Déjà Vu, the Sublime, and the Uncanny: The Route to Self-Overcoming of Hans Castorp’s “Schnee” Vision in Thomas Mann’s Der Zauberberg

Craig Odell Smith

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

2005

Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Department of Germanics
University of Washington
Graduate School

This is to certify that I have examined this copy of a doctoral dissertation by

Craig Odell Smith

and have found that it is complete and satisfactory in all respects, and that any and all revisions required by the final examining committee have been made.

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:

[Signature]
Hellmut Ammerlahn

Reading Committee:

[Signature]
Hellmut Ammerlahn

[Signature]
Diana Behler

[Signature]
Richard Gray

Date: 10/20/2005
In presenting this dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the doctoral degree at the University of Washington, I agree that the Library shall make its copies freely available for inspection. I further agree that extensive copying of the dissertation is allowable only for scholarly purposes, consistent with "fair use" as prescribed in the U.S. Copyright Law. Requests for copying or reproduction of this dissertation may be referred to Proquest Information and Learning, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346, to whom the author has granted "the right to reproduce and sell (a) copies of the manuscript in microform and/or (b) printed copies of the manuscript made from microform."

Signature  
Craig Odell Smith

Date  
12/08/2005
University of Washington

Abstract

Déjà Vu, the Sublime, and the Uncanny: The Route to Self-Overcoming of Hans Castorp’s “Schnee” Vision in Thomas Mann’s Der Zauberberg

Craig Odell Smith

Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Professor Hellmut Ammerlahn
Department of Germanics

Critics have dealt extensively with Thomas Mann’s Zauberberg in terms of literary technique, thematic elements, structural composition, literary influences, psychological and philosophical aspects, historical significance, and place within German literature. Despite the apparently exhaustive analyses of Mann’s novel, a satisfactory treatment of the events of its central “Schnee” subchapter has hitherto remained remarkably absent from the critical literature. A detailed analysis of “Schnee” is indispensable to a proper understanding of the Zauberberg’s overall plot and its significance in the European intellectual and literary tradition.

This dissertation offers an extensive and significant description of the protagonist’s experiences in “Schnee” as a reliving of events in the novel’s greater plot. It performs an in-depth analysis of Hans Castorp’s psychological turmoil during his
skiing excursion in the central subchapter, the enhancement of his predicament during his subsequent dream, and the intellectual resolution of conflicting psychological forces that coincides with his moment of awakening. The dissertation employs seminal concepts in German psychology, philosophy, and aesthetics in demonstration of the Zaubergarten protagonist’s act of surmounting uncanny experience through the sublimity of reasonable resolve. The dissertation contributes to the understanding of the novel’s central themes, elements of composition, significant aspects of its structure, and overall plot. It also includes an unprecedented preliminary analysis of the relationship between the uncanny and the sublime as principal components of psychology and aesthetics – a relationship of whose central aspects Thomas Mann demonstrates his fundamental awareness.

The dissertation’s two sections thus correspond to Hans Castorp’s sublime and uncanny experiences during his skiing expedition in “Schnee” and his subsequent overcoming of his underlying psychological conflict through cognitive reflection. A process of transcending the repressive dilemma of the individual’s adaptation to modern society constitutes the overriding educational component of Thomas Mann’s novel of education – a process whose goal of sublime self-reconciliation is achieved through direct confrontation of one’s repressed desires and fears. Only through consideration of Mann’s profound insight into questions of psychology and aesthetics may one arrive at a proper understanding of his novel’s significance both within the Bildungsroman genre and in the European intellectual tradition.
Table of Contents

Introduction: Hans Castorp’s “Regierungspflichten” and Pursuit of an Overview............ 1

Chapter 1. Hans’s “Schnee” Excursion: Sublime Natural Law and Uncanny
Natural Violence. .................................................................................................. 14
1.1. Sublime Ascent and Uncanny Subjection. .................................................. 14
1.2. Hans Castorp’s “Eskapade” as an Escape from Repression. ...................... 42
1.3. The Goal of Reconciling the “Homo humanus” and the “Homo Dei.”........... 62
1.4. The Quest for Sublime Oversight. .............................................................. 103
1.5. Pathetic Fallacy, Animistic Projection, and the Uncanny. ....................... 124
1.6. Hans Castorp’s Uncanny Predicament in Quest of the Sublime. ............... 142

Chapter 2. Hans’s “Schnee” Vision: Sublime Overcoming of Uncanny
Experience. ........................................................................................................ 149
2.1. Déjà-vu Illusions of Restored Natural Harmony. ...................................... 149
2.2. Uncanny Destruction of Imagined Harmony. .......................................... 162
2.3. The Underlying Chaos of Rigidly Structured Order. ............................... 190
2.4. Hans Castorp’s Dream in “Schnee” as Manifestation of the Latent Sensual
Components of Eros and Thanatos. .................................................................... 205
2.5. Aspiration of “Regieren,” “Gedankentraum,” and Self-Interpretation: Hans
Castorp’s Reconciliation of Eros and Thanatos. .............................................. 233

Conclusion: Neurotic Isolation and Social Sublimity......................................... 278

Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 323
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author expresses his great appreciation to the Department of Germanics for their ongoing support, to his committee members for their patience and outstanding advice, to Katja Sommer for her keen eye and diligence, and finally to Professor Hellmut Ammerlahn for his excellent guidance, persistent wisdom, and sustained encouragement.
Introduction: Hans Castorp’s “Regierungspflichten” and Pursuit of an Overview.

Along with the insight he offers into the operations of the human psyche, Thomas Mann’s indebtedness to the German literary tradition is among his most distinguishing qualities as an author. Accordingly, any analysis of Der Zauberberg is bound to draw attention to the affinity between character features represented in Mann’s novel and the psychological concepts that were simultaneously being developed by Sigmund Freud – an affinity whose coincidence was nonetheless partially due to both thinkers’ reliance upon a mutual tradition.1 As my own analysis will show, the critical literature also gives widescale treatment to the reliance of Mann’s composition upon the psychological and philosophical notions of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Schiller, among others. While it is useful to take account of the independent affinity of Mann’s work to the notions of psychoanalysis and dependence upon German literary tradition, my own interpretation regards these connections merely as a means to a deeper understanding of Mann’s work. The principal clues to its proper interpretation are offered by the Zauberberg text itself. The true value of any critical analysis of the author’s sources is its provision of a clearer picture of the significant elements in that author’s literary text. While Werner Frizen’s detailed study greatly contributes to the documentation of Schopenhauer’s influence on

---

1 Aside from casual exposure through conversations, newspaper articles, and general literary references, it is a widely accepted fact that Mann first began to familiarize himself with Freud’s writings between 1925 and 1926 – thus, in the period directly following his publication of Der Zauberberg. Jean Finck, Thomas Mann und die Psychoanalyse (Paris: Société d’Édition “Les Belles Lettres,” 1973) 17. As Finck nonetheless also notes: “Freuds Topographie des Psychischen, die Unterscheidung zwischen bewussten und unbewussten psychischen Inhalten und Prozessen ist auf jeden Fall durch die nachidealistische Philosophie des Irrationalismus, vor allem durch Nietzsche und Schopenhauer, aber auch den Roman Dostojewskis vorbereitet worden.” Finck, 18.
Der Zauberberg, Børge Kristiansen nonetheless also discerns that it provides little clarification of the novel’s structure. It is thus that Kristiansen establishes the presence in Mann’s novel of the Schopenhauerian concepts of “Unform – Form – Überform” in order to arrive at his “strukturanalytisch fundierte Neuinterpretation des Zauberbergs.”

In order to produce an original interpretation of the Zauberberg plot’s centrally significant events through an examination of the active psychological forces that bring them about, my own analysis relies in part on the extensively documented influences of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Schiller on Thomas Mann. The centrally significant events of the “Schnee” section may be roughly summarized in the aesthetic terms of sublime aspiration, uncanny disenchantment, symbolic recollection, and poetic reconciliation – the culminating event for whose description Schiller serves as an optimal guide. But my analysis of the events leading up to that act relies extensively on Kant’s definition of the sublime and Freud’s descriptions of the uncanny and the dream-work – theories with which one may assume Mann was at best only superficially familiar. As in my employment of literary references with which Mann was demonstrably familiar, I refer to theories beyond his scope of familiarity only as a means to describing the intricacy of independent psychological understanding that underpins Mann’s description of Hans Castorp’s creative quest. Not a little unlike his novel’s protagonist, Thomas

---

2See Werner Frizen, Zaubertrank der Metaphysik: Quellenkritische Überlegungen im Umkreis der Schopenhauer-Rezeption Thomas Manns (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1980).


Mann takes a rich body of tradition as the point of departure for his independent attempt to achieve a fuller description of the psyche at the center of the individual's search for meaning in the modern world.

In addition to a pronounced willingness to obey the prescriptive mandates of a convalescent existence that hardly seems suited for him, Hans Castorp, the protagonist of Mann's novel, possesses a streak of independence that subtly sets him apart from the other patients of the Berghof sanatorium. By the time of the "Schnee" section of the novel's second volume, Hans's drive for independence almost appears to represent an attempt to find a self derailed by circumstance. His quest returns him almost inexorably to the domain in which Chauchat's identity earlier revealed itself to him – to the natural environment of "Hippe." A series of textually internal referents testifies to the underlying link in Castorp's psyche between his personal discovery in "Hippe," his contemplations of "Forschungen," the contemplative activity he calls "Regieren," and his solution in "Schnee" of the controversy over the concept of humanity that takes form in his mind as the problem of the "Homo Dei" – considerations that I will later explain in greater detail. The referents are far from easily identifiable, however. If the protagonist seems only vaguely aware of them, their discovery by the reader hinges on a great deal more than mere participation in the events surrounding Hans Castorp. An attentive reading of Thomas Mann's Zauberberg not only reveals the deep structural link in Eros between Hans's discovery of Chauchat's personal meaning to him in "Hippe," his pondering over her "Innenporträt" during his acts of contemplation, the loyalty he appears to profess to the Berghof way of life, and his vision in "Schnee." The attentive
reader also discerns the foundations in personally intensive self-introspection of the pursuit that persistently carries Hans Castorp beyond the confines of his social environment. It is from the position of societal exteriority that Hans Castorp attempts to bring fruit to his deeply personal introspective educational goal. The ordeal that poses itself en route to his sublime achievement is an intensified confrontation of the forces of desire, fear, and destruction that form the basis of uncanny experience. Through his confrontation of natural might in “Schnee,” Hans Castorp simultaneously brings himself into a position of self-confrontation – a confrontation of the irrational self that secretly exerts its tyranny over his actions from behind a wall of repression. It is on the basis of his self-encounter that Hans Castorp attains his independent capacity for self-transcendence in Der Zauberberg.

Despite Hans Castorp’s apparently all-too-willing submission to the Berghof’s way of life, he possesses a moderate streak of independence that makes him stand out from the other sanatorium guests. The “schlecht gedrucktes Heft” popularly in circulation among the patients in “Forschungen” is Herr Albin’s “’Die Kunst, zu verführen.’” In addition to the scholarly Settembrini and Joachim, “mit seinen russischen Übungsbüchern,” the narrator speculates:

Vielleicht gab es Ausnahmen, vielleicht solche, die die Stunden des Liegedienstes mit irgendeiner ernsten geistigen Beschäftigung, einem irgendwie förderlichen Studium erfüllten [. . .], wenn nicht unter den Insassen des Speisesaals, was

---

5Thomas Mann, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 3 (Oldenburg: Fischer, 1960) 380. Further citations from this edition will be indicated parenthetically with the abbreviation, GW, followed by the volume and page number.
wirklich unwahrscheinlich war, so möglicherweise gerade unter den Bettlägrigen und Moribunden – Hans Castorp war geneigt, es zu glauben. (GW 3, 381)

The narrator’s speculation nevertheless seems to be a direct report on Castorp’s thoughts as distinct from actual Berghof practices. An earlier comment makes it clear that Hans’s researches deviate markedly both from the sanatorium norm and the value its long-term patients place on the development of a talent for idleness. “Es wurde nicht wenig gelesen auf den Liegehallen und Privatbalkons des Internationalen Sanatoriums ‘Berghof,’ ” the narrator explains, “– namentlich von Anfängern und Kurzfristigen” (GW 3, 379-80). The narrator then describes how those more accustomed to the patients’ way of life abstain nearly completely from the activity of reading:

[...] denn die Vielmonatigen oder gar Mehrjährigen hatten längst gelernt, auch ohne Zerstreuung und Beschäftigung des Kopfes die Zeit zu vernichten und kraft inneren Virtuosentums hinter sich zu bringen, ja, sie erklären es für das Ungeschick von Stümpern, sich dabei an ein Buch zu klammern. (GW 3, 380)

Hans Castorp’s readings in “Forschungen” distinguish him as someone with a profound interest in the phenomenon and state of pathological suffering – above all, it seems, as a means to a fuller understanding of the human condition. In “Totentanz,” Hans’s decision to create occasional happiness for the terminally ill likewise demonstrates an independence of will that sets him above the norm. His action is “‘gegen die Hausordnung,’ ” exclaims Joachim, “‘du durchbrichst sie gewissermaßen damit’ ” (GW 3, 412). Beyond their demonstration of a markedly excessive preoccupation with the pathological condition and its contingent suffering that form the basis of sanatorium
existence, Hans Castorp’s “Forschungen” and charitable activities in “Totentanz” also display an independence of spirit and earnestness that distinguish him from the other patients in his milieu.

Castorp’s autonomy of spirit reaches its climax in the *Zauberberg*’s second half as its protagonist takes his reflections beyond the confines of his convalescent environment. Through a complex series of subtle references to interrelated passages, Mann provides the answer to the question of why Castorp breaks the Berghof proscription against physical activity in order to adventure into the snow: it has to do with his wish to discover the true meaning of Naphta’s “Homo Dei.” Since the novel is so rigorously constructed of intricately interrelated passages, however, their apparent effect is most frequently to lose the reader rather than to serve as an effective guide. Having traced such interrelations within Mann’s text oneself, the attentive reader need only observe the reactions of the critics to grasp the veracity of this proposition. Among the devices that Mann employs to put his reader in his protagonist’s shoes, the camouflaging of the novel’s internal referents through obfuscation and spatial impracticability places the reader in a state of confusion paralleling that of his protagonist. The textually internal links between Hans Castorp’s expeditions in “Hippe” and “Schnee” are indeed so obscure and remote that one would be quite justified in claiming that Castorp himself is no longer conscious of their full import. Nor does he seem cognizant of the fact that, on both occasions, it is his drive for knowledge that presses him to venture outside the limits of his constrained convalescent surroundings.
Certain verifiable considerations of which the protagonist is evidently unaware potentially provide Mann’s readers with the capacity of intellectually surmounting the process of intense identification with Castorp’s predicament to which his narrative subjects them. In “Schnee,” Hans Castorp’s “Sympathie mit den Elementen” and the “Würdegefühl,” of which he becomes aware “beim Anblick des schlittelnden Völkchens,” make a “tiefere und größere, weniger hotelbequeme Einsamkeit als die seiner Balkonloge” appear to him both suitable and desirable (GW 3, 659). From Hans’s place on the balcony “hatte er das hohe Nebelgebirg, den Tanz des Schneesturms betrachtet und sich seines Gaffens über die Brustwehr des Komforts hin in seiner Seele geschämt” (GW 3, 659). Castorp’s awareness of his comfortable separation from nature engenders a natural interest and feelings of shame in him that are so similar to the effects produced in the beholder of nature’s naïveté that they might be called identical. At the end of the opening paragraph of Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung, Schiller stipulates two conditions necessary for the production of natural interest in the beholder: that the object observed be natural or “dorch von uns dafür gehalten” and that it be naïve, “d. h., daß die Natur mit der Kunst im Kontraste stehe und sie beschämé.” Castorp beholds the natural spectacle of the alpine landscape and original human nature (“des schlittelnden Völkchens”). The shame he feels seems to arise from the comparative inadequacy of his position of artificial comfort when measured against natural freedom. Nature in “Landschaften” and human nature “in Kindern, in den Sitten des Landvolks

---

und der Urwelt” are among the natural objects Schiller lists as producing the effects of love and emotional regard in the beholder \((SW\,5,\,694)\). In related fashion, Hans’s interest in nature and feelings of shame are the inevitable manifestations of the lover’s repressed erotic feelings for his beloved, as further considerations will demonstrate. Contrary to Kowalik’s assertion, Castorp does not go “into the snowy landscape believing that its ‘Totenstille’ would be a ‘passender Schauplatz für das Austragen seiner Gedankenkomplexe,”’ \(^7\) – if that were the case, he would certainly manage far better by remaining in the tranquility of his “Balkonloge.” The “Gedankenkomplexe” themselves, as I will show, are merely the abstractions through adaptation of original contradictory impulses of moral scrupulosity and erotic attraction, on the one hand, and desire to conform and lust for knowledge, on the other. Why, however, does Hans Castorp’s “Sympathie mit der großen Winterwildnis” cause him to choose the latter as the suitable realm for his solution of the problem of the “Homo Dei” \((GW\,3,\,659)\)? The answer lies in the consideration that – quite apart from the problem’s acquisition of a name from a colloquium between Naphta and Settembrini, as to be discussed below – the problem itself owes its derivation to the contemplative activity of “Regieren” that, at least in the beginning, takes place not in the secluded realm of Castorp’s balcony, but in the open space of nature.

Because of its fundamental ties to the natural space beyond the Berghof’s confines, Hans’s reflective activity possesses the quality of a self-probing reenactment.

\(^7\)Jill Anne Kowalik, “‘Sympathy with Death’: Hans Castorp’s Nietzschean Resentment,” \textit{German Quarterly} 58.1 (1985): 38. The space specifically mentioned in the \textit{Zauberberg} text as suited for “das Austragen seiner Gedankenkomplexe” is the great “Winterwildnis.” \textit{GW} 3, 659.
That activity’s foundations in societal exteriority have thus far failed to attract the attention of the critics. I will therefore return to address this theme and its implications in my first chapter’s subsection on “Hans Castorp’s ‘Eskapade’ as an Escape from Repression.” Castorp’s reflective activity returns him to the natural space of the section, “Hippe,” in which he discerns Chauchat’s personal meaning to him – her identity with Přibislav Hippe. The meditative practice that draws Castorp into nature’s openness seems to reiterate the original process of internal disclosure that at once binds him to the sanatorium and promises liberation from its power of enthrallment.

If Hans Castorp’s reflective practice derives its hidden impetus from his recognition of Chauchat’s personal meaning to him, what might one then conclude about his education at the Berghof? The implications seem clear. The relationship between Hans Castorp and Clawdia Chauchat – represented in terms meaningful to the former – is the subjectively determined relationship between subject and object. Hans possesses personal forces within himself capable of creating the illusion of transpersonality in his external world. He seems driven through the evident prevalence of such forces to seek them out at their source. The predicament for Hans Castorp consists in the fact that he is neither certain of his internal world, nor of that which constitutes his exterior. Chauchat reveals her true personal significance to Castorp in “Hippe,” but that hardly means that Hans’s search for self-discovery has progressed – perhaps it has just grown a degree more complicated. The reflective activity that Hans pursues at the original site of his “Hippe” vision is surely motivated by Eros, especially given the fact that a great deal of it seems to be consumed in reminiscent contemplation of Madame Chauchat’s x-ray, or
“Innenporträt” (GW 3, 485; 540). Hans Castorp’s activity of “Regieren” appears to return him to the place by the brook of his “Hippe” vision in an unconscious search for further clarification of the feelings of love that exercise a power over him of troubling and yet indeterminate significance.

The strength of Hans’s determination to puzzle out the meaning of his “Hippe” vision reveals itself in the section, “Jähzorn. Und noch etwas ganz Peinliches.” After spending one year at the Berghof, Hans Castorp defies Behrens’s authoritatively pronounced dismissal from the sanatorium to insist upon remaining at the Berghof – an act whose motivating considerations indicate Hans’s attachment to the local convalescent way of life over a bourgeois existence in the flatlands. Castorp deems it “‘unmöglich’” to return, like Joachim, to life “in der Welt des Flachlandes, unter lauter Menschen, die keine Ahnung hatten, wie man leben mußte, die nichts wußten vom Thermometer, von der Kunst des Sicheinwickelns, vom Pelzsack, vom dreimaligen Lustwandel [...]” (GW 3, 581-82). Such activities are really only an indirect source of his devotion to the sanatorium, however. Since the very prospect of returning to the flatlands seems impossible, Hans decides, “so würde er also allein und ohne Joachim hier oben weiter leben” (GW 3, 582). At the very root of his sentiments, one fails to discern the obedient patient’s conscientious devotion to the Berghof itself. On the contrary, that to which Hans Castorp truly owes his allegiance is the independent, personally invented activity for which life at the sanatorium only provides the necessary conditions of idleness. Aside from the consideration that Hans feels it impossible to depart the sanatorium, “weil er auf Clawdia Chauchat warten mußte, von deren Rückkehr nichts verlautete” (GW 3, 582), his
responsibilities as a civilian – in contrast to his cousin’s military allegiances – hold him duty-bound to pursue the activity of contemplation he terms “Regieren.” His realization of the difference between his own and Joachim’s positions causes Hans to sacrifice himself to the cold: “Um diesen entscheidenden Gedanken aus seinem Gefühl emporzuarbeiten, hatte [Castorp] sich heute hier ins Naßkalte gelegt […]” (GW 3, 583). Hans Castorp’s deepest loyalties lie neither with the flatlands, the military, nor the Berghof, but with his “Regierungspflichten”:

[…] für ihn [Hans Castorp] wäre es wirklich Desertion gewesen, die Gelegenheit zu ergreifen und wilde oder halbwilde Abreise ins Flachland zu halten, Desertion von ausgedehnten Verantwortlichkeiten, die ihm aus der Anschauung des Hochgebildes, genannt Homo Dei, hier oben erwachsen, Verrat an schweren und erhitzenden, ja seine natürlichen Kräfte übersteigenden, doch abenteuerlich beglückenden Regierungspflichten, denen er hier in der Loge und am blau blühenden Orte oblag. (GW 3, 583)

Mann’s protagonist sacrifices himself to the cold in order to reproduce the symptoms of infirmity that justify his convalescent existence. That existence, in turn, enables him to pursue the activity to which he owes his true allegiance. Hans Castorp clearly feels obligated to confront his personal dilemma in the Berghof alpine environment. The problem’s resolution, however, seems additionally to hinge on his personal liberation from the constraints of his immediate milieu.

His integration into the Berghof’s society of patients and adoption of their ideal of pathology thus merely constitutes a stage on Hans Castorp’s route of ascent to the supra-
moral vision of "Schnee." At the same time that his activities in "Forschungen" and "Totentanz" demonstrate Castorp's commitment to the Berghof's pathological ideal, they betray an earnest, almost diffident autonomy of spirit that sets him apart from that ideal environment. Compared to his fellow patients, Hans is at once a truer representative of the sanatorium's tendency to glorification of pathology and suffering, while at the same time possessing an independence from its attitude of conformity that demonstrates his fundamental loyalty to the principle of life. It is in pursuit of this principle under the rubric of the "Homo Dei" that Castorp takes his reflections into the free space of nature in the second half of Mann's novel. For his life principle emerges from his "Hippe" dream's revelation of his interestedness in Clawdia Chauchat. Hans Castorp returns to the extra-societal site of his original intrapsychic vision in search of a solution to the problem of his sexual object become abstraction -- of an interpersonal erotic liaison that transforms itself into an ethical relationship with humanity. Central to his act of returning to this enduring theme is his quest for the meaning of Eros under conditions not only of abstraction, but -- as my first chapter will demonstrate -- also of repression. Hans Castorp's attempt to gain a liberated view of the human predicament thus informs the need to perform his reflections in the unbounded natural realm -- to physically set himself beyond the confines of his constrained social environment. In order to achieve in "Schnee" the sublime vision of higher autonomy that provides the promise of his liberation, the seeker after the answer to the human riddle must abandon the safety of a humanly regulated environment and expose himself to the uncanny peril of naturally unregulated forces. The process of external natural interaction exposes the naturally
unregulated forces at work within him. Hans Castorp’s quest is thus an attempt at liberation of self through a process of confronting the unseen self that holds him in subjection.

1.1. Sublime Ascent and Uncanny Subjection.

In the revelation of dream that directly follows his failed challenge of the elements, Castorp achieves the height of enlightenment. Nietzsche writes in Schopenhauer als Erzieher: "So hoch zu steigen, wie je ein Denker stieg, in die reine Alpen- und Eisluft hinein, dorthin wo es kein Vernebeln und Verschleiern mehr gibt und wo die Grundbeschaffenheit der Dinge sich rauh und starr, aber mit unvermeidlicher Verständlichkeit ausdrückt!" Erkme Joseph refers to this passage in support of his claim that Castorp’s experience during his "Skiwanderung" is "eine Übersetzung von Nietzsche’s Philosophie in sinnlich-anschauliches Abenteuer." With regard to Castorp’s desire and his excursion’s ultimate goal – his achievement of a determinate resolution of will and intellect – Joseph’s assertion is valid. Rather than following the prescriptive advice and prescriptive rules of the Berghof staff, Hans, as in "Hippe," once again follows his will in pursuit of an independent course. Hans allows himself in "Hippe" to get the idea ("ließ sich einfallen"), "auf eigene Hand einen ausgedehnten Spaziergang zu

---

8Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Einzelbänden, hrsg. v. Giorgio Colli u. Mazzino Montinari, 3. Aufl., 1. Bd. (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1993) 381. Further citations from this edition will be indicated parenthetically with the abbreviation, KSA, followed by the volume and page number. The immediately cited passage is actually the continuation of the hypothetical soliloquy of one who, as Nietzsche describes, "darüber nachdenkt, was zum Beispiel Schopenhauer im Verlaufe seines Lebens alles gehört haben muss." KSA 1, 380. Frizen cites the same passage in reference to his description of Castorp’s original ascent to the Berghof as a “Transzendieren der Welt des Flachlandes als Welt der Vorstellung” and process of “Sich-Selbst-Übersteigen.” Frizen, 288, & n. 525.

machen” (GW 3, 165). A closely preceding passage demonstrates that his decision comes from the heart. As Joachim nearly catches him in the act of ogling Marusja, Hans feels his heart pulsate “unmotiviert und auf eigene Hand” (GW 3, 164). The heart is for Schopenhauer the “primum mobile des Organismus” and the “Symbol und Synonym” of will.10 When Hans sets forth in “Hippe,” marching “stockschwenkend die Fahrstraße hinab seine eigenen Wege” (GW 3, 166), he freely follows the command of a will consciously released from the constraints of its social environment. Joseph correctly contends that Hans Castorp’s “Schneewanderung” paraphrases a fragment from Nietzsche’s “Nachlaß” “in reicher Ausmalung, dennoch Schritt für Schritt”:

Wer auf eigenen Wegen geht, begegnet Niemandem: das bringen die “eigenen Wege” mit sich. Niemand kommt ihm dabei zu “Hülfe,” und mit allem, was ihm von Gefahr, Zufall, Bosheit und schlechtem Wetter zustößt, muß er selbst fertig werden. Er hat eben seinen Weg für sich, und auch seinen gelegentlichen Verdrüß über dieses harte unerbittliche “für sich” [...]. (KSA 12, 159)11

As in “Hippe,” Hans Castorp sets off in “Schnee” in obedience to an impulse of will that also gives expression to a desire for independence. His unconscious search for the liberation of reason in nature transports him through the opposed realms of the sublime and the uncanny: the former characterized by the clarity and assuredness of reason, the latter by the uncertainty and “Angst” of an unconscious guided by fantasy. Hans’s


ensuing dream and its vision are the ultimate realization of a longing for autonomy that expresses itself in a lucidity of concurrent thought and sentiment. En route to his vision, however, Hans Castorp first crosses the subjective barrier between sublime and uncanny experience.

The fundamental psychological and aesthetic difference between the sublime and the uncanny – however patent – has never been adequately described. The existing literature in aesthetics and psychology that concerns itself with the phenomena offers limited assistance to my description of Mann’s portrayal of Hans Castorp’s pursuit of a course leading from the sublime to the uncanny and back again. In combination with Freud’s discussion of the uncanny, the descriptions of the sublime by Kant and his successors provide a valuable foundation upon which to build my analysis. Despite the fundamental similarities and dissimilarities of the experiences, however, no-one has ever properly defined the fundamental difference in interrelationships between psychological faculties upon which either form of experience founds itself. Harold Bloom observes that Freud’s “The Uncanny” is “of enormous importance to literary criticism because it is the only major contribution that the twentieth century has made to the aesthetics of the Sublime.”\footnote{Harold Bloom, \textit{Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism} (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1982) 101.}

\footnote{Bloom, \textit{Agon}, 91-118.}

Although he demonstrates very well the sublime’s assumption under Freud of the dimensions of “A Catastrophe Theory of Creativity,”\footnote{In the chapter in question he consequently makes no mention whatsoever of Kant, Schiller, Schopenhauer, nor even of Burke or Coleridge.} he makes little attempt to show how such a view essentially differs from earlier theories of the sublime.\footnote{In the chapter in question he consequently makes no mention whatsoever of Kant, Schiller, Schopenhauer, nor even of Burke or Coleridge.}
the only work that deals in a comprehensive way with the sublime and uncanny in literature is a historical analysis. In his *Ethics and Aesthetics in European Modernist Literature*, Ellison thus only describes in widely disconnected passages the psychological considerations that differentiate the sublime from the uncanny. He observes that the sublime "is morally elevated or 'ennobled' by the fact that it stands its ground against the charm (*Reiz*) of the sensible" and that the important stage of the Kantian sublime (as distinct from that of Burke) "occurs not during one's awe or terror at the immensity of nature, but rather in the final return to reason which takes place once the imagination has faced its limits."\(^{15}\) Of the uncanny, Ellison later explains: "If the uncanny, in its ghostly appearance, can be provisionally defined as an unmastered force which passes between life and death, crossing the boundary [that] human rationality establishes between these two domains, it represents that which exceeds the control of the agents of reason [...]."\(^{16}\) Ellison refrains, however, from consolidating a reason-based distinction between the sublime and the uncanny into a single argument. His analysis is historical, so when he speaks of the sublime and the uncanny together, it is to regard them as elements in a historical paradigm. The uncanny is hence "an avatar of" and "the unruly descendant of Kant's sublime." "The uncanny is the sublime for our age. Just as Romanticism is impossible to understand without the sublime as one of its cardinal points, in the same way Modernism (and beyond?) cannot be studied independently of its figuration in the

---


\(^{16}\)Ellison, 74.
uncanny.17 Ellison’s historical assessment is correct. In order to bring fuller understanding to that trend, however, it is necessary to examine the psychological components in the aesthetic experiences of the sublime and the uncanny upon which it is predicated. Only through an in-depth analysis of the psychological interrelationships involved in the aesthetics of the sublime and the uncanny can one truly understand the significance of Mann’s Zauberberg as an examination of the aesthetic subject at the crossroads between Romanticism and Modernism.

As a portrayal at once of nature’s sublime capacity for ennoblement and uncanny power of devastation, Der Zauberberg’s “Schnee” section symbolically depicts the historical journey that transports the bourgeois subject from the height of grandiose expectation to the depths of abysmal disappointment. How does Mann’s text make it possible for the inclusion of two such seemingly disparate elements as the sublime and the uncanny – one aesthetic, and the other psychological – as consistent elements in a single body of experience? The sublime is clearly an aesthetic phenomenon. The fact that Kant treats it as a major theme in the first part of his Kritik der Urteilskraft – the section titled “Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft” – makes the point abundantly clear.18 One is also reminded that Freud’s examination of the uncanny in “Das Unheimliche” is for him an exploration of the territory of aesthetics that he views as uncharacteristic of usual psychoanalytical investigations: “Der Psychoanalytiker verspürt nur selten den Antrieb zu ästhetischen Untersuchungen, auch dann nicht, wenn man die Ästhetik nicht

17Ellison, 53; 58.

auf die Lehre vom Schön einengt, sondern sie als Lehre von den Qualitäten unseres Fühlens beschreibt.¹⁹ The psychoanalyst customarily concerns himself with other levels of psychological experience ("des Seelenlebens") and has little to do with the object-inhibited and subdued "Gefühlsregungen" – the latter primarily the subject matter of aesthetics (Ges.W. 12, 229). On the basis of what seems to represent a fundamental distinction between the sublime and the uncanny (or perhaps "good taste" and tastelessness), however, Freud undoubtedly feels amply justified in devoting a psychoanalytic treatment to the uncanny as "ein bestimmtes Gebiet der Ästhetik" – especially in view of aesthetic literature's neglect of the topic as "ein abseits liegendes" (Ges.W. 12, 229). The customary "Darstellungen der Ästhetik" prefer to preoccupy themselves "mit den schönen, großartigen, anziehenden, also mit den positiven Gefühlsarten" (Ges.W. 12, 230) – by which Freud clearly means feelings of beauty and sublimity. Like the sublime,²⁰ the uncanny is also a feeling (Ges.W. 12, 262). Feeling is, in fact, the relational subjective component that distinguishes aesthetic judgements from their object-related logical counterparts:

Gegebene Vorstellungen in einem Urteil können empirisch (mithin ästhetisch) sein; das Urteil aber, das durch sie gefällt wird, ist logisch, wenn jene nur im Urteile auf das Objekt bezogen werden. Umgekehrt aber, wenn die gegebenen


Vorstellungen gar rational wären, würden aber in einem Urteil lediglich auf das
Subjekt (sein Gefühl) bezogen, so sind sie sofern jederzeit ästhetisch. 21

By definition, the possibility exists for the inclusion of the sublime and the uncanny as
aesthetic constituents of Hans Castorp’s subjective experience. What makes their
interaction possible on a psychological level is the consideration that the aesthetic
experiences of both the Kantian sublime and the Freudian uncanny may only properly be
understood through consideration of the intrapsychic factors that form the causative basis
of either feeling in reaction to their objective environment.

As my analysis will attempt to show, the particular manner in which the Freudian
uncanny opposes itself to the Kantian sublime achieves distinctive clarity through
Thomas Mann’s depiction of Hans Castorp’s experiences in nature in Der Zauberberg’s
“Schnee” section. Is “experiences” the appropriate word, however? With respect to the
uncanny, it would seem that it is. Freud attempts to make a distinction “zwischen dem
Unheimlichen, das man erlebt, und dem Unheimlichen, das man sich bloß vorstellt, oder
von dem man liest” (Gew. W. 12, 261). In terms of the character himself, what happens to
Castorp in “Schnee” clearly falls under the first category. On the other hand, Kant’s
descriptions of the sublime avoid all use of such words as “Erfahren” or “Erleben” that
would suggest the quality of experience. He thus speaks of the power of such naturally
imposing objects as “Felsen,” “Donnerwolken,” “Vulkane,” “Orkane,” the “Ozean,” and
a “Wasserfall” to reduce “zur unbedeutenden Kleinigkeit” our power to resist them. 22

21 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 116.

22 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 185.
Kant also explains the “Bestürzung” that befalls the “Zuschauer in der St. Peterskirche in Rom beim ersten Eintritt.”23 The sublime effects that Kant describes are clearly founded on the conditions of experience formed of the individual’s confrontation of empirical objects. His avoidance of all language suggesting “experience” in these events nonetheless appears to reflect a conscious effort on his part to exclusively limit the aesthetic phenomenon under observation, i.e. the sublime, to the realm of subjectivity.24 As described above, the decisive factor determining sublime feeling is the “Geistesstimmung” of the subject experiencing it, and not the objective reality of what is transpiring around that subject. All use of the word, “experience,” in describing the sublime should therefore exclusively connote the domain of subjective experience.25 In order to avoid speech that is too rigidly technical, however, I will nonetheless use phrases like “sublime experience” to indicate what is happening in Hans Castorp’s mind. Sublime feeling is essentially determined by the events transpiring in the thoughts, imagination, and feelings of the subject, so any reference I make to Castorp’s “experience” of the sublime should be understood exclusively as connoting just such a subjective state of affairs.

---

23 *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 174.

24 "In Kant, the sublime has nothing to do with art: it is a feeling in someone, provoked by an object in nature before which her imagination trembles, till her reason reasserts itself.” Denis Donoghue, *Speaking of Beauty* (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2003) 74.

25 "If there is a common ground between the sublime and the uncanny, it is that both are depicted, by philosophers and writers, as unsettling experiences in which the individual human subject, having set out to plot the territory of beautiful forms, encounters, within these forms, the moral labyrinth on which they are constructed.” Ellison, 211.
The same rule of subjectivity should also apply to my descriptions of Hans Castorp’s uncanny experiences. In describing the particular form of the uncanny “experienced” by the individual, Freud thus writes: “Das Unheimliche des Erlebens kommt zustande, wenn verdrängte infantile Komplexe durch einen Eindruck wieder belebt werden, oder wenn überwundene primitive Überzeugungen wieder bestätigt scheinen” (Ges. W. 12, 263). A motif of dismemberment plays a significant role in Hans Castorp’s confrontation of latent irrational impulses (see below, p.168ff.). An examination of the motif in consideration of the castration complex’s role in the uncanny would certainly be possible (cf. Ges. W. 12, 238-45; 259). Since such an examination would not appear to significantly elucidate Castorp’s subjective experiences and would unnecessarily complicate my analysis, I have refrained from giving it deeper consideration. I have chosen instead to devote extensive consideration to the role played by the recurrence in Castorp’s mind of “überwundene” (or repressed) “primitive Überzeugungen” in creation of his uncanny feelings. Like the sublime, the uncanny is founded on intrapsychic factors. In describing the aesthetic transition between the experiences of the sublime and the uncanny that transpire in Castorp’s mind, it will be necessary to examine the relationships between reason and fantasy and the conscious and unconscious that determine both kinds of experiences.

Both in general and as they pertain to Hans Castorp, the aesthetic experiences of the sublime and the uncanny may be distinguished on the basis of the psychological faculties that respectively prevail over each one. (My subsequent analysis of the Zauberberg text will demonstrate this general preliminary distinction in greater detail.) The sublime attains its overall positive quality through the tempering by "Vernunft" or the "Gemüt" of impressions or feelings that would otherwise be perceived as either disorienting or threatening. Although Freud refrains from expressly mentioning the faculty of reason, his descriptions make it clear that the uncanny's unpleasant effect derives from the feelings of uncertainty (Ges.W. 12, 231; 237) or "Angst" (Ges.W. 12, 235; 252-54; 256) brought about in the subject by reason's powerlessness to provide a sense of clarity or security to experienced aesthetic phenomena. Through examination of their descriptions in Kant and Freud, it appears that the uncanny feelings that derive from uncertainty represent a contradiction of the conditions of Kant's mathematically sublime, while those originating in "Angst" counter the experience of Kant's dynamically sublime.

The uncanny's assumption of a position contrary to the mathematically sublime corresponds to its disturbance of the factor of reasoned equilibrium that characterizes sublime experience. Reason's preservation of a position of ascendancy while being faced with the enormity of nature serves as the quality of the mathematically sublime that provides the experience with conditions of psychological equanimity. The mathematically sublime is founded on the capacity of reason to comprehend even imperceptibly large magnitudes as a totality and consequently surpass every standard of

---

27Kritik der Urteilskraft, 172; 179.
the senses ("allen Maßstab der Sinne") – including that of the imagination.\textsuperscript{28} The mathematically sublime consequently testifies to the aesthetic subject's possession of a capacity of overcoming the impressions offered to it by the senses. That capacity is limited, however, to spatial considerations of magnitude. In contrast to Kant's analysis, the aesthetics of the uncanny considers those situations in which the power of imagination gains the upper hand over reason. Jentsch finds the "wesentliche Bedingung für das Zustandekommen des unheimlichen Gefühls in der intellektuellen Unsicherheit" (\textit{Ges.W.} 12, 231). The intellectual uncertainty that corresponds to the uncanny is often produced by the observer's inability to determine if a normally inanimate object actually possesses a soul or if an "anscheinend lebendige[s] Wesen[]" is actually inanimate – an effect produced by such objects as "Wachsfiguren, kunstvolle[] Puppen und Automaten" (\textit{Ges.W.} 12, 237). Although Freud fails to draw attention to the fact, his description makes it clear that the condition of uncertainty is brought about by a discrepancy between (sensual) appearance and reasoned expectation, or between the way in which one imagines what one is seeing and one's intellectual capacity to bring logically sensible meaning to one's perceptions. While the mathematically sublime testifies to reason's capacity for dominating the sense perceptions presented to it by imagination, the uncanny gives evidence to a countertendency of the imagination to gain ascendancy over reason. To be sure, the phenomenal conditions that prevail over the production of the sublime and the uncanny are distinctly limited. Thomas Mann's genius is to employ the setting of an alpine landscape through which to explore the barriers between the two forms of

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 176-78.
experience. Through the addition of the transitions between day and night and clement and inclement temporal conditions, Mann subsequently exposes to the scrutiny of analysis the aesthetic subject in its meanderings between rational lucidity and the unclarity of mental instability, between the temperance of reason’s guidance and the intemperance of an unguided will. In provision of a fuller contrast between the sublime and the uncanny, Mann’s experimental narrative thus augments the spatial considerations of alpine expansiveness that provide the setting of the mathematically sublime with the dimension of time that inherently provides the sublime with the quality of the dynamic.

The rough contrast that I make between the dynamically sublime and the uncanny founded not in uncertainty, but in “Angst,” is in one sense more direct, but in another the distinction is subtler. Both aesthetic experiences represent the mind of the aesthetic subject in its relationship to fear-producing objects in its environment. The fact that Freud refrains from simply equating the uncanny with fear perhaps at first makes other critics’ definitions appear more useful in describing it as a counterpart to the dynamically sublime. Kant defines the dynamically sublime in terms of the aesthetic subject’s resistance to natural power: “Macht ist ein Vermögen, welches großen Hindernissen überlegen ist. Eben dieselbe heißt eine Gewalt, wenn sie auch dem Widerstande dessen, was selbst Macht besitzt, überlegen ist. Die Natur, im ästhetischen Urteile als Macht, die über uns keine Gewalt hat, betrachtet, ist dynamisch-erhaben.”

Since a certain degree of fearlessness is the quality that characterizes dynamically sublime experience,

---

29 *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 184.
fearfulness is the quality that negates it.  

Fear and terror are the traits that for Todorov characterize the uncanny. Although “l’étrange n’est pas un genre bien délimité,” he says, “La pure littérature d’horreur appartient à l’étrange,” and “L’étrange réalise [. . .] une seule des conditions du fantastique: la description de certaines réactions, en particulier de la peur.” Freud, in contrast, ascribes “Angst” rather than fear to the experience of the uncanny, seeking then to clarify what the “gemeinsame Kern ist, der etwa gestattet, innerhalb des Ängstlichen ein ‘Unheimliches’ zu unterscheiden” (Ges. W. 12, 229-30). He distinguishes “Angst” (or dread) from fear in the following terms: “Angst bezieht sich auf den Zustand und sieht vom Objekt ab, während Furcht die Aufmerksamkeit gerade auf das Objekt richtet” (Ges. W. 11, 410). In general terms, Kant’s sublime is “an einem formlosen Gegenstände zu finden, sofern Unbegrenztheit an ihm, oder durch dessen Veranlassung, vorgestellt und doch Totalität derselben hinzugeschoben wird.” In defining what it is that constitutes the sublime, Kant places overriding emphasis on the subjective state (as opposed to the quality of the experienced object) as the dominant factor in determining sublime feeling: “Mithin ist die Geistesstimmung durch eine gewisse die reflektierende Urteilskraft beschäftigende Vorstellung, nicht aber das Objekt erhaben zu


32Riviere provides the following note to her translation of the twenty-fifth of Freud’s Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, entitled “Angst,” from which the above citation was taken: “Angst. The German word denotes a more intense feeling than the English ‘anxiety’; the latter, however, derived from the same root, has become established as the technical English term.” Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, trans. Joan Riviere (New York: Pocket, 1973) 400, n. 1.

33Kritik der Urteilskraft, 165.
nennen." It is the subject's force of mind that fulfills the conditions of the dynamically sublime. It consequently also follows that the above-described fearfulness that negates the experience is that of the subject ("Wer sich fürchtet [. . .]") and not the object. Freud's reference of "Angst" to a state rather than an object consequently seems most to correspond to the subjective state described by Kant as determining the sublime. In addition to its contradiction of the fundamental stipulations of the Kantian sublime in general, the uncanny under Freud's psychological definition thus also presents the best description of the psychological phenomenon as a negation of the dynamically sublime.

Despite the direct contrast in states of mind between the dynamically sublime and the Freudian uncanny, the manner of their divergence at first appears to be more complex. Under the dynamically sublime, the resistance of the mind (or "Gemüt") to the overpowering might of nature gives it the power of judging nature "ohne Furcht" and regarding its "Bestimmung" over nature as "erhaben." Under the uncanny, reason relinquishes to the insecure guidance of irrational imagination its position of ascendancy over irrational feeling. In recapitulation of his observations on animism, Freud thus says that we often get an uncanny feeling, "wenn die Grenze zwischen Phantasie und Wirklichkeit verwischt wird, wenn etwas real vor uns hintritt, was wir bisher für phantastisch gehalten [. . .]" (Ges.W. 258). I nonetheless observed above that Jentsch's criterion of "intellektuelle Unsicherheit" in producing uncanny feeling (cf. also Ges.W.

---

[^34]: [Kritik der Urteilskraft], 172. See also [Kritik der Urteilskraft], 166; 178-79.

[^35]: [Kritik der Urteilskraft], 185.

[^36]: [Kritik der Urteilskraft], 189.
12, 231; 237-38; 242) draws upon imagination’s evident ability to gain the upper hand over reason. Does Jentsch’s “intellektuelle Unsicherheit” not also represent a blurring of the “Grenze zwischen Phantasie und Wirklichkeit”? It does, but the quality of intellectual uncertainty seems to lack the temporal dimensionality of an uncanny founded in reference to “Animismus und die überwundenen Arbeitsweisen des seelischen Apparats” (Ges.W. 12, 258). Freud’s ascription of “Angst” to the experience takes the uncanny’s fundamental quality of “Unsicherheit” from the conscious to the unconscious level. Through the addition of temporal dimensionality to his analysis, Freud’s “Das Unheimliche” brings the earlier observed quality of intellectual “Unsicherheit” into the realm of depth psychology by replacing it with what one might best describe as an “Unsicherheit” of feeling.37 When one observes the relationship of the mathematically sublime to the dynamically sublime, it seems that a very similar transformation in feeling occurs. The inclusion of chronological dimensionality in the experiences of the sublime and the uncanny transfers the consideration of intellectual security or certitude to the level of feeling, whereby the intellectual quality in the earlier relationship remains in a position now subordinated to the foregrounded quality of feeling.

Just as the uncanny founded in “Angst” receives from the uncanny of intellectual uncertainty its destabilizing quality of “Unsicherheit,” the dynamically sublime seems to inherit from the mathematically sublime the counter-disruptive quality of reasonable control over sublime experience. Under the Kantian model of psychological

37Depth psychology claims “to furnish a key to the exploration of the unconscious mind, and through this a renewed knowledge of the conscious mind, with wider application to the understanding of literature, art, religion, and culture.” Henri F. Ellenberger, Discovering the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (New York: Basic. 1970) 490.
interrelationships, the psychological functions assumed by the Freudian ego (or “Ich”) are loosely assumed by the “Gemüt,” or mind, which consists of the three faculties of the “Erkenntnisvermögen,” the “Gefühl der Lust oder Unlust,” and the “Begehrensvermögen.” The experience of the mathematically sublime refers back to the “Erkenntnisvermögen,” while the dynamically sublime refers back to the “Begehrensvermögen.” Both faculties are faculties of “Gemüt[].” Since the power of “Gemüt” to resist natural might’s terrifying influence characterizes the dynamically sublime, it seems that, along with the “Begehrensvermögen,” the “Erkenntnisvermögen” must also play a role in determining the experience’s outcome of sublimity. The resistance of “Gemüt” to nature’s might seems to rely on the totality of the mind’s faculties, including those also of understanding, judgement, and reason that constitute the “Erkenntnisvermögen.” As noted above, that which provides the “Geistesstimmung” with the quality of sublimity is “eine gewisse die reflektierende Urteilskraft beschäftigende Vorstellung.” As with the beautiful, in the sublime “das Vermögen der Darstellung oder die Einbildungskraft” is considered “bei einer gegebenen Anschauung” in harmony “mit dem Vermögen der Begriffe des Verstandes oder der Vernunft, als Beförderung der letzttern.” Counter to the extravagance of fantasy that produces the uncanny’s effect of uncontained intellectual and emotional disturbance, reason’s

38 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 110.
39 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 168.
40 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 110.
41 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 164-65.
prevalence over the power of imagination provides the sublime with an inhibition of emotional excitement.

The border between the contained emotionality of the sublime and the emotional incontinence of the uncanny becomes clearest in consideration of the dynamic relationship between externally "experienced" nature and the internal human nature that experiences it. An attitude of fearful submission is inconsonant with the "Stimmung zur ruhigen Kontemplation and ganz freies Urteil" that is necessary, "um die göttliche Größe zu bewundern." The sublime thus distinguishes itself from superstition, which is not "Ehrfurcht für das Erhabene, sondern Furcht und Angst vor dem übermächtigen Wesen, dessen Willen der erschreckte Mensch sich unterworfen sieht, ohne ihn doch hochzuschätzen, im Gemüte gründet [...]." The capacity of the sublime to resist nature's fearful display of might derives from the subject's conscious assurance of emotional control: "Also ist die Erhabenheit in keinem Dinge der Natur, sondern nur in unserm Gemüte enthalten, sofern wir der Natur in uns, und dadurch auch der Natur (sofern sie auf uns einfließt) außer uns, überlegen zu sein uns bewußt werden können." The sublime is thus able both to prevail over and be conscious of the subject's external and internal nature. Without such awareness of the forces that determine exterior and interior phenomena, the aesthetic subject is placed in a position of passive submission to events seemingly beyond the subject's control. Under the influence of repression, it is

\[42\textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 188.\]

\[43\textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 188-89.\]

\[44\textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 189.\]
precisely such unawareness – particularly of one’s internal nature – that provides
uncanny feeling with its characteristic qualities of uncertainty and vulnerability.

In contrast to the sense of conscious assuredness maintained by the sublime in the
aesthetic subject’s confrontation of natural magnitude and might, the uncanny produces
feelings of “Angst” that derive from the subject’s confrontation of a nature made
unconscious under the agency of repression. The repetition compulsion dominates
psychological activity in the unconscious, lends demonic character to “gewissen Seiten
des Seelenlebens” (Ges. W. 12, 251), and often results in a feeling of “Hilflosigkeit und
Unheimlichkeit” (Ges. W. 12, 249). Freud explains:

Es scheint, daß wir alle in unserer individuellen Entwicklung einen [dem]
Animismus der Primitiven entsprechende Phase durchgemacht haben, daß sie bei
keinem von uns abgelaufen ist, ohne noch äußerungsfähige Reste und Spuren zu
hinterlassen, und daß alles, was uns heute als ‘unheimlich’ erscheint, die
Bedingung erfüllt, daß es an diese Reste animistischer Seeleentätigkeit rührt und
sie zur Außerung anregt” (Ges. W. 12, 253-54)

From a modern point of view, the belief in a world dominated by supernatural beings
rather than rules of natural law is fantastic, illogical, and contrary to reason – the faculty
without whose guiding influence the feeling of the sublime becomes impossible. Without
directly pinpointing its contradiction of reason as the cause of its psychologically
disturbing effect, Freud nonetheless explains that there is an “Art des Ängstlichen”
produced by the return of the repressed. The disturbing quality of this “Art des
Ängstlichen” – which Freud equates with the uncanny – results from the consideration
that “jeder Affekt einer Gefühlsregung, gleichgültig von welcher Art, durch die Verdrängung in Angst verwandelt wird” (*Ges. W.* 12, 254). Since the explanations of reason tend to provide a sense of logical order to the world, it would seem possible for Freud to have argued that the unsettling effect of being prevailed upon by one’s earlier-held primitive beliefs derived from their contradiction of that order. He might also have argued that the return of the repressed was a manifestation in the subject of the automatic behavior that characterizes the psychologically primitive repetition compulsion – and thus “‘Zweifel an der Beseelung eines anscheinend lebendigen Wesens’” (*Ges. W.* 12, 237) with respect to one’s own person – another factor that would seem to seriously disrupt one’s sense of reasonable order. Freud argues instead that there is an inherent doubtfulness in our adherence to reason’s guidance:


The underlying reasons for the uncanny’s divergence from the sublime are for my present examination unimportant. The essential point is that the uncanny constitutes itself of a view of the external world that defies reason and corresponds to feelings of “Angst” – an attitude in direct contradiction of the sublime’s reasonable harmonization of natural exteriority and interiority.
Rational domination is thus the primary criterion for distinguishing the sublime from the uncanny and its domination by irrationality. My analysis of Castorp’s experiences in “Schnee” will demonstrate Mann’s depiction of the subtle aesthetic and psychological barrier that separates sublime and uncanny experience. Hans’s excursion exposes him at once to nature’s uplifting power of sublimity as well as to its overpowering uncanny malevolence. His excursion describes a transition between the rationality of the sublime and the irrationality of the uncanny, between equilibrium and disequilibrium, between the guidance of reason and the misguidance of fantasy.

Castorp’s immediate striving in “Schnee” – rather than taking elevated vision as its goal – reveals to him instead a previously disregarded tendency of instinctual compulsion that challenges reason’s limits. Precedent to his excursion, Hans acquires the skills of a skier autodidactically, making visual observations and independently practicing his technique “auf eigene Hand, fern von dem Gewimmel der Übungsplätze,” on a slope behind the sanatorium (GW 3, 656). Here, as in “Hippe,” the phrase, “auf eigene Hand,” seems to imply just the sort of “für sich” expressed in Nietzsche’s above-cited description of one in pursuit of “die ‘eigenen Wege.’” It clearly describes an independence of will that sets itself apart from social constraints through conscious determination.

Castorp’s repeated independent rupture of social routine in “Hippe” and “Schnee” seems to represent a consciously undertaken – but nonetheless unconsciously motivated – experimental attempt to gratify instinctual need and perhaps intellectual curiosity along with it. Through a consciously controlled temporary release of unconscious forces from
restraint, the unconscious forces of will of which his elevated environment first makes him aware become discernible to Castorp. The motif, "auf eigene Hand," first appears in Castorp's complaint to Joachim of the uncanny sensation produced by the tachycardia of alpine elevations: "'Aber wenn einem das Herz nun ganz von selber klopft, grundlos und sinnlos und sozusagen auf eigene Hand, das finde ich geradezu unheimlich [. . .]" (GW 3, 103). Its context clearly reveals that the phrase, "'ganz von selber,'" is an equivalent variation of "'auf eigene Hand'" — a meaning somewhat different from that which Joseph attempts to ascribe to it. Joseph's own findings appear quite evidently to disprove his thorough and useful analysis's attribution of a connotation of "Verantwortung" to the motif. 45 By the time of Joachim's return to the sanatorium in "Als Soldat und brav," Hans will no longer be able to live on the "Zauberberg" as in the beginning, "als sein Herz noch ohne erkennbaren Grund nur körperlich und ohne Zusammenhang mit der Seele klopfte," says Joseph:

[Hans's] Seele, sein Bewußtsein müssen die Kontrolle übernehmen, müssen Haltung bewahren: Verantwortung ist ihm zugewachsen gegenüber seinem todkranken Vetter. In diesem Leitmotiv ist die Entwicklung von Grund- und Sinnlosigkeit des Herzklopfens hin bis zur Kontrolle, Bewußtwerdung und daraus erwachsener Sinnhaftigkeit vollzogen. 46

---


46 "Das Motiv 'Hand,'" 145.
Hans makes his decision to remain at the Berghof following his cousin’s decease, as Joseph implies, on his own initiative. Castorp’s personal responsibility for the decision does nothing to hide its slavish dependence upon considerations of pleasure, however. The narrator thus contrasts Hans’s inexcusable lack of initiative in not visiting the nearby waterfall with “die strenge Dienstlichkeit seines Vetters, der nicht zum Vergnügen hier gewesen war” (GW 3, 851). The contrast is telling. If Joachim is not there for pleasure, Hans clearly is. “Im Gegensatz zu den meisten anderen Bewohnern von Haus Berghof ist Castorp eher durch Neigung als durch Not ein Patient.”47 The motif, “auf eigene Hand,” initially connotes “Grund und Sinnlosigkeit,” as Joseph correctly observes. Yet contrary to Joseph’s claim, the motif is useful not only in gauging Hans’s progress through a course of positive development, but also his lack of one. The phrase, “auf eigene Hand,” only connotes “Verantwortung” in the sense of the expression, “auf eigene Verantwortung,” as when someone does something at his or her own risk. The motif describes the apparent senselessness and lack of outside justification in all actions performed by their agents of their own accord.48 Every time that it is used in Mann’s novel, the phrase denotes actions that are performed by their respective agents “all on their own.”49 To varying degrees, the expression connotes not only the conscious

47C.A.M. Noble, Krankheit, Verbrechen und künstlerisches Schaffen bei Thomas Mann (Bern: Lang, 1970) 146.


49Four of these instances have been mentioned in this and the immediately preceding paragraphs. For the others, see Joseph, “Das Motiv ‘Hand,’” 142-47.
independence of Hans’s expeditions in “Hippe” and “Schnee,” but also the kind of
unconsciously automatic behavior to which Freud attributes the experience of the
uncanny (Ges.W. 12, 237-38; 245). Just such “‘unheimlich’” feelings are produced in
Castorp when he feels his heart throbbing “‘ganz von selber [. . .], grundlos und sinnlos
und sozusagen auf eigene Hand’” (GW 3, 103). As Schopenhauer explains, “der Wille
allein ist αυτόματος” (WWV 2, 245) – a word that literally means “von selbst, aus
eigenem Antrieb.”50 The motif, “auf eigene Hand,” clearly seems to represent the will.
Whether as return of the repressed or merely in Schopenhauer’s sense, the will would
consequently appear uncanne to the observations of the intellect. As the discussions
contained in this chapter’s following sections will demonstrate, Hans Castorp’s mastery
of skiing techniques “auf eigene Hand” seems to be a point of departure for his further
exploration of uncanne experience by unquestioningly following his will’s independent
dictates. Only therein lies the “Bewuβtwerdung” of which Joseph speaks – a process that
nonetheless concludes in the section that precedes “Als Soldat und brav” through the
vision with which Castorp completes his “Regierungspflichten.” For on obtaining his
vision, he consequently releases himself from the “ausgebreitete[] Verantwortlichkeiten”
that arise from his consideration of Settembrini and Naphta’s controversy over the
concept of humanity that takes form in his mind as the problem of the “Homo Dei” (GW
3, 583).

Hans indeed seems to strive for greater self-understanding in “Schnee,” but he
first goes about it through an unconsciously “willed” act of getting lost. Castorp’s

repeated disappearance into the fog is not accidental; it accords fully with his hidden desire to cloud reason. Contrary to Joseph's suggestion, the unconscious urge that leads Hans into the heights is not a striving for the immediate attainment of comprehensibility ("Verständlichkeit"). His exertions belong instead to a power of deception tending unrelentingly toward the incomprehensibility of the uncanny. Hans makes no human contacts during his excursion, but he encounters forces within himself that he has earlier only vaguely anticipated. By the time he succumbs to the port-enhanced intoxication of physical and mental exhaustion in "Schnee," the baffled Castorp realizes that he has secretly aspired to nothing short of self-bewilderment and loss of self. Castorp ultimately does achieve the "Verständlichkeit" Joseph above refers to, but not as a direct result of his penetration of the elements. The heightened awareness that comes to him in dream becomes a life-promising counterargument to the threat of perishing from the circumstances in which his irrational act of rebellion has placed him. In the meantime, the excursion that begins in "Schnee" as a sort of transcendence to elevated vision disintegrates under the onslaught of natural might and internal disruption into a mortally threatening dance with death, until the Zauberberg's hero, overcome with fatigue, succumbs to the inner lure of consummate exhaustion. Only then does he truly transcend to the sublime insight of his initial striving.

The vast majority of the critics of Mann's novel concentrate on the significance of the revelation that Castorp receives in the two-part dream that constitutes the second half
of "Schnee." The experiences of the skiing excursion that precedes Hans’s attainment of his vision play such an integral part in its motivation, however, that it seems hardly explicable that the extensive body of literature written on Mann’s novel should make so little mention of them. Notwithstanding, Hans Castorp’s "Schnee-Vision" is indeed the climax of his intellectual "Bildung" on the "Zauberberg," however little he subsequently shares in the fruits of his insight. Scharfschwerdt nonetheless makes a counterclaim: "Castorps individuelle Entwicklung darf sich nur [. . .] in der ersten Hälfte des Romans vollziehen, ist auf diese begrenzt." His argument justifies itself through the consideration that the "durchgängige Experimentierfreudigkeit" of Mann’s hero contains an often-disregarded positive aspect: "eben die lebensfreundlich verbindende und vermittelnde Funktion." Castorp’s "Schnee-Vision" thus assumes value as element of "Bildung" in the reader’s process of development, for as Scharfschwerdt explains: "Der Leser soll also unter der Regie des Erzählers die Entwicklung fortsetzen, die Hans Castorp begonnen hat." Scharfschwerdt’s observation is correct, but by shifting its

---


52 Scharfschwerdt, 151.

53 Scharfschwerdt, 139.

54 Scharfschwerdt, 156, 161.
stress exclusively onto the reader, it tends to ignore the unrealized potential in Castorp’s vision for the protagonist’s own development. That vision itself is the expression of an act of overcoming the uncanny experience that precedes it. The reader’s continuation of Castorp’s development thus depends first and foremost upon his or her ability to discern that experience’s true significance and make meaningful use of it. Since, as I will demonstrate in a later chapter, Hans Castorp attains to a singularly uncharacteristic expression of personal will in response to his “Schnee” vision, it seems somehow inaccurate to regard his vision as anything but the climax of his intellectual development within the novel’s plot. Castorp never brings his vision to practical realization, but if he demonstrates any true positive educational development at all, it is primarily in the realm of theoretical insight. The only practical knowledge Mann’s protagonist gains through his experiences are his sexual encounter with Madame Chauchat and the skills involved in becoming a good patient – both of which place him in a position of dependence. He transforms one of these skills – that of participation in the “Liegekur” – into an independent practice – that of “Regieren,” however, and it is from this activity alone that Castorp’s autonomous vision itself becomes possible. In order to properly understand the independence of Hans Castorp’s vision and its meaning, it is not only imperative to consider Hans’s breach with the normality of prescribed code. It will also be necessary to retrace in depth the uncanny disruption of the sublime that constitutes the prelude to Castorp’s heroic glimpse of the humanly extraordinary.

The intrapsychic struggle between reason and fantasy serves to distinguish the sublime from the uncanny – a conflict that forms the psychological background of Hans
Castorp's experience of nature and aesthetic vision in "Schnee." Among the evaluations of the \textit{Zauberberg}'s "Schnee" section that take psychological considerations into account, many discern elements of the sublime in Castorp's confrontation with nature.\textsuperscript{55} This consideration comes as no surprise, since the experience of the sublime seems to be founded on the mediation of human reason and the internal and external natural influences above which it attempts to elevate itself. Nancy P. Nenno places Castorp's alpine experience in historical context with her observation of philosophy's ascription of "the experience of the sublime and the transcendental" to Alpine regions beginning with these regions' attraction of scientific interest in the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{56} Her analysis fails to expand on this idea, although. In a subsequent section of this chapter on Hans Castorp's "Quest for Sublime Oversight," I will demonstrate the relevance of the thinking on the sublime of two of these eighteenth-century philosophers, Kant and Schiller, to Mann's protagonist's experiences in "Schnee." Few critics, moreover, lay much emphasis on establishing the importance of the central section's portrayal of motivational

\textsuperscript{55}Frizen astutely notes the connection between the "Höhenwanderung Castorps" and both "Faustus-Leverkuhns Ausflug ins 'Unerbaute, nicht zu Erschauende' " and the "Mutterwelt" in Goethe's \textit{Faust}. He then examines Zeitblom's description of the "kantisch-schopenhauerische[r]" Zustand der Erhabenheit im Angesicht der überwiegenden Größe der Natur." Frizen, 292-93. He furthermore holds that - although the \textit{Zauberberg} does not reach the same level of abnegation of the beholder as expressed in \textit{Doktor Faustus} - the "Quieszierung durch das schlechthin Große aber ist allgemein." Frizen, 294. Weigand describes how Castorp, "lost in the blizzard, experiences his sublimely awful visions and verbally articulate dreams of life and death." Hermann J. Weigand, \textit{Thomas Mann's Novel: Der Zauberberg} (New York: Appleton-Century, 1933) 23. As to be discussed again later on. Noble observes that, at the point of receiving his vision, Castorp is "zugleich über den Tod erhoben und von ihm aufs äußerste bedroht." \textit{Krankheit, Verbrechen und künstlerisches Schaffen}, 145.

elements within the plot of Mann’s novel. While addressing Hans’s sensual motivation for taking up skiing in “Schnee,” Nenno’s analysis curiously fails to acknowledge the ethical impulse that also motivates the activity’s pursuit. Yet consideration of this ethical impulse tends to bring completion to her observations on the sublime – another factor I will further discuss in the above-mentioned section on Castorp’s “Quest for Sublime Oversight.” Like Nenno, Jill Anne Kowalik also addresses Castorp’s incentive for the excursion, although she identifies it a little too simplistically as an “attempt to clear his mind” of the “state of high confusion” in which Naphta and Settembrini have placed him.57 Before setting out upon his adventure into the tempestuous chaos of “Schnee,” Castorp feels pressed by a need for relief from the burdens of both his existence at the sanatorium and the spiritual problems that it has set before him. His evasion of his duties as a patient contravenes authority surreptitiously – in a manner similar to the operation of the repressed drives under the watchful gaze of censorship. The act is also motivated by his loyalty to the duties of “Regieren,” however. Castorp’s experience of nature shares the aspects of awe and religious feeling that characterize the sublime, and his feelings of fear provide for his sensation of the dynamically sublime. The law of dynamics underlying the relationship nonetheless sets Hans Castorp in motion. The deeper he plunges into the snowy void, the more Castorp’s relationship to nature, expressed in his interaction with the elements, transforms from one of reasoned superiority and mastery into irrational feelings of insignificance and of utter subjection to uncontrollable natural might. Castorp’s unconsciously motivated quest for the serene experience of the sublime

57Kowalik, 37.
during his skiing adventure in “Schnee” transforms itself into an increasingly terrifying discovery – not initially of greater “Verständlichkeit,” but of the inscrutable, the repressed, the self-antagonistic “other” of his own will, the uncanny.

