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Male Masochistic Fantasy in Carlyle, Tennyson, Dickens, and Swinburne

by

David Hennessee

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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David Hennessee
Doctoral Dissertation

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Male Masochistic Fantasy in Carlyle, Tennyson, Dickens, and Swinburne

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Texts by Carlyle, Tennyson, Dickens, and Swinburne produce fantasies of male masochism that offer to resolve diverse historical problems plaguing Victorian manhood. These texts discipline their transgressive masochistic energies in response to specific ideological pressures, but they do not purge masculinity of masochism. Rather, they valorize as exemplary seemingly conventional models of manhood that remain underwritten by masochism tamed into culturally acceptable forms. Recent studies of Victorian masculinity have often relied on the paradigm of homo/heterosexuality, and as a consequence, they have left male masochism largely unexplored. Following the work of Eve Sedgwick, critics have examined the (de)formative functions of nineteenth century homophobia, and much attention has been given to the disruptive effects of late-century male homosexuality. However, as James Eli Adams and others have argued, the homo/hetero binary that by the 1890s constituted masculinity was not fully operable in the earlier Victorian years. In the early and mid-Victorian texts I consider, masculine sexualities are not troubled only by issues of homo/heterosexual definition. Rather, these texts elaborate masochistic fantasies that respond to a variety of other ideological concerns germane to their historical contexts: the "Condition of England" question, the religious "Crisis of Faith," mid-Victorian ideals of the gentleman, and the proscribed yet flourishing subculture of sadomasochistic pornography and prostitution. Across this wide range, and across striking differences in style and genre, I identify patterns of male masochistic fantasy that connect very disparate modes of masculine self-fashioning: Carlyle's "Hero-worship," Tennyson's poetic melancholia, Dickens' moralized version of gentlemanliness, and Swinburne's sadomasochistic perversities.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I: Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter II: Male Bonding as Male Bondage: Thomas Carlyle's Hero-Worship
and the Condition of England ........................................................................................................ 25

Chapter III: "Let Love clasp Grief lest both be drown'd": Masochism,
Masculinity, and the "Way of the Soul" in Tennyson's In Memoriam; or, Love Hurts .................. 63

Chapter IV: Guilt, Masochistic Fantasy, and the Gentleman in Great Expectations .............. 104

Chapter V: Swinburne's "florid impotence": Flirting with Masochism and
Masculinity in Poems and Ballads, 1866 ............................................................................. 153

Epilogue ..................................................................................................................................... 192

Works Cited ................................................................................................................................. 201
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To my parents, with love.
Chapter I
Introduction

Students of Victorian literature and culture have come to know the conventional gender norms of the period. In *The Subjection of Women* John Stuart Mill cogently describes them in a discussion of Victorian educational practices. Mill critiques a system of education in which women "are universally taught that they are born and created for self-sacrifice," producing "an exaggerated self-abnegation." Men, by contrast, are taught "to worship their own will as such a grand thing," learning "self-worship." Mill searches for the self-assertion achieved by feminine self-abnegating postures. For example, he suggests that through "moral influence" women can become "potent auxiliaries to virtue" (203). So potent is female influence that Mill believes it to greatly account for "two of the most marked features of modern European life -- its aversion to war, and its addiction to philanthropy." ¹ Like Mill, modern feminist scholars have sought to understand Victorian women as more than self-abnegating victims of patriarchal oppression. In recent scholarship Victorian women often appear as social actors who manipulate the structures of patriarchy in ways that offer possibilities of agency and empowerment. ²

Less focus has been given to the other side of Mill's story -- the self-abnegation

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¹ Mill 203. Of course, in his usual balanced way Mill then discusses how "religious proselytism" can be "but another word for embittering of religious animosities," and philanthropic zeal can have negative effects: it can encourage dependence and discourage self-help (204-205).

² This scholarship is too extensive to document here, but for an influential example of it, see Mary Poovey's *Uneven Developments*. Poovey argues that in mid-Victorian England, gender ideologies were deployed "unevenly," always subject to contestation and contradiction. This "unevenness" did "conservative ideological work," but also "allowed for the emergence in the 1850s of a genuinely -- although incompletely articulated -- oppositional voice" (4).
that may inhere in grandly self-willed Victorian masculinity. If Victorian women used postures of self-sacrifice -- even extending to masochism -- to hide their proscribed self-assertion, did Victorian men, conversely, conceal within their assertive postures self-sacrifice, self-abnegation, and a masochism of their own?

I believe that they did. Recent work on Victorian masculinities has left male masochism largely unexplored, and my dissertation charts this territory. Across a wide range of texts, and across striking differences in tone, style, and genre, I trace patterns of male masochistic fantasy that connect very disparate modes of masculine self-fashioning: Carlyle's "Hero-worship," Tennyson's poetic melancholia, Dickens' moralized version of gentlemanliness, and Swinburne's sadomasochistic perversities. These writers make strange bedfellows. What does Carlyle's noisy bluster have to do with Swinburne's languid floridity? How are Tennyson's melancholy musings akin to Dickens' guilt-tortured tales of self-making? I contend that texts by these authors produce fantasies of male masochism that work according to a pattern, recognizable across differences, that marks middle-class masculinity in the early and mid-Victorian years. These authors elaborate masochistic fantasies in response to various ideological problems plaguing early and mid-Victorian manhood: the "Condition of England" question, the religious "Crisis of Faith," the challenge of defining gentlemanliness in an increasingly democratic age, and the limitations of Victorian gender norms and rules of social décorum. These authors produce textual masochistic fantasies that symbolically resolve these ideological difficulties. Yet in response to other ideological pressures, these texts tame the more transgressive of their masochistic energies. However, these texts do not altogether purge masculinity of
masochism, but shape their masochistic fantasies into more culturally acceptable forms. In the end, they valorize putatively normative modes of masculine self-fashioning that remain underwritten by masochism.  

Not coincidentally, all the texts I consider are from the early and mid-Victorian years. A further contention of this study is that the masculine sexualities represented by many texts from this period are expressed in masochistic self-abnegation, submission, and suffering that exceed the power of the homosexual/heterosexual paradigm to explain them. This paradigm has been used to great advantage in recent studies of Victorian masculinities. Through analyses influenced by the groundbreaking work of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, we have gained insight into both the formative and deforming functions of nineteenth century homophobia. Much attention has been given to the disruptive effects of late-century male homosexuality and the dandies, inverts, decadents, Hellenists, Uranians and aesthetes who threw norms of manhood into fin-de-siecle flux. However, as James Eli Adams argues, "The dichotomy of hetero- and homosexuality that emerges from late Victorian discourses has often distorted earlier Victorian constructions of 'manliness' by being unreflectively read back on them" (4). Such distortions occur because the normative binary homo/heterosexuality did not fully constitute manhood in the earlier Victorian

3 I borrow the term "self-fashioning" from Stephen Greenblatt's influential Renaissance Self-Fashioning. Greenblatt argues against the notion that Renaissance gave birth to the autonomous individual. Rather, in the Renaissance, there were "no moments of pure, unfeathered subjectivity... the human subject itself began to seem remarkably unfree, the ideological product of the relations of power in a particular society" (256). However, Greenblatt does not completely bind the subject to power. Instead, he suggests that "self-fashioning occurs at the point of encounter between an authority and an alien [...]what is produced in this encounter partakes of both the authority and the alien" (9). In the texts I consider, we will see "encounters" between authorized Victorian ideology and alien, transgressive male masochism. In these "encounters" modes of male self-fashioning emerge that "partake of both" normative Victorian ideology and ideologically suspect male masochism.
years. I argue that in analyzing manhood of this period, masochism is a necessary supplement to the still-emergent homo/hetero binary. In the early and mid-Victorian texts I consider, masochistic fantasies function similarly regardless of ostensibly homo- or heterosexual context. These fantasies operate according to a logic of their own, not responding primarily to the sexual division homo/hetero, but more often shaping themselves in relation to other ideological pressures involving class divisions, economic difficulties, gender norms, and religious crises.

I cast a fairly wide net in my critical methodology, for I have found that the pattern of Victorian male masochism exists in many different local configurations, necessitating a blend of theoretical stances. In general, I consider "fantasy" mainly in its Freudian sense of "wish fulfillment" and also in the sense that Jessica Benjamin portrays it: as intrapsychic substitute for the lost experiences of intersubjectivity and externality. The masochistic fantasies in the texts I consider take different forms. In Carlyle, for example, masochism exists as the implicitly eroticized submission of the "Hero-worshipper" to the "Hero." As so often in masochistic fantasy, physical pain is not integral to such "Hero-worship."

However, the dominatory nature of Hero-worship justifies reading it through theories of sadomasochism, specifically Benjamin's object-relations theory of erotic domination. Moreover, the erotics of Hero-worship appear as abjected homoerotics, which I read through theories of abjection put forward by Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler. Tennysonian

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4 I elaborate on this point more fully in Chapter III, with reference to the relationship between Tennyson and Hallam.

5 Benjamin argues that while all experience is elaborated intrapsychically, subjects often tend to overinvest in the intrapsychic, negating reality. I will elaborate on this point later in this chapter.
masochism takes the form of eroticized grief, which I label "love that hurts." In analyzing this love, I invoke Freud's theories on mourning, theories of pain advanced by Leo Bersani, Elaine Scarry, and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, as well as Benjamin's work on recognition. My chapter on Dickens' *Great Expectations* accounts for Pip's infamous guilt through Robin Gilmour's work on the gentleman, John Kucich's ideas on Victorian repression, and Deleuze's theory of the masochistic contract. My analysis of Swinburne's "florid impotence" relies on a combination of textual explication, biographical, historicist, and cultural criticism.

This eclectic approach springs from Deleuze's analyses of Sade and Sacher-Masoch in *Masochism*. Deleuze argues against the mergence of sadism and masochism into the entity "sado-masochism," a conflation common in psychoanalytic theories. Instead, he suggests that sadism and masochism are fundamentally different phenomena, and that their differences become apparent when one reads the novels of Sade and Sacher-Masoch. Therefore, Deleuze argues for a "literary approach" instead of a clinical one to sadism and masochism. That is, rather than diagnose based on preconceived clinical definitions and precepts (e.g. Oedipal models), we should look at symptoms, effects, and transformations as they are manifested in specific, local contexts and configurations (9-23). Taking such a "literary approach" to male masochistic fantasy, I examine the surfaces and structures of pain, pleasure, and desire that energize early and mid-Victorian texts and make them work. Deleuze and Guattari advocate this functional approach in *1000 Plateaus*, where they describe the book as a sort of nexus or machine:

As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other
assemblages [...] We will never ask what a book means [...] We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed [...] A book itself is a little machine. (4)

Focusing my inquiry thus I hope to avoid oversimplifying male masochism through reliance on a single theoretical rubric. 6 Examining texts terms of functions and effects instead of origins and meanings will allow me to plug masochistic fantasies into specific socio-historical sockets, and so make historically grounded claims about the relationships between these fantasies and their cultural milieu. I hope to account for the distinctive qualities of the various fantasies I examine, all the while characterizing them as exhibiting a certain family resemblance to one another.

The Masochistic Subject of Discipline

The question remains: why did these Victorian fantasies of masculinity shape themselves in response to issues of the day through masochism, specifically? In what follows I will offer my own theory of Victorian male masochism. This project requires that I lay out several theoretical frameworks. First, I will summarize David Savran's provocative reading of the masochistic tendencies inherent in the western male bourgeois

6 In particular, I have been wary of psychoanalysis. Although it provides useful tools of analysis, it tends to chain sadism and masochism to the Oedipal complex, which I have found unhelpful in thinking through the specificities of the fantasies I examine. However, I do make use of psychoanalytic concepts, in particular moral masochism and the death drive. And I rely heavily on Jessica Benjamin's work. My approach has been to use psychoanalytic concepts only when they facilitate understanding a particular issue or problem. For a study such as this, to rely 100% on psychoanalysis would be theoretically untenable. For a good discussion of the limitations of psychoanalytic approaches to male masochism, see Savran's critique of Kaja Silverman, pp. 9-10.
subject. I will then supplement Savran's broad account with Foucault's theory of "subjectivization," Jessica Benjamin's psychoanalytic account of intersubjectivity, and Lauren Goodlad's melding of the two in her argument about feminist self-disciplinary self-making. I will then put forth a reading of male self-disciplinary individualism in nineteenth century Britain, showing how and why this mode of self-fashioning created conditions of possibility for the male masochistic fantasies that are the object of my study.

In *Taking it Like a Man: White Masculinity, Masochism, and Contemporary American Culture*, David Savran boldly asserts that masochism "is not the perversion that late-nineteenth century sexologists considered it to be [...] It is, rather, part of the very structure of male subjectivity as it was consolidated in western Europe during the early modern period" (10). Savran argues that the late seventeenth century witnessed an historical break in western discourses of pain, pleasure, discipline, and self-making. He takes discourses on pedagogical flagellation as exemplary of this shift. According to Savran, in early modern England pedagogical flagellation was practiced with abandon, but in the late 1600s, its value began to be questioned and new methods of pedagogical discipline advocated. 7 One of the most influential texts describing these methods was John Locke's *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693). In this best-selling work, Locke argues that "Beating, by constant Observation, is found to do little good" (qtd. in Savran 21). Locke devalues corporal punishment because it

contributes not at all to the Mastery of our Natural Propensity to indulge

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7 As I will discuss in my chapter on Swinburne, pedagogical flagellation continued to be practiced well into the nineteenth century.
Corporal and present Pleasure, and to avoid Pain at any rate; but rather encourages it; and thereby strengthens that in us, which is the Root from whence spring all Vitious Actions, and Irregularities of Life. From what other Motive, but of sensual Pleasure and Pain, does a Child act by, who drudges at his Book against his inclination, or abstains from eating unwholesome Fruit, that he takes Pleasure in, only out of Fear of whipping? (qtd. in Savran 21)

By contrast, Locke argues that education must help students "master" their "Natural Propensity" to indulge pleasure and avoid pain. In place of physical pains of the rod, Locke advocates psychological techniques that will encourage students to internalize pleasures and pains. Internal psychological discipline substitutes for literal physical discipline. As Savran argues,

Locke disparages the traditional system of punishment in favor of holding up for the child the promises of "Esteem and Disgrace," which he calls "the most powerful Incentives to the Mind." Furthermore, he urges these be bestowed "not as particular Rewards and Punishments," but that they be internalized by the child as positive and negative ideals. The disdain or honor of others brings one "into a state of Disgrace or Commendation."

(22)

The child is further taught to practice self-denial and self-discipline by not indulging in immediate pleasure. Rather, the child must bear present pain in order to avoid the pain of "Disgrace" and achieve pleasure in the future, or "Esteem." The self-regulating student,
therefore, is schooled in how to transform the painful drudgery of study into the pleasures of "Esteem," as well as the (pleasurable) avoidance of painful "Disgrace." In sum, Savran suggests that for Locke, inculcating self-discipline in children is a process of teaching them how to remake pain into pleasure (21).

Savran argues that this Lockean self-regulating and self-disciplining subject of pedagogy is of a piece with the Freudian "moral masochist." Moral masochism is characterized by feelings of guilt and derives from a sadistic superego, one that has "become harsh, cruel, and inexorable against the ego which is in its charge" (Freud, "The Economic Problem in Masochism" 264). As the Lockean subject internalizes ideals of "Esteem" and "Disgrace," the subject of moral masochism internalizes figures of authority in the form of a harsh, punishing superego. Usually this subject internalizes the authority of the parents, resulting in a reactivation of the Oedipal complex. So as the Lockean subject transforms pain into pleasure, Freud's moral masochist transforms guilt into sexual pleasure \textit{vis-à-vis} a reawakening of Oedipal conflicts. In line with Theodor Reik, Leo Bersani, and Kaja Silverman, Savran argues that Freudian moral masochism is a defining trait of the modern male western subject. Unlike these psychoanalytic critics, however, Savran argues that the male moral masochist is not a universal given, but an "historical production" that is "founded on the confounding of pleasure and pain" (24). Savran concludes that the masochistic self-disciplining subject he identifies developed to meet the needs of modern capitalist, bureaucratic society.

While Savran's paradigm is provocative, it is not fully convincing because it fails to theorize adequately the connections between psychological processes and historical
conditions. For example, Savran claims that the self-disciplining moral masochist is coextensive with such diverse entities as the Althusserian subject of ideology (26), and "the liberal humanist subject" (24), Foucault's subject of panoptical power (23). This last linkage is particularly specious. Self-conscious subjects of education and moral masochism are not at all complementary with Foucaultian "docile bodies" that are subjected to disciplinary power. Foucault's objects of discipline are incapable of the sorts of psychic internalizations that Savran claims occur in the Lockean pedagogical subject/Freudian moral masochist. Because of this overly large theoretical sweep, Savran's analysis falters in trying to explain how the subject who disciplines himself and transforms pleasure into pain is precisely the modern Western bourgeois male subject.

However, I believe that what Savran locates in the Lockean/Freudian subject's self-regulatory transformation of pain into pleasure can be redescribed as what Foucault calls a process of "subjectivization." In his late work, Foucault recognized that his earlier work (primarily Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality Vol. 1) had failed to address the issue of how "a human being turns him -- or herself -- into a subject" (Foucault, "The Subject" 208). To remedy this lack, Foucault begins to theorize "subjectivization," which he defines as "the procedure by which one obtains the constitution of a subject, or more precisely, of a subjectivity which is... only one of the given possibilities of organization of a self-consciousness" ("The Return of Morality" 253). Subjectivization involves "procedures" that Foucault calls "arts of existence" and "techniques of the self" (The Use of Pleasure 11). Critical analysis of these techniques requires looking "for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself.
qua subject" (6) and "those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, to make their life an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria" (11).

This shift in Foucault's thought on subjectivity -- from object of disciplinary power to self-conscious, self-creating subject -- allows his theories to be put in dialogue with psychoanalytic accounts of subject-constitution. Remember that the Lockean subject who comes to know and create himself through self-discipline always does so through relations with others and through psychic internalization -- through teacher/student relationships that both exist in external reality and as the internalized "ideals" of "Esteem" and "Disgrace." The Lockean subject's process of "subjectivization" is therefore an intersubjective process since his subjectivity has "always already transcended the bounds of subjectivity" (Habermas 100). Jessica Benjamin offers a post-Freudian object-relations account of the paths toward intersubjectivity. Building on Hegel and Freud (and showing the influence of Habermas) Benjamin argues that subjectivity is formed from two contradictory impulses: the desire for self assertion versus the desire for recognition by the other, which entails dependency on the other. In true intersubjectivity these two impulses exist in tension. The other is recognized not only as an element of the self's fantasy life or as the one whose recognition validates the self's existence; the other also exists as a part of external reality in his or her own right (Like Subjects 30). Such true intersubjectivity is extremely difficult to achieve; Benjamin calls it "a moment of rare innocence, the recovery of a lost paradise" (Bonds 76). It is founded on mutual recognition: "recognition begins
with the other's confirming response, which tells us that we have created meaning, had an impact, revealed an intention... Recognition between persons is essentially mutual. By our very enjoyment of the other's confirming response, we recognize her in return" (Like Subjects 33). Through mutual recognition, self and other experience each other as part of "shared reality" (41).

The problem for Benjamin is that the structures of "mutuality" organizing intersubjectivity tend to break down into structures of "complementarity," which she defines as "the relationship of giver and taker, doer and done to, powerful and powerless" (Like Subjects 43). These dominatory structures tend toward numbness and exhaustion since they offer no real possibility of mutual recognition. Here Benjamin's debt to Hegel is apparent; she writes, "If I ensnare the other, there is no one to recognize me, for if I allow him no independent consciousness, I become enmeshed with a dead, not-conscious being" (Bonds 53). As a consequence of this intersubjective breakdown, the self over-invests in the intrapsychic. Benjamin describes this process:

The other's reality does not come into view [and in the self] a defensive process of internalization takes place [...] What cannot be worked through and dissolved with the outside other is transposed into the drama of internal objects, shifting from the domain of the intersubjective into the domain of the intrapsychic. (Like Subjects 40)

Benjamin notes that while "all experience is elaborated intrapsychically," when the reality of the other is negated "experience becomes almost exclusively intrapsychic" (40).

Benjamin does value intrapsychic imaginative fantasy, writing that without it we would
witness "a triumph of the external, a terrifying psychic vacuity, an end to creativity altogether" (48). Yet for her, "It is the loss of balance between the intrapsychic and the intersubjective, that is the problem" (40).

Lauren Goodlad adapts Foucault and Benjamin's theories of the subject in an argument that teases out a form of feminist agency implicated in disciplinarity: "self-making as self-discipline." She works out this project in a reading of Austen's Sense and Sensibility. This novel portrays "a society that has abandoned the public good in favor of the pursuit of private happiness" (69). As a consequence, in Benjamin's terms, this society affords no mutual recognition between "like subjects." To compensate for this lack, Elinor Dashwood enacts "self-making as self-discipline" as an "internalized defense" (69). Her self-discipline entails "self-abnegating masochism," which, following Benjamin, Goodlad understands as an intrasubjective compensation for the breakdown of intersubjectivity (71). Taking Elinor as exemplary of "self-disciplinary self-making," Goodlad concludes that "Disciplinary individualism... describes the historical conditions of possibility for a subject who, failing to find or to found an intersubjective community, compensates by becoming mistress of herself [...] To thus subject herself, the self-making feminist simultaneously posits herself as the 'mistress' of other dominatory narratives -- colonialist, nationalist, or domestic" (77).

This argument about feminist self-disciplinary self-making can, I believe, help us understand bourgeois masculine self-fashioning in the early and mid-Victorian years. The failure of Victorian society at this time to "found an intersubjective community" largely accounts for a feeling we have come to know, one expressed by many period writers:
alienation. Matthew Arnold sums up this feeling in the memorable phrase "wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born" 8 Such alienation was not a symptom of timeless existential angst, but a product of history. The early Victorian years witnessed a crisis in bourgeois masculinity. In 1831 Carlyle described this crisis: "The old ideal of Manhood has grown obsolete, and the new is still invisible to us, and we grope after it in darkness, one clutching this phantom, another that" (qtd. in Adams 1). The sweeping socio-political and economic changes that characterized the early and mid-Victorian years caused old models of masculine identity, authority, and relatedness to break down, leaving middle-class men at sea, ironically at the very historical moment when they were trying to take the helm of English political, economic, and social life. Early and mid-Victorian society was unable to produce, in Benjamin's terms, communities of intersubjective mutual recognition that would leave middle-class men secure in their social positions and certain of their identities. Consequently, these men, "wandering" in confusion and "groping" after new ideals, felt alienated from each other, from their world, and often from themselves.

Each writer I consider articulates the failure of intersubjectivity differently, but in the works of each we see men standing alone, unable to access a "shared reality" of mutual recognition that will "make... meaningful the feelings, intentions, and actions of the self [and enable] the self to realize its agency and authorship in a tangible way" (Benjamin, Bonds 12). In Carlyle, economic crisis, the structures of liberal democracy, and laissez faire economics combine to create a nation of men who exist as monads, disconnected

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8 "Stanzas from the Grand Chartreuse" 85-86. Arnold 187.
from each other, unable to realize their identities through creative work or relations with other men. In Tennyson, religious doubt (created by scientific discoveries) and gendered norms of mourning isolate the poet in a world of grief that comes to be problematic because it risks being perceived as inauthentic. In Dickens, the "Beat or cringe" world of social class hierarchy preempts the possibilities of mutual recognition offered by a democratized gentlemanly ideal. Swinburne sees men as limited by stifling gender norms and rules of decorum, as well as existing in a dark, godless universe of coldness and cruelty.

In response to the failure of early and mid-Victorian society to establish intersubjective community, many male writers began to advocate new styles of manhood that emphasized self-discipline as a kind of "subjectivizing" or self-making that would constitute, affirm and authorize emergent middle-class male authority. This self-disciplinary manhood was defined against an ideal of Romantic masculinity that valued effusions of feeling, and a certain eighteenth-century ideal of aristocratic manhood that allowed and expected uncontrolled expression of sensual and sexual desires as the hallmark of manhood. From the 1830s onward, both of these older ideals were increasingly viewed as effeminate and dangerous to social relations. Beginning in the 1830s, new forms of masculine self-fashioning deployed self-discipline as a remedy for the alienation that otherwise threatened to leave men unrecognized, disconnected, uncertain, "wandering between two worlds." To adopt Goodlad's terms, having failed to "find or found an intersubjective community," the Victorian bourgeois self-disciplining man "masters" himself and in so doing claims social authority, positioning himself as "master"
of other Victorian narratives of domination, including patriarchal and class domination. These new definitions of self-disciplinary manhood therefore worked to solidify middle-class male authority.

For example, in *Victorian Masculinities* Herbert Sussman explores how middle-class writers and artists draw on images of monasticism as representative of a new kind of self-regulating manhood. Self-regulation of masculine energy was considered the hallmark of manhood, as Sussman argues: "what the Victorian middle-class termed 'manliness' was situated in developing what Foucault calls 'practices of the self' for properly regulating or managing [...] internal, natural energy" (11). The figure of the self-disciplining, ascetic monk is a kind of "limit case" through which Victorian middle-class writers and artists negotiate the contradictions between their vocations and norms of sexuality, gender, and economics. As such, monastic figures body forth the tensions and anxieties of Victorian masculinity, especially insofar as artistic creation was reserved for men, but often seen as "unmanly." However, as Sussman argues, figures of monasticism also "represent early Victorian ways of resolving this paradox, becoming figures for a masculine poetic situated within a community of men and grounded in the values and activities of normative bourgeois masculinity" (7). Framing this argument more broadly, Sussman writes that while early Victorian "social formations of the masculine created conflict, anxiety, tension... in spite of the stress, men accepted these formations as a form of self-policing crucial to patriarchal domination" (9, emphasis added).

James Eli Adams, in *Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Masculinity*, makes a similar argument about masculine self-discipline. Like Sussman, he examines the
ways that masculine intellectual labor appeared "unmanly"; that is, how "a wide array of
Victorian intellectual vocations [...] came to resemble models of feminine activity and
authority, particularly the 'influence' assigned to domestic women" (1). In response,
writers as diverse as Carlyle, Tennyson, Kingsley, Arnold, Newman, Pater, and Dickens
attempt to authorize their intellectual labor as manly by appealing to models of masculine
identity represented as "the incarnation of an ascetic regimen, an elaborately articulated
program of self-discipline. As such, [these writers] lay claim to the capacity for self-
discipline as a distinctly masculine attribute, and in their different ways embody
masculinity as virtuoso asceticism" (2). More generally, Adams suggests that from the
1830s, self-discipline is increasingly presented as a middle-class, male trait, while women
are "relegated to the netherland that Nancy Cott has called 'passionlessness' " (7), and so
unable to deploy self-discipline as self-making, since to be able to regulate desire one must
first be capable feeling of it. Adams further argues that women are left out the economy of
"virtuoso asceticism" because period discourses of gender distinguished between
masculine "aggressive self-mastery" and "feminine self-denial" which involves the "static
surrender of the will to external authority." 9 Adams takes as representative of self-
disciplinary masculinity Charles Kingsley's statement in Westward Ho!: "The prerogative
of a man is to bold against himself!" (qtd. in Adams 7). In such a regime of ascetic self-
discipline, men are able to do more than claim patriarchal authority; they are able to effect
a kind of self-creation or "subjectivization." to boldly "Locate in the capacity for self-

9 Adams 8-9. Adams further notes that because of this distinction, female efforts to use self-discipline as self-
making were considered suspect, as is often the case with George Eliot's heroines.
discipline a charisma that seems to emanate from a rich interiority or 'deep' subjectivity commonly associated with romantic selfhood" (14).

Adams notes that Kingsleyean self-discipline frequently verges on self-destructive masochistic suffering. He suggestively writes that "The figure of male suffering occupies a powerful boundary position within the structures of Victorian gender" (147). However, Adams does not fully articulate the relation between "virtuoso asceticism " and suffering, or the eroticized suffering of masochism. In my view, early and mid-Victorian styles of self-disciplinary self-fashioning create conditions of possibility for masochistic fantasy. But why?

First, why fantasy? As I have shown, early and mid-Victorian masculinities were plagued by various social forces that tended to militate against the mutual recognition that could produce a viable intersubjective community. In response and to compensate for failed intersubjectivity, the authors I consider elaborate solutions intrapsychically, as textual fantasies. Carlyle's fantasy takes the form of a utopian vision of an all-male society; Tennyson's is articulated through the poet's eroticized world of private grief; Dickens' fantasy is embodied in Pip's masochistically-charged inner world of guilt; Swinburne's fantasy floats freely through his poems in the submission of men to dominant, punishing women. Each fantasy is elaborated differently, but each functions as a wish-fulfilling replacement for the lost experiences of externality and mutual recognition.

But why do these fantasies take masochistic form? To reiterate, masculine self-disciplinary self-making was conceived as compensation for the lack of viable intersubjective community in early Victorian England. As men discipline themselves, they
claim social authority as "proper" men who can serve as "masters" of other dominatory narratives. The structures of self-disciplinary masculinity provide a psychic machinery for transforming pain into pleasure, a transformative process akin to the one Savran locates in the Lockean subject. The masochistic fantasies I consider emerge from within the structures of self-disciplinary masculinity. They foreground the transformation of pleasure into pain and bring its masochistic dimensions into the daylight. These fantasies lay bare the masochism that underwrites self-discipline, and by this show masculine self-disciplinary self-making to be an inherently unstable "technique of the self," one that can work to bely its own goals. First, it can produce its own brand of alienation in the form of excessive intrapsychic investments that symbolically resolve real-world conflicts, but may actually negate the complex realities involved. Second, such self-making creates the possibility that internal transformations of pain into pleasure will become libidinally desirable in themselves -- not so desirable in how they authorize male authority in the realm of social relations.

Yet as I have argued, these texts discipline their masochistic impulses in response to diverse ideological pressures. They enact prescribed masculine self-discipline by "taming" masochistic fantasy into more viable and culturally intelligible forms, ones more amenable to normative Victorian ideologies. This disciplinary movement allows these texts to claim status as "mainstream" Victorian works. Through this movement, these texts allegorize the process of male self-mastery as producing claims to social authority. This process of disciplinary authorization takes different forms: sometimes it is enacted in textual strategies, in transformation of a specific character, in narrative movements, or in
authorial extra-textual commentary. In Carlyle, it occurs in his careful formulation of the
Hero/Heroworshippe bond as desexualized and non-effeminizing. In Tennyson, it is
enacted as the poet's reworking of masochistic grief into religious "honest doubt." Dickens
represents this procedure by plotting Pip's emergence from masochistic guilt into
gentlemanly entitlement. Swinburne, though seldom thought of as "mainstream," through
various means rephallicizes the masculine "florid impotence" of his verse. In such diverse
ways, these texts plug themselves into the narrative of masculine self-discipline as self-
authorizing. However, as I will suggest, masochism remains to underwrite even the
"tamed," authorized versions of masculinity. Therefore, these texts document the
interimplication of validated masculine self-disciplinary self-fashioning and proscribed
male masochism.

Chapter Overview: Four Faces of Victorian Male Masochistic Fantasy

I begin with Thomas Carlyle's model of "Hero-worship" as outlined in Sartor
Resartus, Past and Present, and On Heroes. Carlyle's call for men to submit to the "Hero"
can seem disturbingly proto-fascist. While taking account of this authoritarian tenor, I
argue that Hero-worship represents an attempt to fantasize a solution to the "Condition of
England" question. For Carlyle, early-Victorian capitalism and emergent liberal democracy
produce men as self-asserting and autonomous, but also monadic and disconnected. Hero-
worship proposes to reconnect Victorian men to each other through male bonding
practiced as male bondage: the submission of "naturally" inferior men to their "natural"
superiors, "Heroes." The bonding/bondage that energizes Hero-worship is spiritualized. Its
eroticism is highly repressed, as Carlyle projects sexuality in general onto women, racial others, and failed men who populate an abject realm of sexuality, pollution, and chaos that is anathema to the ordered male world Carlyle envisions. However, abjected sexuality reemerges as an encoded homoerotics that allows us to read Hero-worship through theories of sadomasochism. I examine it in light of Benjamin's work, which suggests that sadomasochistic fantasy attempts to achieve intersubjective mutual recognition through master/slave role playing. Such intersubjective recognition is what Carlyle thinks Hero-worship will give Englishmen. However, to maintain the intersubjective tension that will ensure the vitality of the Hero/Heroworshipper bond, Carlyle is compelled to recover a tincture of self-assertion for his submissive Hero-worshipper. This recovery is further necessitated by early-Victorian gender ideologies (influenced by Carlyle's own "Gospel of Work") that stress active masculine self-creation and self-assertion.

Next I explore Tennyson's *In Memoriam A.H.H.*, a long poem whose cries of grief and pain contrast sharply with Carlyle's bravado. *In Memoriam* has usually been read as exemplifying the nineteenth century "Crisis of Faith," which entailed religious doubt precipitated by scientific discoveries. More recently, critics have examined the homoeroticism inherent in the poet's longing for his dead friend Hallam. In this chapter I bridge these two approaches by showing how religion and eroticism converge in "love that hurts." The poet attempts to keep his grief for Hallam alive by exacerbating it. He figures love as coincident with and aggrandized by pain. This "love that hurts" generates fantasies of gender bending and self-shattering that enable the speaker to imagine himself bonded to Hallam's spirit in spite of his doubts about a religious afterlife. However, these fantasies
run up against Victorian ideologies of manhood and mourning that require emotional discipline and reserve. Moreover, the poet's grief risks being perceived as inauthentic according to norms of masculinity that repudiate self-conscious theatricality.

Consequently, *In Memoriam* disciplines the poet's grief by morphing it into ideologically viable and validated structures of feeling that are nevertheless colored by masochism: the economic idea of deferred gratification and "honest doubt" structured by moral masochism. I conclude this chapter with a few remarks connecting *In Memoriam* to Tennyson's other long poem in which male suffering takes center stage: *Maud: a Monodrama*. Like the elegy, *Maud* links issues of male masochism to broad socio-historical issues. However, *Maud* is far less sanguine than *In Memoriam* about the possibilities offered by male masochistic fantasy.

Chapter IV also presents a skeptical take on the role of masochistic fantasy in Victorian society. The text is Dickens' *Great Expectations*, a definitive work on Victorian gentlemanliness; the object of inquiry is the intense guilt felt by Pip, Dickens' representative gentleman. Many analyses of Pip's much-remarked guilt have been insufficiently historical. By contrast, I read Pip's guilt in context of mid-nineteenth century ideals of the gentleman. Traditionally based mainly on social status, gentlemanliness by mid-century had become associated with moral qualities. Gentlemanliness offered development of a moral sensibility that would result in benevolent treatment of others, thereby promising to bond the self with others in the social world. Yet as I show in discussing the writings of Ruskin, Arnold, Newman, and Smiles, the gentlemanly ideal never disintricated itself from social distinction and elitism. This contradiction structures
Pip's aspirations to gentility. His moral sensibility causes him to feel guilty over social distinctions and snobbery. This guilt proves that he possesses the moral sensibility required by the gentlemanly ideal. However, Pip's guilt also energizes a masochistic fantasy world that threatens to undo the bonds of human relations, belying the social goals of the gentlemanly ideal. In the end, Dickens does allow Pip to escape his world of masochistic guilt, but only by means of artificial closural devices. *Great Expectations* offers no neat resolutions to the contradictions of the gentlemanly ideal; rather, it shows that gentlemanly sensibility and sympathy yield paralyzing guilt over social divisions, enabling them to stand. *Great Expectations* therefore represents a pessimistic shift in Dickens' thought on the moral sympathy that underwrote the gentlemanly ideal, as well as many other Victorian responses to social inequity.

