Money in Taiwanese Politics: A Historical Analysis of Taiwanese Campaign Finance Law

Abstract

Since the establishment of the modern system of government and the dichotomizing of public and private interests, the issue of combatting political corruption, and the question of public office being abused for private/personal use, have become significant challenges for rulers seeking to ensure the public interest while also maintaining their legitimacy. As a young democratic nation, Taiwan is no exception. Under the shadow of colonial and authoritarian rule and the uneven path to democracy, money has played a unique role in Taiwanese politics. While the Taiwanese legislature enacted the Political Donation Act (PDA) of 2004, mainly reflecting the U.S. and Japanese campaign finance law models, the legislative efforts have seemed slight. This dissertation argues the situation has arisen because Taiwanese legislators and reformers underestimated two main factors on the demand side of the campaign finance: the value of transparency and the role of clientelism. This dissertation has adopted the approach of historical institutionalism, on the one hand, vertically analyzing the evolution of mandatory report/ disclosure rules and their interaction with clientelism in four eras: the Japanese colonial rule era (1935-1945), the ROC-KMT rule era (1945-1991), the democratic era (1991-2004), and the PDA era (2004-present). Also, this dissertation undertakes a comparative analysis of the texts, legislative means and ends of mandatory report/ disclosure rules between the host jurisdiction, Taiwan, and the donor jurisdiction, Japan, and the US. From 1895, the Empire of Japan established a colonial regime in Taiwan. The Government-General of Taiwan (GGT) did not hold local congress elections until 1935. To control the social order and electoral outcome, the GGT enacted election laws, mainly extending from Japan, authorizing the police to monitor campaign activities and finance closely. The GGT cooperated with local elites via exchanging interests and suppression of the dissent. As a result, the racial minority regime, the GGT, controlled the majority. The election of 1935 marked the start of election and electoral clientelism in Taiwan. After World War II, the Republic of China (ROC), dominated by the ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT), took over Taiwan. The ROC called a general election in 1946 and extended its election laws from China to Taiwan. After the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War, the Temporary Provisions During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (temporary provisions) were enacted in 1948, suspending all elections. In 1949, the ROC moved its central government to Taiwan, transforming Taiwan from an extended territory to a de facto nation. The ROC suspended elections at the central government level but opened the local assembly elections to gain support from local factions by distributing interests. Without an effective regime to regulate and monitor campaign finance, the arbitrary enforcement granted advantage to obedient local factions over the opposition. As a result, the ethnic minority regime, the ROC-KMT, controlled the majority in each level of local congress; and electoral clientelism took root in Taiwanese society. With the end of the temporary provisions, the ROC reopened elections at all levels in 1991. Given the rise of electoral competitiveness, electoral clientelism boomed. In response to the people’s outrage, the PDA, a milestone in campaign finance law, was enacted in 2004. Nonetheless, the effects of PDA have been slight. This dissertation contends that sunlight is the best of disinfectants. The appropriate financial disclosure rules could increase political accountability, suppress clientelism, and lay the bedrock of a cleaner form of government. As the value of transparency spreads among Taiwanese people, a broader disclosure of campaign finance represents the essential destination for reform.