1.2. Hans Castorp's “Eskapade” as an Escape from Repression.

The return of the repressed’s domination of uncanny experience explains Castorp’s feelings of uneasiness upon being released from the sanatorium’s confines. In confrontation of nature’s elemental power Hans comes into immediate contact with his own otherwise-repressed urges of Eros and Thanatos.\(^{58}\) In relationship to Hans Castorp – the focal point for the events of Mann’s novel\(^ {59}\) – the prescriptive/proscriptive code of the Berghof takes on psychological meaning as a system of repressive controls. The motifs of self-measurement and prostration (embodied in the “Liegekur”) are subsumed in a universally idealized attitude toward sickness and suffering that underpins a body of practices effectively banishing physical activity. Toward the achievement of conditions of convalescent quietude, the Berghof attempts to limit its patients’ sexual and

---

\(^{58}\) As Ellenberger explains, Freud presents a “new dual classification of the instincts” in his essay, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, of 1920: “Eros (grouping together all forms of libidinal instincts) and the death instinct (which Freud’s followers were soon to call Thanatos). In that dual system Freud seemed to postulate that the death instinct was the more fundamental. Like Schopenhauer, Freud now proclaimed that ‘the goal of all life is death,’ that the preservation instinct itself is one aspect of the death instinct because it protects against accidental, externally caused death, in order to preserve the individual for death from internal causes. [. . .]. The two instincts are inseparable, and life is a compromise between Eros and the death instinct until the latter prevails.” Ellenberger, 513.

\(^{59}\) All of Dostoevsky’s works are personalistic: their action is always concentrated around the personality of the main hero.” Konstantin Mochulsky, introduction, *The Brothers Karamazov*, by Fyodor Dostoevsky, trans. Andrew R. MacAndrew (New York: Bantam, 1981) xvi-xvii. The same general tendency characterizes Thomas Mann’s works, and above all, his *Zauberberg*.
recreational activities, suffering, and experience of death – those very factors, in short, that make up the normal functioning of everyday life.

Sexual display is expressly prohibited at the Berghof. Behrens makes it his personal responsibility to uphold a law of abstemious propriety concerning the patients’ interpersonal relations. When someone has thus extinguished the light “in der oberen Liegehalle” for reasons that are quite apparent (“‘durchsichtig’”), the Hofrat, Frau Stöhr explains, “habe es gemerkt und so gewettet, daß es in der ganzen Anstalt zu hören gewesen sei” (GW 3, 108). This repressive attitude toward love undoubtedly exercises an effect on Hans Castorp. The latter is head over heels (“‘über beide Ohren’”) in love with Madame Chauchat, “doch nicht im vergnügten Sinn dieser Redensart, sondern so, wie man liebt, wenn der Fall verboten und unvernünftig liegt [...]” (GW 3, 805). Behrens’s continued mockery of Castorp as a “‘Vergnügungsreisender’” and the brutal injections he administers to him in “Veränderungen” (GW 3, 487) demonstrate that Hans’s love affair with Chauchat contradicts more than his personally held notions of propriety. By the time of “Der große Stumpfsinn,” the Berghof’s attempt to hold its patients’ erotic instincts in check reaches a climax. Since a Bulgarian student accidentally burns himself with chemicals in the “Dunkelkammer” while developing photos, the “Anstaltsobrigkeit” consequently bans its use in an attempt to halt the pandemic spread of a fad of “Liebhaberphotographie” (GW 3, 872-73). Certain measures are also taken – such as the “Abriegelung aller Balkondurchgänge” – to hinder the patients’ illicit nightly visits to one another (GW 3, 874). Despite these measures, however, the epidemic of forbidden courtship continues. “Sehr gesucht waren seitdem
die Zimmer im ersten Stock über der Veranda,” since they provide the possibility of skirting the balcony partitions by using the veranda’s glass roof (GW 3, 874). The policy of sexual repression at the Berghof reflects itself in the narrator’s avoidance of all direct mention of the sexual activity to which he is undoubtedly referring – an omission that provides tacit testimony to his regard for a generally enforced code of decency. By patiently awaiting Chauchat’s return following her departure in “Veränderungen,” Hans Castorp submits to an imperative of delayed sexual gratification that corresponds to an indirectly expressed blanket policy of repressed sexuality at the Berghof.

In addition to its efforts to keep its patients’ sexual urges under wraps, the sanatorium also undertakes an attempt to hide the unpleasantness of human suffering and death – a policy particularly disturbing to Hans Castorp’s senses of curiosity and honesty. Counter to his repressive tendency to laugh off or evade the topic of mortality (GW 3, 19; 22-23), Castorp is intrigued by the question of frequency concerning cases of death – such as that of the American whose quarters Hans inherits upon arriving at the Berghof. Joachim explains that such cases are handled discretely: “‘man erfährt nichts davon oder nur gelegentlich, später, es geht im strengsten Geheimnis vor sich, wenn einer stirbt, mit Rücksicht auf die Patienten und namentlich auch auf die Damen, die sonst leicht Zufälle bekämen. Wenn neben dir jemand stirbt, das merkst du gar nicht’” (GW 3, 77). The coffin of the deceased is brought in under cover of darkness and the corpse spirited away during mealtime. The potentially disturbing reality of death is thus concealed from public view, or as Castorp remarks: “‘Hinter den Kulissen also geht so etwas vor sich’” (GW 3, 77). Death and suffering occur all around, but the sanatorium ethos strictly
discourages displays of despair and anguish. Hofrat Behrens knows how to deal with the "‘unverzeihliche Schlappheit’" of patients’ uncontrolled expressions of anxiety. He has "‘den richtigen Ton in solchen Fällen.’" Joachim describes the case of "‘einer, der zu guter Letzt eine scheußliche Szene machte und absolut nicht sterben wollte.’" Behrens yells at the patient: "‘Stellen Sie sich gefälligst nicht so an!,’" and the patient falls silent and expires (GW 3, 80-81). Behrens also upbraids the "‘Vergnügungsreisender,’” Castorp, for the latter’s public display of tears: "‘Öffentliches Weinen ist hier nicht erlaubt. Hausordnungsverbot’" (GW 3, 242). Medical conditions of sterility prevail at the Berghof that enter into its clinically fastidious attitude toward the occurrence of death, disease, and suffering – yet another consideration that indisposes Hans Castorp to fully embracing its nonetheless comfortable life style.

Despite his overt desire to fit in, the young convert to "elevated" habits is incapable of conforming absolutely to the recommended constraints of his new social environment. Hans frequently uses the periods following the first and second breakfasts in order to make a "Besuch seines Lieblingsortes" – the location by the brook of his dream in "Hippe" (GW 3, 537). These flights into nature give expression, among other things, to his need to escape from the confining atmosphere of the sanatorium and its rigid schedule. The patients’ scheduled participation in the five daily "übergewaltige[ ]Mahlzeiten" (GW 3, 752) and four interjacent periods of rest and temperature measurement (GW 3, 95; 236; 584) leave them neither time nor energy for anything other than self-nourishment, recuperation, and the thrice-daily taking of a half-hour-maximum "Lustwandel" (GW 3, 69; 582). In addition to the general prohibition against activity
implicitly embodied in the “Liegekur,” sports assume a leading position on the list of the Berghof’s specifically banned activities. Joachim formulates his excuse for not playing tennis in general terms: “‘Wir müssen liegen, immer liegen . . .’” (GW 3, 105). The narrator explains that “Sportliche Betätigung” is “unbedingt verwehrt,” both at the Berghof and “in ähnlichen Anstalten” (GW 3, 654). Out of feelings of loyalty to the prescribed Berghof code, by the time of “Totentanz” Hans already shares in Joachim’s nonparticipation in athletic activity and disdain for spectatorship (GW 3, 438). Even just spectating at sporting events is against the rules of the house and may only occur through breaking one’s prescribed participation in the “Liegekur” (GW 3, 375). The consummate leisureliness of the patients’ existence conceals the universal rigidity of the sanatorium’s regulation of living (see also below, p.201). Poker is forbidden at the Berghof, and the playing of “petits chevaux,” reputed to be “das allerschädlichste,” brings to the relevant offender the threat of discharge (GW 3, 106). By hiding from view displays of sexuality, fear, and grief and minimizing the individual’s daily exertions, the Berghof society attempts to minimize the vicissitudes of daily existence and its emotional turbulence. The system of customs and rules that prevails at the Berghof is a highly refined structure that exalts human passivity to the exclusion of the active forces of life.

If Hans adopts the prevailing sedentary way of life at the sanatorium with difficulty, it is because a part of him needs more from life than release from the strain of activity alone. In contravention of a policy that attempts to reduce its patients’ experiences of the tension of life and death to a minimum, Castorp makes his visits to the moribund in “Totentanz.” His visits are a response to a “Bedürfnis seines Geistes, Leiden
und Tod Ernst nehmen und achten zu dürfen” (GW 3, 412). Even more unsettling to his spiritual equilibrium is the internalization of Behrens’s values by means of which Castorp presumes to assure himself of the Hofrat’s fatherly affection. For by taking a stand against Behrens’s express permission to leave the sanatorium (GW 3, 584), Hans commits himself to the ultimately discontented Berghof way of life. Through renunciation of love’s immediate material gratification, Castorp secures a promise of spiritual affection that characterizes his completion of acclimation to the Berghof. Castorp’s show of enduring loyalty to Chauchat – a person with whom he has formed no lasting relationship – is only apparent. Beneath his seemingly noble show of character lurks the evident expectation of delayed gratification, itself somehow symbolic of the Berghof’s system of repression. For when the reality principle takes the place of the pleasure principle, Freud writes, it enforces three conditions: “Aufschub der Befriedigung, [. . .] Verzicht auf mancherlei Möglichkeiten einer solchen und die zeitweilige Duldung von Unlust auf dem langen Umwege zur Lust” (Ges. W. 13, 6). Hans is nevertheless inordinately compliant. Castorp’s “erotic detachment is extraordinary [. . .]. If he has a high passion for Clavdia, it nevertheless carries few of the traditional signs of love’s torments.” Castorp’s act of awaiting Madame Chauchat’s uncertain return symbolically announces itself as the most salient aspect of his submission to the “Realitätsprinzip” of the Berghof. Under the “Walpurgisnacht” festivities’ lifting of societal constraints, the fulfillment of pleasure is for Hans a directly experienced reality. With Chauchat’s departure at the beginning of

---

60See also Scharfschwerdt, 150.

the novel’s second volume, the realization of pleasure becomes subject to the constraints of time and space – a mere possibility contingent upon Castorp’s remaining at the Berghof. I will show that, in opposition to this trend, Hans Castorp’s natural encounter in “Schnee” contains detectable erotic motivations that betray the skier’s need for the release of instinctual energy.

As I mentioned earlier, although, Hans’s excursion also takes its impulse from a need for fulfillment on the spiritual level. The sanatorium does offer the possibility of achieving intellectual gains at one’s leisure, but the promise of obtaining useful elevated rewards – or even respect – like that of obtaining physical gratification, is also a chimera. Despite the great personal value Hans places on his claim to a postition in the society of the suffering, the Hofrat’s disinterest in Castorp’s inconsiderable ailments grows increasingly evident as the novel progresses, culminating in the suggestion made in a paroxism of “Jähzorn” that Castorp depart the sanatorium (GW 3, 579-80). In “Der große Stumpfsinn,” the Hofrat announces to his patient the latter’s “Entgiftung und triumphale Heimkehr in ungeahnter Balde” (GW 3, 869). By the time of the novel’s conclusion, the respect that Behrens and Mylendonck pay to Castorp never exceeds the expression of an occasional greeting (GW 3, 981). Castorp’s elevation into the spiritual sphere of idealized convalescence is ultimately greeted by an attitude of utter disinterestedness from his superiors. His attempts at interpersonal spiritual growth fare no better. Settembrini’s recurring admonitions to refrain from speech serve as a barrier to an important form of intellectual development, as I will discuss below. The dual aspects of sexual and societal gratification that originally lure Castorp into participating in the
Berghof way of life begin by the time of “Schnee” to show their lack of substance. Are the promises of instinctual and spiritual fulfillment, now postponed, perhaps unobtainable within the sanatorium environment? The Berghof appears more and more to impose an insufficiently compensated restraining influence on Castorp’s evident desire for instinctual and spiritual growth.

Against such influences of limitation and confinement, Castorp’s excursion in “Schnee” is largely the result of a need to discharge pent up psychological energy. The protagonist’s quick mastery of the art of skiing fulfills a psychological need: “Hans Castorp erfuhr, daß man eine Fertigkeit rasch gewinnt, deren man innerlich bedürftig ist” (GW 3, 656). There is a fundamental link between Hans’s decision to break Behrens’s prohibition against physical exercise and his psychological need to challenge the elements. As it begins to snow on the temporary fugitive from the sanatorium (GW 3, 662), a spirit of defiance, or “Herausforderung,” arises in Castorp’s psyche that conquers his realization that it would be wiser to put an end to his excursion (GW 3, 665). 62 The narrator further explains that it is understandable that in the psychological depths (“Seelengründen”) of a young man who had lived as Castorp, “[... ] manches sich ansammelt oder [...] ‘akkumuliert,’ was eines Tages als ein elementares ‘Ach was!’ oder ein ‘Komm denn an!’ von erbitterter Ungeduld, kurz eben als Herausforderung und Verweigerung kluger Vorsicht sich entlädt” (GW 3, 665). The delayment of gratification that characterizes the latter stage of Castorp’s adaptation to life at the Berghof brings “ökonomische” factors into consideration very similar to those addressed by Freud in
Jenseits des Lustprinzips. 63 “Duldung” signifies a willingness to tolerate a given condition as opposed to the unwillingness for toleration of “Ungeduld.” Since, as just mentioned, the postponement of instinctual gratification corresponds to the “Duldung von Unlust,” Castorpus “Ungeduld” appears to represent the principle of “Lust” in its inhibited striving for gratification.

If one reflects on Castorpus’s situation, what he accumulates is all of the instinctual energy one usually expends when letting off steam. “Alle Instinkte, welche sich nicht nach Außen entladen,” Nietzsche describes, “wenden sich nach Innen [. . .]” (KSA 5, 322). The repressive ban placed by Castorpus on the release of his instincts results in an accumulation of unexpended energy within his psyche that in Freudian terms corresponds with an increase in displeasure (cf. Ges.W. 13, 5). While the Berghof’s proscriptions against activity are certainly advisable for its suffering and asthenic patients, it is not such much personal necessity as a desire for conformity that compels Castorpus to subscribe to the prevailing attitude of inactivity. In order to make his compliance possible, however, his natural opposition to a ban on instinctual activity needs to be held in check. Castorpus stores up his instinctual energy to the point that he can no longer ignore the need to expend it. He experiences the “Winterwildnis” as the “passenden Schauplatz für das Austragen seiner Gedankenkomplexe.” What is more, however, he sees the same winter


wilderness “als geziemenden Aufenthalt für einen, der, ohne freilich recht zu wissen, wie er dazu kam, mit Regierungsgeschäften, betreffend Stand und Staat des Homo Dei, beschwert war” (GW 3, 659). The metapsychological factor of an accumulated surplus of psychological tension instills sensual and intellectual restiveness in the Zauberberg’s protagonist. The motivation behind Castorp’s romp in the snow is both instinctual and spiritual.

The dual motivation of Castorp’s skiing excursion sets the pattern for his difficulty in perceiving its underlying nature. His inability to explain, “wie er dazu kam” – i.e. the manner of his arriving in his present psychological state – anticipates the aspect of self-disorientation that forms one of the principal trends dictating the outcome of Hans’s excursion in “Schnee.” It also indicates Hans’s ignorance or forgetfulness of his original interest in the subject of humanity as embodied in the activity of “Regieren” that I will soon demonstrate to trace back to the “Hippe” episode. His burdening with the problem of the “Homo Dei” is, on the other hand, clearly intellectual, or is it perhaps the intellectualization of a personally concrete dilemma? The confused intertwining of Castorp’s unknown motivations with projects that are intellectually discernible seems symbolic of the modern individual’s struggle in distinguishing instinctual impulse from reasonable intention. As Schopenhauer remarks in Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung:

Ja, der Intellekt bleibt von den eigentlichen Entscheidungen und geheimen Beschlüssen des eigenen Willens so sehr ausgeschlossen, daß er sie bisweilen wie die eines fremden, nur durch Belaufen und Ueberraschen erfahren kann, und
ihn auf der That seiner Aeußerungen ertappen muß, um nur hinter seine wahren
Absichten zu kommen. (WWV 2, 242)
The state itself in which Castorp now finds himself – as I have suggested – is
characterized by the repression of Eros and Thanatos, but his method of perceiving it is
through the mediation of symbol or, more specifically, on the abstract plane assumed by
the activity of “Regieren.” The dual motivation of Hans Castorp’s excursion corresponds
nonetheless to the twofold categories of repressed needs that seek fulfillment through its
enactment.

Hans Castorp is driven into the natural realm of “Schnee” by two kinds of needs –
one sensual, the other moral. Schiller’s description, in Über naive und sentimentalische
Dichtung, of modern humanity’s longing for natural happiness and harmony appears
particularly suited to Castorp’s psychological condition precedent to setting out upon his
skiing excursion: “Solange wir bloße Naturkinder waren, waren wir glücklich und
vollkommen. Wir sind frei geworden und haben beides verloren. Daraus entspringt eine
doppelte und sehr ungleiche Sehnsucht nach der Natur, eine Sehnsucht nach ihrer
Glückseligkeit, eine Sehnsucht nach ihrer Vollkommenheit” (SW 5, 707-08). Reason’s
liberation from natural necessity causes a sensual longing for the original state of
instinctual satisfaction, a moral longing for its sense of completeness (SW 5, 708).
Castorp’s desire for physical activity – for motion – is clearly motivated by instinctual
need – it is a desire for physical freedom. His sense of longing also manifests itself on
the abstract level, however, as a need to reconcile the contradictory notions of Naphta and
Settembrini. In this sense, it is a desire for freedom of thought. The conflicting sensual
and spiritual needs of “Erholung” and “Sicheinleben” linger in the background of Castorp’s process of adapting to the sanatorium (GW 3, 147). The significance of Mann’s distinction between “Erholung” and “Sicheinleben” may be better comprehended through comparison with the terminological contrast Schiller draws between the realistically sensual needs of “Erholung” and the spiritually ideal demands of “Veredelung”:

Dem Begriff der Erholung […] werden […] gewöhnlich viel zu enge Grenzen gesetzt, weil man ihn zu einseitig auf das bloße Bedürfnis der Sinnlichkeit zu beziehen pflegt. Gerade umgekehrt wird dem Begriff der Veredelung […] gewöhnlich ein viel zu weiter Umfang gegeben, weil man ihn zu einseitig nach der bloßen Idee bestimmt. (SW 5, 767)

The opposed sensual and spiritual aims of “Erholung” and “Sicheinleben” now find expression in Castorp’s twofold desire. As I will discuss in the subsequent chapter, both aspects of Hans Castorp’s longing play a central role in the two-part dream that concludes the “Schnee” section. A longing for freedom, both instinctual and moral, thus forms the combined impetus for Hans Castorp’s venturing beyond the Berghof’s protected patient environment into the snowy void.

Castorp’s temporary escape into the wilderness in “Schnee” is the independent expression of a physical and spiritual need extending beyond the sanatorium’s protective provision of care and the guardianship both of its overseers and his pedagogical mentors. Since his outdoor expenditure of accumulated energy conflicts with the Berghof code, Castorp elects to keep his activities secret from Behrens: “Da er’s der Hausordnung
halber dennoch verbieten würde, beschloß Hans Castorp, hinter seinem [Rhadamanthys] Rücken zu handeln” (GW 3, 655). Castorp’s craving for physical activity by no means exceeds his individual capacity for physical exertion: “Er [Castorp] hatte keine Eskapaden im Sinn, wollte sich schon mäßig halten, und was er plante, hätte Rhadamathys ihm recht wohl gestatten können” (GW 3, 654-55). Mann’s employment of the term, “Eskapaden,” ironically throws considerations of psychological motivation on their head. The word “Eskapade” designates quite literally the act of slipping out from under one’s cape, or, more precisely, an “escape from confinement or restraint.”

Castorp’s temporary reprieve from the Berghof’s restraints on both his instincts and thoughts is necessarily underhanded.

In psychological terms, the surreptitious release of instinctual energy from behind a wall of prohibition is the very expression of neurosis. As Freud explains: “die Existenz des Symptoms hat zur Voraussetzung, daß irgendein seelischer Vorgang nicht in normaler Weise zu Ende geführt wurde, so daß er bewußt werden konnte” (Ges.W. 11, 303). Mann’s description of Hans’s sudden desire to take up skiing in “Schnee” makes it clear that the practice of the sport itself is not what attracts him to it. Castorp takes up skiing in indirect satisfaction of a dual need for erotic contact with nature’s elements and for the achievement of a sense of moral completion in the seclusion of thought (see below, p.110). Could an activity such as skiing be considered symptomatic of needs other than those that are immediately apparent? Like Freud’s symptom, Castorp’s practice of skiing is “ein Ersatz für das, was da unterblieben ist” (Ges.W. 11, 303-04). In

*Die Stellung Freuds in der modernen Geistesgeschichte*, Mann describes Freud's diagnosis of the relationship between repression and symptom in social-psychological terms. For Freud, the neurotic symptom is "die Folge – nicht die notwendige Folge, aber eben die pathologische Folge der Verdrängung." Thomas Mann portrays factors of individual motivation in language that reflects a deep understanding of fundamental psychological notions, demonstrating that Castorp's "Schnee" excursion is more than just the expression of a desire for adventure. Hans's jaunt into the snow is symbolic of the surreptitious path taken by the neuroses in defiant release of the bottled up instinctual energy of repression – itself the very expression of a psychological rupture between intellect and instinct.

Even more than that, Castorp's act of temporarily liberating himself from the contraints of his social environment brings to completion his attempt to surmount the predicament of psychological rupture that becomes the principal preoccupation of his reflective pursuits. Hans's "Schnee" jaunt is a symbolic resumption of the activity of "Regieren," whose objective of transcendence lies hidden in its persistent attraction of the seeker into the extra-societal domain of nature. Yet despite the presence of significant clues within Mann's text, none of its currently existing interpretations draws attention to the vital interrelatedness of the *Zauberberg*'s "Hippe" and "Schnee" sections. One of the more insightful critics of Mann's *Zauberberg*, Jürgen Scharfschwerdt, significantly divides the novel's plot into halves corresponding to the two original volumes, such that

---

Hans Castorp’s “development” terminates at the beginning of the sixth of seven chapters (after the completion of his seventh month at the Berghof and his brief erotic liaison with Chauchat). Scharfschwerdt explains: “Hans Castorp zieht sich im zweiten Teil des Romans von Zeit zu Zeit an einen einsamen Ort zurück, um das Erlebte und Gehörte zu überdenken, um Klarheit über die verwirrende Mannigfaltigkeit von Gegensätzen zu erlangen.”

Scharfschwerdt’s failure to give Castorp’s reflective retreat a specific name seems much less to result from his own lack of diligence as from Mann’s mastery of the craft of subjecting his reader to the same conditions – in a different way – as those under whose influence he places his protagonist. Scharfschwerdt’s interpretation of Hans’s development exclusively in terms of his advancement to the stage of sensual fulfillment takes inadequate account of Castorp’s furtherance of the trend on the level of abstraction. Despite the narrator’s use of language indicating a commonality of knowledge between himself and the reader concerning its location, critics for the largest part fail to definitively identify the spot where Hans Castorp’s contemplative activity takes place.

Kristiansen simply mentions that Hans retires to his “‘Lieblingsort’ ” in order to perform it. Völker merely explains that Castorp pursues his activity “auf einer Bank oberhalb des Sanatoriums.” Neither, however, explains the location of this bench or why it is Hans’s favorite spot. Brigitte Schmitz comes closest with her explanation of Castorp’s

---

66Scharfschwerdt, 153.
67Scharfschwerdt, 151-52.
68Kristiansen, 251.
“doppelter Rückzug”: first from everyday reality in the act of becoming a sanatorium patient and then from the Berghof itself, “um ‘mit seinen Gedanken und Regierungsgeschäften allein zu sein.’” As preparatory of this latter activity, her analysis mentions Castorps “Sich-Befreien aus dem Bannkreise des ‘Berghofes’” (GW 3, 166) and the visits he pays to “besondere Orte”: the “‘blau blühende Ort’” (GW 3, 974), the winter wilderness of “Schnee” (GW 3, 659), and his balcony space (GW 3, 117; 231). She fails to draw an explicit connection between the former act of escaping from the Berghof and Hans’s initial visit to the “‘blau blühende Ort’” in the same section, however, although that original act of self-liberation and act of reclining on the bench are thematically linked as determinant elements in that section’s fateful episode. In contrast, Bollmann astutely observes the connection between Naphta’s “Homo Dei” and Hans’s image of life –


---

"Schmitz, 91-94."
– without, however, making any note of the consideration that Hans’s “Hochgebild organischen Lebens” is also linked through Chauchat to the picturesque location of retreat in which he contemplates it.\(^{72}\) A significant aspect of Castorps’s reflective activity is lost upon the Zauberberg’s best critics. It is now necessary, therefore, to demonstrate not only what “bench” Hans lies upon in precisely what “Lieblingsort,” but also why the latter is his “Lieblingsort,” why he fills his balcony with flowers, and – much later – why he feels so strongly motivated to seek conditions of personal isolation in the wilderness of “Schnee.”

The contemplative activity that Hans Castorp calls “Regieren” takes place at the location where Chauchat’s personal meaning for him reveals itself to him in dream. Unique among the Zauberberg’s critics, to my knowledge, only Karl Werner Böhm\(^{73}\) and Michael Maar draw attention to the consideration. As the latter explains: “Castorps erster großer Spaziergang ins Freie führt ihn zum späteren Regierungssitz.”\(^{74}\) At the beginning of “Vom Gottestaat und von übler Erlösung,” Hans fills his balcony space with aquilegia from the place where he previously succumbed to the nosebleed and dreamed about Přibislav Hippe (GW 3, 536-37). Castorp reclines in “Hippe” on a “Ruhebank” in a

\(^{71}\)Schmitz, 93-94.

\(^{72}\)Stefan Bollmann, Selbsterlösung oder Selbsterhaltung: Thomas Manns “Der Zauberberg” im Kontext (Düsseldorf: Bollmann, 1991) 160. See also Bollmann, 172; 212.


\(^{74}\)Michael Maar, Geister und Kunst: Neuigkeiten aus dem Zauberberg, rev. ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1997) 141.
picturesque natural landscape whose floor “war blau von den Glockenblüten einer staudenartigen Pfanze, die überall wucherte” (GW 3, 168) – the aquilegia he later places in his balcony. The location of his nosebleed in “Hippe” becomes his “Lieblingsort[]”: the place he visits – weather permitting – “nach dem zweiten Frühstück,” occasionally “schon nach dem ersten,” and frequently during the hours between tea and dinner (GW 3, 537). He comes to sit on the bench, listen to the brook, observe “das geschlossene Landschaftsbild” and the “Menge von blauer Alkelei,” but primarily “um allein zu sein, um sich zu erinnern, die Eindrücke und Abenteuer so vieler Monate zu überschlagen und alles zu bedenken” (GW 3, 537). The activity Castorp terms “Regieren” begins, one might consequently surmise, with the vision he receives in “Hippe” and its awakening within him of the presence of Eros. It seems evident that the “Lieblingsort” of Hans’s “Regieren” obtains its preferred status through its subjectively internal connectedness to the person of Madame Chauchat – and through her to Přibislav Hippe. Seen in terms of Schmitz’s description of Castorp’s above-noted “doppelter Rückzug,” Chauchat is not only the “Genius des Ortes” (GW 3, 486) with respect of the Berghof; she is also the “Genius” of Hans Castorp’s “Lieblingsort” in an aquilegia-filled alpine meadow by a brook.75 The erotic bond that forms the underlying motivation for Castorp’s submission to the dictates of his sanatorium environment also contains the hidden impulse that compels him to mentally and physically transcend its constraints.

Hans’s “Regieren” takes place outside of Berghof society. His attempt to break out into nature in “Schnee” is a somewhat concealed expression of the same desire for

75 My emphases.
unfettered reflection that propels him to pursue the activity on other occasions at the "blau blühende Ort" by the brook. Near the beginning of his "Gedankentraum" in "Schnee," Castorp sums up his experiences at the Berghof, thinking: "Ich [. . .] habe viel gelernt bei Denen hier oben [. . .]" (GW 3, 684). Gronicka explains: "Diese gefaselten Worte Hans Castorps bedeuten dem Leser, Castorp habe es instinktiv empfunden, daß nach einer solchen Erleuchtung, wie ihm in diesem Traume zuteil geworden, er nie und nimmer mit seinem Gewissen ein Mitglied 'Derer hier oben' sein könne" (Gronicka's emphasis). Since the time of "Launen des Merkur," Hans has consistently considered himself one of the locals: "einer von Uns hier oben" (GW 3, 327). His reversion to a use of the phrase, "'Derer hier oben,'" indicates his return to an external perspective. Gronicka thus correctly surmises that what Hans Castorp has achieved in his "Gedankentraum" is structurally significant to Mann's narrative as the expression of a perspective that lies beyond the Berghof: "Das Aufklingen dieses Motivs läßt dem Leser keinen Zweifel darüber, daß es dem Helden gelungen sei, den Banden des Zauberberges in dem affektgeladenen Moment sich zu entreißen, sich, wenigstens 'auf Augenblicke,' die Außenstellung zu erringen." In the spirit of the activity he playfully calls "Regieren," Castorp reaches a temporary position in "Schnee" beyond the Berghof—a position in continuation of the perspective of emphatic societal exteriority (and

---

76Scharfschwerdt appropriately terms Castorp's dreaming reflection upon the dream of images that has preceded it a "Gedankentraum." Scharfschwerdt, 143.


78Gronicka, 129.
consequently accentuated individual interiority) that he initially attains through his excursion in “Hippe.”

Hans Castorp’s snow excursion is thus an attempt to break the spell both of instinctual and intellectual discontent through an act of physical and spiritual transcendence. In sensual terms, Hans Castorp’s escapade is a reaction against the Berghof’s attempt to hold the basic instincts of life under strict constraints. The sanatorium places a repressive ban on sexuality, suffering and death, athletic activity, gaming, desire for immediate gratification, and emotional expression. Apart from its obvious contravention of the Berghof proscription against physical exercise, Hans’s skiing excursion also contains concealed meaning within Mann’s text as a reaction against its other prohibitions. Examination of specific passages of the “Schnee” section reveals Hans’s challenge of the elements as the expression of a latent need for erotic gratification in a highly emotional personal encounter of nature’s forces. Castorp’s natural encounter, furthermore, intensifies his experience both of his own suffering and the threat of death. On an abstract level, the basic instincts of life incorporated in the Berghof ban also constitute the basic elements of the “Bild des Lebens” – life’s sensual vitality and mortality – that Castorp envisions in “Forschungen.” These constituents of life also take center stage in the abstract debates of Naphta and Settembrini. Their varying concepts of humanity support and exclude, in turn, these same life elements and consequently form the greatest motivational source, on the abstract level, for Castorp’s alpine adventure in “Schnee.”
1.3. The Goal of Reconciling the "Homo humanus" and the "Homo Dei."

Lying at the core of Hans Castorp’s expedition into the snow is a divided concept of humanity represented in the contrary notions of Settembrini and Naphta. Hans’s placement in a position in the middle between the advocate of nature, bourgeois liberalism, and reason, on the one hand, and spirit, communist asceticism, and mysticism, on the other, accentuates the dual constitution of his psychological nature. Castorp’s internal psychological division lends him meaning within Mann’s novel as a representative of modern humanity. The confusion to which his mentors subject him arises, as Hans Castorp notices, from similar divisions within themselves, yet it also seems to result from their varying contradiction of the unified principle of life that he has earlier developed through his independent studies in “Forschungen.” Not only do the pair of contenders’ conceptual notions stand in the way of his ability to come to grips with the various elements of their arguments, however. Settembrini’s protectiveness also inadvertently performs the function of excluding Castorp from the sphere of abstract development. The atmosphere of confusion reaches a climax in the allegedly liberal-thinking Settembrini’s self-contradictory attitude of intolerance. This self-contradictory, intolerant attitude is mirrored in the uncanny voluptuousness with which the “Wollüstiger,” Naphta, combats human voluptuousness. Against all of their high-minded efforts, both disputants seem in a certain sense to incorporate the very principles they attempt to suppress. Castorp’s confusion notwithstanding, his comprehension of the human predicament increases undeniably through exposure to the intellectual notions that confront him at the Berghof. His confusion, however, is in certain respects merely the
recurrence, on an abstract level, of the physical turmoil that inflicts itself upon him throughout the first few months of being at the sanatorium. Hans Castorp’s initial perplexity over the cause of his symptoms has merely transformed itself into a preoccupation with the abstract problem of the “Homo Dei” and its true significance. During his skiing adventure Hans experiences this same dilemma, on yet another level, once again. The motivations behind his journey into the solitude of “Schnee” are of a deeply personal nature. Hans Castorp’s flight into the solitude of a snowy void takes place not only in reaction to the restraints that the Berghof places upon his life instincts. It also derives from an impulse to confront, challenge, and transcend the uncanny influences that present themselves to him in the abstract guise of the human problem.

The psychological predicament confronting Castorp at the beginning of “Schnee” reflects itself on the cognitive level as a conceptual breach. The fact that Castorp experiences his psychological condition in symbolic terms indicates his dilemma’s derivation from unconscious sources. As already noted, Hans perceives himself to be burdened with “Regierungsgeschäften, betreffend Stand und Staat des Homo Dei” because of the conceptual rift that arises from his mentors’ respective notions of humanity. In opposition to Settembrini’s concept of the “homo humanus” (GW 3, 86), Naphta proposes his anti-utilitarian “‘Idee des Homo Dei’ ” (GW 3, 524). Naphta’s concept of the “‘Arbeit des Religiösen’ ” eschews purposiveness to the point of sensual mortification (GW 3, 523-24). Naphta sternly elevates above sensuality and material need the ascetic’s quest for spiritual purity – the latter the metaphysical sphere of the will that Settembrini would prefer to subordinate to the material “‘Segen der Arbeit.’ ”
Settembrini later declares: "'Die Metaphysik ist das Böse. Denn sie ist zu nichts gut, als den Fleiß einzuschläfern, den wir dem Bau des Gesellschaftstempels zuwenden sollen' " (GW 3, 713). Naphta's and Settembrini's varying notions of asceticism and work oppose themselves to sensuality and will, respectively, thus contributing to a schism concerning the concept of humanity that preoccupies Castorp precedent to setting forth into the wilderness of "Schnee."

The deviating notions of Naphta's "Homo Dei" and Settembrini's "homo humanus" create an antagonism that comprises one among many "symbolic structures" that constitute the novel's structural totality. "Aber wie kommt [Hans Castorp] überhaupt auf den 'Menschen' und darauf, sich um seinen 'Stand und Staat' zu kümmern?" – Thomas Mann asks Josef Ponten in his letter of 5 November 1925. "Primär nicht durch Naphta und Settembrini, sondern auf viel sinnlicherem Wege, der in der lyrischen und verliebten Abhandlung über das Organische angedeutet ist." The enamored Hans Castorp derives his interest in the problem of humanity from his readings and introspective reflections in "Forschungen" (GW 3, 373-99), – above all, however.


81 According to his wife, Katia, Thomas Mann found Josef Ponten's first novel, Der babylonische Turm, "sehr begabt." "Er hat Ponten darüber nett geschrieben und seine Bekanntschaft gemacht," she explains. Katia Mann also describes Ponten's unflagging desire to outdo his fellow novelist, most notably with his overambitious plan for writing "ein Zaubergebirge" that was to be called "'Volk auf dem Wege – Roman der deutschen Unruhe' " - a project that was never realized. Katia Mann, Meine ungeschriebenen Memoiren, hrsg. v. Elisabeth Plessen u. Michael Mann (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1980) 61.

from the heightened state of \textit{interestedness} brought upon by \textit{being in love}.\textsuperscript{83} Hans Castorp’s “künstlerische Regierungstätigkeit” consummates itself “nicht in einem gleichsam luftleeren Raum des Nur-Abstrakten, sie besitzt eine durch konkrete inhaltliche Elemente näher bestimmte Grundlage, ist auf ein anderes, schon genauer umrissenes Lebensbild zurückbezogen.”\textsuperscript{84} In “Vom Gottesstaat,” Castorp lies on the bench of his earlier “Hippe” vision, listens to the “Geräusche des Gießwassers,” and observes the blue aquilegia. As he looks back upon his experiences at the Berghof, the “Hochgebild organischen Lebens, die Menschengestalt” hovers before him, “wie in jener Frost- und Sternennacht anläßlich gelehrter Studien” (\textit{GW} 3, 540) – that is, those of “Forschungen” (cf. \textit{GW} 3, 385). Hans reflects: “‘Homo Dei’ hatte der häßliche Naphta das Hochgebild genannt, als er es gegen die englische Gesellschaftslehre verteidigte” (\textit{GW} 3, 541).\textsuperscript{85} Hans immediately associates Naptha’s concept of humanity with his privately conceived image of life – an image of which the Jesuit has no knowledge. A tendency to project personally isolated experiences onto surrounding events pervades Castorp’s self-centered, narcissistic outlook on the world. Hans’s interest in humanity stems originally from his captivation with the humanly manifest form that draws him to Chauchat, her artistic representation by Behrens, and the image of life of “Forschungen” – pretty much the same factors that form the positive educational component of his attachment to the Berghof.

\textsuperscript{83}Cf. Frizen, 181.

\textsuperscript{84}Scharfschwerdt, 153.

\textsuperscript{85}See also Bollmann, 160.
Just as his longing for physical union underlies Hans’s interest in Chauchat, his preoccupation with the concepts of life and humanity strives for a union of their principles on an abstract level. Hans Castorp’s vision of life in “Forschungen” positions itself between materiality and spirituality – the contradictory extremes that conjoin in constitution of life’s being: “Es war nicht materiell, und war nicht Geist. Es war etwas zwischen beidem, ein Phänomen, getragen von Materie, gleich dem Regenbogen auf dem Wasserfall und gleich der Flamme” (GW 3, 385). Castorp’s “Regieren” now searches for a concept of humanity lying somewhere between Naphta’s ascetic spirituality and Settembrini’s bourgeois materialism. Hans’s idea of humanity is an outgrowth of his image of life. Prior to becoming informed of Naphta’s and Settembrini’s contrary abstract concepts of humanity, Castorp beholds a synthetic anthropological image uniting the formal and informal, phenomenon and will. Hans Castorp’s imaginative reflections at first appear to unite what Naphta’s and Settembrini’s abstract systems of thought divide. The abstract theories of Settembrini and Naphta, on the other hand, the antagonistic representatives of bourgeois formalism and absolute will, split humanity along conceptual lines, thus creating of Castorp’s vision of harmony the theoretical foundations of a perceived internal anthropological rupture.

Settembrini’s formalistic rigidity and rejection of the passions subtly opposes Castorp’s image of life, although with certainly less vigor than Naphta’s direct assault on the life principle itself. The overemphasis Settembrini lays on form in fact runs the risk of straying meaninglessly from the realm of living experience. Naphta declaims against the academic’s empty rhetoric – his cloistered development of opinions without
foundation in practical understanding, ability, and experience (GW 3, 721). Settembrini, in contrast, praises the merits of form independent of content. "— der Kultus der Rede als einer Kunst um der Kunst willen [. . .]" (GW 3, 722). Settembrini supports in theory the practice of speaking eloquently about trifles that originally earns him the title of "einh rechter Windbeutel" (GW 3, 90). As Wysling observes: "Settembrinis Form-Begriff ist aufklärerisch, er enthält die intellektualen Anschaungsformen von Raum, Zeit und Kausalität, und zudem ist die 'Form'-Welt für Settembrini mit dem Utilitatsprinzip, der flachlandischen Arbeit also, verbunden."\(^{86}\) The accentuation of form in Settembrini’s concept of humanity runs the risk of straying so far from its purported promotion of life, however, that it allows the latter’s enslavement to a work ethic that loses sight of the goal of life’s betterment — the very consideration from which it derives its justification.

Just as his views on politics and rhetoric subject life’s content to the constraints of a rigid formalism, Settembrini’s aesthetic theory attempts to do away with passion. Settembrini applauds literature’s "reinigende, heiligende Wirkung" and "die Zerstörung der Leidenschaften durch die Erkenntnis und das Wort" (GW 3, 724). As a member of the "‘Bund zur Organisierung des Fortschritts,’" it is Settembrini’s stated goal to do away with the suffering of existence on a grand scale (GW 3, 343). As with its "Leiden," Settembrini also strives for the extirpation of life’s "Leidenschaften." The inherent contradiction of the life principle underlying Settembrini’s opinions makes itself evident through its effectiveness in causing Nahta to take up arms in support of self-preservation and life ":[. . .] gegen den Geist der Zersetzung, welcher sich hinter jener seraphischen

\(^{86}\)Hans Wysling, "Probleme der Zauberberg-Interpretation," 23.
Gleiserei verberge” (GW 3, 724). Naphta senses deception in Settembrini’s ambitions for literature: “denn die Form, die der literarische Geist mit dem Prinzip der Untersuchung und Trennung zu vereinigen sich rühme, sei nur eine Schein- und Lügenform, keine echte, gewachsene, natürliche, keine Lebensform” (GW 3, 724-25). Naphta discerns in Settembrini’s aim of eradicating the passions only “die Entmannung und Entblutung des Lebens,” calls his zealous theory “lebensschänderisch,” and says that he who wants to destroy the passions wants nothingness, pure nothingness (GW 3, 725). In addition to his rigid defense of a bourgeois formality that attempts to elevate itself in opposition above the vital substance from which it draws its energy, Settembrini seeks the annihilation of the pleasure and suffering that Castorp sees as elemental to life.

Naphta’s more radical advocacy of spirit, in contrast, goes even beyond that of Settembrini in its contradiction of the life principle that Castorp finds imaginatively embodied in Madame Chauchat. While he places it between the realms of materiality and spirit, the principal qualities Hans Castorp ascribes to life in “Forschungen” are form and sensuality (GW 3, 385). Since Naphta lances his polemic against the shallowness of life, his attacks against its formal and sensual qualities are particularly vengeful. Naphta ridicules Settembrini’s bourgeois formality. In his eyes, the umbrella-carrying Italian’s “Verehrung des Einzellebens” belongs to the “allerplattesten Regenschirmzeitläuften (GW 3, 135 & 637). Naphta also attacks the very principle of form that Settembrini takes as his ideal (GW 3, 222-23). The Romantic, Naphta, is the upholder of medieval formlessness and spirituality. Naphta defends the illiteracy of “der größte Dichter des Mittelalters, Wolfram von Eschenbach” against the formal bourgeois education of the
“Literat,” causing Settembrini to cite Naphta’s mockery of “die Liebe zur literarischen Form” as proof of his barbaric taste (GW 3, 721-22). With a vengeance that makes evident his enmity to that principle itself, Naphta attacks the formal constituent of life earlier envisioned by Castorp.

The Jesuit consequently shows just as much vehemence in assaulting the quality of sensuality that Castorp also sees as essential to life. In his view, the religious calling serves the objective of “‘Abtötung der Sinnlichkeit’” (GW 3, 523-24). The sacrament of marriage fulfills a wholly negative function as “Schutz gegen die Sünde” – an institution conferred solely for “Einschränkung der sinnlichen Begierde und der Unmäßigkeit” (GW 3, 817). Naptha’s religious mission formulates itself as the transcendental spirit’s conquest of the sensual. He is guided by the awareness, “daß das innermenschliche Problem [...] auf dem Widerstreit des Sinnlichen und Übersinnlichen beruhe” (GW 3, 645; cf. also GW 3, 553). At the heart of his concept of the “Homo Dei” is Naphta’s dualism – his conviction of the spirit’s opposition to nature. Naphta believes in the antagonism between a finite world and transcendental divinity. Naphta’s contravention of Castorp’s “Bild des Lebens” extends to an attack upon the natural principles of form and sensuality at its very core.

Naphta’s radical espousal of a subjective standpoint hypostatizes spirit to the complete abnegation of material reality, much as the Berghof’s prevailing attitudes toward convalescence place a damper on the normal activity of life. As demonstrated in

---

87 The Jesuit Order into which Naphta has been indoctrinated, explains the narrator, originally defined its mission not so much as a reasonable resistance to the “Empörung des Fleisches,” but through the very act of doing battle against the “Neigungen der Sinnlichkeit, der Eigen- und Weltliebe [...]” GW 3, 620.
the immediately foregoing subchapter, Hans Castorp embarks on his skiing adventure in “Schnee” largely in reaction to the Berghof’s implicitly systematic suppression of his life instinct. With the blind conviction of the radical extremist, Naphta demonstrates his support for the most extreme form of such an attitude of repression during his debate with Settembrini in “Operationes spirituales.” Maintaining that our true worth rests in spirit, not in the flesh, toward the latter of which the “Menschenseele” nonetheless tends, Naphta consequently argues in favor of corporal punishment as “ein durchaus empfehlenswertes Mittel, ihr die Lust am Sinnlichen zu versalzen und sie gleichsam aus dem Fleisch in den Geist zurückzutreiben, damit dieser wieder zur Herrschaft gelange” (GW 3, 629). Naphta bolsters his promotion of terror and castigation on an assumed original condition of spirit. In Naphta’s eyes, punishment is advisable in order to restore spirit to a state of hegemony. Naphta seems like an incarnation of the Berghof’s prevailing attitudinal opposition to the bourgeois materialism of the flatlands. Castorp views life in “Forschungen” as “ein Phänomen, getragen von Materie [. . .]” (GW 3, 385). Naphta’s metaphysical advocacy of spirit places him absolutely on the side of the noumenal thing in itself – or Schopenhauer’s will (WWV 1, 234; 2, 248) – in radical opposition to the material substance upon which life’s phenomenality constructs itself.

Naphta’s and Settembrini’s divergent antagonistic stances to Hans’s life principle complement the East-West dichotomy in which the protagonist is also placed. According to Settembrini’s definition, there are “zwei Prinzipien im Kampf um die Welt: [. . .] das Prinzip des Beharrens und dasjenige der garenden Bewegung, des Fortschritts” (GW 3,
221). The former is clearly Naphta’s principle, and the latter is Settembrini’s. Settembrini expressly places on both Castorp’s and his country’s shoulders the responsibility for reaching decisions of incalculable significance for Europe’s future happiness: “‘Zwischen Ost und West gestellt, wird es [Deutschland] wählen müssen, wird es endgültig und mit Bewußtsein zwischen den beiden Sphären, die um sein Wesen werben, sich entscheiden müssen” (GW 3, 714). Settembrini contradicts his Enlightenment principles through his confinement of the dilemma facing Castorp to a categorical decision between the East and West – positions that in relationship to his pupil are extrinsic by definition. By restricting his pupil to passively accepting either of two external givens, Settembrini leaves him no room for inclusive personal development. As if in elaboration of the consideration, Mann explains in Goethe und Tolstoi that to opt in either direction would be to act in contradiction of one’s own nature:

Der humanistische Liberalismus des Westens, politisch gesprochen: die Demokratie, hat viel Boden bei uns, aber nicht den ganzen. Es ist der schlechteste Teil von Deutschlands Jugend nicht, der vor die Entscheidung ‘Rom oder Moskau?’ gestellt, für Moskau optiert hat. Gleichwohl irrt diese Jugend, nicht

---

88See also Kristiansen, 76.

89Chauchat also represents the Asiatic principle. Manfred Sera, Utopie und Parodie bei Musil, Broch und Thomas Mann: Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, Die Schlafwandler, Der Zauberberg (Bonn: Bouvier, 1969) 146-47. Kristiansen, 160.

90Weigand thus rightly asserts Castorp’s significance as a symbol of Germany: “Gravitating as [Hans Castorp] does between Settembrini and Clavdia; steering his cautious course between the two rival educators after Clavdia’s departure, he stands as a symbol of Germany, das Land der Mitte, politically and philosophically.” Weigand, 13. Nenno’s excellent article offers an in-depth look at Hans Castorp’s role as symbol of German identity. Nancy P. Nenno, “Projections on Blank Space,” 305-21.
Rom, nicht Moskau hat die Antwort zu lauten, sondern: Deutschland. (*Essays* 2, 83)

By limiting his pupil to an absolute choice between his own western viewpoint and Naphta’s eastern perspective, Settembrini forces Castorp into a position of implied obedience and self-betrayal. Is Settembrini offering anything substantially different from his rival’s insistence upon “Absoluter Befehl, eiserne Bindung,” and “Gerhorsam” (*GW* 3, 645)? By restricting Castorp to the act of passively deciding between extremes, Settembrini implicitly contravenes his “European” principle’s standard of activity and goal of attaining human self-perfection through reason (*GW* 3, 221). Settembrini undermines in practice his own Darwinian idea, “daß der innerste Naturberuf der Menschheit ihre Selbstvervollkommnung ist” (*GW* 3, 341). In contrast to their fulfillment of negative functions in contradiction of Castorp’s conception of life, his mentors’ principles of East and West nonetheless assume a more positive aspect as the complementary halves of the complete human psyche.

Placed in the middle between Naphta’s and Settembrini’s Asiatic and European principles, as representative of the German people, Hans Castorp plays the primary role of conciliating extremes – a function to which Mann is fond of drawing attention in his essays. He thus declares in his 1927 article, “Kultur und Sozialismus”:

Was nottäte, was endgültig deutsch sein könnte, wäre ein Bund und Pakt der konservativen Kulturidee mit dem revolutionären Gesellschaftsgedanken, zwischen Griechenland und Moskau [. . .]. Ich sagte, gut werde es erst stehen um
Deutschland, und dieses werde sich selbst gefunden haben, wenn Karl Marx den Friedrich Hölderlin gelesen haben werde [. . .]. (Essays 3, 63)

As early as in Goethe und Tolstoi Mann militates for the necessity of the socialist movement’s performance of the same synthetic task (GW 11, 170). Mann similarly holds that Castorp “ist seinen gesteigerten Gedanken persönlich nicht gewachsen” (see also below, p.89). The connection implies that, in order to live up to his responsibilities as a German, Hans must realize his capacity for assimilating and coming to terms with the East-West principles of his immediate cultural reality.

On a general level, Settembrini and Naphta represent the contrary halves of the human psyche. On the basis of Settembrini’s definition in “Aufsteigende Angst,” one might even go so far as to regard Settembrini and Naptha as the representatives of the opposed psychological principles of reality and pleasure, or intellect and will, in Freud’s and Schopenhauer’s respective analyses. Mann pretty much equates the latters’ principles himself. ⁹¹ He first draws the connection in Freud und die Zukunft (GW 9, 486-87), a fact he recalls two years later in his 1938 essay, Schopenhauer. Mann stresses the identity between “Schopenhauers finsteres Willensreich” and what Freud calls “das ‘Unbewußte,’ das ‘Es.’ ” He also notes the correspondence between “Schopenhauers ‘Intellekt’ ” and the Freudian “‘Ich’ ” (Essays 4, 302). In a similar way, Settembrini and Naptha might also be regarded, however roughly, in terms of Schiller’s contrary realist

and idealist personality types that – since they are mutually approachable under Schiller's concept of idealism – also constitute the possibility for the individual's psychological development in the "true" direction of balance.

Settembrini and Naphta might correspondingly also be viewed according to Nietzsche's distinction between Apollinian and Dionysian psychological tendencies, the latter however raised to the level of Nietzsche's ascetic priest – especially given his terms' derivation from Schopenhauer's already-noted concepts of intellect and will. Settembrini's representation of the Apollinian trend is suggested by Joseph's explanation that the Italian is a replication of the epoch in which "das Sokratische, die Vernunft und weise Leidenschaftlosigkeit über das Dionysische siegte, in der wissenschaftliche Hingebung an das Wahre' höher stand als die sogenannte 'Inspiration,' als künstlerische Genialität." In Kristiansen's analysis, Settembrini correspondingly represents form. Naphta, on the other hand, is the representative of "Überform." In Sera's interpretation, Chauchat portrays "jene verlockende Sphäre des Dionysisch-Rauschhaften und Maßlosen," and Hans's love for her is a "Neigung zur Krankheit, dionysisch-rauschhafte Hingabe an eine Sphäre, die keine Forderungen und Zielsetzungen kennt." Like Chauchat, Peeperkorn also represents "Die dionysische Existenzform." The

---


93Kristiansen, 56-154 and passim.

94Kristiansen, 252-72.

95Sera, 146-47 and 150-51.

96Kristiansen, 277-85.
Zauberberg’s characters generally seem to represent different accentuations of the human psyche’s various traits that find representation in Hans Castorp’s variegated psyche.

The consideration becomes most salient in “Schnee,” as Castorp imagines himself to be physically threatened on dual fronts by the animate forces of a perilous wind and a temptation to surrender to the presently felt power of death. This double conflict between Hans and the outwardly threatening forces of nature, on the one hand, and the natural threat from within, on the other, is a reenactment in the physical realm of his intellectual struggle against the persuasive rhetoric of Naphta and Settembrini. He encounters these forces as deadly, just as he perceives it as “lebensgefährlich” that Naphta and Settembrini – “ein Teufel rechts und einer links” – impede his intellectual progress on dual fronts in “Operationes spirituales” (GW 3, 640). Castor’s predicament in “Schnee” is an uncanny recurrence in physically actual, concrete form of a dilemma that has confronted him – through the mediation of his pedagogical mentors – in the language of the abstract. In order to avoid being covered over by “‘hexagonale[ ] Regelmäßigkeit,’ ” Hans struggles in “Schnee” “‘immer genau gegen den Wind!’ ” (GW 3, 669). In the novel as a whole, one finds the wind-related quality of “Windbeutelei” attached to the “Windbeutel,” Settembrini, the ideological representative of the reality principle and “bürgerliche Tugendstrenge” (GW 3, 646).97 The “Macht der Versuchung” that tempts Hans to yield to the urge to lie down in the snow bears a connection with something “scharf Jesuitisches und Menschenfeindliches” that unmistakably represents Naphta (GW 3, 671).

---

97 For references to Settembrini’s “Windbeutelei,” see GW 3, 209; 223; and 646. The narrator refers to Settembrini as a “Windbeutel” on GW 3, 90; 210; 313; 660; 721; and 974.
It clearly recalls the temptation of Castorp by the Jesuit’s arguments near the conclusion of “Operationes spirituales” to indiscriminately surrender to the great “Versuchung” to cast himself head over heels into his “‘sittlich ungeordnetes All’” (GW 3, 646). Hans’s dilemma in “Schnee” is the symbolic representation in pathetically personified, concrete form of the abstract struggle that – through the arguments of Naphta and Settembrini – both menaces and tears at him from the dualistically opposed subjective and objective positions maintained by the pair of disputants.

Their qualities’ recurrence in Castorp’s personal struggle against elemental forces in “Schnee” highlights Settembrini’s and Naphta’s incorporation within the novel’s greater plot of the qualities of wind and temptation on a more abstract level. Settembrini, the representative of realist ideology, thus symbolizes – through his relationship to Castorp – the Freudian ego: “der Vertreter der realen Außenwelt im Seelischen” (Ges. W. 13, 256). It is precisely as a “‘Vertreter’” that Castorp perceives Settembrini (GW 3, 458) – the performer of a similar function as that of his uncle, James Tienappel, the “Vertreter und Abgesandter der Heimat” (GW 3, 592). As Schopenhauer states: “die vernünftige Betrachtungsart” is similar to “dem gewaltigen Sturm, der ohne Anfang und Ziel dahinfährt, Alles beugt, bewegt, mit sich fortreißt [. . .]” (WWVI, 252). Settembrini represents the tempestuous forces of intellectual progress in continual strife with the conservative doggedness of Naphtan will. In relationship to Mann’s protagonist, Naphta is the embodiment of an inner principle of temptation. Since Naphta’s principle opposes itself to Settembrini’s, it might best be described – in reference to Freud – as Mann’s equivalent of the id. Their particular manifestations in “Schnee” as dynamically
operative components of Hans’s experience of the uncanny are central to the dilemma of heightened awareness to which his excursion exposes him – a consideration I will investigate below in the subchapter on “Pathetic Fallacy, Animistic Projection, and the Uncanny” (see below, p.124). At his expedition’s outset, Hans feels “Sympathie mit den Elementen” as well as “Sympathie mit seinem Herzen” (GW 3, 659-61) – conditions of external and internal harmony that disintegrate into an experience of pervasive enmity under the confusion of a gathering storm. As the advocates of reality and the will, Settembrini and Naphta represent the principles that mortally threaten Hans Castorp with external natural violence and internal desire to surrender. Significantly, it is a reconciliation of these principles as represented in the “Homo Dei” problem that motivates him to embark on his unpermitted skiing adventure in the first place.

Since Naphta and Settembrini in a certain sense represent the separate halves of Hans Castorp as well, the latter’s placement in a position between the pair of extremes not only underscores the personal significance of his role as mediator. Hans’s dual nature also stands as an obstacle to his educational mission’s implied goal of self-knowledge. Hans Castorp is torn between his devotion to the Berghof and the flatlands existence to which he knows he should return: “Down in the matrix of [Hans Castorp’s] self the two opposing forces fight out their tug of war, and while the decision is apparently brought about by a passive yielding along the line of least resistance, it is in truth his innermost being that determines the choice.”

Kristiansen rightly asserts that the persons surrounding Castorp may be described as “Projektionen und Entfaltung der

\footnote{Weigand, 22.}
Möglichkeiten der inneren subjektiven Welt Castorps” and not just as representatives of objective possibilities, as Ziolkowski maintains. Castorp develops noticeably in the different directions represented by the psychological elements that he projects upon his surroundings. If the ways that Mann’s text refers to him are any indication, however, the bourgeois character projectively represented by Settembrini with which Hans arrives at the Berghof remains intact up through the “Peeperkorn” sections. Castorp is a “Zivilist,” “junger Mann aus dem Zivilpublikum,” “Kind des Friedens,” and “Kind[] der Zivilisation” (GW 3, 251; 579; 620; 659). In the meantime, Hans progressively develops in the course of Mann’s novel toward the sensual and quietistic attitudes represented by Chauchat and Naphta. Settembrini’s and Naphta’s opposed viewpoints portray the unreconciled forces of reason and will within the psyche of the protagonist himself.

The problem in pursuit of which Castorp sets forth in “Schnee” thus founds itself on a rupture in the concept of humanity that penetrates Castorp’s view of life, placing him in the position of mediator between reason and will or intellect and pleasure – the objectified forces of his own human nature through which he gains greater understanding of himself and the human predicament on the abstract level. The attitude of conflict that pervades Settembrini and Naphta’s debates is merely the visible surface of their ideologies’ unspoken subterranean opposition to Hans Castorp’s harmonious image of life. Settembrini opposes life’s content in will, passion, and suffering, while Naphta attacks its formal principle, sensuality, and underlying phenomenality.

---

atmosphere of conflict also penetrates the self-relationships of Castorp’s mentors – their self-contradictions undermine their pedagogical missions and place them in the ironic position of barricading their pupil’s path to the achievement of his educational goal. The end product of this all-pervasive discord is the “große Konfusion” to which Castorp tacitly wishes to bring order upon setting out in “Schnee.”

Close inspection of their divergent concepts of humanity discloses the ruptured human life principle represented in the conflict of ideologies that, taken individually, also contradict the ostensible aims of the Zauberberg’s disputants. The voluptuous Naphta’s opposition of sensuality bears the evident stamp of self-contradiction inherent in the ascetic’s reversion of the will back against itself. As Nietzsche observes, such self-contradiction is the very essence of the ascetic: “Denn ein asketisches Leben ist ein Selbstwiderspruch: hier herrscht ein Ressentiment sonder Gleichenz, das eines ungesättigten Instinktes und Machtwillens, der Herr werden möchte, nicht über Etwas am Leben, sondern über das Leben selbst [. . .]” (KSA 5, 363). Despite his Marxism, Naphta promotes the advancement of the human spirit not only to the neglect of material need, but even by the express means of physical castigation – through the “Züchtigungsmittel der Schläge” (GW 3, 629). Marx and Engels, on the other hand, are adamant in emphasizing the fulfillment of human need as the first step in the attainment of all higher human achievements – those of spirit included: “Zum Leben [. . .] gehört vor
Allem Essen und Trinken, Wohnung, Kleidung und noch einiges Andere. Die erste
geschichtliche Tat ist also die Erzeugung der Mittel zur Befriedigung dieser Bedürfnisse,
die Produktion des materiellen Lebens selbst [. . .]."\(^{101}\) All spiritual activity depends on
its corporeal foundations: "Selbst wenn die Sinnlichkeit, wie beim heiligen Bruno, auf
einen Stock, auf das Minimum reduziert ist, setzt sie die Tätigkeit der Produktion dieses
Stockes voraus."\(^{102}\) Just as Naphta’s advocacy of spirit over life causes him to argue in
support of notions that undermine his Marxist standpoint, Settembrini’s promotion of
intellect against the Naphtan concept of will brings him to contradict his own
philosophical position.

Settembrini’s utilitarian subjugation of will and Naptha’s idealistic neglect of
human material need blatantly contradict the principles of freedom of will and fulfillment
of need in their respective democratic and communistic ideological stances, thereby
accentuating the internal psychological division represented in their ongoing contest of
wits. While these self-contradictory trends in their ideological programs reveal internal
ruptures in either’s thinking, however, the climate of self-contradiction becomes most
acute through Naphta’s and Settembrini’s assumption of antagonistic stances to the very
principles they ostensibly represent. Naphta’s just-noted embodiment of the very spirit of
self-contradiction makes his opposition to his own principle of will evident. For that
reason it seems unnecessary to further pursue the consideration at the present time. The

\(^{101}\) Karl Marx u. Friedrich Engels, \emph{Die deutsche Ideologie: Kritik der neuesten deutschen
Philosophie in ihren Repräsentaten Feuerbach, B. Bauer und Stirner, und des deutschen Sozialismus in

\(^{102}\) \emph{Die deutsche Ideologie}, 28.
opposition of the representative of Enlightenment, Settembrini, to his personally advocated principle of reason, however, is far less evident. Since it has thus far received imprecise and incomplete recognition from the critics – and particularly since it exercises such a decisive influence on Castorp’s education, it will be worthwhile here to examine the principal ways in which Settembrini’s attitude of self-contradiction manifests itself.

Despite his advocacy of democracy, Enlightenment, and reason, Lodovico Settembrini nevertheless demonstrates a rigidity of character that undermines his theoretical outlook and his pedagogical attempt to bring it to practical realization. Settembrini’s promulgation of an attitude of material advancement prepared to trample the will en route to achieving its ends makes will the slave of intellect from the outset, thereby undermining the notion of autonomy in the concept of democratic choice. Since communities are made “by the consent of every individual” and derive their power to unified action “only by the will and determination of the majority,” it is difficult to see how Settembrini’s contestation of will could possibly serve his purported democratic political aims. The true Enlightenment attitude toward will is one not of opposition, but of guidance by reason. Settembrini expressly opposes a recognizably Schopenhauerian form of will – “das Prinzip des Beharrens” that he opposes (GW 3, 221) is clearly akin to Schopenhauer’s will as “das Beharrende und Unveränderliche im Bewußtsein” (WWV 2, 103 John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government, Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau (London: Oxford UP, 1976) 57.

104 Copleston thus summarizes the German Enlightenment views of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) on education and the will: “The will naturally seeks the good. But man can have mistaken ideas of the good. Hence the importance of developing true, clear and adequate ideas. The will can be rightly directed only by the intellect.” Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 6, pt. 1 (New York: Image, 1964) 132.
162). Notwithstanding, the stridency of Settembrini’s opposition also makes him an enemy of will under the Enlightenment definition. In Settembrini’s bourgeois value system, rather than guiding the will, the intellect becomes the will’s absolute master. Contrary to the implicit Enlightenment principles of education, individual autonomy, and happiness, Settembrini’s notion of a material prosperity gained through the intellect’s coercion of will into obedience seems more nearly to promote conditions of uneducated docility and servitude than anything remotely similar to his professed democratic goals.

