Global-Domestic Linkages in Environmental Politics

Abstract

This dissertation investigates how states engage in international environmental politics, and how global and regional institutional embeddedness in environmental institutions can shape states’ policies. Empirically, I focus on global climate governance through the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and marine biodiversity governance in Europe. Using a synthetic control design, text analysis of COP decisions, and two-way fixed effects logistic regression, this three-paper dissertation investigates the following questions: (1) Do Global South countries receive material benefits from hosting UNFCCC COP meetings? (2) Does the inclusion of women in country delegations or the leadership of female COP Presidents influence gender discussion in UNFCCC COP decisions? (3) How do regional institutions and domestic economic interests shape implementation of marine protected areas in Europe? Chapter 1 examines whether Global South COP Presidents benefit from a “spotlight effect” after hosting COP. I find limited evidence that COP leadership increases development aid: across 28 country-aid pairs, only six show a shift in aid flows after hosting. Chapter 2 uses text analysis of UNFCCC COP decisions from 1995 to 2024 to examine the relationship between gender representation and gender language in formal negotiation outcomes. I find no significant relationship between female representation in country delegations or COP leadership and gender discussion in COP decisions, but I do find a strong mainstreaming effect over time. Chapter 3 examines marine protected area implementation in Europe and finds that regional sea conventions increase the likelihood of domestic implementation, but that this effect is limited by domestic economic interests in capture fisheries. This dissertation advances debates in global environmental politics and international relations by showing both the possibilities and limits of international leadership, representation, and regional institutional pressure.