Cooperation and Non-Cooperation in Indonesian Criminal Case Processing: Ego Sektoral in Action

Abstract

In recent years, Indonesian reformers have called for greater cooperation among criminal justice actors when processing a case. Indonesia has a specific term to label the failure of criminal justice actors to cooperate, which is “ego sektoral,” literally translated as sectoral or institutional ego. Although legal commentators have frequently and ubiquitously used this term, there has been little attempt to deconstruct and examine its meaning. Because of this, investigating the factors that lead to cooperative and uncooperative behavior among actors (police, prosecutor, judges, and defense lawyers) is a crucial aspect of research. This dissertation asks one fundamental question: What factors impede and induce cooperation among actors in Indonesian criminal case processing? In answering these questions, this dissertation derived its findings from interviews with 36 criminal justice actors from various ranks and the systematic analysis of relevant laws and internal regulations. Interview data have been collected, analyzed, and triangulated using a qualitative grounded theory approach. The interviews captured the interplay between the formal and informal workgroup rules that shape the actors’ incentive systems. After identifying the impeding and inducing factors, this dissertation examines and contrasts the two to understand the actual practices found in the system. This dissertation divides its findings based on two main case processing levels: the pre-trial level relationship between the police and the prosecutor and the trial-level relationship between the judges and the prosecutors. At the pre-trial level, this dissertation suggests that the impeding factors come from the association between power competition, conflict, and distrust. As a result, it produces ego sektoral behavior that significantly affects the ability of the police and the prosecutor to work together. Meanwhile, this dissertation further indicates that the inducing factors designed to incentivize cooperation fail to negate the impeding factors. This problem can be categorized as a structural problem because it eliminates interdependencies between the two actors. That structural problem also impacts the cooperation between judges and the prosecutor at the trial level. Because of such a problem, the Indonesian prosecutor cannot play their ideal role as prescribed by the formal rules. Consequently, this creates extra work pressure for the judges. However, this research indicates that the inducing factors are stronger than the impeding ones because of a shared need for efficiency in case processing.Furthermore, defense lawyers can be categorized as creating both impeding and inducing factors depending on their litigation strategy and type of appointment. This research reveals that most Indonesian defense lawyers tend to cooperate with their counterparts because the system forces them to play a submissive role. There are several important benefits of this research. The first is that it accurately maps the system of criminal case processing as it exists on the ground in Indonesia. Second, it detects problems and potentials associated with actors’ cooperative and uncooperative behavior. Third, this dissertation goes beyond providing a detailed and rich description of the system by offering an in-depth insight into ego sektoral behavior and failed criminal justice reform by using its findings as an analytical tool. Finally, this research expands the growing literature that treats the criminal justice system as organizational activity.