No study of male masochism in the Victorian period would be complete without Swinburne. Early in life Swinburne lost faith in a compassionate, humane God who presides over an orderly and benevolent universe. Consequently, he came to see the world as founded on pain, suffering, and cruelty. Yet Swinburne's interest in pain was not only intellectual. He read the work of the Marquis de Sade; he patronized prostitutes who flogged him; he corresponded with others of the same sexual tastes; he wrote pornographic flagellant poetry. Many critics ignore these facts or only take note of them dismissively and judgmentally. In this chapter I treat Swinburne's work as an entry point into the mind of a Victorian flagellant. Many Victorian men of the middle and upper-classes shared Swinburne's taste for erotic flagellation, a taste often inaugurated by the brutal corporal punishment practiced in the public schools. Yet as Ian Gibson suggests,
"What makes Swinburne different from that system's other victims is that he wrote about the obsession and tried to understand it" (135). I focus on Swinburne's Poems and Ballads of 1866, a volume of verse that scandalized mid-Victorian readers with its celebration of frank, unbridled sensuality and its portrayal of love as ecstatic agony based on coldness and cruelty. These poems self-consciously rebel against the limitations of Victorian gender ideologies and rules of decorum. In Swinburne's verse, eroticization of suffering and pain produce fantasies of "florid impotence," or aestheticized, non-phallic, masochistic masculinity. Swinburne plays with this model's attractive possibilities: it offers a superflux of sensual and sexual thrills and feelings of intense bonding or even mergence with the other. At its most extreme, "florid impotence" threatens to shatter the masochistic male subject. Despite his attraction to this model, Swinburne only flirts with the possibilities it offers, and ultimately recovers conventional masculine ideals. This flirtation/recuperation trajectory is apparent as well in Swinburne's larger body of work and in his published commentary on Poems and Ballads. So while Swinburne consciously rebels against Victorian norms of gender and sexuality, his seemingly subversive masochistic postures work to recover normative ideals of manliness. In line with this analysis, and drawing on recent feminist analysis of commercial S/M sex work (in particular the analyses of Anne McClintock), I postulate that the proliferation of sadomasochistic pornography and prostitution among middle and upper-class Victorian men did offer a certain subversion of the Victorian sex-gender system, but ultimately reinforced the terms of its discourse.
Chapter II

Male Bonding as Male Bondage: Thomas Carlyle's Hero-Worship and
the Condition of England

It is well known that Thomas Carlyle's thought and personal force exerted great
influence over the intellectual life of Victorian Britain. Although Carlyle after the 1840s
grew increasingly eccentric, volatile, dogmatic and intellectually stunted, at the same time
he was worshipped as embodying cherished Victorian values of moral fervor, energetic
work, and duty. Many younger writers and intellectuals -- including Tennyson, Mazzini,
Clough, Froude, Emerson, and Margaret Fuller -- paid homage to the "Sage of Chelsea."
In the early Victorian years, though, Carlyle's cultural position was quite different: vital,
vibrant, challenging, iconoclastic, topical. For example, when On Heroes was published in
1841, Carlyle's name "was running like wildfire through the British Islands and through
English-speaking America; there was the utmost avidity for his books [...] especially
among the young men; phrases from them were in all the young men's mouths" ¹ This
popularity makes Carlyle's body of work a rich site for examining ideals of masculinity in
the early Victorian period, since, as Sussman cogently states, "for Carlyle the Condition of
England question is primarily the Condition of Manliness question" (62).

In truth, Carlyle pays almost no attention to the other great "question" of his time:
the "Woman Question." Women in his texts are marginal, rather shadowy figures, mainly
significant in how they affect men, or invested with sexual perversity and pollution. For

¹ David Masson Carlyle Personally and in His Writings, 1885. Quoted in On Heroes, ed. Goldberg, et. al.
bxiii
example, the character Blumine in *Sartor Resartus* represents the possibility of romantic love that temporarily distracts the main character, Teufelsdröckh, on his spiritual journey. In *Past and Present*, the Irish widow’s tragic death from typhus exemplifies Carlyle’s more general point about lack of connection in English society. Carlyle says nothing about her plight as a woman, or as Irish, for that matter. Most biographers believe that Carlyle was anxiously conflicted about women and sexuality, a fact that explains his attraction to the ascetic, monastic world for models of masculinity. \(^2\) There, male sexual energies could be sublimated into devotion, service, work, and obedience to other men. The implicit erotic components of such male bonds of obedience are my subject here.

Writing in the early Victorian years, Thomas Carlyle envisioned an invigorated, spiritualized male bonding as the utopian fantasy solution to the "Condition of England" question. Male bonding in the Victorian period has been provocatively analyzed by Eve Sedgwick. Her influential work *Between Men* proposes that male bonding in 18th and 19th century England took place along a "male homosocial continuum" that was fractured by homophobia. Consequently, bonds between men needed to be purged of any hint of homoeroticism, so they were mediated through women in the erotic triangle. This structure not only heterosexualized male bonds, it also displaced potentially dangerous male rivalries in business and politics onto sexual rivalry over women, thereby channeling libidinal energy disruptive to the male homosocial world into less threatening currents. Moreover, the erotic triangle buttressed the patriarchal gender system that underwrote

\(^2\) Carlyle’s relationship with his intelligent, gifted wife Jane Welsh Carlyle was itself fraught. He suffered from ill health, and there is some evidence that he was impotent. On this, see Symons 100-105.
male homosociality, in that it reduced women to objects of exchange between men.³

Because Carlyle excludes women from his fantasized world of men, he does not describe male bonding that occurs between men through women because of homophobia. Indeed, women, racial others, and certain kinds of failed men populate an abject realm that is excluded from Carlyle's ideal all-male world. In this fantasy world, bonding occurs directly between men through relations of dominance and submission. Carlyle works out this model in Sartor Resartus, Past and Present, and On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History. These three works contain almost all to Carlyle's major ideas, including those on Englishness, manliness, and male bonding. Carlyle envisions male bonding as male bondage: the submission of naturally inferior men to their natural superiors, "Heroes." He labels this structure of dominance, submission and obedience "Hero-Worship," and calls for it to organize the male homosocial bonding of a utopian English society.

The authoritarian tenor of Hero-worship has long been suspect in that it seems to anticipate fascism. ⁴ However, a reading of Carlyle as part of a tradition extending through Nietzsche to Hitler is specious; Carlyle did influence Nietzsche to some degree, but the latter's "übermensch" is "beyond good and evil," while Carlyle's "Hero," as subordinate to God's will, is fully imbricated in moral frameworks. Moreover, it hardly seems fair to judge these thinkers harshly because fascists of the twentieth century twisted their ideas

⁴ For such a reading, see Bentley, A Century of Hero-Worship.
around to support heinous socio-political agendas. Hitler would not qualify as a Carlylean hero, any more than a blond, blue-eyed Aryan embodied the Nietzschean Superman.

While the association of Carlyle with fascism is unwarranted, Hero-worship does have certain regressive cultural implications when viewed in historical context. As I mentioned, it is based on misogyny. Furthermore, it is easily mapped onto nineteenth century racist and imperialist ideologies, a connection Carlyle made himself in "Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question." At home in Britain, Hero-worship's call for authoritarian rule offered support for anti-democratic politics and continued exploitation of the working classes, as Goldberg writes:

The heroic governor as an alternative to Victorian democracy had an obvious appeal to those Victorians who associated democratic aspiration with revolutionary turmoil and mob violence. For many people the Chartist movement in the 1840s awakened memories of the French Revolution and provided an immediate focus and urgency to Carlylean calls for the emergence of new Cromwells and Napoleons. They shared Carlyle's hope that the heroic leader would be a bulwark against social disintegration, and that hero-worship, by evoking loyalty for a common leader, would counteract the antisocial forces of personal rather than communal ambition. (Ivxiii)

Although Carlyle's views are conservative at best and disturbing at worst, anyone who knows his work has realized that it refuses to fit neatly into political categories. For example, Carlylean Hero-worship runs counter to early-Victorian ideologies of manhood
in its call for England to become a nation of submissive men. In this chapter I hope to recuperate some of the subversive potential lurking within the model of Hero-worship. I argue that Hero-worship represents an attempt to imagine a more intense and secure male bonding than was allowed by available norms of manhood in Carlyle's time. Since Hero-worship is a fantasy of achieving connection through dominance and submission, I believe it can be viewed as sadomasochistic. Hero-worship is not explicitly sexualized; in fact, its eroticism is highly repressed and diffused, but nevertheless present as an encoded homoerotics: an abject sexuality that reappears unbidden, as the abject is wont to do. This kernel of sexuality justifies reading Hero-worship through theories of sadomasochism. Carlyle's Hero, of course, is not a sadist in the popular sense of one who enjoys inflicting pain. Neither is his Hero-worshipper one who simply takes "pleasure in pain." S/M is not just about whips, restraints, and nipple clamps; rather in fantasy and practice it literalizes and sexualizes repressed fantasies about power, dominance and submission. Therefore, theories that explain S/M can also illuminate what is at stake in the power differentials that organize Carlylean Hero-worship. Hero-worship is a relational structure, so in examining its psycho-dynamics I employ theories of intersubjectivity, in particular, those of Benjamin, who takes an object-relations approach to sadomasochistic fantasy in order to elucidate its intersubjective mechanisms. In Benjamin's view, S/M fantasy attempts to achieve intersubjectivity and mutual recognition through master/slave role playing. Such intersubjective recognition is what Carlyle thinks Hero-worship will give Englishmen: a fuller, more secure, truer sense of connection with others than that provided by laissez faire economics or emergent liberal democracy. In Carlyle's view these forms of socio-
economic organization presume and produce the individual as self-contained, self-asserting, and autonomous, but also isolated, monadic, disconnected from others. So while Hero-worship has certain obviously regressive implications, it is nevertheless an attempt to fantasize a way forward out of the alienation that haunts Victorian masculinity.

Moreover, that this fantasy of male bonding is achieved through dominance and submission positions it as a paradigm for understanding the dark side of Victorian masculinity and the bourgeois self-disciplinary individualism that shaped it: the submissive, self-abnegating, self-abasing, masochistic man, as well as the ubiquity of sadomasochistic fantasy in the period. Carlylean Hero-worship begins a tradition of Victorian writing that challenges hegemonic norms of manliness by exploring the attractions and possibilities offered by male masochism. While on one hand these literary fantasies offer possibilities of connection achieved through submission, abandonment of self (what Carlyle calls renunciation or entsagen) they also, and at times simultaneously, offer a kind of self-assertion or partial recuperation of phallic masculinity. As I will show, this duality is explored in later writings of Tennyson, Dickens, and Swinburne.

The Englishman as Fashion Victim

To explain how this conception of male bonding plays out in Carlyle's later, overtly political works Past and Present and On Heroes, it is necessary to explain its philosophical underpinnings in Sartor Resartus. This early work, published in 1833-34, translates as "the tailor tailored." It is the fictional autobiography of a German philosopher, Professor Diogenes Teufelsdröckh of Weissnichtwo (translation: "Professor God-born Devil's Dung
of Know-Not Where"), who is Professor of "Things in General." Sartor Resartus both tells
the story of Teufelsdröckh's life and explains his philosophical system, the "Philosophy of
Clothes." This biographical-philosophical method allowed Carlyle to make erudite German
philosophy accessible and even entertaining to an English audience. In doing so, Carlyle
laid out his own philosophical system as well, derived from post-Kantian German Idealism
(e.g. Novalis, Fichte, Schelling) and fused with the Calvinism in which he had been
raised. 5 C.F. Harrold sums up Carlyle's borrowings from German philosophy: "Mind, or
Spirit is the true power; material things and organization are but the evidence and means
of that power; and the more subtle the means the nearer they are to the spiritual" and the
"Divine Idea [is] in the act of being embodied in nature and in man's history." 6

This relationship between the material and the ideal informs the "Philosophy of
Clothes." The two tenets of this philosophy are, Carlyle writes: "First, that Man is a Spirit,
and bound by invisible bonds to All Men; Secondly, that he wears Clothes, which are the
visible emblems of that fact." (48). Carlyle uses clothing as a metaphor for everything in
the material world that bodies forth abstractions such as the moral imperative or the divine
within man. He argues:

       All visible things are Emblems; what thou seest is not there on its own
       account; strictly taken, is not there at all: Matter exists only spiritually, and
to represent some Idea, and body it forth. Hence Clothes, as despicable as

5 On Carlyle's German influences, see C.F. Harrold Carlyle and German Thought and Elizabeth Vida
Romantic Affinities: German Authors and Carlyle.

6 Sartor Resartus, ed. Harrold, 180. All further references to Sartor Resartus are to the edition edited by
McSweeney and Sabor.
we think them, are so unspeakably significant... all Emblematic things are
properly Clothes. thought-woven or hand-woven. (56)

In fact, men's bodies are themselves a kind of clothing, as Carlyle argues: "what is Man
himself, and his whole terrestrial Life, but an Emblem; a Clothing or visible Garment for
that divine ME of his?[...] Thus is he said also to be clothed with a body" (57). Most
people mistakenly believe that "clothes make the man," or that visible, material emblems
are themselves important, and that they comprise the essence of human nature, a view
Carlyle chastises: "Perhaps not once in a lifetime does it occur to your ordinary biped, of
any country or generation, be he gold-mantled Prince or russet- jerkined Peasant, that his
Vestments and his Self are not one and indivisible, that he is naked, without vestments, till
he buy or steal such, and by forethought sew or button them" (45).

In Sartor Resartus Carlyle also preaches the "Gospel of Work," which is one part
Goethe, one part Calvinism. Carlyle joins Goethe's belief in the importance of action
(summed up by "in the beginning was the Deed" from Faust) with Calvinism's emphasis on
work as the inherent, inescapable condition of humanity. Carlyle writes: "Yes here in this
poor, miserable, hampered, despicable Actual, wherein thou even now standest, here or
nowhere is thy Ideal: work it out therefrom; and working, believe, live, be free! Fool! The
Ideal is in thyself" (149). In action man realizes his true nature as embodiment and emblem
of the divine; he works out the Ideal. Such work is required because the divine within man
is a dynamic, ever-changing force that must be emblematized by a similarly dynamic
outward presentation: work. Moreover, the Gospel of Work guarantees that emblems, or
clothes, will not become important in themselves, but that the process itself of tailoring
and retailoring oneself will be. Carlyle's exhorts the men of England: "Be no longer a Chaos, but a World, or even Worldkin. Produce! Produce!" (149). Carlyle demands not just that one produce something in the world, but that, through work, one produce identity itself. One must make himself into a "World, or even Worldkin." Identity must be a constant process of becoming, not of simply being -- an active and constant self-creation and reinvention -- hence, "the tailor retailored."

The Philosophy of Clothes and the Gospel of Work are themselves reworked in Past and Present. Published in 1843, ten years after Sartor Resartus, Past and Present contrasts the dire state of England in the "hungry forties" with life in the twelfth century monastery of St. Edmunds bury. Past and Present represents a practical application of the philosophical ideas laid out in Sartor Resartus, specifically to English male identity and its bearing on the larger "Condition of England." The "Philosophy of Clothes" is retailored in Past and Present as the metaphor of "Formulas." Carlyle writes of the importance of Formulas:

Formulas too, as we call them, have a reality in Human Life. They are real as the very skin and muscular tissue of a Man's Life; and a most blessed indispensable thing, so long as they have vitality withal, and are a living skin and tissue to him! No man... can go abroad and do business with the world without skin and tissues. (128)

Carlyle believes that "Formulas," like clothes, are a fundamental principle of existence. "a reality in Human Life," as natural as Man's embodiment in "skin and muscular tissue."

Although Formulas take different forms according to time and place, their importance
remains constant. Carlyle stresses their role in determining identity: "[T]he wise man too speaks, and acts, in Formulas; all men do [...] There is no mortal extant [...] but lives all skinned, thatched, covered over with Formulas, and is [...] held in from delirium and the Inane by his Formulas" (129-130). Formulas, as they construct the materiality of the body, must make it "a living one, and the heart-pulse everywhere discernible through it" (131).

Carlyle further specifies how this model of identity creation relates to Englishness. He considers Englishness to be a Formula, or "second skin," writing:

This English Nationality, whatsoever from uncounted ages is genuine and a fact among thy native People, and their words and ways: all this, has it not made for thee a skin or second-skin, adhesive actually as thy natural skin? This thou hast not stript off, this thou wilt never strip off: the humour that thy mother gave thee has to shew itself through this. (129)

Moreover, if Englishness is a kind of clothing -- a "second-skin" -- it is one that is bodied forth in action and work. The Gospel of Work informs Carlyle's version of Englishness: the English are for Carlyle "a dumb people [who] can do great acts, but not describe them." In a garrulous diatribe on the virtues of silence, Carlyle vaunts his representative Englishman: the "Man of Practice," describing him as "thick-skinned, seemingly opaque, perhaps sulky [...] cloudy-browed, thick-soled [...] in silence mainly, with here and there a low grunt or growl [in] the Doable... you find him there!" (160-161). Carlyle likes him: he works, he does things, he makes things happen. His Englishness is a "second skin" materialized on his body by enacting the Gospel of Work. Clearly, Formulas are analogous to clothes, and the "second skin" of Englishness, as a Formula, is a kind of clothing.
The problem with England in the 1840s, as Carlyle further argues in *Past and Present*, is that the social class system, burgeoning liberal democracy, *laissez faire* economics, and the "cash nexus" have been fetishized, mistakenly taken as important in themselves. Yet they are in fact clothes or "second skins" that miserably fail to embody the divine nature of man and his spiritual connection with others. Indeed, Carlyle is quite right to observe that the "Condition of England" in the 1840s was condition of division. In *Past and Present* Carlyle describes England as fractured into three classes: the landowning aristocracy and gentry (the "Unworking Aristocracy"), the wealthy capitalists ("Captains of Industry"), and the working poor (whom he calls the "Chartists"). Tensions between these groups over repealing the Corn Laws had reached critical pitch by the early 1840s. Enacted in 1815, the Corn Laws were designed to protect domestic agriculture from foreign competition through high tariffs on imported grain. In this protected market, the price of bread climbed: in 1841-42, a loaf of bread cost on the average a shilling, while "Agricultural laborers commonly earned nine or ten shillings a week, miners fifteen, and artisans in the building trades eighteen shillings for a (64-hour) week" (Altick vi). Workers were understandably enraged over this state of affairs and in July and August of 1842 expressed their discontent in a series of riots centered mainly in the industrial Midlands, but extending to Scotland and Wales as well. Industrialists likewise favored repeal of the Corn Laws as stimulating to trade overall, and found themselves oddly aligned on this point with their workers. On the other hand, the wealthy landowners of the aristocracy

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7 Richard Altick in his Introduction to *Past and Present* (vii) observes that this last appellation is inaccurate, as the Chartists were a specific organized group that represented working class interests, but to which not all workers belonged. To be a "Chartist," for Carlyle, one simply had to be poor, rebellious, and hungry.
and gentry were determined to keep the Corn Laws in place to safeguard their socio-economic primacy. This group was represented by the Tory party, led by Sir Robert Peel, and aligned with the Church of England. Until 1846, the landowning class was successful is maintaining the Corn Laws because even though the Reform Bill of 1832 had remedied centuries of electoral corruption, in Parliament landowners remained over-represented, while the urban middle and upper-classes continued under-represented, and the working classes completely unrepresented. Hence Carlyle's mistrust of "the ballot box" as remedy for England's problems had practical as well as philosophical causes.

This state of class conflict was exacerbated by other economic factors in addition to the high price of bread. The "Condition of England" in the 1840s was dire indeed; as Altick describes: "Since 1836 England had been suffering from severe economic depression. There was a series of bad harvests, the price of bread was cruelly high, wages were falling, and unemployment was reducing hundreds of thousands of workers to pauperism" (Altick v). In 1842, one person in eleven was a pauper; in Manchester alone, 12000 families were supported by charity; in Birmingham, one-fifth of the population received poor relief (vi). The Poor Law Amendment of 1834 had promised to solve the problem of pauperism by abolishing outdoor relief and forcing the unemployed or unemployable into workhouses. The theory was that if conditions in the workhouse were almost unbearable, the poor would be motivated to seek work rather than relief. However, poor economic conditions caused pauperism to outstrip the government's ability to construct new workhouses. As a result, in 1842 there were far more paupers receiving outdoor relief than residing in workhouses, as Carlyle notes at the very opening of Past
and Present (7). Even for the employed, working conditions in industry and mining were harsh, brutal, virtually intolerable, as documented by parliamentary "blue book"
investigations that "revealed a state of affairs that shocked even the most indifferent" (x).

All of these factors form the "Condition of England" that Carlyle rails against. He opens Past and Present with this dark portrait of the nation's state:

The condition of England [...] is justly regarded as one of the most
ominous, and withal one of the strangest, ever seen in this world. England
is full of wealth, of multifarious produce, supply for human want of every
kind; yet England is dying of inanition. With unabated bounty the land of
England blooms and grows, waving with yellow harvests; thick-studded
with workshops, industrial implements, with fifteen millions of workers,
understood to be the strongest, the cunningest and willingest our Earth
ever had; these men are here; the work they have done [...] is here [but] Of
these successful skilful workers some two millions [...] sit in Workhouses,
Poor-law Prisons; or have "out-door relief flung over the wall to them." (7)

Not only is such poverty appallingly unjust and inhuman in itself, according to Carlyle, it
denies each man his fundamental right to realize himself through enacting the Gospel of
Work. As we have seen, doing so is, for Carlyle, crucial to identity-formation. Carlyle
believes that the laissez faire economic system is responsible for these conditions. He rails
against its failures, particularly its inability to connect men with one another: "The liberty
especially which has to purchase itself by social isolation, and each man standing separate
from the other, having 'no business with him' but a cash-account: this is such a liberty as
the Earth seldom saw" (218). For Carlyle, such social isolation is the cruelest fate:

"Isolation is the sum-total of wretchedness to man. To be cut off, to be left solitary: to have a world alien, not your world; all a hostile camp for you; not a home at all, of hearts and faces who are yours, whose are you!" (271). Carlyle abominates the lack of connection among the men of England, where class divisions prevent the spiritual connections of all men from being bodied forth in the material world. He writes, "Men cannot live isolated: we are all bound together, for mutual good or else for mutual misery, as living nerves in the same body. No highest man can disunite himself from any lowest" (282). Male bonding — and indeed, love — are vaunted by Carlyle: "Love of men cannot be bought by cash-payment; and without love, men cannot endure to be together" (269). And "men's hearts ought not to be set against one another; but set with one another" (22).

Fashioning Male Bonds through Hero-Worship

In the face of an economic and political system that sets men against one another, Carlyle asks: how can Englishmen body forth their spiritual connections and love for one another? He answers: through Hero-worship and its logic of dominance and submission. Carlyle first expounded this doctrine in 1840 in a series of six public lectures, subsequently transcribed and collected as On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History. Hero-worship was then further developed in Past and Present. As in the Philosophy of Clothes and the Gospel of Work, in Hero-worship Carlyle fuses religious values with German Idealism; specifically, Hero-worship combines the Calvinist doctrine of the elect with
Fichte's concept of the Hero as incarnate revelation of the Divine Idea. Carlyle's ideas about Hero-worship are not entirely systematic, but certain emphases run throughout. Revising his argument in the 1831 essay "Signs of the Times" -- that history is comprised of "innumerable biographies" -- Carlyle bluntly states instead that "The History of the World is but the Biography of Great Men" (On Heroes 26). Some men are born great -- Heros -- and others are born to submit to them. Carlyle figures the Hero as a kind of lightning rod or conductor of energy; he acts as a catalyst "provid[ing] a dramatic impetus to events" (Goldberg lviii). Carlyle's diverse list of Heroes includes Mohammed, Dante, Shakespeare, Luther, Knox, Johnson, Rousseau, Burns, Cromwell, and Napoleon. The greatness of these men manifested itself differently in specific historical moments, but greatness as a quality of the Hero is a transhistorical constant, an expression of the Divine Idea.

In all times and all places, the Hero has been worshipped. It will ever be so. We all love great men; love, venerate, bow down submissive before great men: nay can we honestly bow down to anything else? Ah, does not every true man feel that he is himself made higher by doing reverence to what is really above him? No nobler or more blessed feeling dwells in man's heart. And to me it is very cheering that no sceptical logic, or general triviality, insincerity and aridity of any Time and its influences can destroy this noble inborn loyalty and worship that is in man. (14)

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8 Fichte writes that Heroes are "the champions in whom the Spirit of the Time has most gloriously revealed itself." Quoted in Harrold, Carlyle and German Thought, 183.
Hero-worship is presented in *Past and Present* as the solution to England's social, political, and economic problems. It is fundamental to effective social organization, as Carlyle writes: "Hero-worship, done differently in every different epoch of the world, is the soul of all social business among men... the doing of it well, or the doing of it ill, measures accurately what degree of well-being or ill-being there is in the world's affairs" (39). In the 1840s, according to Carlyle, not only are there are no real Heroes in England, but because of the nation's misplaced faith in the ballot box and the cash nexus, the English wouldn't know a real Hero if they saw one. To choose the right Heroes to worship, the worshipers must themselves be the right kind of men, themselves heroic (although not to the degree that the Hero is), producing what Carlyle calls in *On Heroes the blessedest result... a whole World of Heroes*. If Hero means sincere man, why may not every one of us be a Hero? A world all sincere, a believing world: the like has been; the like will again be, — cannot help being. That were the right sort of Worshippers for Heroes: never could the truly Better be so reverenced as where all were True and Good. (109) Carlyle's call for "a whole World of Heroes" hints at egalitarianism. However, Hero-worship is decidedly anti-democratic. Hero-worshippers are only heroic to the degree that they bask in the Hero's greatness and glory. Carlyle makes this point clear when he asks, "does not every true man feel that he is himself made higher by doing reverence to what is really above him?" (14, emphasis added). Rather than pursue the idea that all men can be heroic, Carlyle repeatedly advises the men of England to become Hero-worshippers: "we must learn to do our Hero-worship better [...] to do it better and better, means the
awakening of the Nation's soul from its asphyxia, and the return of blessed life to us" (Past and Present 39).

In Past and Present, the twelfth-century monastery of St. Edmundsbury represents England in the 1840s, and Samson, its Abbot, represents what England needs, the Hero. A monastery is by nature hierarchical and disciplinary, with the monks first and foremost submissive to God, and in day-to-day practical matters to their Abbot. Yet Samson inherited a monastery in which hierarchy, discipline, and order had broken down, resulting in its monks' living a "disjointed distracted way of life" (94). Samson, however, was a strong governor perfectly suited to the task of whipping the monks of St. Edmundsbury into shape. Carlyle describes him:

in the man himself there exists a model of governing, something to govern by! There exists a heart-abhorrence of whatever is incoherent, pusillanimous, unveracious, -- that is to say, chaotic, ungoverned [...] A man of this kind cannot help governing! He has the living ideal of a governor in him. (91-92)

This living ideal is perfectly bodied forth in Samson's tenure as Abbot. His first order of business was to "institute a strenuous review and radical reform of his economics" (94), which enabled him to pay off the monastery's debts within four years. He curbed the monks' tendencies toward drunkenness and laziness. He was fair and impartial in his promotion of subordinates. He did not hesitate to excommunicate the blasphemous or the riotous. Overall Samson's goal was to produce order out of disorder, certainty and security out of chaos. Carlyle's language for describing the pre-Samson monastery
represents these goals figuratively; St. Edmundsbury is described as a "lazily fermenting wreck," a "frightful, unmanageable [...] bottomless confusion," an "inorganic waste whirlpool" (94-95). Against this confusion, "The clear-beaming eyesight of Abbot Samson, steadfast, severe, all-penetrating [...] penetrates gradually to all nooks, and of the chaos makes a kosmos or ordered world!" ⁹

If Samson is the exemplary dominant, Carlyle's exemplary submissive is a character from Sir Walter Scott's Ivanhoe: Gurth the swineherd, "born thrall of Cedric the Saxon" (211). Gurth epitomizes the benefits of being a Hero-worshipper. Carlyle writes of Gurth:

- with the sky above him, with the free air and tinted boscage and umbrage round him, and in him at least the certainty of supper and social lodging when he came home; Gurth to me seems happy, in comparison with many a Lancashire and Buckinghamshire man, of these days, not born thrall of anybody! Gurth's brass collar did not gall him: Cedric deserved to be his Master. The pigs were Cedric's but Gurth too would get his parings of them. Gurth had the inexpressible satisfaction of feeling himself related indissolubly, though in a rude brass-collar way, to his fellow-mortals in this Earth. He had superiors, inferiors, equals. (211)

Although Carlyle calls Gurth's brass collar "rude," it is in fact the ultimate fashion statement: it visibly symbolizes Gurth's divinely sanctioned inferiority and submission to Cedric, his "indissoluble" connection with Cedric and the rest of the world, and his "satisfaction" in bondage. Submission like Gurth's is needed; as Carlyle argues: "Man [...] 

⁹ 95. This analysis of imagery in Carlyle is indebted to Holloway and Sussman.
is necessitated to obey superiors; He is a social being in virtue of this necessity; nay, he
could not be gregarious otherwise. He obeys those whom he esteems better than himself,
wiser, braver, and will forever obey such; and even be ready and delighted to do it" (241).
"Delighted" by their submission, men know either consciously or through a "noble
instinct" that they must submit to their betters (269). The certainty of this knowledge
produces security, as Carlyle sums up: "Gurth was hired for life to Cedric, and Cedric to
Gurth" (275). Sussman notes in passing that the relationship between Gurth and Cedric
involves "a good deal of abasement, or to use rather anachronistic terms, a good measure
of sado-masochism" (63). In a moment I will come to the erotics implicit in this bond, and
merely note here that the alternatives to self-abasement and voluntary submission are
presented by Carlyle as hardly attractive: "Gurth born thrall of Cedric, it is like, got cuffs
as often as pork-parings, if he misdemeaned himself; but Gurth did belong to Cedric: no
human creature then went about connected with nobody; left to go his ways into Bastilles
or worse, under Laissez-faire; reduced to prove his relationship by dying of typhus-fever!"
(244). This last reference is Carlyle's worst- case scenario of how the democratic, laissez
faire system emergent in the 1840s works to deny connections between people. Carlyle
tells the story of the Irish widow: neglected and forgotten by society, she died of typhus
and fatally infected seventeen other people. Her connection to society was tragically
bodied forth in her death, as Carlyle writes "she prove[d] her sisterhood by dying, and
infecting you with typhus" (151). Her death is a perverse kind of "clothing" emblematizing
her connection to the world. Gurth's brass collar is obviously better than this.
Male Bonding as Male Bondage

There is a contradiction, however, in Carlyle's account of the Englishman. Is English manhood constructed by an active, self-assertive Gospel of Work busy at retailoring, or is it established by the "noble instinct" for submission to the "natural" superior, the Hero? Creative self-assertion and the self-abnegation required by submission are clearly at odds with one another: why would a man who actively retailors himself as his own special creation voluntarily submit to the Hero? In The Bonds of Love Benjamin asks a similar question of the sadomasochistic erotic novel The Story of O: "How is domination anchored in the hearts of those who submit to it?" (52) Her answers can help to explain where Carlyle's "noble instinct" for submission comes from and help to reconcile Carlyle's competing models of identity: identity through self-creation vs. identity through submission. 10

In explaining the fantasy of erotic domination, Benjamin builds on Hegel, Freud, and object-relations theory, emphasizing the intersubjective dynamics of sadomasochism. She argues that subjectivity is formed from two contradictory impulses: the desire for self-assertion versus the desire for recognition by the other, which entails dependency on the other. In true intersubjectivity these two impulses precariously and paradoxically coexist, contradictions intact. The other is perceived not as an element of the self's fantasy life, but as a part of external reality in his or her own right. Such true intersubjectivity is extremely

10 In making her feminist argument, Benjamin associates sadism with masculinity and masochism with femininity. This association is, of course, germane to the argument she makes about the domination built into gender polarity. However, I agree with Lynn S. Chancer that sado-masochism "refers to patterns of behavior... that are in no way essentially fixed by gender, though they obviously take on gendered forms" (85). Indeed, as I argue throughout this study, sadomasochistic economies of fantasy and practice often exceed or at least profoundly complicate the fixity and coherence of binaries of gender and sexuality.
difficult to achieve; Benjamin calls it "a moment of rare innocence, the recovery of a lost paradise" (76). Sadomasochism only approximates true intersubjectivity; it is a bad copy of the ideal. Sadists and masochists want to experience the other authentically, and try to do so through relations of dominance and submission.

In the dyad of sadist and masochist, the two fundamental human impulses are split: self-assertion becomes sadism; dependency becomes masochism. As Benjamin argues, "the basic tension of forces within the individual becomes a dynamic between individuals" (62). Hence the tight bond between top and bottom: they embody together the impulses that organize individual subjectivity. Both want recognition from the other. The sadist hopes to achieve it by dominating the other, making his or her will felt, recognized and affirmed by the other. The sadist says to the masochist: "Reflect my power, recognize my self-assertion through your submission." The masochist likewise seeks a sense of self that comes from being recognized by the sadist, even risking annihilation through radical dependence on and submission to the sadist. The masochist says to the sadist: "Dominate me, and in doing so let me know that you understand me, that you recognize me as the one who experiences your will." If each recognizes the other, then s/he must really be there, which imparts a sense of getting through, experiencing the other authentically as part of what Benjamin calls "shared reality." So erotic domination really limns the bonds of love, and is ultimately about trying to achieve intersubjectivity. As Benjamin concludes, erotic domination offers "to break the encasement of the isolated self, to explode the numbness that comes from 'false' differentiation. It is a reaction to the predicament of solitary confinement -- being unable to get through to the other, or be gotten through to --
which is our particularly modern form of bondage" (83).

As we have seen, for Carlyle "solitary confinement" comes from faith in the cash nexus, the ballot box, Liberty and democracy — all produce "numbness," "false differentiation," and inability "to get through to the other." Mutual recognition is therefore impossible. Hero-worship is Carlyle's fantasy solution to this state of affairs. As Benjamin posits S/M fantasy trying to achieve an ideal, perfect intersubjectivity through mutual recognition, Carlyle's fantasy of Hero-worship is the closest the English can come in the material world to approximating the ideal spiritual connection and love between all men. From Hero-worship, the Hero gains necessary recognition and affirmation of his power and true heroic nature. Carlyle's Hero-worshippers gain a sense of connection to the Hero, and indeed, all the world, since by submitting to the Hero the worshipper becomes secure and certain of his place in it. He also gets to share in the glory of the Hero; to quote once again from On Heroes: "Ah, does not every true man feel that he is himself made higher by doing reverence to what is really above him?" (14). Similarly, Benjamin argues that one benefit the masochist receives from submission to the sadist is access to and refuge in his greater power. So to address the question of identity through assertion vs. identity through submission: Gospel-of-Work self-creation establishes identity, but in order for the individual, isolated self to become part of the social body, he must be recognized, which happens through the logic of dominance and submission organizing Hero-worship. Self-creation produces subjectivity, but Hero-worship organizes intersubjectivity.

However, the intersubjective structure of Hero-worship runs up against Victorian gender ideology. Adams notes that because the Hero needs recognition of his status by an
audience, his manliness is questionable since it becomes implicated in theatrical, self-conscious posing, which was suspect according to norms of manhood emergent in the early Victorian years. Adams argues, "Under the conjoint authority of Evangelical faith and romantic subjectivity, early and mid-Victorian norms of manhood construct an ideal of essential selfhood that repudiates self-consciousness as a mark of theatricality" (10). To preserve the Hero from implication in theatricality, Carlyle attempts to contrast the "Hero" with the "Dandy," who is overly theatrical, all show and no substance, completely dependent on self-presentation for his sense of self. Carlyle writes tellingly of the Dandy: "what is it that the Dandy asks [...]? Solely [...] that you would recognize his existence; would admit him to be a living object; or even failing this, a visual object, or thing that will reflect rays of light" (Sartor Resartus 207). The Dandy's dependence on an audience for recognition marks him as unmanly; as Adam further argues: "For Carlyle and early Victorian culture more generally, there was a "failure of a life of 'manful' action and the radical failure of autonomy inherent in the dandy's abject appeal to an audience for his very identity" (24). Yet because the Hero needs recognition (from a nation of Hero-worshippers) just as much as the Dandy, the distinctions between the two constantly erode. Despite Carlyle's best efforts to portray his Heroes, whether in the guise of Abbot Samson, Cedric the Saxon, or modern "Captains of Industry," as ideals of timeless, non-theatrical, natural, essential manliness, their heroism always threatens to collapse into the unmanning theatricality of the Dandy (Adams 21–42).

While this contradiction shows a paradox at the heart of Hero-worship, I believe that paradox is the point. Benjamin is again relevant here. She writes that the key to true
intersubjectivity is the maintainence of the assertion/dependency paradox. If that paradox breaks down by splitting into polarity, as in fantasies of erotic domination, then the relationship fails. More specifically, as the sadist seeks to become pure assertion, he increasingly treats the masochist as an object, a non-person. The sadist does so to maintain independent, assertive subjectivity by denying dependence on the masochist. Referring again to the *Story of O*, Benjamin writes of O's captors: "in order to maintain their separate subjectivity, they must scrupulously deny their dependency on her. Otherwise they would suffer the fate of Hegel's master, who in becoming dependent on his slave, gradually loses subjectivity to him" (57). This need for the sadist to maintain separation is at odds with the goal of S/M fantasy -- intense experience of the world of the other -- and marks one reason that the fantasy of erotic domination ultimately fails. On the other hand, for the sadist to receive the masochist's submission as love, the masochist must resist, must withstand the sadist's attack and remain intact. If the masochist were to crumble, there would be no one to reflect the sadist back to himself. This happens in *The Story of O*: O begins to dissolve as a separate person, so her tormentors grow bored with her. The inevitability of masochistic self-dissolution is the other reason that S/M fails according to Benjamin. In her reworking of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, dominatory relations cannot achieve a lasting intersubjectivity because the sadist must deny dependence on the masochist and because the masochist gradually loses independent subjectivity. As she writes: "For both partners, the sense of connection is lost [...] the sado-masochistic relationship tends toward [...] deadness, numbness [...] exhaustion of sensation" (63).