Where the Italian’s rigid advocacy of reason betrays its greatest tendency to self-contradiction, however, is in his practical endeavor to gain an adherent in Hans Castorp. Despite his advocacy of human progress, Settembrini consistently thwarts Hans Castorp’s free development of a personal viewpoint. With the exclamation, "‘Es ist zwecklos, daß Sie fortfahren, Ingenieur,’" Settembrini cuts short Castorp’s attempt to describe an affinity between military “‘Dienst’” and the cleric’s renunciation of material rewards (GW 3, 525). On another occasion, Hans’s praise of the recliner’s usefulness in furthering intellectual contemplation clearly represents an attempt to synthesize his mentors’ opposed ideas of “Ruhe” and “Fortschritt” into a concept of intellectual progress. Settembrini intolerantly stifles Castorp’s comment and physically restrains his advance by taking him by the arm (GW 3, 523). Castorp’s Italian “Wortführer” actively impedes his pupil’s efforts at argumentatively developing his own intellectual notions, verbally and physically halting Hans’s progress with a ban on forward movement.

---

105 What Settembrini’s comment ironically and offhandedly betrays is a predilection for subsuming the concept of utility, of which he argues in support, into the very method of his argumentation. The latter attracts suspicion to itself as rejecting Castorp’s interjected comments not so much because they are not valid, but because of their uselessness in serving his own argumentative position.
Settembrini's uncompromising lack of willingness to yield any ground to Naphta expresses itself as an effective prohibition on the sort of intellectual progress in his pupil that his pedagogical calling ostensibly promotes.

Even when Hans Castorp gives clear indication of his intellectual advancement, the Italian makes no acknowledgment of his pupil's mastery of the concepts that he has earlier taught him. Castorp cites Plotinus's shame of his body, Voltaire's revulsion at the earthquake in Lisbon, and the "absurde Naturfeindschaft der gotischen Kunst" as examples of a spiritually honorable "Emanzipation von Fatum und Faktum" — as the expression of an unsubservient pride that refuses to abdicate "vor der dummen Macht, nämlich vor der Natur" (GW 3, 548). By comparing the passage with Settembrini's earlier description of the same persons, events, and concepts (GW 3, 349-50), it becomes clear that Castorp's views are founded on an accurate assimilation of his instructor's notions. Hans's comments evidently fail to serve Settembrini's presently held argumentative position, however. The Italian consequently gives him an upbraiding for being "'so witzig'" and drops the entire subject (GW 3, 548). Later, when Castorp again demonstrates his affinity with Settembrini's notions, Hans's feverish inarticulateness causes him to be misunderstood, consequently drawing another reprimand from the Italian (GW 3, 641-42). Here Castorp only appears to be praising death over life, however. That for which he is really searching is a moral principle with which to counterbalance what Settembrini terms the "dumme Macht" of nature (cf. GW 3, 349; 644). Settembrini's behavior directly contradicts his avowed principles. Rather

---

106 See also the related passage in Mann's 1909 essay, Süßer Schlaf! Essays 1, 110.
than praising his pupil’s demonstrative command of the concept in which he earlier attempted to instruct him, the Italian’s lust for argumentative prevalence results in his adoption of an unjustly intolerant attitude that exerts itself against the very principle of reason he openly advocates.

Whereas one would rightfully expect an enlightened democrat to uphold rules of free speech and freedom of opinion, with regard to Hans Castorp, Settembrini openly militates against his own avowed principles. For fear of receiving an admonitory upbraiding, Hans refrains from explaining to Settembrini his plan to visit the moribund in “Totentanz.” “Aber denken dürfen wird man sich ja sein Teil,” Hans complains to Joachim, “– Sire, geben Sie Gedankenfreiheit’” (GW 3, 411). Settembrini betrays his actual attitude to such freedoms with such commands as “Wähnen Sie nicht, sich von Hause aus viel denken zu können’” (GW 3, 711),108 “Schweigen Sie, Ingenieur!’” and “Unterrichten Sie sich, aber produzieren Sie nicht!’” (GW 3, 560). Since intellectual progress and the production of ideas are so highly interdependent, Settembrini offhandedly exposes inconsistency in both his own conception of individualism and its relationship to pedagogical method. Settembrini may be an allegory of “Enlightenment Man” when he flips on the light in “Ewigkeitssuppe” (GW 3, 270),109 but he seems on the


whole more like a caricature of true pedagogical intentions.¹¹⁰ Settembrini expressly
forbids and thereby actively prevents his pupil both from developing his own ideas in
conversation and, ironically, from gaining a higher understanding of the very ideas with
which he wishes to acquaint him.

Rather than playing the role of intellectual guide that his theoretical advocacy of
Enlightenment would deem appropriate, Settembrini assumes in practice the position of a
master or guardian. Schmitz is fairly unique among the critics in observing Settembrini’s
attempts in praxis to gain mastery over his pupil – a tendency directly at odds with the
latter’s striving to come of age. Whereas one consistently finds Settembrini’s
employment of the expression, “placet expiriri,” “in den Kontexten der Unterjochungs-
versuche des ‘Mentors,’ ” Castorp’s usage of it always occurs “in Kontexten, die die
gelungenen Strebungen in Richtung auf das Ziel Mündigkeit kommentieren [. . .].”¹¹¹ In
Die Schule des Zauberbergs, Mann himself seems to recall the same consideration, taking
note of Castorp’s representation of a characteristic tendency of German youth in their
dealings with a class of educators that vividly remind one of Settembrini: “Den ewigen
Widerstand der Jugend gegen die Versuche der Erwachsenen, zu gängeln und zu führen;
das Mißtrauen des Suchenden gegen die Bevormundung, die scheinbar zu überzeugen
und in Wahrheit nur zu unterwerfen sucht, wache Gefolgschaft sagt und blinde Hörigkeit
meint [. . .]” (GW 11, 601).¹¹² Latta also notes Settembrini’s trait of exclusiveness or

¹¹⁰See, for instance, Nehamas, 109.

¹¹¹Schmitz, 257.

¹¹²See also Ludwig Fertig, Vor-Leben: Bekenntnis und Erziehung bei Thomas Mann (Darmstadt:
"intolerance." As just mentioned, however, Settembrini effectively tells Hans Castorp not to think – a consideration that places him in direct opposition to the very principle of Enlightenment he purportedly upholds. As Kant explains in *Was ist Aufklärung?*, the unique demand of Enlightenment is that most innocuous of freedoms: "von seiner Vernunft in allen Stücken öffentlichen Gebrauch zu machen." Kant makes his observations in 1784, near the end of the movement that espouses reason as its guiding faculty, yet he still finds the prevalence of a spirit of unreason: "Nun höre ich aber von allen Seiten rufen: Räsonniert nicht! Der Offizier sagt: Räsonniert nicht, sondern exerziert! Der Finanzrat: Räsonniert nicht, sondern bezahlt! Der Geistliche: Räsonniert nicht, sondern glaubt!"

Settembrini’s attempts to prohibit Hans Castorp from speaking, “producing,” and thinking directly contradict his principle of Enlightenment. "*Der öffentliche Gebrauch* seiner Vernunft muß jederzeit frei sein,” explains Kant of the human subject under conditions of Enlightenment, “und der allein

---


kann Aufklärung unter Menschen zustande bringen."^{116} Hans Castorp’s social environment – by continually compelling him to place himself in a position of obedience to its influence – poses the greatest obstacle to his achievement of true “Bildung” in Mann’s Zauberberg. In attempting to make his ideas prevail against those of his anti-Enlightenment opponent, Settembrini inadvertently embodies a spirit bordering on despotic compulsion that in practice contravenes the notions of “free exchange” and relinquishment of control of opinion that date back to the Enlightenment’s origination in the thoughts of Bacon and Descartes.^{117} In contradiction to one critic’s claim, Castorp only in a very limited sense meets in Settembrini “mit einem seinen geistigen Bedürfnissen entsprechenden Erzieher.”^{118} Settembrini seems to represent the greatest theoretical source of hope for Hans’s liberation from the uncanny forces of subjection that surround him, but his mistrust of Castorp’s capacity for intellectual autonomy and his tendency of guardianship effectively undermine the project of Enlightenment to which he openly aspires.

Settembrini’s prohibitions against Hans Castorp’s contributions to his debates with Naphta spring from an evident instinct of fatherly protection. Settembrini desires to guard his younger pupil from the locally prevalent glorification of suffering and ethos of passivity with which the latter all too readily identifies. He warningly attempts to shelter

---

^{116} *Was ist Aufklärung?*, 171.


Castorp from the sanatorium itself (*GW* 3, 123-24), its unfavorable climate, deplorable overseers, and the moribund habits and outlook of its insufferable guests (*GW* 3, 136-37). Above all, he attempts to prevent Castorp from making Naphta’s acquaintance (*GW* 3, 542) and severely admonishes him against the danger of the Jesuit’s influence (*GW* 3, 569). Settembrini’s stance is problematic. His intention of preventing his pupil from letting himself fall under the seductive control of Naphta’s way of thinking participates in the aims of the Enlightenment. As Kant explains in *Was ist Aufklärung?*: “Faulheit und Feigheit sind die Ursachen, warum ein so großer Teil der Menschen, nachdem sie die Natur längst von fremder Leitung freigesprochen [...] , dennoch gerne zeitlebens unmündig bleiben; und warum es anderen so leicht wird, sich zu deren Vormündern aufzuwerfen.” Settembrini rightfully desires to admonish his pupil against an all-too-human tendency to unthinkingly let another do one’s thinking for one, then sets himself up as the one to do all of Hans’s thinking. “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit,” explains Kant. Not coming of age (“Unmündigkeit”) results from one’s inability to make unguided use of one’s reason; when one lacks the determination and courage to independently make use of that reason, it becomes self-inflicted (“Selbstverschuldet”). In order to prevent his pupil from falling victim to Naphta’s dogmatic views, Settembrini takes it upon himself to do Hans’s thinking for him. Castorp reflects on Settembrini’s evident desire to pedagogically

---

119 *Was ist Aufklärung?*, 169.

120 *Was ist Aufklärung?*, 169.

121 "Sapere aude! Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung,” Kant says. *Was ist Aufklärung?*, 169.
prevent him from making Naphta’s acquaintance, “obgleich ja er für seine Person mit ihm verkehrte und disputierte.” Hans thinks: “Sich selber gönnen [die Erzieher] das Interessante, indem sie sich ihm ‘gewachsen’ nennen; der Jugend aber verbieten sie es und verlangen, daß sie sich dem Interessanten nicht ‘gewachsen’ fühle” (GW 3, 542). With regard to freedom of religion, Settembrini similarly informs Castorp: “‘Dem Problem der Toleranz dürften Sie kaum gewachsen sein, Ingenieur’” (GW 3, 713). If, as Thomas Mann claims, Hans Castorp “ist seinen gesteigerten Gedanken persönlich nicht gewachsen,”122 might it at least in part be due to the fact that his environment – and Settembrini in particular – allow him too little room to grow? Despite his pedagogical intentions, Settembrini only seems practically capable of warning and shielding his pupil – like a concerned parent protects his or her offspring – against the folly of falling victim to the seduction of Naphta’s subjective dogmatism.

Settembrini’s practical contradiction of his own theoretical convictions becomes most evident in the way he leads his life. By again advising Castorp in “Enzyklopädie” to return to Hamburg, Settembrini shows that he is “‘vorsichtiger für sich als für andere Leute!,’” Hans tells him. Settembrini has obeyed his physicians’ proscription against travelling to the “‘Fortschrittskongreß’” in Barcelona out of a fear of dying (GW 3, 346). Claiming that his case is significantly worse than Castorp’s,122 Settembrini acquiesces to Behrens’s commands in order to preserve himself for continued service to humanity and defiance of the spirit of illness (GW 3, 347). Settembrini thus justifies his position in

122Briefe, Bd. 1, 232.

123See also Nehamas, “Nietzsche in The Magic Mountain,” 107.
reference to the very locally prevalent hierarchy of suffering and submission to pathological imperatives from which he ostensibly wishes to shelter his younger acquaintance. Settembrini’s obedient submission to the Berghof’s pathological ethos and insistence on Castorp’s docile acquiescence to his pedagogical guardianship are the practical manifestations of a principle that opposes itself diametrically to his Enlightenment objective of self-autonomy.

Since he refrains from setting an example through his own conduct, Settembrini’s pedagogical message fails to truly connect with Castorp. Despite their expressed pedagogical intentions, the argumentative techniques employed by Naphta and Settembrini do little to actively engage the interest of the youths that surround them. Naphta and Settembrini argue, – “pädagogischerweise, wie Hans Castorp wohl wußte, und um die Bildsamkeit lichtsuchender Jugend zu bearbeiten” (GW 3, 647). As the narrator explains, the rivals’ arguments nevertheless conflict with their pedagogical intentions, surpassing Ferge’s ability to comprehend them and arousing Wehsal’s interest only when “Prügeln und Folter” come under discussion. Meanwhile, they spur Castorp only to consideration of “die große Konfusion” that they create (GW 3, 647). Castorp seems unique in taking a decided interest in the themes discussed by his mentors. Contrary to their professed intentions, however, the only effect of their debates even on Hans is to increase the sense of internal turmoil he experiences as a “große Konfusion” somehow abstracted from the sphere of immediate relevance.

With Naphta’s appearance in Davos, even the matter-of-fact Settembrini’s speech withdraws to the elevated level of elusive abstraction. Scharfschwerdt insightfully
observes that, with Naphta’s arrival, a quality of indirectness replaces the immediate interactive function of Castorp’s conversations with Settembrini and Chauchat. In the first half of Mann’s novel, Settembrini und Chauchat “sind […] in ihren Begegnungen und Gesprächen mit Hans Castorp auf diesen direkt bezogen” and relate to him more or less on his personal conscious level. In its second half, Settembrini und Naphta “beziehen […] in ihren Diskussionen Hans Castorp nur in indirekter Form mit ein, ja nehmen oft genug überhaupt keine Rücksicht auf die geistige Aufnahmefähigkeit des armen Hans Castorp [. . .].”

124 Naphta and Settembrini’s confrontational arguments surpass Castorp’s capacity to understand them, such that the latter, “als individueller Charakter betrachtet, hier vor allem in den wenigsten Fällen versteht, was da zwischen Settembrini und Naphta verhandelt wird.”

125 The elevated level and highly interpersonal nature of Naphta and Settembrini’s debates effectively excludes Castorp from the possibility either of sufficiently understanding the subjects under discussion or of putting them in the personally comprehensible and meaningful perspective of his own language. Hans clearly wishes to learn from his mentors. With regard to the Italian pedagogue, “den jungen Hans Castorp verlangte es herzlich, beeinflußt zu werden [. . .]” (GIV 3, 210). Regrettably, Castorp’s oft-voiced quest for wisdom in the company of Naphta and Settembrini – despite their pedagogical intentions – meets primarily with disappointment.

Thus frustrated in his search for personally meaningful lessons, Castorp spends in “Operationes spirituales” what amounts to exactly three full pages of text in introspective

124 Scharfswerdt, 152.

125 Scharfswerdt, 152.
reflection on “die große Konfusion” of self-contradictory and overlapping arguments advanced by Naphta and Settembrini (GW 3, 644-46). What troubles Hans most are the disputants’ varying shifts both in support and rejection of diametrically opposed factors and tendencies. Settembrini takes a stand for nature against the contrary position of bitter enmity represented in Naphta’s advocacy of spirit. Earlier, however, the Italian decries nature as “die ‘dumme Macht,’ ” while Naphta, in contrast, acts as defender of natural instinct (GW 3, 644). Hans discerns fluctuations from subjective to objective standpoints both in the objective upholder of liberal individualism and democratic values, Settembrini, and in Naphta, “der Mann der Freiheit und des Subjects” (GW 3, 644-45). The question of who among them really promotes principles of freedom and who promotes piety has everyone stumped, says the narrator (GW 3, 644). Naptha’s utilitarian notion of truth – “Wahrheit sei, was [dem Menschen] fromme” and Settembrini’s erotically sublated notion of freedom – “Freiheit sei das Gesetz der Menschenliebe” are restrictively dependent on their ideas of humanity (GW 3, 645-46). Castorp correctly discerns that this binding of their concepts to the human subject is “entschieden mehr fromm als frei” and that the very distinction between freedom and piety runs the danger of getting out of hand through such definitions (GW 3, 646). In the viewpoints of both of his pedagogical mentors, Hans vaguely discerns a fundamental lack of objectivity at variance with their arguments’ sustainability. The humanistic perspectives of both Settembrini and Naphta are infected with vying anthropocentric claims that prevent one from making a valid judgement of their views’ respective worth.
Hans Castorp is incapable of deciding exclusively either for blind obedience to
the iron command of Naphta’s unsympathetic ascetical communist terrorism or empty
service to Settembrini’s extrinsically unengaging bourgeois liberalism. The narrator
describes the theoretical impasse that confronts Castorp in “Operationes spirituales”:

Wer war denn nun eigentlich frei, wer fromm, was machte den wahren Stand und
Staat des Menschen aus: der Untergang in der alles verschlingenden
Gemeinschaft, der zugleich wüstlingshaft und asketisch war, oder das “kritische
Subjekt,” bei welchem Windbeutelei und bürgerliche Tugendstrenge einander ins
Gehege kamen? (GW 3, 646)

What seems most to trouble the confused Castorp is the problem of the distinction
between liberty and pious conviction: between the freedom of will or thought and the
bindingness of earnest. Admittedly, both disputants advocate their own concepts of
freedom. Positing freedom in the spirit, Naphta has a conceptual affinity with Saint
Augustine, to whose City of God the title of the section, “Vom Gottesstaat und von übler
Erlösung,” clearly alludes. 126 Augustine limits the very discussion of freedom in that
work to its concluding section’s description of heaven. Paradoxically, only suspension of
life’s freedom “either to sin or not to sin” brings absolute freedom: “in the everlasting
City, there will remain in each and all of us an inalienable freedom of the will,
emancipating us from every evil [. . .].” 127 Like Augustine in De Civitate Dei, Naphta

126 “Vom Gottesstaat” is, in fact, the accepted German version of the work’s original Latin title, De

confines his concept of freedom to the afterlife, although he also appears to associate it with the dissolution of individuality involved in one’s joining in the collective cause. Naptha’s estimation of Hegel as “einen ‘katholischen’ Denker” – “denn der Begriff des Politischen sei mit dem des Katholischen psychologisch verbunden” (GW 3, 612-13)¹²⁸ – surely coincides with the totalitarian aims of his revolutionary communism. On the other hand, Settembrini’s liberalism sacrifices freedom to the dictates of virtue. Both ideologies contain imperatives of compulsion behind their notions of autonomy that relegate freedom to the respective “beyonds” of the hereafter and an unrealized historical ideal. Neither shows much piousness at all toward the individual subject’s inherent desire for independence in the here and now. Neither is therefore capable of pointing the way to the “wahre[ ] Stand und Staat des Menschen” that Castorp feels should be one’s principal objective.

The true answer, Castorp feels, must lie somewhere in between. The word “Konfusion” initially arises in the novel from the question of devoting oneself to Settembrini’s bourgeois “‘Weltrepublik’” or Naphta’s hierarchical “‘Kosmopolis.’” Hans Castorp has paid close attention to both of their arguments, but he nonetheless finds that “‘die Konfusion war groß, die herauskam bei ihren Reden’” (GW 3, 535-36)¹²⁹. Hans is unable to reconcile Settembrini’s endorsement of an international republic and

¹²⁸Gardiner thus observes: “Hegel’s notion of spirit’s struggle to overcome self-alienation in the course of realizing its ‘Ideal being’ has been treated by some commentators [. . .] as primarily religious in aspiration, an attempt to give philosophical expression to ideas mythically portrayed in the Christian doctrines of creation, fall, and redemption.” Patrick L. Gardiner, introduction, Nineteenth Century Philosophy, ed. Patrick L. Gardiner (London: Collier, 1969) 8.

¹²⁹See also Scharfschwerdt, 137.
peace with his simultaneous promotion of an intercontinental war through pursuit of the
chuaunistic aim of obtaining the “‘Brennergrenze’” (*GW* 3, 536).¹³⁰ Neither can Hans
Castorp bring Naphta’s disdain for the concept of the state and advocacy of humanity’s
universal unification (“‘der allgemeinen Vereinigung’”) to terms with his defense of
natural instinct and mockery of peace conferences (*GW* 3, 536). Hans concedes to
Joachim the importance of hearing the disputants’ debates, “‘um klug daraus zu werden.
Du sagst zwar, wir sollen hier nicht klüger werden, sondern gesünder,’” Castorp
explains. “‘Aber das muß sich vereinigen lassen, Mann, und wenn du das nicht glaubst,
dann treibst du Weltentzweigung [. . .]’” (*GW* 3, 536). The notions of getting cleverer and
healthier are, however, not what Castorp feels need to be reconciled with one another.¹³¹
Since it is “Konfusion” of which Hans has been speaking (the word appears thrice on that
page), it seems clear that what concerns him even more is reconciling the conflicting
notions of internal and external political harmony represented by Settembrini and Naphta.
Similarly, Scharfschwerdt correctly discerns that the contrasting figures of Chauchat and
Settembrini, Naphta and Settembrini, and the latter pair and Peeperkorn “durch Hans

¹³⁰ This latter objective is arguably as much the expression of a policy of expansion as of any
legally justifiable claims to territorial restitution, since Tyrol had not lain in Italian hands since the intrusion
of the Lombards into northern Italy in 568 AD. C. Warren Hollister, *Medieval Europe: A Short History*, 3rd
ed. (New York: Wiley, 1974) 39. The Italian Trentino and the German South Tyrol were among the prizes
offered to Italy for entering World War I under the arrangements of the secret treaty of London of 26 April

¹³¹ Stresau nonetheless summarizes the passage as follows: “Joachim bemerkt einmal zornig, sie
seien nicht hier, um klüger, sondern um gesund zu werden, um im Flachlande Dienst tun zu können, worauf
Hans Castorp erwidert, beides müsse sich vereinigen lassen, das Klügerwerden und das Gesundwerden.”
Hermann Stresau, *Thomas Mann und sein Werk* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1963) 139.
Castorp [...] miteinander konfrontiert und verbunden werden. As Scharfschwerdt further explains, “die Grundstruktur des Zauberberg” is determined by a multiplicity of “überindividuellen Problemen der gesellschaftlichen und geistigen Situation der Zeit.” Since its individual characters incorporate various aspects of these problems in the form of isolated opposites, “kann nun Thomas Mann seiner Hauptfigur die Aufgabe übertragen, durch eine charakteristische Haltung und Distanz die in den einzelnen Figuren verkörperten Einseitigkeiten und Widersprüche zu desillusionieren, um neue harmonische Zusammenhänge zu finden.” It is in this spirit of reconciliation that it appears to Castorp “als ob irgendwo inmitten zwischen den strittigen Unendlichkeiten, zwischen rednerischen Humanismus und analphabetischer Barbarei das gelegen sein müsse, was man als das Menschliche oder Humane persönlich ansprechen durfte” (GW 3, 722). The greatest polarity of all in Der Zauberberg is the opposition represented by the contrary figures of Naphta and Settembrini and their mutually antagonistic ideologies. It is with a mind to bringing order to the climate of confusion that arises from their verbal confrontations that Hans Castorp seeks the self-reflective solitude of “Schnee.”

Castorp seeks a point of equilibrium that lies somewhere between the extremes of Settembrini’s realism and Naphta’s idealism. The true realist, says Schiller, subordinates himself to nature and necessity as eternal wholes, and not to nature’s blind, momentary contraints (SW 5, 779). The true realist is thus unconstrained by reality. In

\[132\] Scharfschwerdt, 137. See also Scharfschwerdt’s excellent full-passage treatment of “Hans Castorp als episches Prinzip der Verbindung und Vermittlung.” Scharfschwerdt, 135-39.

\[133\] Scharfschwerdt, 136.

\[134\] Scharfschwerdt, 136.
complementary fashion, the true idealists’ departure from reality is conditional and only partial: “Der wahre Idealist verläßt nur deswegen die Natur und Erfahrung, weil er hier das Unwandelbare und unbedingt Notwendige nicht findet, wonach die Vernunft ihn doch streben heißt” \((SW\ 5,\ 780)\). The conjunction of their different approaches produces the inevitable agreement of the true realist’s and true idealist’s results \((SW\ 5,\ 779)\).

Between \textit{Der Zauberberg}’s disputants, however, there is no such agreement.


The \textit{Zauberberg}’s ideological disputants represent the dual halves of a human psyche whose reconciliation becomes Hans Castorp’s overriding ambition.

Castorp fails in the end to fulfill his synthetic function in \textit{Der Zauberberg}, but not before first demonstrating his capacity of envisioning its possibility. The productive act of creation explained by Nietzsche in \textit{Die Geburt der Tragödie} first becomes possible through the conflict of the Dionysian and Apollonian.\footnote{Walter Kaufmann, \textit{Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist}, 4th ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1974) 128.} Out of the tension of Naphta and Settembrini’s competition, a creative spark ignites in Castorp akin to the “Fortentwicklung der Kunst” that is bound up with the duality of the Apollonian and
Dionysian that Nietzsche compares in the *Birth of Tragedy* with sexual regeneration’s dependency on the “Zweiheit der Geschlechter, bei fortwährendem Kampfe und nur periodisch eintretender Versöhnung” (*KSA* 1, 25). In his foreword to the short essay, “Homer’s Wettkampf,” Nietzsche describes humankind’s uncanny dual nature: “Der Mensch, in seinen höchsten und edelsten Kräften, ist ganz Natur und trägt ihren unheimlichen Doppelcharakter an sich.” The internal human conflict forms the source of human productivity: “Seine furchtbaren und als unmenschlich geltenden Befähigungen sind vielleicht sogar der fruchtbare Boden, aus dem allein alle Humanität, in Regungen[,] Thaten und Werken hervorwachsen kann” (*KSA* 1, 783).\(^{137}\) Hans’s choice is not between East and West. The true position that he seeks is a fruitful position of harmony between the chaos of their extremes.

Although the deep connection between Hans Castorp’s image of life and his idle contemplations has been critically acknowledged, *Zauberberg* interpretations have hitherto failed to analyze the manner of the relationship between the elemental components of that image and the constituents of Naphta’s and Settembrini’s vying concepts of humanity. Such an analysis is indispensible for an adequate understanding of Hans’s subsequent reconciliatory act in “Schnee,” however. Scharfschwerdt’s above-cited claim that Hans Castorp’s “künstlerische Regierungstätigkeit” consummates itself

---

\(^{137}\) The notion of contest permeates Nietzsche’s reflections on the act of artistic creation, as Gray fittingly notes: “The notion of competition, play, or rivalry also was central to Nietzsche’s understanding of the pre-Platonic Greek philosophers. [. . .]. Nietzsche believed that the productive tension that arose from this competitive situation gave rise to the tremendous creativity of Hellenic culture, as he elucidates in the example of Homer and Hesiod.” Richard Gray, afterword, *Unpublished Writings from the Period of Unfashionable Observations*, by Friedrich Nietzsche, trans. Richard Gray, vol. 11 of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Bernd Magnus (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1995) 484.
“nicht in einem gleichsam luftleeren Raum des Nur-Abstrakten” at the same time carries the implicit assertion that his contemplative activity nonetheless does concern itself with a process of theoretical enhancement. The image of life of which Hans conceives in “Forschungen” is “Fleisch [. . .] das zur Form, zum hohen Bilde, zur Schönheit wurde.” It is “der Inbegriff der Sinnlichkeit und der Begierde,” and it is “nicht geistgetragen” (GW 3, 385). It is “das Bild des Lebens” (GW 3, 385). As object of Hans’s activity of “Regieren,” his image of life becomes a “Hochgebild” (GW 3, 540-41) that he infuses with the fundamentally contrary qualities of Naphta’s “Homo Dei.” It is clear from the context that Naphta’s “Homo Dei” describes the work of the religious. According to his explanation, such work provides protection against “‘das Fleisch’” and serves the mortification of “‘Sinnlichkeit’” (GW 3, 523-24). The “Hochgebild” that Hans names “Homo Dei” (GW 3, 571) is an abstraction of his image of life turned almost diabolically against its original carnal and sensual principle.

While Hans’s interest in humanity originally derives from the positive expression of natural impulses, his confrontation of the human problem on an abstract level emerges from the negative climate of eristic discourse. Castorp seeks in “Schnee” the solution to a problem that compounds itself of a dialectical schism in which Naphta’s advocacy of asceticism, moral purity, metaphysics, and conservative will pits itself against Settembrini’s support of activity, utility, the fulfillment of human needs, and the progress of realism. Hans’s quest for a concept of humanity that reconciles his mentors’ opposed anthropological notions is impossible in the atmosphere of polemical inflexibility sustained in their presence. Hans Castorp’s placement in a middle position between the
contradictory ideologies of the pair of disputants makes their principles’ reconciliation increasingly a matter of withdrawal into personal reflection.

In relationship to the objectified figures of personal intellect and will represented in Settembrini and Naphta, Hans Castorp attains in the second half of Mann’s novel the capacity to articulate on an intellectual level the internal conflict that besets him. Neumann contends that the “Initiations-Erfahrung” of the first volume of the Zaubergebrends Castorp “ein neues eigenes Gewicht gegenüber den Dialektikern.” The contention is partially true, but in the presence of Naphta and Settembrini in the second half of Mann’s novel, Castorp is largely marginalized from the discussions. The disputants bring about confusion in Hans Castorp and stifle his efforts to express himself. The “neues eigenes Gewicht” that Castorp attains comes predominantly through the reflections he makes in natural seclusion. While Castorp’s indoctrination into the Berghof community signifies the attainment of a certain familiarity with the ideas that permeate its environment, his perception of being placed in an abstract predicament merely indicates his internalization of the elements of confusion that have continued to trouble him since his arrival.

In marked contrast to the stifling effect exercised upon Castorp’s development in the presence of his mentors, Settembrini overwhelmingly supports Hans’s plan in “Schnee” to proceed into the field of physical activity. Upon hearing of Castorp’s “Vorhaben,” Settembrini enthusiastically encourages his pupil to follow his ambitions (GW 3, 655). Excluded from the discussion of a problem that interests him deeply – the
problem of the “Homo Dei,” the perplexed young man takes the energy of his confusion instead into the humanly unregulated, natural realm in which he is accustomed to performing the activity of “Regieren.” Rather than obediently placing himself in a position of servitude to either of his pedagogical mentors’ theoretical outlooks, Hans Castorp is clearly in pursuit of a personally meaningful, independent viewpoint. However much inspired by childhood notions, his “Regieren” is thus an expression of the personal autonomy reflected in the term’s literal meaning. Kant hypothesizes that nature must have set reason “zur Regiererin” beside will. Similarly, the quest to gain rational control over his unconscious impressions seems to guide Castorp’s activity of “Regieren.” However coincidentally, Mann’s and Kant’s terms seem to express related notions. Hans’s skiing expedition is thus the physical expression of the same urge for independence implied in his mental task of “Regieren.”

As representatives of the psychologically loaded principles of East and West, Naphta and Settembrini’s varying opposition to Castorp’s unified vision of life accentuates the internal psychological rupture, the reconciliation of whose principles becomes the underlying ambition of his solution of the abstract problem of the “Homo Dei.” In order to escape the confusion of principles and ideologies that besets him, solitude is clearly the condition necessary for Hans Castorp’s pursuit of the solution to

---


139 Woods thus appropriately translates “Regieren” on a continual basis with the phrase, “playing king.” Woods, 383 and passim.

the anthropological problem that they pose to him. Might it be, however, that his quest for an answer to the problem of the “Homo Dei” has even deeper, more personal relevance to the one in search of it? The narrator has much earlier described Hans’s pursuit of an answer to his conscious or unconscious questions concerning the “Anstrengung und Tätigkeit” involved in his studies and career pursuits (GW 3, 50).

Continuing the same passage of “Bei Tienappels,” the narrator explains:

Zu bedeutender, das Maß des schlechthin Gebotenens überschreitender Leistung aufgelegt zu sein, ohne daß die Zeit auf die Frage Wozu? eine befriedigende Antwort wüßte, dazu gehört entweder eine sittliche Einsamkeit und Unmittelbarkeit, die selten vorkommt und heroischer Natur ist, oder eine sehr robuste Vitalität. (GW 3, 50)

Might it be that Hans Castorp’s daring journey into the solitude of nature provides him with the necessary preconditions of “sittliche Einsamkeit und Unmittelbarkeit” for his pursuit of the question of what to do with his life? As I will later demonstrate, Hans’s solution of the problem of the “Homo Dei” in his “Gedankentraum” carries direct personal implications in support of just such a supposition. One finds Hans on the right track to such a discovery when the narrator explains of the skiing protagonist: “Und eine Art von Rührung wandelte ihn an, eine einfache und andächtige Sympathie mit seinem Herzen, dem schlagenden Menschenherzen, so ganz allein hier oben im Eisig-Leeren mit seiner Frage und seinem Rätsel” (GW 3, 660-61). The question and riddle represented by the problem of the “Homo Dei” have deeply personal relevance for Hans Castorp. As Thomas Mann declares in his 1942 lecture before the Library of Congress, Joseph und
seine Brüder. Hans's solution of the question that leads him into the wilderness originates in a desire for self-knowledge. The hero of Der Zauberberg, Mann explains, "war nur scheinbar der freundliche junge Mann, Hans Castorp, auf dessen verschmitzte Unschuld die ganze Dialektik von Leben und Tod, Gesundheit und Krankheit, Freiheit und Frömmigkeit pädagogisch hereinbricht" (Essays 5, 189). The hero in reality is "[…] der homo Dei, der Mensch selbst mit seiner religiösen Frage nach sich selbst, nach seinem Woher und Wohin, seinem Wesen und Ziel, nach seiner Stellung im All, dem Geheimnis seiner Existenz, der ewigen Rätsel-Aufgabe der Humanität" (Essays 5, 189). The question and riddle that have been concerning Hans Castorp through his colloquia with Naphta and Settembrini undoubtedly attract his interest for the very personal reason that their solution provides the promise of offering him answers to the problems – both subjective and general – that have been secretly troubling him.

1.4. The Quest for Sublime Oversight.

Hans Castorp embarks in “Schnee” on an unconscious quest for the elevation of sublime experience that reenacts the conflict between Eros and Thanatos of his interactions with Settembrini and Naphta and draws him ever deeper in subjection to nature’s seductive and frightening capacity to undermine reason. Hans Castorp’s unconscious search for sublime independence in pious awe of nature’s greatness unintentionally propels him toward an experience of uncanny subjection to the very natural forces that his mastery of the art of skiing implicit attempts to dominate.

In addition to reflecting his attempt to circumvent repression and freely arrive at a suitable concept of the “Homo Dei” in the open space of the “Winterwildnis,” Hans
Castorp’s journey into the snowy void is of heightened symbolic value as a description of the sublime. Prior to setting forth on his skis, Castorp basks in the presence of a fantastically sublime “Gnomenwelt” that is both comical and fabulous (“lächlicher anzusehen und wie aus dem Märchenbuch”). From the comfort of his reclining chair on the balcony, Hans observes the snowy landscape: “Mutete aber die nahe Szene, in der man sich mühselig bewegte, phantastisch-schalkhaft an, so waren es Empfindungen der Erhabenheit und des Heiligen, die der hereinschauende fernere Hintergrund, die getürmten Standbilder der verschneiten Alpen erweckten” (GW 3, 651). The scene achieves its sublime aspect through the monumental greatness of a mountainous background that appears to dwarf the “Gnomenwelt” of its foreground – a consideration that fits the descriptions of the mathematically sublime in both Schopenhauer and Kant (see also below, p.121). As the latter explains, “das Mathematisch-Erhabene” can arise “bei der Vergegenwärtigung einer bloßen Größe in Raum und Zeit, deren Unermesslichkeit das Individuum zu Nichts verkleinert” (WWT 1, 277).141 Hans Castorp’s experience of the sublime in “Schnee” begins as a mathematically sublime feeling of being physically reduced in the presence of the distantly towering mountains.

The mathematically sublime feeling that punctuates Hans Castorp’s experience of his alpine environment accompanies him one day as he disappears “im weißen Nebel”

---

141 Kant’s description of the same phenomenon provides a less tangible portrayal of the feeling of the sublime than does Schopenhauer’s, although his analysis of its underlying psychological process is more thorough: “Erhaben ist also die Natur in derjenigen ihrer Erscheinungen, deren Anschauung die Idee ihrer Unendlichkeit bei sich führt. Dieses letztere kann nun nicht anders geschehen, als durch die Unangemessenheit selbst der größten Bestrebung unserer Einbildungskraft in der Größenschätzung eines Gegenstandes.” *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 178. As I will demonstrate below, Schopenhauer’s analysis of fear’s role in producing sublime feeling, on the other hand, is complete than Kant’s.
from Settembrini’s view (GW 3, 656). The experience of sublimity that arises in Hans when confronted with the greatness of nature attains amplified magnitude due to his identity as participant in civilization’s remoteness from nature:

Das Kind der Zivilisation, fern und fremd der wilden Natur von Hause aus, ist ihrer Größe viel zugänglicher als ihr rauer Sohn, der, von Kindesbeinen auf sie angewiesen, in nüchternen Vertraulichkeit mit ihr lebt. Dieser kennt kaum die religiöse Furcht, mit der jener, die Augenbrauen hochgezogen, vor sie tritt und die sein ganzes Empfindungsverhältnis zu ihr in der Tiefe bestimmt, eine beständige fromme Erschütterung und scheue Erregung in seiner Seele unterhält. (GW 3, 658)

The “Erschütterung” and “Erregung” Hans experiences in nature’s presence correspond to the motion of intermittent attraction and repulsion sensed by the beholder of the sublime. In one of the central passages of the “Analytik des Erhabenen,” Kant distinguishes the feeling of the sublime from that of beauty through consideration of the factors of “motion” and “vibration”:\textsuperscript{142}

Das Gemüt fühlt sich in der Vorstellung des Erhabenen in der Natur bewegt: da es in dem ästhetischen Urteile über das Schöne derselben in ruhiger Kontemplation ist. Diese Bewegung kann (vornehmlich in ihrem Anfange) mit einer Erschütterung verglichen werden, d. i. mit einem schnellwechselnden Abstoßen und Anziehen eben desselben Objekts.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{142} Motion” and “vibration” are the terms used by Bernard to translate “Bewegung” and “Erschütterung.” Immanuel Kant, \textit{Critique of Judgement}, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1951) 97.

\textsuperscript{143} Kritik der Urteilskraft, 181.
The qualities of piousness and timidity attached to Hans’s sensations of “Erschütterung” and “Erregung” denote the humility that comprises the same experience. As Kant explains: “Selbst die Demut, [. . .], ist eine erhabene Gemütsstimmung, [. . .].”\textsuperscript{144} Castorp’s attitude of pious reverence in nature’s presence is the product of civilized detachment; it is therefore fully “sentimentalisch” – a factor that directly recalls Schiller’s description of the feeling of natural awe in the opening lines of \textit{Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung}:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

The connection is significant. The love Schiller claims we experience in nature’s presence would indicate an aesthetic appreciation of the beautiful. “Das Schöne bereitet uns vor, etwas, selbst die Natur, ohne Interesse zu lieben,” says Kant.\textsuperscript{145} Schiller’s exclusion of taste (“Geschmack”) from the experience nonetheless explicity disqualifies the supposition. “\textit{Geschmack} ist das Beurteilungsvermögen eines Gegenstandes oder einer Vorstellungsort durch ein Wohlgefallen, oder Mißfallen, \textit{ohne alles Interesse}. Der Gegenstand eines solchen Wohlgefallens heißt schön.”\textsuperscript{146} The “rührende[ ] Achtung”

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 188.

\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 193.
that Schiller also says we dedicate to nature makes it clear that he is speaking of something approaching the sublime, since Kant claims that the latter prepares us to hold the object of aesthetic experience in high regard: "es, selbst wider unser (sinnliches) Interesse, hochzuschätzen."\textsuperscript{147} A feeling of sublimity punctuates Hans Castorp’s initial experience of nature in “Schnee” – a feeling whose depth of piousness describes its fulfillment of the conditions of the sublime in Schiller and Kant.

Such a feeling of reverence before nature arises from the perspective of isolation with which the modern beholder’s experience of it commences. Schiller indicates sentimental detachment from nature as a precondition for the sensation of the sublime. He makes it clear that he is speaking of modern – thus sentimental – humanity, when he states that the natural objects that produce the described feelings of respect “sind, was wir waren; sie sind, was wir wieder werden sollen.” And he continues: “Sie sind also zugleich Darstellung unserer verlorenen Kindheit, die uns ewig das Teuerste bleibt; daher sie uns mit einer gewissen Wehmut erfüllen. Zugleich sind sie Darstellungen unserer höchsten Vollendung im Ideale, daher sie uns in eine erhabene Rührung versetzen” (SW 5, 695).\textsuperscript{148} Kant alludes to the same consideration to the point of stating that sublime judgements of nature depend on culture – i.e. that “das Urteil über das Erhabene der Natur Kultur bedarf.”\textsuperscript{149} Kant furthermore adds that the object of the sublime produces a

\textsuperscript{146}Kritik der Urteilskraft, 124.

\textsuperscript{147}Kritik der Urteilskraft, 193.

\textsuperscript{148}Kant says pretty much the same thing in the Kritik der Urteilskraft: “Man kann das Erhabene so beschreiben: es ist ein Gegenstand (der Natur), dessen Vorstellung das Gemüt bestimmt, sich die Unerreichtbarkeit der Natur als Darstellung von Ideen zu denken.” Kritik der Urteilskraft, 193.

\textsuperscript{149}Kritik der Urteilskraft, 190.
“rührendes Wohlgefallen” in its beholder through representation of the idea of totality.

“Denn es ist hier ein Gefühl der Unangemessenheit seiner Einbildungskraft für die Ideen eines Ganzen, um sie darzustellen, worin die Einbildungskraft ihr Maximum erreicht, und, bei der Bestrebung, es zu erweitern, in sich selbst zurücksinkt, dadurch aber in ein rührendes Wohlgefallen gesetzt wird.”

Castorp’s “religiöse Furcht” and Schiller’s “Art von […] rührender Achtung” fulfill Kant’s stipulation for the feeling of the sublime in nature:

Also ist das Gefühl des Erhabenen in der Natur Achtung für unsere eigene Bestimmung, die wir einem Objekte der Natur durch eine gewisse Subreption (Verwechslung einer Achtung für das Objekt statt der für die Idee der Menschheit in unserm Subjekte) beweisen, welches uns die Überlegenheit der Vernunftbestimmung unserer Erkenntnisvermögen über das größte Vermögen der Sinnlichkeit gleichsam anschaulich macht.

The Zaubерberg’s narrator also describes the beauty “im winterlichen Gebirge” as “zwar ohne Donnerlärm, sondern in Totenstille, doch ganz verwandte Ehrfurchtsgfühle erweckend” (GW 3, 656). The allusion to “Donnerlärm” recalls Kant’s description of the power of “sich auftürmende Donnerwolken, mit Blitzen und Krachen einherziehend” to exercise a diminishing effect upon our faculty of resistance under the influence of the “Dynamisch-Erhabene[,] der Natur.”

---

150 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 174.

151 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 180.

152 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 184-85.
erupts in the “Donnerschlag” and brings Mann’s novel to its conclusion. For Kant, the experience of the sublime is, by definition, founded on feeling. Kant’s sublime feeling is nevertheless one in which reason’s domination of sensuality takes form through the control it holds on the faculty of imagination.\footnote{For Kant’s express reference to the power of imagination as the greatest sensual faculty, see \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 180-81.} In contrast, it seems that neither Schiller nor Mann deems Kant’s feeling of the sublime to adequately encompass the entirety of emotions with which one encounters nature.

The Kantian sublime founds itself on an immediate tension between imagination and reason. Without elaborating on the point in the actual sections on the dynamically sublime, Kant does ascribe to the latter the reference through the imagination of the mind’s subjective movement to the faculty of desire (“Begehungsvermögen”).\footnote{\textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 168-69.} It should be noted, however, that this is a mediated – thus indirect – relationship. Schiller’s “Liebe” – and Castorp’s erotic attraction to nature to an even greater degree – seem to represent an unmediated relationship between the natural object and the emotions of the subject. As the foregoing paragraph demonstrates, Schiller adds “Liebe” and “Wehmut” to the emotions of the sublime natural encounter. When the narrator of the \textit{Zauberberg} states that Castorp’s “religiöse Furcht” determines his “ganzes Empfindungsverhältnis” to nature down to the bottom (\textit{GW} 3, 658), he is describing the totality of Castorp’s experience of the sublime in language quite close to that employed by Kant. As Kant observes, both the attempt to make nature comprehensible to the senses and the idea’s inaccessibility to the imagination, “nötigt uns, subjektiv die Natur selbst in ihrer Totalität,
als Darstellung von etwas Übersinnlichem, zu *denken*, ohne diese Darstellung *objektiv* zu Stande bringen zu können." 155 Yet Castorps confrontation of the elements also dilates to the sphere of totality the aspect of love in Schiller’s natural encounter. Even more, the "scheue Erregung in seiner Seele," as I will show, escalates into an erotic desire to penetrate the elements. Castorps sublimely detached attitude of loving reverence degenerates into raw confrontational lust – evidence of a loosening of the bonds of repression that prepares his coming feelings of the uncanny. Through the inclusion of the erotic, it seems, Mann disrupts the reasonably controlled, spiritual equilibrium represented in Kant’s feeling of the sublime and forces a shift into the domain of the uncanny and terror.

The wish to reconcile the opposed halves of a concept of humanity represented in the theories of Naphta and Settembrini has a morally transcendent — thus sublime — goal, whereas Castorps desire to confront nature’s deadly terror has patently sensual motives. These dual aims provide the impetus for Hans’s ascent into the snow. The narrator thus explains that Hans Castorp

[. . . ] hegte zwei Wünsche: der stärkste davon war der, mit seinen Gedanken und Regierungsgeschäften allein zu sein. Der andere aber, verbunden mit jenem, galt lebhaft einer inniger-freieren Berührung mit dem schneeverwüsteten Gebirge, für das er Teilnahme gefaßt hatte, und dieser Wunsch war unerfüllbar, solange ein unbewehrter und unbeschwingter Fußgänger es war, der sich mit ihm trug. (*GW* 3, 653)

155 *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 194.
In addition to Castorp’s stronger moral desire to seek the answer to the question of the “Homo Dei” in solitude, whose fulfillment presently existing circumstances – however inadequately – nonetheless partially provide for, Hans also possesses a sensual need for interaction (or “Berührung”) with the natural elements. In accordance with sublime experience’s dual tension between reason and sensuality, Castorp sets off on his skis in “Schnee” in compliance with a demand of both intellect and will. His intellectual motivation, though stronger, is tempered by his capacity to pursue it from his loge. It is nonetheless unable to compete, it appears, with Hans Castorp’s far-more-urgent corporeal desire for natural contact, thus setting the stage for the overwhelming of reason by sensuality that constitutes the operational basis of uncanny experience.

In the scenes of natural encounter in the alpine setting of “Schnee,” Hans Castorp’s “Sympathie mit dem Tode” transforms itself from a passive affinity into an active erotic drive. His craving for contact with fearsome natural forces has remained in his disposition from the time of his visits to the island of Sylt: “Von dorther kannte der junge Mann das Begeisterungsglück leichter Liebesberührungen mit Mächten, deren volle Umarmung vernichtend sein würde” (GW 3, 658). Hans’s infatuation with confronting nature’s awesome power expresses itself as a passion for tempting danger. Castorp’s lust for danger draws his attention to the similarity between skiing into the

---

156 In her novel and revealing analysis, Nenno selectively concentrates her focus on Castorp’s sensual desire to the complete exclusion of its morally founded counterpart, thus claiming: “Hans Castorp is drawn to the vision of the mountains because of his desire for proximity to them.” Nenno, “Projections on Blank Space,” 313. Her observation is justified within her analysis’s limited scope, although her failure to take the moral half of Castorp’s attraction to the alpine landscape into consideration does little justice to her earlier observation of the Alps’ connotations within European tradition of sublimity and freedom. Cf. Nenno, 309-11. Both of these latter factors’ relevance to Der Zauberberg becomes most evident through Hans Castorp’s pursuit of the answer to the ethical problem of the “Homo Dei” in the originally unconstrained solitude of the Alps.
wilderness and swimming out into the sea’s boundlessness – an activity whose
description metonymically alludes to the sexual act through the acts of the brush
(“Berührung”), embrace (“Umarmung”), and intercourse (“Verkehr”):

Was [Hans Castorp] aber nicht gekannt hatte, war die Neigung, diese begeisternde
Berührung mit der tödlichen Natur so weit zu verstärken, daß die volle
Umarmung drohte, – als ein schwaches, wenn auch bewaffnetes und von der
Zivilisation leidlich ausgestattetes Menschenkind, das er war, sich so weit ins
Ungeheuerliche vorzuwagen, oder doch so lange nicht davor zu fliehen, bis der
Verkehr das Kritische streifte und ihm kaum noch beliebig Grenzen zu setzen
waren, bis es sich nicht mehr um Schaumauslauf und leichten Prankenschlag
handelte, sondern um die Welle, den Rachen, das Meer. (GW 3, 658-59)

Mann’s use of language that ambivalently alludes to the erotic in Castorp’s natural
encounter is, with the exception of the word “embrace,” fully absent from Lowe-Porter’s
English translation.\textsuperscript{157} Woods’s more recent translation suffers the same defect.\textsuperscript{158} Hans
Castorp’s complaint to Joachim upon first arriving at the Berghof that he finds the
mountain range “’nicht so überwältigend’” (GW 3, 18) appears in context to reveal a
latent desire to become overcome by sublime experience. Hans’s sporting with the

\textsuperscript{157} What he had not then felt was the temptation to come closer, to carry the thrilling contact with
these deadly natural forces up to a point where the full embrace was imminent. Weak human being that he
was – though tolerably well equipped with the weapons of civilization – what he at this moment knew was
the fascination of venturing just so far into the monstrous unknown, or at least abstaining just so long from
flight before it, that the adventure grazed the perilous, that it was just barely possible to put limits to it,
before it became no longer a matter of toying with the foam and playfully dodging the ruthless paw – but
the ultimate adventure, the billow, the lion’s jaws, and the sea.” Thomas Mann, \textit{The Magic Mountain},

elements is the outward manifestation of a barely hidden interplay between the

_Liebestrieb_ and _Todestrieb_ – the fundamental instincts that Freud holds to be inseparable.\(^{159}\)

Mann also combines parallel aspects of both drives in the duelling scene of “Die große Gereiztheit.” His journal entry of Friday, 13 February 1920 thus records the fact that Mann: “dachte vor an das Duell, das nicht nur geistigen Haß, sondern Pädagogen-Rivalität (quasi-erotisch) zum Motiv hat.”\(^{160}\) Both episodes make an allusive connection – although in markedly different ways – between the erotic component in the act of paying court and the potential deadliness of courting with the forces of destruction. Castorp’s quasi-erotic dance with the forces of nature thus – in addition to being an experience of the sublime – also contains an element of sublimation. Frustrated by the absence of the object of his desire, Chauchat, from all possibility for direct release, Castorp’s sexual energy seems to expend itself symbolically in courting the natural elements. Freud defines the capacity for sublimation as the “Fähigkeit, das ursprünglich sexuelle Ziel gegen ein anderes, nicht mehr sexuelles, aber psychisch mit ihm verwandtes, zu vertauschen” (Ges. _W_. 7, 150). Hans observes the bluish light in the marks that the baskets of his ski poles make in the snow and finds it “geheimnisvoll anziehend.” It reminds him of “das Licht und die Farbe gewisser Augen, schicksalsblickender Schrägaugen, [..] Hippe’s und Clawdia Chauchats Augen” (GW 3,

\(^{159}\)Ellenberger, 513.

\(^{160}\)Thomas Mann, _Tagebücher: 1918-1921_, hrsg. v. Peter de Mendelssohn (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1979) 378.
Lubich suggests that by projecting the figure of Chauchat onto the snowscape, Castorp transforms it into a “paysage sexualisé” rather than a battlefield. Castorp’s ability to imagine the snowscape and his confrontation of natural power in terms both of his love object and a sexual act displays an unusually strong capacity for sublimation. His direct confrontation of the forces of nature, although – if it indeed ultimately contributes to the production of his sublime “Schneevision” – nevertheless conjures forth uncanny natural powers en route to its goal. Eros and Thanatos – the underlying psychological motivations for Hans Castorp’s excursion on the snowscape – conceal themselves not only in the trappings of the sportsman’s defiance of the elements; they also assume the aesthetic guise of the dynamically sublime.

Through an implementation of aesthetic technique that might be regarded as an ironic twist (since Mann has the figure of Hans physically describe the motion of feelings under the influence of the sublime), Mann elevates to its zenith the element of the sublime invoked in Castorp’s expedition into the snow. Yet Hans’s motion ultimately assumes the aspect of flight, thus transforming his natural environment – the object of his sublime feelings – into a manifest object of terror. Castorp’s reaction to the silent emptiness presented to him by the alpine wilderness recalls Kant’s description of the sublime through the “beständig vonmme Erschütterung und scheue Erregung in seiner Seele” that characterizes his pious awe, or “religiöse Furcht” (see above, p.108). Might

---

161 Nenna thematically compares the Zauberberg’s “seductive mountain light” with Leni Riefenstahl’s Bergfilme’s subsequent cinematic association of a “romanticized and mythologized Alpinescape” with subtly eroticized “feminine imagery.” Nenna, “Projections on Blank Space,” 316.

the skiing Castorp be regarded as an enactment of the vacillating motion Kant ascribes to the sublime – perhaps even as a slightly too literal, even comic interpretation of the same? I would argue that in a certain sense he is. For just as his behind-the-back flight from the protective authorities of the Berghof repeats the same course as the repressed drives of neurosis, so Hans Castorp’s motion through the snowy void provides a protracted display of the elements of intermittent attraction and repulsion, or “Erschütterung,” with which Kant characterizes the sublime. Rather than more or less passively allowing the sublime to act its powers of attraction and repulsion upon his contemplative spirit, Castorp allows himself to be drawn physically and mentally into a contest with nature in which his determination to proceed vacillates with his desire to take flight. Hans is tempted in his penetration of the wilderness by a “Großes Gebirge, dessen weich gepolsterte Schluchten und Pässe so zugänglich und lockend schienen,” and by the “Lockung der Fernen und Höhen” (GW 3, 664). Equally pressing sensations of fear nevertheless counter his environment’s alluring effect on him (GW 3, 664). The unreasoned foolhardiness of his excursion’s continuation expresses itself most clearly in the attitude of “Herausforderung” through which he represses his feelings of trepidation (GW 3, 665). Hans is tempted to surrender himself to the “Unklarheit” of the falling snow, while at the same time realizing that his attitude is that of one who gets caught in a snowstorm “‘und nicht mehr heimfindet’” (GW 3, 669). His performance or “acting out” of the vacillating movement of the sublime consequently exercises a fundamentally destabilizing effect on the latter’s elemental components. For by actively succumbing to the force of nature’s seduction, thereby allowing it to gain the initial advantage over
reason, Castorp permits the hegemonic relationship maintained by reason under Kant’s feeling of the sublime to be stood on its head.

The sublime is characterized by the hegemony that reason or the mind holds over nature – a hegemony that Castorp forfeits by progressively yielding to nature’s powers of disorientation and imperilment. For under the mathematically sublime, reason holds sway – through its capacity to provide unity to the perception – over the faculty of imagination’s incapacity to fully account for nature’s enormity as a totality.\textsuperscript{163} The feeling of the sublime in nature thus makes intuitively clear “die Überlegenheit der Vernunftbestimmung unserer Erkenntnisvermögen über das größte Vermögen der Sinnlichkeit” – or in other words, our “Einbildungskraft.”\textsuperscript{164} Under the dynamically sublime, the mind (“Gemüt”) shows its undaunted resistance to the terrifying might of nature. Although the “Unwiderstehlichkeit” of nature’s might reveals our physical powerlessness, it simultaneously exposes “ein Vermögen, uns als von ihr unabhängig zu beurteilen” – displaying, in the process, our possession of “eine Überlegenheit über die Natur.”\textsuperscript{165} Everything that appeals to “der bloß reflektierende Urteilskraft” should please “ohne Interesse.”\textsuperscript{166} It consequently stands to reason that anyone who fears (“sich fürchtet”) is incapable of passing judgement on the sublime in nature (“das Erhabene der Natur”).\textsuperscript{167} Since the feeling of the mathematically sublime is a “Bewegung des Gemüts”

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 180. Cf. also \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 178.

\textsuperscript{164} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 180.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 185-86.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 175.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 185.
that by means of the imagination refers to the "Erkenntnisvermögen,"\textsuperscript{168} it would consequently seem to hold that any hindrance of one's perception of space would disrupt one's experience of the sublime. The further Hans Castorp skis in "Schnee," the more he loses his spirit of defiance and clarity of outlook, however. The qualities of lucidity and courage that initially provide his experience of nature with sublimity yield to others that are distinctly not sublime: feelings of fear, unclarity of vision, and an incapacity to clearly piece together the natural events transpiring around him.

The clarity of vision and feelings of intrepidity that initially provide the quality of mathematic and dynamic sublimity to Castorp's natural encounter begin to surrender, in accordance with the spatial progression of the skier, to conditions of obscurity and trepidation that give rise to feelings other than that of the sublime:

Ja, die Lockung der Fernen und Höhen, der immer neu sich auftuenden

Einsamkeiten war stark in Hans Castorps Gemüt, und auf die Gefahr, sich zu verspäten, strebte er tiefer ins wilde Schweigen, ins Nichtgeheure, für nichts Gutstehende hinein, – ungeachtet, daß überdies die Spannung und

Beklommenheit seines Inneren zur wirklichen Furcht wurde angesichts der vorzeitig zunehmenden Himmelsdunkelheit, die sich wie graue Schleier auf die Gegend herabsenkte. (GW 3, 664)

The sublime feeling produced in the temporary fugitive from the Berghof founds itself on a dichotomy between pleasure and displeasure as in Kant. The fear he feels before the might of nature's forces qualifies nature, in Kantian terms, as an object of the

\textsuperscript{168} Kritik der Urteilskraft, 168.
dynamically sublime: "Also kann für die ästhetische Urteilskraft die Natur nur sofern als Macht, mithin dynamisch-erhaben, gelten, sofern sie als Gegenstand der Furcht betrachtet wird."\textsuperscript{169} Yet such natural might is only dynamically sublime in so far as it is "Macht, die über uns keine Gewalt hat."\textsuperscript{170} As Hans Castorp allows nature’s attraction to draw him deeper into its unbounded space, the dynamic factor of transition from day to night lends the experience dynamically sublime feeling that repulses him with sensations of fear that threaten to push his sublime experience beyond its limits.

Hans Castorp’s motion surrenders him over to a natural might that strains sublime experience to the point of rupture through an overaccentuation of its own dynamic quality that consequently transforms the visually bounded expanse of nature into an inscrutably limitless void. Castorp’s experience of his natural alpine environment possesses the mathematically sublime character of overpowering magnitude through the distant and elevated expanses implicitly measured by its "Fernen und Höhen," mentioned just above. Schopenhauer describes the “Eindruck des Mathematisch-Erhabenen” as the experience of a natural space that “nach allen drei Dimensionen mit seiner ganzen Größe auf uns wirkt” (\textit{WWV} 1, 278). Schopenhauer lists as examples of spaces that produce such feeling: “sehr hohe Berge, Aegyptische Pyramiden, kolossale Ruinen von hohem Alterthume.” But he places on the mathematically sublime the following restriction: “Dies kann ein für die Wahrnehmung leerer Raum nie, daher nie ein offener, sondern nur ein durch die Begränzung nach allen Dimensionen unmittelbar wahrnehmbarer, also ein

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 184.

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 184.
sehr hohes und großes Gewölbe, wie das der Peterskirche in Rom, oder der Paulskirche in London" (WWV 1, 278).\textsuperscript{171} The experience of the mathematically sublime thus provides a sense of enclosure to aesthetic perception that Hans’s unrestrained exploration of the surrounding space’s bounds and the transition from day to night both imperil with disruption.

Hans Castorp’s passionate penetration of the elements and the latters’ increasingly menacing qualities of tempestuousness and coming darkness transgress the bounds of the sublime in production of feelings of consummate subjection to imperilment. Both Mann’s protagonist and his environment conspire through their movements to disrupt the sensation of the dynamically sublime that is only sustainable so long as nature’s might fails to pose an actual threat to Hans’s safety. Frizen states:

\begin{quote}
Die ästhetische Betrachtung bannt die drohende Macht des numerisch Extremen, indem sie auf das Wunschziel des Todes verweist: durch Anschauung der eigenen Bestimmung wandelt sich das negative Lustgefühl in ein Positivum. Beide Gleichniswerte des Meeressymbols, der ästhetische und der nihilistische, erscheinen so im”Zauberberg” in einer eigentümlichen Symbolfusion: Über den Begriff des Erhabenen wird auch das Gebirge zum Symbol des Nichts, zur tödlichen Landschaft, während sich nach Buddenbrooks’ Meinung in den Bergen noch die Kinder tollten.\textsuperscript{172}
\end{quote}

Relying on Schopenhauer’s description of the mathematically sublime, Frizen makes an argumentative attempt to preserve the conditions of the sublime in Castorp’s experience

\textsuperscript{171}See also Frizen, 294.
of nature through reference to “das Wunschziel des Todes.” As Thanatos, however, the latter is clearly representative of irrationality, so its emergence from within the sphere of sublime experience cannot fail to utterly offset reason’s hegemony over the relationship that – for Kant and Schopenhauer alike – is a precondition of the sublime. Frizen furthermore fails to address the fact that Castorp’s experience of both sea and mountains as “Nichts” derives from the activity of dynamically surrendering himself over to their might. Frizen might be correct in stating that “Die ästhetische Betrachtung bannt die drohende Macht des numerisch Extremen,” but Hans’s experience of the alpine landscape as a “Nichts” is no longer aesthetic observation, but dynamic penetration. Rather than banning the threat of the numerically extreme through his concealed death wish, Hans Castorp involves himself in a “Totentanz” in which nature’s infinite expansiveness conceals itself behind the dynamic menace of a violent blizzard and approaching dusk. The stipulated conditions of the mathematically sublime crumble as nature transforms itself into a boundless void. Hans Castorp’s sublime experience sustains itself briefly as dynamically sublime anticipation of nature’s might, but once he abandons himself to the latter’s tempestuous violence, the resulting conditions of peril transform his mathematically and dynamically sublime experience into an uncanny bout with natural terror.

The monumental distinction in Hans’s experience of the sublime resides in the reverse positions occupied by his feelings of pleasure and displeasure in relationship to the positions taken by those feelings in Kant’s description of the phenomenon:

\[172\] Frizen, 294.
Das Gefühl des Erhabenen ist also ein Gefühl der Unlust, aus der Unangemessenheit der Einbildungskraft in der ästhetischen Größenschätzung, zu der Schätzung durch die Vernunft, und eine dabei zugleich erweckte Lust, aus der Übereinstimmung eben dieses Urteils der Unangemessenheit des größten sinnlichen Vermögens mit Vernunftideen, sofern die Bestrebung zu denselben doch für uns Gesetz ist.\textsuperscript{173}

The sensation of displeasure in Kant’s sublime is a product of sensuality’s incapacity to measure up to the power of reason. The feeling of pleasure in the same is contingent upon an effort to achieve reason as a goal. What transpires in Hans Castorp manifests itself as a complete reversal of the elements of the Kantian sublime. The feeling of pleasure experienced by the \textit{Zauberberg}’s protagonist derives from the inscrutability of nature’s greatness, i. e. from the overwhelming power exercised by the sensual “Nichts” over reason. In addition to referring to the snowstorm against which Castorp struggles as the “Nichtgeheure, für nichts Gutstehende” (noted directly above), the narrator also calls it “das dunstige Nichts” (\textit{GW} 3, 660), thus emphasizing its intellectual impenetrability. Hans Castorp’s penetration of the snowy void is a pleasure-producing sensual discharge of sublimated erotic energy. Were he to maintain a controlling influence on his activity by pursuing a well-reasoned course, one might consequently be able to ascribe to it the quality of the sublime, yet he does nothing of the kind. Castorp’s feelings of displeasure arise from a growing dissonance between the reasonably ascertained approach of nightfall and the sensual fear that mounts with every stride in the wrong direction his

\textsuperscript{173} \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, 180-81.
misguided striving takes him. For the striving of the Kantian sublime is toward
“Vernunftideen.” Castorp’s, in contrast, takes him ever deeper “ins wilde Schweigen, ins
Nichtgeheure, für nichts Gutstehende hinein,” or into the irrational realm of impending
natural violence and the uncanny. Through active interaction with the sensual elements
of the dynamically sublime, Hans Castorp relinquishes reason’s superiority and his own
security – perhaps the two most essential ingredients in the production of sublime
feeling.174 In Castorp’s intended experience of the sublime in “Schnee,” Mann provides a
new dynamic by setting his hero in motion, thus jostling the Kantian elements toward the
production of an effect of “Erschütterung” of dramatically heightened magnitude – the
nervous shock of the sublime’s opposite: the uncanny.

