The Rise and Fall of Mosaddeq: Political Survival, Ideology, and Revolutionary Coalitions

Abstract

What is the logic of political survival in revolutionary situations? This study expands on selectorate theory by seeking how ideological goals inform allocation decisions in revolutionary situations. Using the case of Mohammad Mosaddeq in Iran, I analyze the logic of political survival by constructing a sociological relational model from selectorate theory, propagation theory, and the Weberian theory of ideology. I apply the model by tracing the relational ties of propagating agents across social and temporal space. I find the key factor in the case is not Mosaddeq's inability to procure an oil deal as most conventional accounts argue, but rather his decision to shrink the winning coalition after the July Uprising. The coup's success was then predicated on targeting fewer coordination resources to prevent the crowds from foiling their attempt. I conclude by hypothesizing that political leaders in revolutionary situations that unify major sources of legitimation in their respective societies before shrinking their winning coalition improve their prospects for political survival.