The priority of being to truth according to Aristotle

Abstract

There appears to be a difficulty in the account which Aristotle offers of being and truth in the Categories and De Interpretatione. In general terms, Aristotle's position is the "realist" one that "propositions are true according to how things are." This "realism" is evident in a Tamilian priority claim first introduced in Categories 12. The claim is that the circumstance of a thing's being such-and-such is prior to the circumstance of the proposition that the thing is such-and-such's being true. The claim is repeated in the Metaphysics: "It is not because we think truly that you are pale [that] you are pale, but because you are pale whoever asserts this has-the-true." A direct argument for the claim appears in Categories 12. Before examining this argument, however, let us try to state more clearly what is being claimed.