Good Neighbor North -- Sino-Japanese Relations and the Surrender of Japan

Abstract

The orthodox view of the end of WWII is that the bombs were dropped in order to end the war as efficiently and with the minimum loss of life while still ending on Allied (American) terms. Along with this view is that the late entry of the Soviet Union was simply a last effort of opportunism, joining in to reap the rewards promised at the Yalta convention, a so-called "thief in the fire", stealing in while the house was coming down. Orthodox views by Russian specialists see the Soviet entry as the linchpin in finally forcing Japan's surrender on August 15. By looking at the varying hostile relationship between the Soviet Union and Japan through the 30's coupled with uneasy neutrality during the war and then the final events in August 1945, one can say that Soviet entry, along with the atom bomb attacks and the heavy last B-29 bombings together had together an impact deep enough both physically and psychologically to finally bring Japan to accept the conditions of surrender. The Soview entry, although opportunistic in how it attempted to seize beyond its promised concessions at Yalta, should not have its efforts discounted. Its invasion into China during the last seven days of the war helped in bringing home to Japan that there was no side still defensible. America's combination of air and nuclear attacks on the homeland along with Russia, the las (but not least) threat to Japan to finally strike closed the country off completely to future possible negotiations without further risk itself, and thus these factors together were the linchpin in forcing the Japanese government to finally go through the final diplomatic measures to end the war. Tensions in foreign policy between the Soviet Union and Japan did not begin in 1931 when Japan invaded Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchuko, but it is accurate to say that the uneasy relations between these two countries advanced at higher rate in the 1930's than in the previous decade. One can go back to the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905 in discussing these tensions, especially since the Soviet concessions at the end of WWII directly related to what they considered the Japanese took from them in 1905. For this paper though, the focus will be from the 1930's until the end of the war. Whether or not the Soviet and Japanese leaders were prepared to speak out publicly about their distrust for each other, their actions reveal their agendas. Following the 1931 "liberation" of Manchuria, both Soviet and Japanese military forces began a steady buildup in North East Asia, specifically focused on the borders between Manchuko, Outer Mongolia and the Soviet Union. From 1932 to 1939, both the USSR and Japan increased their infantry stationed in these areas from 2:1 to 10:3 respectively, with the Japanese Kuantung Army utilizing its connected infantries in Korea if needed.