Reason’s maintenance of ascendancy over the aesthetic experience characterizes
both Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s descriptions of the sublime, although the latters’
examination of the element of fear underlying the relationship is more thorough. “Die
Natur in stürmischer Bewegung,” explains Schopenhauer, “Helldunkel, durch drohende
schwarze Gewitterwolken,” and similar naturally threatening circumstances provide the
setting for our experience of the dynamically sublime:

Unsere Abhängigkeit, unser Kampf mit der feindlichen Natur, unser darin
gebrochener Wille, tritt uns jetzt anschaulich vor Augen: so lange aber nicht die
persönliche Bedrängnis die Oberhand gewinnt, sondern wir in ästhetischer
Beschauung bleiben, blickt durch jenen Kampf der Natur, durch jenes Bild des
gebrochenen Willens, das reine Subjekt des Erkennens durch und faßt ruhig,

174Cf. especially, Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 185-86.
unerschüttert, nicht mitgetroffen (unconcerned), an eben den Gegenständen, welche dem Willen drohend und furchtbar sind, die Ideen auf. In diesem Kontrast eben liegt das Gefühl des Erhabenen. (WWV 1, 276)

The experience of the sublime transpires only under conditions of the containment of will and fear. Observation of natural menace heightens the observer’s sublime experience, but only so long as the observer maintains a position of safety from which to calmly contemplate nature’s spectacle. Both Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s descriptions of the sublime thus underscore the observer’s position of detachment. As seen above, Castorp brushes the critical borderline between safety and fear when venturing out into the waves on the island of Sylt. He fully oversteps this borderline in “Schnee” with his penetration of the threateningly incomprehensible void of his alpine environment. Schopenhauer could easily be describing Hans Castorp’s predicament in the Zaubergeb, when he observes:

Träte ein realer einzelner Willensakt ins Bewußtseyn, durch wirkliche, persönliche Bedrängniss und Gefahr vom Gegenstande; so würde der also wirklich bewegte individuelle Wille alsbald die Oberhand gewinnen, die Ruhe der Kontemplation unmöglich werden, der Eindruck des Erhabenen verloren gehen, indem er der Angst Platz macht, in welcher das Streben des Individuums, sich zu retten, jeden andern Gedanken verdrängte. (WWV 1, 273)

Hans Castorp’s challenge of the elements is the “Willensakt” that places him in peril. Through blindly obedient submission to the misguidance of his deluded imagination, a potentially destructive will, and fear, Hans forfeits the hegemony wielded by reason over
sublime experience. The deeper Castorp strives into the chaotic abyss of “Schnee,” the more his faculty of reason succumbs to the bewildering power of imagination and the more violently his feelings of pleasure are subsequently toppled by unsettling sensations of the uncanny.

Hans Castorp thus experiences in “Schnee” a momentary attitude of piousness toward nature that embraces the entirety of his emotions. The dynamic component that his physical motion provides to the experience nonetheless conjures forth the instincts of Eros and Thanatos and subjects him increasingly to nature’s seduction – to the point that his reverent sensation of sublimity yields to feelings of abject terror. Hans’s motion imperils the mathematically sublime’s enclosure of aesthetic perception, creating instead a short-lived sensation of the dynamically sublime that he also destroys through submission to nature’s might. Hans Castorp’s skiing motion reverses the elements of reason and sensuality that compose sublime feeling, consequently subjecting him in its place to a consummate experience of the uncanny.

1.5. Pathetic Fallacy, Animistic Projection, and the Uncanny.

In the Zauberkür’s “Schnee” episode, a reversal of perceptions occurs that corresponds to the faculty of imagination’s gradual extortion from reason of the latter’s domination of Castorp’s sublime experience. Hans’s cognitive relationship to his snowy environment undergoes a shift from a nearly objective consideration of the inanimate indifference of nature to the subjectively created perception of a nature instilled with

\[175\] "Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken zu können ein Vermögen des Gemüts beweiset, das jeden Maßstab der Sinne übertrifft." *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 172.
destructively inimical spirit. The intensity of Hans's progressively increasing emotional involvement in his battle with the elements exhibits itself in the skier's pathological ascription of his own state of heightened animation to the natural forces he confronts. He enlivens the tumult of natural chaos by projecting aspects of the animate into its every motion. Hans consequently makes the deception complete by frantically transforming the natural forces within and without him into anthropomorphically concrete beings with whom he is engaged in a life and death struggle. Hans Castorp thus temporarily regresses to a primitive, instinctually dominated mode of thought whose depersonalizing, secret tyrannization of his behavior gives him insight — as self-made victim — into the macabre workings of the uncanny.

From the safety of his loge, Castorp acquires a foretaste of his later subjection to nature's uncanny powers of deception in "Schnee." Mann's narrator underscores the necessity of maintaining one's alertness against the secret, alternately revealing and elusive alpine forces that Hans beholds in the panorama before him:

Man mußte scharf achtgeben, um die Schleier-Phantasmagorie in ihren heimlichen Wandlungen zu belauschen. Wild und groß zeigte sich, frei im Dunste, eine Felsgebirgspartei, von der weder Gipfel noch Fuß zu sehen war. Aber da man sie nur eine Minute aus den Augen gelassen, war sie entschwunden.

(GW 3, 652)

Hans Castorp's observation of the Alps from a guarded perspective gives him an objective preview of the phantasmagoria to whose influence he succumbs upon physically committing himself to their potentially treacherous environment.
Hans’s initiation into uncanny experience in “Schnee” begins gradually. As he embarks on his excursion, the “Urschweigen” (GW 3, 657) Castorp experiences in nature’s presence bears a subtle suggestion of personification – particularly since “Schweigen” is unimaginable without an implied faculty of speech. Mann lends the same trait to nature in his poem, “Zweimaliger Abschied” – a poem through whose entire course the motif of “Schweigen” runs like a predominant thread.\(^{176}\) Nature, as Castorp encounters it, tolerates his presence with apathetic indifference:

> Nein, diese Welt in ihrem bodenlosen Schweigen hatte nichts Wirtliches, sie empfing den Besucher auf eigene Rechnung und Gefahr, sie nahm ihn nicht eigentlich an und auf, sie duldete sein Eindringen, seine Gegenwart auf eine nicht geheuere, für nichts gutstehende Weise, und Gefühle des still bedrohlich Elementaren, des nicht einmal Feindseligen, vielmehr des Gleichgültig-Tödlichen waren es, die von ihr ausgingen. (GW 3, 657-58)

\(^{176}\)The lovers, that “wanderten und schwiegen mit dem Meer,” seem almost to be obeying a natural command – that of the sea – “das still und schwarz und schwiegend im Unbegrenzten sich verlor.” GW 8, 1102. Both the “Schnee” passage and the poem evoke the supernatural through employment of the same, subtly nuanced figure of speech. Nature, or the sea, may be still, but “Schweigen” as applied to either case implies intention and is therefore inaccurate. Is it possible to imagine a sea that “still and black and without utterance lost itself in limitlessness”? The sea may be still and black (or appear so to the beholder). But it may only appear to refrain from utterance. (Its waves may emit sound, but to state that the sea itself is capable of uttering anything is technically inaccurate.) Finally, the sea may only appear to lose itself in limitlessness. Every sea’s limits are strictly set by the landmasses that surround it and the rocks and coral that lie at its depths. A sea may become lost from view, but only with regard to an animate object. A sea neither loses nor finds itself. A sea simply is. The apparent limitlessness thus ascribed in Mann’s poem to the sea arises from the limited subjective vision of the lovers experiencing it. On closer examination, Mann’s use of enhancement (or Steigerung) reveals not only a very human tendency of his poem’s subjects and his empathetic readers to identify – through projection – with their environment. It exposes a very natural tendency – particularly when such originally human forces as the instincts (in this case, those of love) come into play – to regress to former, more primitive states of comprehension in which there is little or no difference between perceiver and perceived.
The just-noted tendency to lend nature the qualities of the animate appears once again in the foregoing passage: nature is said to receive its visitor with threatening indifference, as if nature under other conditions might prefer to display an aspect of benevolence. Hans’s low estimation of nature’s manner (“für nichts gutstehende Weise”) of receiving him contradicts the high estimation of the natural object that characterizes the sublime. Kant explains how the sublime “bereitet uns vor, etwas, selbst die Natur, […] selbst wider unser (sinnliches) Interesse, hochzuschätzen.”¹⁷⁷ Nature receives Castorp into its presence “auf eine nicht geheure” (i.e., in an eerie) manner. Both this action of receiving and the notion that feelings of “deadly indifference” might emanate from “diese Welt” are fully imaginary. One discerns already the subject’s experience of the sublime yielding control to an animistic tendency and feelings of the uncanny. As Kristeva notes, the experience of the uncanny is marked by a fundamental shift in perception. Under the alteration in mental outlook that forms the basis of uncanny feeling, one no longer apprehends nature’s powers through the rationally mediated language of symbol. One yields instead to an unmediated experience of natural might based purely on imagination:

Le symbole cesse d’être symbole et “revêt toute l’efficience et toute la signification du symbolisé.” En d’autres termes, le signe n’est pas vécu comme arbitraire, mais prend une importance réelle. En conséquence, la réalité matérielle que le singe devait couramment indiquer s’effrite au profit de l’imagination, qui

¹⁷⁷Kritik der Urteilskraft, 193.
n'est que "l'accentuation excessive de la réalité psychique par rapport à la réalité matérielle.""}\footnote{Julia Kristeva, Étrangers à nous-mêmes (N.p.: Gallimard, 1988) 275. For the original passages

As Hans Castorp sets out on his jaunt in "Schnee," he grasps the reality of nature's disinterestedness in his well-being – yet the objective realization that indicates reason's active domination of his sense faculties begins to show noticeable evidence of yielding to subjective feelings of foreboding. Reason's active objectification of nature gradually cedes ground to a play of imagination that transfers active control over the relationship from Hans, the observer, to nature, the wellspring of potentially destructive violence.

The further Hans proceeds into the wilderness and the more he becomes baffled by the elements, the greater his inclination to ascribe to nature the qualities of the animate. Hans's perception of nature's restfulness, it should be noted, is most intense when he is at rest himself: "Die Stille, wenn er regungslos stehenblieb, um sich selbst nicht zu hören, war unbedingt und vollkommen, sonst nirgends vorkommend" (GW 3, 657). In a coolly ironic passage, Castorp imaginatively animates the snowstorm with the qualities of living and thinking – a fallacy that the narrator affects to correct with a qualifying remark:

[... der Schneesturm, mit einem Worte, war da, der lange gedroht hatte, wenn man von 'Drohung' sprechen kann in Hinsicht auf blinde und unwissende Elemente, die es nicht darauf abgesehen haben, uns zu vernichten, was vergleichsweise anheimelnd wäre, sondern denen es auf die ungeheuerste Weise gleichgültig ist, wenn das nebenbei mit unterläuft. (GW 3, 665)
Blind and unknowing elements cannot intend on destroying us, says the narrator, recording Castorp’s interpretation of events. He corrects this supposition, however, by observing that the elements are uncannily indifferent. Just as “Schweigen” denotes an implied capacity for speech, impartiality implies the existence of an emotional faculty capable of showing preference. The narrator sneakily suspends one instance of erroneous judgement with another. Here one sees the beginnings of the “fallacy caused by an excited state of the feelings”: the fountainhead of irrationality that Ruskin terms “pathetic fallacy.” Ruskin demonstrates by example alone that his notion of pathetic fallacy applies to any passage of literature that imbues inanimate objects with characteristics of the animate in fulfillment of an authentic urge of pathos. “All violent feelings have the same effect,” he states. “They produce in us a falseness in all our impressions of external things, which I would generally characterize as the ‘pathetic fallacy.’” 179 Hans, says the narrator, corrects his erroneous imputation of an inimical spirit to the elements. While they now only seem to menace him, he fallaciously discerns instead their attitude of utter indifference to his well-being. Inanimate objects are nonetheless as incapable of attitudes of impartiality as they are of attitudes of malice. Inanimate objects do not have any attitudes at all – they simply are. Against the forces of nature’s growing opposition to his forward progress in “Schnee,” Castorp’s intensified emotional involvement in his efforts manifests itself as a progressive tendency to pathetic fallacy, pathological animation of the inanimate, and subsequent feelings not of the sublime, but of the uncanny.

---

The overcoming of the intellect through pathos that characterizes Ruskin’s pathetic fallacy serves as the point of origin for another trend: the seizure by the imagination – in reaction to the disturbing, awesome, and frightening – of the intellect’s individual autonomy. As his forward motion brings him further into the wilderness, Hans perceives the quality of anger in the storm that – “mit seinem wütenden Gegendrucke” – has seemingly deflected him from his course (GW 3, 668). In describing the production of uncanny feeling, Freud notes the emphasis E. Jentsch lays on the “‘Zweifel an der Beseelung eines anscheinend lebendigen Wesens und umgekehrt darüber, ob ein lebloser Gegenstand nicht etwa beseelt sei’” (Ges. W. 12, 237).\(^{180}\) In the blizzard wind’s counteraction of his efforts, Hans believes that he senses the naturally inanimate to be imbued with spiritually inimical forces. His mental reactions border on the experience of the uncanny. Castorp’s misdirected skiing and disorientation bring him to impute his own altered direction and anger to the moodiness of the wind. His irritated imagination deceives him into thinking that the wind, into which he has to face in order to make his way back to the valley (GW 3, 666-70), has temperamentally swung against him, “hatte [. . .] sich wohl launisch gedreht, denn Hans Castorp hatte ihn neuerdings im Rücken” (GW 3, 671). The wind becomes a phantasm whose imagined shift in direction conceals from its perceiver his deviation from his intended course. As in the instance of Nietzsche’s dreamer, whose search for causes to present sensations produces their explanation in dream form, in Hans Castorp’s case, “die vermeintliche Ursache wird aus der Wirkung

erschlossen und nach der Wirkung vorgestellt” (KSA 2, 32-34). Castorp’s animation of nature lays the foundation for the projective ascription to the wind of his own shift in direction through which he effectively deceives intellect and surrenders himself to the unguided instincts’ viciously circular pattern of movement.

Hans Castorp’s deluded perception of a will-imbued power of ascendancy in the wind coincides with his abdication of reason to a second form of compulsion whose source lies within him. Hans’s temptation to rest at this point instills itself with the characteristics of a separate being possessing a particular will and power of rightful assertion – of a maker of pronouncements of incomparable uniqueness, urging, and suggestion in its capacity as representative of death. The “Macht der Versuchung,” says the narrator,

beginnende individuelle Rechte, wollte sich ins allgemein Bekannte nicht einordnen lassen, sich nicht darin wiedererkennen, erklärte sich als einmalig und unvergleichbar in ihrer Dringlichkeit, – ohne freilich leugnen zu können, daß sie eine Zuflüsterung von bestimmter Seite war, die Eingebung eines Wesens in spanischem Schwarz mit schneeweißer, gefälteter Tellerkrause, an dessen Idee und prinzipielle Vorstellung sich allerlei Düsteres, scharf Jesuitisches und Menschenfeindliches knüpfe, allerlei Folter- und Prügelknechtschaft, Herrn Settembrini ein Greuel, als welcher sich aber demgegenüber auch nur lächerlich machte, mit seiner Drehorgel und seiner ragione. . . . (GW 3, 671)

Hans experiences the temptation to yield to exhaustion in the personified form of a lasting mental image of death – “eines Wesens in spanischem Schwarz mit schneeweißer,
gefälteter Tellerkrause" — deeply rooted in personal childhood memory. In addition to his desire to succumb to fatigue, the wind also assumes for Castorp the proportions of an animate being that, as Hans Castorp attempts to step out from under the protection of the shed, chops in at him "wie mit Sensen" — another allusion to death in the aspect of the scythe-bearing reaper (GW 3, 676). Does Castorp's imaginative perception of the wind as a sort of "Sensenmann" have something to do with his schoolyard affair with Pribislav Hippe, whose surname is a variation on the word "Sense," or scythe? His imagination personifies the wind as a "Windsbraut," with whom he advises himself not to quarrel (GW 3, 676-67). Since Castorp projects Hippe and Chauchat onto the surrounding snowscape, it is little wonder, says Nenno, "that Castorp's desire drives him to an encounter with the 'Windsbraut.'" With the increase of the storm's intensity, Hans's sensation of the objectively contemplated, sublime beauty in his natural environment transforms itself into an imaginatively deceptive perception of self and nature as bewildering phantasmagoria. The natural power of the wind and the natural temptation to

---

181 A deep childhood impression is made upon Hans by the painting of his grandfather, Hans Lorenz Castorp, "in seiner Amtsstracht als Ratsherrn der Stadt" — a painting that awakens in the observer "allerlei spanisch-niederländisch-spàtmittelalterliche Vorstellungen." GW 3, 40-41. Hans regards the painting's portrayal of his grandfather wearing a black "Überrock" and a "spanische Krause" "als seine eigentliche und wirkliche [Erscheinung]." GW 3, 40-41. Upon dying, Hans Lorenz wears his " Ehrenkrause"; he is ultimately interred "in seine eigentliche und angemessene Gestalt." GW 3, 42. The pastor that oversees his burial also wears a Spanish frill. GW 3, 45. Hans's early experiences' association of such dress with death seems clear in "Totentanz," when he declares to Joachim: " 'Ich finde, die Welt und das Leben ist danach angetan, daß man sich allgemein schwarz tragen sollte, mit einer gestärkten Halskrause statt eures Kragens, und ernst, gedämpft und förmlich miteinander verkehren im Gedanken an den Tod — so war es mir recht, es wäre moralisch.' " GW 3, 411. Hans declares in "Noch jemand" a connection between the stiff collar of a uniform or " 'eine gestärkte Halskrause' " and the ascetic. GW 3, 525. Finally, in "Operationes spirituales," Hans explains that he has always envisioned death " 'mit einer gestärkten spanischen Krause.' " GW 3, 641.

182 For a fuller explanation of the significance of the name, "Hippe," see below, p.167.

183 Nenno, "Projections on Blank Space," 316.
succumb to fatigue appear to Castorp in “Schnee” as fully personified elemental forces that restrict and compel his physical movements and subject him utterly to their deadly threat.

Hans Castorp’s personification of the naturally elemental is closely linked to his feelings of profound uneasiness – feelings that rightfully bear the name of the uncanny. When Freud speaks of the “Ich-Störungen” in E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Die Elixire des Teufels, he emphasizes the “Rückgreifen auf einzelne Phasen in der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Ich-Gefühls, […] eine Regression in Zeiten, da das Ich sich noch nicht scharf von der Außenwelt und vom Anderen abgegrenzt hatte” (*Ges.W.* 12, 249). The struggling Castorp of “Schnee” also appears to be subject to a regressive affinity for an earlier developmental phase. His animation of the forces within and around him is “die Erfüllung der Welt mit Menschengeister” that typifies the primitive religious system of animism (cf. *Ges.W.* 12, 253). As Kristeva explains: “Magie, animisme ou, plus prosaïquement, ‘incertitude intellectuelle’ et logique ‘déconcertée’ (selon Jentsch) sont tous propices à l’inquiétante étrangeté.”

Hans’s imaginative animation of his surroundings gives fruition to feelings of the uncanny (“l’inquiétante étrangeté”). Symptomatic of the urgency with which Castorp views his situation in “Schnee” is his temporary reversion to a superstitious form of belief that not only undermines reason and reality but also inevitably results in deep feelings of estrangement.

Such a psychological reversion to the level of the instinctual, however, would not be possible without a corresponding destabilization of those forces that hold sensuality in

---

check. The sensation of the uncanny represents the temporary reemergence of a primitive mode of thinking in the mind of the aesthetic subject. Its reassertion of an anciently instinctual cognitive outlook disengages the intellect’s modernly logical, linear manner of viewing the world – that is, its tendency to see worldly events in terms of a linear progression between cause and effect. The return of the repressed’s undermining of reason’s hegemony in subservience to an apocalyptic view of nature lends apparent validity to an ancient mode of thought that saw the periodic dissolution of the individual and society as the natural expression of a law of eternal recurrence.\textsuperscript{185} As such, it represents the re-release of a primitively prevalent form of thought that – under the mediation of reason – has since been relegated to the unconscious. In terms of such considerations, Kristeva declares that Freud’s expansion upon the theme of the uncanny “pouvait conduire à voir dans l’inquiétante étrangeté le blason du fonctionnement inconscient, lui-même tributaire du refoulement [. . .].”\textsuperscript{186} The return of the repressed marks a breakdown in the modernly preferred, reasonable manner of viewing the world in reference to reality’s objective criteria. It signals the reemergence of a primitive mode of regarding it instead from the irrational standpoint of the imagination and instincts. Under the influence of an overly active imagination and perceived powerlessness of reason against nature’s threat, Hans Castorp unconsciously opts in “Schnee” for a fantastic view of reality based on gut feelings to the almost complete exclusion of objective rationality.


\textsuperscript{186}Kristeva, \textit{Étrangers à nous-mêmes}, 274.
What characterizes the uncanny element in Castorp’s personification of nature’s forces is the level of psychic reality with which he imaginatively instills them. In his signal work on the theme, Freud states that “[. . .] es nämlich oft und leicht unheimlich wirkt, wenn die Grenze zwischen Phantasie und Wirklichkeit verwischt wird, wenn etwas real vor uns hintritt, was wir bisher für phantastisch gehalten haben, wenn ein Symbol die volle Leistung und Bedeutung des Symbolisierten übernimmt [. . .]” (Ges.W. 12, 258). Hans believes he views in his urge to yield to fatigue no longer a general idea, but a specifically concrete animate power of temptation (see above, p.131). The power of temptation no longer assumes for Castorp the proportions of a general idea, but of something concretely real. His observation of the general rule against giving in to the temptation to rest diminishes his power of resisting something perceived to be much more concrete. He is confronted with “der lebendig-gegenwärtigen Macht der Versuchung” (GW 3, 671). To use the above-cited words of Freud, the symbol of temptation assumes “die volle Leistung und Bedeutung des Symbolisierten” to immediately uncanny effect. In Totem und Tabu, Freud explains the projective mechanism underlying the animistic “‘Weltanschauung’ der Primitiven”: “Die Projektion innerer Wahrnehmungen nach außen ist ein primitiver Mechanismus, dem z.B. auch unsere Sinneswahrnehmungen unterliegen, der also an der Gestaltung unserer Außenwelt normalerweise den größten Anteil hat” (Ges.W. 9, 81). As noted just above, Castorp’s desire to succumb to exhaustion takes concrete shape as an uncanny conjuration of the childhood memory of his deceased grandfather. His sensations of temptation and fatigue are nourished by an imagination that has temporarily gained
ascendancy over reason. Like the animistic primitive, Castorp’s “Gefühls- und Denkvorgänge[1]” project his “innere Wahrnehmungen [. . .] nach außen” in formation of his external world (Ges. W. 9, 81). Feelings of the uncanny dominate the action in “Schnee” as Castorp – in sheer defiance of the rules of reason – lapses into an animistic, primitive view of the world both around and inside him.

Castorp’s experience of the uncanny while plunging deeper into the chaos of “Schnee” grows in intensity as he views the world not only outside him – but especially within – in increasingly concrete terms. Prior to being tempted by the mortal apparition of fatigue, Hans grasps as reality the existence within himself of another, equally unreasonable propensity to self-disorientation: “Diese Furcht machte ihm bewußt, daß er es heimlich bisher geradezu darauf angelegt hatte, sich um die Orientierung zu bringen und zu vergessen, in welcher Richtung Tal und Ortschaft lagen, was ihm denn auch in erwünschter Vollständigkeit gelungen war” (GW 3, 664). Great stress must be laid on Mann’s use of the term “heimlich” in this passage. Freud observes that the word, “heimlich,” does not possess unequivocal meaning, “sondern zwei Vorstellungskreisen zugehört [. . .], dem des Vertrauten, Behaglichen” – on the one hand, “und dem des Versteckten, Verborgengehaltenen” – on the other (Ges. W. 12, 235).187 Does Hans’s fear in the face of the elements not in a certain sense provide a synthetic understanding of the uncanny that fits the dual definition provided by Freud? Castorp’s urge for self-deception is at once “heimlich” in the sense of “vertraut”: he has held it as a trusted principle. At the same time it has been “heimlich” in the sense of “verborgen,” since he
has somehow let it guide his actions unawares, i.e. unconsciously. He has inadvertently allowed himself to be misguided by an unknown, but trusted motive. As he battles against the elements, Hans Castorp discovers unconscious urges within himself that he experiences at first in the guise of self-concealed treachery and then as a fully present, animate, and separate being: the physical incarnation of his imaginative notion of death in the form of “die Macht der Versuchung.”

Hans’s perception of fatigue’s incarnate presence represents a tendency to regard general reality in psychically specific terms that both heightens his experience of the uncanny and intensifies his fear. Mann brings this sensation to a climax at the point where Castorp unwittingly turns full circle in his attempt to find his way home, arriving back at “die bekannte Hütte” that he has earlier passed in his trajectory:

Aber so ging es, so stand es im Buche. Man lief im Kreise herum, plagte sich ab, die Vorstellung der Förderlichkeit im Herzen, und beschrieb dabei irgendeinen weiten, albernen Bogen, der in sich selber zurückführte wie der vexatorische Jahreslauf. So irrte man herum, so fand man nicht heim. Hans Castorp erkannte das überlieferte Phänomen mit einer gewissen Befriedigung, wenn auch mit Schrecken, und schlug sich auf den Schenkel vor Grimm und Staunen, weil sich das Allgemeine in seinem eigentümlichen, individuellen und gegenwärtigen Fall so pünktlich ereignet hatte. (GW 3, 673)

At the moment Castorp realizes that his personal experience coincides precisely with the details of a general phenomenon familiar to him in books, his sensation of the uncanny

\[18^{18}\] See also Richard T. Gray, *Stations of the Divided Subject: Contestation and Ideological*
reaches its climax. With feelings of shock, anger, and astonishment, Hans witnesses the depersonalization of his intimate experience. He experiences the “choc, insolite, étonnement” that are hallmarks of the uncanny.\textsuperscript{188} After imprudently taking a drink of port from his flask, depersonalization characterizes Hans’s predicament as he attributes the return of his temptation to recline to “seiner unpersönlichen, als typisch gefährlich im Buche stehenden Lust zum Liegen und Schlafen” (\textit{GW} 3, 676). Earlier, Hans has been able to withstand the textbook-case occurrence within him of a “Lockung, sich hinzulehnen” – a temptation that has proven, in his case, to be just as great as the “typisch-gefährlich” phenomenon known from textually documented cases (\textit{GW} 3, 671-72). Now, however, delirious with fatigue and intoxication, Hans addresses the uncannily impersonal in his temptation to repose once again: “Und dabei zieht es mich unpersönlicherweise förmlich mit Händen, daß ich mich in den Schnee lege” (\textit{GW} 3, 676). As Kristeva explains, “l’inquiétante étrangeté preserve cette part de malaise qui conduit le moi, au-delà de l’angoisse, à la dépersonnalisation.”\textsuperscript{189} The manifestation in his own particular case of a textually documented general law provides for uncanny feelings of depersonalization that heighten Castorp’s sensation of powerlessness against the forces of self-disorientation and internally seductive willingness to succumb to fatigue.


\textsuperscript{188}Kristeva, \textit{Étrangers à nous-mêmes}, 277.

\textsuperscript{189}Kristeva, \textit{Étrangers à nous-mêmes}, 277.
The consideration that Castorp secretly ("heimlich") plots to disorient himself reveals a certain trait of uncanniness in his relationship to himself – a tendency that manifests itself in his accidental pursuit of a circular course while attempting to return to the town of Davos. Just as Castorp recognizes his desire to succumb to fatigue as a textbook case, Freud cites the tendency to wander in circles as a culturally documented phenomenon. When accidentally arriving at a previously visited location to which one has no intention of returning, one experiences the uncanny. In *Das Unheimliche*, Freud attributes the uncanny feeling experienced in such instances to the "Moment der Wiederholung des Gleichartigen" (*Ges.W.* 12, 249).\(^{190}\) Freud provides anecdotal evidence of the "Gefühl, das ich nur als unheimlich bezeichnen kann," that seizes him as he unintentionally returns thrice to the same sordid area in an unfamiliar Italian village (*Ges.W.* 12, 249). Freud then describes, by way of example, pretty much the same general phenomenon that befalls Hans Castorp in "Schnee":

> Andere Situationen, die die unbeabsichtigte Wiederkehr mit der eben beschriebenen gemein haben und sich in den anderen Punkten gründlich von ihr unterscheiden, haben doch dasselbe Gefühl von Hilflosigkeit und Unheimlichkeit zur Folge. Zum Beispiel, wenn man sich im Hochwald, etwa vom Nebel

---

\(^{190}\)Freud’s choice of terminology makes unmistakable reference to Nietzsche’s philosophy. As Assoun observes, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence of the same expresses the repetitiveness at work in the will to power: "le retour (cosmologique) du même a pour fonction de représenter ou de 'schematiser' la répétitivité à l’œuvre dans la *Wille zur Macht.*" Paul-Laurent Assoun, *Freud et Nietzsche: L’enjeu d’un conjonction* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980) 276. Through a rough equation of Nietzsche’s "Wille" with Freud’s "Verdrängte," a limited correspondence between their concepts becomes visible. Freud attributes the tendency to repetition to the repressed, the unconscious: "Or Freud insiste tout d’abord sur le fait que la tendance à la répétition est à imputer au refoulé ‘inconscient,’ c’est-à-dire au contenu lui-même et a pour mobile le conflit entre le Moi et les éléments refoulés. Dès lors, de proche en proche, du transfert aux névroses de destinée, aux névroses traumatiques et aux jeux d’enfants, c’est ce ‘retour éternel du même’ (ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen) qui manifeste son pouvoir.‘" Assoun, *Freud et Nietzsche*, 278.
überrascht, verirrt hat und nun trotz aller Bemühungen, einen markierten oder bekannten Weg zu finden, wiederholt zu der einen, durch eine bestimmte Formation gekennzeichneten Stelle zurückkommt. (Ges.W. 12, 249-50)

Castorp naturally has more to contend with in “Schnee” than fog alone – the threat of being buried in a snowy tempest makes the effectiveness of his return to the town of Davos all the more urgent. Immediately after making the above-noted startling realization that he has secretly plotted to bring himself off course, Castorp skis by a wooden hut “mit steinbeschwertem Dache” that stands in front of the neighboring mountain he is approaching (GW 3, 665). Soon thereafter, it begins to snow. After a good deal of struggling and several attempts to correct his course and counteract the blizzard, Castorp is relieved to finally discern “den Schatten einer menschlichen Baulichkeit” in the distance, which he greets with a feeling of triumph as a “Willkommener, tröstlicher Anblick” (GW 3, 672). The narrator describes the withering effect upon Castorp’s feelings of optimistic expectation as the building’s true identity reveals itself to its beholder:

Er hielt auf das chimärische, oft ganz im Wetterdunkel verschwindende Etwas zu, hatte noch einen kräfteverzehrenden Aufstieg gegen den Wind zu überwinden, um es zu erreichen, und überzeugte sich, angekommen, mit Empörung, Staunen, Schrecken und Schwindelgefühl, daß es die bekannte Hütte, der Heuschober mit steinbeschwertem Dache war, den er auf allerlei Umwegen und mit redlichster Anspannung zurückerobert hatte. (GW 3, 672)
The uncanny is the unexpected rediscovery by the subject of the known where it is least expected. Hans’s feelings upon thinking he has arrived back in Davos, only to discover that he has again stumbled across the desolate structure in “Schnee,” are therefore necessarily uncanny. Through his addition of the ingredients of urgency and hopeful expectation, Mann elevates the feeling of the uncanny in his scene to maximum effect. Hans Castorp’s optimistic anticipation of reaching his goal suffers a shocking disappointment through his obedience of a general law of regression to instinctual behavior – a phenomenon that underscores the quality of a psyche at variance with itself that serves as the principal source of his sublimely uncanny experience.

Hans Castorp’s physical interaction with the natural elements in “Schnee” involves a tendency to imaginatively animate the world both surrounding and inside him – a tendency to pathetic fallacy, pathological animism, and concomitant feelings of the uncanny that directly counter his experience of the sublime. Hans’s initial tendency to projectively impute his own movements to imagined shifts in the wind and subsequent encounter of the imaginatively personified forces of wind and death are characteristic of the reversion to animistic perception upon which uncanny feeling is often founded. His uncanny experience testifies to an overpowering of reason by the instincts that fantastically instills the imaginary with concrete being. Castorp’s experience of the uncanny becomes complete through the dual workings of intrinsic forces both trusted and unknown – the depersonalizing effects of a power of temptation familiar in literature, yet unanticipated in himself, whose misguidance, deception, and misadvice materialize to mortally threaten the very subject in whom they originate.
1.6. **Hans Castorp’s Uncanny Predicament in Quest of the Sublime.**

Castorp’s excursion in “Schnee” takes its impulse from a conflict on two levels. On the first level, Hans’s instinctual desire for activity struggles for temporary release from the confinement of repression. On the second level, however, it pursues the goal of reconciling the conflicting views of humanity supported by Naphta and Settembrini. Hans Castorp’s skiing adventure is the expression of a desire for the instinctual freedom of motion and the moral freedom of “Regieren,” or contemplation. The tension in Castorp’s symbolic enactment of the motion implied in the feeling of the sublime in “Schnee” arises from the conflicting forces of attraction and repulsion; the transformation in two phases through which these forces pass underlies the broader tension between the hazard of natural seduction and reason’s protective resistance. The overcoming of the latter by the former, however, creates an outcome that must be regarded as the opposite of the sublime. Hans’s trajectory thus takes symbolic form as an attempt to dynamically overcome the conflict between the forces of inner temptation and outwardly objective reason (represented by Naphta and Settembrini) that results in feelings of the uncanny.

Castorp’s active participation in the feeling of the sublime reveals a dynamic complexity that takes the significance played by its subjective component to far greater extremes than that assumed by the same component in Kant’s description of the phenomenon. As just observed, the feeling of the sublime derives its subjective foundation from the relationship between the sensual faculty of imagination (“[das] größte[] sinnliche[] Vermögen[]”) and the faculty of reason. Castorp’s experience of the sublime arises from a subjective tension between the sensual and reasonable faculties that
result not, however, in a Kantian "Übereinstimmung" between these faculties prevailed over by the guidance of reason. The relational tension between sensuality and reason in Castorp reveals itself as discord – as a successful attempt of sensuality to gain the upper hand and topple reason. After a period of sustained struggle against the elements, Hans realizes that he has been misguided into the realm of snowy chaos by a hidden urge to incapacitate reason (see above, p.136). Hans Castorp discovers that his neurotic urge to circumvent Behrens and Settembrini’s physical and intellectual restraints has been just as actively at work in undermining his own intellectual capacity for making sense of his world. He experiences a personal revelation of neurosis. Kristeva’s description of the phenomenon is fitting:

La névrose obsessionnelle, mais aussi et différemment les psychoses, ont cette particularité de "réifier" les signes: de glisser de l’ordre du "dire" à l’ordre du "faire." Une telle particularité témoigne aussi d’une fragilité du refoulement et, sans réellement l’expliquer, laisse s’inscrire en elle le retour du refoulé sous la forme de l’affect d’inquiétante étrangeté.\(^{191}\)

I will later show the particular role that the return of the repressed ("le retour du refoulé") plays in the dream that Castorp has upon succumbing to fatigue in "Schnee" (see below, p.191). What the narrator has meanwhile said of his circumvention of Behren’s authority – his decision, "hinter seinem Rücken zu handeln" (GW 3, 655) – Castorp might equally apply to his own subconscious attempt to elude self-control. The motivation for Castorp’s persecution of a back-and-forth motion echoing that of sublime feeling resides

\(^{191}\)Kristeva, Étrangers à nous-mêmes, 275.
in the will of the drives to circumvent repression, not of reason to fathom the sensually infinite. Through the agency of an overly active imagination, Castorp’s will, or id, thwarts reason’s efforts to mediate between desire and the occurrences of external reality. As Freud comments in *Der Realitätsverlust bei Neurose und Psychose*: “Neurose wie Psychose sind also beide Ausdruck der Rebellion des Es gegen die Außenwelt, seiner Unlust oder wenn man will, seiner Unfähigkeit, sich der realen Not, der Avóγκη, anzupassen” (*Ges.W*, 13, 365). This same irrational will reveals the extent of its rebellion against reason’s authority as a potential threat to the life of its possessor – and thus, quite visibly, as an uncanny will to death. The uncanny is, as Kristeva states: “projection en même temps qu’élaboration première de la pulsion de mort.”192 While the outwardly heroic struggle Castorp wages against the elements is sublime, his unheroic capitulation in an internal conflict with the death drive bears the imprint of an uncanny return of the repressed.

The battle Castorp wages against nature’s tempestuous might is indisputably daring. Joseph cites Nietzsche to claim that Castorp demonstrates “Unerschrockenheit, Tapferkeit und einen zären Willen ‘zu gefährlichen Entdeckungsreisen, zu vergeistigten Nordpol-Expeditionen unter öden und gefährlichen Himmeln (*KSA* 5, 141).’ ”193 Later in the novel, however, Mann himself seems to ironically discount the notion of heroism in Hans’s overall conduct by describing that he has surrendered loyalty to his erstwhile

---


favorite “Maria Mancini” cigar brand in favor of “ein Fabrikat, das selbst dem
Polarforscher im Eise über die ärgsten Strapazen hinweggeholfen hätte und mit dem
versehen man einfach wie am Meere lag und es aushalten konnte [. . .]” (GW 3, 984).  
More than anything else, however, what truly characterizes Castorp’s jaunt in the snow is
the utter recklessness and reactionary defiance that guides his actions. The impatience
with which he challenges the elements and agitated lack of reasonable consideration that
typifies his exertions for a safe return show his actions to be guided more by rashness and
fear than anything even closely akin to true courage.

In daring defiance of nature’s power of annihilation, Castorp attempts to come to
terms with his own desires, which, in the process, reveal their uncanny potential for an
equally destructive might. Kristeava insightfully remarks on the uncanny disorientating
effect of confronting the “other” of internal and external opposition:

Étrange, en effet, la rencontre avec l’autre – que nous percevons par la vue, l’ouïe,
l’odorat, mais n’ “encadrons” pas par la conscience. L’autre nous laisse séparés,
incohérents; plus encore, il peut nous donner le sentiment de manquer de contact
avec nos propres sensations, de les refuser ou, au contraire, de refuser notre
jugement sur elles – sentiment d’être “stupides,” “floués.”

Castorp initially experiences his alpine surroundings as overpowering, perhaps, but his
feelings of “religiöse Furcht” give witness to his well-reasoned ability to control the
impression and transform it into sublime feeling (see above, p.108). Yet once he

194 This, Nenno rightfully claims, is the “single reference to the polar explorer” that exists in

195 Kristeava, Étrangers à nous-mêmes, 276.
surrenders his position of detached contemplation by engaging the forces of nature in a
test of strength, the dynamics in the relationship take a radical shift. Once natural might
overpowers his perceptions, Castorp’s reason becomes subject to the tyranny of the
darker forces of his own sensuality and the reckless hegemony of an overripe
imagination. There is indeed a strange conjunction in “Schnee” between the mental state
of the perceiver and the world he perceives. Hans’s logical perception of his
surroundings and his ability to comprehend them – his capacity for lending his efforts
meaningful direction – crumble under the force of perceived natural chaos. Abandoned
by the guiding influence of reason, Mann’s protagonist is confronted with purely
unmediated, random natural might and the immediate discomforts of exposure to natural
inclemency. Castorp’s original perception of such sensations derives from his childhood
memories: “Auf Sylt hatte er, in weißen Hosen, sicher, elegant und ehrerbietig, am Rande
der mächtigen Brandung gestanden wie vor einem Löwenkäfig, hinter dessen Gitter die
Bestie ihren Rachen mit den fürchterlichen Reißzähnen schlundentief ergänzen läßt”
(GW 658). Hans’s self-progression into the chaos of a snowy tempest plunges him into
the middle of an abyss whose production of horror bereaves him of his power to
reasonably assimilate the maelstrom of sensual might that engulfs him. As Kristeva
continues to explain:

Étrange aussi, cette expérience de l’abîme entre moi et l’autre qui me choque – je
ne le perçois même pas, il m’annihile peut-être parce que je le nie. Face à
l’étranger que je refuse et auquel je m’identifie à la fois, je perds mes limites, je
n’ai plus de contenant, les souvenirs des expériences où l’on m’avait laissée
tomber me submergent, je perds contenance. Je me sens “perdue,” “vague,”
“brumeuse.”196

By surrendering himself over to a struggle against nature’s “indifferent,” potentially
destructive might, Hans Castorp discovers within himself an urge of equally violent
potential that is as unconcerned about his actual well-being as the tempest that surrounds
him.

Every true tragic hero suffers a mortal outcome originating from a tragic flaw that
one might – in a very limited sense – regard as an expression of the death drive. In Hans
Castorp, the certain victim of the tragic events with which Mann’s Zauberberg concludes,
the “Todestrieb” reveals itself with greatest clarity as more than just an invisible force
guiding its possessor toward inevitable destruction. In the “Schnee” section, the death
drive in Hans Castorp demonstrates such a force of presence that the drive itself actually
makes itself visible to the intellect. Thus betrayed, the tragic in Hans Castorp no longer
becomes inevitable and Mann’s hero is able – at least in the immediate context of
“Schnee” – to rescue himself from his predicament. Castorp’s self-introspective
overcoming of the forces of tempestuousness in “Schnee” constitutes the exemplary
complement in terms of “Bildung” to his probable tragic demise during a “Sturm auf die
Gräben” (GW 3, 991) in “Der Donnerschlag.”

Hans Castorp’s contest against the unruly might of a natural tempest during his
“Schnee” excursion gradually yields center stage to an internal conflict between his
instinct for survival and a will to self-deception and submission that bears the clear traits

196Kristeva, Étrangers à nous-mêmes, 276.
of the death drive. Under the influence of his increasingly clouded perceptions, the external dynamic of physical motion arouses an internal dynamic of emotional disorientation and “Angst” that ironically transfers all dramatic tension from the externally objective to the internally subjective sphere and creates of the sublime instead an experience of the uncanny. The tyranny exercised over his movements and actions by Hans’s “Sympathie mit dem Tode” lends them an aspect of underlying cowardice directly contrary to the explicit courageously of his venture. Rather than effectively combatting the potentially destructive forces of nature that confront him, Castorp succumbs instead to this internal tyranny. The indifference to his well-being with which the death drive compels his capitulation directly corresponds to the inherent “indifference” of nature’s forces, yet by revealing its presence it becomes intelligible, evitable, and therefore surmountable. Hans Castorp’s skiing adventure is the drama of a conflict with external nature that culminates in his submission to an irresistible internal urge to rest and, consequently, to relinquish the battle. This shift from the externally objective realm of physical conflict to the subjectively internal sphere of self-contradiction creates of Hans Castorp’s initial task of natural conquest a highly subjective mission of self-overcoming.

2.1. Déjà-vu Illusions of Restored Natural Harmony.

In order to arrive at a proper understanding of his vision’s significance for his process of education, it seems imperative to provide clear definition for the meaning of Hans Castorp’s inward experience in “Schnee” as it relates to the rest of Mann’s novel. The merit of several critiques of the Zauberberg in fact rests to a very large degree on their varying recognitions of the “Schnee” section’s reflection of the significant trends in the novel’s plot. One of Heller’s pair of dialectical conversants thus implicitly calls the “Schnee” section “Thomas Manns radikalste[r] Versuch, vollkommene Integration zu erreichen: nämlich ein Kapitel auf seine Art die ganze Geschichte des Romans noch einmal erzählen zu lassen.”\(^{197}\) The primary psychological forces that motivate Hans Castorp’s dream in “Schnee” are Eros and Thanatos – the instinctual foundations of human will. Hans Castorp’s inspiring vision in “Schnee” is the transitory product of its subject’s physical, fantastic, and spiritual return to the previously trodden ground of sexual-sensual gratification and mortification.

Upon close examination of the Zauberberg text, it appears that there are parallels between Castorp’s experiences and his dream of images in “Schnee” significant enough to suggest the need for explaining the connection in order to arrive at an interpretation.

---

\(^{197}\)Erich Heller, *Thomas Mann: Der ironische Deutsche* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975) 218. Heller utilizes the experimental dialectical technique of a hypothetical conversation between two disputants as the formal context for his critique of Mann’s novel.
that does justice to Mann's novel. In order to discover the latent idea underlying Hans's manifest dream in "Schnee," it will be necessary to examine the broad range of experiences upon which it relies for its content.\textsuperscript{198} Hans's dreams of "Im Restaurant," "Satana macht ehrührige Vorschläge," "Hippe," and dream-like state of "Walpurgisnacht" serve as a significant source of his "Schnee" dream's latent content (see also below, p.249). His erotic experiences of Madame Chauchat and his memories of being medically examined form another such source. The final source for Hans's dream lies in the experiences of the skiing excursion that immediately precedes it. Through close examination of the events portrayed and the narrative descriptions provided in the \textit{Zauberberg}, one gains an indication of the stunning degree to which Mann's novel seems to be attempting a depiction of the dream-work, or the process whereby the latent dream is transformed into the manifest dream (\textit{Ges.W.} 11, 173-74).\textsuperscript{199} It is as if, previous to having read any of Freud's works, Mann were determined to offer his own explanation of repression, the uncanny, and the dream process through an act of fictional narration. However much Thomas Mann relies on Schopenhauer's "Somnambulie-Theorie" for his portrayal of the dream-state in the \textit{Zauberberg},\textsuperscript{200} particularly with Castorp's dream of "Schnee" Mann seems to be looking more toward a

\textsuperscript{198} Freud makes the distinction between manifest and latent dream in his \textit{Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse}: "Wir wollen das, was der Traum erzählt, den manifesten Trauminhalt nennen, das Verborgene, zu dem wir durch die Verfolgung der Einfälle kommen sollen, die latenten Traumgedanken." \textit{Ges.W.} 11, 118.

\textsuperscript{199} For a fuller discussion of the concept, see Freud's lecture on "Die Traumarbeit" in his \textit{Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, Ges.W.} 11, 173-86.

\textsuperscript{200} Manfred Dierks provides convincing arguments in proof of Schopenhauer's theory of somnambulism's influence on Mann's works' dream depictions. \textit{Studien zu Mythos und Psychologie bei Thomas Mann}, 43; 123-25. See also Kristiansen, 170.
depiction of dreams that demonstrates their origination in the realm of everyday experience.

Hans’s suggestibility constitutes a significant link between his waking experiences and the manner of their later portrayal in dream. Any reader of Der Zauberberg becomes immediately aware of Castorp’s extreme proneness to the power of suggestion. As if in response to the Hofrat’s remark that Hans holds the promise of being “‘ein besserer Patient’” and, furthermore, that “‘dazu gehört Talent’” (GW 3, 68-69), Castorp quickly integrates himself into the Berghof’s convalescent society. In overly literal accordance with Behrens’s suggestion that the Berghof possesses “‘allerliebste Damen’” and that many are “‘ganz malerisch’” (GW 3, 69), Hans becomes enamored of the most beloved of its women – and the only one that Mann’s narrative mentions as having been “picturesque” enough to have been literally depicted in painting. The theme of overt suggestive coercion takes center stage in Mario und der Zauberer. From behind the scenes of Mann’s Zauberberg, the theme plays an equally significant, although far more subtle role. A salient characteristic of Hans Castorp is his excessive conformity to the dictates of suggestion.

Under the spell of an apparently unconscious desire to fit into society, Castorp seems mechanically bound to a consummate performance of the tasks to which one sets him. In “Mein Gott, ich seh!,” Castorp gains both insight into the deepest scientific operations of the Berghof and a technologically advanced glimpse of his own mortality. As the two cousins enter the x-ray chamber, the Hofrat asks, “‘Sie haben Angst, Castorp, uns Ihr Inneres zu eröffnen?’” (GW 3, 301). Behrens’s coarse suggestiveness jokingly
provides a routine examination with the overtones of an intimate experience. With the apparent intention of stilling his patient’s misgivings by means of scientific explanation, the Hofrat shows and describes to his patient the interesting details of his collection of patients’ x-rays, which Castorp finds “‘Sehr interessant’” (GW 3, 301). Behrens explains: “‘Das ist ein Frauenarm, Sie ersehen es aus seiner Niedlichkeit. Damit umfangen sie einen beim Schäferstündchen, verstehen Sie’” (GW 3, 301). The Hofrat’s jovial manner is clearly intended to put his patient at ease, but the imagery of an embrace during a “Schäferstündchen” – suggestive of idyllic conditions – has absolutely nothing to do with the crass reality of “Lichtanatomie.” Behrens nonetheless follows his suggestion of erotic adventure with an explicit command denoting the very same conditions: “‘Umarmen!’ sagte er. ‘Das Brett umarmen! Stellen Sie sich meinetwegen was anderes darunter vor! Und gut an die Brust andrücken, als ob Glücksempfindungen damit verbunden wären!’” (GW 3, 302). Behrens jokingly suggests and commands his patient to imagine subjective considerations of love and happiness as a means toward overcoming the objective discomfort of being examined, or so it might appear. Given the close connection between his own views and Krokowski’s theory of “die Liebe als krankheitbildende Macht” (GW 3, 178-83), however, the reader’s perception of an attitude of jovial loquacity in Behrens’s comments yields to the realization that the Hofrat seems to impute eroticism to the entire pathological phenomenon. Whether Behrens makes his remarks with ironic or quite literal intent, Hans Castorp – in accordance with his character – seems to take his suggestions and commands, although belatedly, at their word. In “Schnee”: as I will show, Castorp does exactly as the Hofrat has suggested he
do in “Mein Gott.” Hans opens himself in dream absolutely to the prospects of fulfillment contained in an idyllic view of “Schäferstündchen”; he whole-heartedly embraces a view of harmony that he experiences as the high fulfillment of his “Glücksempfindungen.”

The dream that befalls Castorp in the alpine wilderness of “Schnee” is infused with the experiential qualities that greatly characterize his most psychologically disturbing experience while at the Berghof. Both the objectively and internally experienced details of “Mein Gott” penetrate Castorp’s dream in “Schnee” as the primary constituents of the imagery that confronts him. “Durchleuchtung,” the objective medical procedure that triggers Hans’s deeply personal realization in “Mein Gott” (cf. *GW* 3, 294), appears in Castorp’s dream in the form of a rain shower that is plain and simply “durchleuchtet,” without any immediate mention of the sun (*GW* 3, 677). During Castorp’s x-ray examination, the Hofrat rides back and forth on a footstool, or “Schemel” (*GW* 3, 303). The phonological similarity of the word “Schemel” to “Schimmel” (white horse) in Mann’s description of the Hofrat, who performs his tasks “auf einem Schemel reitend,” is clearly intended to evoke the kind of equestrian imagery popularly incorporated in the title of Theodor Storm’s *Schimmelreiter*. An equivalent equestrian image recurs in Castorp’s “Schnee” dream’s portrayal of youths, “sattellos reitend, mit bloßen Fersen die Flanken der Gäule schlagend” (*GW* 3, 679). The objective details of Hans’s x-ray examination in “Mein Gott” find their way into his dream in “Schnee” in the penetrating light and equestrian imagery of an idyllic setting.
In addition to its objective content, the scene of bucolic tranquility that constitutes the first half of Castorp’s visual dream in “Schnee” seems to derive absolutely from the protagonist’s desire for ethical harmony. Behrens appeals to the same psychological tendency, or human need, during the course of “Mein Gott, ich sehe!” The act of embracing (“Umarmung”) suggested by the Hofrat during his x-ray procedure recurs during Castorp’s skiing excursion in his memory of embracing nature’s elements on the island of Sylt (see above, p.112). His just-noted reference to throwing one’s arm around someone during “Schäferstündchen” seems as if to materialize in the production by Castorp’s dream of a romantic pastoral scene. “Paare ergingen sich das Ufer entlang, und am Ohr des Mädchens war dessen Mund, der sie vertraulich führte,” explains the narrator, while “Langzellige Ziegen” spring from ledge to ledge, “überwacht von einem jungen Hirten” (GW 3, 680). As just mentioned, the Hofrat jokingly suggests in “Mein Gott” a kind of intimacy in the act of “opening oneself” to an x-ray examination, as he asks Castorp if the latter is afraid, “‘uns Ihr Inneres zu eröffnen?’” Consumed with passion for the “Sonnen- und Meereskinder” that his dream presents to him, Hans opens his heart completely: “Hans Castorps ganzes Herz öffnete sich weit, ja schmerzlich weit und liebend ihrem Anblick.” In fulfillment of the Hofrat’s above-noted suggestion in “Mein Gott” of imagined “‘Glücksempfindungen,’ ” Hans’s dream in “Schnee” imaginatively portrays “Sonnenglück,” “lachende[] Felsbecken,” and the archery practice of laughing youths that are “glücklich und freundlich zu sehen” (GW 3, 678-79). The joy of its participants lends enjoyment to Castorp’s observation of their activities: “‘Das ist ja überraschend erfreulich und gewinnend! Wie hübsch, gesund und klug und glücklich sie
sind!” (GW 3, 680). Hans Castorp’s “Schnee” idyll fulfills Behrens’s playfully suggestive insistence on the imaginative pursuit of pastoral love and happiness with an almost uncanny obedience – almost as if unfulfilled erotic wishes were indeed at the core of his ailments.

In addition to the imaginatively fulfilled suggestions of amorousness and contentment just noted, feelings of an almost religious chastity and piety characterize both Castorp’s experiences in “Mein Gott” and his dream of “Schnee.” Thinking of how Behrens would be beaming his “Lichtstrahlen” at Chauchat in “Mein Gott,” Hans turns his head to the side “mit einer ehrbaren Verfinsterung seiner Miene [...] , einem Ausdruck von Diskretion und Sittsamkeit [...]” (GW 3, 299). Immediately prior to being called forward for his own examination, as Hans views his cousin being x-rayed he is overcome with “Zweifel[] an der Erlaubtheit seines Schauens [...] ; und die zerrende Lust der Indiskretion mischte sich in seiner Brust mit Gefühlen der Rührung und Frömmigkeit” (GW 3, 306). Hans recalls the event as he climbs on his skis in the wilderness in “Schnee.” He feels his heart pounding and – seemingly forgetting that it was Joachim’s heart that he saw and not his own – recalls the indiscrete view of it provided him by Behrens’s x-ray apparatus: “– dies Herzmuskelorgan, dessen tierische Gestalt und dessen Art zu schlagen er unter den knatternden Blitzen der Durchleuchtungskammer, frevelhafterweise vielleicht, belauscht hatte” (GW 3, 660).201

---

201 The fact that Hans mistakenly recalls an act of viewing something external to himself as an act of self-observation might at first appear inconsequential. In reality, it reflects the entire process of regarding the external in personal terms that forms the chief ingredient of Castorp’s experience of the uncanny.
Hans' resultant mood is one of deep emotion – almost piousness: "Und eine Art von Rührung wandelte ihn an, eine einfache und andächtige Sympathie mit seinem Herzen, dem schlagenden Menschenherzen [...]

"(GW 3, 660-61). Hans's visual memory of another's heart combines with the sensation of his own to elevate his individual experience to the level of generality. Castorp's initial motivation to learn how to ski results from the shame he experiences at observing nature from the comfort of his "Balkonloge" (GW 3, 659). Hans is similarly overpowered in "Schnee" with feelings of piousness for his dream's "Sonnenleute": "Das ist es, was mich so rührt und ganz verliebt macht: der Geist und Sinn, [...] der ihrem Wesen zugrunde liegt, in dem sie miteinander leben" (GW 3, 680). Hans's experience of the "Sonnenleute" contains the same feelings of piousness – the "religiöse Furcht" and "fromme Erschütterung" – that infuse his experience of the sublime in nature at the outset of his skiing excursion (see above, p.108). Immediately before Hans's dream idyll in "Schnee" disintegrates into the nightmare of the "Blutmahl," he is also seized with doubts very similar to those that beset him in "Mein Gott": "Er wurde des Schauens nicht satt und fragte sich dennoch beklommen, ob ihm das Schauen denn auch erlaubt sei, ob das Belauschen dieses sonnig-gesitteten Glückes ihn, den Unzugehörigen, [...] nicht höchstlich strafbar mache" (GW 3, 681). Feelings of piety bordering on shame anticipate Hans Castorp's subjection to an x-ray examination, the act of getting lost during his skiing expedition, and his witnessing of a cannibalistic rite in the dream of "Schnee" – feelings that include the initial seeds of dread permeating all three subsequent uncanny occurrences.
Hans Castorp’s anamnestic vision of a never-before-visited “Mittelmeer, Neapel, Sizilien etwa oder Griechenland” includes the principally operative qualities of the “Vertrauten” and “Verborgengehaltenen” that produce his feelings of the uncanny upon haphazardly returning to the “Scheune” during his skiing adventure (see above, p.136). Hans has never before visited the region contained in his vision: “Dennoch erinnerte [Hans Castorp] sich. Ja, das war eigentümlicherweise ein Wiedererkennen, das er feierte. ‘Ach, ja, so ist es!’ rief es in ihm – als hätte er das blaue Sonnenglück, das sich da vor ihm breitete, insgeheim und vor sich selbst verschwiegen, von je im Herzen getragen” (GW 3, 678). Hans thus carries the foreknowledge of his Mediterranean seascape secretly in his heart – consequently suggesting the intimate knowledge of the “Vertrauten” as well as the “Verborgengehaltenen” that serves as its counterpart. Dierks explains that Hans Castorp’s dream “will als seelische Realität verstanden sein, als ernst genommene ἀνάμνησις, als Zitat aus dem Unbewußten.” The expressly pleasant déjá-vu experience with which Castorp’s dream begins in “Schnee” is the product of intimately trusted and unconsciously cryptic qualities very similar to those that make up


203 Studien zu Mythos und Psychologie, 123. In Platonic philosophy, recollection, or ἀνάμνησις, is the act of recalling the knowledge of absolutes with which one was originally born. Socrates thus explains to Simmias in Plato’s Phaedo: “Either we are all born with knowledge of these standards, and retain it throughout our lives, or else, when we speak of people learning, they are simply recollecting what they knew before. In other words, learning is recollection.” Plato, Phaedo, 76a, trans. Hugh Tredennick, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, 59. Cf. also Francis M. Cornford, introduction, Plato’s Theory of Knowledge (The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato), trans. Francis M. Cornford (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1977) 2-3.
his earlier uncanny experience of being lost in a snowstorm. Might the manifestly pleasant déjà-vu experience of his dream and Hans’s inherently uncanny experience of subjection to potentially self-destructive tendencies show deeper connections within the workings of the unconscious?

The similarities between Hans Castorp’s other significant déjà-vu experience and that of his dream in “Schnee” offer valuable clues for the latter’s latent meaning. One might even regard Hans’s celebration of “eine Wiedererkennung” in that dream as a reenactment of the initially positive impression made upon him by his déjà-vu experience in “Hippe.” Like the secretly concealed “blaue Sonnenglück” revealed to him in his “Schnee” dream, his conversation with Hippe in the schoolyard fills Hans with the highest degree of gratification (GW 3, 169). The past event that Castorp celebrates in the “Hippe” dream is the happiest of his life: “Aber vergnügter war Hans Castorp in seinem Leben nie gewesen als in dieser Zeichenstunde, da er mit Pribislav Hippe’s Bleistift zeichnete” (GW 3, 173). Hans’s attribution of his interest in Clawdia Chauchat to the discovery of her identity with Hippe rests on his original positive impression of his schoolyard experience. Just as Hans Castorp’s déjà-vu experiences of the dreams of “Hippe” and “Schnee” immediately instill in the dreamer feelings of overbrimming happiness, the consequences of both events – as I will show shortly – inspire in their subject intense feelings of subjection to uncanny forces.

In the “Walpurgisnacht” section, Hans Castorp’s intoxicated reliving of his déjà-vu experience of the “Hippe” dream contains both a high praise of love and an open admission of what he believes are its fatal consequences for his own well-being. Hans
responds positively to Chauchat’s suggestion of watching the dancers in “Walpurgisnacht”: “‘Das wollen wir, [. . .] wir wollen hier sitzen und zusehen wie im Traum. [. . .]. C’est un rêve bien connu, rêve de tout temps, long, éternel, oui, être assis près de toi comme à présent, voilà l’éternité’” (GW 3, 468). Freud notes the tendency to return to similar locations in dream and to dream anew previously dreamed occurrences (Die Traumdeutung, Ges.W. 2/3, 448-49). He also cites Ferenczi’s assertion, “daß das ‘déjà vu’ nicht nur von Tagträumen, sondern auch von nächtlichen Träumen abstammen kann” (Zur Psychologie des Alltagslebens, Ges.W. 4, 297).²⁰⁴ Hans’s well-known dream – “rêve bien connu” – in “Walpurgisnacht” is a déjà-vu recurrence of his previously experienced dream states in “Satana macht ehrträgliche Vorschläge” and “Hippe.” Castorp’s experience in “Walpurgisnacht” fulfills the conditions of déjà vu as “Erinnerung an eine unbewusste Phantasie” (Ges.W. 4, 295). The act of borrowing a pencil from Chauchat reenacts the manifest content of the “Hippe” transaction that forms itself of his latent desire for a sexual encounter, as will soon become evident. The exchange’s reenactment of his dream’s fulfillment of the unconscious fantasy visibly provides Castorp with sensations of pleasure to which he also expressly admits when he calls love “‘une banalité agréable’” (GW 3, 475). His experience also seems to derive its pleasurable sensations as a willfully endured act of anamnesis, since – as Freud’s citation of K. Groos attests: “‘Wenn so der Akt des Wiedererkennens lusterregend ist, so werden wir erwarten dürfen, daß der Mensch darauf verfällt, diese Fähigkeit um ihrer selbst willen zu üben, also spielend mit ihr zu experimentieren’” (Der Witz und seine

²⁰⁴Freud cites from a piece of correspondence that he personally received from his colleague and
Beziehung zum Unbewußten, Ges.W. 6, 136). The chance fulfillment of the anamnestic situation that Hans Castorp intoxicatedly seeks in “Walpurgisnacht” contains a confession of love that seems nearly conscious of the underlying fantasy from which it latently derives its pleasurable content.

Suggestions of love’s fulfillment lend commonality to Castorp’s real and dreamed experiences in “Mein Gott,” “Hippe,” “Walpurgisnacht,” and “Schnee” that describe a cyclical motion through states of elation, piety, shame, and terror – a recurring passage from Eros to Thanatos. The love confession of Hans’s déjà-vu experience in “Walpurgisnacht” not only attests to the unreason from which it derives its impulse. It also bears witness to the position of physical misfortune in which his unconscious desires have landed him:

“Mais quant à ce que je t’ai reconnue et que j’ai reconnu mon amour pour toi, – oui, c’est vrai, je t’ai déjà connue, anciennement, toi et tes yeux merveilleusement obliques et ta bouche et ta voix, avec laquelle tu parles, – une fois déjà, lorsque j’étais collégien, je t’ai demandé ton crayon, pour faire enfin ta connaissance mondaine, parce que je t’aimais irraisonnablement, et c’est de là, sans doute, c’est de mon ancien amour pour toi, que ces marques me restent que Behrens a trouvées dans mon corps, et qui indiquent que jadis aussi j’étais malade . . .” (GW 3, 475-76)


Hans seems convinced that his childhood experience of Hippe is the underlying cause of the spots Behrens has found on his lungs — a good indication that the schoolyard encounter has links in his memory to either an actual or perceived illness occurring around the same time. The realization appears to instill a terrified reaction in Hans Castorp, whose “Zähne schlügen aufeinander” (GW 3, 476). Castorp seems to be deeply convinced of the inherent identity of love and death: “Oh, l’amour, tu sais... Le corps, l’amour, la mort, ces trois ne font qu’un. Car le corps, c’est la maladie et la volupté, et c’est lui qui fait la mort, oui, ils sont charnels tous deux, l’amour et la mort, et voilà leur terreur et leur grande magie!” (GW 3, 476). Hans’s recognition of his childhood companion in Clawdia Chauchat brings an experience of Eros and Thanatos of expressly terrifying and wonderful content — the same content, one notes, that in Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens Freud attributes to the déjà-vu experience:

In der Kategorie des Wunderbaren und Unheimlichen gehört auch jene eigentümliche Empfindung, die man in manchen Momenten und Situationen verspürt, als ob man genau das nämlich schon einmal erlebt hätte, sich in derselben Lage schon einmal befunden hätte, ohne daß es je dem Bemühlen gelingt, das Frühere, das sich so anzeigt, deutlich zu erinnern. (Ges.W. 4, 294)

Hans Castorp’s déjà-vu experience in “Walpurgisnacht” brings him face to face with the powers of Eros and Thanatos that — as I will now demonstrate — form the central elements upon which his pictorial dream in “Schnee” relies for the uncanny effect that its nightmarish conclusion produces upon the dreamer.
2.2. Uncanny Destruction of Imagined Harmony.

