Kenneth Pyle Hiroshima and Nagasaki Seminar Student Papers

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/1773/53142

This collection comprises papers written by students enrolled in the honors seminar on “Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” which was taught by Professor Kenneth Pyle at the University of Washington between 1992 and 2019. These papers examine the complex historical context and the diverse interpretations of the decision to use atomic bombs, reflecting a deep engagement with historiographical debates and the broader challenges of historical inquiry. Although efforts were made to contact all former students who participated in the seminar, only a limited number could be reached. If you are aware that any students' papers are not included and know how to contact them, please encourage them to reach out to the University of Washington Libraries so that their work to be included in this archive.

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Changing Narratives of Buddhism and Its Dynamic Relations with the State in Imperial Japan
(2019) Zhao, Aaron
Modern histories often study narratives on wars from perspectives of geopolitics and international relations. However, the two world wars in the twentieth century were so pervasive in their impact on the world that no part of the human society had really escaped their deadly touch. For this reason, in this paper, I would like to attempt to explore the issue from a different angle by analyzing the changing narratives of Buddhism (or in fact Buddhisms) in Imperial Japan on militarism and nationalism and its relations with the state. The significance of native Japanese religious experiences and interpretations of the events leading up to the end of the second World War, which I believe are a key element in understanding Japanese struggle for its modernization in the early twentieth century, deserves a closer examination. The relationship between religion and war is a delicate matter that often involves large amount of controversies. Japanese Buddhism is no different in this respect. Brian Victoria's Zen at War (and to a lesser degree its successor Zen War Stories) is a provocative work that contributes to the rethinking of Zen Buddhism's relationship with the Imperial Japanese state in the first half of the twentieth century especially during the Second World War by bringing to the front stage the fervent support of Zen Buddhism for nationalism and militarism in Imperial Japan. Zen at War spares no criticism in exposing Buddhism's ideological justification and political and military mobilization for the imperialistic expansion and military aggression of Japan, in which even D.T. Suzuki, the key figure behind Zen Buddhism's popularity in the Western world, has been brought under keen scrutiny for his role in supporting Japan's imperialism and militarism. Of course, Zen Buddhism was not the only denomination of Buddhism in Imperial Japan that supported the government's promoted ultra-nationalism and war efforts. Joudou Shinshuu (Shin Buddhism), another major Buddhist branch in Japan, had also been active in the shaping of Japanese nationalism since the early days of the Meiji era. Thus, this paper will place focus on these two schools of Buddhism. It might seem to be a curious thing on the surface that Buddhism, a generally perceived pacifist religion, would have been so closely associated with war, militarism and imperialistic expansion. Precisely because of this seeming contradiction, the Buddhist perspective on war is essentially interesting. One of the core doctrines of Buddhism is nonkilling and nonviolence due to its belief that all life forms are equal. To the Buddhist, the taking of even an insect's life is a violation of this universal equality. However, when the need arises, a Buddhist will not shy away from fighting demons both figuratively and literally. In addition, Buddhism preaches that life is filled with constant suffering but salvation/liberation from such suffering is achievable through the practice of Buddhist teachings. In a world devastated by war where even the loss of life is a common occurrence, this seems to be particularly relevant and appealing. Less well known but no less important is the fact that Buddhism also preaches its version of the coming of the end of the world. Certain schools, such as the Pure Land and Nichiren, specifically emphasize on this issue. When the invention and application of nuclear weapons made the theory of apocalypse a real possibility that threatened all humankind, Buddhist perception of war may be worth extra exploring too.
The Complexity of American Public Opinion During World War II
(2019) Zhang, Emily
A nation's public has proven the power they hold over politicians' major decisions. From starting revolutions to overthrowing a government with which they are unhappy, to affecting a choice simply with their opinion. However, it is not always obvious exactly what the public wants. While one glance at an issue shows an overarching sentiment, a closer look reveals the countless sides and opinions present. The complexity of public opinion appeared before the war even started, as it broke out in Europe and the United States was debating on intervening or not. The majority of historians today believe that before Pearl Harbor, the American public was strictly isolationist, wanting no part at all in the war in Europe after the pains of the Great War. However, it has become evident that there was a fairly strong interventionist feeling amongst the people that simply could not defeat the isolationism present. In the case of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, James F. Byrnes, the Secretary of State under President Truman, was famously quoted to have said that accepting Japanese terms or softening unconditional surrender terms would lead to the "crucifixion of the president". Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War at the time, also mentioned in his article published in the Harper's Magazine that one could not look at fellow Americans knowing that the bombs could have saved American lives.1 While political leaders in the years leading up to the end of the war believed that the American public would be outraged knowing the possibilities held in the bombs in fact there was much more debate centering around whether unconditional surrender should be pursued or whether the terms of surrender be modified. Along with the surrender terms, there was further debate around Hirohito himself and the position and level of importance he should hold in post-war Japan.
