Evaluating Neural Futures: Good Technoscience and the Challenge of Co-Production

Abstract

If we look beyond just the hypotheses, models, or evidence of technoscience, there are a variety of entangled, normative issues to be examined. Science and engineering enable the creation of new identities, change existing ways of life, and reflect collective visions for society. Accordingly, I use this dissertation to suggest how philosophy of science can address this challenge, taking the "co-production" of knowledge and social order (Jasanoff 2004) as my starting point. I argue, first, that constructivist science and technology studies, rather than precluding philosophy, lay the foundation for ethically and politically-sensitive philosophy of science. Second, I assess promising theoretical frameworks from Helen Longino, Lorraine Code, and Heather Douglas; each provides resources to evaluate technoscience, but require some changes to avoid traditional philosophical blindspots. Third, I shift to a more detailed consideration of neural engineering, as a test case for my interdisciplinary methodology. Ultimately, I propose a pragmatist conception of "good" (rather than true) technoscience, adopt a modest understanding of scholarly expertise, and call for a new philosophy of the field.