Risky Choices on Behalf of Others

Abstract

The goal of this dissertation was to compare risky choices on behalf of others relative to the self and whether accountability plays a role. To that end, three hypotheses were proposed: the risk-as-feelings hypothesis: deciding on behalf of others who we do not know decreases cautiousness; the system 2 activation hypothesis: deciding on behalf of others leads to better decisions; playing-it-safe hypothesis: deciding on behalf of others increases cautiousness. Participants in both experiments took part in a lab-simulation task in which they were given a virtual budget and were required to make crop-choices (Experiment 1) or road-salting choices (Experiment 2) based on weather-forecasts to either maximize their budget (E1) or minimize their losses (E2) on their own behalf or on behalf of another participant. In addition, half of all participants were held accountable such that they needed to justify their decisions. Although none of the hypotheses were supported in E1, in E2 the risk-as-feelings was supported. In addition, accountability reduced cautiousness among those deciding on behalf of unknown participants.