Henry Stimson: The Wartime Statesman
(2018) White, Daniel
The late political philosopher John Rawls defined the statesman as an ideal - an individual who exemplified outstanding insight, judgment, courage and leadership in office. The qualities of a statesman, however, did not end there. Such persons were not only capable of leading during times of trial and uncertainty, but also aimed for peace and the well being of future generations. Henry L. Stimson was one such man. His career in public service would span nearly forty years, taking him from the state level attorney up to the highest echelons of the United States (US) government. Though he was not without flaw, Stimson possessed a clear set of values and principles that consistently influenced the decisions that he made throughout his life. A man who was Secretary of War, once at the eve of the First World War and years later during the conflict of the Second World War, Stimson would face issues that would greatly challenge his moral compass and vision for peace. Yet in spite of the grim realities that surrounded him, Stimson led the US through one of the most turbulent times of its history with the heart of a true statesman. Accordingly, this paper will examine Stimson as a wartime statesman in addition to taking a closer look at the lesser-known aspects of his moral dilemmas during his tenure as Secretary of War. Henry L. Stimson, born on September 21st 1867, would spend most of his early years in New England. His Presbyterian upbringing along with his education at Yale University and Harvard Law School would be formative towards laying the foundation of his moral compass. As Sean Malloy explains, "While Presbyterianism provided the moral core of Stimson's worldview, it was not religious dogma but rather the law from which he drew both his livelihood and the intellectual framework that guided his approach to national and international affairs." In other words Stimson would "...embrace the law as a tool for the gradual evolution of human society towards a more perfect moral order." This viewpoint would govern the decisions that Stimson would make throughout his illustrious career and demonstrate the faith that he put in international law and order. After fifteen some years working at a New York corporate law firm, Stimson was tapped by president Theodore Roosevelt to become the US Attorney for the Southern District of New York. He would hold this office for three years, during which he continued to cultivate his beliefs in law and strong government. Following an unsuccessful bid for governor of New York, he was appointed in 1911 as Secretary of War in the Taft cabinet. Although Stimson was technically a Progressive and President Taft a Conservative, Taft knew that Stimson was "a middle-of-the-road progressive, not running to extreme radicalism on one side or to conservatism on the other." Accordingly, Stimson would fulfill his new role well by not only advocating for preparedness and successfully reorganizing the US army into a modern fighting force on a par with the emerging global power of the US, but also strengthening US policy towards the development of the various territories under American control such as the Philippines. As McGeorge Bundy wrote, these two years as Secretary of War under Taft "were the most important in his early public life," preparing him for the momentous time he would be Secretary of War once more.
Exploring Causes of Atrocities in Japan's Occupation of China from 1931-1937
(2019) Lu, Kendrick
There is an incredible amount of literature and analysis of the events that transpired in Nanjing during Japanese occupation. In the following essay, I will attempt to add a fresh angle by imposing a framework for understanding the different types of violence that the Chinese suffered through. I will start with a broad overview of Japanese imperial racism and its propulsion of Japan into the Asian continent. This will take me to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria from 1931 to mid-1937 - a relatively tame period of rule - and then into the Sino- Japanese War, which saw exponentially high levels of cruelty in comparison. In essence, my analysis boils down the violence of Japanese occupation to 1937 as either macro-violence (large-scale killings and massacres) or micro-violence (small-scale killing and rape). I propose that while macro-violence was the primary method of subjugating the Chinese, it provided a platform for the proliferation of micro-violence could occur. An often-forgotten front of World War II is the Sino-Japanese War. Some of the most horrific crimes in mankind's history took place during Japan's invasion of China; examples include burning crowds alive and the spearing of babies thrown into the air. The pinnacle of this cruelty is the Nanjing Massacre - a six-week period in which hundreds of thousands of Chinese civilians and POWs were believed to have been murdered.