Suggestions of erotic bliss made by Behrens in “Mein Gott” find fulfillment in Hans Castorp’s dream in “Schnee.” From Clawdia Chauchat’s miraculous resemblance of Priibislav Hippe arises a similar promise of erotic elation that achieves fabulous consummation in the dream-like atmosphere of a “Walpurgisnacht” evening. Both by the events leading up to them and by the implications they pose to his thoughts, however, Hans’s actual experiences of death and love during his x-ray exam in “Mein Gott” and following “Walpurgisnacht” are inextricably linked. The hitherto-repressed frightening bond that for Hans Castorp links Eros to Thanatos displays itself to the dreaming subject in the symbolically altered representation of previously experienced figures and events of his image dream in “Schnee.”

It thus appears that Clawdia Chauchat plays some kind of role in the transformation between idyll and gruesome vision that Hans’s dream undergoes before making a second transition to a retrospective dream of thoughts. Chauchat seems indeed to be the latent identity of the handsome youth that acts as agent of transition between the halves of Hans’s pictorial dream. Like its seated youth, with his “auf der Brust verschränkte[] Arme[]” and forward-leaning posture – indicated by the fact that his hair “vorn über der Stirn vorstand und in die Schläfe fiel” (GW 3, 681), Chauchat sits “vorgebeugt,” with her arms crossed on her lap (GW 3, 299). Both figures also share a habit of looking back and forth. While waiting for her appointment in “Mein Gott,” Chauchat “blickte um sich, stand auf mit einer Miene, als wisse sie nicht, woran sie sei und wohin sie sich zu wenden habe [. . .]” (GW 3, 296). The same searching gaze is
found in the "schöne[] Knabe" of Castorp’s "Schnee" dream, whose "Augen gingen zwischen dem Späher [Castorp] und den Bildern des Strandes, sein Lauschen belauschend, hin und her" (GW 3, 681). Ulrich Karthaus even goes so far as to claim that Chauchat guards the door behind which Castorp has "besondere Erlebnisse." Kristiansen correctly identifies Chauchat’s assumption in this instance of the mythical role of "Hermes Psychagogos": "Wie Tadzio am Ende der Erzählung Der Tod in Venedig und wie der ‘schöne Knabe’ in Castorps Schneevision (Z:681) verkörpert auch Chauchat den Gott, der den Menschen in die Unterwelt hinunterbegleitet." The handsome youth of Castorp’s dream has a posture, bodily expression, and gestures that indicate his performance of Clawdia Chauchat’s role, in altered form, of transporter of souls.

Beyond their above-noted similarities, the youth of Hans’s "Schnee" dream and Madame Chauchat both make gestures admonishing the motionless observer to proceed to subsequent events of similarly covert nature. Prior to his first medical examination in "Das Thermometer," Madame Chauchat – who had "sich während des Mittagessens kein einziges Mal nach dem Saale umgeblickt" – suddenly, as the clock strikes two, casts a glance at Hans Castorp:

206Ulrich Karthaus, "‘Der Zauberberg’ – ein Zeitroman (Zeit, Geschichte, Mythos)," Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 44 (1970): 291. Karthaus’s claim that "Settembrini ist aber selbst Führer in die Unterwelt" is less credible, although the power of Settembrini’s rhetorical gift exercises a definite seductive force over Hans Castorp, for instance, so that Karthaus’s assertion should perhaps not be so quickly discounted as it at first appears. Cf. "‘Der Zauberberg’ – ein Zeitroman," 291.

[...] hatte die anmutige Kranke langsam den Kopf und ein wenig auch den Oberkörper gewandt und über die Schulter deutlich und unverhohlen zu Hans Castorps Tische – und nicht nur im allgemeinen zu seinem Tische, nein, unmißverständlich und streng persönlich zu ihm herübergeblickt, ein Lächeln um die geschlossenen Lippen [...], als wollte sie sagen: "Nun? Es ist Zeit. Wirst du gehen?" (GW 3, 247-48)

As the time comes to present himself before the authorities (Behrens and Krokowski) that subsequently pronounce him ill and thereby commit him to the patient’s life style, Chauchat turns to give a friendly but stern glance at Hans Castorp. Her look appears to spur him on toward the fatefully consequential event during which he also learns that his x-ray must be taken (GW 3, 256). Similarly, prior to Hans’s entry into the temple of the “Blutmahl” in “Schnee,” the above-mentioned youth of Castorp’s dream

[...] sah ihn [Hans Castorp], wandte den Blick zu ihm hinauf [...]. Plötzlich aber blickte er über ihn hin ins Weite, und augenblicklich verschwand aus seinem schönen, streng geschnittenen, halbkindlichen Gesicht das allen gemeinsame Lächeln höflich geschwisterlicher Rücksicht – ja, ohne daß seine Brauen sich verfinstern hätten, erstand in seiner Miene ein Ernst, ganz wie aus Stein, ausdruckslos, unergründlich, eine Todesverschlossenheit, vor der der kaum beruhigten Hans Castorp der blasse Schrecken ankam, nicht ohne eine Beitat von unbestimmter Ahnung ihres Sinnes. (GW 3, 681-82)

The youth who casts a glance at Castorp in anticipation of the latter’s intrusion upon a forbidden ghastly rite admonishes his onlooker with the same friendly but “streng”
expression with which Chauchat addresses him in “Das Thermometer.” Whereas Chauchat’s glance in “Das Thermometer” serves to remind the patient of his coming appointment, it is the glance itself that guides Castorp in his dream down the path toward the temple: “Auch er [Hans Castorp] sah rückwärts . . . Mächtige Säulen, [. . .], ragten hinter ihm – die Säulen eines Tempeltors [. . .]” (GW 3, 682). Chauchat’s glance might thus be said to guide the protagonist in a figurative sense. The glance of the youth in his dream symbolically represents the idea of the former event as concrete actuality. The frightful impression that the youth’s look makes upon its object is likewise very related to the effect that Chauchat’s glance makes on Castorp in “Das Thermometer”: the latter “war ein Zwischenfall gewesen,” explains the narrator, “der Hans Castorp in tiefster Seele verwirrt und entsetzt hatte” (GW 3, 248). The admonitory functions performed by “der schöne Knabe” of Hans Castorp’s dream in “Schnee” and “die anmutige Kranke,” Chauchat, in “Das Thermometer” are as similar as are the unsettling effects they work upon their observer.

Castorp’s frame of mind on both occasions gives further indication of the connection of the two figures and the events they represent. Castorp’s trepidation over attending his medical examination in “Das Thermometer” expresses itself in his thought of having Joachim report to Behrens his recovery from his cold and his examination’s resultant lack of necessity (GW 3, 248). In Castorp’s “Schnee” dream, the heavy heart with which the protagonist gets to his feet before descending the stairs to the temple gate makes his reluctance to advance unmistakable (GW 3, 682). There is perhaps no better indication that Hans’s dream of “Schnee” represents the reenactment of previous
occurrences than in the above-mentioned “Beitat von unbestimmter Ahnung ihres Sinnes” that accompanies the “Todesverschlossenheit” with which the youth regards him. Hans Castorp’s feelings of foreboding precedent to entering the tempel of the “Blutmahl” in “Schnee” revive the sensations of uneasiness he feels in anticipation of his medical examination and subsequent x-ray procedure. Provided by the time of his dream with the knowledge of these events, Hans’s revived sensations now appear with exaggerated intensity, anticipating with uncanny foresight the terror-inspiring incidents about to come.

The manifest content of Hans Castorp’s rediscovery of Pribislav Hippe in Clawdia Chauchat and the déjà-vu experience of his dream of images in “Schnee” might best be described in the typically Freudian terms of wish fulfillment. The latent content of both occurrences nonetheless carries markedly graver connotations. Regardless of Chauchat’s lack of suitability as Castorp’s lover – a point he repeatedly brings himself to acknowledge – Hans’s erotic attachment to his Russian paramour binds him to a way of life of potentially disastrous consequences to his health. Castorp experiences both Hippe and Chauchat as socially inappropriate contacts (GW 3, 170-71; 202). As noted above, Chauchat functions in the role of “Hermes Psychagogos” as an admonitory guide to Castorp precedent to the latter’s confrontation with death’s certainty during his medical examination and subsequent x-ray. Kristiansen explains: “Chauchat verführt Hans Castorp, verlockt ihn zum Überschreiten der Schwelle einer fremden jenseitigen Welt.” In reference to the myth of Persephone, she represents the force that holds Hans in thrall to the Berghof realm of sickness and death: “Castorp übernimmt die Rolle der

---

208 See also Kristiansen, 181-83.
Persephone, and Chauchat erweist sich als die Verkörperung derjenigen Macht, die für immer Castorp-Persephone an die Unterwelt fesselt.”\textsuperscript{210} Her identity with Hans’s childhood companion provides her with yet another mortal aspect:

Seine zunehmend enge Bindung an Frau Chauchat und die damit verbundene Gefährdung werden erkennbar in der Identifizierung der geliebten Frau mit dem von Castorp bewunderten, ja angebeteten ehemaligen Mitschüler Hippe (symbolisch für Todesgefährdung, ist doch Hippe ein Synonym für die “\textit{Sense},” die traditionell mit der Figur des Todes verbundene Waffe, mit der dieser – als “\textit{Sensenmann}” – Menschenleben hundert- und tausendfach im Nu auslöscht, wie der Bauer das Korn hundert- und tausendfach abmäht).\textsuperscript{211}

It is love that has seized Castorp, he explains to Chauchat in “Walpurgisnacht,” “`à l’instant, où mes yeux t’ont vue, ou, plutôt, que j’ai reconnu, quand je t’ai reconnue toi, — et c’était lui [cet amour], évidemment, qui m’a mené à cet endroit...’” (\textit{GW} 3, 475).

Clawdia Chauchat thus appears in the triple aspect of death’s power of seduction and captivity and gruesome embodiment. Since, for the one experiencing it, Hans Castorp’s original déjà-vu experience of “Hippe” at the Berghof brings a potentially deadly relationship into being, the materialization of a similar experience in his dream of “Schnee” seems of critical importance.

\textsuperscript{209}Kristiansen, 200.

\textsuperscript{210}Kristiansen, 205. For a full treatment of the relationship between Castorp and Chauchat in terms of the Persephone myth, see Kristiansen, 204-07.

The cannibalistic vision of horror that concludes Castorp’s dream of images derives from the full breadth of impressions of love and death at the core of his experiences at the Berghof. That the critics have thus far failed to pay the consideration even the least bit of attention results from their overconcentration on the act of dismemberment’s mythological significance. As noted in the preceding paragraphs, Chauchat assumes Hermes’s role as conductor of souls precedent to both of Castorp’s medical examinations in “Das Thermometer” and “Mein Gott.” In the first instance, she admonishes her future paramour from afar, and in the second, her presence is more immediate. On a third and final occasion, however, she fulfills her function more explicitly. After saying “‘Adieu’” to Castorp at the conclusion of “Walpurgisnacht,” Chauchat takes her position in the doorway and delivers the instruction that serves to guide him to the inexperienced realm awaiting him on the other side:

Damin glitt sie vom Stuhl, glitt über den Teppich zur Tür, in deren Rahmen sie zögerte, halb rückwärts gewandt, einen ihrer nackten Arme erhoben, die Hand an der Türangel. Über die Schulter sagte sie leise:

“N’oubliez pas de me rendre mon crayon.”

Und trat hinaus. (GW 3, 478)

As Karthaus notes, Madame Chauchat attains in the scene “eine nahezu monumental-mythische Pose.” The hand and naked arm with which she supports herself in the doorway are the objects that particularly draw Castorp’s attention to her during Krokowski’s lecture in “Analyse” (GW 3, 181-82). Hans’s observation of “dieser weich

---

212 ‘Der Zauberberg’ – ein Zeitroman,” 291. See also Kristiansen, 200.
hinter den Kopf gebogene Arm, der kaum bekleidet war” leads him to dreaming speculation on exhibitionist tendencies in female dressing habits, on women’s partial exposure of nape, breast, and arms, “um unser sehnsüchtiges Verlangen zu erregen” (GW 3, 182). He imputes a sort of natural reason to the whole process, concluding, as the narrator tells: “es handelte sich um die nächste Generation, um die Fortpflanzung des Menschengeschlechts, jawohl” (GW 3, 182). When Hans thus wonders, at the section’s end, whether Madame Chauchat “sich zergliedern läßt” (GW 3, 184), Mann’s employment of a double entendre is fully evident to the reader. The inquiry that on the surface refers to Chauchat’s possible participation in Krokowski’s analytic experiments only partially conceals the latent reference to the sexual act upon which it is surely based. Just as Chauchat’s performance of Hermes’s role of conducer of souls into Hades carries added erotic connotations, the deadly act of dismemberment to which Castorp bears witness in his “Schnee” dream seems likewise to refer to the sexual act.

The cannibalistic feast portrayed in Castorp’s dream bears unmistakable connotations of a primordial event. A number of critics consequently see in the “Blutmahl” a depiction of Hades, particularly as exemplified in the myth of Demeter and Persephone, whom the mother-daughter statue composition (GW 3, 682) appears to represent.213 Apart from the motif of dismemberment with which Mann’s text associates the sexual act, the release of erotic energy in that act’s performance brings temporary

---

213 In Lehrner’s view, the “Statuengruppe von Mutter und Tochter ist wohl Demeter und Persephone, ein neuer Hinweis auf die Repräsentation des Todesgedankens in der antiken Mythologie, die Thomas Mann sich hier deutet als ironisches Verhältnis des Todes in Gestalt der Tochter des spendenden Lebens.” “Hans Castorps Vision,” 16. Kristiansen’s analysis supports the same identification of the mother-daughter pair as a universally accepted given among Zaubenberg critics. Kristiansen, 206. See also Herbert Lehrner, Thomas Mann: Fiktion, Mythos, Religion (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1965) 117-18.
surrender to the forces of the unconscious. Such obedience to unconscious urges creates conditions of internal disintegration: “Possession by the unconscious means being torn apart into many people and things, a disjunctio.”\(^{214}\) Mann’s use of a motif of death with which to refer to an act of copulation is consistent with a trend established in literary antiquity. In ancient Greek and Latin literature, the metaphor of killing applies to the male role in sexual intercourse, while that of dying is “used of either or both partners.”\(^{215}\) If it is indeed the sexual act to which the scene of a child being dismembered of Castorp’s dream seems in part to refer, then – when one identifies the scene’s blond-haired child as a manifestation of Hans Castorp – the scene becomes the representation of an act of spiritual transformation. In interpreting Zosimos of Panopolis’s vision of being dismembered and becoming spirit, Carl Jung thus explains: “Christ’s tearing of the breast, the wound in his side, and his martyr’s death are parallels of the alchemical mortificatio, dismemberment, flaying, etc., and pertain like these to the birth and revelation of the inner man.”\(^{216}\) As Hans Castorp later reflects upon it in his “Gedankentraum,” the witnessing of the fleshly sacrifice (that is now explicitly linked in his thoughts with the carnal act implied in returning Hippe’s pencil to Chauchat) brings him deeper insight into the human being: “‘Ich weiß alles vom Menschen. Ich habe sein Fleisch und Blut erkannt, ich habe der kranken Clawdia Přibislav Hippe’s Bleistift


Zurückgegeben, Hans tells himself (GW 3, 684). Seen in very broad terms, the scene of dismemberment of Hans Castorp’s dream appears not only to represent the physically pleasurable unbinding of tensions involved in an act of sex, but also the entire process of self-mortification and spiritual transformation with which it becomes intricately related in binding him to the Berghof manner of existence.

Given Chauchat’s identity as “Hermes Psychagogos” and the underlying reference to sexuality in the motif of dismemberment, Hans’s dream in “Schnee” appears quite strongly to contain latent sexual meaning. In the portion of Castorp’s dream enclosed between his enticement by the “schöne[ ] Knabe” and his witnessing of the act of dismemberment, Hans’s dream experience appears to consist of a series of distinct sexual references. Between the two just-mentioned events, Hans’s dream depicts, listed here in reverse order, a series of individual occurrences that together describe the performance of the sexual act. Immediately before viewing the pair of “gräue Weiber” in his dream, the scene viewed by Castorp depicts the yonic imagery and weak knees of an anticipated sexual encounter: “Da stand ihm [Castorp] die metallene Tür der Tempelkammer offen, und die Knie wollten dem Armen brechen vor dem, was er mit Starren erblickte” (GW 3, 683). As Freud claims in Über den Traum: “Zimmer stellen Frauen(zimmer) dar, die Ein- und Ausgänge derselben die Körperöffnungen” (Ges.W. 2/3, 697; cf. also Ges.W. 2/3, 352). Arguing similarly in the Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, Freud also explains: “Auch das Offen- oder Verschlossesein des Zimmers fügt sich dieser Symbolik [. . .]” (Ges.W. 11, 160). One might thus interpret an open door as a female party’s preparedness for coitus, or as a male’s wish for gratification through
intercourse. Particularly through the threefold source of its composition, the "zwei steinerne Frauenfiguren auf einem Sockel"\textsuperscript{217} that Castorp views before entering the "Tempelkammer" (\textit{GW} 3, 682) would even seem under a strict Freudian interpretation to connote the phallus, although they also possess mythological significance. Freud thus calls the "Dreizahl" "ein mehrseitig sichergestelltes Symbol des männlichen Genitales" (\textit{Ges. W.} 2/3, 363). He also cites the example of a dream wherein male genitalia are symbolized by human figures (\textit{Ges. W.} 2/3, 370-71). The critics ignore this connection in concentration on the statues' meaning in reference to mythology. "In der Forschung ist man sich darüber einig," Kristiansen correctly observes, "daß sich Castorp in dem Tempel Demeters befindet und daß die Statuengruppe eine trauernde Demeter darstellt, die sich von ihrer Tochter Persephone verabschiedet, als diese die Welt des Lebens verlassen muß, um in die Unterwelt zu Hades wieder zurückzukehren."\textsuperscript{218} Hans's act of climbing "die hohen Stufen" of the temple and attaining the "Hallenwald der Säulen," his act of sitting on the "in der Mitte offenen Stufenunterbau" of a "Tempeltor[,]" and his entrance into the "tiefe[r] Torweg hinein, hindurch, auf einer mit Fliesen belegten Straße" (\textit{GW} 3, 682) all seem to portray the act of vaginal penetration and the performance of erotic intercourse. Freud claims in \textit{Die Traumdeutung} that "Stiegen, Treppen, Leitern im Traum" are a "sicheres Koitussymbol" and that "das 'Steigen' ohne weiteres als Ersatzbezeichnung der sexuellen Aktion gebraucht wird" (\textit{Ges. W.} 2/3, 360, n.1).\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{217}My emphases.

\textsuperscript{218}Kristiansen, 206. Cf. also Herbert Lehnert, "Hans Castorps Vision," 16-17.

\textsuperscript{219}The forest of columns in Castorps's dream might easily be interpreted – like the "dichter Wald" cited by Freud – as "Crines pubis," or public hair. \textit{Ges. W.} 2/3, 371, n.2.
“Mächtige Säulen, ohne Sockel, aus zylindrischen Blöcken getürmt, in deren Fugen Moos sproßte” (GW 3, 682) appear to refer to the partially hidden phallus and genital hair of the sexual act. The columns would appear to represent the phallus, since, as Freud notes: “Alle in die Länge reichenden Objekte, Stöcke, Baumstämme, Schirme [. . .] wollen das männliche Glied vertreten” (Ges. W. 2/3, 359). Finally, Hans observes “das allen gemeinsame Lächeln höflich geschwisterlicher Rücksicht” disappear from the face of the “schöne[] Knabe.” As the narrator explains, “—ja, ohne daß seine Brauen sich verfinstert hätten, erstand in seiner Miene ein Ernst, ganz wie aus Stein, ausdruckslos, unergründlich, eine Todesverschlossenheit [. . .]” (see above, p.164). The countenance of the “schöne[] Knabe” – whose latent identity with Chauchat I have established above – thus appears to very possibly bear the altered imprint of one dislocated from the world by the urgency of sexual passion. The immediately listed foregoing events seem to represent the latent sexual content of Hans Castorp’s dream. I have listed them in reverse order from their manner of appearing in Mann’s text (and thus as they manifest themselves in Hans’s dream) in order to demonstrate the logical progression of the latent act they represent. The here-described reverse portrayal of the latent sexual act by Hans’s dream almost seems indicated by the consideration that the “schöne[] Knabe” first looks behind Castorp, and that the latter then also “sah rückwärts” (GW 3, 681-82). If the manifest event of looking backwards possessed latent chronological significance, then the events first seen in the depiction would be the last to have occurred, whereas those last portrayed would have transpired at the earliest point in time. Such a logical reversal, or “Umkehrung in der Reihenfolge der Begebenheiten,” is typical of dreams, notes Freud,
“so daß die kausal vorangehende der ihr nachfolgenden im Traume nachgesetzt wird” (Ges. W. 11, 183). In addition to the seductive role played by its “schöner Knabe” and the sexual connotations with which Mann instills the motif of dismemberment, Hans Castorp’s dream in “Schnee” contains the symbolic details that together appear to represent a logically perverted progression through the steps in an act of coitus.

Is, however, such a meticulous analysis of the events of Castorp’s dream in explicitly sexual terms warranted? Is such a rigorously sexual interpretation not perhaps blameworthy of the worst form of reductionism? If not for certain undeniable considerations, one would have to conclude that it was. The manifest event to which Castorp bears witness upon entering the temple in his dream is dreadful – a consideration underscored both by its instillment of fright in the beholder and by the sense of foreboding that precedes it. Freud nonetheless explains: “Die Angst des Angstrauumes entspreche einem sexuellen Affekt, einer libidinösen Empfindung, wie überhaupt jede nervöse Angst, und sei durch den Prozeß der Verdrängung aus der Libido hervorgegangen” (Ges. W. 7, 87). Even apart from all reference to Freud, the “aufsteigende Angst” that Hans feels upon being confronted with Pribislav Hippe’s recurrence in Clawdia Chauchat is clearly a manifestation of his latent desire for her, for him, or perhaps even for both. Is that feeling’s resemblance to an “Eingesperrtsein mit Unumgänglichem oder Unentrinnbarem” (GW 3, 206-07) not also very similar to the sense of inevitability with which Hans enters the temple in his dream? As I will later demonstrate, the actual act of coitus to which I argue that Castorp’s dream refers is itself the object of a pronounced tendency to repression. It is, moreover, the singular event that
Mann’s novel selects as the object of an expressly symbolic series of repressive acts (see below, p.198). If the events of Castorp’s “Angsttraum” in “Schnee” have any significance at all, then its best clarification appears to be offered by Freudian theory – the application of the rules of which discloses the presence of a latent sexual act underlying its express manifestation of “Angst.”

The latent identity of the handsome lad of Castorp’s dream is Clawdia Chauchat – or, even better, Clawdia Chauchat as reincarnation of Hans’s schoolyard comrade. What of the identity of the victim of its dreadful act of dismemberment, however? The two sections of the fifth and sixth chapters of the Zauberberg previously under comparison: “Mein Gott, ich sehe!” and “Schnee,” among others, offer evidence of the child’s real identity as well. In order for Castorp to be generally capable of reproducing “die Gefühle, die er vor Hippe und vor sich selber unter tiefstem Stillschweigen begraben hatte,” says Härle, he visually dismembers his love object according to the features of Chauchat that she is capable of sharing with Hippe.220 In “Analyse,” Hans optically dissects Chauchat and wonders – in reference to Krokowski’s analytical method –, “Ob auch sie sich zergliedern läßt” (GW 3, 184). Castorp’s amorous plea to Chauchat in “Walpurgisnacht” also proceeds like an anatomical session. He begs to be allowed to

---

smell the kneecap’s fragrance and touch his mouth to the femoral artery of his beloved,\textsuperscript{221} whom he describes as an “‘image humaine d’eau et d’albumine, destinée pour l’anatomie du tombeau’” (\textit{GW} 3, 477). As the “grau Weiber” tear the child apart in “Schnee,” Hans Castorp “sah zartes blondes Haar mit Blut verschmiert” (\textit{GW} 3, 683). Here Hans concentrates on a single body part, but the same general concentration on individual features – again, the blond hair of the viewed object – characterizes his observation as he casts his eyes upon Chauchat in the waiting room before his radiological session in “Mein Gott”: “Er sah ihr Knie unter dem Tuchrock sich abbilden, sah an ihrem gebeugten Nacken, unter dem kurzen rötlichblonden Haar [. . .] die Halswirbel hervortreten, und abermals überlief ihn der Schauder” (\textit{GW} 3, 300). The feeling of horror that overcomes him while visually dissecting Chauchat in “Mein Gott” is repeated in the “Grausende Eiseskälte” that holds him in its spell while witnessing the devouring of the child in “Schnee” (\textit{GW} 3, 683). What Hans actually sees in both instances, however, seems to be of highest significance. Chauchat’s reddish-blond hair reappears in Castorp’s nightmare vision as blond hair smeared with blood. Of further interest is the consideration that the protagonist’s hair is also blond. Indeed, the narrator even describes Hans’s moustache and eyebrows as reddish blond (\textit{GW} 3, 54-55). Since, as Freud explains, “Die erste Leistung der Traumarbeit ist \textit{Verdichtung}” (\textit{Ges. W.} 11, 174), one should not be surprised

\textsuperscript{221}It is naturally the posterior portion of the knee rather than the patella (“rotule”) that holds true interest for Castorp, whose failure to find the correct French expression results in a mildly comic effect. Here Castorp is under the grip of the same curiosity concerning bodily functions that sparks his interest in “Humaniora.” Upon hearing Behrens describe the operations of the lymphatic glands in that section, Castorp enthusiastically exclaims: “‘Die Lymphpe der Beine . . . Das interessiert mich sehr.’” \textit{GW} 3, 370.
to find features both of Chauchat and of Castorp in his dream’s dismembered youth. The youth devoured by the witches of his dream in “Schnee” appears to figuratively incorporate features both of Hans Castorp: the subject of Behrens’s radiological vivisection in “Mein Gott” – to be discussed shortly, and of Clawdia Chauchat: the explicit object of Castorp’s acts of visual dismemberment.

The scene to which Hans Castorp bears witness at the conclusion of his dream of images carries underlying connotations of death and love relating to himself and his love object. As soon to be described, the portrayed act of dismemberment in Hans’s dream revives his earlier confrontation with the reality of his own death. The same event’s parallel depiction of his erotic encounter with Chauchat would thus seem to impart its implications of death to the latter event as well. Nothing exemplifies the consideration better than the object Hans uses to commemorate his beloved. While Castorp’s “Regieren” concerns itself primarily with fathoming the problem of the “Homo Dei,” he accompanies his reflective activity in “Vom Gottesstaat” with contemplation of the x-ray image given him by Chauchat as a souvenir:

[…] ein Täfelchen, das, […] gegen das Himmelslicht aufgehoben, sich erhellt und humanistische Dinge vorwies: das transparente Bild des Menschenleibes, Rippenwerk, Herzfigur, Zwerchfellbogen und Lungenbläse, dazu das Schlüssel- und Oberarmgebein, umgeben dies alles von blaß-dunstiger Hülle, dem Fleische,

---

Footnote: Freud suggests to his audience in the Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse: “Aus Ihren eigenen Träumen werden Sie sich mühelos an die Verdichtung verschiedener Personen zu einer einzigen erinnern.” Freud then proceeds to describe a hypothetical situation in which the qualities of four separate individuals contribute to the representation of a single “Mischperson,” for whom he makes the following qualification: “Durch diese Mischbildung wird natürlich etwas den vier Personen Gemeinsames besonders hervorgehoben.” Ges. W. 11, 175.
von dem Hans Castorp in der Faschingswoche vernunftwidrigerweise gekostet hatte. (GW 3, 540)

Hans Castorp’s participation in the activity of visually dissecting Madame Chauchat continues in her absence with the aid of a roentgenogram providing a clear view of her internal organs and bones. Such a view, as I will soon show, carries a portent of death. Chauchat’s x-ray gives Castorp insight into the bodily composition of her whose flesh he has tasted during a Fasching celebration. Might the witches’ cannibalistic dismemberment of a child in his dream in “Schnee” be the transformed manifestation of the latent memory of a sexual experience evoked by Hans’s contemplation of his beloved’s x-ray image? Might that be the reason that they curse at the dreamer “im Volksdialekt von Hans Castorps Heimat” (GW 3, 683)? Are the witches of his dream perhaps nothing more than the concealed lustful and destructive halves of a self and its performance of an act so radically foreign to his usually repressive disposition that he experiences them in dream as threateningly alien? Hans Castorp’s anatomical experience of “Mein Gott,” his memories of a night of love following “Walpurgisnacht,” and their preservation in Clawdia Chauchat’s “Schattenbild” constitute the latent content of a dream that shocks the dreamer back to wakefulness in “Schnee.”

If my interpretation of the conclusion to Castorp’s pictorial dream of “Schnee” is correct, what might one further deduce concerning the latter’s effect upon the dreamer? An interpretation ascribing sexual connotations to Castorp’s dream would in the first instance be nothing irregular, since, as Freud claims: “im Traume die Symbole fast ausschließlich zum Ausdruck sexueller Objekte und Beziehungen verwendet werden”
Hans’s dream would be nothing more than the expression by will of repressed sexual content. Given the regular pattern of reminiscence established by Hans’s dreams of “Satana macht ehrhörige Vorschläge” and “Hippe,” however, the occurrence of such symbols in his “Schnee” dream would appear to record the memory of past experience. Beyond the mere expression of repressed sexual desire, the portrayal of a sexual act of Hans’s dream seems to relive the experience of his unportrayed night of love with Chauchat following the “Walpurgisnacht” section. The former two dreams evidently express a desire for fulfillment of yet unfilled erotic urges – a point made most clear by the appearance in each of a very similar implement. In the earlier dream, Chauchat lends Castorp “ein[r] rotgefärbc[r], nur noch halblange[r], in einem silbernen Crayon steckende[r] Stift” (GW 3, 130). The instrument appears nearly identical to the “versilbertes Crayon mit einem Ring, den man aufwärts schieben mußte, damit der rot gefärbc Stift aus der Metallhülse wachse” that Hans recalls in “Hippe” (GW 3, 173).

Freud expressly mentions just such an implement as a symbol of the male sexual organ in his Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse. Freud thus refers to “vorschubbare Bleistifte” as an example of objects that are “unzweifelhafte männliche Sexualsymbole” on the basis both of their capacity for elongation and their adherence to

---

223 Such an interpretation would not be without opponents. Kristiansen, for example, declares his support for the interpretation given by Francis Bulhof in Transpersonalismus und Synchronität: “Bezieht man wie Francis Bulhof die Leitmotive und ihre Zusammenhänge in die Analyse mit ein, wird man nicht nur die Annahme einer Identität zwischen Hippe und Chauchat bestätigen finden, sondern man kommt zu einem der psychoanalytischen Deutung diametral entgegengesetzten Ergebnis. Es läßt sich nachweisen, daß Castorps Begegnung mit Hippe keineswegs als das primäre ‘Erlebnis’ zu verstehen ist, das in seinen Träumen in entstehender Form auftaucht und sich in seiner Liebe zu Chauchat widerspiegelt; im Gegenteil ist – so die überzeugende Konklusion Bulhofs – ‘die Begegnung mit Hippe nicht die echte, sie ist eine Ersatzbegegnung.’” Kristiansen, 169. Kristiansen’s citation is taken from Francis Bulhof, Transpersonalismus und Synchronität: Wiederholung als Strukturelement in Thomas Mams “Zauberberg,” diss., Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1966 (Groningen: van Denderen, 1966) 41.
the class of "Instrumente" (Ges.W. 11, 156). Not only is Hippe's pencil capable of extension, but Mann also describes it as a "Mechanismus" (GW 3, 173). The dream-portrayed exchange of such an object would accordingly signify some form of sexual interaction.²²⁴ Whereas the two former dreams depict an unfulfilled wishful occurrence as represented through the memory of a simple schoolyard transaction, the sexual encounter portrayed in Hans's dream of "Schnee" is the wish-fulfilling reminiscence of a previously experienced satisfaction of desires. While the dreams of "Satana macht ehrührige Vorschläge," "Hippe," and "Schnee" all possess latent erotic content, the latter contains distinctly recognizable connotations of death pretty much absent in the former pair of dreams. The conclusion of Hans Castorp's dream of images in "Schnee" is a latent erotic event's manifest portrayal whose simultaneous conjuring of an experience of death exerts an effect of horror, nausea, and despair on the dreaming observer.

The latent experience upon which the manifest content of Hans's dream founds itself is certainly the erotic encounter between Castorp and Chauchat following the "Walpurgisnacht" section at the end of the Zauberberg's fifth chapter. Mann's narrator refrains from providing a description of that encounter; the event nevertheless enters his

²²⁴Böhm's designation of Hippe's pencil as "geradezu die Parodie eines phallischen Symbols" seems to found itself on its usage's immediate transparency. Böhm, 353. It seems hard to imagine that such an object would have evoked the same degree of recognized sexual connotation among Mann's contemporaries as it would today, but seen against the background of Freud's widely held celebrity during the period, the notion seems quite plausible. See Ellenberger, 454-55; 791-93. Böhm however also asserts: "Die im Text geschilderte Bleistiftilieht entpuppt sich näher besehen als mythisierende Umschreibung einer pubertären gegenseitigen Onanie." Böhm, 353. With respect to the "Hippe" dream, such an interpretation is certainly admissable. The transaction involves an undeniable release of homoerotic energy. Notwithstanding, the exchanges of just such a pencil between Chauchat and Castorp in the dream of "Satana macht ehrührige Vorschläge" and in "Walpurgisnacht" have implicitly specific heterosexual connotations. In order to do justice to the multiplicity of its specific usages, it therefore seems best to view the pencil's exchange less restrictively, or in the generally inclusive terms of a simple sexual transaction.
narrative in the symbolic imagery of Castorp’s dream. Since its manifestation in dream carries connotations of death in addition to its inherent erotic content, one might expect the actual experience upon which it is based to serve as the origin of such connotations. The manifestation of Thanatos in Hans’s dream has multiple sources within the body of Hans’s overall Berghof experience, two of which are related in a significant way to his erotic encounter with Madame Chauchat. Hans Castorp’s erotic affair with Clawdia Chauchat is casually connected to her departure and awaited return. In the mind of the protagonist, the ruptured liaison carries deadly overtones both for her that departs and for him who waits.

In the text of Mann’s novel, the motif of departure, or “Abreisen,” bears explicit implications of mortality that are reinforced by the language of symbolism. At three o’clock on the afternoon following their erotic union, Madame Chauchat departs the Berghof for Dagestan (GW 3, 483). Hans observes her leave-taking of the sanatorium as a general event, in which “der Abreisende,” who, “genesen oder nicht, um zu leben oder zu sterben, die Rückreise ins Flachland antrat [. . .]” (GW 3, 484). Such an unadvised departure carries possibly deadly implications, and – in accordance with the sanatorium’s universal rule – Chauchat interrupts her stay at the Berghof “auf eigene Gefahr und mit schlechtem Gewissen” (GW 3, 484). As Hans speaks to Behrens in “Veränderungen” of Chauchat’s departure, he asks: “ ‘Wie will man denn da [in Daghestan] nun leben, unausheillich, wo die Grundbegriffe fehlen und niemand von unserer Ordnung hier oben weiß und wie es zu halten ist mit Liegen und Messen? Übrigens will sie ja ohnedies wiederkommen, hat sie mir gelegentlich mitgeteilt [. . .]’ ” (GW 3, 489). Hans’s personal
interest in his beloved’s return contains genuine concern for her health and safety. His anxiety founds itself on a general understanding that for the ailing patient, leaving the care of the sanatorium and its staff could have deadly consequences – an understanding that lies at the base of Joachim’s declaration: “‘ich reise nach Hause, und wenn es mein Tod ist!’” (GW 3, 481). Hans Castorp’s understanding of the relationship between death and departure appears almost as a given in his rather macabre remark to his visiting uncle that Joachim’s room has been fumigated with hydrogen peroxide, “ebenso gründlich, wie wenn nicht wilde Abreise von dort gehalten worden wäre, sondern eine ganz andere, kein Exodus, sondern ein Exitus” (GW 3, 595). The “ganz andere [Abreise]” to which Hans refers is the removal of a corpse – such as that notoriously performed by sled in winter, since the term “Exitus” – Latin for both departure and death – is also the medically accepted German terminus technicus for decease. The Zauberberg text’s employment of the term is frequent and transparent enough for its meaning to be clear to Mann’s readers. Since death was equated with departure in more primitive cultures, one need hardly be surprised to find the equation of both in Freud’s description of “Die Symbolik im Traum” (the tenth of his Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse): “Das Abreisen bedeutet im Traum Sterben. Es ist auch der Brauch der Kinderstube, wenn sich das Kind nach dem Verbleib eines Verstorbenen erkundigt, den es vermisst, ihm zu sagen, er sei verreist” (GW 3, 163). Madame Chauchat’s departure from the Berghof after “Walpurgissnacht” hardly seems to the reader to have grave implications for Chauchat.


226See also GW 3, 445; 446; 481; 595; 597; 621; 741.
particularly because she – somewhat like Castorp – seems to be sojourning at the sanatorium more out of personal preference than express need. Notwithstanding, in terms of Hans Castorp’s evident feelings for her, her departure carries the insignia of impending peril for both her own well-being and for that of the one to whom she has allegedly promised to return.

Both its principally operative symbols and the latent experiences upon which it is based provide the “Blutmahl” scene of Castorp’s dream with elements of Thanatos in addition to these considerations’ underlying erotic character.

One of these latent experiences, Hans’s x-ray examination in “Mein Gott,” begins, as already discussed, with a suggestion of erotic fulfillment, yet it concludes with what the protagonist believes is a glimpse of his certain death. Hans Castorp’s interest in gaining x-ray insight into the human body’s physical constitution (GW 3, 370-71) would seem to derive its principal motivation from a desire to discern the source of his sensations of tachycardia and blushing, since the same are somehow inaccessible to his inquiring intellect (cf. GW 3, 103; 198). The desire for revelation to which Castorp aspires in “Mein Gott, ich sehe!” – the discovery of the motivations at the base of his symptoms – bespeaks nothing less than the protagonist’s utter lack of self-wisdom (what Nietzsche consistently describes in reference to the Delphic Oracle) and his self-evasive desire to gain the same. An overwhelming prejudice for external explanations dominates Hans Castorp’s approach to himself and his environment. Hans’s course of introspective soul-searching formally begins with his assumption of the task of “Regieren” in “Vom Gottesstaat.” Prior to that, Hans relies prevalently upon his immediate cultural
environment and the prospects of externally advanced, theoretical or technological methods and procedures as the best solution to the problems that beset him. Is it any wonder, then, that Castorp should be shocked at the glimpse of his mortality provided by Behrens’s x-ray? In viewing the x-ray of his hand, Hans Castorp comprehends for the very first time the certainty of his own death: “Mit den Augen jener Tienappel’schen Vorfahrin erblickte er einen vertrauten Teil seines Körpers, durchschauenden, voraussehenden Augen, und zum erstenmal in seinem Leben verstand er, daß er sterben werde” (GW 3, 306). Hans sees his mortality first-hand in witnessing his own skeletal composition through the eyes of his clairvoyant aunt, to whose eyes those soon to perish reportedly appear “als Gerippe” (GW 3, 305). Castorp has witnessed the deaths of those closest to him: his mother, his father, and his grandfather (GW 3, 32, 41-42). He is clearly familiar with the notion of universal human mortality. In “Mein Gott” it nonetheless seems that Hans Castorp first grasps the implications of the general law of mortality applied to his individual case, and he reacts as if faced by an uncanny presence.

Feelings of the uncanny explicitness rule over Hans Castorp’s momentary comprehension of his own mortality in “Mein Gott.” He is at first deeply moved upon viewing Joachim’s pulsating heart, his “Grabesgestalt und Totenbein.” He is filled with “Andacht und Schrecken” and feels himself “von geheimen Zweifeln gestachelt, ob es rechte Dinge seien, mit denen dies zugehe” (GW 3, 305-06). The narrator explains that after Hans peers “in sein eigenes Grab” and realizes – for the first time in his life – that he will die: “Dazu machte er ein Gesicht, wie er es zu machen pflegte, wenn er Musik hörte, – ziemlich dumm, schläfrig und fromm, den Kopf halb offenen Mundes gegen
die Schulter geneigt” (*GW* 3, 306). Hans’s gesture is similar to the one he earlier makes when Chauchat enters the laboratory: “Hans Castorp erkannte sie mit aufgerissenen Augen, indem er deutlich fühlte, wie das Blut aus dem Gesicht wich und sein Unterkiefer erschlaffte, so daß sein Mund im Begriffe war, sich zu öffnen” (*GW* 3, 296).

This is the gesture made by Mann’s characters when gripped by the instinctual and irrational – it is the expression of one who has surrendered consciousness’s control to the workings of the unconscious. The intellectual half of Castorp’s psyche that seems initially motivated by desire for knowledge begins, as if sated or overwhelmed by that knowledge, to surrender its hegemony in the relationship to the expression of pure will (understood in Schopenhauer’s sense) of a death-like trance. Castorp’s vacant expression seems to betray an attitude of trepidation that prompts Behrens to remark: “‘Spukhaft, was? Ja, ein Einschlag von Spukhaftigkeit ist nicht zu verkennen’” (*GW* 3, 306-07).

Kristeva, citing Freud, observes: “‘Sentiment d’étrangeté et dépersonnalisation font partie de la même catégorie.’” Hans comprehends as concrete personal reality the reasonably self-evident general law of mortality – an event that carries depersonalizing, uncanny consequences. Almost immediately, it seems, Hans nevertheless regains control of his senses. Behrens shuts down his instruments and Castorp throws his clothes on as the Hofrat gives him and Joachim “einige Auskunft über seine Beobachtungen, unter Berücksichtigung ihrer laienhaften Auffassungsfähigkeit” (*GW* 3, 307). The narrator

---

227 In *Tristan*, the self-satisfied Herr Klöterjahn opens his mouth and lays his head to the side, “wie manche Leute pflegen, [. . .] beim Horchen.” *GW* 8, 225; 255. As an “Anfall von animalischem Wohlbefinden” seizes Anton Klöterjahn, he makes an exaggeratedly grotesque version of the same gesture while shaking his teething ring and rattle in the air: “Seine Augen waren beinahe geschlossen vor Vergnügen, und sein Mund war so klaffend aufgerissen, daß man seinen ganzen rosigen Gaumen sah. Er warf sogar seinen Kopf hin und her, indes er jauchzte.” *GW* 8, 262.
explains: “Was im besonderen Hans Castorp betraf, so hatte der optische Befund den akustischen so genau bestätigt, wie die Ehre der Wissenschaft es nur irgend verlangte” (GW 3, 307). Within an instant, Hans Castorp has passed through the most profound form of realization and recovered from its uncanny impact to engage intelligently in a conversation concerning the details of his alleged pulmonary condition.

The rapidity with which Hans Castorp evidently represses both the emotional shock of recognizing the fact of his own mortality and his consequent experience of the uncanny provides little occasion – given the intensity of the experience – for coming to terms with it. The depth of Hans’s insight in “Mein Gott” and its swift repression lay the foundations for an inevitable return of the repressed.

Just as Hans’s “Schnee” idyll fulfills the unrealistic suggestions of erotic bliss that Behrens makes in “Mein Gott,” it also reenacts his experience of the uncanny evoked in that section through the insight he gains into his inner being. In the course of his x-ray examination, Hans is shown the “Lichtaufname” of a woman’s arm and other examples of Behrens’s “ ‘Lichtanatomie’ ” (GW 3, 301). He witnesses first-hand a vision of Joachim’s “leeres Gebein,” in which he is able to distinguish separate organs, arteries, bones, and cavities (GW 3, 304-05). During the x-raying of his hand, Hans gazes into his own grave: “Das spätere Geschäft der Verwesung sah er vorweggenommen durch die Kraft des Lichtes, das Fleisch, worin er wandelte, zersetzt, vertilgt, zu nichtigem Nebel gelöst, und darin das kleinlich gedrechselte Skelett seiner rechten Hand [ . . . ]” (GW 3, 306). The skeletal views Hans receives of his own and others’ individual body parts

228Kristeva, Étrangers à nous-mêmes, 277.
accentuate the anatomical theme of Behrens’s roentgenographic procedure – a theme that repeats itself in the nightmarish scene of dismemberment with which his pictorial dream of “Schnee” culminates.

In addition to its representation of an act of vivisection, the acoustical and visual details of the “Blutmahl” and its setting recall the sounds and physical environment of Hans Castorp’s “‘Lichtanatomie.’” If, during his dream in “Schnee,” the protagonist were actually recalling previously experienced reality in dream, no better source could serve to confirm the fact than the sounds he hears in the act of being x-rayed. For nothing in dream seems more definitely related to the activities of the real world than its reproduction of the more sensual details of previous experience represented by sound.  

While being x-rayed in “Mein Gott,” Hans hears the eruption of the “Gewitter,” that “knisterte, knatterte, knallte” as the “Objektiv” peers “in sein Inneres” (GW 3, 302). In the nightmare portion of his dream in “Schnee,” Castorp views a child being dismembered and devoured by two “graue Weiber [. . .] mit hängenden Hexenbrüsten” and hears how “die spröden Knöchlein ihnen im Maule knackten” (GW 3, 683). Might the predominance of the “kn” sound in both experiences be an indication of their connection in the dreamer’s memory? Hans’s dissection by x-ray and the vision of the child’s dismemberment portray similar events to the accompaniment of alliteratively comparable audible plosives. Hans’s experience of the inaudible in “Mein Gott” also

\[\text{Footnote: Freud claims: “Auch Reden komponieren kann die Traumarbeit nicht. Bis auf wenige angebhbare Ausnahmen sind die Traumreden Nachbildungen und Zusammensetzungen von Reden, die man am Traumtag gehört oder selbst gehalten hat, und die als Material oder als Traumanregler in die latenten Gedanken eingetragen worden sind.” Ges.W. 11, 185. If Freud’s supposition were true, might one not expect the same faking of a tendency to transformation with respect to the rest of aural sensory data?}\]
seems to reappear in his “Schnee” dream. Behrens x-rays Castorp in “Mein Gott,” “und aus seinen halblauten Äußerungen, abgerissenen Schimpffereien und Redensarten schien hervorzugehen, daß der Befund seinen Erwartungen entsprach” (GW 3, 306). Hans is thus incapable of hearing what Behrens is saying. One should also keep in mind that Behrens speaks “stark niedersächsisch” (GW 3, 68), or approximately in the dialect of Castorp’s native Hamburg, which lies on Lower Saxony’s northeastern border with Schleswig-Holstein. There is a marked similarity between Hans’s perceptions of Behrens’s inaudible mutterings during the medical exam and the witches’ voiceless hometown-dialectal invective during his dream (see also above, p.178) – a similarity that suggests the events’ identity. Beyond the fact that witches perform the act of dismemberment in “Schnee” and that the narrator compares Behrens’s laboratory to a “Hexenoffizin” (GW 3, 301), both events take place in closed chambers that are first approached by descending a flight of (stone) stairs (GW 3, 295; 682). A further connection is established through the consideration that the “Tempelkammer” of Castorp’s nightmare is reached through a “metallene Tür” (GW 3, 683). Although the door that the narrator mentions as entering into Behrens’s radiological chamber is not explicitly composed of metal (cf. GW 3, 296), one would implicitly expect just such a door – particularly one plated in lead – to be placed there for the purpose of shielding in radiation. The visual imagery, setting, and electrical popping of Hans Castorp’s “dissection” by x-ray in the “Hexenoffizin” of “Mein Gott” reproduce themselves during the nightmare portion of his “Schnee” dream in the scene of a child being brutally dismembered by a pair of witches to the sound of snapping bones.
Hans Castorp’s dream experiences in “Schnee” reproduce – in the symbolically transformed imagery of fantasy – the essential elements of a series of previously experienced real events. The erotic expectations and insight Hans gains into his physical being by means of Behrens’s x-ray apparatus and the fulfillment of his erotic fantasy following “Walpurgisnacht” find their way into the composition of a dream of intensely complex origins. In the preceding paragraphs, I have described the connection between these experiences and their reappearance in the fantastically transformed imagery of Castorp’s dream. The remaining ingredients to be explained in the connection are thus no longer the “what” and the “how” in the relationship, but merely the “why.” Why does Castorp imagine Chauchat and his experience of being x-rayed in “Mein Gott, ich sehe!” in the symbolically altered form of the dream of “Schnee”? The answer must surely lie in the consideration that there is something present in the former events that requires their psychological reworking by Hans through the mediation of dream. In Die Traumdeutung, Freud cites Yves Delage’s contention that dreams are composed of the remains of earlier events experienced in waking: “Wovon träumt man nun aber? Delage erkennt das in unseren Träumen vorkommende Material als bestehend aus Bruchstücken und Resten von Eindrücken der letzten Tage und früherer Zeiten” (Ges.W. 2, 84).230 The manifest events of Castorp’s dream in “Schnee” – in addition to their representation of the events of “Hippe,” their reenactment during “Walpurgisnacht,” and the subsequent erotic encounter – rely largely for their latent content on Hans’s experiences of being x-

230Freud’s failure to cite his source presumably results from the consideration that Delage’s theory was at that time contained in a single article: Yves Delage, “Essai sur la théorie du rêve,” Revue Scientifique 68.2 (1891): 40-48.
rayed. Cloaked in the symbolically transformed guise of original signs and unique plot, they are also unrecognizable to the dreamer, since, as Freud explains: “Alles, was in unseren Träumen auftritt, was wir zuerst geneigt sein mögen, als Schöpfung des Traumlebens anzusehen, erweist sich bei genauerer Prüfung als unerkannte Reproduktion, als ‘souvenir inconscient’ ” (Ges.W. 2, 84). Why, however, might the existence of such earlier impressions contain enough force to compel their transformation into the material upon which the fantastic operations of dream create their images? Again, Freud provides an explanation in reference to Delage: “dieses Vorstellungsmaterial zeigt einen gemeinsamen Charakter, es rührt von Eindrücken her, die unsere Sinne wahrscheinlich stärker betroffen haben als unseren Geist, oder von denen die Aufmerksamkeit sehr bald nach ihrem Auftauchen wieder abgelenkt wurde” (Ges.W. 2, 85). The specifically identifiable experiences of reality that in reference to Delage might have created such a spiritual diversion in Castorp should now be evident to the reader. Through a rapid shift in attention, Castorp has repressed his personal experience of death evoked in the process of being x-rayed. He has also repressed his memory of the fulfillment of his childhood sexual fantasy following the festivities of “Walpurgisnacht.”

2.3. **The Underlying Chaos of Rigidly Structured Order.**

Hans’s experience of his own mortality in “Mein Gott” is evidently an experience of such personal significance that it may not be easily forgotten. He seems to quickly repress the experience and the feelings that accompany it. Castorp possesses a pronounced tendency to repression of Eros and Thanatos. The “ehrbare[] Verfinsterung
seiner Miene” that befalls him in reaction to the unrestrained love-making of his Russian neighbors gives testament to the former tendency (GW 3, 58-60). Evidence of the latter is provided by Castorp’s visible repression of the fact of the very recent decease of his bedchamber’s former occupant (GW 3, 22). As Freud, however, explains, the repressed never loses its urge to become conscious: “Dies Verdrängte behält seinen Auftrieb, sein Streben, zum Bewußtsein vorzudringen” (Ges. W. 16, 201). One of the principal means for such repressed material to return to consciousness is through the special psychological conditions of the dream state – its “andere Verteilung der Besetzungsenergien” in the ego (Ges. W. 16, 201-02). Hans’s dream in “Schnee” is the expression of the since-repressed death urge and its production of intense fear released in the act of his personal realization of mortality in “Mein Gott.” By repressing the realization of his death, Hans Castorp ironically removes from consciousness a threat that nonetheless persists within the unconscious core of his thoughts. Yet what is the specific meaning of his dream’s manifestation of latent sexual content?

The erotic significance of Hans Castorp’s dream in “Schnee” is perhaps the least decipherable element in the entire Zaubernacht plot. Since Castorp continues to be erotically fixated on Chauchat – as evidenced by his obsession with her x-ray image – the sexual portion of his “Schnee” dream seems to be a form of symbolic portrayal of their night of love-making following “Walpurgisnacht.” If it is that, however, the memory of the details of that event seems also to have been repressed from memory. For what the activities of that night actually represent are the culmination of a childhood sexual fantasy recurring in a series of uncanny déjà-vu dream experiences proceeding
progressively from “Satana macht ehrührige Vorschläge” through “Hippe” and
Castorp’s dream-like intoxicated state in “Walpurgisnacht.” That sexual fantasy directly
confronts the protagonist’s feelings of propriety. Is erotic attraction perhaps not merely
the proximate cause for Castorp’s fascination with Madame Chauchat’s x-ray picture –
the underlying reason being that he is attempting to recover a carnal memory that – like
the image – is distorted beyond recognition?

Prior to its ultimate achievement of gratification after “Walpurgisnacht,” his
erotic urge gives rise to increasing feelings of discomfort (or “Aufsteigende Angst”) that
strongly suggest its subjection to Hans’s repressive resistance. Hans’s sexual fantasy
finds its clearest expression in the above-mentioned dream episodes, but it by no means
confines itself to them alone. The déjà-vu experience of his memory of Pfibislav Hippe’s
resurrection in the figure of Madame Chauchat becomes the factor that gradually rules
over Hans Castorp’s existence. Up until the erotic tryst that falls between the narrations
of the first and second volumes of Mann’s novel, Hans Castorp lives in a world in which
fantasy has become reality. The fantastic idea of Hippe’s resurrection in the figure of
Chauchat replaces Hans’s conception of reality. As Kristeva insightfully notes, such
conditions belong to the realm of uncanny experience: “Nous sommes ici devant la
‘toute-puissance de la pensée’ qui, pour se constituer, invalidate aussi bien l’arbitraire des
signes que l’autonomie de la réalité, et les met sous la domination de fantasmes
exprimant des désirs ou des craintes infantiles.”\(^\text{231}\) Under the influence of an increasingly

\(^{231}\)Kristeva, Étrangers à nous-mêmes, 275.
unbridled imagination, Hans undergoes very real sensations of being subject to uncanny tyrannical forces during his skiing excursion in “Schnee” (above, p.135). Hans Castorp relives in “Schnee” the deceptive illusion of being dominated by the inscrutable primitive logic of animism that manifests itself in his belief in a schoolyard companion’s resurrection in a woman of whom he has become enamored perhaps for no other reason than that he had earlier become enamored of his classmate.

What happens, however, when the latent erotic fantasy underlying the whole process of the protagonist’s development in the first half of the Zauberberg finally works its way high enough within his consciousness to achieve real sexual gratification? What might one expect to occur, when the long-repressed sexual urge of the propriety-conscious Castorp makes use of his intoxicated condition to circumvent the otherwise rigid control he attempts to keep over his actions? As the manifest fantasy of a felicitous and socially acceptable exchange gets replaced, following “Walpurgisnacht,” by its latent wish – an act of sexual gratification that contravenes both Castorp’s personal disposition and the rules of the house – the effect hardly limits itself to directly created pleasure. Hans’s subsequent rise in temperature seems to indicate an increase in psychological tension as a result of the affair – a factor to which Freud would most certainly ascribe the presence of “Unlust.”

What further reaction might one expect to take place as a result

\[232\] In Jenseits des Lustprinzips, Freud attributes a rise in psychological tension to sensations of displeasure. Ges. W. 13, 3-5. Hans’s increase in temperature is Mann’s way of indicating such heightened inner tension. In the aforementioned essay, Freud also notes the propensity for the repressed sexual drives to resurface and create sensations of displeasure: “Gelingt es ihnen [den verdrängten Sexualtrieben] [. . .], sich auf Umwegen zu einer direkten oder Ersatzbefriedigung durchzuringen, so wird dieser Erfolg, der sonst eine Lustmöglichkeit gewesen wäre, vom Ich als Unlust empfunden.” Ges. W. 13, 7.
of Hans Castorp’s unguarded submission to the power of instinct? I propose that Hans Castorp’s sexual encounter with his Russian paramour triggers an act of repression on three levels: on the part of Behrens, himself, and even of the Zaubergeb text, whose spirit has come to intensely identify with the spiritual development of the protagonist.

When one considers the attitudes of the Berghof’s chief figure of authority, the protagonist, and the Zaubergeb narrator to Castorp and Chauchat’s erotic rendezvous following the “Walpurgisnacht” section, one finds their universal consensus that the event lies outside the realm of the normally acceptable. Beyond the consideration that he appears to have shared a degree of past intimacy with Madame Chauchat, Behrens is determined to thwart the erotic liaisons that he sees being formed between his patients. The Hofrat is “ein Agent, ein Funktionär, ein Verwandter höherer Gewalten, der erste und oberste freilich” (GW 3, 186). His habit, when examining them, of pulling down upon the lower eyelid of his patients “mit Zeige- und Mittelfinger” (GW 3, 69; 600) almost makes it appear as if he were peering into their souls. Like the superego, which gains knowledge of “die verdrängten Impulse” (otherwise unavailable to the ego) from the unconscious id (Ges. W. 13, 280), Behrens seems both omniscient and omnipotent. He possesses an eerie power to gain control over his patients with the promise of “allerliebste Damen” (GW 3, 69; 157), predicting almost prophetically that Hans Castorp “mehr Talent zum Patienten habe” than his cousin (cf. GW 3, 68-9; 584). The hurtful manner with which he administers his injections to Hans Castorp serves as barely disguised punishment for a kind of behavior he expressly wishes to curtail (GW 3, 487). He performs them as a “Virtuos, mit einem Schwung, indem er beim Einstich zugleich
"abdrückte," paying no regard for "die Stelle, wohin er stach, so daß der Schmerz zuweilen des Teufels war und der Punkt noch lange brennend verhär tet blieb" (GW 3, 487). The narrator particularly emphasizes the impression of aggressive malevolence immediately produced in its recipient by Behrens’s injection: "Ferner wirkte die Injektion stark angreifend auf den Gesamtorganismus" and "erschütterte das Nervensystem wie eine Gewaltleistung sportlicher Art" (GW 3, 487). Behrens repeatedly voices his antagonism to sexual liberality: "Ich bin kein Kuppelonkel! Ich bin kein Signor Amoroso auf dem Toledo im schönen Neapel’" (GW 3, 580). He also says that one must be courteous and that the sanatorium is "doch kein Bagno’" (GW 3, 251-52) – a word whose original significance, as "die mit einem Sklavengefängnis verbundenen Bäder des Serails in Konstantinopel,"233 conjures the aspects of punition, enslavement, and voluptuousness that seem to underlie the power he wields over Hans Castorp. Behrens’s repressive attitude toward Eros finds its most concrete expression in the injections he administers to his patient. In combination with Castorp’s response to the treatment, Behrens’s injections serve as a sort of crass parody of the psychological process of introjection.

Introjection is the process whereby external authority is internalized, and it is just such a transformation in Hans Castorp that exhibits its presence in the subchapter entitled "Jähzorn." When Castorp questions Behrens’s seriousness in suddenly announcing that he may leave the sanatorium, Behrens angrily dispels the notion with his above-cited remark about being “‘kein Kuppelonkel’” and “‘kein Signor Amoroso’” (GW 3, 580).

Behrens patently objects to Hans’s romantic liaison with Chauchat – a relationship for which he, as the Berghof’s presiding authority, feels personally responsible. As Freud observes, each drive has “sein eigenes Vermögen, aggressiv zu werden” (Ges. W. 7, 372). Hans’s act of love is an act of aggression both against the sanatorium’s rules of propriety and its chief representative’s claim to Chauchat as “mistress.”

Although an examination of the theme in terms of the Oedipus complex would consequently also seem appropriate, I will forgo such an analysis in the interest of space. Simply stated, introjection is the forceful inflection of the instincts and internalization of authority. In order to make “unschädlich” the individual’s “Aggressionslust,” Freud explains:

Die Aggression wird introjiziert, verinnerlicht, eigentlich aber dorthin zurückgeschickt, woher sie gekommen ist, also gegen das eigene Ich gewendet.

Dort wird sie von einem Anteil des Ichs übernommen, das sich als Über-Ich dem übrigen entgegenstellt, und nun als “Gewissen” gegen das Ich dieselbe strenge Aggressionsbereitschaft ausübt, die das Ich gerne an anderen, fremden Individuen befriedigt hätte. (Das Unbehagen in der Kultur, Ges. W. 14, 482-83)

The Hofrat’s administration of a vigorous “Prozedur” of prescribed injections against disease in “Veränderungen” is symbolic of the process of introjection’s aggressively proscriptive battle against instinctual aggression. In Freudian terms, the individual’s integration into society proceeds in two stages: in obedience first to external, then to internal authority.

---

Die zeitliche Reihenfolge wäre also die: zunächst Triebverzicht infolge der Angst vor der Aggression der äußeren Autorität, – darauf läuft ja die Angst vor dem Liebesverlust hinaus, die Liebe schützt vor dieser Aggression der Strafe, – dann Aufrichtung der inneren Autorität, Triebverzicht infolge der Angst vor ihr, Gewissensangst. \(\textit{Ges.W.}\) 14, 487

In “Jähzorn,” Hans rejects the Hofrat’s recommendation to return to the flatlands \(\textit{GW}\) 3, 584) – ostensibly in favor of his personal conviction of being ill, but covertly in order to preserve his expectations of receiving love – both from the authority, it seems, as well as from Chauchat. That Hans’s internalization of Behrens’s command to prescriptive obedience (cf. \(\textit{GW}\) 3, 69) is not accompanied by fear of the authority’s aggression, however, is easily explained by his fears (however irrational) of being left to the ravages of illness should he lose that authority’s approval. Behrens comically sheds light on the bond of affection, or “Angst vor dem Liebesverlust,” that seems to lie at the bottom of Castorp’s decision to remain at the sanatorium: “‘Sie stellen mir ja nach, als ob ich ein Frauenzimmer und wunder was für ein Lustobjekt wäre’” \(\textit{GW}\) 3, 731. The “\textit{Aufrichtung der inneren Autorität}” that completes the process of introjection manifests itself through Castorp’s self-sacrificial act of intentionally driving up his temperature by exposing himself to the cool dampness of his balcony \(\textit{GW}\) 3, 583) – an act of self-directed aggression performed in consequence of his conscientious trepidation over having to readapt to life in the flatlands \(\textit{GW}\) 3, 581-82). On the basis of his elevated temperature, Castorp declares to the Hofrat his decision, “noch hier zu bleiben und seine völlige Entgiftung abzuwarten,” thus gaining the Hofrat’s praise of his talent in being a
patient (GW 3, 584). In “Jähzorn,” Hans Castorp internalizes both Behrens’s aggression and the authority of making the decisions that determine his fate, thus accepting out of fear of losing the Hofrat’s fatherly protection the Berghof mandate of “Triebverzicht” — if not as a personal article of faith, at least as the prevailing condition of his existence.

Whether out of obedience to the locally enforced proscription against sexual relations between patients or merely out of necessity, Castorp seems to accept the delayment of gratification implicit in his waiting for Chauchat’s return. Chauchat is, in a certain sense, no longer an actual person from whom instinctual gratification might be realistically expected. Following her departure, she becomes the “Genius des Ortes” (GW 3, 486-87) whose perpetuation in memory provides gratification to the reflective mind of her idealistic worshiper. The door slamming that formerly bound Chauchat to the temporal sphere of presently occurring events ceases, thus announcing through its silence her enduring absence. Although Clawdia Chauchat is “unsichtbar-abwesend,” she becomes “unsichtbar-anwesend für Hans Castors Sinn” (GW 3, 485-86).235 For Hans Castorp, the relationship carries the imprint of the unimaginable and unrealizable from the very beginning: “In jener Stunde hatte sein zuckender Mund in fremder Sprache und in der angeborenen so manches Ausschreibungvolle halb unbewußt und halb erstickt

235Her absence’s production of what appears in Mann’s text to be an actual sensation of Chauchat’s presence might be said to derive from one’s judgement of a real person’s absence being founded in the sphere of experience. As Sartre describes, his sensation of a certain acquaintance’s failure to appear in the café at the habitual time is founded upon an expectation that causes the acquaintance’s absence to occur as a real event concerning that café. By contrast, the judgements that such persons as Wellington or Paul Valéry are not in the café have only abstract meaning, since they are not founded in reality. Sartre concludes: “Cela suffit à montrer que le non-être ne vient pas aux choses par le jugement de négation: c’est le jugement de négation au contraire qui est conditionné et soutenu par le non-être.” Jean-Paul Sartre, L’être et le néant: Essai d’ontologie phénoménologique (N.p.: Gallimard, 1943) 45-46.
gestammelt: Vorschläge, Anerbietungen, tolle Entwürfe und Willensvorsätze, denen alle Billigung mit Fug und Recht versagt geblieben war [. . .]” (GW 3, 486). If, in retrospect, Castorp perceives his confessions of love to have transgressed the realm of the permissible, the physical act that accompanied them most certainly falls victim to the same fate. All that Hans Castorp possesses of his erotic liaison ("aus dieser Stunde tiefen Abenteuers") is "das Schattenpfand" represented by the x-ray she has given him "und die dem Range des Wahrscheinlichen sich nährende Möglichkeit, daß Frau Chauchat zu einem vierten Aufenthalt hierher zurückkehren werde [. . .]" – although in such an instance Hans Castorp "werde dann unbedingt ‘längst weit fort sein’ " (GW 3, 486).

