Consensus and Collaboration in Contemporary Scientific Practice

Abstract

I argue that there is no single, monolithic conception of ‘consensus’ in scientific practice. I distinguish between two categories of aggregative and collaborative consensus. Collaborative consensus, which is produced by interdependent groups, has not been adequately explored in the context of contemporary scientific practice. A central contribution in my dissertation is the proposal of normative conditions for well-functioning collaboration. The trustworthiness of collaboratively-produced consensus positions should include consideration about whether they meet these proposed normative conditions. I also use the distinctions and analyses discussed to assess the public controversy regarding the IPCC’s consensus position on anthropogenic climate change, looking at the arguments of skeptics and a prominent defender, Naomi Oreskes. Both Oreskes and skeptics, I argue, wrongly invoke aggregative consensus to assess the IPCC’s position. However, the group is a collaboration, and their consensus position cannot be assessed according to standards of aggregation. I instead assess the IPCC using the proposed normative conditions for well-functioning collaboration. I show that they generally satisfy them, and I then provide a different response to skeptics for why there are good social reasons to trust the IPCC.