Carlylean Hero-worship, by contrast, just manages to preserve the paradox of
intersubjective relations, all the while maintaining the lineaments of dominance and submission so germane to Carlyle's account of history and the Hero-worship that he believes will save English society at this particular historical moment. If Carlyle's submissive men were to define themselves only through submission to the Hero, they would risk self-dissolution. Like O, they too would become pure dependence, too weak to reflect the Hero back to himself. Yet Carlyle gives his submissive men just enough assertiveness to keep this from happening. Their sense of self does not just depend on submission to the powerful Hero; instead, they actively, assertively create themselves (through the Gospel of Work's "retailoring") and paradoxically, part of that assertive self-creation entails that they create themselves as submissive and dependent. Their constant self-creation ensures that they will never dissolve, and their self-creation as submissive guarantees that neither will their bond with the Hero. Once a Hero-worshiper, always a Hero-worshiper. Now the Hero, as we have seen, is ultimately unable to deny his dependence on an audience of Hero-worshipers. Adams is right to see this as a paradox, but this paradox is what keeps the bond between Hero and Hero-worshiper vital. The Hero, despite efforts to deny dependency, needs the Hero-worshiper; the Hero can never establish his separateness. Carlylean Hero-worship is of course a polarized, dominatory relation, but Carlyle does not allow the intersubjectivity it produces to split completely into polarity. In Benjamin's terms, Hero-worship straddles the line between complementarity and mutuality. 11 Carlyle gives his submissives a tincture of assertion

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11 As discussed in the Introduction, mutuality involves preserving the paradox of intersubjectivity and achieving mutual recognition between "like subjects, while in complementarity relations between self and other break down into the polarities of "giver and taker, doer and done to, powerful and powerless" (Bonds 43)
while endowing his dominants with a built-in incapacity to deny dependence. So unlike in Benjamin, where S&M fails due to loss of intersubjective tension, or Hegel, where the master/slave relationship succumbs to the inevitability of the dialectic, Carlyle's Hero-worship promises to produce a static, fixed, unchanging, solid bond. As Carlyle writes, "In all human relations permanency is what I advocate; nomadism, or continual change, is what I perceive to be prohibitory of any good whatsoever" ("Occasional Discourse" 15). As opposed to the "nomadism" produced by liberal democracy, class divisions, and laissez faire economics, Carlyle believes that Hero-worship offers Englishmen permanent political, social and emotional security.

**Answering the "Condition of Manliness Question"**

Carlyle was justified in this belief, as Hero-worship's fantasy of emotional security proved quite attractive to many early-Victorian men. For example, William Henry Smith, reviewing *Past and Present* in *Blackwood's*, saw in it "an appeal to the consciousness of each man, and to the high and eternal laws of justice and charity -- lo, ye are brethren" (qtd. in Seigel 212). Smith underscores the affective appeal of Carlyle's model of male bonding: "We are accustomed to view his [Carlyle's] works, even when they especially regarded communities of men, and take the name of histories, as, in effect, appeals to the individual heart, and to the moral will of the reader" (qtd. in Seigel 212). A secure, connected, loving community of men would understandably have held this appeal for the middle-class men who were Carlyle's primary audience, since as Davidoff and Hall suggest,
Far from the blustering certainty of the late Victorian paterfamilias, early
nineteenth-century masculine identity was fragile, still in the process of
being forged and always measured against the background of
condescension from the gentry as well as the long tradition of artisan pride.
The mood in which middle class men faced their world was best expressed
by a seed-merchant, a self-made man [who] bitterly remarked: "I may be a
man one day and a mouse the next." (229)

This mood of disconnection from old ideals and uncertainty about identity and position
within male homosocial space was precisely what Carlyle's Hero-worship dreamed of
curing. In addition to the political and economic crises I have discussed, by the 1840s
manhood was under pressure from a variety of other sources. There was no longer a single
public ritual marking passage into manhood. From this point masculinity increasingly
began to be regarded as a plot, a process of integration into the male public sphere, which
was itself an uncertain, shifting space. Moreover, the masculine plot was at odds with the
marriage plot. While the ideology of domesticity offered men the domestic sphere as a safe
haven from the vicissitudes of the public sphere, domestic space also threatened to
feminize them, to impede their hardening into manhood. Middle class boys and young men
increasingly spent more time in the care of women and their marriage age was set back,
while at the same time ideologies of gender difference were becoming more pronounced
and strictly enforced. This duality produced increased anxiety about male differentiation
from the feminine, as Sussman argues: "With Victorians' increasingly sharp gender
distinctions, the need to reject the female values of youth, to leave the feminized home,
became more acute" (46).

These sharp gender distinctions present yet another ideological problem for Hero-worship to confront. The submission of the worshipper, or what Sussman calls the "loss of ego in the group through submission to a stronger male" (46) could be suspect in terms of Victorian gender ideology. As is well known, and as I indicated at the outset of this study, separate spheres ideology gendered submission, subservience and self-abnegation as inherent, essential female traits. On the other hand, Victorian men found themselves hailed by ideologies that stressed self-assertion, ideologies influenced largely by Carlyle's own Gospel of Work. Moreover, Victorian men were also enjoined to pursue Utilitarian "self-interest," and to enact, as Samuel Smiles later put it, "self-help." According to these models, for a man to adopt a posture of submission or self-denial meant that he was unmanned.

One way that Carlyle solves the problem of submission as feminizing is, as we have seen, to give the Hero-worshipper a saving measure of self-assertion. *Contra* Sussman, the Hero-worshipper does not lose his ego in the group, but maintains a sense of self-assertive, Gospel of Work retailoring in order to keep his bond with the Hero vital. Carlyle's other solution to the problem of feminizing submission is quite simple: he defines femininity otherwise and attempts to write women and everything they stand for out of the picture. Disease, corruption, pollution, disorder, chaos, sloth and sexuality -- but not submission -- are projected onto women, repudiated and excluded from Carlyle's ideal male world. Women therefore populate an abject realm that defines the limits of the masculine world.
Despite this abjection, Carlylean manhood is always threatened with the possibility of falling into feminized passivity, inaction, lethargy, dissoluteness. The logic of abjection that organizes Carlyle's version of masculinity makes this possibility inevitable. Theories of abjection put forth by Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler can help us understand this inevitability. In *Powers of Horror* Kristeva, working within Lacanian psychoanalysis, argues that abjection is a universal phenomenon that takes different historical forms. For Kristeva, the abject is not radically separated from the subject. Abjection is always a repudiation of something intrinsic and internal to the subject, so the process of abjection by which the subject establishes integrity and coherence in fact expunges what is unclean in the subject *itself*, a repudiation of self that establishes the self. As Kristeva writes, in abjection "I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which "I" claim to establish myself" (3). Because the abject is formed from the subject's disavowal of part of itself, "from its place of banishment, the abject does not cease challenging its master. Without a sign (for him), it beseeches a discharge, a convulsion, a crying out" (2). Abjection haunts the subject; it "does not radically cut off the subject from what threatens it -- on the contrary, abjection acknowledges it to be in perpetual danger" (9). The abject reminds the subject of the failure, the limits, the incompleteness, the ever-possible breakdown of the process of subjectivization. The causes of abjection lie in "what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite" (4). Examples are the corpse, vomit, food loathing, blood, infection, pollution and filth, and horror over the signs of sexual difference. These non-objects must be radically excluded for the subject to function in the
Symbolic order, to have a "clean and proper body." Abjection thus marks the always precarious position of the subject in the Symbolic order. Abjection takes the subject to a place where language collapses, where meanings proliferate, where desire becomes polymorphously perverse.

Judith Butler draws on the transgressive potential of abjection suggested by Kristeva and elaborates a theory of gender and sexuality that attempts to politicize abjection. Butler extends Kristeva's theory of abjection to encompass the realm of social relations: "The notion of abjection designates a degraded or cast out status within the terms of sociality... certain abject zones within sociality... constitut[e] zones of uninhabitability which a subject fantasizes as threatening its own integrity with the prospect of a psychotic dissolution ('I would rather die than do or be that')" (243). Butler describes how in the social order the process of abjection delineates the realm of the subject:

[The] exclusionary matrix by which subjects are formed... requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those not yet "subjects," but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject. The abject designates... precisely those "unlivable" and "uninhabitable" zones of social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the subject, but whose living under the sign of the "unlivable" is required to circumscribe the domain of the subject. This zone of uninhabitability will constitute the defining limit of the subject's domain; it will constitute that site of dreaded
identification against which — and by virtue of which — the domain of the
subject will circumscribe its own claim to autonomy and life. (3)

Like Kristeva's abject, Butler's "abject zones" are excluded but nevertheless linger to
threaten the subject. Also like Kristeva's abject, which is formed by the subject's abjection
of what is unclean and improper in itself, Butler argues that the subject "is constituted
through the force of exclusion and abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside to
the subject, an abjected outside, which is, after all, 'inside' the subject as its own founding
repudiation" (3). For Butler, this "abjected outside," which is nevertheless "inside,"
therefore threatens to disrupt the coherence and integrity of the subject, and based on this
threat, Butler considers abjection "a critical resource to rearticulate the very terms of
symbolic legitimacy and intelligibility" (3).

According to these models, in Carlyle's work, women, racial others, and failed
masculine figures such as the Dandy all form a "zone of uninhabitability" against which
Carlyle's ideal male world claims "autonomy and life." Yet this abjected zone is
nevertheless "inside" Carlylean masculinity "as its own founding repudiation." Because of
this interimplication, to quote Kristeva once more, "from its place of banishment, the
abject does not cease challenging its master." The challenge of the abject occurs with
regularity in Carlyle's work. As we have seen, the Hero is threatened at all points with
falling into the unmanly, self-conscious theatricality of the Dandy. In *Sartor Resartus*
Teufelsdröckh falls into the "Centre of Indifference," a state of unmanly, paralyzing
confusion and lethargy. Tellingly, this fall is precipitated by his failed romance with
Blumine; his association with the feminine and the feminizing world of romance opens the
door to abjection. As we have seen, in *Past and Present*, prior to Abbot Samson's rule, the monks' failure to embody manliness is described as putrefaction and miasma; St. Edmundsbury is a "lazily fermenting wreck," a "frightful, unmanageable... bottomless confusion," an "inorganic waste whirlpool" (94-95). It is telling that Carlyle describes this unmanly world with such imagery of miasma and confusion, since, as Kristeva points out, the abject is associated not only with waste and putrefaction, but also with liminality and ambiguity.

Carlyle deals with the threat of abjection by, contrary to Victorian gender ideologies, neglecting to gender submission as feminine. Rather, submission is a constant and inevitable trait of Hero-worship, itself a transhistorical constant. Through submission to the Hero, men are interpellated into a bonded relationship that gives them the limits, rules, and certainty that prevent their descent into unmanly, chaotic states of abjection. Teufelsdröckh, for example, gains manhood by submitting, not to any particular person, rather by submitting his ego to the God-like ideal within himself. Through this renunciation (*entsagen*) he gives up the search for "happiness" in exchange for "blessedness." He achieves the "Everlasting Yea" by embracing the Gospel of Work, and pulling himself out of abjection with Biblical rhetoric: "Be no longer a Chaos, but a World, or even Worldkin. Produce! Produce! Were it but the pitifullest infinitesimal fraction of a Product, produce it in God's name!" (149). Similarly, in *Past and Present* and *On Heroes*, men submit to the material manifestation of the God-like in man, the Hero. Like Gurth who submits to Cedric, each man must know that he "is forever 'born thrall' of certain men [...] It is unblessed for him when he cannot acknowledge this fact; he is in the
chaotic state, ready to perish, till he do get the fact acknowledged" (249 emphasis added). Again, the certainties of submissive Hero-worship remedy the unmanned chaos of abjection. As Carlyle cogently states, "Cosmos is not Chaos, simply by this one quality, That it is governed" ("Occasional Discourse" 12). The alternatives to manhood achieved through Hero-worship are, we see again and again in Carlyle, chaos, confusion, disease, death, and a world in which human connections are bodied forth by abject, typhus-spreading Irish widows.

It is no accident that in addition to being female, this widow is Irish. Carlyle racializes as well as feminizes the miasmatic forces he wishes to exclude from his ideal male homosocial world. This racialization occurs most obviously in his "Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question," published in 1849. In this tract Carlyle employs the model of Hero-worship to polemicize for nineteenth-century imperialism and racism. Carlyle describes the West Indies as a realm of pestilence and decay, and the West Indian "Black Quashees" as failed, lazy men who only eat pumpkins and drink rum all day. Their stewardship of the islands has been ineffective; the islands are diseased primordial miasma: "Swamps, fever-jungles, man-eating Caribs, rattlesnakes, and reeking waste and putrefaction, this has been the produce of them under the incompetent Caribal (what we call Cannibal) possessors" (21). As in his account of England in the 1840s, the main problem Carlyle sees in the West Indies is lack of connection and relation between men. He writes.

This of declaring that Negro and White are unrelated, loose from one another, on a footing of perfect equality, and subject to no law but that of
supply-and-demand according to the Dismal Science; this, which
contradicts the palpablest facts, is clearly no solution, but a cutting of the
knot asunder. (25)

Like the men of England, Carlyle believes that West Indian men are victimized by
misplaced faith in egalitarianism and the "Dismal Science" of Political Economy. Rejecting
such "sham" solutions, Carlyle asks instead, "What are the true relations between Negro
and White, their mutual duties under the sight of the Maker of them both; what human
laws will assist both to comply more and more with these?" (25). Carlyle takes it as a
given that the blacks of the West Indies are the natural inferiors of the white British. He
then transposes Hero-worship onto the West Indies and argues that relations between the
British and and West Indians should be structured by dominance and submission. Just as
the monks of St. Edmundsbury need Abbot Samson to pull them out of chaos and
confusion, so Carlyle reasons that the "naturally inferior" West Indians need British rule to
save them from their "natural" laziness and the "waste fertility" of the West Indies (20).
Carlyle demands that the British acknowledge their responsibility to rule the West Indians;
the British need to be proper governors, "real masters" (13). Moreover, according to
Carlyle, proper British governance will force the "naturally" lazy West Indians to work,
and so compel them to become "real" men, men who live by the "Gospel of Work."

This racist logic informed Carlyle's support in the 1860s for Governor Eyre's
notoriously brutal rule of Jamaica, which included imposition of martial law and violent
suppression of rebellion. Here we see how Hero-worship dovetails with nineteenth century
imperialist and racist discourses, particularly as they portrayed colonialism as the civilizing
and Christianizing "white man's burden." Moreover, because the non-white inhabitants of the Empire were, according to racist ideology of the time, the "natural" inferiors of the British, the Empire became a realm for many would-be Heros to find their "true" heroic selves as rulers of their colonial inferiors. From Peter Jenkyns in Gaskell's Cranford to Carnehan and Dravot in Kipling's The Man Who Would be King, to Ronnie Heaslop in Forster's A Passage to India, British fiction is filled with men who take to the Empire in order to play the Hero in ways they never could in Britain itself.

"Who knows how to reverence the Body of Man?": Hero-worship and Homoeroticism

To sum up, Carlylean masculinity is defined against a realm of abjection that never ceases to challenge the purity of Carylean male homosociality. In an attempt to keep the structure of Hero-worship from implication in this abject realm, Carlyle does not gender submission as feminine, but posits submission as intrinsic to manliness. If submission were femininized in Carlyle, then Hero-worship would fall into the abjected world of women, racial others, Dandies other failed men, and so lose its status as a spiritualized, desexualized form of homosociality.

However, while Carlyle works to deny and repress male sexuality, in Past and Present he encodes the homoerotic desire latent in Hero-worship's structures of male homosocial bonding. Carlyle registers homoerotics in a queer episode from Past and Present in which abjected sexuality returns, tellingly, centered around a corpse. Kristeva writes of the corpse that it "is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life. Abject. It is
something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object. Imaginary uncanniness and real threat, it beckons to us and ends up engulfing us" (4). The abject beckons in a chapter from the section of _Past and Present_ describing St. Edmundsbury. The altar of St. Edmund has been damaged by fire. One of the monks then dreams that St. Edmund is "naked and in lamentable plight... stript of his garments, and wasted with hunger and thirst" (121). The monks agree that the dream means that the altar "must needs be reedified" (122). In the course of the altar's refurbishment, Samson and a few other monks open St. Edmund's coffin, look at the martyr's body, and Samson himself touches the body. Carlyle describes that

he touched the eyes; and the nose, which was very massive and prominent

[...] and then he touched the breast and arms; and raising the left arm he touched the fingers, and placed his own fingers between the sacred fingers.

And proceeding he found the feet standing stiff up, like the feet of a man dead yesterday; and he touched the toes, and counted them. (124)

In a text in which eroticism is almost entirely absent, this passage stands out as homoerotic and even necrophilic. The simple declarative sentences, so unusual in Carlyle's convoluted, bombastic style, create a tone of intimacy and vulnerability. Moreover, the imagery hints at phallicism: the "massive and prominent" nose, the fingers, the "raising [of] the left arm," the feet uncharacteristically "standing stiff up." The sexuality that is abjected from Carlyle's all-male world here reappears associated with the corpse of St. Edmund.

However, the erotics of the episode are repressed, in three ways. First, the monks do not view St. Edmund's body directly; it is "all wrapt in linen," with only its "lineaments"
visible (124). Abbot Samson's touches the martyr's body through cloth; he does not touch the flesh directly. Second, the description of Samson's touching scrupulously avoids mentioning the genital region. Samson touches St. Edmund's nose, breast, and arms. When lying down with arms at the sides, one's hands are roughly parallel with groin, so Samson lifts the hands before touching them. The description then swiftly and nervously moves to the feet, completely bypassing the midsection, groin, and legs. Finally, Carlyle is quick to spiritualize Samson's actions by describing the saint's body as an emblem of the divine in man:

Stupid blockheads, to reverence their St. Edmund's dead body in this manner? Yes, brother; -- and yet, on the whole, who knows how to reverence the Body of Man? It is the most reverend phenomenon under the Sun. For the highest God dwells visible in that mystic unfathomable Visibility, which calls itself "I" on Earth [...] And the body of one Dead; -- a temple where the Hero-soul once was and now is not: Oh, all mystery, all pity, all mute awe and wonder... Eternity laid open. (126)

All these methods of desexualizing this unusually erotic passage illustrate Carlyle's general anxiety about eroticism, but more importantly, they illustrate a fundamental constitutive injunction in Carlyle's view of male homosocial relations: that eroticism of all kinds, in this case homoeroticism, be repressed, its abject status preserved.

The homoeroticism that haunts homosocial relations is, in Sedgwick's schema, mediated through women. As two men competed for one woman in the erotic triangle, they articulate their homosocial bond in a heterosexual context, denying their rivalry's
homoerotic elements. Since Carlyle has excluded women from his ideal world, he does not have the option of mediating male homoerotic desire through them. To compensate, Carlyle uses various strategies to desexualize the bonds of Hero-worship. He does so quite thoroughly. Few have ever thought Carlyle's writing sexy. Yet the homoerotic desire in the heart of Hero-worship returns in the episode of Samson touching St. Edmund's body. In Butler's terms, homoeroticism exists "inside" Hero-worship "as its own founding repudiation." This kernel of eroticism lurking within Hero-worship is, as I have argued, what justifies reading it as sadomasochistic.

The dominance and submission of Hero-worship is offered by Carlyle as the fantasy solution to the Condition of England question. This vision of male bonding abjects women, racial others, and failed men in its attempt to allow English men to connect with and love each other more deeply. While Carlyle was working out this model in the 1830s and 40s, Tennyson was writing In Memoriam. In this poem Tennyson works through intense grief over the death of his friend Arthur Henry Hallam, and in so doing confronts the religious "Crisis of Faith" and early Victorian norms of manliness and mourning. Tennyson's introspective, sensitive, melancholy poetry may seem a far cry from Carlyle's preachy social proclamations, and while homoeroticism is hidden in Carlyle's Hero-worship, it is written all over In Memoriam — a poem whose male speaker repeatedly calls himself the "widow" of his dead friend. However, I will show in the next chapter that in their common embrace of masochistic fantasy Carlyle and Tennyson are more alike than is often thought.
Chapter III

"Let Love clasp Grief lest both be drown'd": Masochism, Masculinity, and "The Way of the Soul" in Tennyson's In Memoriam; or, Love Hurts

The genesis of In Memoriam is well known. In September 1833 Tennyson's closest friend, Arthur Henry Hallam, died, and that very month Tennyson began writing short lyric poems elegizing him. Throughout the 1830s and 40s Tennyson continued composing these elegies, finally arranging and publishing 132 of them in 1850 as the "loose baggy monster" of a poem, In Memoriam A.H.H., alternately titled "The Way of the Soul." In Memoriam was widely acclaimed by its first readers, and its popularity is regarded as having clinched Tennyson's appointment in 1850 as Poet Laureate. Much of the poem's appeal came from the comfort and inspiration readers took from it. George O. Mitchell summarizes the Victorians' attitude: "It seemed to be such a satisfactory answer to the problems of existence, especially those raised by the struggle between religion and science, that the Victorians clasped it to their bosoms to supplement the consolation offered by the Bible" (100). One such bosom-clasper was the widowed Queen, who told Tennyson "Next to the Bible, In Memoriam is my comfort." (qtd. in Mitchell 100). Not just Victoria, but many Victorians needed the spiritual solace the poem offered as old religious and moral certainties came under threat from scientific discoveries pointing to a godless, mechanistic, amoral, cruel universe of change and conflict: a cosmos Tennyson famously describes as "Nature, red in tooth and claw" (56:15). Thus Tennyson's psychic breakdown, the intense, self-shattering grief that In Memoriam portrays so movingly, becomes an historical metaphor for the Victorian breakdown of religious and moral
certainty, the "Crisis of Faith." At the same time, the poem's triumph over grief and painstaking reconstruction of belief showed Victorians the path of spiritual reintegration.

My argument begins with the assumption that this reintegration or "way of the soul" is historically situated, emerging from and existing in dialogue with ideological formations of the early and mid-Victorian years. The poem has most often been read in terms of how it engages period discourses on religion and science. More recently, critics have examined In Memoriam's representation of masculinity, especially focusing on the homoerotic language the speaker uses to express his love for Hallam. In this chapter I bridge these two approaches by showing how the poem's religious and erotic thematics converge in its depictions of grief, pain, and suffering: what I call masochistic love that hurts.

I read In Memoriam's representation of male suffering in the context of dominant styles of early and mid-Victorian manhood. As described in the Introduction to this study, these styles required demarcation and discipline of potentially dangerous masculine energies. Tennyson was coming to poetic maturity when this historical shift was occurring, and it is represented in his work. Jerome Buckley argues that following Hallam's death in 1833, Tennyson began to curb the Romantic tendencies of his verse -- his love of aestheticized, escapist scene painting; his exquisitely wrought delineations of mood and feeling -- the very qualities that had gained him renown at Cambridge (including Hallam's admiration) and had contributed to the success of his 1832 Poems. From the 1830s into the 1840s Tennyson turned toward more public subject matter, limning the familiar Victorian move of orienting the self outward toward social relations and public concerns.
As Buckley argues, "Tennyson's verse seemed to have moved deliberately away from an 'ideal' art of fanciful invention towards a 'national' art centered upon immediate actualities [...] Tennyson by the mid-forties had undoubtedly found his place among the 'anti-Romantic' Victorians" (83).

Just as Tennyson gradually moderated his Romantic tendencies, In Memoriam, composed during this period in Tennyson's development, channels its dark currents of feeling into more acceptable public channels. This may seem a counterintuitive argument to make about a poem that is best known for its wild cries of suffering. Yet while In Memoriam elaborately expresses the depths of the speaker's feelings, it just as elaborately disciplines and reworks those feelings into more controlled, calm, and centered forms of emotion. In Memoriam's primary object of discipline is the masochistic energy animating the poet's grief. What the poet calls his "parade of pain" represents his attempt, through writing, to keep his grief for Hallam alive and ever-present. The language the speaker uses to express his grief is at times homoerotic, but that is not the most remarkable thing about it. The speaker's figurations of the pain of grief work to exacerbate that grief; he figures love as inextricably linked with and aggrandized by pain. He values love that hurts. This masochistic fantasy generates the poem's much-remarked gender bending; for example, the poet imagines himself as Hallam's widow, brother, mistress, and child. Such moments of gender confusion indicate both the self-shattering effects of pain and the speaker's desire, through fantasy role-playing, to imagine himself connected to Hallam. Ultimately, though,

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1 I will call the speaker of In Memoriam "the speaker" or "the poet" interchangeably, and refer to Tennyson the real man as "Tennyson."
the poet's masochistic fantasy runs up against Victorian norms of manliness and mourning, and proves inadequate to sustain his love for Hallam. The poet seems to give up love that hurts. He overcomes his grief, finds a new calling as poet, and reintegrates himself into society. Yet as we shall see, despite the poem's ostensible movement out of masochistic fantasy into the public world, it ends by embracing the very realms of fantasy that it seemingly repudiates. Within this fantasy world, In Memoriam keeps love that hurts alive by transmuting it into more culturally intelligible, viable, and validated forms: the economic idea of deferred gratification, and "honest doubt" as akin to moral masochism. In the end, the poem does not repudiate, but reworks and tames transgressive masochism.

After making this argument about In Memoriam, I conclude this chapter with a few comments connecting In Memoriam with Tennyson's other long poem in which male suffering is paramount, Maud: a Monodrama. The two poems have much in common, and will provide ample ground for further study, especially in terms of comparing the ways they link male suffering and masochism to broader historical issues and problems.

**Mourning, Melancholia, and Masochism: Love that Hurts**

Tennyson has long been viewed as a melancholy poet, and In Memoriam the result of protracted mourning that refuses closure -- melancholia, in short. In mourning, according to Freud, one resists transferring desire from the lost object onto new objects, and instead "cling[s] to the [lost] object through the medium of hallucinatory wishful psychosis" ("Mourning and Melancholia 126). This "wishful psychosis," Freud further argues, takes place in memory, where "the existence of the lost object is psychically
prolonged. Each single one of the memories and expectations in which the libido is bound to the object is brought up and hypercathexed" (126). Glossing Freud, Joseph and Tucker explain what the mourner gains from dredging up painful memories: "the ego, in its desire for self-preservation, remembers in order to forget, prolongs the attachment in order to effect a detachment on terms the ego can accept" (120). This detachment occurs, Christopher Craft argues, because each act of memory first binds subject and object, then unbinds them; each act of reviving the lost object "entrains a corresponding death, a terminal forgetting... because the desiring subject cannot, short of psychosis, sustain the fantasmatic presence of the beloved" (60).

Craft further argues that each of the lyric poems comprising In Memoriam works according to this Freudian schema, operating "like a hypercathexed memory, working at once to prolong Hallam's presence and to facilitate his substitution" (61). While this may be true of the poem on the whole, many sections of In Memoriam, especially early sections, work to avoid "getting over" grief. As Timothy Peltason writes, the first sections of the poem show the speaker trying "to make a home of the homeless, grief-stricken present" (28). I argue that the early lyrics of In Memoriam show this home-making poet trying to prevent the work of mourning, to keep his desire from "unbinding" from its object, Hallam. The poet actually says as much: "I long to prove / no lapse of moons can canker Love" (26: 2-3). Desire for Hallam is, in fact, preserved through the poem's repeated figurations of grief as pleasurable and eroticized. The speaker values love conjoined with and intensified by loss: love that hurts. In meditations on writing, grief, and loss, the poet flirts with the seductive pleasures of masochism in an attempt to keep his
pain alive, for if his pain lives, then in a way so does Hallam, at least in fantasy.

The poet desires to keep Hallam alive in fantasy largely because contemporary scientific discoveries have caused him, like many Victorians, to question religion, in particular to doubt the immortality of the soul. 2 If there is no afterlife, how can he persist in loving his dead friend? The poet needs to believe that Hallam still exists. The speaker expresses his fears about immortality and religion in section 55:

The wish, that of the living whole
No life may fail beyond the grave,
Dervies it not from what we have
The likest God within the soul?

Are God and Nature then at strife,
That Nature lends such evil dreams?
So careful of the type she seems
So careless of the single life. (55: 1-8)

Of his faith, the poet then declares, "I falter where I firmly trod" (55:13) and "I stretch lame hands of faith and grope" (55:17). He imagines "Nature, red in tooth and claw" (56: 15) to address him, denying the existence of an afterlife. Nature says,

I care for nothing, all shall go.

Thou makest thine appeal to me:
I bring to life, I bring to death:  
The spirit does but mean the breath: 
I know no more. (56: 4-8)

Moreover, the poet has been thrust into another existential dilemma by Hallam's death. If there is no afterlife, then life itself would be meaningless and pointless for the poet, as he

2 Charles Lyell's Principles of Geology (1830-33) is often cited as contributing to religious doubt of the time. Tennyson read this work in 1837 (Marshall 102). Later in this chapter I will discuss other factors contributing to Victorian religious doubt.
writes:

My own dim life should teach me this,
That life shall live for evermore,
Else Earth is darkness at the core,
And dust and ashes all that is. (34: 1-4).

If life is but "dust and ashes," then the poet feels that he might as well die: "To drop head-
 foremost in the jaws / Of vacant darkness and to cease" (34: 15-16).

Defying these religious uncertainties, the poet attempts to keep Hallam alive
through the pain of grief. In Memoriam's descriptions of mourning seem to anticipate
Freudian theory. For example, the speaker states of his life that it "endures with pain, /
And slowly forms the firmer mind, Treasuring the look it cannot find, / The words that are
not heard again" (18: 17-20). In line with Freud on mourning, the poet believes that
"treasuring" lost looks and enduring with pain — the pain of memory — will eventually
produce "the firmer mind." Transcendence of grief is a step by step process, as the poet
writes, "I held it truth [...] / That men may rise on stepping stones / Of their dead selves
to higher things" (1:1-4). Yet the speaker immediately backs away from this idea, asking
rhetorically: who will "find in loss a gain to match?" (6) and what is the "far-off interest of
tears?" (8). Rather than speculate answers, the poet expresses attraction to suffering itself:

Let Love clasp Grief lest both be drown'd,
Let darkness keep her raven gloss:
Ah, sweeter to be drunk with loss,
To dance with death, to beat the ground (1: 9-12)

Grief is figured as enticing, seductive, sensual, and sweet, while mourning becomes an
orgiastic Danse Macabre. Moreover, grief is necessary for love's survival, since if love fails
to "clasp" grief both will die. To keep his love alive and fend off the "stepping stone" work
of mourning, the speaker recognizes that he must eroticize the alluring "raven gloss" of suffering.

The speaker's meditations on writing likewise conjoin pleasure and pain. For example, in section five the poet initially confesses that he feels guilty because poetry cannot do his grief justice. As he writes, "I sometimes hold it half a sin / To put in words the grief I feel; / For words, like Nature, half reveal / And half conceal the Soul within" (5: 1-4). Next he demurs, arguing that his poetic compositions actually palliate grief. Poetry is a "sad mechanick exercise, Like dull narcotics, numbing pain" (5: 7-8). Then in a circular move typical of In Memoriam, the lyric's conclusion returns to its beginning. The poet again expresses guilt over poetry's inadequacy:

In words, like weeds, I'll wrap me o'er,
Like coarsest clothes against the cold:
But that large grief which these enfold
Is given in outline and no more" (5: 9-12).

The "coarse clothes" of poetry are double-sided. They offer the speaker "dull narcotic" relief and protection from pain, but they also chafe in that they ultimately remind the speaker of poetry's inadequacy. In this theory of elegiac writing, the attempt to ease the pain of grief through writing also causes pain.

Conjunctions of pleasure and pain are also apparent in the poem's best known line:
"Tis better to have loved and lost / Than never to have loved at all" (27: 15-16). In its incarnation as cliché, this line means that worse than losing love is never knowing it to begin with. In context, though, the line holds a different meaning. As in "Let Love clasp Grief lest both be drown'd," the speaker values the love and the loss together, as one unit.
In the less famous part of the lyric containing this line, the speaker actually devalues any feeling not mixed with guilt, pain, or loss.

I envy not in any moods
The captive void of noble rage,
The linnet born within the cage,
That never knew the summer woods:

I envy not the beast that takes
His license in the field of time,
Unfetter'd by the sense of crime,
To whom a conscience never wakes;

Nor, what may count itself as blest,
The heart that never plighted troth
But stagnates in the weeds of sloth;
Nor any want-begotten rest. (27: 1-12)

The poet states that he doesn't envy the joy of the free-born linnet, the "licence" of the beast "Unfetter'd by the sense of crime," nor the blessedness of the heart that "never plighted troth." For the speaker, emotional experience, including love, is deepest and best when tinged with loss, grief, and guilt: factors that cause suffering.

"Such a changeling": Gender Bending, Identity Play, and Fantasies of Connection

Not only does love that hurts offer intensified feeling, it also allows the poet to engage in fantasy role playing in which he occupies various feminized positions of suffering in order to feel connected to Hallam. Tennyson's views on androgyny are summed up by his comment that "men should be androgynous and women gynandrous, but men should not be gynandrous nor women androgynous" (qtd. in Craft 50). However one interprets this convoluted statement, it tells us that Tennyson felt positively about a
degree of gender crossing. In fact, his early poems are notable for imaginative identification with female figures, especially ones who suffer, for example, the Lady of Shallot and Mariana. Additionally, *The Princess*, written concurrently with *In Memoriam*, ends with the Prince's marriage to Ida, and extols their union as a model of androgyny:

Yet in the long years likeer must they grow;
The man be more of woman, she of man;
He gain in sweetness and in moral height,
Nor lose the wrestling thews that throw the world;
She mental breadth, nor fail in childward care,
Nor lose the childlike in the larger mind. (7: 263-268)

*In Memoriam* at one point praises Hallam as androgynous, having embodied "manhood fused with female grace" (109:17). Gender bending in *In Memoriam* usually involves the speaker's imagining himself as Hallam's widow, a fantasy he indulges often. At another point the speaker courts suffering by describing himself as a girl lower in class status than Hallam, asking "How should he love a thing so low?" (60: 16)

Yet gender roles in the poem are more fluid than simple reversal of male and female. For example, in section 9 the speaker gives himself and Hallam both genders and four different relations: He describes Hallam as "My friend," "brother of my love" who is "more than my brothers are to me" (9:19-20). The speaker is also figured as Hallam's widow and Hallam is compared to the speaker's mother. At another point the poet personifies Sorrow, asking her to "live with me [...] as a wife" (59:1-2). I would argue that this desire to wed Sorrow, to fall in love with pain, points to a masochistic desire that exceeds the binaries male and female, homosexual and heterosexual. Indeed, the poet's much remarked homoerotic desire for Hallam is contingent upon his remaining in love
with his own pain. As the poet writes throughout, he believes that to lose his grief is to lose his love for Hallam. This conflation of masochism and homoeroticism is apparent when the poet asks Sorrow: "wilt thou rule my blood" (59:5), and then remarks that if she will, then his "centered passion cannot move, / Nor will it lessen from today" (59:9-10). It is unclear if the poet's "centered passion" is his love for Hallam or his grief itself: unclear because they are one and the same.

I read all this gender play as twofold in significance. First, it is an effect of the speaker's pain. His intense suffering disrupts his gender identity; his psychic organization falters under the weight of grief. Theorists of pain such as Elaine Scarry and Leo Bersani agree on pain's ability to unmake the self, to shatter its coherence. For Scarry, the pain of torture separates body and soul. Bersani describes masochistic "self shattering" as akin to jouissance, an intensity so powerful that it "momentarily disturb[s] psychic organization... disrupts the ego's coherence and dissolves its boundaries" (101). Such loss of subjective coherence leads to my second point about the function of gender play in In Memoriam. Despite the fact that these gender crossings come from grief, there is pleasure to be gained from them. As Carol Siegel argues, "what seems to be one of male masochism's greatest sources of pleasure [is] a temporary release from society's coercive assignment of gender roles" (9). This release is most apparent, of course, in the poet's fantasies of taking on a feminine role. Yet even his same-sex fantasies, such as being Hallam's brother, offer new possibilities of pleasurable connection to Hallam. Deleuze and Guattari's theory of a "Body without Organs" is apropos here. The "Body without Organs," one example of which is the masochistic body, proposes reconceiving the body not as a coherent, hierarchically
organized, unified organism, but as a shifting, fragmented collection of disorganized organs and surfaces. As Deleuze and Guattari write: "the organs distribute themselves on the BWO, but they distribute themselves independently of the form of the organism; forms become contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that are produced, flows, thresholds, and gradients" (164). The BWO is valuable because it is decentered, non-hierarchical, able to form connections in ways a more coherent organism cannot. I believe that the speaker embraces masochism for the same reason: its self-shattering effects generate new ways to fantasize connection with Hallam, whether as friend, brother, son, mistress, or long-suffering widow. The disruption of identity presented by In Memoriam is less radical than that proposed by Deleuze and Guattari's BWO. The speaker of In Memoriam has not gone so far as to "make himself a body without organs," as Deleuze and Guattari put it, but he is well on his way, because he seems to have realized that his fantasies of subjective incoherence enable fantasies of intersubjective connection.