With her departure for Dagestan, Castorp transforms the reality of his love object into an ideal of near impossible achievement.

However vivid his memories of their night of lovemaking, Hans Castorp nonetheless represses his desire for Chauchat by transforming her into an ideal whose attainment only seems possible in fantasy. In ancient Roman religion, a "Genius" is a "Schutzgeist." Might one not logically conclude that, as "Genius des Ortes" (GW 3, 486-87), Chauchat is in some way identical with the "Geist des Ortes" that completely foils the "Versuch" of the "Geist des Flachlandes" (in its representative, James Tienappel) "den außengebliebenen Hans Castorp wieder einzuholen" (GW 3, 601; 608)? Hans attributes Chauchat’s "‘Genialität’" to "‘das geniale Prinzip der Krankheit’" (GW 3, 846). Whether he forces his temperature up by exposing himself to the cold in "Das

\[236\] 'Genius,' *Grosses Handlexikon in Farbe*, 1979 ed.
Thermometer” and again in “Jähzorn” (GW 3, 230-39; 583) or by purposefully overexerting himself in “Launen des Merkur” (GW 3, 328-30), the service Castorp pays to Chauchat’s idealized “geniale Prinzip der Krankheit” effectively eclipses the love that patently motivates it. Fromm describes the disproportionality between merit and expectation in the kind of love Castorp has for Chauchat: “A form of pseudo-love which is not infrequent and is often experienced (and more often described in moving pictures and novels) as the ‘great love’ is idolatrous love.”

Such idolatrous worship of the love object tends to result when a person has “not reached the level where he has a sense of identity, of I-ness rooted in the productive unfolding of his own powers.” Under such conditions, the subject “deprives himself of all sense of strength, loses himself in the loved one instead of finding himself.” Is that not pretty much the situation of Hans Castorp in the Zauberberg? Is it not the reason that he becomes lost to the world and a captive of the Berghof, because of worshipping, like Dante, a “‘sickly and mystagogical shadow’” (GW 3, 223), a Beatrice – as Settembrini calls her – his “‘Führerin durch alle neun kreisenden Sphären des Paradieses’” (GW 3, 717)? In her absence, Chauchat exercises in Castorp’s mind an almost supernatural power over real world events. Similarly ignoring the event’s actual occurrence in obedience to puerile superstitiousness, Hans regards his and Chauchat’s night of lovemaking – since it occurs on a leap year’s February 29 – as something that falls beyond the pale of temporal reality. He later tells

---


238 Fromm, The Art of Loving, 83.

239 Fromm, The Art of Loving, 83.
Peepekorn that he considers it "‘ein aus aller Ordnung und beinahe aus dem Kalender fallender Abend’" – an "‘hors d’œuvre’" (GW 3, 843).

As if in keeping with the protagonist’s attitude toward his overnight “affair,” the narrator abstains from doing anything beyond making belated mention of the event that – as he says – occupies the domain of a “wortlose Zwischenzeit” and “reine Zeit” (GW 3, 483). Through an act of narrative repression, the cardinal event that divides Mann’s work into halves becomes an "hors d’oeuvre" in the literal sense of the term. However special or extraordinary his erotic union with Madame Chauchat, Hans Castorp, Behrens, and the Zauberberg’s narrator exclude the forbidden event from the visibly presentable sphere of the Berghof’s spirit of high order and force it into the realm of the purely imaginary, unutterable, and repressed.

The established Berghof order and Hans’s adherence to it are by no means stable phenomena – however much Castorp seeks refuge in its apparent provision for his security. Hans preoccupies himself both with Chauchat’s prospects for survival beyond the realm of the sanatorium’s “Ordnung” (see above, p.181), as well as with those of Joachim once the latter departs his accustomed “Ordnungsgeleis” (GW 3, 585). With his acclimation to the Berghof, Hans tends to regard the structure of a prescribed life style as the best assurance against the ravages of disease. Its authorities’ attempts to keep the patients’ sexual activities concealed from view also belongs to the Berghof order, however – an order that Castorp to a certain extent transgresses through his boasting admiration of Chauchat (GW 3, 333). He also takes affront with the prevailing
suppression of the news of patients’ deaths in “Totentanz,” but when he breaks the custom by beginning to speak (with respectful intentions) of the decease of the “Herrenreiter,” he meets with vehement opposition (GW 3, 406-07). “Die Ordnung des Hauses schützte sie, die Patientenschaft, sorgfältig davor, von solchen Geschichten berührt zu werden,” explains the narrator, “und da komme nun so ein Grünschnabel und rede ganz laut davon [. . .]” (GW 3, 407). Hans Castorp’s earlier resistance to the Berghof’s suppression of Eros and Thanatos nevertheless yields in the end to a sense of obedience to its values. He reserves his observations on love and death to the intimate privacy of contemplating Chauchat’s “Schattenbild” during his pursuit of the self-reflective task of “Regieren.” Hans’s discomfort over the false sense of security gained through participation in the well-regulated life style of the Berghof seems inadvertently to express itself in his reaction to the uncanny perfect order of the snowflakes he observes in “Schnee”:

[. . .] ja, dies war das Unheimliche, Widerorganische und Lebensfeindliche daran; sie waren zu regelmäßig, die zum Leben geordnete Substanz war es niemals in diesem Grade, dem Leben schauderte vor der genauen Richtigkeit, es empfand sie als tödlich, als das Geheimnis des Todes selbst, und Hans Castorp glaubte zu verstehen, warum Tempelbaumeister der Vorzeit absichtlich und insgeheim kleine

---

Abweichungen von der Symmetrie in ihren Säulenordnungen angebracht hatten.

(GW 3, 663)

Hans thus regards the orderly symmetry of snowflakes to contradict an innate tendency of life to disorder. His reaction to the regulated life style of the sanatorium is similar.

Castorp’s adaption to the well-ordered Berghof existence – “dies schon vertraute, gleichmäßige und genau geregelte Leben” (GW 3, 287) – is never perfect until, perhaps, just before the novel’s conclusion, but there more than anywhere else the achievement of stability reveals its extreme vulnerability to internal disruption. Early on, Hans’s three-week period of convalescent absence from his place at the dining table is an idle (“nichtig”) “Unterbrechung” of the prevailing order that goes virtually unnoticed by his fellow sanatorium guests (GW 3, 287) – clear evidence, indeed, that the individual patient is superfluous to the order that engulfs him. Hans’s reflective activity of “Regieren” is an ongoing interruption of the Berghof’s ordering principle that appears to represent an attempt to create a sense of personally meaningful order independent of the meaninglessly rigid formality of his surroundings. Hans’s “Regieren” thus appears quite literally to represent an attempt to provide a sense of governance to conditions whose apparent “Ordnung” (GW 3, 286; 484) masks their underlying instability. The persistence of the trembling in his neck – symptom of the irreconcilability of the opposed impulses of chastity and Eros, Krokowski’s “Widerstreit zwischen den Mächten der Keuschheit und der Liebe” (GW 3, 180) – gives tangible evidence of Hans’s unstable adaption to prevailing considerations:
Denn auch das Genickzittern, das ihn hier oben bald nach der Ankunft zu
belästigen begonnen, hatte sich nicht wieder verlieren wollen, sondern stellte sich
im Gehen, im Gespräch, ja selbst hier oben am blau blühenden Orte seines
Nachdenkens über den Komplex seiner Abenteuer unvermeidlich ein, so daß ihm
die würdige Kinnstütze Hans Lorenz Castorps beinahe schon zur festen
Gewohnheit geworden war [. . .]. (GW 3, 539)

The unstable relationship between Hans Castorp’s adjustment to a life of order and the
repression of his feelings of love for Chauchat manifests itself symptomatically in Hans’s
inability to hold his head steady (see also GW 3, 541; 554; 714; 969). Chauchat’s
removal from the sphere of concrete actuality coincides only with an apparent
achievement of equilibrium on the part of the protagonist. Even though Hans adapts to
life at the sanatorium in Chauchat’s absence, his habituation to his environment, as the
narrator explains, is “auch nur Gewöhnung daran, daß man sich nicht gewöhnte” (see
below, p.215). Significantly, Hans’s excursion in “Schnee” is the ultimate expression of
his desire to break the false constraints of his environment in the pursuit of the self-
ordering principle of “Regieren.” The event follows closely upon his achievement of full
integration into Berghof society through repulsion of the flatlands’ attempt to recover him
in “Abgewiesener Angriff” (cf. GW 3, 608). The more fully Hans Castorp assimilates
himself to his well-ordered sanatorium environment, it seems, the more his apparent
achievement of psychological equilibrium stands in peril of disruption by the forces of
the uncanny and the return of the repressed.
2.4. **Hans Castorp’s Dream in “Schnee” as Manifestation of the Latent Sensual Components of Eros and Thanatos.**

Through its reiteration of the themes in Eros and Thanatos that serve as its principal elements, Hans’s pictorial dream in “Schnee” appears in the most general way to reenact the events of his adaptation to the “vertraute” Berghof way of life and his acceptance of the ultimately incomprehensible, inscrutable, and uncanny idea of his own mortality that goes along with it. His dream’s depiction of the harmoniously interacting members of a human community and its concealed gruesome rites represents the promise of fulfilled Eros and imminent threat of death that constitute the primary instinctual components of life at the Berghof — itself an allegory of modern society in general. As I have attempted to demonstrate in the foregoing sections, Hans’s dream of images draws upon the broadest spectrum of experience possible. Hans Castorp’s déjà-vu experience of a previously known but yet unvisited Mediterranean landscape relies for its latent content on the full range of erotic experience traversed by his imagination since arriving at the Berghof. It consequently also draws upon his memories of childhood. Hans’s dream is a reenactment of the erotic fantasy of his rediscovery of Hippe in the figure of Madame Chauchat, Behrens’s pre-x-ray suggestions of erotic fulfillment, Hans’s reliving of the symbolic borrowing of his schoolmate’s pencil in “Walpurgisnacht,” and his sublimated erotic confrontation of nature in “Schnee.” Since Hans Castorp’s erotic fantasy lies at the bottom of his integration into Berghof society, it is significant that his dream portrays the process as an experience of societal harmony — a consideration that certainly provides the key to his radical conformity to the sanatorium way of life.
Chauchat’s symbolic function as seductress and conveyer of souls in “Das Thermometer” and “Mein Gott” finds symbolic representation in Hans’s dream in the form of the “schöne[] Knabe” and the effect his gaze has of compelling the dreamer to enter the temple. The event is clearly a symbolic portrayal of her cardinal role in gaining Castorp’s devotion to the sanatorium way of life. Hans Castorp’s passage in his dream through a set of steps, threshold, gate, and street and his compulsive witnessing of an act of sacrificial dismemberment are the manifest representation of personal experiences – experiences of whose universal significance he takes cognizance in his subsequent dream of thoughts (see below, p.222). His dream reveals the circumstantial interconnectedness of spiritual and instinctual desire, his passage through the realm of sexual experience, and his initiation into the sanatorium’s deepest secrets. The sanatorium’s uncanny secrets portrayed in Hans’s dream are Behrens’s “Lichtanatomie” (GW 3, 301; 311), Krokovski’s “Seelenzergliederung” (GW 3, 20), and the insight into the impulses of death and love to which they subject him. The sexual experience to which his dream refers is Hans’s overnight encounter with Chauchat following “Walpurgisnacht” – it is also the other latent source for his dream’s manifestation of the gruesome sacrificial act. Mann’s reliance on such a broad range of latent experiences as the signifieds of Castorp’s manifest dream – whose elements often appear to possess multiply ambivalent meanings – by no means contradicts the findings of psychoanalysis. Freud notes that an individual appearing within a dream frequently possesses multiple latent identities (see above, p.177, n.222). If the dream-work relies on a multitude of latent sources for its production of the figures of manifest dream, it seems likely that it would possess the same tendency
with regard to material objects and events. The personalities, objects, and events portrayed in Hans Castorp’s dream of images in “Schnee” combined, however, appear universally to refer to a single great event. Hans’s dream portrays his transition by means of erotic attraction from the status of independent, yet not fully integrated member of the bourgeoisie to fully indoctrinated and chronically admitted member of a society founded on pathological ideals. Through anticipation of that dream’s latent meaning – the process of his subjection to outside influences as a function of hidden forces within his own psyche – Hans Castorp ascends to the plane of heightened self-knowledge that forms the basis of his “Schnee” vision’s power of liberation.

Hans Castorp’s dream in “Schnee” thus retraces a recurring pattern of symptomatic erotic wish-fulfillment that fantastically transports him through the blissful spiritual reunification of experienced déjà vu toward the unsettling and terrifying uncanny effects of acute psychological disintegration. Mann’s novel conducts its protagonist through a recurring cycle of pleasure and pain that continually ends by confronting his fantastic notions with the unshakable certainty of reality. At each turn, the pleasure initially produced in Hans Castorp restores the original harmony of spirit and desire through fantastic liberation of his repressed erotic instincts. The anamnestic experiences of rediscovering Hippe in Chauchat, of his pulsating heart in the natural environment of “Schnee,” and of the original bliss of his dream’s “Sonnenleute” are at the same time a rediscovery of his own Eros in the world that immediately surrounds him. Each of Hans’s déjà-vu experiences founds itself on the fantastic realization of Eros’s goal of restoring the subject to a state of natural harmony. Each of these
experiences is based upon a sublimation of erotic energy. The act of borrowing a pencil from his classmate (and later again from Chauchat) is the sublimation of Eros to a level enabling artistic production. The acts of challenging nature’s elements in “Schnee” and of feasting one’s eyes on the idyll of a dream represent the rechanneling of erotic energy into the benevolent spheres of play and purely fantastic creation. The outings of “Hippe” and “Schnee” from which Hans’s initial and final déjá-vu experiences take their impetus are both expressions of a spirit of independence that lies at the center of his self-appointed task of “Regieren.” The same will to liberation lies at the bottom of his rupture with Settembrini and pursuit of Chauchat’s pencil in “Walpurgisnacht.” Hans Castorp’s déjá-vu experiences fulfill the protagonist’s inherent desire to find himself in relationship to the world or, more precisely, to establish his relationship to the world as an expression of “Gemütsbewegungen” (cf. GW 3, 103; 172; 198; 203). In each instance, the invocation of the power of Eros initially manifests itself as an expression of positive energy with felicitous results. Each time, however, the positive component of Eros yields to the powers of Thanatos. The spirit of independence and self-discovery, the happiness, and the abundant feelings of love with which each of Hans Castorp’s déjá-vu experiences commences disintegrate, by turns, into the feelings of compulsion, loss of self (or “depersonalization”), disconcertedness, and insurmountable anxiety that serve as the hallmarks of the uncanny.

Each time Hans Castorp surrenders fully to the synthetic, redemptive, and reunifying power of Eros, a second, fully contrary force emerges that threatens the protagonist with disintegration, dissolution, and utter estrangement. As I have shown, the
erotic urge that draws Hans to Madame Chauchat contains a destructive component that expresses itself as a motif of dismemberment whose essence is unbridled instinctual lust. Hans’s dream of “Hippe,” Behrens’s suggestions of an erotic idyll in “Mein Gott,” the reenactment of Hans’s erotic fantasy in “Walpurgisnacht,” and his experiences of the sublime in the wilderness and dream of “Schnee” each bring an initial effect of erotic liberation that subsequently disintegrates into feelings of compulsion and subjection to insuperable uncanny powers. There is a distinct lack of moderation both in Hans’s repressive containment of his instincts and in the violence with which the latter gain control of him once having skirted the consistently watchful gaze of his bourgeois ego. For the same reason, there is also something distinctly excessive in each of Hans’s acts of surrendering himself over so totally to the déjà-vu experience of instinctual liberation.

Contrary to Kant’s feeling of the sublime, in which reason exerts a controlling influence over the potentially overwhelming might of natural sensuality, Castorp’s initially sublime déjà-vu experiences are ruled over by the fundamentally unreliable mediating power of imagination – according to Kant itself merely the highest sensual faculty. In Kant’s terminology, “Einbildungskraft” is “das größte[s] sinnliche[s] Vermögen[]” (see above, p.121). Rather than striving toward reason, Hans’s sublime déjà-vu experiences and their initially pleasurable effects tend increasingly toward reason’s brutal overthrow by unbridled sensuality masquerading as fantastic coincidence. Hans Castorp’s sublime experiences – lacking the guidance of reason – are only potentially sublime, ultimately resulting at each turn in his subjection to unpleasant feelings of the uncanny that, by
definition, represent the complete inversion of the elements constituting sublime experience.

Freud’s uncanny is the Kantian sublime’s complementary relative. In the sublime, reason’s domination of the sensual provides for a feeling of overall pleasure against sensations of displeasure (see above, p.121). The uncanny arises when reason loses its mastery over sensuality, unleashing feelings of overall displeasure through submission to the instinctual.²⁴¹ The sublime presupposes a capacity for keeping the instincts repressively at bay. The uncanny is characterized by a breakdown in repressive capacity and a return of the repressed.²⁴² Hans Castorp’s submission to Eros – despite the fullness of feeling upon which it is founded – is impure. It relies upon the enrapturing effect of a manifest fantasy that conceals its true impulse – its latent eroticism – at first admitting only Eros’s benevolent side into the foreground. Operating within the

²⁴¹ The uncanny inverts the relationship between reason and imagination that characterizes the sublime and, consequently, the feelings of pleasure and displeasure that result from that relationship. As Kant explains: “Das Gefühl des Erhabenen ist also ein Gefühl der Unlust, aus der Unangemessenheit der Einbildungskraft in der ästhetischen Größe zu der Schätzung der Verwund, und eine dabei zugleich erweckte Lust, aus der Übereinstimmung eines Urteils der Unangemessenheit des größten sinnlichen Vermögens mit Verunstadeen, sofern die Bestrebung zu denselben doch für uns Gesetz ist.” *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 180-81. Under the uncanny, the factor of “Unangemessenheit” (inadequacy) lies on the side of reason, not of imagination. Under the uncanny, fantasy gains the upper hand and dumbfounds reason with its primitive, animistic logic. Imagination’s pleasurable sensation of gaining ascendency over reason is completely overshadowed under the uncanny by reason’s displeasure (“Unlust”) at being unable to measure up to the power that imagination holds over it. To be truly uncanny, however, imagination’s achievement of hegemony over reason is based on fear, so that imagination’s inherently pleasurable act of rising to a position of power immediately yields sway to the displeasurable nature of its content. The uncanny draws upon the unpleasant imagery presented to the mind by imagination and the inability of reason to account for it. The wondrous or miraculous, on the other hand, would be constituted of a similar domination of reason by the power of imagination in which the imaginary sensations were pleasant and welcome to reason despite the latter’s inability to account for them.

²⁴² In describing the tendency of those subject to obsessional neurosis and the psychoses to interpret signs as reality, Kristeva thus observes: “Une telle particularité témoigne aussi d’une fragilité du refoulement et, sans réellement l’expliquer, laisse s’inscrire en elle le retour du refoulé sous la forme de l’affect d’inquiétante étrangeté.” Kristeva, *Étrangers à nous-mêmes*, 275.
constraints of its subject's repressive disposition, Hans Castorp's faculty of imagination thus allows for a return of repressed Eros and Thanatos based upon the deception of a sort of primitive logic of fantastically convincing coincidence and its implications of absolute irrationality. The protagonist's self-deceptive obedience of such a "logic" thus puts him in thrall to the full spectrum of instinctual impulses – wonderful and terrible – the latent wellspring of repressed desire, aggression, and fear that lies at the core both of his imagination's and the Berghof's power of bewitchment.

The fantastic logic that facilitates the return of the repressed and Hans Castorp's subjection to feelings of the uncanny restores him to the original human state of primitively instinctual existential experience. Hans Castorp's psychological adventure appears to lie at the core of the novel's plot – the novel that Mann significantly titled "Der Zauberberg" in direct reference to a passage in Nietzsche's Geburt der Tragödie: "Jetzt öffnet sich uns gleichsam der olympische Zauberberg und zeigt uns seine Wurzeln. Der Grieche kannte und empfand die Schrecken und Entsetzlichkeiten des Daseins: um überhaupt leben zu können, musste er vor sie hin die glänzende Traumgeburt der Olympischen stellen" (KSA 1, 35). The process of mythological production, Nietzsche claims, is an attempt to provide manifest significance to the terror and atrocity of existence – factors of which the primitive Greek was continuously aware. For the modern individual, Hans Castorp, the underlying terror of existence has been removed from sight – externally, through the mediation of a well-regulated society, and internally, through the arbitration of reason and the ego's repression of instinct. The manifest fantasies of Hans's desires ultimately provide him with a glimpse into the fundamental
horror of existence very similar to that experienced by the Greek spectator at a tragic performance:

Mit welchem Erstaunen musste der apollinische Grieche auf ihn [den dithyrambischen Dionysusdiener] blicken! Mit einem Erstaunen, das um so grösser war, als sich ihm das Grausen beimischte, dass ihm jenes Alles doch eigentlich so fremd nicht sei, ja dass sein apollinisches Bewusstsein nur wie ein Schleier diese dionysische Welt vor ihm verdecke. (KSA 1, 34)

The only difference between Nietzsche's tragic spectator and Castorp, of course, is that the Greek viewed the manifest vision of dramatic performance as an objectification of the terrifying reality that surrounded him. In contrast, Hans Castorp perceives himself to be personally subjected to the terrifying forces into which his manifest fantasies disintegrate. The depiction of the uncanny in art is the objectification of the subjectively inscrutable. Once one discerns it to be the product of art rather than actual experience, the uncanny loses its uncanny effect, says Freud (Ges. W. 12, 259-62). Freud's limited treatment of the uncanny's role in aesthetics fails to take account of the fact that poetic portrayal of the uncanny possesses the capacity for translating the subjectively incomprehensible into objectively scrutable terms. Art performs this function best when its portrayal of the uncanny faithfully and accurately reproduces those everyday occurrences in which primitive impulses continue to prevail over the modern individual's seemingly unprimitive acts. This tendency to objectification of the deeply subjective provides the truest sense to Mann's synthesis of elements of Romanticism and Realism in Der
Zauberberg.\textsuperscript{243} for it provides the basis of its forward-looking aspiration of overcoming. In the dramaturgy of the Greeks one sees a cultural progression toward greater objectivity and cathartic liberation from the will's compulsion. In Hans Castorp, on the other hand, a radical cultural regression to a state of primitive will-based subjectivity manifests itself as the product of an imagination increasingly released from reason's restraints and enslaving its subject to the irrational's inevitably uncanny arbitrary tyranny.

In the "Schnee" section, however, the objectifying aims of Greek tragedy and Hans Castorp's twofold reexperiencing of the delusional cycle in which he is trapped exhibit a far greater unity of purpose. Hans's skiing excursion and subsequent dream reveal most clearly his subjection to apparently uncontrollable, uncanny forces, yet they also bring the protagonist to conclusive knowledge of their source. As Nietzsche explains (near the conclusion of the same aphorism in \textit{Die Geburt der Tragödie} from which Mann, as just mentioned, borrowed the title to "Der Zauberberg"):  

\begin{quote}
In den Griechen wollte der "Wille" sich selbst, in der Verklärung des Genius und der Kunstwelt, anschauen; um sich zu verherrlichen, mussten seine Geschöpfe sich selbst als verherrlichenswerth empfinden, sie mussten sich in einer höheren Sphäre wiedergehn, ohne dass diese vollendete Welt der Anschauung als Imperativ oder als Vorwurf wirkte. Dies ist die Sphäre der Schönheit, in der sie ihre Spiegelbilder, die Olympischen, sahen. (\textit{KSA} 1, 37-38)
\end{quote}

In the elevated realm of his dramatic interaction with nature's elements and idyllic dream, Hans Castorp observes himself from the privileged viewpoint of the outside onlooker. His delusional entrapment in a vicious circle of sublime déjá-vu captivation and uncanny enslavement portrays itself with exaggerated acuity and becomes objectifiable.

Prior to his dream, Castorp's subjection to the cyclical torment of repression and will becomes visible to him through his sporting confrontation of nature's forces. An indispensable stage on the path to the reflective accomplishment represented by Hans Castorp's "Gedankentraum" – as Scharfschwerdt appropriately terms Hans's reflections upon rousing himself to partial wakefulness\textsuperscript{244} – is his realization – perhaps not so much a realization as a vague comprehension – that the opposed drives of Eros and Thanatos reside within his own psyche. Through the terrifying predicament in which his wayward skiing excursion has placed him, Hans grasps in "Schnee," "daß er es heimlich bisher geradezu darauf angelegt hatte, sich um die Orientierung zu bringen" (see above, p.136). Subsequently believing himself to have successfully attained his goal of returning to Davos upon seeing a hut in the distance, Hans awakens to the terrible realization that he has returned instead to the earlier-encountered "bekannte Hütte" in the wilderness (see above, p.140). Hans's assessment of his situation – "Das war des Teufels" – and his realization of being caught in the performance of an oft-documented reversion to reliance upon primitively instinctual behavior – "Man lief im Kreise herum" (GW 3, 672-73) – indicate his imprisonment within a proverbial vicious circle, or "Teufelskreis." Castorp's act of self-disorientation exposes the restive force of will at his psychological core. He is

\textsuperscript{244}Scharfschwerdt, 143.
the “Subjekt des Wollens” that lies interminably upon “dem drehenden Rade des Ixion, schöpft immer im Siebe der Danaiden, ist der ewig schmachende Tantalus” (*WWV* 1, 266), the eternal searcher after rest who has to content himself with the notion, “daß er sich nicht gewöhnte” (*GW* 3, 654). Hans’s realization of his own responsibility for losing his way in a snowstorm places him on the threshold of a potentially powerful discovery. The motif of losing oneself has played a central role in his yielding to the sanatorium’s seductive power of enthrallment. It is the expression in altered form of his earlier efforts “to become ill.” The act of being caught in a circular pattern of motion is likewise representative of the cycle of erotic attraction and uncanny repulsion in which Castorop has been trapped ever since arriving at the Berghof. Hans’s realization of his own, self-concealed responsibility for bringing himself off course and pursuing a path ruled by potentially deadly primitive instinct possesses the potential – regrettably never fully attained by Mann’s protagonist – of achieving a level of understanding holding the

---


246 Settembrini warns Castorop of the danger of becoming lost to his life in the flatlands in the first section of the novel’s fourth chapter. *GW* 3, 278. In “Walpurgisnacht,” the motif of losing oneself recurs in Chauchat’s declaration to Hans: “qu’il faudrait chercher la morale [...] dans le péché, en s’abandonnant au danger, à ce qui est nuisible, à ce qui nous consume. Il nous semble qu’il est plus moral de se perdre et même de se laisser dépirer que de se conserver. Les grandes moralistes n’étaient point des vertueux, mais des aventuriers dans le mal, des vicieux, des grands pécheurs qui nous enseignent à nous incliner chrétientement devant la misère.” *GW* 3, 473. Contrary to Chauchat’s expectation that the dissolute views on morality of her and her Russian compatriot might displease her admirer, however, Castorop denounces the bourgeois formality incorporated in the “vous” form of address and says that with her, he will never employ it. *GW* 3, 475. Even more tellingly, Hans rejects form itself: “Pourquoi, au fond, de la forme? La forme, c’est la pédanterie elle-même!” *GW* 3, 475. Castorop’s denunciation of the element of form demonstrates his defiant estrangement from the “Lebensform” that figures as a fundamental part of Settembrini’s fourth-chapter warning against losing one’s way. *GW* 3, 278. At the end of the evening, Castorop embraces Chauchat. One might well ask whether or not there is symbolic meaning in that embrace. Is Hans’s amorous relationship with Clawdia symbolic of his espousal of a willingness for loss of self?

247 Hatfield, “The Magic Mountain,” 100.
promise both of self-liberation and of self-determination. Through continuation of a playful snow outing turned mortally earnest, Hans Castorp becomes aware of a secret force operating within him that radically opposes itself to his very life and well-being – not only in the immediate context of his predicament in “Schnee,” but also within the broader scope of his experiences at the Berghof.

Hans’s perception of being threatened internally in “Schnee” manifests itself in the ambivalent terms of the strange and deeply familiar – qualities that also arise near the conclusion of his subsequent dream of images. The witches’ cursing is “stimmlos,” as the narrator explains (GW 3, 683). It thus carries the uncanny quality of the “Verborgene[].” That the witches pronounce their “Flüsterkeifen” in Castorp’s home dialect lends it the second uncanny quality of the “Vertraute[]” as well. As in Hans’s previous uncanny experience, his nightmare’s conclusion creates a violent reaction of panic in its subject: “Es wurde ihm so übel, so übel wie noch nie” (GW 3, 683). Not only is Hans Castorp’s dream in “Schnee” infused with the opposed qualities of intimate familiarity and alien inscrutability that characterize his foregoing disorientation’s production of sensations of the uncanny. As in the previous experience, the uncanny conclusion of Hans’s dream also brings him to a realization of these sensations’ internal origins – of his own responsibility in creating the conditions upon which the terror of his immediate experience is based.

Hans’s inability to escape from the blizzard of “Schnee” derives at least partially from a secret desire to remain trapped in it – a predicament that significantly repeats itself at the conclusion of his subsequent dream as an incapacity to flee its pair of cannibalistic
witches. The situation in which Hans places himself matches that facing the ego in its relationship to the repressed drives. As Freud remarks at the beginning of his essay on “Die Verdrängung”:

Es kann das Schicksal einer Triebsregung werden, daß sie auf Widerstände stößt, welche sie unwirksam machen wollen. Unter Bedingungen [...] gelangt sie dann in den Zustand der Verdrängung. Handelte es sich um die Wirkung eines äußeren Reizes, so wäre offenbar die Flucht das geeignete Mittel. Im Falle des Triebes kann die Flucht nichts nützen, denn das Ich kann sich nicht selbst entfliehen.

(Ges.W. 10, 248)

Repression is thus the psychological mechanism through which the ego effects an apparent escape from its inescapable inner drives. A breakdown in the ego’s capacity for repression, however, leaves it vulnerable to the return of the repressed and subsequent feelings of the uncanny. As a consequence, one might very logically expect the influence of the uncanny to include sensations of being incapable of escaping an impending threat latently represented by the undesired, formerly repressed drives. One in fact finds just such conditions at the conclusion of Castorp’s dream. As he witnesses the witches devouring their sacrificial victim, Hans wants to throw his hands before his eyes, but he cannot. “Er wollte fliehen und konnte nicht,” the narrator continues. “Verzweifelt wollte er sich von der Stelle reißen [...]” (GW 3, 683). I have suggested above the witches’ symbolic representation of the dialectically contrary positions of both Settembrini and Naphta and Behrens and Krokowski, with Castorp in the middle. One appears to ultimately arrive at the full import of the situation only by assuming that these dialectical
opposites also represent inescapable dialectical oppositions within Hans Castorp’s psyche.

The terrifying finale of Hans Castorp’s dream of images in “Schnee” seems to be the concrete portrayal of his figurative experience of being “torn” between the contrary procedures and theories represented in his external environment as they relate to his inner psychological world. The procedures of his physicians and theories of his mentors are related in their mutual oppositions to the internal conflict in Hans at once between Eros and Thanatos and the principles of reality and pleasure. Hans’s position, in the interim, is like that of the ego in its omnifariously dependent “Mittelstellung zwischen Außenwelt und Es und sein Bestreben, all seinen Herren gleichzeitig zu Willen zu sein” (Ges. W. 13, 387). Freud explains the feeling of being trapped when confronted with one’s own repressed instincts:

Gegen die äußere Gefahr kann man sich eine ganze Weile durch Flucht und Vermeidung der Gefahrsituation helfen, bis man später einmal stark genug wird, um die Drohung durch aktive Veränderung der Realität aufzuheben. Aber vor sich selbst kann man nicht fliehen, gegen die innere Gefahr hilft keine Flucht, und darum sind die Abwehrmechanismen des Ichs dazu verurteilt, die innere Wahrnehmung zu verfälschen und uns nur eine mangelhafte und entstellte Kenntnis unseres Es zu ermöglichen. (Ges. W. 16, 82)

In “Schnee” Hans Castorp relives in dream his feelings of helplessness against an internal desire for disorientation and a “Macht der Versuchung” that compels his submission to fatigue. Those feelings also reenact the sensation of being trapped that Castorp
experiences in “Aufsteigende Angst” upon recognizing Přibislav Hippe’s recurrence in Clawdia Chauchat. As the narrator explains:

Das war erschütternd in jedem Sinn; Hans Castorp war begeistert von der Begegnung, und zugleich spürte er etwas wie aufsteigende Angst, eine Beklemmung derselben Art, wie das Eingesperrtsein mit dem günstigen Ungefährr auf engem Raum ihm verursachte: auch dies, daß der längst vergessene Přibislav ihm hier oben als Frau Chauchat wieder begegnete und ihn mit Kirgisenaugen ansah, war wie ein Eingesperrtsein mit Unumgänglichem oder Unentrinnbarem, – in beglückendem und ängstlichem Sinn Unentrinnbarem. (GW 3, 206-07)

Hans evidently feels threatened by Hippe’s imagined recurrence in Chauchat, because the event gives rise to previously repressed feelings. In terms of Castorp’s emotions, Hippe’s fantastic remanifestation as Chauchat is – plainly and simply – a return of the repressed. Does that imply that Castorp’s feelings for Chauchat are merely the manifest façade of his latent homosexual urges? The conclusion seems irrefutable, although Mann’s mastery of the art of irony leaves the question open to an ambiguity of interpretations. Hans has known and possessed Chauchat “in ausschreitungslost süßer Stunde” (GW 3, 486), in “die reine Zeit” (GW 3, 483) – two indications that he both enjoyed the experience and that it transpired in the absolutely timeless domain of pure will. Will’s timelessness is nonetheless the very factor that allows for Hippe’s reincarnation as Madame Chauchat, so it is completely possible that when making love to the latter Hans feels himself to be making love to the former. Does his dream’s scene of dismemberment perhaps manifest at the very bottom Hans Castorp’s experience of being torn between his
latent homosexual desire for Přibislav Hippe and its incapacity for being truly fulfilled even by the person that he imagines as Přibislav’s manifest reincarnation?

Whether because deep-down he perceives her as Hippe’s reincarnation, because he disapproves of her, or perhaps for both reasons, Hans Castorp’s infatuation with Clawdia Chauchat meets with stridently repressive resistance from the very beginning. Castorp’s repressive attitude toward Eros in general expresses itself in the “ehrbare[] Verfinsterung seiner Miene” – the “Ausdruck von Sittsamkeit” – with which he automatically responds to the boisterous lovemaking of his Russian neighbors (GW 3, 59). Chauchat’s habit of slamming the door as she enters the dining room arouses Castorp’s ire from the very beginning. So strong is his hatred of “das Türenwerfen,” that Hans “hätte jeden schlagen können, der es sich vor seinen Ohren zuschulden kommen ließ” (GW 3, 67). Castorp’s “Kritik, die sich [...] aus der Wut über das Türenschlagen speist, stellt sich schon bald als Abwehr einer unbewussten Faszination heraus.” As Chauchat slams the door on another occasion, Castorp “zuckte erbittert” and disapprovingly observes her “‘Unmanier’ ” and her hands’ lack of manicure (GW 3, 109-11). Hans finds her to be unsuitable as a prospective companion (GW 3, 202). When he finally realizes of whom she reminds him in “Hippe,” his former school comrade’s supposed metempsychosic recurrence in the figure of Madame Chauchat provides the fabulous pretext for Hans Castorp’s experience of his repressed desire for her. Or alternatively, it provides the conditions – given prevailing early twentieth-century

\[\text{248}\] „In dem ‘saloppen’ russischen Ehepaar begegnet Castorp die eigene bisher verdrängte Sympathie für die ‘asiatische’ Sphäre des ‘Todes als Uniform.’” Kristiansen, 128.

\[\text{249}\] Böhm, 354.
attitudes toward homosexuality – for his repressed homosexual desire for Hippe to express itself as feelings of attachment to a comparably less "objectionable" love object. Seen from either perspective, the return of his repressed instincts of erotic attraction consequently produces Hans’s feelings of “Angst” and incapacity of escaping. For the same reason, Castorp also experiences the situation as “unheimlich, ja bedrohlich” (GW 3, 207). Freud attributes an uncanny effect to his unintentional return to an Italian “Kleinstadt” (see above, p.139), because “es nur das Moment der unbeabsichtigten Wiederholung ist, welches das sonst Harmlose unheimlich macht und uns die Idee des Verhängnisvollen, Unentrinnbaren aufdrängt, wo wir sonst nur von ‘Zufall’ gesprochen hätten” (Ges. W. 12, 230). Does Hippe’s recurrence in Chauchat not also belong to the same category of apparently fateful coincidence? Through his skiing excursion’s and subsequent dream’s dual reenactment of the “uncanny” psychological predicament that informs his unconscious decision to remain at the Berghof, Hans Castorp brings himself close to the realization that the source of his greater dilemma also lies within.

Toward the end of “Schnee,” Hans Castorp indeed comes very close to realizing his personal responsibility in producing the conditions of his overall predicament. As he awakens from deep slumber in order to pursue the half-waking reflections of his “Gedankentraum,” he immediately grasps that his dream has been of his own making:

dann das Weitere, Schönes wie Scheußliches, ich wußte es beinahe im voraus.”

(GW 3, 683)

Hans’s near advance knowledge of the self-productive origin of his dream seems to prefigure the sensation of familiarity that contributes to his dream’s generation of feelings of the uncanny. At the same time, however, Hans also senses amazement when confronted with the knowledge of his participation in the production of something so alien to him:

“Wie kann man aber so was wissen und sich machen, sich so beglücken und ängstigen? Woher hab’ ich den schönen Inselgolf und dann den Tempelbezirk, wohin die Augen des einen Angenehmen, der für sich stand, mich wiesen? Man träumt nicht nur aus eigener Seele, möchte ich sagen, man träumt auch anonym und gemeinsam, wenn auch auf eigene Art.” (GW 3, 683-84)

The realization of his participation in a process that transcends him likewise seems to explain the sensation of the “Verborgengehaltenen” that contributes to his dream’s genesis of uncanny feelings. “‘Die große Seele, von der du nur ein Teilchen, träumt wohl mal durch dich, auf deine Art, von Dingen, die sie heimlich immer träumt, – von ihrer Jugend, ihrer Hoffnung, ihrem Glück und Frieden . . . und ihrem Blutmahl’ ” (GW 3, 684). In reflecting in his “Gedankentraum” on his participation in an act of dream creation whose power transcends him, Hans Castorp again revives the aspects of the familiar and enigmatic that contribute to his dreams’ production of sensations of the uncanny. But by this time he has graduated to an uncharacteristically liberated position
from which he may view the uncanny with objective detachment, free from subjection to its influence.

Hans Castorp momentarily attains a vantage point from which he is able to discern the sublime and uncanny operations in his own soul. Nothing better exemplifies his transcendence to a position free from influence than his ability to experience both sensations at once with an attitude of absolute self-composure: “‘Da liege ich an meiner Säule und habe im Leibe noch die wirklichen Reste meines Traumes, das eisige Grauen vor dem Blutmahl und auch die Herzensfreude noch von vorher, die Freude an dem Glück und an der frommen Gesittung der weißen Menschheit’” (GW 3, 684). Stefan Bollmann rightly comments:

Ist, was Hans Castorp von je im Herzen getragen und woran er sich in seinem Traum erinnert, demnach das “heimlich Heimische” (Freud) der Seele selbst, ihre eigenste innere Wirklichkeit, so ist auch die Landschaft seines Traums nichts anderes als die “existierende Heimatlichkeit” dieser Seele, in der sie “bei sich zu Hause” ist, “heimatisch bei sich.”

The self-reflective memory of his dream provides Castorp with a total perspective created at once of the dream’s lasting subjective sensations and the objective oversight of retrospective distance. From the graduated perspective of reflective experience, Hans is granted a privileged overview – beyond good and evil – of the sublimely uncanny workings of his soul.

---

Only by having subjectively lived out the experience of his dream, it seems, is Hans Castorp granted a truly deserved purview of his psyche. While held in its spell, his dream’s “Seeligkeit von Licht” is “ganz unverdient” (*GW* 3, 678). Having lived through the delight and torment of his dream of images, however, Hans becomes aware that the perspective of experienced reflection brings new merit: “‘Es kommt mir zu, behaupte ich, ich habe verbriefer Rechte, hier zu liegen und dergleichen zu träumen. Ich habe viel erfahren bei Denen hier oben von Durchgängerei und Vernunft. Ich bin mit Naphta und Settembrini im hochgefährlichen Gebirge umgekommen.’” (*GW* 3, 684). Castorp’s reflection brings him to the advanced insight of a uniquely detached, retrospective, objective point of view. Hans breaks free of the “Banden des Zauberberges” and achieves a momentary “Außenstellung.”251 As my first chapter demonstrates, Hans Castorp’s challenge of the elements imaginatively acts out a psychodrama between Naphta’s and Settembrini’s respective principles of pleasure and reality. The act consequently provides him with the vested rights of the dreamer and momentarily releases him from the “uns hier oben” that has long denoted his subordination to the Berghof’s pathological ideal (see also above, p.60). Castorp momentarily progresses to an objectively privileged perspective of experience. The novel impressions made upon Hans during the first full day of his visit to the sanatorium give him the sensation of having become “‘älter und klüger’” (*GW* 3, 122). Now, in “Schnee,” Hans possesses more than just the sensation of learning. For a single, unique, never-again-to-be-repeated moment in Mann’s novel, Hans is able to look back upon what he has learned at the

251Gronicka, 128-29.
sanatorium and claim: "Ich habe viel erfahren bei Denen hier oben." For a brief instant in "Schnee," Hans Castorp gains the certain knowledge that he has grown older and wiser.

Castorp’s sensation of gaining wisdom through his Berghof experiences derives from his insight into the fundamentally underdeveloped logic on which the latter are founded. Even before he lapses into dream, Hans Castorp’s experiences during his skiing excursion engender in him a reversion to a more primitive mode of looking at the world. In my first chapter’s subsection on “Pathetic Fallacy, Animistic Projection, and the Uncanny,” I have demonstrated Hans Castorp’s proneness to a tendency of regarding the events around him from a primitive point of view. Rather than logically evaluating the events that transpire in his surroundings and arriving at a realistic assessment of their true causes, Castorp’s creative imagination arrives at explanations that – although experienced as concrete reality – exist solely in the fantasy-world of his thoughts. Such reversions to primitive modes of thinking are still a very present part of modern human existence, says Nietzsche, claiming that we may comprehend,

[...] wie spät das schärferes logische Denken, das Strengnehmen von Ursache und Wirkung, entwickelt worden ist, wenn unsere Vernunft- und Verstandesfunctionen jetzt noch unwillkürlich nach jenen primitiven Formen des Schliessens zurückgreifen und wir ziemlich die Hälfte unseres Lebens in diesem Zustande leben. (Menschliches Allzumenschliches I, §13, KSA 2, 34)

The skiing expedition’s placement of Hans Castorp in a position of viewing his world from the perspective of pathetic fallacy and animism exposes the human, all-too-human
person at his core that – just as in his subsequent dream – continues to cling to a mode of thinking prevalent in the days of precivilization.

In Hans Castorp’s two-part dream of images in “Schnee,” Mann’s protagonist returns to a manner of viewing the world both in terms of a pristine, youthful, sublimely innocent idyll and of an ancient, sinful, uncannily malicious “Alptraum.” Surely these images are connected, but among the critics who have proposed their interconnectedness, none has yet provided an adequate explanation of that connection’s true nature. Although failing to provide an adequate picture of the relationship’s operative principle, Wysling designates its essential functional ingredients through his observation,

[... ] daß Thomas Mann sich [... ] der Sprache und der Bilder von Nietzsches Geburt der Tragödie bedient und darauf hinweist, daß erst der apollinische Traum von den Sonnenkindern und die dionysischen Zerreißungsgreuel an den Wurzeln des “Zauberbergs” zusammen die Welt ausmachen, daß aber Licht und Maß die Abgründe verstellen sollen. 252

Koppen’s treatment, by contrast, focuses exclusively on the dream’s uncanny aspect. Supporting his arguments primarily upon reference to Der Tod in Venedig, Mario und der Zauberer, and Doktor Faustus, and for obvious reasons mentioning the Zauberberg but once, 253 Koppen provides compelling evidence throughout that, when Italy appears in Mann’s novellas and novels as “Schauplatz entscheidender Geschehnisse,” demons, death, and devils arise. Koppen writes: “anstelle arkadischer Glückseligkeit, wird das

---

252 Wysling, “Probleme der Zauberberg-Interpretation,” 22-23.

Unheimliche beschworen, und noch in situ kommt es zu Tod und Verderben. In Der Zauberberg, Mann turns this prevailing tendency within his literary opus on its head. Hans Castorp’s dream of Arcadia penetrates to the authentic fountainhead of happiness behind the repressively uncanny façade of instinctual and intellectual discord that constitutes his waking environment. Both in terms of “Glückseligkeit” and “Vollkommenheit,” his dream’s imagery fulfills the double “Sehnsucht nach der Natur” that tempts him into the natural environment of “Schnee” (see above, p.52). The significance of Hans’s vision of harmony clearly outweighs the diabolic nightmare into which it disintegrates. Nietzsche explains the capacity of dream to return us to the primordial state:

[...] der Traum bringt uns in ferne Zustände der menschlichen Cultur wieder zurück und giebt ein Mittel an die Hand, sie besser zu verstehen. Das Traumdenken wird uns jetzt so leicht, weil wir in ungeheuren Entwickelungsstrecken der Menschheit gerade auf diese Form des phantastischen und wohlfeilen Erklärens aus dem ersten beliebigen Einfaße heraus so gut eingedrillt worden sind. (KSA 2, 33-34)

The “Traumdenken” that forms the reflective content of Castorp’s “Traumgedicht” (GW 3, 685) is a return to such “ferne Zustände der menschlichen Cultur.” As already discussed, Castorp has never previously visited the region contained in his “Schnee” vision, and “Dennoch erinnerte er sich” (GW 3, 678) (see above, p.157). Bollmann’s observation of the reproduction of Vergil’s “Arkadien” by Castorp’s dream seems

254Koppen, 163.
correct.\textsuperscript{255} Notwithstanding, Manfred Dierks places the setting of Hans’s dream in Eleusis – site of the Demeter cult – consequently offering an apparently clearer explanation of the “Blutmahl” scene’s incorporation of humanly archetypal “Motive der Thyestes-Sage.”\textsuperscript{256} Heller’s mention, like Wysling’s, of “die zwei Teile des Traums, der dionysische und der apollinische, welchen Hans Castorp im Schnee träumt,”\textsuperscript{257} appears both to correctly place the setting of Hans’s dream in Greece and also to provide it with an appropriate thematic background. Earlier in this section, I have mentioned Nietzsche’s ascription of great “Erstaunen” to the Apollinian Greek upon observing in classical tragedy the embodiment of the figures of a pre-Hellenic, Dionysian world – an astonishment that became all the greater, “als sich ihm das Grausen beimischte, dass ihm jenes Alles doch eigentlich so fremd nicht sei, ja dass sein apollinisches Bewusstsein nur wie ein Schleier diese dionysische Welt vor ihm verdecke” (\textit{KSA} 1, 34). I have also argued that the second half of Hans Castorp’s dream of images guides him through a portrayal in chronologically reverse order of the sexual act (see above, p.171ff.). The reversal of chronology – the fact that Hans Castorp’s dream portrays a going back in time – is signified by the consideration that the dream’s “schöner Knabe” first looks behind Castorp, and that the latter then also “sah rückwärts” (\textit{GW} 3, 681-82). The pair of “graue Weiber” Hans beholds in the nightmare portion of his dream (\textit{GW} 3, 683) bear an aspect

\textsuperscript{255}Bollmann, 92.

\textsuperscript{256}\textit{Studien zu Mythos und Psychologie}, 122-25; 253, n. 8.

of ancientness that contrasts markedly with the evident youthfulness of his dream idyll’s "Sonnen- und Meereskinder," "Mädchen," "Jungmannschaft," "Kinder," "junges Weib," "junge Mutter," and "Jünglinge" (GW 3, 679-81). The dream idyll clearly corresponds to the enlightened "Arkadian" society of ancient Greece, while the "Blutmahl" is a portrayal of the purportedly more barbaric society that preceded it.

Hans Castorp thus dreams of an Arcadia – an age of harmony – whose conditions of interpersonal respect and balance are the product of remembrance of a darker period prevailed over by cannibalistic rites. Of all the critics, Böhm comes closest to discerning this consideration with his observation of the contrast between young and old in the image dream’s halves: "Vor dem Hintergrund dieses Geflechts von Beziehungen und Einflüssen, das die Welt der schönen und friedliebenden Sonnenkinder konstituiert, erscheint die Schreckvision des Blutmahls zunächst als die Gegenwelt des Alters, der Häßlichkeit, der Gewalt." 258 The dream not only contrasts young and old, however. In my view, it portrays a youthfully enlightened age that has grown out of the older barbaric age that chronologically precedes it. The societal harmony of a culture based on understanding is galvanized by the memory of an earlier age ruled over by superstition and unbridled instinct. It is the "Form und Gesittung verständig-freundlicher Gemeinschaft und schönen Menschenstaats – in stillem Hinblick auf das Blutmahl" – a relationship that Castorp first discerns in his dream of thoughts (GW 3, 686). Like "der apollinische Griech“ of Nietzsche’s Geburt der Tragödie, the "Sonnenkinder" of Castorp’s idyll look back with "Erstaunen" on a barbaric Dionysian age. A perpective

258 Zwischen Selbstzucht und Verlangen, 366.
that founds its position of understanding on its relationship to the culturally inherent
instinctual forces that threaten to overcome it, however, is a sublime perspective born of
an act of self-overcoming. Just as Nietzsche’s *Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geist der
Musik* narrates the generation of a sublime worldview out of the gruesome chaos of will,
the idyllic Arcadia of Hans Castorp’s dream is the culturally transcendent product of
goodness and love galvanized by remembrance of its uncannily primitive, barbaric
origins.

For the uncanny frequently results from the reemergence of an earlier, primitive
phase of thinking that has since been surmounted through the course of human
development – the aspect of *Entwicklung* that underpins the *Entwicklungsroman* and
*Bildungsroman* alike. As the signal achievement of the faculty of judgement, the sublime
possesses the quality of development away from the existential terror that resides at the
heart of uncanny experience. It is thus that “Kant’s own taste inclines him toward the
sublime more strongly than in the direction of the beautiful,” because the sublime
represents the condition “where esteem emerges from initial terror and places us in
closest proximity to the moral good.”

259 The faculty of judgement makes possible the
transition from the realm of natural concepts to that of the concept of freedom.
260 The experience of the uncanny – in many ways the sublime’s complement – seems to derive
from a breakdown in the faculty of judgement and a corresponding regression back
toward natural concepts and away from freedom. As Freud explains, the feeling of the

259 Ellison, 13.
260 *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 108.
uncanny arises from the recurrence of primitive belief in the omnipotence of thought, prompt wish fulfillment, and the deads’ reincarnation – manners of thinking that we have since overcome. Yet since we are not completely sure of our newer convictions, “die alten [Denkweisen] leben noch in uns fort und lauern auf Bestätigung” (Ges.W. 12, 261-62). The feeling of the uncanny arises from one’s judgement that it is possible to kill another by means of a wish alone or that the dead live on to haunt the living, and so forth (Ges.W. 12, 262). The feeling of the uncanny thus corresponds to a breakdown in one’s capacity for logical judgement. Freud describes the judgemental imbalance that prevails over one’s experience of the uncanny: “[. . .] für die Entstehung des unheimlichen Gefühls ist [. . .] der Urteilsstreit erforderlich, ob das überwundene Unglaubwürdige nicht doch real möglich ist [. . .]” (Ges.W. 12, 264). Castorp comes to the realization in “Schnee” that “‘‘Treue zum Tode und Gewesenen nur Bosheit und finstere Wollust und Menschenfeindschaft ist, bestimmt sie unser Denken und Regieren’ ” (GW 3, 686). Is his realization not also a coming-to-terms with the fact that he has permitted himself to be led astray by a primitive belief in the ineluctable presence of Eros and Thanatos expressed in Hippe’s reincarnation as Chauchat? For Castorp’s attraction to the metempsychosic recurrence in Chaucat of Hippe (Hippe is a symbol of death) is the expression in almost concrete terms of his “Sympathie mit dem Tode” on a purely animistic level – exactly the sort of thinking that leads to the feelings of the uncanny. Hans Castorp’s act of cognitively liberating himself from subjection to a regressive tendency to primitive thinking portrays the aspect of “Bildung” on an originary, universal level.
Castorp's "Schnee" excursion and dream conjure the instinctually original conditions both of natural chaos and harmony. Hans's skiing confrontation of nature seems to accentuate the primitive psychological mechanisms still in operation in his soul. As such, it is the confrontation of the modern, civilized individual with his natural, primitive self. His dream lends conscious recognition to the fact through its production both of a vision of humanity's barbaric origins and - through the dream-works' previously discussed reversal of chronology - of the subsequent sublimey reasonable society that historical tradition says eventually superseded it. Hans's dream not only attests to the barbaric primordial origins of human society. It also expresses a longing for an idealized version of the society that supplanted it - that of classical antiquity: an openly unrepressive and "anti-barbaric" society whose concept of autonomy contrasts both with the age that precedes it as well as with the rigid organization under whose influence he presently resides.²⁶¹ As a reaction against the present state of affairs, Castorp's idyll thus possesses an affinity with what to him, at least - as the subject of an imperial monarchy - must appear in both cases as revolutionary forms of thinking in the ideologies of the Marxist, Naphta, and the republican Settembrini. The ostensible aim of revolution is the restoration of "an old order of things that [has] been disturbed and violated."²⁶² Thomas Mann nevertheless seems to indicate that, through greater understanding of the human predicament, Hans Castorp's vision of a more humane

²⁶¹ Hatfield's assessment of Castorp's idyll supports this view: "The 'People of the Sun,' probably ancient Greeks, act with grace and dignity, with 'noble simplicity and quiet grandeur.' Statuesque, beautiful, and relaxed [. . .], they seem the perfect examples of the classical life; they are representatives of Nietzsche's 'Apollonian' Greeks. Still more they remind one of Goethe's Greeks, for they behave with a humane kindness not at all reminiscent of the authentic Hellenes." Hatfield, "The Magic Mountain," 100.
society of peaceful harmony might be obtainable in the present or future. As the next section will demonstrate, Mann expressly ascribes just such a forward-looking quality to Castorp’s vision. Against the reality of Hans’s all-too-human tendency toward the uncanny arises his vision of the sublime cultural goal of societal harmony. Against the backdrop of his experiential entanglement in a cyclical conflict between repression and the repressed, a nonrepressive or inclusive impulse emerges that performs the act of harmonization first on the fantastic and then the cognitive level. The impulse is that of a consciously nonrepressive “Ich” that embraces its irrational “will” while forfeiting none of its transcendent autonomy – the expression of a utopian impossibility only imaginable in certain aesthetic states, such as one of dreaming.

2.5. Aspiration of “Regieren,” “Gedankentraum,” and Self-Interpretation: Hans Castorp’s Reconciliation of Eros and Thanatos.

In Hans Castorp’s dream vision, the impossibility of restoring human totality through an act of reconciliation appears – at least for a moment – to be possible. Through the conditions of natural sublimity created during his skiing adventure, Hans rediscovers what at least momentarily appears to be a state of original personal harmony with nature. His obdurate attempt to prolong his experience despite the weather’s lack of cooperation subsequently causes him to become lost. He loses himself further to sleep after his drink of port, and his Arcadian dream again restores – on a yet higher level – the former sense of unity between himself and his surroundings that prevailed over his sensation of nature’s sublimity during his excursion. As his dream of images approaches its

conclusion, however, Hans becomes lost again to the forces of the uncanny and perhaps even again seems to be at the gates of perdition. The shock of terror nevertheless brings him to another act of self-discovery – the discovery of his true location in nature or, more accurately, within the sphere of reality. For a moment, Hans Castorp even finds the sense of conviction that nearly appears to assure the ultimate success of his evident desire to find his place in the world. Toward the end of the “Schnee-Kapitel,” Mann’s protagonist appears momentarily resolved to abandon his preoccupation with death and to turn over a new leaf. One glimpses for an instant a formidable will to self-determination in Castorp that serves as the spiritual highpoint of the entire novel. The origins of Castorp’s revelation and his apparent momentary resolve to transform dream-spun ideas into reality are motivated primarily within the poetic structure and plot of the Zauberberg itself. This chapter’s preceding sections demonstrate that the dream inspiring Hans Castorp in “Schnee” to take concerted action against the lulling influence of death draws upon an intimate preoccupation with love and death resultant of the protagonist’s experiences of Chauchat, the sanatorium environment, and his subjection to Behrens’s and Krokowski’s methods of examination. The aim of the present section is to show that these elements’ recurrence on an abstract level in the theories of Settembrini and Naphta establishes the basis for Castorp’s spontaneous creation of the “Gedankentraum” that contains the terminus a quo of his potential liberation from their hegemony.

Hans Castorp’s engagement of the principles of Naptha’s “Homo Dei” and Settembrini’s “homo humanus” in the reflective practice of “Regieren” appears to be the primary cause for his adventuring into the natural wilderness of “Schnee” (see above,
Far from bringing them unity, however, Hans’s skiing excursion brings to a symbolic climax the conflict between Settembrini’s and Naphta’s principles – portrayed in concrete terms respectively as externally destructive natural violence and the fatal internal seduction of will. In reversal of the trend, Castorp’s dream idyll subsequently reconciles Naphta’s and Settembrini’s contrary principles in its concrete imagery of harmoniously existing natural and human elements. Sun and sea – the symbols of reason and eternity – complement and enhance one another, as if they were the necessary components of a universal idea. Likewise, freedom and piety – rather than becoming lost in irresolvable conflict as they do in Settembrini and Naphta’s debates – appear in Hans’s dream as the necessarily interrelated halves of a harmonious whole. Driven into the alpine wilderness by the burden of his reflective activity’s seeming incapacity to reconcile the contrary principles of the “Homo Dei,” Hans Castorp’s “Regieren” provides him with a glimpse of his goal through the mediation of a dream’s ideal vision.

The irresolvable conflict between Hans Castorp’s pedagogical mentors is symbolic of a tension between psychologically opposed forces that – despite Castorp’s efforts – remain unreconciled on the personal level, attain increasing acuteness within the Berghof society, and ultimately culminate in an international conflict with Germany in the middle. The individual and societal rupture hinges on a breakdown in the art of diplomacy between the representatives of antagonistic psychological forces. Naphta and Settembrini are the manifestations of the dialectically opposed human psychological forces of speculation and intuition, spirit and instinct, and death and life in the contradictory dispositions of the idealist and realist. The tendency to view things with
sobriety is for Schiller a naïve or realistic trait – one that distinguishes Settembrini’s appearance, values, and manner of expression. Settembrini’s smile is “nüchtern[],” he praises the “edlen und nüchternen Geister[]” that have scorned tobacco, and he knows “alles nüchtern Treffendes vorzubringen” concerning modern transportation’s “Ernüchterung des Bestattungsvorganges” (GW 3, 271; 87; 632). Schiller opposes the poeticizing spirit of the sentimental poet to “dem nüchternen Gemeinsinn” of his naïve counterpart (SW 5, 738-39). Mann accentuates the conflict of ideas between Settembrini and Naphta by contrasting the naïve aspects of sobriety, plastic ability, and objectivity in the former with the subjectively sentimental qualities possessed by his opponent – qualities that distinguish Naphta either as Schiller’s “false idealist” or Nietzsche’s “ascetic priest.”

Settembrini’s objectivity opposes Naphta’s subjectivity – an opposition that forms one of the bases of Schiller’s distinction between the naïve and sentimental personality types. Schiller describes Goethe’s combination of the dual aspects of the sentimental and naïve in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre (as well as in his earlier novel, Die Leiden des jungen Werther) in terms of this subjective/objective distinction: “selbst in seinem neuesten Roman stellt sich, so wie in jenem ersten, der poetisierende Geist dem nüchternen Gemeinsinn, das Ideale dem Wirklichen, die subjektive Vorstellungsweise der objektiven – aber mit welcher Verschiedenheit! –

entgegen . . ." (SW 5, 738-39). So long as their discussions confine themselves to the theoretical subject matter of their arguments, Settembrini’s and Naphta’s contradictory positions find reception in an ongoing dialogue that is – however confusing – nonetheless an integral whole. Yet the more their arguments abandon the rules of formality and bypass their disputant’s intellectual positions in order to attack the actual person standing behind them, the more their conversations disintegrate and the more their polemics bear the aspect of unbridled libidinal aggression. Schiller regards the removal of the poetic element from the relationship between the naïve and sentimental as the source of irreconcilability of his dual principle’s halves: “Aber eben darum, weil es nur der Begriff des Poetischen ist, in welchem beide Empfindungsarten zusammentreffen können, so wird ihre gegenseitige Verschiedenheit und Bedürftigkeit in demselben Grade merklicher, als sie den poetischen Charakter ablegen; und dies ist der Fall im gemeinen Leben” (SW 5, 769). The less Mann’s disputants concentrate on proving the theoretical validity of their arguments in order to discredit the views of the person opposing them, the more their attacks concentrate on personal elements, and the more their mutual identity as human beings yields to the rift that divides them into their specific types. The disintegration of relations between Naphta and Settembrini is symptomatic of a

264 In the original draft of Thomas Mann’s short essay of 1912, Zu “Fiorenza,” he states that Schiller’s distinction between the naïve and sentimental was in itself a distortion of reality because of its reliance upon antithesis: “Aber die innere Form des Essays [Über naïve und sentimentalische Dichtung], antithetisch wie die des Dramas, ließ ihn der Wirklichkeit nicht gerecht werden, verführte ihn zu der Fiktion, als sei der Gegensatz in ihm und Goethe rein dargestellt gewesen.” Essays 1, 156. The later, more publicly familiar version of the same essay, recants this position: “Aber die innere Form des Essays, antithetisch wie die des Dramas, hinderte ihn nicht, der Wirklichkeit gerecht zu werden, verführte ihn nicht zu der Fiktion, als sei der Gegensatz in ihm und Goethe rein dargestellt gewesen” GW 11, 563-64.
breakdown in the art of objective argument, yet how does all of this relate to Hans Castorp?

The only hope in the Zauberberg for a humanistic resolution of the conflict between the opposed views of Mann’s disputants lies in Hans Castorp, yet his hope’s realization never progresses beyond the fantastic anticipation of a dream and the reflective expression in thought of its unifying principle. His oneiric reconciliation of the forces of life and death announces itself in Castorp’s words, significantly, as poetic dream: his “‘Traumgedicht vom Menschen’” (GW 3, 685). Castorp’s dream vision is capable of uniting the irreconcilable principles of the naïve and sentimental in Settembrini and Naphta, because, as Schiller states, their unity is only achievable by poetic means: “Denn endlich müssen wir es doch gestehen, daß weder der naive noch der sentimentalische Charakter, für sich allein betrachtet, das Ideal schöner Menschheit ganz erschöpfen, das nur aus der innigen Verbindung beider hervorgehen kann” – a condition that is only perpetuated “solange man beide Charaktere bis zum dichterischen exaltiert” (SW 5, 768-69). The image produced through the poetically creative force of Castorp’s imagination is one of humanity (Settembrini’s principle) that includes Naphta’s principle of death, or as Mann states in Die Schule des Zauberbergs:

Der Gral, den [Castorp], wenn nicht findet, so doch im todesnahen Traum erahnt, bevor er von seiner Höhe herab in die europäische Katastrophe gerissen wird, das ist die Idee des Menschen, die Konzeption einer zukünftigen, durch tiefstes Wissen um Krankheit und Tod hindurchgegangenen Humanität. (GW 11, 617)
The humanistic vision embodied in the Holy Grail is “das Wissen, die Einweihung, jenes Höchste, wonach nicht nur der tumbe Held, sondern das Buch selbst auf der Suche ist” (GW 11, 617). The knowledge Castor seeks is thus, at least in part, the object of a desire to resolve the spiritual tension of a divided world. “Diese zweigeteilte Welt,” writes David, “ist für Thomas Mann – wie für Schiller, den er vielleicht aus diesem Grunde so gut verstand – charakteristisch. Am Anfang seines Schaffens hießen die zwei Blöcke ‘Geist’ und ‘Leben’; nur der List des ‘Künstlers’ konnte es gelingen, zwischen ihnen zu lavieren.”

In the spiritually clarified vision of a dream, Mann’s protagonist gains the unifying insight for which he seeks.

In his oneiric vision of “Schnee,” Hans Castorp, the neurotic “Leidensgenosse[]” (GW 3, 760), “Schmerzenszögling” (GW 3, 675), and “Sorgenkind des Lebens” (GW 3, 429), dreams of a world healed of its dialectical rupture. The harmonious union of reason and will, life and religion, time and eternity mend the ruptured natural and societal heritage of the Zauberberg’s “Erdensohn[]” (GW 3, 755) and “Kind[] der Zivilisation” (GW 3, 659). In rebuttal to modern reality’s disharmony and the consequent tension of suffering, the Zauberberg’s “Sorgenkind des Lebens” envisions the harmonious dissolution of the strife between reason and will. Hans Castorp achieves his fantastic vision of universal concord through the reconciled natural symbols of sun and sea on a

---

“Mittelmeer” coast peopled by “Sonnen- und Meereskinder” (GW 3, 679) – the symbolic representatives of the unified principles of reason and will.

