed is rhetorical understanding of Crane's poetic mode that offers a way to read The Bridge as Crane asks to be read, synecdochally, not with an eye toward a thematizing allegorical generalization. The myth Crane's own "curveship" lends to God does not take the outward form of a generalization or of a sacramentalizing allegory. The Bridge, Crane's Harp and Altar of man's "fury fused" is a "Swift peal of secular light, intrinsic Myth. . . ."

("Atlantis," 65).

Beginning with Arnold and Tennyson poets have become increasingly wary of the authority of lyric expression to make generalizations about the world or moral claims for that world based on received systems of belief. The Romantic search for an organizational principle clearly constituted by relations among emphasized particulars rather than those elicited by analogical or generic categorical patterns resulted in the Victorian perception that emphasized particulars speak not for an objective organizational principle, but for isolated consciousness itself whose only
relation to an objective ideal order is mediated and synecdochic. With Hart Crane the Romantic search for an organizational principle by which to ground the play of shifting synecdochic perspectives culminates in the discovery that this principle is synecdoche itself, an innate human dynamic by which to conceptualize the perceptual and give experience a human representation. Crane's constitutive use of synecdoche is one modern poetic strategy by which consciousness can continue to engage its most serious subject: its own imaginative examination of, and assimilation to, the world.
END NOTES: CHAPTER V


2. Altieri, p. 653.

3. See Chapter IV of this study, pp. 227-229.


7. Browning's qualification added to his *Dramatic Lyrics* (1842).


27. Quinn, p. 80.
28. Quinn, p. 81.
29. Vogler, pp. 142-196.
30. Vogler, p. 146.

34. Hazo, p. 108.


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