Indeed, there are many examples throughout In Memoriam of the poet's desire to feel himself connected to his friend by expanding the borders of self-contained identity. The poem explicitly theorizes the formation of identity as a process of differentiation that entails realizing the borders of the self, ultimately leading to isolation:

The baby new to earth and sky...
Has never thought "this is I:"

But as he grows he gathers much,
    And learns the use of "I" and "me,"
    And finds "I am not what I see,"
And other than the things I touch.

So rounds he to a separate mind
From whence clear memory may begin,
As thro' the frame that binds him in
His isolation grows defined. (45:1-12)

The isolated poet's grief gives him a taste of mental and emotional incoherence. He often registers the psychic confusion, disequilibrium, and self-division common to mourners. For example, he asks: "Can calm despair and wild unrest / Be tenants of a single breast, / Or sorrow such a changeling be?" (16:2-4). He further calls himself a "delirious man / Whose fancy fuses old and new, / And flashes into false and true, / And mingles all without a plan" (16: 16-20). The poet realizes that in addition to these moments of grief-induced self-division and confusion of identity, he can voluntarily, through imaginative fantasy, escape his "separate mind" and "the frame that binds him in" -- the bonds of the unified, empirically limited and contained self. For example, in section 12 the speaker has an out-of-body experience: he imagines that he is a female dove flying to meet Hallam's ship returning to England: "Like her I go; I cannot stay; / I leave this mortal ark behind, / A weight of nerves without a mind" (12: 5-7). This dove-poet eventually comes back to him/herself; s/he "return[s] / to where the body sits, and learn[s] / That [s/he has] been an hour away" (12: 17-20). The best example of the poet's desire to expand the boundaries of the self appears in his meditation on the yew tree. The leaves of this hardy tree do not change color as the seasons change, making it a symbol of the permanence, constancy and timelessness for which the poet yearns. He addresses the tree, "gazing on thee, sullen tree / Sick for thy stubborn hardihood, / I seem to fail from out my blood / And grow incorporate with thee" (2: 13-16). The disintegration of the poet's independent identity, his "fail[ure] from out [his] blood," precipitates his imaginative incorporation into the yew
tree. Again we see that embracing subjective incoherence enables connections to form. Moreover, this process of "becoming tree" allows the poet access to the constancy, in the form of the yew's changelessness, for which he yearns. In this image of the yew tree we see unified all the psycho-dynamics of In Memoriam mentioned so far. First, the speaker desires to remain constant in love for Hallam. Next, he intensifies his grief by gazing on the tree and meditating on Hallam. Finally, his fantasy of subjective incoherence produces a heightened sense of connection to Hallam, in that the poet as yew-poet will remain constant in his love for his dead friend.

Masculinity, Mourning, and Grief's Recognition

However, at the same time that the poet plays with the possibilities offered by masochistic self-shattering, he realizes that what gives life to this identity-play -- his intense grief -- is ideologically suspect. In section 21 he ventriloquizes possible objections to his poetry. It is excessively sentimental: "This fellow would make weakness weak, / And melt the waxen hearts of men" (21: 7-8). His grief is theatrical, inauthentic: "He loves to make a parade of pain / That with his piping he may gain / The praise that comes to constancy" (21: 10-12). His mourning is an obsessively private affair, not the public concern proper for a man as "more and more people throng / The chairs and thrones of civil power" (21: 15-16). The poet then counters these objections with a simile; he claims authority for his feeling by comparing himself to yet another female bird, a mother linnet:

I do but sing because I must,
And pipe but as the linnets sing
And one is glad; her note is gay,
For now her little ones have ranged;
And one is sad; her note is changed,
Because her brood is stol'n away. (21: 23-24)

Adams argues that poet employs this simile to claim for himself the "moral authority of maternal devotion, his culture's most powerful emblem of absolute emotional integrity" (45). However, I would suggest that while the poet tries in this stanza to portray his grief as authentic — as natural as mother's love or birdsong — he nevertheless acknowledges that if he remains in the realm of masochistic grief and writes about it, then he abrogates maleness. In his imagination he can be a yew tree, a female dove, or Hallam's widow, but when he explicitly confronts the public world, as he does in this lyric, he avows that there is no viable way to reconcile his grief with early Victorian norms of masculinity. He might just as well be a mother linnet.

The incompatibility between the poet's feelings and masculine norms is even more evident when one reads *In Memoriam* in context of Victorian norms of mourning. Victorian obsession with death and the period's extravagant mourning rituals are well known. The Duke of Wellington's 1852 funeral exemplifies this extravagance; as Joseph and Tucker describe, it was "a High Victorian ideal for state funeral pomp: a million and a half mourners along the parade route, a coffin of quadruple ply, a hearse costing L 11,000, and L 80,000 on funeral seating alone" (119). The theory behind such ostentatious public mourning was that "The more extravagant the display, the more expeditious might be the public catharsis" (119). Private grief was likewise characterized by extravagance: mourning periods and clothing styles were strictly set; mourners used special stationary
and wore special jewelry, often containing bits of the deceased's hair (119). Women, more than men, were expected to fulfill the social requirements of mourning, as Joseph and Tucker argue:

While bourgeois men did... mourn, their need to go to work in a man's world encouraged a discourse of Victorian mourning that remained gender-marked: etiquette books, for example, tended to enunciate rules of mourning on the part of widows and mothers. During the first year of mourning [...] women clad in jet black were expected to behave as veritable social outcasts and refuse all invitations to leave the home. But once the specified period of mourning was past, there set in a no less binding expectation that the mourner speedily reactivate her discarded social identity. (119)

Mourners were expected, after a time, to reenter the social sphere — an expectation clearly shown by the intense public pressure put on Queen Victoria, the "Widow at Windsor," to put by grief and resume public duties. As the Queen's period of mourning ballooned to twenty years, her "subjects became at first increasingly suspicious, and at last inevitably convinced, that there was something wrong about their monarch's prostration, something downright pathological — and a combined journalistic and parliamentary campaign said so in strong terms" (121).

Similarly suspect is the grief of In Memoriam's speaker. It defies these Victorian standards of mourning, both because it lasts too long and because it is felt and expressed by a man. Criticizing Tennyson's grief and the poetic sensibility that nurtured it, Edward
Fitzgerald wrote in 1845 (5 years before the poem was published): "We have surely had enough of men reporting their sorrows [...] if Tennyson had got on a horse and ridden 20 miles, instead of moaning over his pipe, he would have been cured of his sorrows in half the time. As it is, it is about 3 years before the Poetic Soul walks itself out of darkness and despair and into Common Sense" (qtd. in Ricks 214). Fitzgerald's statement sums up what was considered proper manly behavior in the 1840s -- direct action, "common sense," and sublimation of feeling -- versus improper behavior -- "reporting sorrows," "moaning" in "darkness and despair," and giving free reign to the "Poetic Soul." After In Memoriam's publication, a reviewer for The Times deprecated its "tone of [...] amatory tenderness," writing: "Very sweet and plaintive these verses are, but who would not give them a feminine application?" (qtd. in Ricks 219). Another review found the same feminine qualities and actually assumed that the poem's author was a woman: "These touching lines evidently come from the full heart of the widow of a military man."  

As these examples suggest, In Memoriam's extravagant grief violates norms of masculinity; specifically, it violates norms of self-control and reserve so intrinsic to emergent ideals of the gentleman. Other Victorian modes of male self-fashioning attempted to contain male feeling as well. For example, in Sartor Resartus, published around the same time that In Memoriam was begun, Carlyle gives his famous exhortation -- "close thy Byron, open thy Goethe" -- encapsulating a masculine ideal that rejected passivity and self-indulgent, solipsistic focus on interior states of mind, and instead

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3 Quoted in Hallam, Lord Tennyson Alfred, Lord Tennyson: A Memoir, in In Memoriam, ed. Ross. 117. This error was possible because In Memoriam was not originally published under Tennyson's name.
embraced creative action and active self-making. Similarly, separate-spheres ideology attempted to naturalize feeling as feminine, rational thought as masculine. Utilitarianism provided a philosophical justification for the active, self-asserting man motivated by self-interest, who sought pleasure and avoided pain, or only endured pain as necessary for a payback of future pleasure. According to its tenets, a man should not value pain in itself, as does the speaker of In Memoriam.

These ideological norms of mourning and masculinity coerce the poet to moderate and overcome his grief. Moreover, the internal logic of the poem itself indicates that love that hurts is unviable. The poet realizes that the "home" of perpetual grief he has built through masochistic fantasy is faulty by the nature of its construction. In section 69 the speaker reveals the limits of this fantasy. He wanders from a town into the woods and there puts on a crown of thorns. Wandering back to the town, he is not favorably received.

I met with scoffs, I met with scorns
    From youth and babe and hoary hairs:
    They call'd me in the public squares
The fool that wears a crown of thorns:

They call'd me fool, they call'd me child:
    I found an angel of the night;
    The voice was low, the look was bright;
He look'd upon my crown and smiled:

He reach'd the glory of a hand,
    That seem'd to touch it into leaf;
    The voice was not the voice of grief,
The words were hard to understand. (69: 9-20)

The speaker's crown of thorns, like Christ's, symbolizes love that embraces suffering, love linked with and made more potent by pain. However, this lyric explains the problem with
this brand of masochistic fantasy: it is purely intrasubjective, not intersubjective. It offers the poet no recognition of his suffering. The townspeople ridicule and mock him, while the angel, who symbolizes Hallam, smiles but speaks inarticulately, and his hands only seem to touch the crown of thorns into leaf. One could argue that the townspeople's ridicule and the angel's unintelligible response are forms of recognition, albeit negative, mocking, and inadequate. Yet the recognition the speaker desires is different. To experience his grief as meaningful, he needs to know that others recognize his pain as real, heartfelt, and authentic. As Benjamin argues, recognition is "that response from the other which makes meaningful the feelings, intentions, and actions of the self" (Bonds 12). The poet needs the confirming response of others in order to feel his grief to be real. The problem for In Memoriam is that because love that hurts is self-inflicted, or at least self-intensified, suffering, it opens the poet to the charge that his feelings are not completely genuine and natural, and so lacking in meaning, for him and for others.

More importantly though, love that hurts cannot guarantee what the poet wants most: recognition by Hallam. It seems obvious that the poet can get no recognition from Hallam since Hallam is dead, yet the poet repeatedly longs for precisely that, and suffers even more when it doesn't come. The poet longs to know that Hallam is aware of his grief. For example, he addresses his dead friend: "mayest thou watch me where I weep" (63: 9)). At another point he wishes "That I could wing my will with might / to leap the grades of life and light, / And flash at once, my friend to thee" (41: 10-12). He desires Hallam's spiritual presence, as expressed in the suggestive lines "Descend, and touch, and enter; hear / The wish too strong for words to name; / That in this blindness of the frame /
My Ghost may feel that thine is near" (93: 13-14). The desire for Hallam's recognition is further given voice in the plaintive "Be near me" section, in which the poet figures his suffering in vivid bodily imagery, and cries for recognition of that suffering, for someone to "Be near" him in his pain.

    Be near me when my light is low,
    When the blood creeps, and the nerves prick
    And tingle; and the heart is sick,
    And all the wheels of being slow.

    Be near me when the sensuous frame
    Is rack'd with pangs that conquer trust; (50: 1-6)

The danger of the poet's suffering is that if unrecognized, by others and especially by Hallam, it risks meaninglessness, unintelligibility and absurdity.

    Tennyson lays bare . . . the potential absurdity of suffering, especially when self-inflicted, in the early dramatic monologue "St. Simeon Stylites." Simeon Stylites of Syria was a fifth-century Christian renowned for his extreme self-mortification. In Tennyson's poem, Simeon stands atop a pillar, waiting for death, and describes in vivid detail his many self-imposed sufferings. For example, Simeon says,

    while I lived
    In the white convent down the valley there,
    For many weeks about my loins I wore
    The rope that haled the buckets from the well,
    Twisted as tight as I could knot the noose,
    And spake not of it to a single soul,
    Until the ulcer, eating through my skin,
    Betray'd my secret penance. (60-67)

Another example:

    Three winters, that my soul might grow to thee [God],
    I lived up there on yonder mountain side.
My right leg chain'd into the crag, I lay
Pent in a roofless close of ragged stones;
Inswathed sometimes in wandering mist, and twice
Black'd with thy branding thunder, and sometimes
Sucking the damps for drink, and eating not. (70-76)

The poem is filled with similar descriptions of self-torture by which Simeon hopes to prove to God that he is worthy of being recognized as a saint.

The people who surround Simeon recognize him as saintly, but their response is inadequate. As Simeon waits to be taken to heaven, he says that he "scarce can hear the people hum / About the column's base" (37-38). He addresses God directly, dismissing the admirers who have gathered to watch him die:

Am I to blame for this,
That here come those that worship me? Ha! ha!
They think that I am somewhat. What am I?
The silly people take me for a saint,
And bring me offerings of fruit and flowers (122-126)

Simeon needs God, not people, to validate and recognize his suffering. Having mortified himself for thirty years, Simeon hopes that God will grant him "The meed of saints, the white robe and the palm" (20). Simeon's suffering is laughable in Tennyson's presentation of it -- as excessive, theatrical, disingenuous, and self-congratulatory -- but is made even more so because God's validation remains uncertain. If God does not recognize Simeon's sufferings, then Simeon will become just a fanatic who ties ropes around his loins and chains himself to mountains in the middle of winter. His sufferings will have been for nought. Indeed. Simeon says as much. "Let this avail, just, dreadful, mighty God, / This not be all in vain" (9-10). At the end of the poem, Simeon becomes ludicrous, reduced to sputtering pathetically and incoherently:
The end! the end!
Surely the end! What's here? a shape, a shade,
A flash of light. Is that the angel there
That holds a crown? Come, blessed brother, come!
I know thy glittering face. I waited long;
My brows are ready. What! deny it now?
Nay, draw, draw, draw nigh. So I clutch it. Christ!
't is gone; 't is here again; the crown! the crown!

Simeon gets his crown, and his recognition, and thereafter his tone becomes more controlled, ending with the quiet prayer: "O Lord, / Aid all this foolish people; let them take / Example, pattern; lead them to thy light" (218-220). However, one wonders whether Simeon's intense self-mortification has so damaged his psyche that by the end of the poem he becomes hallucinatory. If this be true, then his suffering really has been meaningless, as it has made led him to mistake saintliness for madness.

The danger for the speaker of In Memoriam is that if his suffering remains a private affair and goes unrecognized, it will be meaningless and even laughable, like that of Simeon Stylites. Indeed, Fitzgerald's comment about curing Tennyson's grief through riding a horse displays no small measure of mockery. In Memoriam demonstrates the necessity of grief's recognition; at one point, the poet describes himself as "An infant crying in the night: / An infant crying for the light: / And with no language but a cry" (54: 18-20). This inarticulate, unwitnessed suffering gains meaning when there is an audience for it, as the poet later describes, "Then was I as a child that cries, / But, crying, knows his father near" (124: 19-20).

Adams argues that In Memoriam registers anxiety about the authenticity of the poet's grief: it "will seem not spontaneous utterance [...] but calculated performance" (45).
As I have shown, "love that hurts" preserves the poet's love for Hallam, but it also traps the poet in a double bind. His pain needs to be recognized as genuine, but recognition implies an appeal to an audience. This appeal implicates the poet in theatricality and attendant suspicion of "calculated performance," calling into question whether his pain is genuine and natural, especially insofar as it is self-intensified. The poem registers these problems, and tries to deal with them. For example, as Adams argues, the poet's repeated figurations of himself as Hallam's widow attempt to make his grief seem genuine by associating it with the culturally valorized image of the grieving widow. However, I believe that over and above the poet's problems in authenticating his grief, what ultimately makes him give up love that hurts is that it cannot guarantee a lasting sense of intersubjective recognition by the spirit of Hallam. The speaker experiences a brief moment of recognition by Hallam's spirit in section 95, in a sublime moment when, as he says, "the living soul was flashed on mine" (95: 36). Spurred on by this, the poet in the last sections of In Memoriam elaborates a fantasy that enables him to experience Hallam in a more permanent way.

"A Dream of Good": Fantasy, Homoeroticism, and Love

The concluding sections of In Memoriam represent the poet's psychological reintegration, ostensibly achieved through movement out of the private world of grief and suffering into the public world of social relations and obligations. He casts off his earlier elegies as "Idle brawling rhymes" (Epilogue: 23) and his "own phantom chanting hymns" (108: 10). Instead, the poet says that he will not isolate himself nor obsess over private
concerns:

I will not shut me from my kind,
And, lest I stiffen into stone,
I will not eat my heart alone,
Nor feed with sighs a passing wind: (108: 1-4)

The poet finds a new calling, believing himself to "have grown / To something greater than
before" (Epilogue: 19-20) and vowing to be a "fuller minstrel" (106: 20). The speaker
accomplishes this transformation through religious faith. However, he does not come to an
orthodox Christianity, but instead generates a fantasy in which he projects Hallam onto the
entire world in a kind of personalized pantheism. As he says to his dead friend:

Dear friend, far off, my lost desire,
So far, so near in woe and weal;
O loved the most, when most I feel
There is a lower and higher;

Known and unknown; human, divine;
Sweet human hand and lips and eye;
Dear heavenly friend that canst not die,
Mine, mine, for ever, ever mine

Strange friend, past, present, and to be;
Loved deeplier, darklier understood;
Behold, I dream a dream of good,
And mingle all the world with thee. (129)

Although the speaker says that he loves Hallam most when he feels the separateness of
"lower and higher," this lyric breaks down that distinction, as well as the distinctions
between the human and the divine, the material and the immaterial, the "known and
unknown." The "heavenly friend" Hallam is not an invisible spirit, but has "sweet human
hand and lips and eye." The speaker's "dream of good," "mingle[s] all the world with"
Hallam's spirit; in this dream, flesh and spirit, heaven and earth unite. This pantheistic
fantasy, in which Hallam's spirit infuses all creation, lets the poet believe that he is still connected to Hallam. In fact, this connection is quite intimate, a kind of possession or ownership; the speaker claims Hallam as "Mine, mine, for ever, ever mine."

Moreover, this resolution intensifies the poet's love for Hallam because it allows him to feel that Hallam recognizes his love. As the poet writes:

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But tho' I seem in star and flower
To feel thee some diffusive power,
I do not therefore love thee less.

My love involves the love before;
My love is vaster passion now;
Tho' mix'd with God and Nature thou,
I seem to love thee more and more. (130: 6-12)
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In contrast with the speaker's fantasy of masochistic "love that hurts," which produced a sense of imaginative connection to but no sense of recognition by Hallam, the poem's conclusion offers a fantasy that works better. This fantasy that Hallam is one with a deified Nature allows the poet to feel in the "diffusive power" of nature Hallam's palpable presence. The poet can take every "star and flower," every sign in the natural world, for the wonder of recognition by Hallam. This sense of recognition makes the poet's love "vaster passion" than "the love before." Because Hallam is "Mix'd with God and Nature," he is loved by the poet "more and more."

It is vital to note that In Memoriam is geared toward preserving and intensifying love for Hallam because the poem has often been read as marked by homophobia, or at least marked by the locutionary indirection that often characterizes expressions of homoeroticism. According to these readings, the poet's desire for Hallam is dangerous,
transgressive, threatening to normative heterosexuality, and the poem must take steps to render it less so. Christopher Craft, for instance, calls the poem "a machine for the sublimation, management, or transformation of male homosexual desire," and argues that the elegy negotiates its problematic desire less by a centering of its warmth than by a dispersion of its bliss, less by acts of specific definition than by strategies of deferral, truncation, and displacement, strategies that work everywhere to 'refine and spiritualize' what otherwise would be "the wish too strong for words to name." (47)

Jeff Nunokawa, in his essay "In Memoriam and the Extinction of the Homosexual" argues that the poem does not "refine and spiritualize" its homoerotic content; rather, the poem simply repudiates homoeroticism and moves toward a standard Victorian affirmation of heterosexuality. Nunokawa argues that In Memoriam "proposes a developmental model of male sexuality which establishes the homoerotic as an early phase that enables and defines the heterosexual" (428).

I take issue with these assertions that In Memoriam is centrally concerned with responding to homophobic injunctions. It strikes me as odd that a poem by an unmarried poet who calls himself the widow of another bachelor could be thought of as worried about homophobia. The openness, frankness and intensity of the poet's expressions of feeling do not suggest to me a closet or invite analytic techniques developed to analyze literature of the closet. 4 Tennyson's subsequent emendations to the poem certainly suggest

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4 The best example of such an approach remains Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's The Epistemology of the Closet. Craft and Nunokawa's analyses are indebted to Sedgwick's groundbreaking work, and also reflect its limitations. In that Sedgwick's deconstructive method of reading homosexuality in nineteenth century literary
that he later felt the pressure of homophobia. For example, the climactic sublime moment of the poet's encounter with Hallam's spirit originally read: "His living soul was flash'd on mine, / And Mine in his was wound, and whirl'd / About empyreal heights of thought (95: 36-38). In the late 1870's, fearing that the masculine pronoun "his" would give "the wrong impression," Tennyson altered the lines: "The living soul was flash'd on mine, And mine in this was wound" (qtd. in In Memoriam, 61, italics added). By the 1870s, expressions of implicitly homoerotic male love were far more suspect than they were in the late 1830s and early 1840s, when Tennyson likely wrote section 95. 5 We cannot be absolutely certain that Tennyson felt the need to alter this sections because of homophobic pressure, but this possibility is quite likely. However, when one reads In Memoriam in context of its early Victorian composition, the ideological pressures it registers relate mainly to gender and grief, as I have argued. The poem's first readers primarily questioned the propriety of a man having such intense, long-lived feelings of grief, not the propriety of his feelings being for another man.

Yet while homoeroticism is peripheral in the poem, it should not be dismissed. As I have indicated, in the poem's early "love that hurts" phase, the poet's desire for Hallam is coincident with his eroticized grief; homoeroticism and masochism are conjoined. But what about the poem's conclusion, where the poet seems to have overcome grief and love that hurts? Richard Dellamora's biographical and historicist approach to In Memoriam is

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5 On the dating of this lyric, see Eleanor B. Mattes "Chronology of In Memoriam" in Ross. Mattes judges that the lyric was written anywhere from 1836 to 1842.
instructive here. Dellamora places Tennyson and Hallam's friendship in the context of their association with the Cambridge Apostles, a group of literary undergraduates, "liberals guided by the principle that one should be able to enter sympathetically into a wide range of views, including unconventional or unpopular ones" (Dellamora 19). Many of the Apostles had sex with other men, and those who did not at least knew homosexuality's existence. There is no evidence that Tennyson or Hallam ever had sex with each other or other men. Yet as Dellamora argues,

> Since we now know that Tennyson was familiar with possibilities of sex between men, that he joked about the subject, and that he even raised the possibility of sharing such adventures with Arthur -- though in a humorous and dismissive vein -- we see that Tennyson clearly was capable of perceiving that their strong emotional connection might have sexual implications" (19)

Reading *In Memoriam* in light of Tennyson's association with the Apostles sex-gender nonconformity, Dellamora argues that in the poem we see a similar effort to enlarge "the expressive range of 'manly love' " (30). The Apostles' "experimental outlook helps account for Tennyson's efforts to widen and intensify the range of expression of male friendships/love in *In Memoriam*" (20). This "widening" informs the poem as a whole; as Dellamora concludes "the poem moves not toward self-definition [...] but toward self-expansion, an expansion of self in which Hallam, nature, God himself are assimilated to the poet's being -- and to his poetry" (39).

I do not believe, as Dellamora does, that the poet incorporates Hallam and God
into himself, but that the poet imaginatively transposes Hallam onto all of nature in order to feel that he is connected to and recognized by Hallam. However, Dellamora's point about the expansive quality of the poet's love is well taken. In the end, the poet's love for Hallam continues to comprehend both Hallam's spirit and his "sweet human hand and lips and eye;" it remains a love of the body, tinged with sexuality. Therefore, contra Craft, the poem's dispersion of Hallam onto all of creation is not a refinement and spiritualization of "the wish too strong for words to name." Rather, it is a carefully formulated strategy that allows the poet to persist in loving his dead friend as he has always done: with a love that comprehends both spirituality and physicality. The primacy of love in the poem was noted by George Eliot, who wrote that "The deepest significance of the poem is the sanctification of human love as a religion" (qtd. in Ricks 221). Indeed, it has often been overlooked by critics keen to find homophobia in the poem that diffusion of Hallam actually intensifies the poet's love for him. To quote again from section 130:

But tho' I seem in star and flower
To feel thee some diffusive power,
_ I do not therefore love thee less._

My love involves the love before;
_ My love is vaster passion now;_
Tho' mix'd with God and Nature thou,
_ I seem to love thee more and more._ (130: 6-12, emphasis added)

Simply put, at the end of the poem, the speaker loves Hallam more than he did at its beginning.

Because of this expansion of the poet's love, I fail to see the validity of Nunokawa's argument that the poem moves its speaker from immature, homosexual
infatuation with Hallam into the mature public world of heteroerosexual social obligation.

Nunokawa's evidence for this movement rests mainly on decontextualized close reading of a few stanzas, a tenuous intertextual connection with Shakespeare's sonnets, and the fact that the poem's Epilogue is an epithalamion, or poem celebrating marriage, in which the poet attends the wedding of his younger sister. Ending the poem with a wedding would seem a typical nineteenth century closural device affirming heterosexuality. In truth, Tennyson intended the Epilogue to represent rebirth, hope, and the affirmation of social values; as he writes, *In Memoriam* "begins with a funeral and ends with a marriage -- begins with death and ends with promise of a new life" (qtd. in *In Memoriam* 86). The ending of *In Memoriam* does seem to move the poet out of grief into engagement with the world.