The motifs of light and sea that pervade the idyllic portion of Hans’s dream in “Schnee” are clearly symbolic references to Settembrini’s and Naphta’s contrary principles. His dream’s reconciliation of these elements is an evident result of his discovery, announced in “Operationes spirituales,” of the consideration that “der Gegensatz vom Leben und Religion auf den von Zeit und Ewigkeit zurückzuführen sei” (GW 3, 639). In the greater Zauberberg text, the sun represents objectively measurable time, while the sea symbolizes the immeasurableness of eternity. Hans Castorp’s idyllic dream of “Schnee” unites Settembrini’s and Naphta’s contrary principles of life and religion, real time and eternity in a vision whose symbolic elements of sun and sea interpenetrate one another in fantastic achievement of the reconciliatory aims of “Regieren.”

The motif of light that penetrates the imagery of Castorp’s snow vision represents the principle of reason promoted by Settembrini, the advocate of “Aufklärung” who switches on the light in “Ewigkeitssuppe und plötzliche Klarkeit” (GW 3, 270). As instances of the leitmotifs of “Klarheit” and “Licht,” that episode’s “Deckenlicht und die sich in dem dunklen Krankenzimmer verbreitende Klarheit” are symbolic of the appearance of reason.\(^\text{266}\) As “Sonne” – original natural reference point for the measurement of time – the light motif represents Settembrini’s principle of reality as well. Both as a coming (GW 3, 449-50; 500) and as a presently occurring event (GW 3,

\(^{266}\) Kristiansen, 139.
511; 515), the “Sommersonnenwende” serves Castorp during his first year at the Berghof as a meaningful point of reference for his reflections on time’s passage. At the beginning of “Walpurgisnacht,” the narrator gauges Joachim’s completion of a year at the Berghof in terms of a “Sonnenumlauf” (GW 3, 448). The sun’s significance as chronological gauge becomes most apparent when one considers that, in conjunction with space and causality, time is “essential for the existence of real objects.” Settembrini’s principle of reason and reality appears in Hans Castorp’s idyllic dream in “Schnee” – not, however, in opposition to Naphta’s principle of will (whose symbol in the dream is the sea), but as the latter’s harmonious complement.

Hans’s dream represents Naphta’s principle of eternity in its benevolent aspect as a partially bounded and unbounded sea of calm. Naphta functions in the structure of the Zauberberg text as the representative of a tendency that at bottom is Chauchat and Peeperkorn’s “Wille zum Leben”: “Leitmotivisch ist das ‘religiöse Wesen’ des Jesuiten in den Kontext der ‘Unform’ und der Seinsdämonie des Willens zum Leben eingefügt.” Will is limitless, and – as its representative – Naptha is the proponent of eternity: “Mit Castorp als Mittler wird die ‘religiöse Welt’ Naphtas in den umfassenden Sinnhorizont des leitmotivischen Elements ‘Ewigkeit’ hineintransponiert, dessen Grenzen sich durch ‘magisches nunc stans,’ ‘stehendes Jetzt’ und das ‘wahre Sein der Dinge’ angeben


268 Kristiansen, 261.
lassen." As eternity’s representative, the figure of Naphta is also most intimately related with Hans Castorp’s experiences on the “Magic Mountain” in Mann’s novel, of which the latter writes:

[, . .] denn indem es die hermetische Verzauberung seines jungen Helden ins Zeitlose schildert, strebt es selbst durch seine künstlerischen Mittel die Aufhebung der Zeit an durch den Versuch, der musikalisch-ideellen Gesamtwelt, die es umfaßt, in jedem Augenblick volle Präsenz zu verleihen und ein magisches “nunc stans” herzustellen. (Einführung in den “Zauberberg,” GW 11, 612) In the central passages of his novel in which Mann describes the sea, the latter usually appears as the embodiment of the “nunc stans” and “stehendes Jetzt” (cf. GW 3, 757) – an image he most certainly takes from Schopenhauer, as his reference to the concept in his later Schopenhauer essay clearly indicates. The narrator’s description of the experience of suspended time and space produced by a “Spaziergang am Meeresstrande” (GW 3, 755) in “Standspaziergang” is an evident attempt to recreate the sensation of Schopenhauer’s “nunc stans”: “Als universales metaphysisches Sinnbild symbolisiert die Zaubermeerwelt den Gesamtkomplex der intellektuellen Abenteuer des Helden, des nunc


270See also Bollmann, 38-39.

stands, der leidlosen Kontemplation, des Identitätsverlustes, der Sehnsucht nach
Einfachheit, nach dem Nichts.”272 The spirit, Holger, evokes similar notions of the sea’s
limitlessness in “Fragwürdigstes” with his recitation of a poem that is “uferlos wie das
Meer, von dem es vornehmlich handelte” (GW 3, 921). It is this idea of the Naphtan
principle of eternity’s limitlessness incorporated in the sea that nonetheless also portrays
its potential malevolence to reason’s constraints.

During the “Schnee” skiing expedition in which Hans challenges the elements, the
unbounded sea represents for the “von der Zivilisation leidlich ausgestattetes
Menschenkind” an uncanny force of all-consuming might with a potentially deadly
embrace (GW 3, 658). Castor on his skis is like the “Schiffer” sitting in his boat “auf
dem tobenden Meere” of Schopenhauerian will (KSA 1, 28). Venturing too deeply “ins
Ungeheuerliche” brings subjection to consuming forces of natural violence, against
which the very setting of limits becomes an impossibility, “bis es sich nicht mehr um
Schaumauslauf und leichten Prankenschlag handelte, sondern um die Welle, den Rachen,
das Meer” (see above, p.112).

In contrast, Castorp’s dream idyll in “Schnee” portrays a sea whose partial
embrace by the land restores the factor of limit without infringing on the sea’s essential
quality of unboundedness. The sea is thus half open, half enclosed by land: “eine
wunderschöne Bucht, dunstig offen an einer Seite, zur Hälfte von immer matter
blauenden Bergzügen weit umfaßt [. . .]” (GW 3, 68). The dreamer’s aerial perspective
enhances the dream’s portrayal of the moderate limiting by reason of will’s

272Frizen, 300.
boundlessness: “Der Horizont lag hoch, die Weite schien zu steigen, war daher kam, daß
Hans den Golf von oben sah, aus einiger Höhe” (GW 3, 678). Castorp’s dream
symbolically portrays Naphta’s and Settembrini’s principles of will and reason in the
inclusively harmonious panorama of an expansive embrace between the eternal sea and
its mountainous partial coastal limit.

Hans’s dream harmoniously interblends Settembrini’s and Naphta’s respective
symbols of sun and sea in the image of a “Meer” suffused with sunlight – “ein Meer, das
Südmeer war das, tief-tiefblau, von Silberlichtern blitzend,” – and light imbued with
“sonnige[] Wasserfrische” (GW 3, 678). Sea and sun combine to create “das blaue
Sonnenglück” that spreads out before Castorp as if he had always carried it secretly in his
heart (“insgeheim und vor sich selbst verschwiegen, von je im Herzen getragen”) (GW 3,
678). Hans’s secret wish is the expression of a harmonious interplay of will and intellect:
“Und dieses ‘je’ war weit, unendlich weit, so wie das offene Meer zur Linken, dort, wo
der Himmel zart veilchenfarben darauf niederging” (GW 3, 678). The boundless will
(symbolized by the sea) gently conjoins with the intellect (represented by the heavens).
Like the “Akelei oder Aquilegia” with “blauen und veilchenfarben [. . .] Blüten” that
Castorp places in his room as an evident reminder of the spot where his “Regieren” began
(GW 3, 536), the heavens and sea of his dream are infused with the blue and violet colors
that mark the preferred location of that activity. Through its harmonious unification of
the elements of reason and will in its images of sun and sea, Hans’s idyllic dream in
“Schnee” represents the fulfillment in fantasy of the synthetic goal of his reflective
“Gedankenbeschäftigung.”
Hans’s “Sonnen- und Meereskinder” give human shape to the synthesis as representatives of the original harmonious unity of these contrary principles – the light of reason and the amorphous endlessness of will. They are clearly not two separate peoples divided on the basis of their solar and maritime origins. The “Sonnen- und Meereskinder” are one people united in allegiance to a universal double heritage – descendents or incorporations at once of sun and sea.

The idea of harmoniously unified reason and will contained in its portrayal of the sun and sea attains anthropological dimension through the representation in Hans’s dream of a body of humanity imbued with the same qualities. The ideal image of unification for which Castorp has been seeking reveals itself to him in the dream of the “Sonnen- und Meereskinder” upon whom he simultaneously reflects in the act of dreaming (GW 3, 679). For the dreaming Castorp, the people in his vision are an ideal synthesis of mental and physical, inner and outer vivacity and beauty: “‘Wie hübsch, gesund und klug und glücklich sie sind!,’ ” he thinks. “‘Ja, nicht nur wohlgestalt – auch klug und liebenswürdig von innen heraus’ ” (GW 3, 680). It is the “Geist und Sinn” resting at the bottom of their being (“Wesen”) that stirs Castorp emotionally and enamors him of them:

[Hans Castorp] meinte damit die große Freundlichkeit und gleichmäßig verteilte höfliche Rücksicht, mit der die Sonnenleute verkehrten: eine leichte und unter Lächeln verborgene Ehrerbietung, die sie einander, unmerklich fast und doch kraft einer deutlich durch alle waltenden Sinnesbindung und eingefleischten Idee, auf Schritt und Tritt erwiesen; eine Würde und Strenge sogar, doch ganz ins Heitere gelöst und einzig als ein unaussprechlicher geistiger Einfluß undüsteren
Ernstes, verständiger Frömmigkeit ihr tun und lassen bestimmend – wenn auch
dicht ohne alles Zeremoniell. (GW 3, 680-81)

The scene clearly portrays an ideal: personal attachment and mutual respect are shared in
equally by all and coexist in harmony; the deference that the “Sonnenleute” show for one
another is neither a burden nor ostentatious – a clear sign that it is genuine. Their
deferential attitude is, as the narrator explains, the product of a sensual attachment
(“Sinnesbindung”) and the incarnation of an idea actively present in each of them. That
the same attitude of deference is also a “Würde und Strenge” released in happiness (“ins
Heitere”) is not only an indication that the “Sonnenleute” profit from the benefits of
graciousness in social intercourse. They are also a “verständig-heitere Menschheit” (GW
3, 679) – a consideration that describes a clarity of outlook originating in their genesis, as
“Sonnenkinder,” from an impulse of reason. Beyond that, the derivation of their
deferential attitude solely from the influence of an “undünstere[r] Ernst[]” and
“verständige[r] Frömmigkeit” reveals, through comparison with linguistic conventions
established in the course of the narrative, that it founds itself on lack of compulsion and
the peaceful concordance of knowledge and desire.

Hans Castorp’s capacity for poetically constructive creation emerges in “Schnee”
as the unpremeditated product of unconscious desire and the harmonious goal of morally
motivated reason. The spiritual influence of “undünstere[r] Ernst[]” and “verständige[r]
Frömmigkeit” of the “Sonnenleute” – itself the manifestation of unified life and
religiosity – stands in direct opposition to the “ehrbare Verfinsterung” that Mann uses to
portray the psychological “shutting out” in the act of repression, as does his dream’s
“Landschaft” that “sich öffnete in wachsender Verklärung” (GW 3, 678). Not only does this influence of an “undünstere[r] Ernst[]” suggest an attitude of cheerfully unrepressive gravity; the unconstrained unity of sensual charm and spiritual dignity embodied in Castorp’s “Sonnenleute” also recalls the ideal union of polar opposites reflected, among others, in such works as Schiller’s Über Anmut und Würde and Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung or in the works of Goethe.\textsuperscript{273} Of the latter, Blume explains: “Goethes Beispiel zeigt dem Zwiespältigen nicht nur, daß es möglich ist, die inneren Gegensätze zu einer Einheit zusammenzufassen, sondern daß umgekehrt auch der Begriff der Totalität selbst es erfordert, daß sie in Gegensätze zerlegbar sei.”\textsuperscript{274} “Der Gegensatz der Extreme,” says Goethe, “indem er an einer Einheit entsteht, bewirkt eben dadurch die Möglichkeit einer Verbindung.”\textsuperscript{275} Hans’s compulsive habit of exclusion yields in dream to an emotional embrace: “Menschen, Sonnen- und Meereskinder, regten sich und ruhten überall, verständig-heitere, schöne junge Menschheit, so angenehm zu schauen – Hans Castorps ganzes Herz öffnete sich weit, ja schmerzlich weit und liebend ihrem Anblick” (GW 3, 679). In Schopenhauer the heart is synonymous with the will. One accordingly

\textsuperscript{273}Beyond that, Behler correctly observes that the “dialectical process by which Hans Castorp takes up the various ideas presented to him and transforms them into a larger totality beyond the oppositions” is not only “Goethean in nature” but is “strongly reminiscent of Novalis as well.” Behler, 197. She also argues very convincingly that Mann’s Zaubergest shares a distinct affinity with “Schlegel’s idea of the absolute novel, and secondly, Novalis’ dialectical movements upwards to ‘Romantic’ infinity, and back down into the real, material world.” Behler, 200 and passim. Indeed, Behler’s description of Mann’s employment of a technique of narrative perspectivism incorporating such oppositions as those of “Flachland” and “Zaubergest” and time and timelessness could form the starting point for a fruitful detailed analysis of Mann’s narrative technique that would certainly serve to describe the extent of his affinity with his Romantic predecessors and his unique method of carrying out their project.

\textsuperscript{274}Blume, 57.

notes that it is Hans’s will that in his dream forms the connection between himself and what he experiences. Like “das offene Meer” and its quality of being “unendlich weit” (GW 3, 678), Hans’s heart “öffnete sich weit.” Castorp’s dream freely exposes the will at the source of his conscious experiences. As Schopenhauer explains: “[Der Wille] ist der wahre, letzte Einheitspunkt des Bewuβtseyns und das Band aller Funktionen und Akte desselben: er gehört aber nicht selbst zum Intellekt, sondern ist nur dessen Wurzel, Ursprung und Beherrscher” (WWV 2, 162). During the experience of beholding his dream’s representation of an ideal concordance of intellect and will, Hans Castorp’s will assumes the oceanic proportions only available to pure, unrestricted will. As I have shown in chapter 1, however (see p.52), this desire for unbounded original happiness – seen in Schiller’s terms – only represents the sensual half of his longing. The conditions of unity that his dream produces are the expression of a moral impulse. His harmoniously happy image is thus the expression of a will unhindered by reason’s restraints and an intellect unclouded by aggravated will – an image only possible in the unreality of dream.

His dream’s imaginary suspension of the conditions of discord that Hans finds enacted in Naphta’s and Settembrini’s eristic struggle for conversational supremacy fulfills the task of a “Wunschtraum.” It is by no means a classic example of the psychological phenomenon described by Freud, however. Castorp’s vision of the ideal represents the expression of a wish of a much higher order than that experienced in the average dream. The daydreaming activity of reflection that motivates his dream’s production of an ideal synthesis of sensual and moral impulses is itself the manifestation
of a search for erotic satisfaction and for insight into Eros – a quest at once for instinctual gratification and intellectual fulfillment.

The activity of “Regieren” that takes as its object the disparate elements of Hans Castorp’s experiences on the “Zauberberg” finds its culmination in the synthetic accomplishment of his dream in “Schnee.” As Scharfschwerdt rightly explains, Hans’s dreams of “Im Restaurant,” “Satana macht ehrrührigre Vorschläge,” and “Hippe,” along with his “Tagtraum” of “Walpurgisnacht,” bring situations to light that prepare in “ihrem charakteristischen Nacheinander schon ihren Höhepunkt, Hans Castorps Traum im ‘Schnee’-Kapitel.”276 Hans’s ecstatic “Hymnus auf die Ordnung und Schönheit des Körpers” during “Walpurgisnacht” places life above death, and, as Scharfschwerdt adds:

Damit sind Rahmen und Grundlage für den fünften und letzten Traum vorbereitet, für Hans Castorps größten Traum, der einen umfassenden und vollkommenen Zusammenhang zwischen allen Bereichen des Romans zeigen will, insofern nun alle im Roman auftretenden Gegensätze, dadurch daß der Mensch als “Herr der Gegensätze” erscheint, in einen endgültigen Zusammenhang gebracht sind.277 Scharfschwerdt accurately identifies the progressive development in Castorp’s dreams of the synthetic idea culminating in “Schnee.” Despite his admirable treatment of Hans’s activity of “Regieren,” however, Scharfschwerdt fails to identify the fundamental connection between Castorp’s reflective activity and his dreams. As earlier described, Hans Castorp’s contemplative taking account of his experiences at the Berghof takes the

276 Scharfschwerdt, 142.

277 Scharfschwerdt, 142.
dream of "Hippe" as its point of departure and terminates, for the most part, with the
dream of "Schnee." The "Regieren" that Hans Castorp prefers to perform sitting on the
bench by the brook — the site of his former recovery from a nosebleed — takes as its object
not only "das Handgreifliche" of his memories of life at the Berghof, but also the "bloß
Gedachte[], Geträumte[], und Vorgestellte[]," since the latter, the narrator describes, are
nearly indistinguishable from the former (GW 3, 537). The critics have yet failed to
properly identify a salient feature of Mann's Zauberberg. The imaginative process of
dreaming that initially motivates Castorp's educational development yields in the final
chapter of the novel's first volume to a process of intoxicated day-dreaming beginning
with "Ewigkeitssuppe," followed by Hans's feverish conception of the image of life in
"Forschungen," and terminating with his drunken reverie in "Walpurgisnacht." Castorp's
replacement of the activity of dreaming with that of conscious reflection in the novel's
second half represents the third stage in the process. Hans's dream in "Schnee" is the
culmination both of his sequence of dreams and of the activity of "Regieren" that, prior to
"Schnee," gradually replaces them. It is the seventh in the series of dreams ("Im
Restaurant," "Satana macht ehrührige Vorschläge," "Hippe") and daydreams
("Ewigkeitssuppe," "Forschungen," "Walpurgisnacht") that reflect Castorp's increasing
coming to consciousness. Since his ultimate dream constitutes itself of halves that are
dreamt and thought, it also represents a synthesis of the acts of dreaming and
contemplation. In reflection of the synthetic operation of its content, Hans's "Schnee"
dream — apart from formally repeating the activities' description of a process of gradual
coming to awareness – also constitutes a formal synthesis of the respective unconscious and conscious activities of dreaming and reflection.

I have discussed earlier in this chapter the considerable extent to which “das Handgreifliche” of Hans’s former experiences at the Berghof enters into his dream of “Schnee.” The salient quality of Hans’s dream in “Schnee” is that, throughout its entire course, it stimulates the dreamer to cognitive reflection, so that it constitutes itself in the end solely of the protagonist’s thoughts on the significance of its previously dreamt content. The developmental progression of recurring themes in Castorp’s dreams is but one strand in a more complex trend that includes Hans’s mental return in dream to the themes of death and childhood infatuation and his physical return to the scene of his “Hippe” dream in order to consciously pursue an activity of conscientiously reminiscent daydreaming.

Hans Castorp develops a pronounced talent for bringing his imaginative capacity for dream production into use in a wakeful attempt to reconcile forces of contention that in reality are beyond resolution. Hans’s “Regieren” concerns itself with “so weitläufige Komplexe wie Form und Freiheit, Geist und Körper, Ehre und Schande, Zeit und Ewigkeit” (GW 3, 541). “Diese Komplexe gründen,” as Scharfschwerdt notes, “zu einem Hauptteil in den gegensätzlichen geistigen Welten von Settembrini (Form, Körper, Ehre, Zeit) und Naphta (Freiheit, Geist, Schande, Ewigkeit).” As Scharfschwerdt also correctly explains, Hans Castorp is “den Zusammenhängen in seinen zentralen

\footnote{Scharfschwerdt, 141.}
Gedankenexperimenten, seinem ´Regieren,´ überhaupt nicht [. . .] gewachsen.´

In the above section on Castorp’s “Goal of Reconciling the ‘Homo humanus’ and the ‘Homo Dei’,” I have suggested the extent to which Settembrini – as Mann’s representative of the aims of reality – stifles not only Castorp’s developmental progress, but also his nascent attempts at bringing the views of his mentors into a state of accordance. Is Settembrini’s attitude not also symbolic of the conditions in which the established order of reality places the individual? Freud, as Marcuse remarks, “justifies the repressive organization of the instincts by the irreconcilability between the primary pleasure principle and the reality principle,” thus expressing “the historical fact that civilization has progressed as organized domination.”

As sublimated Eros, Settembrini’s civilized concept of “Menschenliebe” (GW 3, 646) is at variance both with Chauchat’s sexuality and the sublimated version of the impulse represented in Naphta’s religious passion (GW 3, 644). As Marcuse explains, the “essentially explosive force” of sexuality that conflicts with Eros “as the effort ‘to combine organic substance into ever larger unities’” – the contradictory divisive and unifying aspects of sexuality – “reflect the inner unreconciled tension in Freud’s theory.”

Against Freud’s “notion of the inevitable ‘biological’ conflict between pleasure principle and reality principle, between sexuality and civilization,” Marcuse writes, “militates the idea of the unifying and gratifying power of

---

279 Scharfeswerdt, 141.
280 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon, 1974) 34.
281 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 42-43.
Eros, chained and worn out in a sick civilization.”\textsuperscript{282} Hans Castorp’s dream represents just such a unifying impulse of Eros in its effort to resolve the presently real state of internal discord objectively portrayed in the pathologically inflamed conflict between Naphta and Settembrini – the \textit{Zauberberg}’s proponents of the principles of pleasure and reality, or “Wollust” and “Zivilisation.”

Beyond arising from a fundamental tendency of Eros, Hans’s dream in “Schnee” seems to be the accidental product of a series of experiences and their contemplation in the activity of “Regieren.” Castorp’s reflective activity attempts not only to reconcile the contrary conceptions of humanity held by Naphta and Settembrini. It also consumes itself in visual dissection of Chauchat, as well as in reflection on a further portion of Hans’s experiences at the Berghof of which the narrator makes only passing mention – his subjection to Krokowski’s psychoanalytic treatment. After subjecting Chauchat’s x-ray image to an intense visual dissection in “Vom Gottesstaat,” Castorp directs his thoughts

\begin{quote}
[...] an den Kameraden Krokowski und an das, was er seit einiger Zeit im verdunkelten Zimmergelaß mit ihm trieb, besann sich über das doppelte Wesen der Analyse und wie weit sie der Tat und dem Fortschritte förderlich sei, wie weit dem Grabe verwandt und seiner anrüchigen Anatomie. (\textit{GW} 3, 541)
\end{quote}

The narrator describes at the conclusion of “Veränderungen” the pair of “Durchleuchtungskabinette” on either side of the door to the “Ordinationszimmer” – “links das organische und rechts um die Ecke das um eine Stufe vertiefte psychische, mit

\textsuperscript{282}Marcuse, \textit{Eros and Civilization}, 43.
Dr. Krokowski’s Besuchskarte an der Tür” (GW 3, 510). Joachim secretly observes his cousin knock at Krokowski’s door and “im Halbdunkel von Dr. Krokowski’s analytischer Grube verschwinden” (GW 3, 511). In addition to the dialectical opposition of Settembrini’s and Naphta’s viewpoints, “ein Teufel rechts und einer links” (GW 3, 640), Hans Castorp is thus also torn between the left-right opposition of Behrens’s organic “Lichtanatomie” and Krokowski’s psychoanalytic “Seelenzergliederung” and “Durchleuchtung des Unbewußten” (cf. GW 3, 301; 20; 183). Whereas the Hofrat’s procedures confront Castorp with the certainty of his death, Dr. Krokowski’s analyses surely expose him to the erotic impulse underlying all his symptoms and actions. The pair of witches that tear a “kleines Kind” apart in Hans’s nightmare consequently appear to represent the generally recurring irreconcilable forces that confront Hans Castorp: the novel’s “Kind der Zivilisation,” “Erdensohn,” “Kind des Friedens,” “Menschenskind,” and “Sorgenkind des Lebens” (GW 3, 658; 755; 619; 233; 429).²⁸³ Hans’s submission to the medical procedures of the Berghof’s physicians exposes to him the drives of Eros and Thanatos that motivate his excursion in “Schnee” and its ensuing dream. These elements, along with the contrary theories of Settembrini and Naphta, provide his contemplative “Gedankenbeschäftigung” with the fundamentally disjointed content upon which Hans Castorp performs his act of fantastic and conceptual reconciliation in the two-part dream of “Schnee.”

Hans Castorp’s “Wunschtraum” in “Schnee” embodies a desire for reconciliation that momentarily inspires its creator to an affirmation of the sentiments incorporated in

²⁸³ My emphases.
its composition. During the second stage of his dream, when he has awakened enough to realize that he has been dreaming, Castorp nonetheless continues to a certain degree to dream, "nicht mehr in Bildern, sondern gedankenweise, aber darum nicht weniger gewagt und kraus" (GW 3, 683). Still caught within the spell of lingering slumber, Hans interprets the pictorially vivid dream that he has immediately dreamt. What he has dreamt as an image recurs again as a thought containing an expression of intellectual conviction and intention of will. He arrives at this point first, however, in consideration of the forces of contention that provide partial motivation for his dream. "‘Die beiden Pädagogen!’,” he reflects, “‘Ihr Streit und ihre Gegensätze sind selber nur ein guazzabuglio und ein verworrenen Schlachtenlärmm, wovon sich niemand betäuben läßt, der nur ein bißchen frei im Kopfe ist und fromm im Herzen’” (GW 3, 685). His remark is critical, for by making his observation as one who is himself “frei im Kopf” and “fromm im Herzen,” he unmistakably imputes to himself the same aspect of “verständiger Frömmigkeit” that he has ascribed to the “Sonnenleute” (GW 3, 680-81).

What is more, he embraces the conciliatory attitude of the ideal as an imperative to which he attaches his will:

sind durch ihn, und also ist er vornehmer als sie. Vornehmer als der Tod, zu
vornehm für diesen, – das ist die Freiheit seines Kopfes. Vornehmer als das
Leben, zu vornehmen für dieses, – das ist die Frömmigkeit in seinem Herzen.” (GW
3, 685)

Hans Castorp’s thoughtfully imaginative reflection on the meaning of the dream imagery
that culminates with a pair of witches devouring a child rejects, in thought, the very
concept of fundamental strife in favor of the foregoing idyll’s picture of harmony. Since
the child represents himself, his act is also guided by an impulse of personal salvation.
His thoughts thus proceed backwards again from a consideration of the irreconcilability
of the positions of Naphta and Settembrini toward an affirmative espousal of the ideal
represented by the “Sonnenleute” as nothing less than his personal emblem of self-
vindicatation.

The ideal that Hans embraces rejects the antithetical elements in the two
pedagogues’ intellectual positions, while he at the same time affirms their principles in
idealized form as his own – an act that corresponds to the aim of Mann’s novel itself.  

In keeping with the impossibility of reconciling the opposites except by poetic means,
Castorp’s “Traumgedicht vom Menschen” performs its ideal act of unification in
accordance with a fundamental law of beauty. “Die Schönheit,” says Schiller.  

---

284 Behler thus writes of Der Zauberberg: “the novel reflects the classical attempt to achieve
synthesis in the face of polarities, harmony out of confusion, and finally, to arrive at a higher level of
existence, the elevation of the personality to the realm of humanity which lies beyond the antimonies.”
Behler, 197.

285 Citations are taken from the “Achtzehnter Brief” of Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des
Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen.
“verknüpft die zwei entgegengesetzten Zustände des Empfindens und des Denkens” — conditions, he adds, that are incapable of being united (“niemals eins werden können”) (SW 5, 625). Just as beauty performs its act of unification by conceiving of this opposition “in ihrer ganzen Reinheit und Strengigkeit” (SW 5, 625), Castorp reconciles Naphta’s and Settembrini’s opposed principles by subjecting them to an act of ideal purification modeled on his dream’s “Sonnenleute.” Yet Castorp also rejects what are recognizably Naphta’s and Settembrini’s contrary respective tendencies of “mystische[] Gemeinschaft” and “windige[s] Einzeltum” in favor of a third position of autonomy — that of the “Mensch” — that resides somewhere in between. Hans’s act of reconciliation through rejection corresponds very closely to beauty’s performance of its act of unification through suspension of the opposites of thought and feeling, since “jene zwei entgegengesetzten Zustände verbindet die Schönheit und hebt also die Entgegensetzung auf” (SW 5, 625). As I will soon discuss, Settembrini and Naphta’s respective personalities’ betrayal of self-conflicting tendencies vaguely indicates the need for their opposition’s suspension. Schiller describes how beauty places us in a “mittleren Zustand” between “Materie und Form, zwischen Leiden und Tätigkeit” (SW 5, 624) — extremes corresponding in principle to the positions upheld by the disputants in Der Zauberberg. Beauty’s occupation of the middle ground between material and form also recalls Hans’s image of life, which is neither material nor spirit, but “etwas zwischen beidem” (GW 3, 385). On the basis of the same consideration, the express inward and outward beauty of his dream’s “Sonnenleute” coincides with their possession of a concordance between “Geist und Sinn” (GW 3, 680). Through contemplation of his self-
produced image of harmonious balance, Castorp forges his concept of humanity as a “middle condition” corresponding to that of beauty and life. Hans Castorp’s designation of the “‘Mensch’” as “‘Herr der Gegensätze’” imputes implicit notions of autonomy and beauty to the latter’s “‘Stand und Staat’” (*GW* 3, 684-85) that correspond fundamentally to Schiller’s “Staat des schönen Scheins” and the “eigne schöne Natur” that autonomously guides its participants’ conduct (*SW* 5, 669). The extent to which Mann’s novel strives for a classical synthesis becomes apparent in consideration of Hans Castorp’s use of an aesthetic guide for human orientation that corresponds so closely to the project of Schiller’s *Ästhetische Briefe*.

Castorp’s return to the wish-fulfilling ideal of his dream brings evidence of the same desire for reconciliation as that earlier expressed in his emphatic insistence on unifying Settembrini’s and Naphta’s divergent concepts as the only means of averting the danger of “‘Weltentzweiung’” (see above, p.95). Through the mediation of dream, Hans becomes independently conscious in half-waking of the proper calling of Naphta’s “Homo Dei” and Settembrini’s “homo humanus” – from the awareness of which the mutually exclusive perspectives of the notions’ proponents have earlier excluded him. In defiance of the inevitable conflict of his mentors’ principles, Castorp embraces a personal image of humanity that performs beauty’s dual operations of unification and suspension on the human extremes of thought and feeling.

Hans Castorp’s act of purifying unification infuses the agent himself with a spirit of coordinated mental and physical resolution that empowers him against the mortal threat of confusion’s incapacitation. As the representatives of the intellect and the will,
the bodily organs that correspond to Settembrini and Naphta would be the head and the heart. Beyond Hans’s recognition that their vociferous disputes, as just mentioned, contravene the aspirations of anyone who is “‘frei im Kopfe’” and “‘fromm im Herzen,’” his mentors’ advocacies of liberal thinking, on the one hand, and piety, on the other, are directly undermined by their respective tendencies to compulsion and cruelty. Settembrini’s principle calls for freedom, while that of his Jesuit adversary insists on deep piety. However, as I have shown, the Italian effectively prohibits Castorp’s liberal acquisition of independent opinions. One in fact wonders to what extent the opinions of this grandson of a Risorgimento politician and son of a humanist (GW 3, 646) actually derive from independent thinking and how much has merely been inculcated in him by his elders. On the other hand, Naphta’s notion of piety is grounded not in true passion for his religious mission, but in cruelty (GW 3, 609). The rabbi who instructs him is impressed by Naphta’s “Geistesgaben” but – apparently sensing his pupil’s lovelessness toward his calling – also realizes, “daß er eine Schlange an seinem Busen genährt hatte” (GW 3, 611). In place of true religious passion, Naphta possesses a “logische[] Leidenschaft” (GW 3, 611). It seems clear that Settembrini’s and Naphta’s personal qualities are directly at variance with the notions they sponsor. Castorp rightly sees that, in contrast to Naphta, Settembrini means well, whereas Naphta’s arguments are almost

---

always better than those of his opponent (GW 3, 660). Naphta appears much more to be “frei im Kopf” than the pedantic Italian proponent of Enlightenment, while the latter – and not his piety-mongering Jesuit antagonist – is “fromm im Herzen.” As the individual expression of a tendency both at variance with the falseneses in these principles and restorative of their true nature, Hans’s “Gedankentraum” is the manifestation of a pious heart beating in rhythm with the well-measured thoughts of an independent head.

In objectively reflecting on the harmony of his dream idyll, Hans Castorp establishes similar conditions of concord subjectively within himself. The experience of beauty instills conditions of unified form and feeling in the subject like those observed in the object. Hans’s recognition of his own role as provider of his idyll’s harmonious balance is fundamental to the process. Castorp’s thoughtful reflection on the idyll of the “Sonnenleute” now becomes the basis for an assertion of will bolstered on knowledge of his act of self-creation: “Da habe ich einen Reim gemacht, ein Traumgedicht vom Menschen. Ich will dran denken. Ich will gut sein. Ich will dem Tode keine Herrschaft eiräumen über meine Gedanken!” (GW 3, 685). Schopenhauer describes the “Ich” as the “pro tempore identische Subjekt des Erkennens und Wollens [. . .], der zeitliche Anknüpfungspunkt der gesammten Erscheinung, d.h. der Objektivation des Willens: es bedingt zwar die Erscheinung, aber ist auch durch sie bedingt” (WWV 2, 234). Castorp’s

---


288 “Die Schönheit ist also zwar Gegenstand für uns, weil die Reflexion die Bedingung ist, unter der wir eine Empfindung von ihr haben; zugleich aber ist sie ein Zustand unseres Subjekts, weil das Gefühl die Bedingung ist, unter der wir eine Vorstellung von ihr haben. Sie ist also zwar Form, weil wir sie betrachten; zugleich aber ist sie Leben, weil wir sie fühlen. Mit einem Wort: sie ist zugleich unser Zustand und unsre Tat.” Schiller, Über die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, SW 5, 653-54.
half-conscious reflection on the content of his previous unconscious dream experience is symbolic of the objectifying process that creates personal identity out of will. In isolated reflection on the expression in will of his dream’s wish fulfillment, Castorp’s “Ich” takes shape as the identical conscious expression of an originally unconscious desire. In uncharacteristic fashion, Mann’s selflessly will-less protagonist suddenly reveals his true colors as a creature imbued with the senses of self-identity and resolution. The “Sonnen- und Meereskinder” of Castorp’s dream of images are the harmonious unification of the principles of reason and will. Similarly, the threefold reiteration of objectified subjective will incorporated in the “‘Ich will’ ” of Hans’s “Gedankentraum” unites, in the objects of its desire, both thought and being in his pursuit of personal liberation from the mystifying powers of death.

It is a personally active reason to which Castorp gives voice in his unified subjective expression of intellect and will. In a note appended to the 18th of his Ästhetische Briefe, Schiller explains: “Die Natur (der Sinn) vereinigt überall, der Verstand scheidet überall, aber die Vernunft vereinigt wieder” (SW 5, 626, n.1). Castorp’s thought-dream reconciles the intellect’s and will’s opposed goals of individuality and totality through an expression of reason in which his personal maxim of salvation reflects itself in the general terms of a moral pronouncement.

The synthetic act that Hans performs in his “Gedankentraum” is essentially moral in nature. Hans’s self-made moral declaration and awakening in “Schnee” are similar to the act of birth as described by Mann in Süßer Schlaf. As Mann explains, the human fetus’s face is originally open in the front and then grows together “von beiden Seiten
allmählich nach der Mitte [. . .], es schließt sich langsam und sicher zusammen zu diesem unseren symmetrischen, schauenden, wollenden, individuell-konzentrierten Ich-Gesicht . . .” (Essays 1, 108). Similarly to the way in which the fetus’s face develops personal form by growing toward the middle, the balanced personal expression of will of Castorp’s moral pronouncement in “Schnee” performs its synthetic act in the middle ground between Settembrini’s and Naphta’s contrary principles. As Mann continues to describe in his essay, it appears to him as though all “individuelles Dasein” should be similarly comprehended as the “Folge [. . .] eines übersinnlichen Willensaktes und Entschlusses zur Konzentration, zur Begrenzung und Gestaltung, zur Sammlung aus dem Nichts, zur Absage an die Freiheit, die Unendlichkeit, an das Schlummern und Weben in raum- und zeitloser Nacht – eines sittlichen Entschlusses zum Sein und zum Leiden” (Essays 1, 109). Like an act of coming into being, Hans’s self-generative assertion of true individuality counteracts the confused indeterminacy of sensations and ideas typical of his sanatorium experiences. The same existential moral decision of becoming that Mann describes in Süßer Schlaf finds symbolic representation in the combined aspects of the moral pronouncement that concludes Castorp’s dream. His pronouncement portrays a moral coming into being through its expression of personal will, the renunciation of freedom implicit in its imperative formulation, and the personal call to awaken that concludes it. Hans’s synthetic act is not only moral, however, it is also morally good.

It is as an act of good will that the “Traumgedicht vom Menschen” with which Castorp awakens in “Schnee” opposes itself to the darker side of will that motivates his
earlier succumbing to fatigue. In Thomas Mann's letter to Josef Ponten of 5 November 1925, he defends his *Zauberberg* against the notion of its enmity to the life principle:

Aber seien wir gerecht in Sachen der Lebensfeindlichkeit! Ist mein Buch nicht gegen seine eigene innere Fatalität ein Buch des *guten Willens*? Ich lasse dabei die Frage bei Seite, ob ein Nihilismus, der sich über extremistische Theorien lustig macht und ihnen immerhin Figuren, wie den tapferen Joachim und den großmächtigen Stammler Peeperkorn entgegenzustellen weiß (Besseres liefert die Zeit nicht) – eigentlich ein so ganz echter Nihilismus ist.\(^{289}\)

If Mann views his novel as a book of good will, certainly it is because of the expression of goodwill that its protagonist embraces in opposition to the nihilistic fatalism that symbolically confronts him in “Schnee.” Inherent in that trend is the personal resolve reflected in Hans Castorp’s decision to break free of the confusion of Naphta and Settembrini’s ideological divisions to pursue a personal solution of the “Homo Dei” problem in the separation of solitude. As Ortega y Gasset correctly observes, only in solitude can one come to an understanding of one’s true individuality:

Solitude, dripping hour after hour upon the soul, performs upon the latter the work of the forger. Solitude has the quality of an influential blacksmith that compresses and embosses our being. Beneath its treatment, one consolidates one’s individual destiny and can enter the street with impunity, without allowing oneself to become fully contaminated by unguided endemic public opinion. In isolation, a filtering and discrimination of our ideas, efforts, and passions

\(^{289}\) *Briefe* 1, 231.
produces itself automatically, and we learn to recognize those that are our own and those that are anonymous, extraneous, cast upon us like the road’s chaotic dust.  

Hans Castorp’s search for the solution of the human problem in the isolation of “Schnee” is more than just an attempt to break free of the misguided confusion of Naphta and Settembrini’s discourse. In the isolation of “Regieren” that resides as the concealed motivation at his excursion’s core, Hans momentarily frees himself of the detritus of false opinion that has collected in his all-too-receptive memory. Hans transcends to recognition of his personal mission as a human being. After falling into slumber under the influence of an uncannily malevolent will, Hans Castorp nonetheless frees himself from its influence by pursuing a course of independent reasoning and feeling that brings him insight into a basic human law of ethical propriety – the expression, in short, of a transcendentally good will born of the chaos of experience.

As an act of good will, Hans’s sublime awakening in “Schnee” is an expression of love – most notably, an expression of love of self. In reflection upon his dream of images, Castorp beholds the true purpose of the pathological interests that have bound him to the Berghof:

---

290My translation of the following: “La soledad, hora tras hora goteando sobre el alma, hace faena de forjador sobre ella. La soledad tiene algo de herrero trascendente que hace a nuestra persona compacta y la repuja. Bajo su tratamiento el hombre consolida su destino individual, y puede salir impunemente a la calle sin contamínarse por completo de lo público, mostrenco, endémico. En el aislamiento se produce de manera automática una criba y discriminación de nuestras ideas, afanes, fervores, y aprendemos los que son nuestros y los que son anónimos, ambientes, caídos sobre nosotros como la polvareda del camino.” José Ortega y Gasset, “Socialización del hombre,” Obras Completas, 4th ed., vol. 2, El Espectador (1916-1934) (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1957) 746-47.
“Denn alles Interesse für Tod und Krankheit ist nur eine Art von Ausdruck für das am Leben, wie ja die humanistische Fakultät der Medizin beweist, die [. . .] nur eine Abschattung ist des einen großen und dringlichsten Anliegens, das ich mir nun mit aller Sympathie bei seinem Namen nenne: Es ist das Sorgenkind des Lebens, es ist der Mensch und ist sein Stand und Staat . . .” (GW 3, 684)

Hans Castorp’s interest in death and pathology is subordinate to his interest in life. His great and most urgent concern is not just humanity per se; it is also “‘das Sorgenkind des Lebens’” or, in other words, his self. By mentioning his own condition as the “singularly greatest and most urgent concern,” Hans Castorp places himself in a benevolently self-interested position of balance. His taking of a personal interest in his condition sets him above the depersonalizing irrational sensations of self-antagonism that characterize his prior “uncanny” experiences. Beyond demonstrating unflinching identification with his own cause, the consideration that he refers to it “‘mit aller Sympathie’” also testifies to a sentiment of righteously motivated love of self in the protagonist.

Castorp’s adventure in “Schnee” traces a developmental course of sympathy that culminates in an exaltation of human self and life over the depersonalizing forces of mortality. The outwardly and inwardly directed “Sympathie mit den Elementen,” “Sympathie mit der großen Winterwildnis,” and “Sympathie mit seinem Herzen” (GW 3, 659-61) that Castorp feels at his expedition’s outset disintegrate into feelings of outward and inward contention against the confusion of natural inclemency and defiance of fatigue. Castorp’s “Mut und Sympathie” (GW 3, 659) describe an affinity with life that
visibly yields in the blizzard to the “Sympathie mit dem Tode” that typifies his attachment to the Berghof way of life (GW 3, 906). His dream nonetheless restores the life principle to its position of ascendancy. Hans recognizes “‘mit aller Sympathie’” his own predicament as participant in the human condition. Life is the answer to his anthropological riddle, and Castorp’s personal role as representative of humanity is participation in life’s maintenance of its hegemony over death.

Hans Castorp’s restoration to a natural, self-interested position founded on Eros coincides with his assumption of a self-unified stance in affirmation of life. A bit further on in his dreaming reflection, Hans carries his act of creation one step further by transforming his three-part anaphoristic assertion of objectified subjective will – “‘Ich will’” – into a generally applicable rule containing the admonitory tone of an imperative: “‘Der Mensch soll um der Güte und Liebe willen dem Tode keine Herrschaft einräumen über seine Gedanken’” (GW 3, 686). As the expression of a will that asserts its desire for goodness – “‘Ich will gut sein’” (GW 3, 685) – Castorp’s imperative is clearly an expression of good intentions, if perhaps not of good will in the strictly Kantian sense.²⁹¹ Hans’s intentional performance of the subsequent beneficial act of rousing himself to wakefulness is thus the isolated act of good will that corresponds to the good intention of his imperative. Hans Castorp’s imperative of “Schnee” embraces love and goodness in an expression of moral benevolence toward self and humanity alike.

²⁹¹ There is a discernible distinction between wanting to be good and actually being good. Kant takes care not to equate good intention with good will, claiming that intentions lead to the good only accidentally. Tom Sorell, “Kant’s Good Will and Our Good Nature,” Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays, ed. Paul Guyer (Lanham: Rowman, 1998) 88.
As if in recognition of his general human rule’s need for foundation in action, Castorp expresses personal interest, immediately prior to uttering it, in the subjective implementation of its principle: “‘Oh, so ist es deutlich geträumt und gut regiert [i.e. “thought”]! Ich will dran denken. Ich will dem Tode Treue halten in meinem Herzen, doch mich hell erinnern, daß Treue zum Tode und Gewesenen nur Bosheit und finstere Wollust und Menschenfeindschaft ist, bestimmt sie unser Denken und Regieren.’” (GW 3, 686). In order for Castorp’s personal maxim to attain possible validity as a universally applicable rule of human behavior, cognitive attention to its value judgement must first be consistently exercised in memory. Only then might the handling subject’s actions pursue their proper course toward achieving the quality of exemplarity for a generally prescribed mode of human behavior. In the course of the rest of the Zauberberg’s plot, Hans Castorp – palpably lacking in self-awareness – never fully exposes his real intentions – always leaving the reader to divine the underlying meanings and motivations of actions that lie continually buried in the uncertainty of ambivalence. In “Schnee,” Castorp’s deeply moral wish for reconciliation announces itself in the idyll of a dream, in reflection upon which the self-interpretive waking dreamer suddenly and clearly gives temporary voice to a will become conscious of its loving attachment to self and life.

Hans’s general prohibition against letting death rule over one’s thoughts is the culmination of a process of soul-searching that begins with the young visitor from Hamburg’s arrival at the Berghof. It is the end product of the process of “Regieren” that, as I have shown, begins with the psychological revelation of “Hippe,” causes Hans to remain – despite an improvement in health – in the isolated surroundings of the
sanatorium, and serves as the principal motivating force behind his venturing out into the wilderness of “Schnee.” Even more than that, Hans’s imperative is the result of a thought process founded on intense involvement in the experience of the uncanny – a process in which the subject becomes aware of his unconscious individual subjection to general laws of destruction. Hans’s imperative – “‘Der Mensch soll um der Güte und Liebe willen dem Tode keine Herrschaft einräumen über seine Gedanken’” – is the expression, in terms lucidly comprehensible to the intellect, of a general rule of salvation with the potential for countering the universally threatening powers of uncanny destruction that loom on the horizon in “Der Donnerschlag.” Castorp’s invocation of reason in the service of goodness and love against the irrational restores him to the position of rational security against irrational peril characteristic of the sublime. Noble cites Castorp’s maxim in proof of his claim: “Nur die Liebe, nicht die Vernunft, ist stärker als der Tod.” He nonetheless fails to observe that Hans’s maxim employs an implicit reasoning (i.e. doing something for something else’s sake) with which to achieve its desired effect. Only through reliance upon the guiding power of reason does love truly become stronger than death. Only through his maxim’s reliance upon reason is Castorp at this moment, as Noble further explains, “zugleich über den Tod erhaben und von ihm aufs äußerste bedroht.” Hans Castorp’s general human rule of conduct is the

---

292 Dierks observes that Castorp’s imperative’s qualification (“Einschränkung”) of his earlier thoughts prepares “die im Joseph demonstrierfte Fortbewegung von Metaphysik zu ‘Psychologie’ (Individuation).” Studien zu Mythos und Psychologie bei Thomas Mann, 124. In somewhat similar fashion, Stresau argues that the “tiefer Frage” of the “‘Homo Dei’” points to Mann’s “künftig[s] Werk.” Stresau, 150.

293 Krankheit, Verbrechen und künstlerisches Schaffen, 145.

294 Krankheit, Verbrechen und künstlerisches Schaffen, 145.
intellectual objectification of his subjective will. It is the culmination of his process of "Regieren": the lucidly comprehensible solution to the problem of the "Homo Dei" and bulwark against the uncanny whose ultimate meaning as an act of self-preservation corresponds to its formal antagonistic expression of nonrepressive defiance against death.

As semi-conscious act of reflection of increasing clarity, Castorp's "Gedankentraum" is the product of an awakening to consciousness producing physical activity as its immediate result. Stefan Bollmann correctly asserts that the actual meaning of Castorp's "Traumwort" consists in inciting him "zum wirklichen Aufwachen aus der Immanenz des Traumgeschehens […], indem es den Punkt bezeichnet, an dem das Erkennen sich aus eigenem Antrieb dem Handeln überantwortet […]."295 The long process of creation that culminates in Hans's general rule of liberation from compulsive thinking thus ironically confines itself to the performance of an isolated act of arousing its agent from a potentially deadly slumber.

The significance of Hans Castorp's ascension to a harmoniously balanced moral plateau in "Schnee" attains greatest clarity in contrast to the conditions of discord, decay, and death that complete the Zauberberg's plot. For although the protagonist forgets to employ it as a guide to his conduct, subsequent events in the plot remind the reader of the wisdom embodied in Castorp's vision and the fatalistic consequences of his failure to heed it.

---

295 Bollmann, 106.
Upon returning to Davos, Hans rapidly forgets his express desire to recall the objectified general rule he forms of his subjective will (GW 3, 688). In the following section, “Als Soldat und brav,” Hans returns to the fierce atmosphere of Naphta and Settembrini’s debates as if nothing has changed – a clear sign that his will and its power of unification have receded back into the repressed state of the unconscious, again yielding precedence to the confused pondering of intellect. Schopenhauer explains: “Aus der FORM DER ZEIT UND DER EINFACHEN DIMENSION der Vorstellungsreihe, vermöge welcher der Intellekt, um Eines aufzufassen, alles Andere fallen lassen muß, folgt, wie seine Zerstreuung, auch seine VERGESSENLICHKEIT” (WWV 2, 162-63). Faced at the outset of his excursion in “Schnee” with the dilemma of a psyche divided against itself, Hans is overcome with a sensation of confusion. His confusion is the product of a manifest struggle between the intellect’s diffusion, or “Zerstreuung,” and the will’s inherent tendency to unite. In subsequent combination with his dream- Liberated will, Hans’s intellect gains a correspondingly unified glimpse of original harmony that relies for its production of anamnesis on will’s unforgetfulness. With hubristic enthusiasm, Hans Castorp immediately assumes that the “‘Wort!’ ” for which he has sought will remain in his memory: “‘Nun habe ich [das Wort]. Mein Traum hat es mir deutlichst eingegeben, daß ich’s für immer weiß’” (GW 3, 686). Castorps strangely regards his “‘Traumwort’” as the end result of a process of intellectual production. In recapitulation of the consideration that his activity of “Regieren” begins in “Hippe” and ends in “Schnee,”

---

296 On Hans Castorps’s act of promptly forgetting the wisdom of his vision, see Thomas Mann, Briefe 1, 232; Bollmann, 68; Koopmann, “Zur Einführung,” Thomas Manns Zauberberg und Schopenhauers Metaphysik, by Borge Kristiansen, ix; xxiii; Lehnert, “Hans Castorps Vision,” 1; Maar, 166; Spiewok, 28; Wysling, “Probleme der Zauberberg-Interpretation,” 23.
Castorp exclaims: "‘Und damit wach’ ich auf... Denn damit hab’ ich zu Ende geträumt und recht zum Ziele. Schon längst hab’ ich nach diesem Wort gesucht: am Orte, wo Hippe mir erschien, in meiner Loge und überall. Ins Schneegebirge hat mich das Suchen danach auch getrieben’” (GW 3, 686). Hans Castorp thus regards the attainment of his imperative, his "‘Traumwort,’” in terms of a process of linear development divorced from will or, in other words, in terms of the simple “DIMENSION der Vorstellungsreihe” that Schopenhauer designates as the source of the intellect’s forgetfulness. What Castorp ignores is that his productive act depends for its effectiveness on a cyclical process of progressive enhancement in which his will and faculty of reason are finally enabled to deliver him a clear assessment of his true situation and personal attitude toward it. Rather than, for example, seeing his tendency to self-disorientation as the recurring manifestation of a phenomenon that has caused him to stray from his course in life, he appears to regard it – along with the rest of the events of that section so characteristic of his overall dilemma – solely within the context of his immediate predicament. The achievement of a truly enlightened depth of understanding is nonetheless only possible through the practice of a persistent return to significant themes. As Schopenhauer explains, memory is “kein Behältniß, sondern eine bloße Uebungsfähigkeit im Hervorbringen beliebiger Vorstellungen, die daher stets durch Wiederholung in Uebung erhalten werden müssen, da sie sonst sich allmählich verlieren” (WWV 2, 163). Hans Castorp’s achievement of a moment of penetrating insight abandons its creative potential by repressively excluding will’s unforgetfulness as a factor in the sustained production of
meaningful thought and consequently confining itself to the uniform superficiality of the intellect’s linear path of “Zerstreuung” and forgetfulness.

For Hans Castorp, the achievement of aesthetic balance between intellect and will becomes much more than just an accomplishment of education; since he perishes without it, it becomes an imperative of survival – the indispensible goal of human life in the modern world. In language reminiscent of Schopenhauer’s distinction between intellectual “Zerstreuung” and the will’s unifying function, Schiller advises his reader in Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung: “Fürchte dich nicht vor der Verwirrung außer dir, aber vor der Verwirrung in dir; strebe nach Einheit, aber nicht in der Einförmitigkeit; strebe nach Ruhe, aber durch das Gleichgewicht, nicht durch den Stillstand deiner Tätigkeit” (SW 5, 708). The motivation for Hans Castorp’s expedition in “Schnee” is a desire to overcome the internal confusion that he experiences on an objective level in Naphta and Settembrini’s debates. In “Schnee,” he overcomes this internal confusion in a vision of balanced unity true to the spirit of Schiller’s recommendation. At the end of Mann’s novel, however, Hans Castorp’s descent into the monotony of prolonged sanatorium existence surrenders him over to an uncanny personal identification with the external forces of “Verwirrung” that manifest themselves in his societal surroundings. The pandemics of “Stumpfsinn” and “Gereiztheit” (GW 3, 868-83; 947-80) – both symptomatic of the sanatorium’s waning power of repression – signal the return of the repressed and a reversion to conditions of natural chaos. As Schiller also explains:

Jene Natur, die du dem Vernunftlosen beneidest, ist keiner Achtung, keiner Sehnsucht wert. Sie liegt hinter dir, sie muß ewig hinter dir liegen. Verlassen
von der Leiter, die dich trug, bleibt dir jetzt keine andere Wahl mehr, als mit freiem Bewußtsein und Willen das Gesetz zu ergreifen oder rettungslos in eine bodenlose Tiefe zu fallen. (SW 5, 708)

In “Schnee,” Hans Castorp literally awakens to the reality of nature’s immanent power of destruction. Nature compels him to submit to his experience of natural sublimity being reduced to an uncanny “Totentanz” with forces of potential threat to his existence. He thereby learns — at least momentarily — to put nature behind him in obedience of his threefold annunciation of the “Ich will [. . .]” (GW 3, 685) — the personal maxim of action — that highlights his vision’s unification of “Bewußtsein” and “Willen” in accordance with Schiller’s formula. In the first half of Mann’s novel, Castorp’s harmonious image of life provides the background for his achievement of the unifying goal of sensuality. In accordance with the divisive function of “Verstand” (see above, p.261), that harmony disintegrates into the confusion of opposites when subsequently raised to the abstract level of Naphta and Settembrini’s debates. It is the same primordial dream of natural harmony and its mortally threatening disruption by the knowledge of love and death that Castorp relives in his dream of images of “Schnee.” For modern humankind, knowledge of the unguided passions’ ultimate disruption of societal concord frustrates the very notion of attaining a state of harmonious balance solely in response to sensual urges. But repressive disregard for sensuality’s need for unity, on the other hand, also disrupts societal balance through its production of conditions of gathering discontent and the ultimate eruptive violence of the return of the repressed. In creation of humane society, the truly moral urge of reason that effectively reestablishes nature’s drive for
union accommodates will and intellect alike. According to such a nonrepressive formula, a morality balanced between instinct and understanding subsequently becomes the sole remaining means for human life’s salvation from the abyss.

The law of impending natural violence forms the imperative motivational background for appeasing nature through achievement of nonrepressive balance. The conditions of strained repressive tension that seem to compel Castorp to retreat into nature in “Schnee” repeat themselves on the societal level in the overwrought atmosphere of aggression that pervades the sanatorium environment preceding the eruption of “Der Donnerschlag.” In “Operationes spirituales,” the “große Konfusion” that Naptha’s and Settembrini’s arguments produce in Castorp is so great that the latter is tempted, “sich kopfüber in Naphta’s ‘sittlich ungeordnetes All’ zu stürzen” (GW 3, 646). The “Schnee” section is the portrayal of Hans’s confrontation and resistance of, temporary submission to, and eventual overcoming of this temptation. When the temptation comes again in the form of the epidemic pandemonium of “Der Donnerschlag,” Hans Castorp is powerless to resist it. “Fünftausend Fuß tief stürzte das Völkchen Derer hier oben sich kopfüber ins Flachland der Heimsuchung [. . .], – und Hans stürzte mit,” says the narrator (GW 3, 989). Hans is faced on two occasions with Schiller’s decision between moral progression and natural regression: either “mit freiem Bewuβtsein und Willen das Gesetz zu ergreifen oder rettungslos in eine bodenlose Tiefe zu fallen.” Through personal confrontation of nature’s external and internal might in “Schnee,” he ultimately chooses the former. As a willing participant in the external and internal natural seduction of patriotic aggression in “Der Donnerschlag,” he succumbs to the latter. Survival becomes less a question of
moral convictions than of moral choice – moral choice, moreover, not on an individual, but on a collective level. The narrator bewails the false security that his narrative and the repressive order of the sanatorium provide against the scourge of war: “O Scham unserer Schattensicherheit!” (GW 3, 993). Hans is helplessly swept up in a pandemic regression to conditions of natural chaos – like Naphta and Settembrini’s duel, “‘die Rückkehr zum Urstande der Natur’” (GW 3, 971). Through portrayal of the position of extreme vulnerability to universal external turmoil in which Hans Castorp’s failure to overcome conditions of internal discord places him, Mann’s novel describes the mission of self-overcoming envisioned by its hero in “Schnee” as a matter of life and death. Since it portrays the vulnerability of society itself to those conditions of external turmoil as a natural process, Mann’s Zauberberg subtly transforms Castorp’s imperative of moral survival into the collective mission of a society to overcome its natural tendency to self-disruption or even annihilation.

Hans Castorp’s reconciliation of Settembrini’s and Naphta’s opposed principles of reason and will is the impossible moral achievement of a poetic impulse. His achievement’s capacity for salvation not only demonstrates a certain potential in its vision’s underlying idea of harmonious human coexistence, however, but it also seems to indicate it as indispensible for human survival. Within the greater Zauberberg plot, Hans’s vision in “Schnee” culminates a process leading through physical turmoil and sensual completion to intellectual confusion and moral fulfillment. It also completes multiple series of related events proceeding from the unconsciousness of dream to the awareness of awakening, from the uncertainty of will-lessness to the conviction of will,
from selflessness to selfhood, from depersonalization to “person-hood,” from the uncanny to the sublime. In addition, Hans’s vision is the realization in self-actual terms of his image of life – the union of spirit and matter (GW 3, 385). For it provides conscious shape to the hitherto inchoate content of his feelings and meaningful content to his yet empty principle of humanity. Hans Castorp’s personal endeavor in “Schnee” restores life to its natural position of prevalence over death by uncompulsively sublimating individual Eros to the plane of universal moral goodness. Contrary to its protagonist’s visionary achievement in “Schnee,” however, Mann’s novel concludes with conditions completely antithetical to the wisdom of Castorp’s vision and its affirmation of life, love, moral goodness, and humanity. Hans Castorp ultimately enters into the inhumanity and indifference of war marching “auf schlimmen Wegen” (GW 3, 991) toward a meaningless certain demise. The Zauberberg’s narrator draws attention to the contrast:

Man könnte [Das junge Blut] sich denken: Rosse regend und schwemmend in einer Meeresbucht, mit der Geliebten am Strande wandelnd, die Lippen am Ohre der weichen Braut, auch wie es glücklich freundschaftlich einander im Bogenschuß unterweist. Statt dessen liegt es, die Nase im Feuerdreck. Daß es das freudig tut, wenn auch in grenzenlosen Ängsten [. . .], ist eine erhabene und beschämende Sache für sich, sollte jedoch kein Grund sein, es in die Lage zu bringen. (GW 3, 992)

There is an element of admirable sublimity even in the most brutal form of self-sacrifice, but that does not make it desirable. Peace, on the other hand, is desirable. “Man könnte
es sich denken” – according to Mann’s colloquialism, the very act of imagining conditions of peace proves their possibility. Seen in such terms, war is an unnecessary evil endured for lack of devotion to the cause of human peace’s potential fulfillment as envisioned in “Schnee.” The apparent linearity of Castorp’s development through stages from sensuality to intellect to morality, from unconsciousness to awareness, and from will-less selflessness to will-imbued selfhood is deceptive. For underlying that linearity is the natural cyclicity of Schopenhauerian will – the dynamic undercurrent that provides sublime experience with its action of attraction and repulsion and threatens all achievements of repressive sublimation with uncanny disruption. The shape ultimately assumed by Castorp’s course of development is only apparently linear; in reality it is circular. By proceeding on a linear path beyond its attainment of a position of intellectual advancement in “Schnee” toward a state of absolute detachment à la Schopenhauer’s “nunc stans,” Castorp ironically appears to wind up in the unconscious state with which all life begins. Following his attainment of the morally sublime high ground of self-consciously determined will in “Schnee,” Hans gradually completes the cycle that returns him to an indeterminate state of raw sensuality and unconsciously mechanical willlessness – to the selfless sacrifice of war as the most violent form on a societal level of the return of the repressed. The Zauberberg thus seems to pose two alternatives with respect to human existence: the possibility of human peace achieved through continuous striving for the nonrepressive reconciliation of Eros and Thanatos or the certainty of periodic societal disintegration brought upon by the false security of their repressive control.
Conclusion: Neurotic Isolation and Social Sublimity.

The high point of Thomas Mann’s Der Zauberberg is Hans Castorp’s sublime vision in “Schnee.” His vision is the spiritual product of a deeply intimate coming to terms with his past experiences – experiences of death, sexual desire, and a will for self-destruction. The quest of Mann’s hero is thus a search for self-discovery – the pursuit of knowledge about a vague and obscure self that has been occluded from view and made intangible both by his own repressive tendency and that of the society he inhabits. Castorp’s quest for self-knowledge leads through a recurring cycle of intellectual curiosity and erotically disturbing or mortally terrifying discovery that terminates at each turn with a repressive act of self-concealment. Dreams play an integral role in that cyclical process, and it is noteworthy that the ultimate vision with which the process terminates is a “Gedankentraum” – the fusion, in short, of intellectual cogitation and sensual fantasy. Hans Castorp’s sublimely visionary achievement in “Schnee” is the product of a cyclical process of sublime quest and uncanny discovery that transports him beyond the constraints of societally supported self-preconception into an unconstrained natural environment whose vacillations between calm and tempestuosity correspond to the goings on in his soul.

There is a distinct correspondence in Mann’s Zauberberg between Hans Castorp’s internal impressions and the events of his external environment – a correspondence that one might very well term “Romantic.” Feelings of internal harmony and unity with nature punctuate Hans’s journey onto the sunny slopes of “Schnee” (GW 3, 660-61).
Internal discord and “Unklarheit” is the condition that accompanies his battle against nature’s blinding tempestuousness (GW 3, 669-70). Almost as if it were brought on by the optimistic clarity of the dreamer’s resolve, “‘gut Wetter’” is the climatological state that greets the victor over internal turmoil as he cheerfully awakens near the end of “Schnee” (GW 3, 686-87). The storm that confronts Castorp and the conditions of temporal clemency that greet him upon awakening in “Schnee” are symbolic of the transition from psychological turmoil to equanimity that characterizes his perception of the world that he inhabits. “Die Betrachtung (Reflexion) ist das erste liberale Verhältnis des Menschen zu dem Weltall, das ihn umgibt,” Schiller explains (SW 5, 651). Through the dream that my analysis designates as the culmination of Castorp’s reflective process of “Regieren,” Hans Castorp attains the stage of aesthetic development that puts him at the threshold of his educational task’s fulfillment. “Sobald es Licht wird in dem Menschen, ist auch außer ihm keine Nacht mehr; sobald es stille wird in ihm, legt sich auch der Sturm in dem Weltall, und die streitenden Kräfte der Natur finden Ruhe zwischen bleibenden Grenzen,” Schiller explains (SW 5, 652). Having traversed the aesthetic realms of sublime and uncanny experience, Hans Castorp achieves the aesthetically elevated plane of spiritual equanimity through the autonomously active performance of a spiritually reflective act of poetic reconciliation that symbolically reflects itself in a state of “Romantic” concord with his environment.
But if it momentarily appears as though “Die Welt wird Traum, der Traum wird Welt,” as presaged in Novalis’s Heinrich von Ofterdingen, the illusion is immediately shattered as the wisdom of Castorp’s “Schnee” vision vanishes into oblivion upon his return to the pampering of the sanatorium’s “hochzivilisierte Atmosphäre” (GW 3, 688). His environment clearly holds sway over Castorp’s sentiments, and not vice versa. The evident resurgence of childhood sexual desire brought upon by the seemingly miraculous reappearance of his former schoolyard companion in female form nearly makes it appear as if fantastic desire alone were capable of exerting a power of compulsion over the concrete world. Chauchat, however, comes and goes at her own will, and Castorp is forced to submit. Reality’s determination also of the sphere of the irrational is made patently obvious, in the end, by Castorp’s inability to withstand the infectious climate of pandemic rage that first pervades his human environment in “Gereiztheit” (GW 3, 948) and ultimately explodes with its “Donnerschlag” all former semblance of societal concord. However poetic its description of Castorp’s visionary creation of the “Traumgedicht” in “Schnee,” the realism of Mann’s novel crassly overcomes its own experimental tendency to romantic dream realization. Hans Castorp’s moment of insight is consequently left as an apostrophe to his development – a development whose stated objective’s lack of realization seems to lend its underlying vision of harmony the semblance of an unobtainable ideal rather than of a realistically practicable solution to the human predicament.

