Networked Authoritarianism in the Russian Federation: Domestic Internet Policy and the 2018 Election

dc.contributor.advisorRadnitz, Scott
dc.contributor.authorPeterson, Catherine
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-26T18:03:53Z
dc.date.issued2021-08-26
dc.date.submitted2021
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2021
dc.description.abstractThe Kremlin’s strategy toward the internet has evolved markedly over the past decade, leading to the adoption of a variety of legislative and regulatory measures designed to exert increased control over the Russian internet. This paper analyzes the internet control strategies employed by the Kremlin to repress Alexey Navalny’s 2018 presidential campaign and their impact. It first addresses how domestic internet policy has changed in recent years before turning to data from Agora and the Levada Center to assess specific mechanisms of internet control used by authorities over the course of the Navalny campaign. Findings indicate that the government relied largely on six main mechanisms of repression, most of them being legislative and non-tech specific. Data also indicate such efforts likely made attracting additional support difficult for the campaign. These findings are consistent with signs that the Russian government is making deliberate efforts to control information within its borders and raises questions regarding the future of internet policy both within Russia and across the globe.
dc.embargo.lift2026-07-31T18:03:53Z
dc.embargo.termsRestrict to UW for 5 years -- then make Open Access
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.otherPeterson_washington_0250O_23001.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1773/47252
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.rightsnone
dc.subjectAlexey Navalny
dc.subjectinternet
dc.subjectnetworked authoritarianism
dc.subjectRussia
dc.subjectPolitical science
dc.subject.other
dc.titleNetworked Authoritarianism in the Russian Federation: Domestic Internet Policy and the 2018 Election
dc.typeThesis

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