From Contemporary (Semi-Competitive) Authoritarian Regimes to Constitutional Democracies in Africa: Lessons from The Gambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe

dc.contributor.advisorWalsh, Walter J
dc.contributor.authorNABANEH, SATANG
dc.date.accessioned2024-10-16T03:15:13Z
dc.date.available2024-10-16T03:15:13Z
dc.date.issued2024-10-16
dc.date.submitted2024
dc.descriptionThesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2024
dc.description.abstractAfrica’s political landscape is experiencing a period of flux, with long-standing authoritarian leaders stepping down. This dissertation explores how semi-authoritarian regimes in Africa manage these leadership transitions. Focusing on The Gambia's surprising upset in 2016, Uganda’s controversial re-election of President Museveni, and Zimbabwe’s Mugabe resignation, the study examines motivations behind holding elections in regimes lacking true democratic features and the potential for these elections to yield unexpected outcomes. The research tackles four key questions. First, it investigates why authoritarian regimes choose to hold elections despite the inherent risks. Second, it explores the factors that influence regime stability or change. Third, the study examines the role that constitutions play in facilitating transitions from authoritarianism. Finally, it analyzes the dual role of elections, both legitimizing regimes and potentially leading to their downfall. The dissertation argues that authoritarian regimes strategically hold elections to bolster their legitimacy but face the risk of opposition mobilization and internal dissent. While these regimes manipulate legal frameworks to maintain control, the very constitutions they exploit can offer avenues for challenges, creating a precarious power balance. The dissertation acknowledges the contingency of electoral processes and examines the diverse outcomes across case studies. It explores how manipulating constitutions and concentrating executive power, as seen in recent Ugandan elections, can impact a regime’s longevity. The concept of ‘constitutional authoritarianism’ is introduced, arguing that regimes exploiting constitutions for control can be weakened by those very structures. Excessive authoritarian practices within a constitutional framework can backfire by galvanizing opposition movements and fracturing regime support. Employing a socio-legal approach, the research utilizes legal analysis, interviews, and archival research to understand the factors enabling successful transitions from authoritarianism to democracies. It contributes to broader scholarly discussions on competitive authoritarianism or electoral authoritarianism, comparative constitutionalism, the dynamics of elections in semi-authoritarian contexts, democratization and African politics.
dc.embargo.termsOpen Access
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.otherNABANEH_washington_0250E_27308.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1773/52543
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.rightsnone
dc.subjectAfrican Politics
dc.subjectcomparative constitutionalism
dc.subjectCompetitive authoritarianism
dc.subjectThe Gambia
dc.subjectUganda
dc.subjectZimbabwe
dc.subjectLaw
dc.subjectPolitical science
dc.subjectAfrican studies
dc.subject.otherLaw
dc.titleFrom Contemporary (Semi-Competitive) Authoritarian Regimes to Constitutional Democracies in Africa: Lessons from The Gambia, Uganda and Zimbabwe
dc.typeThesis

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