However, in my view the poem is actually very anti-social. It affirms in the end the very withdrawal into the self-contained world of fantasy that it has seemingly repudiated. This withdrawal is most apparent in the Epilogue. Despite Tennyson's stated intentions, the "new life" most convincingly promised by the Epilogue is not that of the heterosexual couple, but the poet's life of the mind, his world of imaginative fantasy. The Epilogue's portrayal of the wedding seems uninspired and perfunctory, as many critics have noticed. The poet's heart does not seem to be in it. A few examples demonstrate his lack of conviction. He describes the newly married couple:

```
O happy hour, and happier hours
    Await them. Many a merry face
    Salutes them -- maidens of the place,
    That pelt us in the porch with flowers.  (Epilogue: 65-68)
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There is an abrupt shift here from formal syntax -- "O happy hour" -- to the commonplace image of being pelted with flowers. The awkward enjambment of this stanza suggests that its narrative description is more suited for prose and only awkwardly fits into the in Memoriam stanza. Another example: "O happy hour, behold the bride / With him to whom her hand I gave" (Epilogue: 69-70). The inverted syntax here gives the line a jerky, staccato rhythm. Similarly, the description of drinking champagne is laughable: "My drooping memory will not shun the foaming grape of Eastern France" (80-81). The speaker's description of the wedding guests enacts the general mundaneness of the scene; the guests discuss "how their courtship grew, / And talk of others that are wed, / And how she look'd, and what he said" (97-99).

Yet notice how the verse improves when the poet retreats into revery, thinking of Hallam:

Nor count me all to blame if I
Conjecture of a stiller guest,
Perchance, perchance among the rest,
And tho' in silence, wishing joy. (85-88)

The poet leaves the wedding reception and retreats further into reverie, back into his world of imaginative fantasy. Once alone, his verse becomes once again richly imagistic, fluid and melodious. More significantly, the transition from the public world of the reception to the poet's solitude is strikingly abrupt:

Again the feast, the speech, the glee,
The shade of passing thought, the wealth
Of words and wit, the double health,
The crowning cup, the three-times-three,

And last the dance; -- till I retire: (101 -105)
The poet then wanders off alone to think about Hallam. The dash between "dance" and "till" marking his departure represents what In Memoriam ostensibly tries to overcome: the division between the public world of social obligation and the private world of feeling and imagination. More specifically, if the poet's leaving his sister's wedding to go and dream about his dead male friend does not constitute a symbolic rejection of heterosexual social obligation, then what does? The power of creative imagination itself is what the poem most celebrates, as Peltason argues. ⁶ I would go further and argue that in the end the poem celebrates a poetic soul that, despite its best efforts at effecting reintegration into the world of men and women, remains radically unassimilated into the social order, in fact symbolically rejecting that world in favor of the interior world of imagination and feeling from which it has seemingly emerged. Again, in this imaginative world the poet can not only persist in loving Hallam, but love him even more.

Honest Doubt, or Faith that Hurts

Most crucially to my argument, this imaginative world is still energized by love that hurts reworked into new forms. The poem reconfigures its masochistic energies in two ways. The first conceives of psychic pain in economic terms. The poem's conclusion joins Christian teleology with the economic notion of deferred gratification; the poet's pain of yearning for Hallam is worth it because in their ultimate reunion, there will be even greater pleasure, as the poet says, "O days and hours, your work is this, / To hold me from my proper place, / a little while from his embrace, / For fuller gain of after bliss" (117: 1-

⁶ See Peltason 164-170.
4). The poem's earlier masochistic version of love that hurts is in the end diluted into the Utilitarian notion that pain is justifiable if it will yield future pleasure, as well as the Christian idea that earthly suffering is necessary to reap rewards in heaven.

The other, more significant and complicated method by which the poem reworks love that hurts is in its formulation of religious faith as "honest doubt." Doubt is central to the poem's vision of religious faith -- the faith that underwrites the poet's pantheistic preservation of love for Hallam. As T.S. Eliot aptly observes, In Memoriam "is not religious because of the quality of its faith, but because of the quality of its doubt. Its faith is a poor thing, but its doubt is a very intense experience" (177). The poem's best statement of honest doubt occurs in section 96, where the speaker describes Hallam's struggles with religious doubts:

Perplex in faith, but pure in deeds,
    At last he beat his music out.
There lives more faith in honest doubt,
Believe me, than in all the creeds.

He fought his doubts and gather'd strength,
    He would not make his judgement blind,
He faced the spectres of the mind
And laid them: thus he came at length

To find a stronger faith than his own (96: 9-17)

In this version of religious belief, faith is achieved not through indoctrination, revelation, conversion, or mystical experience, but through a continual process of mastering and disciplining doubt, requiring that the doubter "trust / With faith that comes of self-control, / The truths that never can be proved." (131: 9-10, emphasis added). Through the arduous process of controlling doubt -- even fighting it -- one's belief is purified and strengthened.
This is precisely what the poem enacts: doubts are fought throughout and ultimately a strengthened faith triumphs. Carlisle Moore argues that this version of honest doubt is disciplinary in function. He writes "doubt is [not] to be nurtured: it is to be endured, like a hairshirt, as a chastener of one's faith" (191). The honest doubter does not have an unquestioned, blind faith; like Hallam, he does "not make his judgement blind." He faces doubt, the "spectres of the mind," always aware that his faith is not quite as strong as it should be, chastening himself, struggling to achieve certainty. To feel oneself inadequate and deserving punishment, to inflict that punishment on oneself intrapsychically -- this is very much like Freudian moral masochism, which is characterized by feelings of guilt, and derives from a sadistic superego, one that has "become harsh, cruel, and inexorable against the ego which is in its charge" (Freud, "The Economic Problem in Masochism" 264). Chastening and disciplining belief, honest doubt exerts a self-critical, self-punishing mechanism akin to the Freudian superego. The poem thus translates unacceptable masochism into a feeling Victorians knew well: guilt. This translation is one way the poem conserves its psychic investment in a love that hurts. 7 Moreover, the masochistic thread in this "hairshirt" of honest doubt suggests that the poem's reconstruction of religious faith as honest doubt represents a reworking and continuation of the masochistic pleasures of grief that drive most of the poem, not a complete transcendence of them. This reconstructed faith is what enables the poet to overcome his love-that-hurts fueled grief, to conform to

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7 One might ask why the poem would effect this conservation. On one level, In Memoriam on the whole is a monument to repetition compulsion, so for the poem to keep "love that hurts" alive in some form is unsurprising. However, I am not interested so much in why the poem conserves its investment in "love that hurts," but rather that it does so, and how this structure of revamped masochism intersects with mid-Victorian religious experience.
Victorian ideologies of mourning and manliness, and to preserve his love for Hallam, including its homoerotic elements. All these goals are achieved by rewiring the masochistic energies of love that hurts into the circuitry of honest doubt.

Finally, I believe that understanding honest doubt in this way can explain some of the poem's cultural resonance, specifically with reference to the religious doubts of the first-generation Victorians who were its original audience. Gilmour argues that early Victorians dissented from Christian dogma not primarily because of the challenges posed to it by science, but on moral grounds. They objected to the harsh, vengeful God of the Evangelicals who simply watches as humanity suffers. Gilmour writes of first-generation Victorians that their objections to Christianity were overwhelmingly moral rather than scientific, objections to certain key doctrines of evangelical religion in which some had been reared but all had experienced in the religious culture of the time. The Atonement, chiefly, hell, everlasting punishment, original sin -- a God who demanded the obedience of his creatures on those terms did not deserve worshiping, a primitive, barbaric Deity. (The Victorian Period 87)

Gilmour takes Herbert Spencer's experience of religious crisis as exemplary of early Victorian religious doubt. Spencer writes in his Autobiography that he eventually came to repudiate several tenets of the Methodist faith in which he had been raised, including the notion of a deity who is pleased with the singing of his praises, and angry with the beings he has made when they fail to tell him perpetually of
his greatness [...] a being who calmly looks on while myriads of his creatures are suffering eternal torments [...] and the idea that] for Adam's disobedience [...] all Adam's descendants should be damned, with the exception of a relatively few who accepted the "plan of salvation" which the immense majority never heard of. (qtd. in Gilmour 87)

Based on this and other evidence from the period, Gilmour concludes that in the religious doubt of first-generation Victorians we see, "The familiar paradox of Victorian doubt: the moral sense turning on the Evangelical sense which had helped to shape it" (87).

In Memoriam's religious faith, or more accurately, its religious doubt, would have resonated with this highly developed moral sense that had been shaped by submission to the will of a stern God. In Memoriam offers the experience of intense doubt as a replacement for the self-critical mechanism that early Victorians had lost in their repudiation of a punishing God. The poem proposes that if one would don the "hairshirt" of honest doubt, he or she would not need God in order to feel guilty, chastened, disciplined, punished. Through always fighting doubts, one could punish him/herself, enjoying the guilt, self-beratement and self-criticism that had formerly come from submission to the will of a judgmental God. Freud is again apropos here; as he writes of the superego, that it "has retained the essential features of the introjected persons [the parents] namely, their power, their severity, their tendency to watch over and punish" ("The Economic Problem in Masochism 264). Substitute "God" for "parents" and In Memoriam's version of honest doubt offers a blueprint for building a better superego.

So what are we to make of this poet, who, at the end, seems to have triumphantly
regained a sense of self-coherence by rejecting and overcoming self-shattering grief, yet who still embraces pain, albeit in reworked forms? This question points to the dynamics of Victorian male masochism more generally. As we have seen in Carlylean "Hero-worship," and as we will see in Dickens and Swinburne, masochistic fantasy is a way to resolve a specific Victorian ideological issues: for Tennyson, the "Crisis of Faith" and norms of manliness and mourning. In Memoriam disciplines the poet's masochistic grief by remaking him into the "fuller minstrel." However, the poet's reconstituted masculinity is not purged of masochism. Especially in the poem's version of religious faith as honest doubt, the poem valorizes an ostensibly conventional model of manhood that is, in fact, underwritten by masochism reworked into culturally acceptable forms.

Postscript: Toward Maud

In addition to In Memoriam, Tennyson's other long poem primarily concerned with male suffering is Maud: a Monodrama. I want to end this chapter with a few points of connection between In Memoriam and Maud, since I believe that the two poems represent many of the same themes and processes, especially in terms of how they link male suffering to larger socio-cultural issues. Published in 1855, Maud was not critically acclaimed, but was popular, and because Tennyson read it aloud so often, it became clear that it was one of his favorite works.

The speaker of Maud is an unnamed young man of twenty-five who pines away for his lost love, Maud. When Maud was still an infant, she and the speaker were promised to each other. However, Maud's father and brother broke this promise and betrothed her to
the son of a wealthy industrialist. The speaker is left destitute and depressed, and the poem documents his dark, shifting moods. The speaker has a family history of madness (as did Tennyson) and at various points worries that the pain of his unrequited love will push him over the edge to insanity, or even suicide, as in the case of his father.

There are several points of similarity between Hallam and Maud. Both are objects of desire for the speakers; their loss and the speakers' ensuing grief over it form the conditions of possibility for poetic composition. While *In Memoriam* sticks to consistent poetic form (the "*In Memoriam* stanza") and demonstrates the self-shattering nature of grief through the speaker's gender-bending fantasies, *Maud* enacts its speaker's unquiet mind through a nonlinear narrative formed by disparate poetic styles. Moreover, even though Maud lives, she is virtually as disembodied as Hallam: she never really materializes in the poem, but remains shadowy, indistinct, unrealized. The most vivid image of Maud is of her voice floating out over the meadow. The speaker says that the beauty of her song causes him

\[
\text{to move to the meadow and fall before} \\
\text{Her feet on the meadow grass, and adore,} \\
\text{Not her, who is neither courtly nor kind,} \\
\text{Not her, not her, but a voice. (IV: 3)}
\]

As these lines suggest, the speaker does not love the real-world Maud. Indeed, he at times deprecates her, calling her "all unmeet for a wife," and inexperienced, having "but fed on the roses and lain in the lilies of life" (IV: 10). Instead, the speaker loves the Maud of his dreams. Like Hallam, Maud is less a real character than an object of the narrator's idealizing desires.
The desire of Maud's speaker, like the poet's desire for Hallam in In Memoriam, energizes a world of imaginative fantasy that removes him from reality. As Maud's speaker says, "I will bury myself in myself" (I: 19). As in the elegy, this interior world allows the speaker freedom to fantasize, which he does at great length. But also as with In Memoriam, interiority is presented as problematic. The speaker of Maud fears that he will descend into madness, like his father. He repeatedly worries about this possibility; for example, "What! Am I raging alone as my father raged in his mood?" (I: 14). The speaker's black blood, like In Memoriam's grief, is figured as feminizing, a failure of masculinity. As the speaker laments, "And ah for a man to arise in me, / That the man I am may cease to be!" (X: 6).

Not only is the suffering speaker alienated from the masculine within, he is excluded from the patriarchal privilege that undergirds male homosociality in Maud. Since the narrator is prevented from marrying Maud, as he had been destined to do, he is left out of the exchange of women that cements male bonds. The narrator longs not only for Maud, but also for reentry into the world of male homosociality that their marriage would have guaranteed. His exclusion from this world is represented most poignantly in an episode where Maud's father throws a party, to which the speaker, of course, is not invited:

A grand political dinner  
To the men of many acres,  
A gathering of the Tory,  
A dinner and then a dance  
For the maids and marriage makers (XX: 3)

Excluded from this community, the speaker lingers in the garden, waiting for Maud to
come out and recognize him as her "true lover" (XX: 4).

The problem for the speaker is that not only does he lack Maud, but he lacks access to models of masculinity that will give him fulfillment and purpose. His own incoherent, suffering, possibly mad masculinity is clearly suspect, both to himself and others. The speaker also criticizes the other men in the poem. He describes Maud’s father as "the wrinkled head of the race" (IV:3). The man Maud is to marry is a nouveau riche, vulgar commercialist and the object of the speaker’s vehemence. The speaker believes that if he could only be a better man, then Maud would "not do herself this great wrong, / To take a wanton dissolute boy / For a man and leader of men" (X: 4). The speaker reserves his most intense scorn for Maud’s brother, whom he suspects of doing the most to keep Maud from him. The speaker says of the brother: "his essences turn'd the live air sick" (XIII: 1). The speaker sums up his view of masculinity: "However we brave it out, we men are a little breed" (IV: 5).

The narrator’s longing for a new brand of masculinity echoes Carlyle’s Hero-worship:

Ah God, for a man with heart, head, hand,
Like some of the simple great ones gone
For ever and ever by,
One still strong man in a blatant land,
Whatever they call him, what care I,
Aristocrat, democrat, autocrat — one
Who can rule and dare not lie. (X:5)

In the end, the narrator finds this hierarchical male world by joining the army and going off to fight in the Crimean War. This gives him a centering of identity that lets him escape his melancholy. Like the speaker of In Memoriam, he dismisses his world of private suffering,
reenters the public world, and finds purpose there. He dismisses his former self and joins his countrymen in the war effort:

"It is time, O passionate heart," said I
(For I cleaved to a cause that I felt to be pure and true),
"It is time, O passionate heart and morbid eye,
That old hysterical mock-disease should die."
And I stood on a giant deck and mix'd my breath
With a loyal people shouting a battle cry,
Till I saw the dreary phantom arise and fly
Far into the North, and battle, and seas of death (III: 3)

However, the speaker casts some doubt on the completeness of his transformation; he says "And myself have awaked, as it seems, to the better mind" (III: 5, emphasis added). Is he really better, or does he just seem so? I believe the latter. The last line of the poem supports this reading; the speaker says, "I embrace the purpose of God, and the doom assigned." Here the speaker expresses a death wish, as he has done throughout the poem in his thoughts of suicide. Clearly Tennyson is not validating the narrator's suicidal tendencies, as period critics who accused him of jingoism thought. Rather, as in In Memoriam -- where religious faith is underwritten by masochism -- in Maud Tennyson demonstrates that patriotic fervor, and styles of manliness formed from it, draw on energies of self-abasement and self-destruction that verge on madness. Patriotism is presented in Maud as a kind of masochistic, self-destructive insanity. In these insights, Tennyson anticipates Freud's association of masochism, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, with the death drive.

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8 I am indebted to Tabitha Sparks for this observation.
Guilt, Masochistic Fantasy, and the Gentleman

in Great Expectations

As we have seen, masochistic energies, tamed and reworked into less threatening forms, underwrite various early Victorian masculine responses to specific ideological concerns. Carlyle answers the "Condition of England" question by envisioning a utopian male world structured by the implicitly erotic dominance and submission of Heroes and Hero-worship. Tennyson confronts the "Crisis of Faith" and ideologies of masculinity and mourning with a fantasy of "love that hurts," which he then transmutes into the culturally validated religious pain of "honest doubt." By contrast, as I suggested briefly, in Maud Tennyson exposes patriotic hyper-masculinity as a fragile cover for the masochistic fantasy of the death wish. In this chapter, I will argue that Dickens likewise critiques mid-Victorian ideals of gentlemanliness as powered by guilt-ridden masochistic fantasy. Paradoxically, this fantasy is formed from those ideals and functions as proof of their embodiment, but also prevents realization of their socially beneficent goals.

For the Victorians, the words "ladies and gentlemen" formed not just a salutation; rather, they described hotly contested social categories. Kitson Clark observes that in nineteenth-century Britain, discriminating between the unrefined and gentlefolk was an "agonizing problem which possibly [...] caused more trouble and heartburning in well-nourished bosoms than any other secular problem" (253). Many period writers struggled to define gentility. One of the most enduring Victorian novels, Charles Dickens' Great Expectations (1861), thoroughly explores issues of gentility and gentlemanliness in charting the progress of its protagonist, Pip. In this chapter, I read Great Expectations in
relation to mid-nineteenth century ideals of English gentlemanliness, the ideals Pip aspires to embody as he rises in station. I focus on the issue of Pip's guilt in relation to the gentlemanly ideal as conceived at mid-century. I argue that in *Great Expectations* gentlemanly moral sensitivity does not yield the sympathy, fellow-feeling, and ethical conduct that would produce beneficial social results, as promised by period models of gentlemanliness. Rather, to be a gentleman in this novel is to be morally sensible of social inequities, to feel painfully guilty about them, and to substitute a fantasy world of guilt charged with masochistic erotic intensities for real-world connection with social inferiors. In this novel, the very thing that marks Pip's gentlemanliness -- his morally sensitive guilt -- ends up vitiating the social goals of the gentlemanly ideal.

I am not the first to notice that Pip is guilt-ridden. Many critics have tried to account for his guilt through the explicit or implicit invocation of psychoanalytic theory. ¹ I take a different approach, not discussing the origins of Pip's guilt in explicitly Freudian terms, for two reasons. First, such analysis has been done and done to death. Second, it seems to me that many psychoanalytic and symbolic analyses of Pip's guilt entangle themselves in webs of character relationships, images, narrative patterns, psychological processes -- but fail to place them in historical context. Pip's inner world has often been discussed either in isolation from the socio-historical conditions that shape it, or only with reference to quite broad historical contexts. For example, in her essay "How We Must Read *Great Expectations," Q. D. Leavis berates American critics for misreading the

¹ Examples include Shuli Barzilai "Dickens' *Great Expectations*: The Motive for Moral Masochism" and Peter Brooks chapter "Repetition, Repression, and Return: The Plotting of *Great Expectations* " in *Reading for the Plot*. 
novel's portrayal of the British class system. Yet Leavis herself is hardly historicist, reaching as she does the bland and general liberal humanist conclusions that Pip's is "the history of a successful progress toward spiritual freedom [...] Pip [...] is fully human in having impulses flowing freely in different directions [Pip understands] himself and his needs more fully so that his new self is produced of free choice." 2 Julian Moynahan exhaustively and ingeniously discusses the symbolic function of doubling in the novel, but his analysis yields this somewhat vague conclusion: "Pip's career enacts his society's condition of being — its guilt, its sinfulness, and in the end, its helplessness to cleanse itself of a taint of prison and crime" (87). The argument that "Pip's story represents the guilt of an entire society" offers little payoff in terms of an enriched understanding of mid-Victorian Britain or Pip's relationship to it. Recent analyses have been more specifically historicist, but often shy away from discussing Pip himself. 3 The paucity of analysis that places Pip's bildung in a developed historical context is perhaps due to the novel's form, as Janice Carlisle argues: "The form of Great Expectations has determined its critical history. The very emphasis on the personal and the private, which the prominence of the autobiographical voice makes almost inescapable, has made it difficult to conceive of the novel in any other terms" (459).

However, I believe that the inescapably private nature of the novel should not preclude historicizing Pip's inner world of emotion and guilt. To do so requires attending ________________________

2 287. As I will argue, the novel profoundly questions such liberal humanist pieties.

3 A reading exemplary in its historicity is Susan Walsh's "Bodies of Capital: Great Expectations and the Climacteric Economy" (Victorian Studies, Autumn 1993, 37:1). Walsh's reading links Miss Havisham to figurations of economic crisis as a menopausal woman.
to particularities in representations of emotion and delineating the socio-historical conditions that enable or thwart its growth and expression. Examining Pip's guilt in these terms, I take a Deleuzean "literary approach" to masochism. As I discussed in Chapter I, Deleuze argues that rather than relying on clinical definitions, we should look at symptoms, effects, and transformations in specific contexts. I follow this methodology in examining Pip's guilt, exploring the structures of pain, desire, pleasure and fantasy that energize and organize his story. Through this approach, I hope to connect issues of guilt and masochism in *Great Expectations* with specific socio-historical conditions forming the world of the mid-Victorian gentleman.

**The Mid-Nineteenth Century Gentlemanly Ideal**

The first point of connection to be made is with the gentlemanly ideal. Before the nineteenth century, whether or not one was a gentleman was mainly a question of birth or social status. One could claim the moniker if he were an aristocrat, a member of the landowning gentry, a clergyman in the Church of England, an officer in the army, or a member of Parliament. Yet the category also had a moral component prescribing development of inward states of mind that would result in mildness, tenderness, gentleness of manner and disposition, kind and generous treatment of others. By the mid-nineteenth century, "the moral element was generally acknowledged to be in the ascendant" (Gilmour 4). This emphasis on moral attributes rather than status and birth opened the category of gentleman to a range of middle-class Victorian men, enabling them to coopt the ideal to authorize their own social status and ultimate ascendancy. As we will see,
these inner qualities and modes of relation also drew implicitly and explicitly on Christian values, as well as the liberal humanist ideal of the free-standing, autonomous individual who is able, through imaginative sympathy, to feel himself connected to others. In sum, the gentlemanly ideal represented a fantasy marriage between the world of the self and the social world. In Benjamin's terms, it promised modes of thought and behavior that would enable intersubjective mutual recognition. However, as I will show, efforts to egalitarianize the ideal fell short, often lapsing back into elitist associations with rank, blood, or class -- associations that threatened the gentlemanly ideal's capacity to produce recognition between "like subjects."

We can observe the shift toward emphasizing gentlemanly moral qualities over social distinction in various definitions of the gentleman given by mid-century writers. In the chapter "Of Vulgarity" from Modern Painters (1860) John Ruskin seems to imply that gentlemanliness is an inherent, even somatic quality: "A gentleman's first characteristic is that fineness of structure in the body, which renders it capable of the most delicate sensation; and of the structure in the mind which renders it capable of the most delicate sympathies -- one may say, simply, 'fineness of nature' " (345). However, Ruskin does not limit gentlemanliness to the nobility or gentry, arguing that it is "an error to suppose that, because a man's name is common, his blood must be base" (345). For Ruskin, the gentleman is "well bred, in the sense that a horse or dog is well bred" (343). He believes that through generations of morally sensitive conduct, what he calls "pureness of moral habit," over time, gentlemanliness is produced as an innate quality (345). In fact, he asserts

4 This summary is greatly indebted to Robin Gilmour's work on the gentleman in Victorian literature.
that "rightness of moral conduct is ultimately the great purifier of race" (346). In sum, Ruskin believes that gentlemanliness is primarily based on moral fiber and not social class. Yet in his assertion that gentlemanliness is "bred" through "rightness of moral conduct," his model retains an association with blood and proper breeding, giving it a socially exclusive, elitist dimension. In the same way that thoroughbreds are superior to pack horses and showdogs are superior to mongrels, gentlemen are superior to the ungenteeel.

In *Culture and Anarchy* (1869), a virtual sacred text of liberal humanism, Matthew Arnold expounds a theory of individualism that, while not explicitly defining gentlemanliness, bears on the gentlemanly ideal. Arnold advocates development of an ideal self, what he calls the "best self." The "best self" is characterized by thought and reflection rather than action. This model advocates a kind of aesthetics of living that serves a social purpose. The aesthetic qualities of the "best self" — a "human nature perfect on all sides," "a complete human perfection" (416) — are meant to serve the ethical ends of doing good and producing positive effects in society. The inward development of the "best self" is yoked to its social orientation: "the individual is required, under the pain of being feebled and enfeebled in his own development if he disobeys, to be continually doing all he can to enlarge and increase the volume of the human steam sweeping thitherward" (412).

However, it is unclear from this definition exactly why the individual is "feebled and enfeebled in his own development" if he refuses to play a part in advancing the greater social good. What is it about the "best self" as Arnold defines it that necessarily orients it
Arnold's chapter on "Hebraism and Hellenism" offers an answer to this question. Arnold writes that Hellenism involves seeing things as they really are, "spontaneity of consciousness" (478), and striving toward perfection. By contrast, Hebraism is characterized by moral conduct, obedience, and "strictness of conscience" (478). English national character embodies both Hebraism and Hellenism; the English are Indo-European, descended from the Greeks, but also have the "strength and prominence of the moral fibre" characteristic of Hebraism (473). Hebraism and Hellenism are said to be properties of race: Hellenism is "of Indo-European growth, Hebraism Semitic growth." The English, as Indo-European, would seem by nature to embrace Hellenism. Yet the English character also has a strong Hebraising strain. It is therefore unclear if the Englishness Arnold describes is an essentialized racial identity. Yet Arnold's version of Englishness does, at least rhetorically, combine Hellenism with Hebraism into a hybridized Englishness that unifies the two elements of the "best self" according to the logic of race. The mixed blood of the Englishman necessitates that he be a gentleman in both the inward and outward senses. The hybridized "best self" is Hellenic -- inward, contemplative, aesthetically-minded -- but also Hebraic -- moral and conscientious, and concerned with proper conduct in the social world. Arnold reworks older arguments about gentlemanly "blood" in a way that opens the gentlemanly ideal to all Englishmen who are willing to strive for it.

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5 Charles Taylor suggests in Sources of the Self that Arnold's Victorian readers would not have been as eager as we are to ask this question. According to Taylor, most Protestants believed that individuals were morally obligated to improve their world, and that God had arranged nature and human psychology to reward people for doing so. That said, Arnold's "Hebraic-Hellenic" Englishness can be viewed as an explanation of God's plan.
The method that Arnold advocates for achieving the "best self" is to pursue "Culture" through study of "the best that is known and thought in the world" (257). Doing so will develop the moral sensibility and social orientation that characterize the "best self."

The broad generalizations that characterize Arnold's moral and social prescriptions seem to indicate democratizing potential in his model. Indeed, Arnold suggests that "under all our class divisions, there is a common basis of human nature," and that the pursuit of culture "seeks to do away with classes" (426). Arnold also proposes that there are "aliens" within each class who are inherently prone to pursue "Culture" and capable of developing its attributes fully. Yet one must not forget that leisure to study "the best that is known and thought" was an option open primarily to men of the middle and upper-classes who could afford to attend elite public schools and universities. These men form the audience to which Arnold directs his message. Arnold enjoins these men to educate their social inferiors in "Culture" and model its virtues for them. Arnold writes of the lower orders:

They arrive, these masses, eager to enter into possession of the world, to gain a more vivid sense of their own life and activity. In this their irrepressible development, their natural educators and initiators are those immediately above them, the middle classes. If these classes cannot win their sympathy or give them their direction, society is in danger of falling into anarchy. (qtd. in Eagleton 24)

As Terry Eagleton pointedly states, "Arnold is refreshingly unhypocritical: there is no feeble pretense that the education of the working class is to be conducted chiefly for their
own benefit" (24). Rather, giving the lower orders "Culture" -- even those who are "aliens" -- serves the primary goal of preventing their agitation for socio-economic and political change. This is the relationship between "Culture" and "Anarchy." So although Arnold's "best self" model moralizes gentlemanliness, disassociates it from elite bloodlines, and in fact democratizes by associating it with Hebraic-Hellenic English national character, Arnold nevertheless recovers a dimension of gentlemanly elitism intended to preserve the social status quo.

Like Ruskin and Arnold, Cardinal Newman defines gentlemanliness through qualities of sensitivity, sympathy, and moral treatment of others. Newman emphasizes the Christian values of the gentleman. In Discourse VIII from The Idea of a University (1852), he defines the gentleman as "one who never inflicts pain" (208). For Newman, embodying the gentlemanly ideal entails developing an empathetic cast of mind; the gentleman will be attuned to his effects on others and to their feelings. Newman writes:

The true gentleman avoids[...] whatever may cause a jar or jolt in the minds of those with whom he is cast; -- all clashing of opinion, or collision of feeling, all restraint, or suspicion, or gloom, or resentment; his great concern being to make everyone at their ease and at home. He has his eyes on all his company; he is tender toward the bashful, gentle toward the distant, and merciful toward the absurd; he can recollect to whom he is speaking; he guards against unseasonable allusions, or topics which may irritate [...] he throws himself into the minds of his opponents. (209)

Newman's moral gentleman is always socially oriented; as Newman writes, the gentleman
"is mainly occupied in [...] removing the obstacles which hinder the free and unembarrassed action of those about him" (209). Even an ostensibly anti-social trait such as pride, when embodied by the gentleman, has positive social effects. In a gentleman, pride becomes "self-respect," and therefore is no longer a restless agent, without definite aim; it has a large field of exertion assigned to it, and it subserves those social interests which it would naturally trouble. It is directed into the channel of industry, frugality, honesty, and obedience [...] It diffuses a light over town and country; it covers the soil with handsome edifices and smiling gardens; it tills the field, it stocks and embellishes the shop" (207).

Not only does pride moralized as "self-respect" facilitate social intercourse, it also advances economic progress.

Newman's thorough Christian moralization of the gentlemanly ideal seems to purge it of associations with rank, birth, and purity of blood. However, elitism creeps back in when Newman addresses the issue of "condescension." He distinguishes between "philosophic" and "religious" views of condescension. The philosophic variety entails a stooping indeed of the person, but a bending forward, unattended with any the slightest effort to leave by a single inch the seat in which it is so firmly established. It is the act of a superior, who protests to himself, while he commits it, that he is superior still, and that he is doing nothing else but an act of grace towards those on whose level, in theory, he is placing himself" (206).
In contrast with this "philosophic" condescension that maintains differences in rank, "religious" condescension involves empathy and means placing ourselves in our thoughts on a level with our inferiors; it is not only a relinquishment of the privileges of our own station, but an actual participation or assumption of the condition of those to whom we stoop. This is true humility, to feel and to behave as if we were low; not, to cherish a notion of our importance, while we affect a low position" (205).

Newman here explicitly acknowledges differences in rank, and suggests that through empathy, the "high" can "assume the condition" of the "low." This is a questionable argument, for three reasons. First, such empathetic condescension exists only in the mind of the one who stoops; as Newman writes, it means "placing ourselves in our thoughts" on par with the low. Second, it is unclear how "to behave as if we were low" ("religious" condescension) is readily discernible from "affect[ing] a low position" ("philosophic" condescension). The difference seems to be that one who "behaves" as low rather than "affects" lowness has really entered into the world of his inferiors, at least in his own mind. But how are inferiors to know the condescending person's state of mind, if not by his actions? Newman is unable to describe how real or "religious" condescension differs in practice from affected condescension. In truth, what inferiors think of the stooper is less important than what the stooper thinks of himself. This leads to my third point: even "religious" condescension ultimately maintains class distinctions; as Newman says, it means feeling and behaving "as if we were low." The simile marks the unbridgeable distance between superior and inferior. If one behaves only "as if" low, then
one is not really low. To be fair, Newman does greatly extol the positive social effects of gentlemanliness. His model is egalitarian in that it drops the elitist association with blood that appears reworked in Ruskin's formulation. Unlike Arnold, Newman does not polemicize for the gentlemanly ideal as a means of maintaining the social status quo. However, Newman's emphasis on the mindsets of those who stoop suggests that his model aims to teach the middle and upper classes to think of class differences in moral and spiritual terms so that they might feel better "in [their] thoughts" about status hierarchies and attendant condescension.

Like Ruskin, Arnold, and Newman, Samuel Smiles in *Self-Help* (1859) emphasizes the moral dimension of gentlemanliness, to the degree that in Smiles' account, old associations of the gentlemanly ideal with rank and blood/birth drop out entirely. *Self-Help* was widely read as a sort of how-to manual for upward mobility, pulling oneself up by the bootstraps, "getting on." Smiles preaches how through energetic work, individuals can better their condition. In line with his gospel of social uplift, Smiles necessarily defines gentlemanliness not through social status or birth, but through morality. Smiles writes:

> The inbred politeness which springs from right-heartedness and kindly feelings is of no exclusive rank or station. The mechanic who works at the bench may possess it, as well as the clergyman or the peer [...] Riches and rank have no necessary connection with genuine gentlemanly qualities. The poor man may be a true gentleman — in spirit and in daily life. He may be honest, truthful, upright, polite, temperate, courageous, self-respecting, and self-helping — that is, be a true gentleman. The poor man with a rich spirit
is in all ways superior to the rich man with a poor spirit. 6

Although a large part of Smilesian "self-help" involves material success, Smiles also emphasizes what he calls "self-culture," or the development of character, arguing that "Every man's first duty is, to improve, to educate, and elevate himself" (99). Gilmour suggests that for Smiles, "it was the acquired character, not the material success of the self-made man, that he valued. The process of self-improvement... was to be undergone not because it might bring worldly wealth -- Smiles stressed that it might not -- but because it strengthened character and dignity and gave the working man a sense of dignity and independence" (99).

Smiles' moralization of gentlemanliness makes it a seem a truly egalitarian ideal. His model contrasts sharply with those of the other writers I have discussed, for whom gentlemanliness, despite its loosened association with social status and birth, remains an elitist ideal. Smiles tries to disengage gentlemanliness from rank and blood through such radical comments as "Riches and rank have no necessary connection with genuine gentlemanly qualities." However, Smiles cannot avoid the implications of class hierarchy in the gentlemanly ideal. Smiles emphasizes inner moral "self-culture" as the end of gentlemanliness, yet, as Gilmour argues, "there was an unavoidable sense of social mobility involved in the idea of 'raising' or 'elevating' oneself" (100). The interimplication of moral "self-culture" and socio-economic elevation appears in the economic language Smiles uses to describe the moralized social virtue of "courtesy." Even though Smiles attempts to frame "courtesy" as a purely moral virtue, as Gilmour suggests, his "

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6 Quoted in Gilmour, 100. Further references to Smiles are taken from Gilmour and cited parenthetically.
language... is soaked with the vocabulary of investment: courtesy is 'cheap,' wins 'hearts and purses,' produces 'results,' forms 'the small change of life,' of 'little intrinsic value' but growing by 'accumulation' " (100). Smiles asserts that a lowly mechanic can be just as gentlemanly as a clergyman or peer, and that it is better to be a "poor man with a rich spirit" than a "rich man with a poor spirit." However, the ultimate goal in Smiles's schema is for the poor man to become rich in spirit and in fact. Self-Help was published only two years before Great Expectations. In its insistence on both moral and socio-economic class elevation, Smiles' view is very close to that of Dickens, to whom I now turn.

Dickens, the Gentleman, and Guilt

These writers' definitions of gentlemanliness portray the tensions in the ideal as it was conceived at mid-century, and these tensions are apparent in Great Expectations. Despite efforts to dislodge the gentlemanly ideal from old associations with rank, status, and birth by moralizing it, the ideal was never disintricated from an elitism that was one step away from the snobbery that could threaten the positive social goals of the ideal. Indeed, as often embodied in social relations, gentlemanliness was merely a veneer for self-serving, crass snobbery and social pretension.

However imperfectly realized, the gentlemanly ideal's promise was to escape such snobbery by bridging — through morality — the world of the self and the social world. This promise is quintessentially Victorian. In contrast to what they perceived as Romantic over-emphasis on the world of the self, the Victorians, broadly speaking, attempted to fashion models of selfhood that would account for both the individual's private world of
imagination and feeling as well as his or her relation to the social network. Dickens' panoramic representations of Victorian life frequently dramatize worst-case scenarios of characters who are unable to negotiate this duality and who move to one extreme or the other. Elliot L. Gilbert charts this pattern in Dickens' work. First, there are characters trapped in the prison of the self: "Men and women so locked into themselves, so trapped in secret lives of their own devising, that they have largely lost connection with independent reality, with what positivism called the 'true order' of the world around them" (150). Such characters include Mr. Pickwick, Mr. Micawber from David Copperfield, and Mrs. Gamp from Martin Chuzzlewit. The Dickens world is populated as well with characters who lack, or even reject interiority, usually in favor of obsession with social position and/or crass materialism. Gilbert describes these characters as "Men and women who reject the secret life, with its treacherous subjectivity, in favor of a positivistic, 'objective world as it really is,' who seek to avoid the 'abyss of idealism,' the prison of the self, by rigorously directing their energies outward, by heeding Carlyle's well-known exhortation to 'Produce! Produce!'" (152-153). Examples of this type include Ebenezer Scrooge, Mr. Merdle from Little Dorrit, Mr. Dombey, Thomas Gradgrind from Hard Times, and Edward Murdstone from David Copperfield.

Great Expectations likewise portrays characters who live primarily either in the private world of the self or the world of social externalities. Miss Havisham, in her monomaniacal obsession with the past and elaborate isolation from the world, represents an extreme case of a mind grown sick from turning in upon itself. Pumblechook stands for social snobbery, vulgar materialism, and lack of real feeling. Jaggers keeps himself from
being emotionally affected by the degraded and sad world of his criminal clients by focusing on the subject of payment, fetishizing their deaths (seen in the death masks that adorn his office), and by compulsively washing his hands, symbolically rinsing off the taint of his connection to human tragedy. Estella claims to have no heart whatsoever, existing only as the cold and beautiful instrument of Miss Havisham’s vengeance on men.