Despite his “Schnee” vision’s promise of the possibility of a better life, Hans Castorp’s fate seems determined instead by forces beyond his control. The process of Castorp’s uncanny submission to the prescriptive recommendations of a society to which he initially does not belong constitutes a subplot of such magnitude that it often appears to dominate the action from behind the scenes. A comprehensive examination of this process would be necessary to comprehend the full significance of Hans Castorp’s experience of the uncanny in the “Schnee” chapter – an examination that my present analysis has regrettably only been able to hint at. The correlation between Castorp’s “inner” and “outer” worlds is in any case significant enough to suggest the interconnectedness between social and psychological factors as described by the juxtaposition of psychological “Unbehagen” and societal processes in Freud’s Unbehagen in der Kultur – or of “Triebstruktur” and “Gesellschaft” in Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization. A comprehensive examination of Castorp’s integration into the Berghof society might employ such socio-psychological analyses as an effective interpretive tool describing the relationship between Hans’s social environment and his individual psychological experiences. Yet alongside the examination of his submission to externally prescribed societal dictates, the full implications of Castorp’s secret rebellion against that trend to submissiveness would also need to be examined. A close inspection of Mann’s narrative reveals the high degree to which Hans Castorp’s individual actions seem to be regulated by external forces beyond his control. An

attentive perusal of the text nonetheless also exposes his overwhelming helplessness against unconscious forces of tyranny that control him from within. It is the conjunction of these indomitable external and internal forces that produces the feelings of "Unbehagen" that vex and perplex the novel's protagonist from start to finish and subject him to a fate of seemingly inevitable outcome.

Against this fatalistic trend, an even closer reading of Mann's *Zauberberg* demonstrates its protagonist's effective resistance of those forces of conformity and unconscious submission that hold him in bondage. My dissertation explains how Hans Castorp's pursuit of the reflective activity he calls "Regieren" is his true motivation for prolonging his residence at the Berghof. That activity surely receives its secondary justification in a convalescent life style because of the freedom from a constrained bourgeois existence that such a way of life offers its performer. The contemplative pursuit that culminates with Castorp's vision in "Schnee" is a quest for independence - a factor accentuated by the externality from the human social environment of the spot by the brook in which he habitually performs it. Yet it is also in this extra-societal natural environment that the troubled meditator on the human paradox becomes aware of his otherness - of the fact that internally concealed, personal causes might be as much to blame for his feelings of uncanny disturbance as the objects in his surroundings that provoke them. The awareness that Castorp momentarily attains in "Schnee" is the product of a process of severing the bonds of repressive self-concealment by breaking out of the socially constrained environment in which those bonds are forged.
Hans Castorp’s creation of a “Traumgedicht vom Menschen” and reflectively sublime vision of humanity in “Schnee” is a reaction against the process of repressive societal integration that systematically robs him of his instinctual and spiritual liberty. His attraction to the spectacle of alpine grandeur, at first sublime, turns uncanny under the threat of unseen natural malevolence. Hans’s battle against the blizzard indirectly reveals the forces within him whose projective manifestations, as “Windsbraut” and “Macht der Versuchung,” constitute the opposed external/internal elements in a deadly conflict based on repression. Flight from reality and resistance to temptation form the pair of repressive acts that collaborate to place Castorp in a position of uncanny subjection. “L’étranger est en nous,” says Kristeva. “Et lorsque nous fuyons ou combattons l’étranger, nous luttons contre notre inconscient [. . .].” In counteraction of the trend that oneirically reveals itself as founded on his experiences at the Berghof, Castorp’s ensuing dream idyll and the dream of thoughts that succeeds it unite the elements of intellect and will, reality and pleasure, environment and self in a briefly sustained vision of social and psychological harmony that is distinctively nonrepressive. In reaction against the repressive sanatorium environment, Hans Castorp’s “Schnee” vision bears the distinctive mark of nonrepressive sublimation whose liberation from civilization’s burdens is not the goal, but merely the means to a higher form of civilization that replaces the negativity of repression with a positive valuation of the human totality.

---

289 Étrangers à nous-mêmes, 283.
Although Castorp’s vision ultimately formulates itself as a universal maxim, he never brings it to true realization within the Berghof social environment. The erotic and spiritual objectives of Castorp’s expedition into the wilderness of “Schnee” nonetheless find unified expression in that maxim through an act of synthesis bordering on nonrepressive sublimation. Of the latter, Marcuse explains: “If the antagonistic separation of the physical from the spiritual part of the organism is itself the historical result of repression, the overcoming of this antagonism would open the spiritual sphere to the impulse.”

It is just such a conjunction of sensual and spiritual impulses that Castorp beholds in his dream idyll’s “Sonnenleute,” who are both “‘wohlgestalt’ ” and “‘klug und liebenswürdig von innen heraus’ ” (GW 3, 680). The “unaussprechlicher geistiger Einfluß undüsteren Ernstes, verständiger Frömmigkeit” that pervades the actions of Hans’s “Sonnenleute” (GW 3, 680-81) is the nonrepressive model from which Castorp takes the inspiration for his imperative: “‘Der Mensch soll um der Güte und Liebe willen dem Tode keine Herrschaft einräumen über seine Gedanken’ ” (GW 3, 686). Although his imperative places human activity in hypotactic service to “goodness and love,” the paratactic combination of the latter pair of terms – one moral, one sensual – seems to preclude the possibility of one’s repression by the other. Castorp’s imperative formulates itself as a nonrepressive expression of good will in direct contradiction of the subordination of sensuality to the moral dictates of reason that characterizes Kant’s “kategorischer Imperativ.”

Yet Hans not only fails to impart the wisdom of his vision

---

300 Marcuse, 210.

301 People have “keine Neigung” to “Handlungen,” Kant explains, “die wirklich pflichtmäßig sind.” Lack of inclination, in fact, is for Kant the sign of a truly moral action. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der
to his fellow sufferers at the sanatorium; in forgetting it, he also forfeits its liberating potential for himself. The sublimated wedding of Eros with reason inspired by Hans Castorp's dream of societal harmony never brings itself to bear upon the visionary's interpersonal conduct and consequently fails to satisfy the stipulation of truly sublimated Eros.

For it is only through this sublimated wedding of the sensual and the supersensual in actuality – not just in dream – that a truly symbiotic relationship between individual desire and societal law establishes itself as reality. The achievement of such a harmonious relationship is one of the primary aims of aesthetic education: the reestablishment of "die Einheit der menschlichen Natur" that appears to Schiller to have been fully suspended by the "ursprüngliche und radikale Entgegensetzung" of "der sinnliche Trieb" and the "Formtrieb" (SW 5, 607). Castorp's imperative for humanity takes its impetus from his Arcadian vision's reconciliation of the contrary human principles, thus repeating the process of retrospectively taking as one's model a perceived original state of harmony (cf. SW 5, 651-52) that, in Schiller's scheme, serves the goal of aesthetic education. The appearance of this highly poetically infused Arcadian pattern

---


302 Schiller the moralist was attracted by Kant's dualistic System. Schiller the poet had to regain the unity of human nature and of the human world. But it was not in Schiller's nature simply to throw away Kantianism and philosophy. He had to achieve the conquest of the realm of poetry by philosophy and so to outstrip Kant by Kant's own instruments." Katharine Everett Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn, *A History of Esthetics* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1954) 360.

303 Aside from putting "his theory to work as a means of tackling and conquering the human problems laid bare by the French Revolution," the aim of Schiller's *Aesthetische Briefe* "was to demonstrate that aesthetic experience was the defining mode of human existence, the harmonizing, catalytic moment between the physical and the moral, where the individual begins the process of restoring his wholeness."
of inspiration at the high point of Mann's novel seems to make its educational connotations clear by definition. That in Castorp's case that unity's attainment is the stuff of dreams designates it as a yet unattained goal, a utopian vision, or — to speak in Schiller's terms — a kind of "Staat des schönen Scheins." It seems clear that Castorp's dream in "Schnee" points the way in the direction of true education. It therefore also seems that the educational goal indicated by Thomas Mann's Der Zauberberg as "Bildungsroman" lies in the realm of the yet unattained, of a future beauty to come, the wonderous utopian dream of a better life achieved through a sensually and spiritually inclusive aestheticism. The forward-looking aestheticism of Castorp's vision opposes itself to the physical and intellectual deprivations of his ascetic and asthenic existence — of comfortably subsisting in a repressively stagnant environment that offers little opportunity for emotional and spiritual growth. Yet without some additional means for its practical implementation, Hans's dream-bound unification of the sensual and supersensual nonetheless restricts itself to the realm of the merely possible, thus betraying the educational goal for which it strives.

Castorp's vision has educational meaning as aesthetic achievement. The significance of the aesthetic act per se lies in its revelation of the possibility of reconciling the irreconcilable human faculties of intellect and will — or, as Schiller says, the "Unvereinbarkeit" of thought and feeling (SW 5, 654).

Nicholas Martin, Nietzsche and Schiller: Un timely Aesthetics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996) 100. The ancients were educated according to the "Ideal menschlicher Schönheit." Über Anmut und Würde, SW 5, 481. Nature should not rule over the human exclusively and reason should not rule over him conditionally. "Beide Gesetzgebungen sollen vollkommen unabhängig voneinander bestehen und dennoch vollkommen einig sein." Ästhetische Briefe, SW 5, 651.
Da nun aber bei dem Genuß der Schönheit oder der ästhetischen Einheit eine wirkliche Vereinigung und Auswechslung der Materie mit der Form und des Leidens mit der Tätigkeit vor sich geht, so ist eben dadurch die Vereinbarkeit beider Naturen, die Ausführbarkeit des Unendlichen in der Endlichkeit, mithin die Möglichkeit der erhabensten Menschheit bewiesen. (SW 5, 654)

The aesthetically pleasing experience brought to Castorp by his “Traumgedicht vom Menschen” (GW 3, 685) brings him to reflect on the possibility of a more sublime form of humanity. There is the quality of aesthetic education in the dream vision that guides Castorp toward the formulation of his human imperative – a quality that arises out of a spirit of resistance to the pathological predicament in which his sanatorium experiences have placed him.

Hans Castorp’s symbolic ascent from bourgeois status to the spiritually elevated level of an “abstract” sanatorium existence forms the developmental background from which his aesthetically educational experiences in the “Schnee” section set themselves radically apart. Weigand is perhaps the foremost representative of a prevalent trend in Zauberberg criticism that tends to confound Hans Castorp’s pathological experiences with the educational insights and achievements that constitute the novel’s portrayal of a process of “Bildung.” Castorp has thus “been awakened, stimulated, released to a plane of intellectual and emotional intensity compared with which his former life in the ‘Flachland’ appears as a vegetative existence” – a process of awakening that is “partly the work of disease.”

304 Weigand, 46.
Hans’s entry into the society of the pathologically afflicted also appears to have a highly symbolic quality attached to it. Castorp’s adaptation to a convalescent existence is also a transition to a life of abstraction. However enlightening, Hans Castorp’s process of spiritual uplifting into a state of detachment from everyday bourgeois affairs is predicated upon an assumed pathological condition. Like that condition, it is implicitly in need of a corrective or cure.

There is a distinct irony in Mann’s intermingling of Castorp’s pathological condition with the reflective activity of “Regieren” that takes him beyond that condition in search of remedy. With his ultimate entry into the patients’ ranks and renunciation of a “normal” life of activity, Castorp enters into the realm of pure objectivity. He no longer has Chauchat to gaze at, but merely her image: her “inneres Schattenbild” (GW 3, 486). The function of such a “photographische Aufnahme” is to make matters objectively clear (“den Sachverhalt objektiv klarstellen”) (GW 3, 261). In the novel’s first half, “Das Objektiv hatte in [Hans Castorp’s] Inneres geblickt” (GW 3, 302). In the novel’s second half, Chauchat’s roentgenogram provides Hans with objective scrutiny of her innermost being – a condition symbolic of objectified will, perhaps? Castorp’s reflective activities in the second half of Mann’s novel represent the elevation of his prior physical experiences to the level of abstraction (see above, p.63). The sensation of “Freiheit” mixed with “Schrecken[]” that accompanies Castorp’s seventh-week epistolary declaration of a prospective extended period of convalescence (GW 3, 314-15) yields in the novel’s second half to “die vollendete Freiheit, vor welcher [Castorp’s] Herz nachgerade nicht mehr erbebte” (GW 3, 608). The transition from feeling to thought
provides a sense of autonomy. "Aus dem Sklaven der Natur, solang er sie bloß empfindet, wird der Mensch ihr Gesetzgeber, sobald er sie denkt," says Schiller (SW 5, 652). The concrete sensations of being in love that preoccupy Castorp in the novel's first half yield in its second half to his reflective activity's preoccupation with the human problem on an abstract level. The practice of reflective contemplation that both exemplifies Hans Castorp's transition into the world of abstraction and provides the greatest promise for a remedy to his persistent turmoil is clandestinely attached to the natural sphere from which it is abstracted. At the heart of Castorp's attraction to the sublime - overwritten with its overt striving for rational mastery - lies a repressed irrational impulse for return to nature, replete with both its expectations of libidinal fulfillment and all of its terrible might.

Castorp's aesthetic encounters of the sublime and the uncanny display an aesthetic need for finding oneself in relationship to one's outside world - a need that forms the primary strain in his process of education. Castorp's entry into the realm of abstract thought is attendant upon the repression of fears and desires - a process of loss of self that forms one of the primary leitmotifs of Mann's novel and provides a counterargument to the peril inherent in Castorp's diseased condition. Similar to Castorp's entry into the world of abstraction, a tendency to radical departure from reality also forms the prevailingly romantic element in Schopenhauer's philosophy - his recognition of "die Aufhebung der Individuation" as "höchstes Ziel." In pure subjective contemplation, Schopenhauer states, one devotes "die ganze Macht seines Geistes" to the act of beholding the object of contemplation, "indem man, nach einer sinnvollen
deutschen Redensart, sich gänzlich in diesen Gegenstand verliert, d. h. sein Individuum, seinen Willen vergißt, und nur noch als reines Subject, als klarer Spiegel des Objekts bestehen bleibt" (WWV 1, 244). For Schopenhauer, pure contemplation is contingent upon the dissolution of temporality’s bonds, through which the subject gets lost in the act of lending its attention fully to the contemplated object (WWV 1, 266).

Such disinterested contemplation – the foundation of the Kantian and Schopenhauerian notions of beauty\(^\text{305}\) – is for Schopenhauer the basis of both artistic and philosophical “Erkenntniß” (WWV 1, 361). It is precisely against such estrangement from life and loss of self that Settembrini admonishes Castorp in “Ewigkeitssuppe und plötzliche Klarheit,” objecting that Hans’s complaint against life’s cruelty “‘zeugt von einer gewissen Entfremdung, die ich ungern anwachsen sehen würde, denn wer sich gewöhnt, ihn zu erheben, kann ganz leicht dem Leben, der Lebensform, für die er geboren ist, verlorengehen. Wissen Sie, Ingenieur, was das heißt: “Dem Leben verlorengehen?” ‘” (GW 3, 278). Settembrini’s complaint is like that of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra: “Und so ist es immer schwacher Menschen Art: sie verlieren sich auf ihren Wegen. Und zuletzt fragt noch ihre Müdigkeit: ‘wozu gingen wir jemals Wege! Es ist Alles gleich!’ ” (KSA 4, 258). Like loss of self, indifference is another prominent leitmotif in Mann’s novel that has escaped the attention of the critics. It expresses itself primarily in the Berghof patients’ universally adopted gesture of shoulder shrugging (GW 3, 320-21) – a recently acquired habit for Joachim (GW 3, 17; 19; 25) that Castorp also adopts into his own behavior (GW 3, 104; 124; 197-98). His abstract existence’s progressive indifference,

\(^{305}\)Cf. Donoghue, 72-74.
estrangement from life, and loss of self constitute the historical background for Castorp’s aesthetic educational need to confront the sublime and the uncanny in the natural domain of “Schnee.”

Mann’s ironically concealed view in Der Zauberberg seems to be that the true goal of education is not knowledge about life, but only the value that such knowledge may provide for the enrichment of living. The enlightenment of aesthetic or metaphysical vision is not the goal, but only the means. There is distinctive benefit in philosophical abstraction, as Schiller concedes: “[. . .] jedem Schrecknis der Natur ist der Mensch überlegen, sobald er ihm Form zu geben und es in sein Objekt zu verwandeln weiß” (SW 5, 652). Immediate transition to the realm of the pure object nonetheless gives rise to other requirements:


An all-too-powerful objectification of one’s desires and fears – might that, as Schiller suggests, result from giving too much free rein to one’s imagination? If that were so, then imagination might be said to play a role in the act of repression through which such
objectification takes place. As I examined in the above subchapter on “Pathetic Fallacy, Animism, and the Uncanny,” an unbridled imagination characterizes Hans Castorp’s perceptions of his natural environment as imbued with supernatural power – an imagination that takes its impetus from the return of the repressed. If imagination played a role in both the counter-instinctual act of repression and the counter-repressive release of instinctual energy that form the cause-and-effect halves of the individual’s disturbance by feelings of the uncanny, then prevention of the condition might be found in a state of imaginative balance between instinct and reason. Schiller’s aesthetics calls for such a state of balance with a concept of beauty that, as “Werk der freien Betrachtung,” transports one into the “Welt der Ideen” – without, however, abandoning “die sinnliche Welt” (SW 5, 653). Hans Castorp’s reclusive sanatorium existence, a life “nicht mehr in der Welt” (GW 3, 25), makes his obedience of an imperative of return to nature inevitable – and the manner with which he effects that return a matter of life and death.

For it is his desertion of the world, his estrangement from nature, that provides Castorp’s abstract mission of higher learning with its true symbolic meaning. Hans Castorp represents modern humanity in its predicament of having advanced to a state of knowledge that simultaneously places it at the furthest remove from its native origins. As just observed, the transition to absolute abstraction is unnatural: “Ein solcher Sprung ist nicht in der menschlichen Natur.” Although placing his emphasis on the psychological (rather than epistemological) considerations that underly the process of human advancement, Nietzsche makes an observation very similar to that of Schiller. Through a process (the “Verinnerlichung des Menschen”) of reflecting the aggressive drives back
upon oneself, the human individual becomes the subject of its own inhibited drives and develops a “bad conscience” (KSA 5, 323).

Mit [dem schlechten Gewissen] aber war die grösste und unheimlichste Erkrankung eingeleitet, von welcher die Menschheit bis heute nicht genesen ist, das Leiden des Menschen am Menschen, an sich: als die Folge einer gewaltsamen Abtrennung von der thierischen Vergangenheit, eines Sprunges und Sturzes gleichsam in neue Lagen und Daseins-Bedingungen, einer Kriegserklärung gegen die alten Instinkte, auf denen bis dahin seine Kraft, Lust und Furchtbarkeit beruhte. (KSA 5, 323)

It is as a result of such a division from the originally natural state that an unprecedented “Elends-Gefühl” or “bleiernes Missbehagen” prevails over the modern human temperament (KSA 5, 322). The modern human being is “das kranke Thier” and “der grosse Experimentator mit sich, der Unbefriedigte, Ungesättigte” (KSA 5, 366-67). It is certainly for related considerations that Settembrini warns Castor against the dangers of experimentation (“Placet expiriri”): both in reaction to Hans’s supposition that illness must make people “‘fein und klug und besonders’ ” and to his subsequent purchase of a blanket with which to participate in the activities of the convalescent (GW 3, 138-39; 143). The diagnosis of a universal pathological condition similar to that made by Nietzsche dominates the theoretical outlook and practical procedures of the Berghof medical staff in Mann’s Der Zauberberg. Krokowski thus claims that he has never encountered “‘ein ganz gesunder Mensch’ ” (GW 3, 29-30) and doubts, “‘daß “Mensch” und “vollkommene Gesundheit” überhaupt Reimworte seien’ ” (GW 3, 268). Although
the reader is given a very limited glimpse of his general procedure, Behrens's evident practice of pronouncing every visitor "‘total anämisch!’" (GW 3, 69; 600) seems to testify to his adherence to Krokowski's view. Castorp's entry into convalescence is consequently representative of his participation in the human condition—a condition that, since it is portrayed as ailing, is implicitly in need of healing. "Unser Gefühl für Natur gleicht der Empfindung des Kranken für die Gesundheit," says Schiller (SW 5, 711). Modern humanity's estrangement from nature is the condition that Schiller and Nietzsche's respective analyses designate as the cause of a pathological condition necessitating humanity's return in the direction of natural balance. It is this human imperative of natural return that Hans Castorp's predicament portrays in Der Zauberberg—an imperative for which it demonstrates the possibility of a salubrious outcome whose lack of fulfillment seems to prepare the way for the deleterious consequences with which the novel concludes.

As if in emphasis of the necessity of natural return that psychologically underpins the protagonist's actions, Thomas Mann's seven-year tale of Hans Castorp possesses the narrative frame and cyclical structure typical of the "Rahmenerzählung." The same circularity of structure also informs the plot. Hans Castorp departs the lowlands of Hamburg at the beginning of the Zauberberg's first chapter (GW 3, 11), and toward the end of its final chapter he joins the universal head-over-heels descent that returns him to the "Flachland" (GW 3, 989). Nietzsche's notion of the eternal recurrence gives expression to a law of both natural and psychological circularity similar to that which

---

finds structural representation in the plot of Mann’s novel. Zarathustra urges: “ihr Ewigen, liebt [die Welt] ewig und allezeit: und auch zum Weh spricht ihr: vergeh, aber komm zurück! Denn alle Lust will – Ewigkeit!” (KSA 4, 403). At once an exhortation to Amor fati, or love of fate, his invocation takes as given the cyclicality of pleasure and pain – of human suffering and happiness. The capacity to love life’s ups and downs is for Nietzsche the route to higher human happiness through acceptance of the “ewige Wiederkunft” of “Dasein” (KSA 6, 345) – the law of cyclicality that Nietzsche exalts as the “höchste Formel der Bejahung, die überhaupt erreicht werden kann” (KSA 6, 335). To be elevated to a position “beyond good and evil” requires a distance of vision that implies nonrepressive mastery – through acceptance – over the vacillations of one’s passions. For Nietzsche, the master “is [clearly] not the master of the slave, but the master of himself, his acts, and, above all, his ‘inward chaos.’ The master is the individual who gives himself his own law, and whose ethic is built on pure self-affirmation.”

Hans Castorp never attains to a position of self-mastery, but when he rises as lawgiver above the “inward chaos” of his cyclical turmoil in “Schnee,” he seems more than anything else to indicate the human potential for achieving the goal that slips beyond his grasp. The imperative that Hans Castorp forges in sublime overcoming of his uncanny predicament seems to offer him the opportunity – if not to avert the all-too-human compulsion of eternal recurrence (for to do so would be impossible) – at least momentarily to rise above it and use it to his advantage.

---

The “Traumgedicht vom Menschen” that lends the inspiration to his imperative is itself the product of Castorp’s unconscious need to return to nature. The reflective activity of “Regieren” that repeatedly draws him to the spot by the brook has unconscious motivations in repressed Eros. The same need underlies Hans’s rapid mastery of the fundamentals of skiing in “Schnee.” “Hans Castorp erfuhr, daß man eine Fertigkeit rasch gewinnt, deren man innerlich bedürftig ist” (GW 3, 656). From the context it is clear that Hans’s internal need is “aesthetic” in the sense of “having to do with pure emotion and sensation.” Castorp thus finds as he skis that a “heimlich-heiliger Schrecken sein Gemüt beherrscht hatte” – a sensation that recalls his infantile “Begeisterungsglück leichter Liebesberührungen mit Mächten, deren volle Umarmung vernichtend sein würde” (GW 3, 658). Hans is drawn to nature for considerations in aesthetic sensation that are similar to the “Art von Liebe und von rührender Achtung” that, as Schiller explains, one frequently devotes to natural objects (SW 5, 694). The individual human being seems to be subject to a need for recurring natural contact. Schiller’s aesthetic imperative of a return to physical nature (“zu der Sinnenwelt wieder umkehren müssen”) is an attempt to keep pace with an innate human psychological requirement (see above, p.291). Beyond its sensual desire for natural “Glückseligkeit,” Hans’s return to nature also takes its unconscious motivation from a moral desire for natural “Vollkommenheit” (see above, p.52). The death-defiant, consciously lucid moral pronouncement that triumphantly completes Hans Castorp’s adventure in “Schnee” is the product of a

---

coming-to-awareness of innate natural desires through the personal aesthetic experience of a return to nature.

Castorp’s return to nature in “Schnee” depicts his achievement through personal aesthetic experience of a sublimated view of himself and the world that he lives in. Through its lucidity of outlook, his sublimated view fulfills the stipulations in “Erkenntnisvermögen” of the mathematically sublime.309 Through its defiance of death, does it not also fulfill the requirements in “Begehren-vermögen” of the dynamically sublime?310 As indicated at the end of the preceding chapter, Hans’s experiences in “Schnee” directly oppose themselves to the other scene of return to nature with which the novel concludes. The differentiation of the subchapters is subtle, and one could easily be led by their similarities to conclude – as many have done – that Hans Castorp’s return to the flatlands at the end of the novel represents his return to life. To do that, however, is to lose sight of the educational goal of Mann’s novel as “Bildungsroman.” The depiction of Castorp’s battle against a blizzard in “Schnee” and the battle scene into which he vanishes in “Der Donnerschlag” appear to rely on the classically recognizable imagery of the sublime with which to describe the internal conflict of the protagonist engulfed in both tempests. Through the combination of its magnitude and might, the motif of the storm is the symbol par excellence of the dual aspects of the mathematically and dynamically sublime. Using the sublime as a measuring rod, what might one immediately conclude when comparing the scenes of the snowstorm and thunderstorm that consume the Zauberberg protagonist? While Hans Castorp emerges in triumphant

defiance from the blizzard in “Schnee,” he disappears in obedient servitude to the tempestuous call to battle in “Der Donnerschlag.” Where earlier he emerges sublimely into the light fighting courageously for his life, in the end Hans Castorp disappears into obscurity fighting frightenedly in response to a distant command to patriotic service.

What meaning does Mann intend with his repeated employment of the imagery of the sublime in the very similar – yet fundamentally different – scenes of tempestuous struggle in “Schnee” and “Der Donnerschlag”? Perhaps the best answer lies in the unique “Bildungsroman” character of the “Schnee” subchapter. In that section, the hero of the struggle rises victoriously from the tragic circumstances of his own fate – but only after his near-fatal surrender to the tempest that blinds and demoralizes him. In “Der Donnerschlag,” the reader takes leave of Mann’s hero at the point where he seems once again to be succumbing to the demoralizing effects of the tempest that engulfs him. Both scenes contain comparable elements of heroic struggle, tragedy, and the sublime. If “Schnee” and “Der Donnerschlag” are portrayals of the struggle between the aesthetic subject and natural might that form the basic of the tension in the dynamically sublime, then how do they differ?

The perspectives through which they are seen differentiate the dynamically sublime contests between overwhelming natural forces and the power of individual resistance that provide dramatic tension to “Schnee” and “Der Donnerschlag.” As readers we view Castorp’s battle against the blizzard in the “Schnee” section fully through the protagonist’s eyes – from an attitude of aesthetic involvement. In “Der

\[\text{Cf. Kritik der Urteilskraft, 168.}\]
Donnerschlag” we are lifted above the field of battle – maybe a bit like the dreamer in
“Schnee” peers down on an Arcadian landscape (GW 3, 678-79) – to view the transpiring
events from an attitude of aesthetic detachment. Early on I have noted Freud’s
distinction between the uncanny, “das man erlebt,” and the uncanny, “das man sich bloß
vorstellt, oder von dem manliest” (see above, p.20). The same fundamental distinction
between subjectively experienced and objectively observed or imagined events would
seem also to apply to the aesthetics of the sublime. Hans utters the word “ich” 58 times
during the soliloquy he maintains throughout his excursion in “Schnee” (GW 3, 656-87);
the word “wir” occurs 15 times in the narrator’s dialogue with the reader during the battle
scene of “Der Donnerschlag” (GW 3, 990-94).311 The contrast underscores the
consideration that Castorp is the aesthetic subject of the former experience, while the
narrator and reader are the collective aesthetic subjects of the “experience” at the novel’s
conclusion. Hans Castorp’s sublime and uncanny experiences in “Schnee” – his
dynamically sublime struggle – are portrayed from the subjective viewpoint of the
struggling skier. If we see the same thematically repeated struggle in “Der
Donnerschlag” no longer through Hans Castorp’s eyes, but as onlookers, it is because we,
as readers, have overtaken from Mann’s protagonist the subjective role of experiencing
the contest ourselves.

At the conclusion of Mann’s “Bildungsroman,” the reader thus inherits Hans
Castorp’s subjective task of learning through experience – a task that my analysis has
portrayed as an aesthetically heightened passage through the domain of sublime and

---
311 Francis Bulhof, *Wortindex zu Thomas Mann: Der Zauberberg.* (Ann Arbor: Xerox U
uncanny experience. Scharfschwerdt’s earlier mentioned claim – “Der Leser soll also unter der Regie des Erzählers die Entwicklung fortsetzen, die Hans Castorp begonnen hat” (see above, p.38) – would appear to be vindicated. The overriding theme of Hans Castorp’s sensual/spiritual adventure on the “Magic Mountain” presents itself on a manifest level as pathological suffering, but it is easy to see that the latent meaning of his tribulations is the modern individual’s placement in a position of powerlessness against forces beyond his or her control. Thomas Mann’s masterful employment of a motif of passivity linguistically interpenetrates the entire Berghof environment in such themes as that of the “Patient,” “Passion,” “Pathologie,” “Leiden,” and “Leidenschaft.”

Mann’s adeptness at clarifying the predicament through ironic exaggeration leads Weigand to quip that he has “known more than one reader to take up the book and lay it down again, for fear of contracting tuberculosis through suggestion.” Mann’s profound emphasis of the theme of suffering makes passivity itself the great challenge confronting the modern individual in the struggle to gain a sense of control against the apparent insuperability of contemporary events. It also seems to foreground the theme of pathos, or the pathetic, that constitutes one of the cardinal elements of the dynamically sublime. At the

---


313 Weigand, 39.
beginning of Über das Pathetische, Schiller draws upon Kant’s theory of the dynamically sublime in an attempt to provide meaning to art’s portrayal of suffering:

Darstellung des Leidens – als bloßen Leidens – ist niemals Zweck der Kunst, aber als Mittel zu ihrem Zweck ist sie derselben äußerst wichtig. Der letzte Zweck der Kunst ist die Darstellung des Übersinnlichen, und die tragische Kunst insbesondere bewerkstelligt dieses dadurch, daß sie uns die moralische Independenz von Naturgesetzen im Zustand des Affekts versinnlicht. (SW 5, 512)

The suffering of the tragic hero, Schiller is evidently saying, is not the purpose of art; it is the means through which art provides us as spectators with a sense of purpose. The spectacle of ultimate succumbing in a tragedy’s portrayal of dynamically sublime struggle nonetheless empowers the spectator with a sense of independence:

Nur der Widerstand, den es gegen die Gewalt der Gefühle äußert, macht das freie Prinzip in uns kenntlich; der Widerstand aber kann nur nach der Stärke des Angriffs geschätzt werden. Soll sich also die Intelligenz im Menschen als eine von der Natur unabhängige Kraft offenbaren, so muß die Natur ihre ganze Macht erst vor unseren Augen bewiesen haben. Das Sinnenwesen muß tief und heftig leiden; Pathos muß da sein, damit das Vernunftwesen seine Unabhängigkeit kundtun und sich handelnd darstellen könne. (SW 5, 512)

Schiller delicately contrasts the positions of what is portrayed and who beholds the portrayal, the physical sufferer on stage and the intellectually active comprehender of portrayed suffering who sits in the audience. The aesthetic subject of the sublime experience that constitutes a tragic performance is thus the performance’s spectator.
Mann's narrator reveals the aesthetic subject at the end of his *Zauberberg* as the novel's reader. The reader that inherits Hans Castorp's subjective task of learning through experience is thus confronted in dramatically sublime terms with the spectacle of the protagonist's submission to forces beyond his control.

As many do, one could certainly find meaning in Castorp's efforts on the battlefield as the expression of a sacrifice to a future ideal. Such an interpretation nonetheless fails to do justice to the objectively callous manner in which the scene is portrayed and the narrator's instillation of it with a subjective sentiment of outright repulsion. The scene becomes meaningful from the perspective of the sublime through the spirit of independence from Castorp's fate that the events' placement in the past lends to the reader. The educational challenge that Mann's novel subsequently appears to pose to its reader is the problem of the relationship between passivity and war and, more importantly, how that problem may be actively overcome.

Although it prescribes no solution to the seemingly insurmountable problem with which it confronts the reader, through its clinically discerning depiction of the psychological factors that inform Hans Castorp's dilemma, Mann's novel seems to make a significant suggestion. Castorp's ultimate radical estrangement from reality — his retreat into a state of mental isolation — corresponds to his joining the universal charge into a war in which he takes absolutely no interest other than that through which his patriotic loyalties bind him. In an aphorism of the *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* entitled "Der Wille zum Leiden und die Mitteidigen," Nietzsche examines the above-mentioned relationship between passivity (or suffering) and war. After critically examining the
usefulness to both sides in any given relationship between altruist and sufferer, Nietzsche makes a subtle but significant distinction between the conscience ("Gewissen") of the individual and that of the group:


Nietzsche seems to be saying that one’s duty to the group often becomes a convenient pretext for abandoning one’s moral obligation to oneself. Mann also calls attention to the problem of the relationship between the individual conscience and duty to the group when he has Naphta claim (in "Als Soldat und brav") that the individual frees himself of the burden of conscience in service to the organization: “Die Idee des Bundes überhaupt ist untrennbar und schon in der Wurzel verbunden mit der des Unbedingten. Folglich ist sie terroristisch, das heißt: antiliberal. Sie entlastet das individuelle Gewissen und heiligt im Namen des absoluten Zweckes jedes Mittel, auch das blutige, auch das Verbrechen’” (GW 3, 703). When one surrenders completely one’s individual conscience to that of the group, one becomes capable of acts that directly contradict the notion of respect both for oneself and for one’s fellow human being. The absolute selflessness of the chauvinist’s devotion to country begins to express itself as selfish disrespect for human values, and the most extreme morality takes on the uncanny aspect of the immoral. Mann’s
statements in his 1939 essay, *Dieser Krieg*, show the same emphatic valuation of fidelity to self that distinguishes Nietzsche’s comments in *Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft*:

Ein wie törichter, wie verblendeter Affekt ist doch der Neid der menschlichen Wesen und auch der Völker auf einander! Ein jedes hat das Leben zu bestehen, sein Schicksal zu erfüllen, unbewußt seinen Charakter in dieser Erfüllung darzustellen, und das Geschäft ist für jedes schwer und sorgenvoll genug, trotz allem Genuß, den die Bewährung und Auslebung des Ich im Schicksal bereitet, und der schlechthin der Genuß des Lebens ist. *(Essays 5, 101)*

In order for the bond between individual and society to preserve its mutually beneficial moral character, a means needs to be learned to bring the needs and obligations of the individual and the requirements and demands of society into a state of balance.

For it is only when one attempts to overcome one’s personal trials on one’s own that true happiness is obtained – thus would read the message of individual self-reliance expressly contained in Nietzsche and evident in Mann. Both authors attribute emotional reward to the pursuit of the goal of one’s personal fate. To the adherents of a morality based on pity, Nietzsche exclaims: “Ach, wie wenig wisst ihr vom Glücke des Menschen, ihr Behaglichen und Gutmütigen! – denn Glück und Unglück sind zwei Geschwister und Zwillinge, die mit einander gross wachsen, oder, wie bei euch, mit einander – klein bleiben!” *(KSA 3, 567).* Castorp envisions life in “Der große Stumpfsinn” as a “Leben ohne Zeit, das sorg- und hoffnungslose Leben, das Leben als stagnierende betriebsame Liederlichkeit, das tote Leben” *(GW 3, 872).* Does he not admit to the sort of discontentedness in submission to a manner of living free of life’s tensions bewailed by
Nietzsche? The doctrine of self-reliance proposed by Nietzsche and Mann seems to proclaim that true satisfaction can only be gained at the cost of personal striving. Mann also links the twin Nietzschean values of “Glück und Unglück” to individual perseverance. He explains above that the task of fulfilling one’s fate is difficult enough, “trotz allem Genuß, den die Bewährung und Auslebung des Ich im Schicksal bereitet.” What is more, he states that this egoistic attitude toward fate is “schlechthin der Genuß des Lebens.” Nietzsche might have been speaking of Hans Castorp in “Schnee” when he says in the same aphorism on “Der Wille zum Leiden” that “der Pfad zum eigenen Himmel immer durch die Wollust der eigenen Hölle geht” (KSA 3, 566). Is it perhaps because of its treatment of themes similar to those that occur in a “Bildungsroman” concluding with the outbreak of war that Thomas Mann “jenen Aphorismus in Nietzsches Fröhlicher Wissenschaft angekreuzt hat”? In their criticisms of the value of pity and envy in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft and Dieser Krieg, Nietzsche and Mann raise to the level of an aesthetic ideal the individual’s achievement of pleasure and happiness through personal exertion in the fulfillment of his or her individual fate as distinct from that of the group.

When one compares Nietzsche’s aphorism with events in Der Zauberberg, one comes to the conclusion that the same idealized vision of the individual’s personal

---

\[314\] Mann continues his criticism of envy in Dieser Krieg by exposing the vanity, judgemental frailty, and presumptuousness exhibited in the attempt to found one’s pleasure on the fulfillment of envious intentions: “Wie ungeschickt, sich den Lebensgenuß zu vergleichen, indem man das natürliche Staunen über Eigenschaften, die fremder Lebensbewältigung zugehören, zur Mißgunst werden läßt – auf eine Charakterrolle, die jemand anderem aufgetragen und die dieser andere, eben weil es die seine ist, nach ihrem Range im Weltenspiel wohl garnicht überschätzt, auch wenig geneigt ist, sich ihrer zu überheben.” Essays 5,101.

\[315\] Joseph, Nietzsche im “Zauberberg,” 182.
mission in life is also of vital importance to that individual’s survival. Hans Castorp’s above-noted estrangement from his environment also manifests itself as a personal ignorance of his own age. As the narrator explains: “Niemand bestreitet nun freilich, daß Hans Castorp, wenn er gewollt hätte, ohne wirkliche Schwierigkeit aus dem Ungewissen sich rechnerisch hätte ins klare setzen können [. . .]” (GW 3, 751). Hans’s self-forgetfulness is an act of will. For such a will, says the narrator, is not to be found in Hans Castorp:

Was Hans Castorp betraf, so war ihm vielleicht nicht gerade besonders wohl darin, allein irgendwelche Anstrengung, sich der Verschwommenheit und Versponnenheit zu entringen und sich klarzumachen, wie alt er hier schon geworden sei, ließ er sich’s auch nicht kosten; und die Scheu, die ihn daran hinderte, war eine Scheu seines Gewissens, – obgleich es doch offenbar die schlimmste Gewissenlosigkeit ist, der Zeit nicht zu achten. (GW 3, 751-52)

Is Castorp’s lack of self-regard not an abdication of his personal responsibility to himself? Mann’s text thematically links Hans Castorp’s abdication of self-responsibility to a process of yielding to the suicidal tendencies that constitute his human environment. The connection between this pervasive suicidal undercurrent and the outbreak of war at the novel’s conclusion is one of the cardinal themes of Mann’s novel, and it is surprising that the Zauberberg’s critics usually disregard even the barest mention of it. Dettmering comes closest with his analysis of Castorp’s relationship to his suicidal rival, Pieter Peepenkorn.316 Dettmering also observes that the war landscape at the end of Mann’s

316Dettmering, 32-42.
novel has “analsadistische[r] Charakter” and corresponds to Castorp’s “regredierte[r] Zustand[,]” also noting that “regnerische Dunkelheit, schwermütige Stimmung und todesnahe Musik geben diesen letzten Passagen [. . .] ein suiizidgerichtetes Gefälle.”

His short analysis nonetheless fails to address the suicidal trends that almost pervade the “Zauberberg” atmosphere. Herr Albin’s suicidal antics during the first full day of Hans’s visit to the sanatorium inspire the Hamburg visitor to imagine himself in a similar position, for example. Hans experiences a “Gefühl von wütster Süssigkeit” as he imagines what it would be like, “wenn man endgültig des Druckes der Ehre ledig war und auf immer die bodenlosen Vorteile der Schande genoß” (GW 3, 116). The notion of taking one’s own life is evidently at the forefront of Castorp’s thoughts. Hans knows what has transpired with Peeperkorn even before being informed of the Dutchman’s suicidal act, being “in Ungewißheit mehr über das Wie als über das Was der Stunde” (GW 3, 864).

Naphta’s act of shooting himself in the head during a duel thematically links the themes of self-immolation and the kind of outward aggression that also finds expression in war; the critics nonetheless universally fail to give the consideration any comment. They also disregard Castorp’s eventual conformity to the patients’ universally observed impractical and inherently unhealthy practice of leaving their heads bare when venturing out of doors: “denn seit er Profeß getan, hatte Hans Castorp sich in Gottes Namen der herrschenden Sitte anbequemt, ohne Hut zu gehen, so sicher er sich anfangs, diesem Brauch gegenüber, seiner Lebensform und Gesittung gefühlt hatte [. . .]” (GW 3, 327).

Nor has anyone ever adequately treated the significantly related motifs of

---

317Dettmering, 38.
autointoxication, or “Selbstvergiftung” (GW 3, 263), and losing oneself. Madame Chauchat expresses the spirit of the Berghof when she tells Castorp in “Walpurgisnacht” that one should seek morality “dans le péché, en s’abandonnant au danger, à ce qui est nuisible, à ce qui nous consume,” and when she announces that it is “plus moral de se perdre et même de se laisser dépérir que de se conserver” (GW 3, 473). Despite the critical literature’s widespread discussion of Hans Castorp’s “Sympathie mit dem Tode,” there has been very little discussion of the role played by the leitmotif of self-destruction in Mann’s novel. Chauchat’s description of Peeperkorn’s act of suicide as an “‘abdicatio’” (GW 3, 867) and the notion of casting oneself head over heels into Naphta’s “sittlich ungeordnetes All” (GW 3, 646) are recognizable variations on the same leitmotif. The act of abandoning one’s personal duty to oneself and one’s life in order to participate in a universally held belief in the value of physical and spiritual perdition is a yet-untried overriding theme of Der Zauberberg – a consistent and building tendency to self-destruction, in short, in which “Der Donnerschlag” seems merely to play a role as the concluding episode.

Mann’s portrayal of a societally prevalent tendency to self-destruction has a great deal in common with Nietzsche’s treatment of the interconnectedness of the tendency to suicide and the act of going to war in “Der Wille zum Leiden und die Mitleidigen.”

---

Toward the end of his aphorism, Nietzsche makes a curious claim relating the participation in armed conflict to the commission of a suicidal act:

Und wenn jetzt irgend ein Krieg aussbricht, so bricht damit immer auch gerade in den Edelsten eines Volkes eine freilich geheim gehaltene Lust aus: sie werfen sich mit Entzücken der neuen Gefahr des Todes entgegen, weil sie in der Aufopferung für das Vaterland endlich jene lange gesuchte Erlaubnis zu haben glauben – die Erlaubnis, ihrem Ziele auszuweichen: – der Krieg ist für sie ein Umweg zum Selbstmord, aber ein Umweg mit gutem Gewissen. (KSA 3, 567-68)

With respect to this particular passage, his use of the phrase, “mit gutem Gewissen,” should not mislead one into thinking that Nietzsche is making a praise of war. Since the turning inward of the instincts creates the bad conscience (KSA 5, 322-23), it only follows in Nietzschean terminology that their outward discharge would be an expression of “good conscience.” What makes Nietzsche’s assertion remarkable is the way with which his above-cited textual emphases equate the terms “death” and “goal” in the phrases “Gefahr des Todes” and “ihrem Ziele ausweichen.” Nietzsche seems to be stating that, by participating in war, one exchanges one goal for another – and that both goals are mortal. War represents a detour to suicide, says Nietzsche; the implication is that when one participates in war one exchanges the personal death to which one someday must submit for a death in which one actively participates. The conclusion of Nietzsche’s aphorism also shows that he is not attempting to glorify one’s active participation in war over one’s passive submission to the forces of one’s fate as a normal member of civilized society. Nietzsche asserts, although, that this elusion of civilized death is something that society’s
noblest members do desire, and the solution to the fact of its lack of societal recognition lies in the consideration that it is, as he states, "eine freilich geheim gehaltene Lust." The same self-destructive urge is also the above-mentioned "heimliche Verführung" of the "Religion des Mitleidens." Nietzsche's language seems at first to suggest that this hidden desire is one that is kept secret by the individual from the rest of society. Upon closer inspection, however, it seems most likely that it is kept just as secret from the individual subject and that civilization serves as the principally determining agent in providing for its concealment. Seen in these terms, Nietzsche's "geheim gehaltene Lust" must represent some form of desire held captive from consciousness through the agency of a societal ban. In psychological terms, it may best be described as one of the repressed drives, and since its object is death, it appears to be a pre-Freudian version of Freud's "Todestrieb." Through their treatment of the interconnectedness of suicide and war, Thomas Mann's Der Zauberberg and the 338th aphorism of Friedrich Nietzsche's Die fröhliche Wissenschaft give independent preliminary expression to the notion of the death drive first announced by Freud in his 1920 essay, Jenseits des Lustprinzips.

In counteraction of that tendency, Nietzsche's aphorism and Mann's "Bildungsroman" offer an ironic educational alternative to the societally prevalent tendency to social conformity that characterizes their era - the pursuit of individual independence as the only route to personal and societal salvation. At the conclusion of Nietzsche's aphorism, he writes:

Und, um hier Einiges zu verschweigen: so will ich doch meine Moral nicht verschweigen, welche zu mir sagt: Lebe im Verborgenen, damit du dir leben
kannst! Lebe unwissend über Das, was deinem Zeitalter das Wichtigste dünkt!
Lege zwischen dich und heute wenigstens die Haut von drei Jahrhunderten! Und
das Geschrei von heute, der Lärm der Kriege und Revolutionen wird dir ein
Gemurmel sein! Du wirst auch helfen wollen: aber nur Denen, deren Noth du
ganz versteht, weil sie mit dir Ein Leid und Eine Hoffnung haben – deinen
Freunden: und nur auf die Weise, wie du dir selber hilfst: – ich will sie muthiger,
aushaltender, einfacher, fröhlicher machen! Ich will sie Das lehren, was jetzt so
 Wenige verstehen und jene Prediger des Mitleidens am wenigsten: – die
Mitfreude! (KSA 3, 568)

Could the notion of resisting the temptation to be swept off into the modern age’s mass-
mobilizations for war be the only solution for humanity’s salvation? Does such an
attitude not almost treasonously defy the notions of patriotism and duty to one’s country
on which all modern states are constructed? Nietzsche’s severe critique of the human-all-
too-human tendency to sacrifice oneself immorally to the impersonal mandate of a
country at war finds its parallel in Mann’s symbolic depiction of war as a tempest of
misguided human nature inimical both to reason and life. The educational task of such a
point of view becomes the attainment of a position of reasonable sublimity in the face of
uncannily recurring pandemic outbreaks of the repressed death drive and its nationwide,
transnational, or worldwide power of subjugation and devastation.

The determination of an educational mission in terms of the sublime appears to
attempt to transfer the quality of aesthetic experience to that of character. As such, the
project might be described as a sort of educational aestheticism or “ästhetische
Erziehung” in Schiller’s sense. Can the beyond-good-and-evil perspective of Nietzsche’s “Übermensch” or the “Mensch” as “Herr der Gegensätze” of Mann’s *Zauberberg* be understood in any other way than as the attempt to provide the quality of disinterested aesthetic experience to the character of an interested individual endowed with a certain kind of aesthetic vision? Schiller alludes to such sublimity of character in *Über das Pathetische*:

Man kann niemals wissen, ob die *Fassung des Gemüts* eine Wirkung seiner moralischen Kraft ist, wenn man nicht überzeugt worden ist, daß sie keine Wirkung der Unempfindlichkeit ist. Es ist keine Kunst, über Gefühle Meister zu werden, die nur die Oberfläche der Seele leicht und flüchtig bestreichen; aber in einem Sturm, der die ganze sinnliche Natur aufregt, seine Gemütsfreiheit zu behalten, dazu gehört ein Vermögen des Widerstandes, das über alle Naturnacht unendlich erhoben ist. (*SW* 5, 512-13)

Mann’s *Zauberberg* portrays the qualities of such a “Sturm, der die ganze sinnliche Natur aufregt,” in the “Gewitter” of Peeperkorn’s passions and “schmetternde und posaunenumdröhnte Wucht” of his “Donnerwort” (*GW* 3, 788; 784) and in the infectious wave of Dionysian feeling that universally seizes hold of the sanatorium environment with “Stumpfsinn” and “Gereiztheit” and finds its ultimate outbreak in the “Donnerschlag” of repressed aggressivity. The unspoken educational mission of Mann’s novel is not the attainment in isolation of a point of view removed from the influence of such trends – repressive isolation appears to constitute the accentuated violence of their eruption under the sign of the return of the repressed. The educational goal of Mann’s
Zauberberg seems to be the achievement of a sublime standpoint of reasonable equilibrium in nonrepressive confrontation of the uncanny tempestuousness of the times.

The sublime and uncanny experiential realm through which Castorp passes poses the highest imaginable challenges to his intellect and will. If Mann’s novel ultimately calls upon us as readers to make a similar passage, then it is only because we share with his protagonist a common heritage and common challenges to our fate – challenges both to our responsibilities as individuals and as members of the human collective. For the parallel between the tempests of “Schnee” and “Der Donnerschlag” portrays the specter of war as a natural phenomenon – but a natural phenomenon of human origins. The phantoms of “Stumpfsinn” and “Gereiztheit” that seize hold of the sanatorium’s inhabitants testify to fantasy’s overthrow of reason and the subversion of the sublime by the uncanny on a collective level. The narrator describes the “Donnerschlag” as a sort of explosion of repressed societal energy. The “Donnerschlag” is a “betäubende Detonation lang angesammelter Unheilsgemenge von Stumpfsinn und Gereiztheit” (GW 3, 985) that portrays on a societal basis the psychological energy that “sich ansammelt” in Castorp’s “Seelengründen” in “Schnee” and “als ein elementares ‘Ach was!’ oder ein ‘Komm denn an!’ von erbitterter Ungeduld […] sich entlädt” (GW 3, 665). The Zauberberg’s thematic opposition of the individual and society draws the reader to a close examination of the deep interrelationships between love and self-love, destruction and self-destruction – and their implications for individual and society. The tempestuous conditions of war that conclude Mann’s novel are humanly collective in origin, and it is to the pluralistic humanity of his readership as continuers of Castorp’s process of education that the
narrator addresses himself in "Der Donnerschlag." Mann’s "Bildungsroman" thus poses its educational challenge both to the individual, Hans Castorp, and to a collective readership. There consequently exists an evident responsibility on both the individual and societal levels for the tragic outcome of Hans Castorp’s tale. The educational solution to the human predicament posed by the story of Hans Castorp seems to rest in the description of a proper relationship between the individual and society.

Hans Castorp strays from the goal of his sublime act of self-overcoming in "Schnee" and his general vision of humanity to languish in a state of near absolute metaphysical isolation from reality – a state characterized by "Freiheit" and a Schopenhauerian "nunc stans." Schiller describes the danger entailed by such a lapse into the realm of the purely ideal:

Aber eben darum, weil die Phantasterei keine Ausschweifung der Natur, sondern der Freiheit ist, also aus einer an sich achtungswürdigen Anlage entspringt, die ins Unendliche perfektibel ist, so führt sie auch zu einem unendlichen Fall in eine bodenlose Tiefe und kann nur in einer völligen Zerstörung sich endigen. (*SW* 5, 780)

The danger of an absolute departure from reality into the realm of ideals is comparable to the earlier-cited danger of attempting to return to the since-surpassed nature of the "Vernunftlosen": the latter also leads to an irreparable plunge "in eine bodenlose Tiefe" (*SW* 5, 708) (see above, p.273). Schiller’s description of the elevated threat of peril revealed in the false idealist’s addiction to spiritual perfection rests on the false idealist’s radically misguided isolation from and blind disregard for reality. Is that not the
condition reached by Hans Castorp previous to the point that "das Völkchen Derer hier oben" catapults itself "kopfüber ins Flachland der Heimsuchung" – "und Hans stürzte mit" (GW 3, 989)? Castorp has "‘gar keine Fühlung mehr mit dem Flachland,’ " he admits: "‘die ist mir abhanden gekommen’ " (GW 3, 823). He is now "‘dem Flachlande völlig abhanden gekommen und in seinen Augen so gut wie tot’ " (GW 3, 848). The once fastidious Castorp no longer pays any heed to his appearance in public, growing a small beard on his chin: the "Zeugnis einer gewissen philosophischen Gleichgültigkeit gegen sein Äußeres" (GW 3, 981). Neither do those that surround him take much interest in Hans:

Die Obrigkeit hatte aufgehört, Diversionen für [Hans Castorp] zu ersinnen.
Außer der morgendlichen Frage, ob er "schön" geschlafen habe, die aber rhetorischer Art war und summarisch gestellt wurde, richtete der Hofrat nicht mehr besonders oft das Wort an ihn, und auch Adriatica von Mylendonk [ . . . ] tat es nicht alle paar Tage. Sehen wir die Dinge genauer an, so geschah es selten oder nie. (GW 3, 981)

Hans’s "Neigung zur Vernachlässigung seiner selbst" corresponds to a similar "Neigung der Außenwelt in Beziehung zu ihm" (GW 3, 981). Hans enjoys the "lustige[r] Vorzug[,]" "nicht mehr gefragt zu werden, nichts mehr zu tun zu brauchen, weil sein Sitzenbleiben beschlossene Sache ist und weil er nicht mehr in Betracht kommt, – eine orgiastische Form der Freiheit [ . . . ]" (GW 3, 981). Hans Castorp literally enjoys the same kind of freedom – “‘wie auf dem Gymnasium, wenn es entschieden war, daß man sitzenblieb und nicht mehr gefragt wurde und nichts mehr zu tun brauchte’ ” – the
condition of no longer coming "‘in Betracht’ " that earlier drives Herr Albin into a state of hysterically derisive suicidal despair (GW 3, 115-16). The condition of full adaptation to the sanatorium that corresponds to Castorp’s aesthetically detached disinterestedness in his condition and his surroundings reveals unmistakable signs of gathering peril comparable to the quiet that precedes a storm.

Hans Castorp’s full integration into the society of the Berghof ironically coincides with his adoption of an attitude of asocial indifference to his immediate environment and the world at large. The only device Castorp has for keeping time is the cheap cigar that he uses as a sort of “Sanduhr,” “denn seine Taschenuhr trug er nicht mehr,” and he has renounced all possession of calenders (GW 3, 984). Hans refuses to keep abreast of the news and lends “wenig Ohr” to Settembrini’s attempts to keep him informed of current events (GW 3, 985). Nor does he appear to take cognizance of what is transpiring in his immediate vicinity. Although Hans witnesses the event, he fails to see that the “Knabe” Teddy has grown into a “Jüngling” (GW 3, 982-83). After “abenteuerliche Jährchen der Entfremdung,” the death of his great-uncle, Konsul Tienappel, is like the “Zerreiß ennoch einer Bindung, noch einer Beziehung zur unteren Sphäre” and gives “letzte Vollständigkeit” to Castorp’s sense of “Freiheit” (GW 3, 983-84). Hans passes his seventh year at the sanatorium, yet “er wüsste es nicht” (GW 3, 984). Castorp renounces all cognizance of transpired time “aus Gründen der ‘Freiheit’ [. . .], dem Strandspaziergange, dem stehenden Immer-und-Ewig zu Ehren [. . .]” (GW 3, 984). Hans Castorp becomes the fully adapted adherent of a sort of catatonic “nunc stans” metaphysical state. Can there be any doubt that the sort of freedom attained by the
unbridled dreamer – “der junge Faun” (GW 3, 898) of “Fülle des Wohllauts” and witness to “Phantome” (GW 3, 928) of “Fragwürdigstes” – is exactly the sort of absolute departure from reality represented by the “Phantasterei” of Schiller’s false idealist? If the “DING AN SICH” is the “WILLE,” as Schopenhauer says (WWV 1, 234), is Castorp’s attainment of a state of absolute metaphysical abstraction not – contrary to Schopenhauer – an act of submission to the ascendancy of will? Castorp is clearly lost in the moment. The moment represents itself to the metaphysical glance “als das allein Beharrende [. . .], das Nunc stans der Scholastiker” (WWV 1, 367). Schopenhauer nonetheless also explains that the will is “allein das Beharrende und Unveränderliche im Bewuβtseyn” (WWV 2, 162). However “willenlos” the “SUBJEKT DER ERKENNTNIS” may be (WWV 1, 245), it seems clear that Castorp’s adherence to a permanent “Nunc stans” is an experience dominated by will or, to use the language of Mann’s Zauberring, by “das Prinzip des Beharrens,” “das asiatische Prinzip” (GW 3, 221). Castorp seems to have attained the stage of a “‘geistige[r] Wille[]’” raised “‘zur eigenen, dem Leben entgegengesetzten Macht’” that is not, as Settembrini explains, “‘die Erlösung vom Übel, sondern die üble Erlösung’” (GW 3, 570). Hans Castorp is in a situation very similar to that of Hanno Buddenbrook.319 Is his psychological state not also a submission to the unconscious as return of the repressed? The Zauberring’s protagonist ironically turns his independently achieved sublime vision of societal harmony on its head by retreating into the uncanny

isolation of absolutely detached social conformity and its false sense of salvation and security.

Seen in such terms, Hans Castorp’s resolution of his predicament from the viewpoint of societal isolation introduces an ironic element of societal dislocation into his “Schnee” dream’s resolution of the predicament in terms of societal integration. Hans passes from being an acceptable member of Hamburg’s bourgeois society – with its conveniences and expectations of performance, to being an accepted member – based on pathological passivity – of the Berghof community. Hans conforms to the external mandates of society without being a truly committed societal participant. As Schiller says: “Der Keim der [Schönheit] wird sich gleich wenig entwickeln, wo eine karge Natur den Menschen jeder Erquickung beraubt und wo eine verschwenderische ihn von jeder eignen Anstrengung losspricht – wo die stumpfe Sinnlichkeit kein Bedürfnis fühlt und wo die heftige Begier keine Sättigung findet” (SW 5, 655). Is that not Hans Castorp’s predicament – a situation of being too readily gratified by external provisions for his immediate comfort while at the same time submitting to repressive restraints upon his development – emotional and otherwise? One’s development as a properly adapted societal individual rests upon a conjunction of one’s need for contact both with oneself and with the members of one’s community:

Nicht da, wo der Mensch sich troglodytisch in Höhlen birgt, ewig einzeln ist und die Menschheit nie außer sich findet, auch nicht da, wo er nomadisch in großen Heermassen zieht, ewig zur Zahl ist und die Menschheit nie in sich findet – da allein, wo er in eigener Hütte still mit sich selbst und, sobald er heraustritt, mit
dem ganzen Geschlechte spricht, wird sich ihre liebliche Knospe entfalten. (SW 5, 655)

It is clear that Hans Castorp is on the right path to becoming the properly adapted member of a human community through his independent pursuit of an answer to general human concepts – that of the "Homo Dei" – in his own terms. At the end of his aesthetic adventure, it also seems clear that he is on the wrong track by pursuing a goal of absolute independence through utter submission to a general rule of social conformity. Hans’s "ich will gut sein" (GW 3, 685) and awakening in "Schnee" contrast diametrically with his almost certain demise "auf schlimmen Wegen" (GW 3, 991), with hands and face raised to a "schweiflig dunkel" heaven that serves as nothing more than a substitute for the "Grottendecke des Sündenberges" (GW 3, 988). Freedom should not be the goal – not losing oneself. Freedom should be the means to finding oneself in relationship to one’s human environment. In terms of Castorp’s inner resolve, remaining at the Berghof originally expresses itself as the means to further pursuing his reflective "Gedankenbeschäftigung" – itself the means to a higher human end. Yet his sanatorium sojourn ultimately serves no further purpose than to free him of all contact with his human environment – an abdication of responsibility to self as well as to his fellow human being. The irony in Hans Castorp’s liberal pursuit of a solution to the human predicament lies in his substitution of an end with its means. The freedom of thought that serves as the means to Castorp’s higher achievement becomes perverted, in the final analysis, into an end without purpose.
There is thus profound irony in the nonrepressive vision of societal harmony and its imperative that complete Castorp’s pursuit of instinctual and spiritual reconciliation beyond the confines of the Berghof sanatorium. His erotic desire to penetrate the elements (GW 3, 658-59), the oniric vision of happiness to which Castorp’s heart lovingly opens itself (GW 3, 679), and the imperative he formulates in service to “‘Güte und Liebe’” (GW 3, 686) represent the different stages in a process of Eros’s sublimation. The insightful glimpse of wisdom that Hans attains clearly opposes itself to the constrained environment from which he takes flight. “Where repressive sublimation prevails and determines the culture, non-repressive sublimation must manifest itself in contradiction to the entire sphere of social usefulness.”

What use for a society of sufferers is the vision of a society whose harmony and happiness seem to arise from conditions of health (cf. GW 3, 680)? The profoundly paradoxical nature of the product in which Castorp’s process of erotic sublimation culminates becomes evident in consideration of the societal ingredient underlying all true sublimation: “The difference between a neurosis and a sublimation is evidently the social aspect of the phenomenon. A neurosis isolates; a sublimation unites. In a sublimation something new is created – a house, or a community, or a tool – and it is created in a group for the use of the group.”

“‘Der Mensch soll um der Güte und Liebe willen dem Tode keine Herrschaft einräumen über seine Gedanken’” is clearly an imperative that sublimates Eros in creation of a new tool whose generalized terms implicitly intend it for use within the broadly defined

---

320 Marcuse, 208.

human collective. Castorp nonetheless performs his act of creation in a space that lies explicitly on the exterior of human society; since he never makes use of his creative tool for societal improvement, it remains neurotically isolated. In order for his reconciliation of Eros and Thanatos to achieve its promise of human betterment, a higher act of love in reconciliation of intimate experience and the societally meaningful would need to occur. No matter how noble the intention, distinctive effort is necessary if the world is to be formed in accordance with one’s desires rather than the other way around. Without the means for bringing it to fruitful completion, the potentially beneficial effects for himself and humanity of Hans Castorp’s expression of goodwill toward humankind remain fantastically isolated from the realm of actual fulfillment.

Neurotic isolation is in fact the quality that pervades all of Castorp’s attempts to create higher meaning out of his sensual and spiritual turmoil – the conditions of blushing and tachycardia that perplex him from the point of his arrival at the sanatorium and the “große Konfusion” that besets him in the company of Naphta and Settembrini. The dream of “Hippe” that reveals Chauchat’s personal meaning to him, his investigations in “Forschungen,” his secret affair with Chauchat following “Walpurgisnacht,” his contemplative acts of “Regieren,” his dream in “Schnee,” and his reveries of “Fülle des Wohllauts” all pursue their erotic aims in neurotic isolation from society. Addressing himself to Hans Castorp, the Zauberberg’s narrator poses a question at the novel’s very conclusion that takes on added significance in consideration of the consistently prevailing context of its protagonist’s neurotic isolation:
Abenteuer im Fleische und Geist, die deine Einfachheit steigerten, ließen dich im Geist überleben, was du im Fleische wohl kaum überleben sollst. Augenblicke kamen, wo dir aus Tod und Körperunzucht ahnungsvoll und regierungsweise ein Traum von Liebe erwuchs. Wird aus diesem Weltfest des Todes, auch aus der schlimmen Fieberbrunst, die rings den regnerischen Abendhimmel entzündet, einmal die Liebe steigen? (GW 3, 994)

Although Hans Castorp fails to impart to the fellow members of his human environment the message of wisdom of his “Schnee” vision, the narrator nonetheless does. Despite his corporeal mortality, the protagonist’s adventures survive in spirit, i.e., in the narrative account that imparts them to the reader. Where his hero falls short of his goal, Thomas Mann’s novel nonetheless succeeds in creating a bridge between isolated individual erotic experience and the societally meaningful through its performance of an act of nonrepressive sublimation.
Bibliography


Roth, Maria C. “Mynheer Peeperkorn in the Light of Schopenhauer’s Philosophy.” *Monatshefte für deutschen Unterricht, deutsche Sprache und Literatur* 58.4 (1966): 335-44.


VITA

Craig O. Smith was born in San Mateo, California. He is widely travelled and has lived and worked in Germany. He currently resides in Portland, Oregon. He obtained a Bachelor of Arts in History from Portland State University in 1994. He earned a Master of Arts in German from Portland State University 1996. This dissertation completes the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Germanics at the University of Washington.