Majority influence in negotiation

Abstract

A social identity model of majority influence in negotiations is presented, which considers the effects of various social identifications on the processes of integrative and distributive bargaining. Two-faction negotiations were examined in a laboratory experiment: negotiation configuration was varied (negotiations were composed of either a majority faction and a minority faction or two equal-sized factions), as was social identity (negotiators were led to either identify with their own individual party or with the group of negotiators as a whole). Negotiators' agreements were less integrative when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient, particularly in negotiations between a majority and a minority Also, the majority faction had a significantly greater profit advantage over the minority faction when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient. However, although the majority's relative advantage was greater when group identity was salient, majority members did not earn significantly more in an absolute sense when group identity was salient than when individual identity was salient. The results of this study suggest that although group identity has been found to promote beneficial outcomes in other types of conflicts, its effects in negotiation are potentially negative, leading negotiators to miss opportunities for joint gain, particularly in negotiations between unequal factions.