Wemmick embodies both sides of the equation, although in doing so he deliberately fractures his identity: in Walworth he is a tender-hearted, dutiful son, but in Little Britain he is a machine-like, "portable-property"-accumulating clerk.

Pip is the only character in Great Expectations who is forced to fully engage the ideological tangles of gentlemanliness at mid-century. Unlike these other characters, Pip tries throughout the novel to reconcile his private world with the world of social relations. The gentlemanly ideal that Pip tries to embody promises to bridge the two, and Great Expectations thoroughly examines the degree of its success in doing so. Dickens clearly ridicules Pip's obsession with exterior markers of gentility: proper speech patterns, proper social decorum, genteel clothing and furniture, and classical education. Pip's social pretension, which causes him to undervalue and slight Joe, Biddy, and Magwitch, has led many readers to pigeonhole Pip as a snob. For example, G. K. Chesterton famously remarked that Great Expectations is "an extra chapter to The Book of Snobs." and

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7 This is not to suggest that for a Dickensian character to be genteel, he or she must possess realist psychological interiority. Flat characters, such as Mr. Pocket from Great Expectations and Mr. Brownlow from Oliver Twist, are unambiguously genteel.

8 Quoted in Cotsell. 28. Chesterton’s reference is to Thackeray’s Book of Snobs (1848), a satire of snobbery and social pretension.
Humphry House sums up Pip's bildung: "It is, of course, a snob's progress" (qtd. in Cotsell 49). In these readings, Pip's snobbery is posited as the major obstacle to his achievement of true generosity of spirit, moral sensibility and consequent benevolent treatment of others. In this view, Pip's snobbery means that he is not a true gentleman either morally or socially, and he does not become one until he reconciles with Joe, Biddy, and Magwitch.

However, Pip is not just a snob, nor is the novel just about his deluded enactment and eventual abandonment of social pretension. The argument that "Pip is a snob" oversimplifies Dickens' treatment of gentlemanliness in particular and the Victorian ideology of "bettering one's condition" in general. Dickens usually portrays favorably characters who are on an upward trajectory in terms of class, so long as their desire for self-improvement also contains a spiritual or moral dimension. For example, both Oliver Twist and David Copperfield are robbed of their middle-class status, and their respective stories sympathetically document their gradual reattainment of it. Oliver and David's moral sensitivity is rewarded with socio-economic rise. Moreover, their morality contrasts with the immorality of such characters as Fagin, Bill Sykes, Uriah Heep, and Mr. Murdstone -- characters who all meet bad ends. Guppy, the social-climbing legal aid from Bleak House, is ridiculous and pretentious, but his foibles, including his rejection of the smallpox-scarred Esther Summerson, are laughable rather than morally reprehensible. Guppy has no real malice. Even the grossly inept Mr. Micawber always tries to better his condition, and his generous spirit is rewarded in the end when Betsey Trotwood finances his emigration to Australia, where he finds an arena for his particular gifts. Esther Summerson is probably the best example of a character for whom self-improvement is both moral and social;
throughout *Bleak House* she selflessly tries to help various characters improve both their stations and their spirits, and she is ultimately rewarded with marriage and a middle-class life of her own.

It is in this context that we must read Pip's desire to rise in station. Pip's gentlemanly aspirations are not merely pretentious, illusory, deluded, or snobbish; rather they lie squarely within the dominant Victorian ideology of "getting on" and within Dickens' moralization of that ideology. It is important to note that on the level of plot, Dickens does in the end allow Pip to improve his social status. For all the novel's exploration of the costs, contradictions, and pathologies inherent in Pip's "great expectations," Dickens does make Pip rise from apprentice blacksmith to clerk and then to partner in C.leariker's counting house. This narrative movement acknowledges upward mobility as a powerfully attractive trajectory, so long as it is accompanied by concurrent moral or spiritual growth. Pip's gentlemanly aspirations do promise both improvement in spirit and station. Gilmour argues this point: "Pip's desire to become a gentleman... has a representatively positive element, in the sense that it is bound up with that widespread impulse to improvement, *both personal and social*, which is a crucial factor in the genesis of Victorian Britain" (119, emphasis added). Gilmour further notes that gentlemanly aspirations like Pip's contained a moral element that mitigated snobbery and social pretension: "The desire to become a gentleman was not just a snobbish aspiration out of one's class, but also a desire to become a gentle man, to have a more civilized and decent life than a violent society allowed for most of its members" (129).

Yet while Pip's aspirations have this dimension of laudable moral self-
improvement, Pip exhibits undeniable marks of snobbery. This is perhaps inevitable. Nineteenth-century emphasis on moral distinction in the gentlemanly ideal certainly democratized the ideal. However, as I have discussed, gentlemanliness was historically rooted in the aristocracy and gentry, and was a means of marking, establishing, and maintaining social hierarchies. In the world of *Great Expectations*, the gentlemanly ideal retains this elitist dimension; it is based in part on the outward signs of social distinction that discriminate the genteel from the common. As Gilmour suggests, Dickens understood that "however earnestly it might be moralised the concept depended for its existence upon exclusion, on separating gentlemen from non-gentlemen" (109). Given that this is the brand of gentlemanliness that Pip's world offers him, some degree of snobbery is an unavoidable by-product of his rise in station. But that does not mean that Pip is *just* a snob. The real snobs in the novel are Pumblechook and Mrs. Pocket, and Pip "sees through them from the start" (Gilmour 119). Unlike these thoroughgoing snobs, Pip displays second-order awareness of his snobbery and pretension, awareness that leads him to feel guilt. True snobs, as a rule, do not feel guilty for fancying themselves superior to others.

Pip does. He is without a doubt one of the most guilt-ridden characters in literature. Pip's guilt issues from his moral sensitivity, which, according to Dickens, is a crucial element of gentlemanliness. Like the other writers I have examined, Dickens in *Great Expectations* defines gentlemanliness largely through morality. Herbert Pocket, for example, is kind, considerate, and gentle, although he is still "looking about" for the money that will secure his gentlemanly status (which, predictably, he finds in the end). By
contrast, other men in the novel display all the status markers of the gentleman, but are
deficient in moral qualities. Bentley Drummle has social position and wealth, but is a brute
who, in the words of Pip's lawyer Jaggers, "either beats or cringes" (357). Jaggers himself
has wealth and status, but is a self-serving sadistic bully. ⁹ Compeyson has all the trappings
of gentlemanliness, but is a scoundrel. In fact, his double-dealing with Magwitch is
arguably at the root of all evil in the novel. Unlike the novel's false gentlemen and total
snobs, Pip possesses moral sensibility, which both causes his guilt and is recursively
proven by that guilt.

Yet it is precisely Pip's guilt -- the very guilt that marks him as gentlemanly --
which threatens the balance of self and social in the gentlemanly ideal. From the very
beginning of the novel, Pip is portrayed as immensely sensitive, tender and conscientious,
and every page of his story proves the vitality and creativity of his imaginative world. Yet
he is also forced at a young age into intercourse with a public world that is harsh, cruel,
dark, dehumanizing, based on rigid and crass class distinctions. This world works mainly
through relations of dominance and submission; in it, most people, to quote Jaggers again,
either "beat or cringe." As a child Pip sees no way around this sadomasochistic imperative
and lives in a state of "cringing." He connects with his world through the pain of guilt.
Later, when Pip begins to become a gentleman, he tries to negotiate a balance between the

⁹ An important qualification to this point is that Jaggers does have benevolent motives for arranging Estella's
adoption by Miss Havisham; he says that he wished to help her out of the poverty that leads to criminality. This
is his one benevolent act in the novel, and it testifies to the power of the "beat or cringe" world of the novel that
this act leads to more suffering: Estella's being raised without a heart, Pip's painful love for her, and Estella's
eventual marriage to the brutish Bentley Drummle. It is possible to postulate that Jaggers' one good deed
shows that he possesses a tincture of moral sensibility, and that his handwashing shows his guilt, which, like
Pip's guilt, is a sign of moral sensibility.
moral sensibility and social distinction that compete within the gentlemanly ideal, but this effort only gives him guilt. His guilt does mark him as a morally sensitive gentleman, but it also offers intrapsychic rewards: guilt gives Pip an inner space of erotic intensity and it enables fantasies of connection to others. However, these fantasies simplify and evade the complexities of Pip's interpersonal relationships, vitiating the real world of human relations, and belying the social goals of the gentlemanly ideal.

So Pip's "progress" from guilt-ridden apprentice blacksmith to guilt-ridden London gentleman shows that despite the gentlemanly ideal's promise to bridge the world of the self and the social world, the ideal is inherently prone to breakdown. It is unable to reconcile the interior world of imagination and moral sensibility with the exterior world of human relations. In the world of the novel, to be a truly moral gentleman is to feel guilt about one's status in the social hierarchy, and to be guilty means to replace real-world connections to social inferiors with connections that exist only in guilty fantasy. Great Expectations offers no convincing way out of this deadlock, and this lack of reconciliation is represented formally by closural devices that avoid direct confrontation with the ideological contradictions the novel has all along explored.

"My sense of my own worthless conduct... was greater than every consideration":

Pip the Guilty Gentleman

The interweaving of guilt, pain, fantasy, and desire for connection is apparent even before Pip becomes a gentleman. For example, the opening scene of Great Expectations represents the genesis of the boy Pip's understanding of the world, and establishes his
great desire for connection with it. Pip's "first most vivid and broad impression of the identity of things" (24) involves his gazing at the tombstones of his family -- father, mother, and five brothers -- and trying to imagine what they were like, trying to feel himself somehow bonded to his lost relations. As he writes, "The shape of the letters on my father's [tombstone] gave me an odd idea that he was a square, stout, dark man, with curly black hair. From the character and turn of the inscription "Also Georgiana wife of the Above" I drew a childish conclusion that my mother was freckled and sickly" (23). Immediately following these fantasies, Pip is confronted by the escaped convict, Magwitch. As Pip writes, Magwitch had "a great iron on his leg... broken shoes... a man who had been soaked in water, and smothered in mud, and lamed by stones, and cut by flints, and stung by nettles, and torn by briars; who limped and shivered, and glared and growled" (24). The juxtaposition of Pip's tombstone reverie and his confrontation with the dramatically suffering Magwitch establishes metonymic linkages between the desire for connection, the processes of imaginative fantasy, and pain. Pip's "first most vivid and broad impression of the identity of things" mingles all three.

Next Magwitch orders Pip to fetch him some food, and Pip runs home. Pip lives with sister, Mrs. Joe and her husband Joe Gargery. Mrs. Joe is a harsh, cruel woman who regularly beats Pip and Joe (sometimes with a cane called the "Tickler") and makes them feel guilty for being burdensome to her. By contrast, Joe is remarkably mild, gentle and submissive; as Pip says, "I always treated him as a larger species of child, and as no more than my equal." (29). These "like subjects" bond as "fellow-sufferers" (28) in their joint submission to Mrs. Joe's physical assaults and efforts to guilt-trip them. For example, Joe
says that he feels guilty over his inability to protect Pip from Mrs. Joe's mistreatment, and that he wishes "that he could take it all on [him]self" (64). After this revelation Pip narrates that he felt "a new admiration of Joe [...] We were equals afterwards [...] I had a new sensation of feeling conscious that I was looking up to Joe in my heart" (64).

Pip's bonding with Joe through their joint suffering and guilt is mirrored in Pip's sense of connection to Magwitch. Throughout the early chapters of the book, Magwitch is constantly in Pip's thoughts. As we have seen, Magwitch and Pip are linked in the novel's opening scene though a figurative nexus of fantasy, desire for connection, and pain. When we learn that, like Magwitch, Pip is also the victim of physical pain (at the hands of his sister) the figurative connection is literalized: Magwitch and Pip become "fellow-sufferers." They are likewise linked through guilt. Magwitch is a criminal, and after stealing supplies for him Pip thinks of himself as likewise criminal. Pip's sense of connection to Magwitch is apparent in Pip's name for him: "my convict." In sum, Pip bonds with both Magwitch and Joe through their shared physical suffering and guilt. In these early instances, Pip's imaginative sense of connection to his world is bound up with and occurs by means of pain and guilt.

In fact, Pip's childhood sense of connection to his entire world takes place through his submission to actual physical pain and to the painful feelings of guilt. As I mentioned, Mrs. Joe continuously ridicules Pip, beats him, refuses to take him seriously, tries to make him feel guilty for being a burden, and demands his complete submission and respect because she had bottle-fed him, or brought him up "by hand." Pip sums up Mrs. Joe's treatment of him: "I was always treated as if I had insisted on being born, in opposition to
the dictates of reason, religion, and morality, and against the dissuading arguments of my best friends" (41). Mrs. Joe is not the only person in Pip's life who makes him feel guilty for being alive. For example, at Christmas dinner Pumblechook calls Pip "Naterally vicious," and the entire party concurs; as Pip narrates, "Everybody then murmured 'True!' and looked at me in a particularly unpleasant and personal manner" (43). This scene encapsulates Pip's guilty status as "Naterally vicious;" his very existence is criminal. As a boy, Pip understands his connection to the world through the pain of guilt.

Guilt not only structures Pip's sense of connection with the world, it also produces imaginative fantasies that distort his sense of reality. For example, when Pip goes to Mrs. Joe's pantry to steal food for Magwitch, he imagines that inanimate objects accuse him of crime: "every board upon the way and every crack in every board, calling after me 'Stop thief!' and 'Get up, Mrs. Joe!' In the pantry [...] I was very much alarmed by a hare hanging up by the heels, whom I rather thought I caught, when my back was half turned, winking" (35). After this scene, as Pip delivers the goods to Magwitch, it seems to him that all the world calls him criminal. As Pip narrates: "everything seemed to run at me...

The gates and dykes and banks came bursting at me through the mist, as if they cried as plainly as could be 'A boy with Somebody-else's pork pie! Stop him!' The cattle came upon me with such like suddenness, staring out of their eyes, and steaming out of their nostrils, 'Holloa, young thief!'" (36). Pip even imagines an ox to resemble an accusatory churchman, and cries out to the clerical animal: "I couldn't help it, sir! It wasn't for myself that I took it!" (36). A further example of guilt's distorting Pip's sense of reality occurs the next day at Christmas dinner. Pip fears that when Pumblechook drinks his brandy he will
find it weak because Pip had stolen some for Magwitch and diluted the rest with water. Pip is unaware that he had actually poured tar-water into the brandy decanter. Pumblechook goes into spasms after drinking the tar-laced brandy, and Pip thinks to himself, oddly, "I didn't know how I had done it, but I had no doubt I had murdered him somehow" (46).

Why should Pip think that brandy mixed with water would kill Pumblechook? Because of another function served by Pip's guilty fantasies: they distort reality in ways that enable Pip to fantasize connecting to his world in ways that he cannot in real life. Pip's resentment of Pumblechook's pomposity is thinly veiled in the scene that culminates in the tar brandy-induced Pumblechookian spasms. The older narrator Pip shapes the episode so that Pumblechook gets his comeuppance, but the younger Pip has no way to express his resentment except in a fleeting fantasy of murder. The boy Pip engages in a bit of wish-fulfillment; he imagines the ultimate vengeance for all the indignities Pumblechook has heaped upon him. A similar process occurs when Pip's sister gives the company a "fearful catalogue" of Pip's childhood offenses, which include the high crimes of illness, inability to sleep, and falling down. While his sister holds forth, Pip fantasizes about pulling Mr. Wopsle's "Roman nose." Pip the child cannot lash back at his sister's unjust characterization, but he can imagine hurting Mr. Wopsle, who has also treated him badly. Pip does at one point imagine lashing back at his sister. One evening Pip returns home to learn that his sister has been viciously attacked. As he narrates, "I was at first disposed to

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10 Pip is, of course, a child, a fact that excuses these fantasies, and Dickens' comic-ironic tone diminishes the gravity of these imaginative distortions of reality. However, as I will show, the process of guilty fantasy producing distortive views of reality has more serious implications later in the novel.
believe that I must have had some hand in the attack" (125). Of course, it was Orlick who attacked Mrs. Joe. Orlick has often been read as Pip's double who acts out symbolically the aggressive feelings that Pip cannot. 11 While this is a valid symbolic reading, for Pip to think that he is responsible for Orlick's attack is absolutely ridiculous since he was not even home when it occurred. Instead of openly rebelling against his sister's harsh treatment (which would no doubt be followed by merciless application of the Tickler), Pip imagines that he is responsible for the vicious attack on her. This guilty fantasy allows Pip a fleeting sense of connection to his sister, through violence, in which his aggression can be expressed.

Similarly, when Pip encounters the world of Satis House, his guilty suffering energizes fantasies of connection with the gentility of that world, from which he is excluded. I will discuss later how this dynamic plays out with Estella and Miss Havisham, and focus here on Pip's painful guilt regarding his fight with the "pale young gentleman," his future friend Herbert Peggotty. Herbert insists that he and Pip fight. Pip pummels and bloodies Herbert, who takes it all in stride and afterward shakes Pip's hand. Pip then feels a sense of guilt over beating Herbert up, despite the fact that Herbert initiated the fight and that to him, being thrashed by Pip was just a bit of sport. However, by this time Pip has begun to long for the gentility represented by Satis House and its occupants. Pip needs to feel guilty in order to feel a sense of connection to Herbert and the gentility he represents. Imagining that it must be criminal for a common country boy to beat up a

11 See Julian Moynahan "The Hero's Guilt: the Case of Great Expectations" in Gotsell for an elaborated version of this argument.
young gentleman, Pip thinks to himself: "The more I thought of the fight, and recalled the pale young gentleman on his back in various stages of puffy and incrimsoned countenance, the more certain it appeared to me that something would be done to me. I felt that the pale young gentleman's blood was on my head, and that the Law would avenge it" (102). Pip does not believe that Herbert will try to avenge his beating, as he says, "It was high testimony to my confidence in the spirit of the pale young gentleman, that I never imagined him accessory to these retaliations; they always came into my mind as the acts of injudicious relatives of his, goaded on by the state of his visage and indignant sympathy with the family features" (102). This guilty fantasy allows Pip to believe that despite Herbert's indifference to him, he is connected in a criminal way (as he is to everything in his world) with Herbert, Herbert's genteel features, Herbert's family, and the gentility of their world.

The key point in all these examples is that while Pip's painful guilt energizes fantasies of connection, these fantasies are nevertheless distortions of reality that simplify or even contradict Pip's real connections with the world. In Pip's guilty fantasies, the complexities and contradictions of his real-world relationships are oversimplified and resolved. The distortion/resolution pattern of Pip's fantasies is apparent in Pip's adult relationship with Joe and Biddy. The difference here is that the pattern is informed by Pip's attempts to embody the gentlemanly ideal and its tensions between moral sensibility, benevolent treatment of others, and elitism. Pip has all along possessed a sense of morality, as shown by his intense sense of guilt. As an adult, Pip's developed moral sense dovetails with the moral component of gentlemanliness. He has that part of it down.
Consequently, when he rises to gentlemanly social status and moves to London, Pip's already strong moral sensitivity tells him that he should maintain close relations with Joe and Biddy. However, the emphasis on social distinction and inescapable elitism of the gentlemanly ideal entail that he maintain a certain distance, literal and emotional, from his former acquaintance.

This contradiction is represented formally by a system of doubling in which Herbert Pocket and Bentley Drummle represent the competing components of the gentlemanly ideal in simplified forms. Herbert Pocket is still in the process of securing gentlemanly social status, but he does possess gentlemanly kindness and moral sensitivity. Consequently, Pip feels little compunction with Herbert regarding his low origins, and does not mind if Herbert sees Joe when the blacksmith comes to visit Pip. On the other hand, Bentley Drummle represents the social-status side of gentlemanliness. Yet Drummle does not enact the paternalism or benevolent condescension that Ruskin, Arnold, and Newman advocate in their models of gentlemanliness. In Drummle, the moral element of gentlemanliness is completely absent; he represents elite status so divorced from moral sensibility that becomes unambiguously crass, brutish, and indeed, sadistic. Proving this last point, we learn later that Drummle beat Estella after they were married. As Joe's visit to London approaches, Pip thinks to himself: "I had the sharpest sensitiveness as to [Joe's] being seen by Drummle" (209). Herbert and Drummle represent the two faces of gentlemanliness: Herbert represents its moral sensibility, while Drummle's brutishness is a hyperbolic, "worst-case" version of its elitism and snobbery.

Like Herbert, Pip is moral. Like Drummle, he has money and status. The
dichotomy represented by Herbert and Drummle resides within Pip and makes him guilty. This guilt is most apparent in Pip's feelings about Joe and Biddy. After Pip learns of his expectations and moves to London, he wishes to keep distance himself from his old friends. He describes his feelings about Joe's immanent visit: "Not with pleasure, though I was bound to him by so many ties; no; with considerable disturbance, some mortification, and a keen sense of incongruity. If I could have kept him away by paying money, I certainly would have paid money" (209). Snobbery such as this gives guilt Pip about Joe and Biddy. As he later says, "I lived in a constant state of uneasiness regarding Joe. My conscience was not by any means comfortable about Biddy" (256).

However, Pip's guilt-ridden moral sensibility does not prompt him to treat them better or enact a Newman-esque "condescension." Rather, he only inflicts paralyzing guilt upon himself. Indeed, Pip acknowledges that his guilt overrides any concern for making real amends. For example, after he discovers that Magwitch is his benefactor, guilt-ridden, Pip thinks of Joe and Biddy:

I would not have gone back to Joe now, I would not have gone back to Biddy now, for any consideration: simply, I suppose, because my sense of my own worthless conduct to them was greater than every consideration. No wisdom on earth could have given me the comfort that I should have derived from their simplicity and fidelity; but I could never, never, never, undo what I had done. (301, emphasis added)

Once again, Pip's guilt fuels a fantasy of connection that preempts real-world connections. Moreover, this fantasy distorts and simplifies reality. It is not true that Pip can "never,
never, never undo" his neglect of Joe and Biddy -- indeed, at the end of the novel he does, to a great extent, undo it -- but he needs to believe he cannot in order to keep his guilty fantasy alive. Similarly, he needs to idealize their "simplicity and fidelity" in order to make his guilt even more potent. Pip does not actually have to remedy his shameful behavior because he already feels connected to Joe and Biddy in his own mind, through guilt. Here we clearly see how Pip's gentlemanly moral guilt undercuts the promised social goals of gentlemanliness.

The socially paralyzing nature of Pip's guilt was apparent even when he was a child. After stealing supplies for Magwitch, Pip longed to tell his "fellow-sufferer" Joe of his culpability. However, he feared losing Joe's intimacy. He remarks: "I was too cowardly to do what I knew to be right, as I had been too cowardly to avoid doing what I knew to be wrong. I had had no intercourse with the world at that time, and I imitated none of its inhabitants who acted in that manner. Quite an untaught genius, I made the discovery of the line of action for myself" (57). Pip substitutes guilt about keeping secrets from Joe for genuine intimacy and confidence. It is likely that if Pip had told Joe that a starving convict had threatened him with death if Pip did not steal food, Joe would have understood, given the blacksmith's generosity. In fact, on the marsh after Magwitch's capture, Joe tells Magwitch (in Pip's presence) that he doesn't begrudge the loss of the food: "God knows you're welcome to it [...] We don't know what you have done, but we wouldn't have you starved to death for it, poor miserable fellow-creatur. -- Would us, Pip?" (56). Despite this evidence of Joe's forgiving and magnanimous nature, Pip chooses to act as though if he tells Joe, then their intimacy would be irrevocably broken. He chooses the course of action
that will enable him to remain in his guilty world.

This tendency to choose a fantasy world of guilt over the complexities of real human interactions is evident as well in Pip's adult response to Magwitch. Pip oversimplifies his relationship with Magwitch in order to maximize his sense of guilt about the convict. For example, after Magwitch is caught by the authorities during the attempted river escape, Pip thinks to himself:

When I took my place by Magwitch's side, I felt that that was my place henceforth while he lived.

For now, my repugnance to him had all melted away, and in the hunted wounded shackled creature who held my hand in his, I only saw a man who had meant to be my benefactor, and who had felt affectionately, gratefully, and generously, towards me with great constancy through a series of years. I only saw in him a much better person than I had been to Joe. (406, emphasis added)

Pip is playing spin-doctor here, and despite his qualifier "for now," he maintains this view of Magwitch for the rest of the novel. Magwitch's motives and his relationship with Pip are more complicated than this. Magwitch sought to make Pip a gentleman in part to prove his own worth, to get back at the society that had wronged him, and to comfort him in his degraded state as transported convict. Magwitch values status symbols, as shown by his admiration of Pip's watch, ring, linen, clothes, and books. Pip is Magwitch's status symbol, as the returned transport blatantly tells "his gentleman":

It was a recompense to me [...] to know in secret that I was making a
gentleman. The blood horses of them colonists might fling up the dust over me as I was walking; what do I say? I says to myself, "I'm making a better gentleman nor ever you'll be!" When one of 'em says to another, "He was a convict, a few years ago, and is a ignorant common fellow now, for all he's lucky," what do I say? I says to myself, "If I ain't a gentleman, nor yet ain't got no learning, I'm the owner of such. All on you owns stock and land; which on you owns a brought-up London gentleman? This way I kep myself a going. (299)

Pip is wrong to believe that Magwitch's desire to make him a gentleman issued only or even primarily from gratitude and generosity to the boy who had helped him on the marsh. Indeed, Magwitch's desire to "own" Pip the gentleman denies Pip's fundamental humanity. Jack P. Rawlins argues this point: "Magwitch is the epitome of a basic adult perversion: the desire to create, own, and exploit human beings as property and extensions of the ego... Magwitch speaks in pure form the doctrine by which adults relate to children in Dickens's world: I made you; you exist only as extension of me" (175). Moreover, to see how his gentleman-making has turned out and to demand Pip's gratitude, Magwitch illegally returns to England. In doing so, he jeopardizes Pip's expectations, and ultimately thwarts them, since after Magwitch's capture the convict's property is confiscated by the Crown. One might argue that if Magwitch really wished to secure Pip's status as gentleman or even truly loved Pip, he would have stayed in Australia and not jeopardized Pip's future.

Magwitch may be in general more sinned against than sinning, but he is not morally
spotless. However, Pip chooses to gloss over all the complications of their relationship and redefine Magwitch as guiltless, for two reasons. First, doing so allows Pip to exacerbate his already potent guilt about Joe; as Pip says, "I only saw in [Magwitch] a much better person than I had been to Joe" (406). Second, whitewashing Magwitch allows Pip to feel even more guilty about his treatment of the convict. Pip not only denies the darker elements of Magwitch's patronage, but he also denies all that he has done for *Magwitch*. Instead, Pip focuses on the one thing -- his repulsion by Magwitch's lack of gentility -- that will make him feel guilty. Rawlins makes this argument, asking: "How has Pip served [Magwitch]? He has fed him, stolen for him, risked his life attempting to effect his escape from England, sympathized with him and acknowledged his inherent human integrity from the beginning -- and is shocked by his low appearance in London. Out of all this, Pip finds a kernel with which to nourish a sense of his own error, and he takes it" (177). Pip focuses only on his snobbish repulsion at Magwitch's lack of gentility, and his moral horror over his snobbery leads him to deny the realities of his relationship with his dubious fairy godfather. In keeping with the pattern, Pip's gentlemanly moral sensibility leads him to a sense of guilt over Magwitch that causes him to misapprehend reality, allowing him to resolve the complexities of his relationship with the convict into a painfully guilt-driven, fantasized sense of connection. The very guilt that indicates Pip's gentlemanly moral sensibility ends up stimulating his distortive fantasy life of painful guilt, which encloses him in his own world of self, and divorces him from real-world fellowship with other people and society.

This analysis raises questions. Why does Pip feel guilt over his social status, rather
than enact a version of the moralized condescension or paternalism that we have seen as advocated by ideals of gentlemanliness? Why should Pip's moral impulse, which could produce fellow-feeling and sympathy, end up in guilt? Why does the mid-nineteenth-century gentlemanly ideal (or at least Dickens' version of it in Pip) produce this imaginary excess?

Answering these questions requires backing up a bit. The Christian and liberal humanist traditions -- within which Dickens writes -- suggest that because we can imagine, we can imagine ourselves in the other's place. We have seen this idea echoed in Newman's theory of the empathy involved in "religious condescension." Benjamin, writing within the traditions of liberal humanism, provides an important qualification to the argument the relatedness can be produced through imagination. Benjamin values imagination. In her view, though, imagined relatedness, or what she terms "mutual recognition," must occur between *equals*. As I described in Chapter two, her analysis of sadomasochistic fantasy shows that when attempts to achieve intersubjective recognition are predicated on power differentials, they are inherently prone to breakdown. The structure of these unequal relationships produces excessive investment in imaginative fantasy, negating reality.

Where does Dickens fit in this schema? He is known as a critic of class inequalities. Like Newman, Dickens has little patience with genteel philanthropists for whom social condescension is merely a form of self-aggrandizement. In *Bleak House* we see this in the negative characterizations of Mrs. Pardiggle and Mrs. Jellyby. Yet he is also a fan of a certain kind of middle-class noblesse oblige that we see in characters like Brownlow and Jarndyce. Dickens does seem to believe that genuine feeling and sympathy for one's social
inferiors can be a positive force of social change, and he is not the only Victorian who advances this view. As we have seen, Ruskin, Arnold, Newman, and Smiles all present gentlemanliness as a morally sensible and sympathetic mode of mitigating the social inequalities that result from social hierarchy. Ruskin, in a different context, advised industrialists to adopt a paternalistic attitude toward their workers. Similarly, the Industrial novels of the 1840s proposed that if industrialists would just sympathize with workers, then the brutalizations of factory of life could be remedied or at least palliated. As we saw with Carlyle, the solution to the "Condition of England" problem is intensified, spiritualized affective bonding between Heroes and Hero-worshippers.

In contrast to these positive Victorian deployments of social condescension, Great Expectations represents a pessimistic shift in Dickens' views on the value of moral sympathy as enabling social fellowship. In this late novel, Dickens is laying bare the idea that gentlemanly status involves exclusion, even in the quasi-democratic middle-class form in which it is equated more with moral attributes than economic or social distinction. As a mode of relationality predicated on power differentials and inequality, the gentlemanly ideal cannot offer true mutual recognition. As happens in Benjamin's account of S/M fantasy, in Great Expectations, lack of mutuality creates an excessive investment in the realm of the intrapsychic. Pip's imaginative powers and gentlemanly moral sympathy do not produce fellow-feeling and ethical conduct. His empathetic bonding with others as a "fellow sufferers" only goes so far. Rather, Pip is sensible of social inequities, feels painfully guilty about them, and substitutes this masochistic fantasy world of connection

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12 See Unto this Last.
for any real-world connection with social inferiors. In this trajectory, I believe that Dickens is acknowledging the power of a certain Victorian response to social inequity, a response still based on fellow-feeling and moral sensitivity, but a response that allowed the disconnections of a hierarchical society to stand, a response that in fact worked to keep social hierarchies firmly in place. Guilt. To borrow Mary Poovey's phrase, the "ideological work" of guilt like Pip's is accomplished when moral feeling is turned inward rather than outward. In this way, moral sensibility — which could bridge class divides and be a positive source of social progress — does not challenge the social status quo, but perpetuates it. In Great Expectations, therefore, we see a trenchant critique of the moral sympathy in which so many Victorians, and Dickens (in his earlier novels) placed such great faith. 13

The Erotics of Guilt, or, Love that Hurts Revisited

Moreover, the "ideological work" of Pip's guilt "works" so well because it offers a space of intrapsychic, autoerotic pleasure. John Kucich has explored representations of imaginative inner worlds in Victorian novels, arguing that these realms are produced and maintained by characters' repressing and refusing outward expression of feeling. Psychic energies that would otherwise be expressed socially are contained within, producing luxuriant states of self-division that offer autoerotic pleasure. Pip's eroticized guilt

13 A contemporary correlate to the guilt I see Dickens pinpointing is white liberal guilt. This has been criticized for having similar socially paralyzing effects, in that those who feel it congratulate themselves for the ability to acknowledge and feel guilt for their white privilege, but this guilt does not translate into real-world change, or leads them to adopt a patronizing, condescending attitude toward people of color that reinforces racist social structures.
functions similarly. As we have seen, Pip’s guilt lets him be a morally sensitive gentleman. It allows him to fantasize connections to others that do not exist, preemption real-world efforts to bridge or ameliorate the status differentials on which gentlemanliness relies. To top it all off, the guilt that does this "ideological work" of preserving the status quo proves to be libidinally desirable in itself.

The erotic nature of Pip's guilt is apparent in early in the novel. After his initial encounter with Magwitch, Pip goes home to dinner with his sister and Joe. He decides to take his dinner (a piece of bread and butter) to Magwitch, shoves it down the leg of his trousers, and remarks:

Conscience is a dreadful thing when it accuses man or boy; but when, in the case of a boy, that secret burden co-operates with another secret burden down the leg of his trousers, it is (as I can testify) a great punishment. The guilty knowledge that I was going to rob Mrs. Joe -- I never thought I was going to rob Joe, for I never thought of any of the housekeeping property as his -- united to the necessity of always keeping one hand on my bread and butter as I sat... almost drove me out of my mind. (32)

This passage forms a metonymic linkages between guilty conscience and sexuality, specifically masturbation. The "secret burden" of Pip's guilt is linked to "another secret burden down the leg of his trousers," and his subterfuge requires Pip to keep "one hand on

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14 For an elaborated discussion of imagery of hands and masturbation in the novel, see William Cohen. "Manual Conduct in Great Expectations."
[his] bread and butter." This reading may seem a bit of a stretch, but one must remember that Victorian novels often go to elaborate lengths to encode their erotics. I believe this episode is more than just a bit of cleverness (along the lines of Master Charley Bates from Oliver Twist, known as "Master Bates"). This conjunction of guilt and eroticism is an early figurative indication of the fact that in Great Expectations guilt, suffering and psychic pain bear traces of eroticism.

This figurative eroticization is literalized in Pip's relationship with Estella. Pip loves Estella despite as he says, "never [having] had one hour's happiness in her society" (281). It is a peculiar kind of love in which, as Pip writes, "Everything in our intercourse did give me pain" (253). From the beginning of their acquaintance as children the spell she casts over him draws its power both from her beauty and her ability to make Pip feel guilty, inferior, unworthy, coarse and common. When Pip sees Estella again as an adult, he says as much:

Proud and wilful as of old, she had brought those qualities into such subjection to her beauty that it was impossible and out of nature -- or I thought so -- to separate them from her beauty. Truly it was impossible to dissociate her presence from all those wretched hankerings after money and gentility that had disturbed my boyhood -- from all those ill-regulated aspirations that had first made me ashamed of home and Joe. (225)

Estella's attraction issues from her beauty and her pride and willfulness; her sexual desirability is united with qualities that make Pip feel inferior to her, qualities that give him psychic pain. Additionally, Pip associates her presence with his guilt over his gentlemanly
status: his "wretched hankerings" for status that "disturbed [his] boyhood," and his shame about Joe. Indeed, as many critics have noted, Estella (whose name means "star") symbolizes the ideal of gentility. On the level of plot, she is also associated with this ideal, in that Pip aspires to be a gentleman largely to be equal to, and so worthy of her. To be in love with Estella is to be in love with gentility, and consequently Pip's love for her is also mixed with the guilt he feels over his gentlemanly aspirations.

The explicitly masochistic dimension of Pip's love for Estella becomes strikingly apparent in one of the most climactic scenes of the novel. As Estella prepares to marry Pip's nemesis Bentley Drummle, Pip makes a long impassioned speech about how much he loves Estella and how unhappy she has made him, and then comments on it: "In what ecstasy of unhappiness I got these broken words out of myself, I don't know. The rhapsody welled up within me, like blood from an inward wound, and gushed out" (335). Pip's " unhappiness" is "ecstasy;" he describes his expression of feeling in imagery suggestive of orgasm and pain: "blood... gush[ing] out." These tropes show what the novel narrates all along: Pip's love for Estella is a tangled web of pleasure, pain, and eroticism, interwoven with Pip's guilt over gentlemanliness.

Disentangling this web a bit, we see that Pip's relationship with Estella resembles the masochistic contract as Deleuze theorizes it. Deleuze argues that in masochism, the torturess, the role played by Estella and Miss Havisham,

Is a pure element of masochism [...] the torturess escapes her own masochism by assuming the active role in the masochistic situation. It is a mistake to think that she is sadistic or even pretending to be so... She does
indeed belong essentially to masochism, but without realizing it as a
subject; she incarnates instead the element of 'inflicting pain' in an
exclusively masochistic situation. (42)

Miss Havisham "belong[s] essentially to masochism," as proved by her view of love. She
advises Pip that she knows "what real love is. It is blind devotion, unquestioning self-
humiliation, utter submission, trust and belief against yourself and against the whole
world, giving up your whole heart and soul to the smiter -- as I did!" (229) Miss Havisham
escapes her masochism, in Deleuze's terms, "by assuming the active role," fashioning
Estella into her vicarious "element of inflicting pain." Miss Havisham trains Estella to be
the instrument of her elaborate fantasies of vengeance on the male sex. Later in the novel,
away from Miss Havisham in London, Pip likewise puts Estella in the role of torturer.

Deleuze writes that with a male masochist like Pip

We are dealing... with a victim in search of a torturer and who needs to
educate, persuade, and conclude an alliance with the torturer [...] it is
essential to the masochist that he should fashion the woman into a despot,
that he should persuade her to cooperate and get her to 'sign' [the
masochistic contract]. He is an educator and thus runs the risk inherent in

all educational undertakings (20).

We have already seen that Pip is, and thinks of himself as, the victimized recipient of pain
from others. As a child he lives in a world of "torturers," individuals who physically hurt
him and/or induce painful feelings of guilt. As child and adult, Pip further victimizes
himself with his guilty conscience. Pip's love for Estella, both as child and adult, is painful
and guilty. In this, Pip might seem to embody Miss Havisham's view of love as pure masochism. However, Pip's adult relationship with Estella does not involve his "giving up... heart and soul to the smiter;" he is not merely victimized by Estella's coldness and cruelty. In fact, as an adult Estella the "smiter" is largely a creation of Pip's imaginative fantasy. Hilary Schor makes a similar point, arguing that Pip never really sees Estella as a person with an equivalent, independent center of self. Schor asserts, "For Pip, the "I" and "You" are always the "I,:" there is no Estella; and yet there can be a Pip only if he is in love with something he calls Estella" (546). Pip forces Estella into the role of smiter by insisting that he occupies the role of one smitten with/by her. Like Miss Havisham, he tries to "fashion [Estella] into a despot."

Pip must do so because Estella does not wish to be his despot or smiter. When a child, Estella deliberately tried to hurt Pip, but Estella the adult is merely indifferent to him and actually tries to warn him away from loving her. Estella at one point says to him: "It seems [...] that there are sentiments, fancies -- I don't know how to call them -- which I am not able to comprehend. When you say you love me, I know what you mean, as a form of words; but nothing more. You address nothing in my breast, you touch nothing there. I don't care for what you say at all. I have tried to warn you of this; now, have I not?" (333). In Deleuze's scenario, the torturer supposedly "escapes her own masochism" in asserting dominance over the male masochist. However, Estella resists signing the masochistic contract; she does not wish to participate in Pip's fantasy. Indeed, she does not wish to participate in Miss Havisham's fantasy either, as shown by her marriage to Drummle, a man whom she does not dominate and torture (as Miss Havisham taught her
