Late Teacher Hiring in Washington State: The Role of Collectively-Bargained Contract Provisions on Late Hiring

Abstract

The practice of late hiring has detrimental and disruptive effects on school district and state finances, teacher morale, and student outcomes. While there are many direct and indirect causes of late hiring, a majority of principals surveyed state that collectively-bargained provisions regulating teacher transfers and vacancies play a significant role in preventing them from making sure all teachers are hired on-time. While this may be an important perception from hiring principals, there is a dearth of empirical evidence to support this claim. This study examines the empirical relationship between district late hiring rates and CBA-mandated hiring timelines in 148 Washington State school districts for the 2009 school year. This study concludes that there is no empirical evidence to support the notion that specific collectively-bargained contract provisions specifying how long administrators have to wait to hire teachers from outside the district have any effect on late hiring. It appears that the strongest relationship exists between late hiring and the size of the school district, with larger school districts having a greater likelihood to hire teachers after school begins. This is contrary to some previous research, which suggests that CBA provisions “tie the hands” of administrators and prevent them from hiring all teachers on time.