to do), but a man who ends up abusing her instead. Estella attempts to assert her own independent subjectivity outside of the world of fantasy into which she has been forced by Miss Havisham and Pip.

However, Estella's attempts escape this world by warning Pip away from her are unsuccessful because Pip embodies yet another element of the masochistic fantasy: masochism as a state of waiting. Deleuze writes that for the masochist, pleasure and pain are linked by the experience of suspenseful waiting. The masochist expects pain, but awaits pleasure:

The masochist waits for pleasure as something that is bound to be late, and expects pain as the condition that will finally ensure [...] the advent of pleasure. He therefore postpones pleasure in expectation of the pain which will make gratification possible. The anxiety of the masochist divides therefore into an indefinite awaiting of pleasure and an intense expectation of pain. (71)

In Deleuze's view, what the masochist is really after is not pain, but pleasure. He tolerates and even eroticizes pain because, for him, pain is the necessary precondition for pleasure. In the relationship between Estella and Pip, Pip awaits the pleasure that will come when Estella accepts and marries him. However, in the meantime he gets nothing but indifference from her, causing him suffering. Estella's treatment of Pip enters into the masochistic circuitry of expected pain/awaited pleasure. She gives Pip the pain that signals the pleasure to come from their ultimate union. Thus her indifference keeps the currents of his masochistic desire flowing. So claiming not to care for Pip, and even claiming to be
incapable of caring for him, cannot free Estella from the magnetic pull of his masochistic fantasies. As we have seen, these fantasies are all the more complex and powerful because not only are they energized by the pain that Pip receives from Estella, they are also wired to Pip's guilt about his gentlemanly status.

To be blunt, Pip's love for Estella is all about Pip. More specifically, it is all about Pip's fantasies. Estella the independent subject does not exist for Pip; she is merely the "element of inflicting pain" and guilt that charges with erotic intensity his masochistic fantasy world. Again we see how Pip's masochistic fantasy world leads him to negate reality. In this case, Pip negates Estella's independent subjectivity, and consequently behaves to her in ways that ignore the reality of that subjectivity. Pip's inner world of moral sensibility, deformed as it has been into a would-be Victorian gentleman's guilt-ridden masochism, clearly is not reconciled with perhaps the most intimate aspect of social relations: romantic love.

Moreover, in Pip's relationship with Estella we see encapsulated the various patterns -- socio-historical, psychological, and narrative -- that I have been tracing in this chapter. She symbolizes the gentility for which Pip longs, and she is also the primary object of Pip's erotic intensities. Since Pip's relationship with Estella conjoins issues of social status and eroticism, it is the novel's primary nexus for fantasy, guilt about genteel elitism, masochistic pleasure, and negation of reality.

Great Expectations of Closure, or, There's No Place Like Egypt

I have painted an unflattering portrait of Pip, but I want to stress that his fantasies
are more than negations of reality; they represent accommodations to the sadomasochistic "beat or cringe" world he lives in, a world informed by the contradictions of the mid-century gentlemanly ideal. Pip's fantasies are intrapsychic compensations for the inability of that world and ideals of gentlemanliness to provide intersubjective mutual recognition. One would think that the moralized gentlemanly ideal would equip a man to function with integrity and benevolence in this world. However, Pip is ideologically hailed just as strongly by the gentlemanly ideal's elitism as he is by its moral sensibility. The fact that Pip feels guilt over his elitism means that he possesses developed gentlemanly moral sensitivity. But contrary to the gentlemanly ideal's promise, Pip's morally sensitive "self-culture" hardly serves socially beneficial ends. Instead it yields painful guilt over elitism; this painful guilt yields an eroticized inner world that is a distortive substitute for real-world connections.

To be fair, it would be misleading to suggest that Pip's world of eroticized guilt and masochistic fantasy is so strong and all-pervasive as to prevent his ever seeing others as independent selves rather than elements of fantasy, and consequently forming real-world connections and relationships. He does so, in the end, with Joe and Biddy, with Herbert, and possibly with Estella. However, examining how Great Expectations resolves Pip's relationships with these four characters shows the novel's difficulties in affirming the socially benevolent, Christian, liberal humanist values that gentlemanliness promised to produce.

First, Joe and Biddy. Near the end of the novel, after Magwitch's death, the convict's fortune is confiscated by the Crown, stripping Pip of his great expectations and
social distinction. Pip then reconciles with Joe and Biddy. At this point, Pip is well-educated, well-mannered, and morally sensitive. Yet he is also penniless and in debt: no longer a gentleman in status. The illness in which Joe cares for him marks a symbolic death of Pip the would-be gentleman: that is, the death of Pip the gentleman who possesses both moral sensibility and social distinction. Tellingly, the furniture that Pip bought to mark his status is repossessed during this illness. As if aware that his gentlemanly status is gone, Pip remarks that under Joe's care, "I fancied I was little Pip again" (424). He and Joe are able to resume their former intimacy because Pip no longer possesses the status that divided them in the first place. Once Pip is equal in station to Joe and Biddy, he is unable to feel guilty for snobbery and pretension because he no longer has any grounds on which to be snobbish or pretentious. The novel has all along explored the contradictions and tensions in the mid-nineteenth century gentlemanly ideal that lead Pip to grow estranged from Joe and Biddy. As a closural device, Pip is reunited with them by being stripped of the very gentlemanly social status that created so many of his problems and was one of the novel's primary objects of scrutiny.

However, Dickens does ultimately let Pip recover some of his lost social status. Pip goes off to Egypt and there rises from clerk to partner in Clarriker's counting house. This plotline rewards Pip's moral improvement with economic rise, which is fitting given Dickens' view that upward mobility should be both spiritual and material. Yet in another sense, Pip's emigration represents yet another closural device by which the novel evades the overdetermined nature of gentlemanliness. As is so often the case in Victorian novels, emigration is the narrative *deus ex machina* that resolves ideological contradictions. As
Pip rises from clerk to partner, he is not given the opportunity to snobbishly neglect social inferiors. Pip's only intimacy in Egypt is with Herbert and Herbert's wife. Throughout the novel Herbert has represented a simplified version of gentility: its moral dimensions minus social status and money. By the time Herbert gets to Egypt, he has money and position as well, having risen to partner in Clarriker's _vis-a-vis_ Pip's earlier convincing of Miss Havisham to write Herbert into her will. These narrative movements reward Herbert's morality with social rise, and also reward Pip's generosity, as in Egypt he gets to live with the now-thoroughly genteel Pockets in an isolated world of moral/social gentility. The circularity is charming: because Pip did the gentlemanly and generous thing in securing Herbert's fortune and social status, he now does not have to worry about growing snobbish to Herbert as he himself rises in Clarriker's. Pip was never snobbish to Herbert, and this narrative device ensures that he never will be.

But what about Joe and Biddy? In Pip's Egyptian rise to gentlemanly social status, he conveniently has no opportunity to mistreat Joe and Biddy, simply because he is on different continent than they are. The novel doubtless tries to suggest that by this point Pip has outgrown snobbishness. Then why not let him prove it by staying in England, in closer proximity to Joe and Biddy? If he did, he would have to learn to do some Newmanian morally sensitive stooping, and as we have seen, Dickens doesn't place much faith in that. Pip does tell us that while in Egypt, he "maintained a constant correspondence with Biddy and Joe," and that "They had often been before my fancy in the East." Still, it is far easier

\[15\] Except perhaps native Egyptians, to whom Pip would be justified in snobbery according to imperialist, racist ideologies.
to maintain good relations with those who exist only in letters and "fancy" than it is to deal with a real flesh-and-blood people. Pip's only contact with Joe and Biddy for eleven years takes place through letters and in Pip's mind, suggesting that his sense of connection to them partially reverts back to existence in his world of imaginative fantasy.

In my view, these plot devices suggest that in *Great Expectations* the ideological contradictions in the gentlemanly ideal are posited as ultimately unsolvable. Dickens needs to have "his gentleman" Pip, reconcile with Joe and Biddy, so he takes away the social status that had divided them. Dickens needs to reward this reconciliation with a rise in socio-economic station, so he has Pip work his way from clerk to partner in Egypt, where Pip lives in isolated bachelorhood with the genteel Pockets. As Pip regains social status, he is given no chance to grow snobbish to his still-lowly former acquaintances, and is allowed to feel connected to them through letters and imagination. Pip does eventually return to England and see Joe and Biddy in person; this happens when at the beginning of chapter fifty-nine he suddenly appears on their doorstep. The abruptness of Pip's return suggests that as much as it issues from any desire to see Joe and Biddy (and we are not told that this was Pip's motive), it is also necessitated by the novel's need to achieve formal closure in the plotline with Estella. Yet this closure is not definitively given by the novel's infamously ambiguous ending. Unlike many other Victorian novels that resolve ideological contradictions through the closural device of marriage, *Great Expectations* does not give its hero the wife and family who make everything all better. As I have argued, Estella, and Pip's aspirations to win her, have been synonymous with Pip's aspirations to gentility, so for Pip's final position in relation to her to be ambiguous makes sense. The irresolution of
the love story with Estella indicates the novel's more general irresolution with regard to the gentlemanly ideal.

The novel's critics have, like me, noticed the pervasiveness of guilt in *Great Expectations*. They have also noticed the paralyzing effects of Pip's guilt, and to notice that guilt can in general be paralyzing is not my original idea. However, there has been a tendency among critics to posit Pip's guilt as an immature stage of development through which he must pass in order to realize that "there's no place like home" -- a home warmed by the fires of universal Christian, tolerant, liberal humanist values. Leavis' argument is representative of this view. To quote her again, Pip's story is a "successful progress toward spiritual freedom"; Pip "is fully human in having impulses flowing freely"; Pip's "new self is produced of free choice." Critic after critic has advanced a version of the argument that Pip's *bildung* is complete when he gives up his deluded, snobbish gentlemanly aspirations and comes to embody these humane values. Deconstructive critics have noticed that the novel's status as text undermines this affirmation, but these analyses tell us nothing about the ideologies of the time that inform the text's deconstruction of itself. 16 Gilmour's admirable historicist analysis locates Pip's gentlemanly aspirations within a developed socio-historical context, but even he ends up saying that the novel "unequivocally affirms" that "the gentle man [lives] by the Christian ideals of love and forgiveness" (143). Qualifying this view, Gilmour further notes that "one cannot read [Great Expectations] sympathetically without feeling that it taps a deep source of uneasiness in the Victorian cult of the gentleman" (144). I hope I have shown in this

16 For example, see Eiichi Hara "Stories Present and Absent in *Great Expectations*" in Cotsell.
chapter the depth of the novel's unease about gentlemanliness. Pip is not just a snob who has to learn to be a Christian, liberal humanist gentleman. Rather, he is a snob who embodies the historical overdetermination of the gentlemanly ideal. This ideal's contradictions are not convincingly resolved by the novel, creating the unease that Gilmour and many others have felt emanating from it. In *Great Expectations*' attempts to resolve the contradictions of gentlemanliness, Dickens allows the seams in his closural devices to show, and as readers we either consciously or unconsciously see them. If on one level this makes the novel unsatisfying, it also makes it an honest and revealing assessment of the great expectations that the gentlemanly ideal was, in the end, unable to realize.

In my final chapter, I will show that like Carlyle, Tennyson, and Dickens, Swinburne portrays male masochistic fantasy as a seductive, enticing, alluring solution to the difficulties of achieving intersubjective recognition. Of the texts I consider in this study, his are the most overtly invested in sadism and masochism, as seen in his *Poems and Ballads* of 1866. Yet also like Carlyle, Tennyson, and Dickens, Swinburne ultimately backs away from masochism's more radical and threatening potentialities. Moreover, male masochistic fantasy functions in Swinburne as it does in *Great Expectations*: to preserve the social status quo. I read Swinburne's poetry in context of Victorian flagellant pornography and prostitution and argue that in all three instances, male masochistic fantasy ultimately buys into and, in fact, reinforces the structures of Victorian gender inequality and sexual normativity.
Chapter V

Swinburne's 'florid impotence': Flirting with Masochism and Masculinity in Poems and Ballads, 1866

Swinburne's Poems and Ballads of 1866 created a literary scandal. Many mid-Victorian readers reacted with horrified shock to this collection of verse that celebrated frank, unbridled sensuality, portrayed love as ecstatic agony, contained no discernible moral or ethical lessons, and posited a universe based on coldness and cruelty. The "poetic perversities" of Poems and Ballads include necrophilia, sadism, masochism, lesbianism, and cannibalism. Imagery suggesting cunnilingus and anal intercourse has even been ferreted out by modern critics. With delightful understatement, Allison Pease sums up the Victorian reaction to Swinburne's work: his "depictions of sexually enslaved, sexually ambiguous characters biting one another and sucking the blood from inflicted bruises were just the kind of thing that could bring a Victorian family's reading session in the parlour to an unfortunate and abrupt close" (46).

Poems and Ballads also inspired more vehement responses than just closing the book. One reviewer denounced the collection as "a carnival of ugly shapes" that was "unclean for the mere sake of uncleanness" (qtd. in Pease 44). It was said to be "crammed with pieces which many a professional vendor of filthy prints might blush to sell." (qtd. in Henderson 119). Swinburne himself was condemned as perverse and immoral. He was presumed to have "a mind all aflame with the feverish carnality of a schoolboy," (qtd. in Pease 44), labelled "the libidinous laureate of a pack of satyrs," and accused of being

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1 I borrow the phrase from Richard Dellamora's chapter "The Poetic Perversities of A. C. Swinburne" in Masculine Desire.
obsessed with all manner of "nameless shameless abominations." (qtd. in Henderson 118).

One reviewer denigrated his poetic ability: "We may safely affirm, in the face of many pages of brilliant writing, that such a man is either no poet at all, or a poet degraded from his high estate, and utterly and miserably lost to the Muses" (qtd. in Pease 45-46). His manliness was questioned; he was described as "quite the Absalom of modern bards -- long-ringed, flippant-lipped, down-cheeked, amorous-lidded" (qtd. in Pease 46). One reviewer, though, seemed to recognize that iconoclasm was the very essence of Swinburne, writing

He is so firmly and avowedly fixed in an attitude of revolt against the current notions of decency and dignity and social duty that to beg of him to become a little more decent, to fly a little less persistently and gleefully to the animal side of human nature, is to beg him to be something different from Mr. Swinburne. (qtd. in Pease 44)

Indeed it is primarily the "the animal side of human nature," represented by the frank sexual content of his poetry, that caused most offense. Unsurprisingly, Swinburne himself was compared to an animal: "Mr. Swinburne fastens on [morbid and sensual topics] and feasts on them with a greedy and cruel voracity like a famished dog on raw meat" (qtd. in Henderson 126). Punch went further, suggesting that he change his name to "Swineborn" (qtd. in Henderson 126).

The reaction of Swinburne's literary contemporaries was mixed. The characteristically non-libidinous Ruskin (who otherwise appreciated Swinburne's work) described his reaction to Swinburne's "Faustine" as anxiously pleasurable: "it made me all
hot... like pies with the devil's fingers in them" (qtd. in Pease 46). Tennyson and Browning, themselves no strangers to "poetic perversities," also expressed doubts about Swinburne and his work. Tennyson admired the musical qualities of the verse, calling Swinburne "a reed through which all things blow into music" (qtd. in Burnett 148). Coming from the supreme lyricist Tennyson this is high praise, but the Laureate's metaphor portrays Swinburne as inactive and unconscious of his poetic process, thus feminizing him by association with passivity and irrationality. Robert Browning, on the other hand, was directly damning. In response to Isa Blagden's comment that Swinburne's verse was "florid impotence," Browning offers this definition of the appellation: "As to Swinburne's verses [...] they are 'florid impotence,' to my taste, the minimum of thought and idea in the maximum of words and phraseology. Nothing said and nothing done with, left to stand alone and trust for its effect in its own worth" (qtd. in Burnett 148). The failed masculinity of "florid impotence" is underscored by the idea that nothing in Swinburne's verse is "left to stand alone" -- whole, unified, coherent, independent, phallic.

Browning's view of Swinburne as high on words and low on ideas, rather than merely obscene, proved to be the judgement of succeeding generations. Swinburne was praised as versifier *par excellence* who, regrettably, had nothing important to say. Reference books on English literature called his work "extremely melodious and very varied in the handling of metre, but as vague and shallow in content as it is emotionally intense" (qtd. in Rooksby 1). The verse was viewed as "chiefly notable for its verbal cascades, luxurious images and metrical pyrotechnics, for it would be difficult to make a case for its spiritual, philosophical or political profundity" (qtd. in Rooksby 1). T.S. Eliot
helped to solidify this critical judgement. Clothing criticism within compliment, Eliot wrote: "That so little material as appears to be employed in 'The Triumph of Time' should release such an amazing number of words requires what there is no reason to call anything but genius" (qtd. in Rooksby 5). Eliot took familiar charges about Swinburne's word-play to an extreme, suggesting that his verse in fact is about nothing but language; in Swinburne's poetry "the object has ceased to exist, because the meaning is merely the hallucination of meaning, because language, uprooted, has adapted itself to an independent life of atmospheric nourishment" (qtd. in Rooksby 5). This view proved influential. For example, Graham Hough argued that Swinburne is "a virtuoso on the English metrical keyboard, much of whose significance lies in his versification for its own sake" (qtd. in Rooksby 9). Swinburne was no longer just "unclean for the mere sake of uncleanness," but poetic for the mere sake of poetry. Even praise of Swinburne's poetic gifts contains seeds of this idea. As one critic wrote, his "poetic gifts were astonishing, his facility extraordinary [...] In the technical way there was nothing he could not manage easily... not so much a master of language as immersed in it, swimming in a sea of words" (qtd. in Rooksby 9).

Swinburne was rescued from the perception of perpetually "swimming in a sea of words" with the publication of his letters (1959-1962), an event that ushered in a renaissance in Swinburne studies. Back on the dry land of literary and cultural history, his work has been examined in terms of biographical influences, debts to the English Romantics, French decadence, medievalism, theology, and the Marquis de Sade. Much previously unpublished information has come to light about Swinburne's reaction to Sade's
work, as well as the poet's infamous taste for flagellation. We have learned a great deal regarding Swinburne's patronage of prostitutes who flogged him, his correspondence with others of the same sexual tastes, and his pornographic flagellant poetry. While many critics take note of these facets of Swinburne's character, they usually do so in a judgmental or condescending way, and only make superficial connections between Swinburne's personal predilection for flagellation and his poems that abound with imagery of dominance, submission, pleasure in pain.

In this chapter I put these biographical facts in dialogue with Swinburne's verse. In his work we have a unique entry point into the mind of a Victorian flagellant. Swinburne was hardly unique among Victorian men of the middle and upper-classes in his taste for the birch, a taste often inaugurated by the system of violent and ritualized corporal punishment practiced in the all-male public schools. Yet as Ian Gibson suggests, "What makes Swinburne different from that system's other victims is that he wrote about the obsession and tried to understand it" (135). Moreover, Swinburne's flagellant obsession intersects with another aspect of his character. In his youth, Swinburne lost his faith in a benevolent God and developed a darkly fatalistic worldview that he called "turbid nihilism." The cruel universe in which Swinburne came to believe forms the backdrop for Poems and Ballads. Swinburne is preoccupied in this volume with pain, suffering, cruelty, dominance and submission. In poems such as "Faustine," "Dolores," "Laus Veneris," and "Anactoria" he portrays men who cower before cold, cruel, dominating women. The

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2 While "Anactoria" concerns lesbianism and its speaker is Sappho, I will argue that it represents male fantasy.
sadomasochistic fantasy worlds that Swinburne imagines in these poems enable a kind of "florid impotence" or aestheticized, non-phallic, masochistic masculinity to emerge. Swinburne plays with the attractive possibilities of this model of masculine subjectivity: it offers a superflux of sensual and sexual thrills, and feelings of intense connection to or even mergence with the other. At its most extreme, the male body constituted through "florid impotence" threatens to dissolve or shatter in masochistic submission to the dominating woman.

However, despite his attraction to this brand of masculinity, Swinburne is only flirting with the possibilities offered by masochistic fantasy. His attraction to the tantalizing, thrilling world of masochism is powerful, but when combined with his intellectual/ethical rejection of that world, there emerges a curious ambivalence in his work. Enacting this ambivalence, his sadomasochistic poetry works to simultaneously stabilize and destabilize the masculine subject. While the verse flirts with masochistic manhood, it ultimately recuperates masculine wholeness and coherence: through imagery, through parodic, burlesque qualities, and though repetitive style. This flirtation/recuperation trajectory is present as well in Swinburne's larger body of work, which makes it is clear that Swinburne portrays masochism as a phase, albeit a necessary one, through which the soul passes. Moreover, Swinburne's vehement public reaction to his critics rephallicises the poet, recovering the manliness that they had seen threatened in the poetry and transposed onto him. Swinburne is indeed "firmly and avowedly fixed in an attitude of revolt" against the Victorian sex-gender system. However, even his most ostensibly subversive and masochistic poems remain, at the end of the day, very much
embedded in normative Victorian ideologies of gender and sexuality. His work ultimately validates and recuperates non-subversive ideals of manliness, including ideals of transcendent masculine subjectivity. Finally, I will argue that the dynamics of sexuality and gender in Swinburne's verse are the poetic correlates to the dynamics of Victorian sadomasochistic pornography and prostitution. Drawing on recent feminist analysis of commercial S/M sex work, I postulate that the proliferation of sadomasochistic pornography and prostitution among middle and upper-class Victorian men did offer a certain subversion of the Victorian sex-gender system, but ultimately reinforced it.

Swinburne's Interest in Cruelty

Pain and cruelty are intrinsic to Swinburne's poetry of the 1860s. Three main factors contribute to his preoccupation with these themes: first, his loss of religious faith; second, his experiences of corporal punishment at Eton, which began a life-long obsession with flagellation; and third, his reading of and reaction to the writings of the Marquis de Sade.

Swinburne was raised as an Anglo-Catholic. While attending Oxford, around 1858 or 1859, he experienced a religious deconversion, in part precipitated by his association with the Old Mortality Society, a free-thinking undergraduate literary discussion group. Margot Louis has reconstructed Swinburne's main objection to his childhood faith. He diverged with High Church theologians over the idea of the world as unchanging system of meaning created by God. Louis summarizes the church's view:

the world that we see constitutes a sacramental system of meaning, a vast
analogy created and organized by God to express His love and wrath. God alone makes and is meaning: the significance of His sacramental system is stable, and accessible to all who are rightly attuned to its divine harmonies.

(3)

Swinburne objected to the idea that one can know God by reading his existence and perfection in the unchanging, divinely-ordained structures of the natural world. For Swinburne, a God conceived so was hopelessly anthropomorphic, and to have faith in Him was absurd. Swinburne expressed these objections in a letter:

I always felt by instinct and perceived by reason that no man could conceive of a personal God except by brute Calibanic superstition or else by true supernatural revelation; that a natural God was the absurdest of all human figments; because no man could [...] conceive of any other sort of divine person than man with a difference -- man with some qualities intensified and some qualities suppressed. (qtd. in Louis 10)

In place of Church doctrine, Swinburne developed a worldview that he later called "turbid nihilism" (Louis 10). This view is reflected in his early work, and runs throughout the

Poems and Ballads of 1866. As Louis writes,

For approximately a decade after his 'deconversion' [...] Swinburne's work expressed a deep pessimism, a bleak faith that the universe had been created and organized by a god whose name was time, change, or pain -- and all these names are one name, in which all language is summed up. (3)

This is the dark lens through which Swinburne saw the world while writing his work up to
and including *Poems and Ballads* of 1866. As Louis further writes on Swinburne's early work, in his "eucharists of violence, the eaten God is transformed into a diabolical maw, a consuming fire that sheds darkness visible rather than light [...] God becomes indistinguishable from his own black distorted shadow" (3-4).

Before Swinburne lost faith in a benevolent God, he was exposed to the brutalities of corporal punishment at Eton. In all-male public schools like Eton, birching was the primary form of discipline. Corporal punishment was almost universally approved by the Victorians; as Ian Gibson writes, "upper and middle class Victorians [...] never tired of reminding themselves that the beating of naughty children had been strictly enjoined on them by God" (48). One of these divinely ordained discipliners was influential Rugby headmaster Thomas Arnold, who believed that children were naturally inferior to adults, so beating pride out of them was justifiable. Other qualities thought to merit punishment in children were "self will" and "forwardness." Teachers were often referred to in slang as "bum bruisers," and schoolmasters particularly skilled at beating gained notoriety among their students. The English predilection for corporal punishment was so well known that advertisements in Germany often solicited governesses and tutors adept at "English methods" of instruction. (Gibson 96-100, 228). Victorian periodicals regularly published letters and stories offering advice on proper methods of corporal punishment and extolling its beneficial pedagogical effects. Detailed advertisements for birches and canes were common (Gibson 117, 194-232).

A typical scene of corporal punishment in an all-male public school like Eton or Rugby would unfold as follows: a boy who had offended in some way was brought before
an audience of his peers. The charge was repeated. The boy's pants were taken down and he knelt on the "flogging block," a portable wooden step. Two boys flanked him, holding him down and raising his shirt-tails to expose his buttocks. A schoolmaster would deliver the appointed number of blows with a huge collection of birch branches, sometimes as much as five feet in length. The boy would usually cry out, although a point of honor among the boys was the ability to "take it" without doing so. The boy's buttocks would be left red, lacerated, often bleeding, and he would feel the effects of the beating for weeks to come. The whole procedure was referred to as "the execution."

Swinburne entered Eton, where such "executions" were common, in 1849 at the age of 12. Ian Gibson carefully sifts though the archival evidence of Swinburne's time at Eton, concluding that there is "no doubt" that young Swinburne witnessed many birchings, especially since he later wrote detailed and authentic-sounding descriptions of beatings in the mock-epic flagellant poem The Flogging-Block and in the two poems he contributed anonymously to The Whippingham Papers. Gibson cites strong evidence that Swinburne was flogged by his tutor, Rev. James Leigh Joynes. In a letter to Richard Monckton Milnes, Swinburne writes of one such experience:

Once, before giving me a swishing that I had the marks of for more than a month [...] he let me saturate my face with eau-de-Cologne. I conjecture now [...] that, counting on the pungency of the perfume and its power over the nerves, he meant to stimulate and excite the senses by that preliminary pleasure so as to inflict the acuter pain afterwards on their awakened and intensified susceptibility. (qtd. in Gibson 124)
Based on this and other evidence, Gibson suggests that Swinburne's tutor "was something of a dilettante flagellant" (127). Swinburne left Eton at age 16 for somewhat vague reasons, most likely because of friction with his tutor over idleness at his studies. However, one biographer suggests that Swinburne's "peculiar attitude toward punishment" may have been at issue. (Gibson 128-129). Indeed, later Swinburne said that he preferred a beating to copying out lines because a beating was over more quickly (Henderson 19).

Swinburne was obsessed for years with his youthful experiences at Eton, to the extent that later in life he requested and received a photograph of Eton's flogging block (Gibson 130). In a letter Swinburne describes this photo, in which the block was devoid of floggees and floggers, with a wondrous blend of nostalgia, eroticism, and aesthetic delectation:

What a pity the scene is imperfect, a stage without actors, a hearth without fire, a harp without cords [sic], a church without worshippers, a song without music, a day without sunlight, a garden without flowers, a tree without fruit! I would give anything for a good photograph taken at the right minute — say the tenth cut or so — and doing justice to all sides of the question. As it is the block is just at the right angle for such a representation. If I were a painter -- ! I would do dozens of different fellows diversely suffering. (qtd. in Gibson 130)

Gibson concludes of Swinburne's "flagellant obsession, we can be certain that it was at Eton that it became fixed and confirmed. We may be certain too, that many of his fellow Etonians before and after his time developed similar tendencies as an inevitable reaction to
the birching system" (135).

This obsession with punishment and pain, inaugurated at Eton, was heightened by Swinburne's reading of Sade's Justine in 1862. Julian Baird argues that Swinburne's "personal neurosis drew him to Sade and to the pleasure-pain paradox which becomes such an important theme in much of the poetry of the Poems and Ballads of 1866" (56). Swinburne on the surface was unimpressed with Sade's writing. In a letter to Monckton Milnes, he expresses scorn for "the divine Marquis":

I really thought I must have died or split open or choked with laughing. I never laughed so much in my life: I couldn't have stopped to save my life...

"Is this the mighty satyr?" is this all? I did think -- I did hope that this one illusion might have turned out a reality. Weep with me over a shadowed idol! The style of Micawber is inadequate to express my feelings. (qtd. in Gibson 68)

Swinburne found Sade's artificiality and repetitiveness laughable, and he tended to downplay Sade's influence on him, but there is no doubt that the Marquis made more of an impact on Swinburne than the poet was prepared to admit. As Henderson suggests, "Once read, Justine and de Sade's other works became an obsession. Their effect on Swinburne was overwhelming [...] the persistence with which he wrote and spoke of de Sade, and the letters to Milnes six to ten pages long [...] testify to Swinburne's fascination with the subject" (69). Baird argues that Swinburne's reaction to Sade was twofold; for Swinburne, there were two Sades: one who appealed to him through "simple eroticism," the other whose ideas he judges and rejects intellectually (50). For Swinburne, Sade was "as an
unsuccessful rebel against Christian notions of asceticism" (49) who operates "within the framework of the very premises against which he seeks to rebel. Rather than asserting the dignity of the flesh as indissolubly wedded to spirit, Sade mortifies the flesh by accepting the old error of asceticism that flesh and spirit are divisible" (52).

I believe this ambivalence toward Sade is demonstrated in Poems and Ballads. The attraction of Sade was not just founded on the "simple eroticism" (as if eroticism could ever be simple). Rather, Poems and Ballads demonstrates the attractive physical and spiritual possibilities offered by Sadean practice, especially its promise to break down the flesh to release the spirit. At the same time, the poetry dramatizes Swinburne's ambivalence about these possibilities, and his ultimate rejection of them in favor of a recuperated phallic masculinity. This ambivalence between feminizing submission and phallicizing assertion has biographical basis as well. Biographer Harold Nicolson suggests that Swinburne's primary conflict was between "the impulse to revolt and the impulse towards submission" (qtd. in Henderson 114). Henderson further argues that Swinburne's "conduct during the first half of his life, at least, was a perpetual oscillation between these two poles of feeling" (114). We see this "conflict" and "oscillation" played out in Poems and Ballads of 1866.

"Florid Impotence"

I coopt Browning's term "florid impotence" to describe the brand of subjectivity offered by masochism in Poems and Ballads. "Florid impotence" is a kind of aestheticized, non-phallic masculinity that Swinburne represents in several works. It is achieved through
submission to a cruel, dominating female figure. It offers several psychic possibilities: a superflux of sensations that are ambiguously pleasurable and painful, which in turn produce fantasies of self-shattering and of mergence with the other.

In Swinburne, most bodily contact is figured as painful: lips hurt lips, flesh burns flesh. An example from "Anactoria" illustrates this point. Sappho addresses her lost love, Anactoria:

I feel thy blood against my blood: my pain
pains thee, and lips bruise lips, and vein stings vein.
Let fruit be crushed on fruit, let flower on flower.
Breast kindle breast, and either burn one hour.

Infliction of pain is reciprocal and mutual, as Sappho tells Anactoria, "pain / pains thee," "lips bruise lips," "vein stings vein," "breast kindle[s] breast." Both Sappho and Anactoria cause pain in the other and receive pain from the other. Bodily contact is also often figured as ambiguously pleasurable and painful. This ambiguity is apparent as the speaker of "Dolores" addresses "Our Lady of Pain":

All thine the new wine of desire
The fruit of four lips as they clung
Till the hair and the eyelids took fire,
The foam of a serpentine tongue,
The froth of the serpents of pleasure,
More salt than the foam of the sea,
Now felt as a flame, now at leisure
As wine shed for me.

Their erotic union mixes pain with pleasure. Fruit, fire, foam, froth, salt, wine: it is unclear whether these images indicate pleasure or pain. Their appearance in rapid succession indicates that the sensations they describe defy referential language.

While these intense sensations are not be easily comprehensible, it is clear that
Swinburne's speakers want more of them. For example, the speaker of "Dolores" conjures the "Lady of Pain" with a litany of imagery indicating a profusion of physical and emotional desire:

By the hunger of change and emotion,
By the thirst of unbearable things,
By despair, twin-born of devotion,
By the pleasure that winces and stings,
The delight that consumes the desire.
The desire that outruns the delight,
By the cruelty deaf as a fire
And blind as the night,

By the ravenous teeth that have smitten
Through the kisses that blossom and bud,
By the lips intertwined and bitten
Till the foam has a savour of blood,
By the pulse as it rises and falters,
By the hands as they slacken and strain,
I adjure thee, respond from thine altars,
Our Lady of Pain.

The sheer volume of imagery in passages such as this leads Pease to associate Swinburne's speakers with the sublime, as she writes, "his poetic personae are representations of an unframed, sublime excess" (47). I will address this claim more fully later, but now note that, in line with Pease, I suggest that the superflux of sensation represented in Swinburne's poems enables the possibility of a self-disintegration akin to that effected by sublime self-shattering. In the sadomasochistic poems, such self-shattering is often figured as speakers being reduced to and divided into body parts: eyes, eyelids, breast, lips, hair, limbs. Similarly, in Swinburne's later, overtly flagellant poems, the boy being beaten becomes nothing more than an ass to be flogged, arms to be pinned, a mouth to entreat mercy, eyes to cry. In the same vein, Dolores' victims are portrayed with
imagery of physical multiplicity and division; their "lives are as leaves overblown":

multiple, disconnected, in motion, scattered by the force of Dolores' power. Faustine
actually feeds vampire-like off the limbs and blood of the knights who battle over her:

She loved the games men played with death,
Where death must win;
As though the slain man's blood and breath
Revived Faustine.

Nets caught the pike, pikes tore the net;
Lithe limbs and lean
From drained-out pores dripped thick red sweat
To soothe Faustine.

She drank the steaming drift and dust
Blown off the scene;
Blood could not ease the bitter lust
That galled Faustine.

Similarly, in "Laus Veneris," Swinburne's speaker -- the knight Tannhauser -- has been
enslaved by Venus, cruel goddess of love, and imagines himself to dissolve under the
power of her cruelty:

    my blood and body so
Shake as the flame shakes, full of days and hours
That sleep not neither weep as they go...

Would God my blood were dew to feed the grass,
Mine ears made deaf and mine eyes blind as glass,
My body broken as a turning wheel,
And my mouth stricken ere it saith Alas!

Later Tannhauser fantasizes about all of Venus' former victims, men who were undone by
her feminine power:

    Their blood runs round the roots of time like rain:
She casts them forth and gathers them again;
With nerve and bone she weaves and multiplies
Exceeding pleasure out of extreme pain.

Her little chambers drip with flower-like red,
Her girdles, and the chaplets of her head,
Her armlets and her anklets; with her feet
She tramples all that wine-press of the dead.

However, the value of such self-shattering is ambiguous in Swinburne's poems. His work equivocates on the Sadean notion that mortifying the body releases the soul. In "Laus Veneris," for example, the speaker holds forth at great length about Venus' extreme cruelty and its self-shattering effects, finally ending with the claim that her cruelty has enabled his union with her, a union that transcends body and soul and will last until the end of time:

For till the thunder in the trumpet be,
Soul may divide from body, but not we
One from another, I hold thee with my hand,
I let mine eyes have all their will of thee,

I seal myself upon thee with my might,
Abiding always out of men's sight
Until God loosen over sea and land
The thunder of the trumpets of the night.

The speaker of "Dolores" likewise endorses Sadean theory. He personifies "Love" as one of Dolores' victims, and entreats Dolores to make "Love" feel more powerfully:

Thou shalt touch and make redder his roses
With juice not of fruit nor of bud;
When the sense in the spirit reposes,
Thou shalt quicken the soul through the blood.

Sensory intensification, or reddening of the roses, issues from Dolores' touch, and this produces an intensified, quickened state in the soul. In this formulation, the avenue to the soul is painful sensory stimulation. Yet elsewhere in "Dolores" the speaker denies this
Sadean notion. For example, he says

On thy mouth though the kisses are bloody,
Though they sting till it shudder and smart,
More kind than the love we adore is,
They hurt not the heart or the brain

Dolores' bloody kisses are "more kind" than love because they are only physical; they do not affect "the heart or the brain." Here the speaker seems to deny the Sadean idea that bodily punishment enables access to the soul.

This contradiction is telling, for it represents Swinburne's ambivalence about the roles of self-division, self-shattering, and pain in intersubjectivity -- in sum, his ambivalence about masochistic "florid impotence" and sadomasochism in general. On one hand he sees the possibilities offered by Sadean mortification of the flesh. On the other, he intellectually rejects Sade as trapped in the ascetic, Christian spirit/flesh binary. As opposed to this division, Swinburne's poetry in general values an ideal form of love figured as spiritual and physical coalescence. As the bodies of lovers merge, so do their spirits. For example, "The Triumph of Time" sings of "Twain halves of a perfect heart, made fast / Soul to soul while the years fell past." Swinburne's verse is rife with imagery of bodies mixing together, or of one body incorporating the other into it, as symbolic of spiritual connection. "The Triumph of Time" illustrates these ideas; for example, "Were you once sealed mine, / Mine in the blood's beat, mine in the breath, / Mixed into me as honey into wine."
"Anactoria": Flirting with Masochism

In Swinburne's sadomasochistic poems, masochistic fantasy represents an attempt to achieve this kind of mergence with the other. Yet Swinburne's ambivalence about its efficacy in doing so is apparent, especially in what is probably the most sadomasochistic work in *Poems and Ballads* of 1866, "Anactoria." As David Riede argues of this poem, "Sappho's sadism, and the sadism of all 'fatal women' in Swinburne's poetry, aims at breaking down the barriers of the flesh in order to achieve mergence of spirits" (57). Yet more than just exemplifying Sadean theory, I believe that "Anactoria" bodies forth Swinburne's ambivalence about sadomasochism, specifically his uncertainties about male masochistic fantasy. Masculine anxiety might seem an odd *topos* in a poem about lesbian lovers. Yet as Dellamora notes, in writing "Anactoria," "Swinburne affiliates himself with a long tradition of male poetry invoking or impersonating Sappho, a tradition that includes Catullus, Ovid, John Donne, and Byron" (75). Closer to Swinburne's time, French writers such as de Courtivon, Baudelaire, Gautier, and Balzac "use lesbian sexuality as a field in which to play out male confusion about and discontent with prescribed roles for men and women" (75).

It is exactly this male confusion that we see played out and voiced through Sappho in "Anactoria." The poem is energized by Sappho's desire to break free from the hold of her former lover. Sappho wishes to assert self-mastery once again, and her ultimate way of accomplishing this is to assert her own immortality as a poet. However, before Sappho reaches this conclusion, she toys with the pleasures of sadism and masochism. There are several Sapphos in the poem: 1) Sappho as coherent, self-mastered, sadistic, inflicting
pain or even death on Anactoria; 2.) Sappho as subservient to Anactoria, masochistic; 3.)
Sappho as ambiguously sadomasochistic, both inflicting pain on Anactoria and receiving
pain from her; 4.) Sappho as having incorporated Anactoria into herself; 5.) Sappho as
one with Anactoria in an undifferentiated wholeness. Sappho's subjectivity oscillates
between the poles of self-assertion and self-abasement, self-shattering and self-integration,
sadism and masochism, the desire for omnipotence and the desire for dissolution. In the
end, "Anactoria" re-phallicizes Sappho, but does so in a way that betrays lingering
ambivalence about the entire sadomasochistic economy of assertion and dependence, self-
mastery and self-shattering.

Moving through the poem, we see these various shifts in Sappho's subjectivity.

The poem begins with Sappho's address to her lost lover:

My life is bitter with thy love; thine eyes
Blind me, thy tresses burn me, thy sharp sighs
Divide my flesh and spirit with soft sound,
And my blood strengthens, and my veins abound. (1-4)

Immediately the tension between self-dissolution and self-aggrandizement is apparent.

Sappho is blinded, burned, her flesh and spirit are divided, yet at the same time her "blood
strengthens" and "veins abound." These lines represent the coexistence of intense sensory
stimulation, self-division, and self-strengthening.

Sappho then longs for the simultaneous dissolution of herself and Anactoria:

Let life burn down […]
I would the sea had hidden us, the fire […]
Severed the bones that bleach, the flesh that cleaves,
And let our sifted ashes drop like leaves.

Sappho desires that fires consume them and that their ashes be scattered together in the
sea. Absorption into the sea is an image that is ubiquitous in Swinburne’s work. The best example of this desire for such self-dissolution comes from "The Triumph of Time" in the well-known stanzas beginning "I will go back to the great sweet mother, / Mother and lover of men, the sea." In these stanzas the speaker imagines losing himself in the sea's embrace.

However, after Sappho expresses the wish to merge with Anactoria in the sea, she abruptly recovers a sense of their distinctness:

I feel thy blood against my blood: my pain
pains thee, and lips bruise lips, and vein stings vein.
Let fruit be crushed on fruit, let flower on flower.
Breast kindle breast, and either burn one hour.

Here the two lovers are no longer imagined as merged, but quite separate, and painfully so; their every action and every body part hurts the other. In this sadomasochistic fantasy, the other is known as the one who inflicts pain on the self and who in turn receives pain. "Lips bruise lips, and vein stings vein" — both Sappho and Anactoria bruise and are bruised, sting and get stung. Both are sadists, and both are masochists.

This recovery of a somewhat more coherent subjectivity enables Sappho to issue a challenge to Anactoria: "Why wilt thou follow lesser loves? Are thine / Too weak to bear these hands and lips of mine?" This aggressive stance leads to Sappho's elaboration of an extreme sadistic fantasy:

I would my love could kill thee; I am satiated
With seeing thee live, and fain would have thee dead.
I would the earth had thy body as fruit to eat.
And no mouth but some serpent's found thee sweet.

Here Sappho wishes for omnipotence, fantasizing total power over Anactoria's very
existence. Instead of mergence with Anactoria, Sappho here sees their relationship in
terms of total polarity, with Sappho as master and Anactoria as slave. While Sappho
becomes god-like, Anactoria actually threatens to disappear as earth and serpents devour
her.

This fantasy of total mastery leads to another explicit moment of Sapphic sadism.
The poet imagines exquisite tortures for Anactoria:

I would find grievous ways to have thee slain,
Intense device, and superflux of pain;
Vex thee with amorous agonies, and shake
Life at thy lips, and leave it there to ache;
Strain out thy soul with pangs too soft to kill

The image of "strain[ing] out thy soul with pangs too soft to kill" is distinctly Sadean.
However, Sappho follows this fantasy with a statement that she has in fact grown bored
with Anactoria: "I am weary of all thy words and strange soft ways." This is transparently
an attempt to assert dominance over Anactoria by feigning indifference, for next comes an
elaborate twenty-line tribute to the very "strange soft ways" Sappho has just disavowed.
Yet even though Sappho shows in this erotic reverie that she is still under the spell of
Anactoria, submissive to her lost lover's charms, her textualization of Anactoria shows her
effort to recover control and mastery. As we have seen in Swinburne's other verse, in this
section of the poem Sappho figuratively dismembers Anactoria into eyes, eyelids, lips,
hair, heart, tears, laughter, girdle. In this way, her homage to Anactoria is a continuation
of her sadism. Finally, as if realizing that she is not really "weary" of Anactoria, Sappho
shifts and instead proclaims that she still loves her: "Yea, all thy beauty sickens me with
love."

Later in the poem, Sappho locates her relationship with Anactoria in a broader context; she realizes that they are part of a cosmos founded on cruelty, created and presided over by a merciless God. As she laments, "For who shall change with prayers or thanksgivings / The mystery of the cruelty of things?" (194) Referring to God, she cries, "Is not his incense bitterness, his meat / Murder? his hidden face and iron feet / Hath not man known, and felt them on their way / Threaten and trample all things and every day?" (195). In Sappho's view, God is the ultimate sadist. Yet Sappho asserts that she could be even "crueller than God," if given the chance, in another remarkable fantasy of sadistic omnipotence:

were I made as he  
Who hath made all things to break them one by one,  
If my feet trod upon the stars and sun  
And souls of men as his have always trod,  
God knows that I might be crueler than God. (194)

Sappho continues to rail against the heartlessness of God; she threatens to ascend the heavens and take him on: "Him [God] would I reach, him smite, him desecrate, / Pierce the cold lips of God with human breath, / And mix his immortality with death" (195).

This fantasy of god-like omnipotence and transcendence of human limitation leads Sappho to formulate her ultimate strategy for escaping Anactoria's sway. Sappho asserts that Anactoria will die, but she will not, as she will live on through her verse. Sappho associates her timelessness with the permanence of Nature. She acknowledges that Nature is subject to God, but claims that she is not. Contradicting herself, she says that "I Sappho shall be one with all these things" -- all the things of Nature -- but also asserts defiance of God. She proclaims independence, uniqueness, and supreme egotism:
Yea, they shall say, earth's womb has born in vain
New things, and never this best thing again;
Borne days and men, borne fruits and wars and wine,
Seasons and songs, but no song more like mine. (198).

Sappho never logically resolves this contradiction. Her resolution is all rhetorical flourish; her independent subjectivity -- independent of Anactoria, God, Time -- is achieved only though language, through the power of her verse.

As if acknowledging the tenuousness of this resolution, Sappho tries one more strategy of self-assertion. In her immortality, she figures herself as, vampire-like, draining life from her readers:

Yea, though thou [Anactoria] diest, I say I shall not die.
For these shall give me of their souls, shall give
Life and the days and loves wherewith I live,
Shall quicken me with loving, fill with breath,
Save me and serve me, strive for me with death. (198)

Sappho as symbolic vampire lives by sucking the souls of the living, quickened "with loving" and "fill[ed] with breath" of those who live after her. This passage recalls an earlier one in which Sappho imagines herself vamping Anactoria's breast:

Ah that my lips were tuneless lips, but pressed
To the bruised blossom of thy scourged white breast!
And that my mouth for Muses' milk were fed
On the sweet blood thy sweet small wounds had bled!

The image here is of Sappho as child nursing her mother Anactoria. Pre-dating by 30 years the famous scene in Stoker's Dracula where Mina nurses blood at the Count's breast, Swinburne's lesbian lovers transform blood into milk in this perverse tableau. Not only is Sappho subordinated as the dependent, helpless child at its mother's breast, she is willing to abrogate her identity as poet; she wishes her lips to be "tuneless." In the later passage,
though, Sappho's identity is more complicated. Like the vampire, she is parasitic and paradoxical, powerful yet utterly dependent on others for her existence, omnipotent in darkness yet burned to a cinder by a single ray of daylight. Like the vampire, Sappho is liminal, undead, destabilized. This contradictory image of immortality shows the failure of Sappho's efforts to free herself from masochistic dependence on Anactoria.

Again, as if acknowledging this failure, the poem ends with Sappho's death wish; she writes of the "supreme sleep" that will grant "bloodless ease" and allow her to become one with the sea: "And [...] around and over and under me / Thick darkness and the insuperable sea" (199). In this fantasy of mergence with the sea, unlike those that have come before, Anactoria does not join Sappho in the sea. Therefore this dreamed death could be yet another gesture toward self-assertion. Yet paradoxically, this final fantasy of self-mastery also represents capitulation to what Freud later would identify as the death drive. Moreover, given the wild oscillations of Sappho's desire represented in "Anactoria," it is not clear that Sappho's last wish is her final one. In this remarkably perverse poem, Swinburne does not allow Sappho's subjectivity to harden into either sadism or masochism; rather, like the vampire she imagines herself to be, she is ambiguous, indefinite, shape-shifting. Ultimately, even her efforts to recover phallic mastery through hyperbolically describing herself as timeless poet remain underwritten by the most masochistic of all desires, the death-wish.

Restabilizing Masculinity

This rather inconclusive reading of "Anactoria" -- that the poem demonstrates
ambivalence about sadomasochism -- shows that if we wish to find clearer positions on sexuality, gender, sadism and masochism represented by Swinburne's often baffling verse, we must employ analytical tools other than close reading. To get at these postitions we must also consider the spirit in which Swinburne wrote such poems "Dolores," "Faustine," "Laus Veneris," and "Anactoria." In his personal life, Swinburne was infamous for irreverence and impishness, and many critics read the sadomasochistic poems in this light -- not as serious metaphysical statements, but as comic. Louis, for example, writes of Dolores, "it is impossible to take her very seriously, because the poet is burlesquing his own technique. 'Dolores' is a black joke, a frivolous offshoot" (41). Whether or not this is the best or only way to read the poems is open for critical debate, and indeed, many critics read these works without seeing any hint of parody or irony. In my view, the parody is there. It is difficult to read lines such as these from "Faustine" without a smile of appreciation for their somewhat silly dark humor:

   All round the foul fat furrows reeked,
   Where blood sank in;
   The circus splashed and seethed and shrieked
   All round Faustine.

Compare these, ostensibly serious lines with Swinburne's self-parodic poem, "Poeta Loquitur," in which he describes his verse as

   A perennial procession of phrases
   Pranked primly, though pruriently prime,
   Precipitates preachings on praises
   In a ruffianly riot of rhyme
   Through the pressure of print on my pages:
   But reckless the reader must be
   Who imagines me one of the sages
   That steer though Time's sea.
As Kathleen Blake has remarked, for Swinburne to write such a self-parody is redundant because so much of his verse is "already self-parody." Swinburne's impish tendencies toward the parodic and burlesque have the effect of distancing both him and his masochistic male speakers from the self-abasement and self-shattering represented by the poems. Male masochism is, at least in part, a "black joke."

What of the other much-remarked element of Swinburne's verse: his languid, repetitive, florid, image-laden style? In a recent conference presentation, Ellis Hanson associates similar qualities of Walter Pater's prose with masochism. Building from Deleuze's argument that masochism should be framed as a literary rather than medical question, Hanson locates masochism not in psychology, but in style: specifically, in syntax. He argues that Pater's ornate syntax has the effect of straining the reader, delaying narrative consummation, and producing the waiting and suspense that Deleuze attributes to masochistic experience. I am struck by how well this account tallies with the experience of reading Swinburne, whose verse is not known for getting quickly to the point. Yet Swinburne's style relates differently to the masochistic male speakers of Poems and Ballads. As I mentioned, Pease associates Swinburne's gender-ambiguous speakers with the sublime: "his poetic personae are representations of an unframed, sublime excess. Both in gender and emotion, they cannot be framed or contained within the privileged Victorian ideology that seeks to reify itself in its artistic images" (47). Yet Pease also suggests that Swinburne's much-remarked monotony and repetition may be have the effect

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3 Personal communication

4 Ellis Hanson "Suffering as Syntax" MLA Convention, December 29, 2000, Washington, D.C.
of mitigating the self-shattering effects of the speakers' masochism: "the heated, repetitive tone from the poems' narrators [is] perhaps an effort to stabilize one's identity in the face of an undoing" (49).

I argue that the self-parodic elements of Swinburne's verse work in tandem with its peculiar repetitive style to "frame" and "contain" the sublime excess of his speakers' gender-transgressive masochism. As is known of the sublime, when it fails, it becomes bathetic and laughable. Swinburne's sublime speakers do not exactly enter the realm of bathos, but they certainly skirt its borders. This flirtation with the laughable has the effect of undermining the threats they pose to Victorian gender ideology. Critics often make too much of the transgressiveness of Swinburne's work, and miss its comic, tongue-in-cheek elements (as Pease does in describing Swinburne's speakers as unambiguously sublime).

Consider Camille Paglia's overblown interpretation of Dolores:

She is an everlasting principle of evil and disorder which defiles history...

Swinburne's thousand-named goddess is a daemonic Cosmic Woman, trampling history beneath her feet. Her metamorphic identity seeps inexorably into place, mind, and word, contaminating both language and action. (223)

Dolores is not an "everlasting principle," nor is she a "Cosmic Woman;" she is a darkly humorous creation who fulfills the masochistic contract. If there is any trampling to be done, it will involve Dolores' walking over the speaker of the poem in the spiked heels he has asked his "Lady of Pain" to don specially for the occasion. As we saw in the relationship of Pip and Estella, Swinburne, and his speakers, fashion Dolores, Faustine and
other dominant women into torturers to produce the fantasized masochistic pleasures of "florid impotence." Moreover, Swinburne, through his speakers' repetitive style and burlesque, maintains "creative control" over the perverse *tableaux* that result. The comic, parodic elements of Swinburne attest to what Deleuze finds in masochism: theatricality, playfulness, a scripted miming of real relations of domination.

In addition to these textual methods of rephallicizing the masochistic masculinities of *Poems and Ballads*, Swinburne's published commentary on his verse further diminishes its subversiveness to Victorian norms of gender and sexuality. His *Notes on Poems and Reviews* represents both an effort to explain *Poems and Ballads* and to respond to critics' charges of hedonism, perversity, and unbridled sensuality. In this commentary Swinburne works to stabilize the poetic masculine subjectivity that his work has threatened with destabilization.

Following the suggestion of W. M. Rossetti that "Dolores," "The Garden of Proserpine," and "Hesperia" work as a trilogy, Swinburne argues that he intended to write them that way to represent a progression of the soul. The first stage is the "Dolores" phase. Swinburne calls this stage

that transient state of spirit though which a man may be supposed to pass,
foiled in love and weary of loving, but not yet in sight of rest; seeking
refuge in those 'violent delights' which 'have violent ends,' in fierce and
frank sexualities which at least profess to be no more than they are. (qtd. in
Riede 48)

The second stage is represented by "The Garden of Proserpine." Swinburne suggests that
this poem is "expressive [...] of that brief total pause of passion and of thought, when the spirit, without fear or hope of good things or evil, hungers and thirsts only after the perfect sleep" (qtd. in Riede 60). Riede sees this stage as characterized by a kind of stasis and lassitude akin to the states of mind represented by Tennyson's "the Lotos-Eaters" or Carlyle's "Center of Indifference" (61). Swinburne writes of the last stage, as represented by "Hesperia," that it represents a new stage and scene [...] the worship of desire has ceased; the mad commotion of sense has stormed itself out; the spirit, clear of the old regret that drove it upon such violent ways for a respite, healed of the fever that wasted it in the search for relief among fierce fancies and tempestuous pleasures, dreams now of truth discovered and truth attained. (qtd. in Riede 67)

This retrospective account of Poems and Ballads subordinates the transgressive elements of sadomasochistic poems, represented by "Dolores," to a bildung in which perversities are outgrown, and a calm, transcendent, abstract masculinity is at last achieved in "Hesperia." Swinburne argues that destabilizing "florid impotence" is an immature stage that the masculine soul eventually overcomes.

Swinburne's response to critics' attacks on him also works to rephallicize his poetry by describing it in terms of conventional Victorian gender ideology. In Notes on Poems and Reviews, Swinburne reappropriates the terms of this ideology in defense of himself and his art. He writes:

The office of adult art is neither puerile nor feminine, but virile...
will be as impotent as the pulpit to dictate laws and remove the landmarks of art [...] Then all accepted work will be noble and chaste in the wider masculine sense, not truncated and curtailed, but outspoken and full-grown. (qtd. in Pease 55)

Here the "florid impotence" of the Poems and Ballads is vitiated by claims about the "outspoken and full-grown," the realm of "adult" and "masculine" art. Not the poet, but the press will be "impotent." As Pease argues, Swinburne answers his critics' charges by claiming to have "broadened the category [of masculinity], pioneered new territory, and discovered a virile land that was ready to be populated by men of discerning tastes" (55). Although Swinburne's "discerning" men may embrace "florid impotence" as part of a widened definition of masculinity, the definition itself differs not much from definitions offered by normative Victorian gender ideology.

Sadomasochistic Pornography and Prostitution

Of course Swinburne, as aesthete, considered himself one of these men "of discerning tastes." But he was also one of the large number of middle and upper-class Victorian men who had a taste for the rod. I do not wish to take Swinburne's experience as representative of all these men and their obsession with sadomasochism. However, in his work we do have a unique entry into understanding Victorian male masochistic fantasy. I am struck by certain structural similarities between the fantasies represented by Swinburne's verse and the fantasies and practices of Victorian sadomasochistic pornography and prostitution in general.
Immense amounts of flagellant pornography were written during the Victorian period, by men to be read by men. For all its diversity, this literature's basic plot of remains the same. Steven Marcus summarizes this plot in _The Other Victorians_. Someone is accused of doing something wrong. The accuser is almost always a woman in a position of authority, a mother surrogate, never the mother herself. The accuser threatens with punishment. The accused pleads for mercy, to no avail, and punishment ensues. The birch is brought out and described in fetishistic detail. Sometimes it is even adorned with a ribbon. The accused is bound in some way or lies on the lap of the accuser. His clothes are removed to expose the buttocks. This procedure is described in detail, as is the reddening and twitching of the body under the rod. There can be conscious play acting and role playing, or the scenes can be "for real." Women are usually portrayed as flagellomaniacs; they love to beat, and never miss an opportunity to do so. It is very unusual to see men beating boys (Marcus 255-257).

The following excerpt from _The Romance of Lust_, published in 1873, contains many of these elements. In it, a governess, age 22, punishes her male pupil, age 15. The governess, Miss Evelyn, begins:

> Now, Charles, I give you ten minutes longer to finish that sum. If not done in that time I shall whip you; you are exhibiting the mere spirit of idleness. I do not know what has come over you, but if persisted in, you shall certainly be punished. (qtd. in Gibson 273)

Charles becomes so excited by the prospect of being whipped by the lovely Miss Evelyn that he can think of nothing else and can't finish the sum. He is then punished, as he
narrates:

Miss Evelyn turned the key in the door, opened a cupboard, and took out a new rod, small, flexible as a whalebone, and neatly tied up with a blue ribbon. Now, my blood coursed through my veins, and my fingers trembled so that I could hardly hold my pencil.

"Put down your slate, Charles, and come to me."

I obeyed, and stood before my beautiful governess, with a strange commixture of fear and desire.

"Unfasten your braces, and pull down your trousers.

I commenced doing this, though but very slowly. Angry at my delay her delicate fingers speedily accomplished the work. My trousers fell to my feet.

"Place yourself across my knees."

Tremblingly, with the same commixture of feeling, I obeyed. Her silk dress was drawn up to prevent its being creased — my naked flesh pressed against her snowy white petticoats. A delicate perfume of violet and vervain assailed my olfactory nerves. As I felt her soft and delicate fingers drawing up my shirt, and passing over my bare posteriors, while the warmth of her palpable forms beneath me penetrated my flesh, nature exerted her power, and my prick began to swell out to a most painful extent. I had but little time however to notice this before a rapid succession of the most cruel cuts lacerated my bottom.
"Oh dear! Oh Dear Oh dear! Oh, Miss Evelyn, I will do the sum if you will only forgive me. Oh, oh, oh, etc.

Holding me firmly with her left arm, Miss Evelyn used the rod most unmercifully. At first the pain was excruciating, and I roared out as loud as I could, but gradually the pain ceased to be so acute, and was succeeded by the most delicate tickling sensation. (qtd. in Gibson 273-274)

The scene goes on in a similar vein. Charles catches a glimpse of Miss Evelyn's ankle. This, combined with the beating and the friction of his penis on her petticoats, render him as he says "almost delirious" and "in a state of perfect frenzy." When he gets up Miss Evelyn notices his erection, stares at it in fascination, but then blushes and quickly leaves the room.

There are several points of connection between the structure of fantasy represented here and that of Swinburne's sadomasochistic poems. As in Swinburne, the male figure, Charles, submits to a punishing, powerful female figure. Senses are heightened: Charles' "blood course[s] though [his] veins." Pleasure and pain commingle: standing before Miss Evelyn, Charles feels "a strange commixture of fear and desire;" her "delicate perfume" "assail[s] him, and later the pain of the beating transforms into "the most delicate tickling sensation." There is a passing hint at mergence of self and other: "the warmth of her palpy forms beneath me penetrated my flesh." Moreover, Charles is broken down into component parts: blood, veins, fingers, braces, trousers, flesh, posteriors.

This last detail alerts us to another point of connection between Swinburne's work
and flagellant pornography. Both represent the shattering and incoherence of identity brought about by masochism. In pornography this shattering is evident in style. Marcus notes that much Victorian flagellant pornography is characterized by narrative incoherence: "point of view is inconsistent and unsustained, sometimes switching several times within a single page -- the degree of mental concentration in these fantasies is so uncertain that even the shortest anecdote cannot be carried through coherently" (257). The sexual identity of the person being beaten is shifty as well. Sometimes it is a boy, sometimes a girl, sometimes a boy dressed as a girl. I suggest that the narrative incoherence and gender ambiguity of sadomasochistic pornography correlates to the self-shattering we have seen figured in Swinburnean "florid impotence."

This excerpt from *The Romance of Lust* is unusual in that it mentions the genitals, which are hardly ever mentioned in flagellant pornography. When Charles' erection is revealed, Miss Evelyn is so taken aback that she must leave the room. The phallic authority Charles had lost to her literally reasserts itself, stands up and makes itself known. This detail allegorizes another defining trait of this pornography in general. Despite the fact that in it, women are powerful and punishing, this work is a symptom of, not a challenge to, Victorian patriarchy. Written by men for men, it represents yet another example of the masochistic contract; women are fashioned by men into torturesses for the scripted and theatricalized satisfaction of male masochistic fantasy.

Such fantasy could easily be indulged in the real world, as flagellant prostitution was common in Victorian England. In London there were several brothels that catered exclusively to men who had a taste for flagellation, and less specialized establishments
usually had flogging equipment, facilities, and prostitutes adept at the ways of the birch. It is certain that Swinburne was a patron of a brothel in St. John's Wood. Unlike modern male patrons of commercial S/M, who generally refrain from genital contact with dominas, Victorian men such as Swinburne often used flagellation as a prelude to intercourse. Gibson writes, "The evidence is conclusive that passive flagellants would prefer not to have their compulsive lech and to be able to become sexually excited in a more normal way but that, despite themselves, they can only achieve erection by having recourse to their fantasies [...] after the birch came the bed" (256-257). Gibson spends considerable time elucidating the relationships between Frederick Hankey (an avid sadist), Henry Spencer Ashbee (sadomasochistic enthusiast and collector of pornography), Monckton Milnes, Richard Burton, and Swinburne, arguing that

All of these men felt themselves to be in rebellion against the Establishment of the day in matters of sexual morality, and greatly disliked its hypocrisy and puritanism; all were travelers, linguists and students of foreign literatures, erotic and otherwise; and all of them were obsessed with sexual perversion. (257)

Gibson concludes that "We can be absolutely certain that their tastes were shared by a great many men from similar backgrounds" (257).

Certainly the daylight world of Victorian Britain considered the sexual practices of these men immoral and perverted, just as it considered Swinburne's aestheticized representations of the pleasures of sadomasochism decadent and dirty. Yet what is the real extent of the "rebellion against the Establishment" represented by male patronage of
flagellant prostitution and pornography? Anne McClintock offers insight into this question. In "Maid to Order: Commercial Fetishism and Gender Power" McClintock describes and analyzes late 20th century commercial S/M practice, including domestic slavery, dirt fetishism, and babyism. She notices that contrary to gender stereotypes of the dominant male and submissive female, "By far the most common service paid for by men in heterosexual S/M is the extravagant display of submission" (92). These men come from all walks of life, and, like their Victorian forebears, otherwise fit the mold of what would be considered "normal;" they include: "Proper gentlemen who know how to behave [...] solicitors [...] doctors, senior police officers, business executives and churchmen. They come to be humiliated, frightened and tormented to the limits of their endurance"  

In the culture of commercial S/M that McClintock describes, we see a reconstruction of male privilege similar to that we have seen in Swinburne. As McClintock writes, 

After the via dolorosa of the S/M session, the domina bears witness to the resurrection of manhood. Finally, it was all over [...] Dennis got up and gingerly put his pants on. He was instantly transformed into a normal, confident, aggressive man [...] We all stood around chatting and having a cup of tea. 'Is the heterosexual male thus left finally unimpaired, to be reassembled again in the boardroom and bedroom?'  

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6 McClintock 97. Internal citation from Taylor. Prostitution 45.
McClintock sees contemporary commercial S/M practices as, in the end, reaffirming patriarchy: "Perhaps in these expiation rituals, men pay to... be symbolically 'absolved' of guilt for the everyday abuse of women — only to resume their authority once more as they return restored" to the everyday world (102). Patriarchal authority is further reestablished by the fact that modern dominas (and their Victorian forebears) are paid by men, positioning these women as subordinate, as employees. That said, many modern sex-workers do not see themselves as exploited, but rather as taking advantage of male perversities for monetary gain (and they are often paid well). I don't believe we can responsibly discount these subjective experiences. However, on the macro-level of gender ideology, I agree with McClintock that such temporary local disturbances of patriarchy offer no substantial challenge to it, and may in fact help reinforce it by assuaging male guilt over gender inequality. Commercial S/M acts as a kind of "safety valve" that lets off the psychic guilt and other burdens of patriarchy, but otherwise leaves its machinery intact. McClintock concludes that commercial S/M caricatures "social edicts in a sumptuous display of irreverence, but without substantially interrupting the social order" (112).

Commercial S/M is not totally complicit with dominant norms of gender and sexuality, but neither does it meaningfully subvert them. This analysis bears out Pat Califia's sobering statement on sex radicalism: "I do not believe that we can fuck our way to freedom" (qtd. in McClintock 111).

Clearly Swinburne was considered, and considered himself, to be a sex radical of his time. His verse without a doubt challenged the Victorian sex-gender system, in no small measure due to his spectacularization of the pleasures of male submission, suffering,
self-abasement, and even self-shattering. Yet as we have seen, phallic masculinity is
reconstructed through various means in Swinburne's verse, just as it is reconstructed
symbolically in the scenario described by the domina above, and just as it is literally
reestablished in the practices of Victorian flagellant prostitution, in which birching was a
prelude to intercourse. This trajectory of flirtation with masochism / recuperation of
standard masculine subjectivity coincides with what I have called the "taming" of
masochism in Carlyle, Tennyson, and Dickens. With Swinburne, though, the dynamic is
reversed. While these authors underwrite conventional masculinity with masochism,
Swinburne underwrites his masochism with conventional masculinity. Either way, in the
work of these writers we see the complex interimplication of the daylight world of
Victorian manliness and the twilight world of male masochistic fantasy.
Epilogue

Carlyle, Tennyson, Dickens, and Swinburne all document divergent modes of masculine self-fashioning that embrace masochistic fantasy. The fantasies they offer serve to compensate for the lack of intersubjective mutual recognition that, for various reasons, haunted Victorian men. In Carlyle, economic crisis, liberal democracy, and capitalism all work to divide men from each other and from the spiritual within. In Tennyson, religious doubt and gendered norms of mourning lock the poet in a private world of grief. In Dickens, the "beat or cringe" world of social class hierarchy prevents the mutual recognition promised by a more egalitarian gentlemanly ideal. Swinburne sees the world in general as dark, chaotic, and cruel, and Victorian society in particular as shackled by strict gender ideologies and norms of social decorum.

In the face of such failures of intersubjectivity, these authors elaborate solutions in the form of textual fantasies. These masochistic fantasies are produced within the structures of masculine self-disciplinary self-fashioning through which middle class Victorian men tried to establish social authority. Carlyle's fantasy envisions a utopian all-male society of Heroes and Hero-worshippers; Tennyson eroticizes grief; Dickens' fantasy lives in Pip's masochistic inner world of guilt; Swinburne dreams of submission to dominant, punishing women. Each fantasy is distinct, but each represents a wish -- a dreamed replacement for lost possibilities of mutual recognition.

Moreover, the masochistic sexualities of these early and mid-Victorian texts exceed the explanatory capacity of the homosexual/heterosexual model. Rather, the
peculiar masochistic logics these texts represent are informed not only by the sexual
division homo/hetero, but also by other historical concerns, including class conflicts,
economic crises, gender ideologies, and religious doubts. In Carlyle, for example,
masochism exists in the (homoerotic) submission of the "Hero-worshipper" to the "Hero."
This submission forms the "Hero-worship" that is Carlyle's fantasy solution to the
"Condition of England" question. The masochism of In Memoriam emerges in "love that
hurts," which offers a way out of the religious "Crisis of Faith." "Love that hurts" is
coeextensive with homoeroticism, while Maud employs a similar masochistic logic in a
heterosexual context, showing that the dynamic I isolate is not reducible to the
homo/hetero binary. Dickens' Great Expectations deploys masochism in both an explicitly
erotized heterosexual arena -- Pip's relationship with Estella -- and in the less overtly
sexualized contexts where Pip negotiates the contradictions of gentlemanly status. In both
deployments, however, masochism energizes worlds of fantasy that substitute for the
intersubjective recognition that the gentlemanly ideal fails to deliver. Swinburne represents
coldness and cruelty, dominance and submission in both hetero- and homosexual contexts
as part of his general project of challenging Victorian orthodoxies with polymorphous
perversity. As I have argued, this challenge is not powerful as often thought; instead it
ends up reinforcing normative Victorian ideologies of gender and sexuality.

In such various ways, these textual fantasies of male masochism promise to resolve
specific historical problems. At the same time, these texts discipline their masochistic
energies. However, they do not rid masculinity of masochism. Instead, they advocate
seemingly conventional models of manhood that are, in fact, still marked by masochism
reworked into culturally viable forms. By this, these works document the interimplication of culturally sanctioned masculine self-disciplinary self-making and culturally proscribed male masochism.

This analysis, I believe, will enable further work on Victorian male masochism. I would like to sketch out a few directions such work might take. The work of Matthew Arnold can be read as a kind of "taming" or reworking of masochistic energies. His famous shift from writing melancholy verse -- what he calls "the dialogue of the mind with itself" (Preface 203) -- in favor of the "sweetness and light" of "Culture" has been usually viewed as a simple rejection of the former. However, according to the terms I have laid out, it is possible to read "Culture" as a careful reworking of the issues represented in the verse, not a total transcendence of them. Arnold's poetry is notable, as I mentioned in Chapter I, for its documentation of Victorian male alienation. Intersubjective breakdown is one of the main causes of this alienation and the sorrow it produces. For example, the desperate cry of "Dover Beach" -- "Ah, love, let us be true / To one another!" (29-30) is followed by its speaker's recognition that the world "Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light" (33). How can they love each other in a world that has no love? In a pessimistic reading of poem, to "be true / To one another" means to be truthful with each other: there is no possibility of connection in the dark, ever-changing, uncertain world the poem represents -- a world characterized by "the turbid ebb and flow / Of human misery" (17-18).

Similarly, "The Buried Life" tearfully represents the difficulties of achieving connection. Its speaker -- whose "eyes are wet" (2) -- asks of his loved one: "turn those
limpid eyes on mine, / And let me read there, love! thy inmost soul" (10-11). But he then
immediately questions his ability to do so:

Alas! is even love too weak
To unlock the heart, and let it speak?
Are even lovers powerless to reveal
To one another what indeed they feel? (12-15)

The speaker then locates such failures of communication within a broader social context:

I knew the mass of men conceal'd
Their thoughts, for fear that if reveal'd
They would by other men be met
With blank indifference, or with blame reproved;
I knew they lived and moved
Trick'd in disguises, alien to the rest
Of men, and alien to themselves — and yet
The same heart beats in every human breast! (16-23)

The poem then elaborates on the difficulties overcoming self-alienation, or coming to
know one's "buried life," which is figured as an "unregarded river" whose flow is
"indiscernible" and "eddying." In the end the poem tries to reconcile the twin problems it
raises: knowing oneself and knowing others.

Only -- but this is rare --
When a beloved hand is laid in ours,
When [...] Our eyes can in another's eyes read clear,
When our world deafen'd ear
Is by the tones of a loved voice caress'd --
A bolt is shot back somewhere in our breast,
And a lost pulse of feeling stirs again.
The eye sinks inward, and the heart lies plain,
And what we mean, we say, and what we would, we know. (77-87)

Reading clearly "another's eyes" does not let one read the "inmost soul" of the other, as
the speaker earlier desired to do. Rather, experience of the other is merely occasion for
heightened self-knowledge. The other is not experienced for his or her own sake; rather,
looking into the eyes or hearing the voice of another only makes one's eye "sink inward," enabling him to become "aware of his life's flow" (88). The poem even questions this possibility of self-awareness, saying that one "thinks he knows / The hills where his life rose, / and the sea where it goes" (96-98, emphasis added).

Arnold later repudiated such uncertainty, melancholy, and despair. In Preface to *Poems*, 1853 he writes that he sees no value in poetry in which "a continuous state of mental distress is prolonged" and in where "the suffering finds no vent in action" (204). Arnold reinvents himself as a positive social critic, advocate of the "Sweetness and Light" and "Culture" that he hopes will reconnect Englishmen with one another, giving them certainty and security. Yet the hopeful views Arnold comes to advocate still contain elements of masochism. As we saw in Chapter IV, the Arnoldian "best self" lives in a state of division. He is Hebraic -- moral, strict of conscience -- but also Hellenic -- disinterested, spontaneous of conscience. As I argued in Chapter IV, through this hybridity Arnold insures that his "best self" is both interested in self development and in furthering benevolent social goals. This model of selfhood seems, on first examination, to possess a tincture of moral masochism in its Hebraic element: the part of personality that reins in -- through moral strictness -- the possible excesses of Hellenism. Arnold needs this "reining in" in large part because in the mid-nineteenth century, Hellenism, especially at Oxford, was offering modes of discourse and models of identity conducive to an emergent homosexual subculture.¹ Moreover, Arnold's model of English society remains hierarchical, founded on dominance and submission. Arnold is deeply suspicious of

¹ On this, see Dowling.
democracy and "freedom" as ways of connecting men. As I argued in Chapter IV, he suggests instead that men of "Culture" model its virtues for their inferiors, in large part to keep them in their place. Moreover, Arnold calls upon men of "Culture" to take the helm of "the State," which he defines as "the nation its collective and corporate character, entrusted with stringent powers for the general advantage, and controlling individual wills in the name of an interest wider than that of individuals" (Culture and Anarchy 429). This model is, of course, not specifically sadomasochistic. Yet it has affinities with Hero-worship. While Carlyle saw men as bound to submit to the Hero, an embodied version of the divine-in-man, Arnold calls on Englishmen to submit to a sort of Platonic ideal of "Culture" as materialized in "the State" run by a meritocracy of "best selves," men of "Culture."

Arnoldian aesthetics are explicitly referenced by Walter Pater at the outset of The Renaissance, a volume that created scandal for its seemingly hedonistic philosophy and encoded homoeroticism. While Arnold believed that one should try to see the object in itself, as it "really is," Pater believed that one could only know one's impressions of the object. The Paterian subject, already barraged by stimuli from a world of constant change, is enjoined to seek out ever more sense impressions: "to be forever testing new opinions and courting new impressions[...] getting as many pulsations as possible into the given time" (Pater 152-153). For Pater, the subject is always in flux, scattered, shattered in his submission to a plethora of stimuli, and the subject actually "courts" more stimuli. Therefore, what Pater calls "that strange, perpetual, weaving and unwinding of ourselves" (152) I am tempted to redescribe as masochistic self-shattering. In Chapter V I mentioned
a recent analysis of Paterian aestheticism as masochistic. Indeed, Pater's statement of what constitutes "success in life" — "To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame" — could well have been delivered (in greatly expanded version) by one of Swinburne's masochistic speakers. In this image we see a paradox similar to those I discussed in Swinburne's poetry. An image of self-dissolution and pain — "to burn" — coexists with imagery of subjective coherence and strength — the "hard, gem-like flame." The Paterian subject is singular and unified — like a flame or a gem. Yet also like a flame or gem, this subject is multiple, multi-faceted, flickering, ever-changing.

Pater has often been read as encoding homosexuality in his work, as has Wilde. Critics have long noticed that in De Profundis — his letter to Bosie from Reading Gaol — Wilde compares his suffering to that of Christ. Recent work has begun to see this peculiar text in terms of masochism. We know that Wilde suffered greatly during his trial and imprisonment. His hard-labor sentence in Reading Gaol was made even more trying by a lingering, constantly painful ear infection. Clearly De Profundis' wild oscillations in tone, topic, and style result from the trying conditions under which Wilde composed it. Despite these difficulties, De Profundis represents Wilde's desperate attempt to find some meaning in his suffering, both before his imprisonment and during it. In large part, he tries to understand his self-defeating actions of the late 1880s and early 1890s: continuing an unprofitable and dangerous association with Bosie, allowing himself to be drawn into the court battles that were his downfall, ignoring the advice of friends that he leave the country. In my view, Wilde in De Profundis is thinking through the impulses to self-destruction — extending to masochism — that underlay his tragedy. He tries to understand,
as he writes in "Ballad of Reading Gaol," why "each man kills the thing he loves."

Examining Wilde in this way will, I believe, create a space for critical dialogue between paradigms that refer to the homo/hetero binary (often applied to Wilde) and those developed to explain S/M.

The homo/hetero dynamics of the erotic triangle have been used to good effect by Eve Sedgwick in analyzing late Dickens, specifically, Our Mutual Friend. I believe that the masochistic model I lay out in Chapter IV -- on Great Expectations' pessimism -- can be productively applied to this other late, dark novel. Sedgwick looks at the bizarre love triangle of Bradley Headstone, Eugene Wrayburn, and Lizzie Hexam. Neither of these men are particularly secure in their gentlemanly status -- particularly Headstone. Their gentlemanly insecurities produces anxieties and pathologies similar to those we saw in Pip. Moreover, to a great degree, Headstone and Wrayburn make Lizzie into a torturess (as Pip does Estella), since Lizzie, for much of the novel, resists their advances. The immensely complicated interconnections made in Our Mutual Friend between guilt, gentlemanliness, the erotic triangle, and the masochistic contract will, as with Wilde, provide opportunity to put critical models in dialogue with each other.

The work of Charles Kingsley, advocate of men's being "bold against" themselves, will also provide fruitful ground for further study. Kingsley is well-known as advocate of "Muscular Christianity," a brand a masculine self-fashioning that emphasized virile physicality, athleticism, courageous action -- but also rigorous, Christian, ascetic self-discipline. As I indicated in Chapter I, Adams locates in Kingsleyan self-discipline the possibility of masochism. I believe that examining Kingsley's masochistic heroes, in
particular Alton Locke, through the frame I have laid out may help explain why this is so. Moreover, Kingsleyan Muscular Christianity in many ways was an offshoot of Carlylean Hero-worship. Both models undergirded the imperialist ideologies that became more powerful as the nineteenth century wore on. Examining how their sadomasochistic energies play out in literature of Empire will allow us to understand anew the relations of dominance and submission that structure nineteenth-century racism and imperialism.

Possibilities proliferate because Victorian culture in general laid the foundations for male masochistic fantasy. Denied (due to a variety of reasons) the mutual recognition of "like subjects" and enjoined to compensate by mastering themselves, Victorian men were drawn to fantasies of masochism, as seen in works by authors as different as Carlyle, Tennyson, Dickens, and Swinburne, not to mention Arnold, Pater, Wilde, and Kingsley. Viewed in this light, male masochism is not the isolated perversion that late-nineteenth century imagined it; nor is it just a titillating possibility offered by the prostitution and pornography available to a certain class of men. Rather, masochistic fantasies are fundamental to what we have come to know as "mainstream" Victorian masculinities, as well as to socio-historical concerns central to the Victorian era.
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