The Reconstruction of Postwar Japan: Architectural Philosophies as Expression of Japanese Identity through 1970
(2019) Hansen, Jacob
The morning broke in silence. From above, grids of former streets stood in stark contrast to the darkened soil and ash that surrounded them. The few standing structures appeared alien, looming over an otherwise flattened landscape. The trees were toppled and burned; they had been reduced to lifeless husks, resembling figures bent down to weep. In the days following the atomic bombing of August 6th, 1945, almost nothing remained in the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The damage brought upon Japanese cities by the end of the war was extensive, far beyond the confines of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the two victims of atomic bombs. American forces took advantage of the density of Japan's urban areas, which were often comprised of flammable wood and paper, as targets for widespread fire bomb campaigns. The packed buildings, often in impoverished areas with high populations, acted as kindling for fires that raged beyond control and ravaged wide swathes of land.' In all, over 30 major cities were more than half destroyed, with the coastal city of Fukuyama losing the highest proportion of its area: 80.9%. Tokyo, Japan's burgeoning metropolis, was 51% destroyed. This mass destruction left urban Japan in ruins and a large population homeless. The only choice was to rebuild, but the method for how this was to be achieved was still unknown. After Allied forces left Japan, the newly democratized country was anxious to be accepted by the international community and viewed by its former enemies as an economic and cultural equal. In hopes of assimilating to global standards and burying its stigmatized past, initial state-sponsored reconstruction projects aimed to display this image through Western-based Modernist architectural and infrastructural projects. But an economic boom in the 1960s provided Japan with newfound wealth and confidence; the Metabolist movement emerged as an expression of Japanese identity and a metaphorical rebirth from the ashes. Comparing the 1964 Tokyo Olympic Games to the 1970 World's Fair, both globally publicized events, elucidates this shift in expression of identity over a short span of time.
A Slippery Slope in the Sky: Bombing in Principle and in Practice
(2018) Beall, Alexey C.
After the first World War, the American war machine had a vision of the future of war: As one fought from the air. Generals imagined armies in the sky dropping bombs on strategic targets until the enemy on the ground capitulated. Military planners felt this scenario was much preferable to the horrible trench warfare of WWI, with its shelling and gassing of soldiers trapped in wet, muddy encampments. In WWII, the decision to embrace this new aerial warfare strategy caused the nascent United States Army Air Forces and the British Royal Air Forces to take center stage. Along with this attitude of enlightened warfare came the idealism of strategic bombing. Non combatants would be spared from the Royal Air Force's wrath from the sky. In June 1940, a directive "specifically laid down that targets had to be identified and aimed at. Indiscriminate bombing was forbidden." Practical issues became apparent quickly, however. Bombing was far too imprecise for attacks on strategic targets to be effective. One report in August 1941 documented that "only about one bomb in five landed within even a five-mile radius of the designated target." In November, "Bomber Command was instructed simply to aim at the center of a city [...] The aiming points are to be built-up areas, not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories." What caused the Royal Air Force's change of heart was what Michael Walzer called a "supreme emergency". That is, "the decision to bomb cities was made at a time when victory was not in sight and the specter of defeat ever present. And it was made when no other decision seemed possible if there was to be any sort of military offensive against Nazi Germany." Somehow, the immense crisis faced by Britain justified foregoing the idealism from the start of the war. It was imminently impractical to abandon "the only force in the West which could take offensive action ... against Germany, our only means of getting at the enemy in a way that would hurt at all." It would have seemed to the island nation fighting the Nazi beast ridiculous to give up the only advantage they had found since the start of the war.
MacArthur and Willoughby: Two "Bataan Boys" and a Case Study of Intelligence Operations in Asia from 1941-1951
(2019) Yee, Wesley
Like all historical figures and events, the coverage and opinions surrounding General Douglas MacArthur and his staff during the period spanning World War II and the occupation of Japan are varied and sometimes controversial. While General MacArthur is known in popular history and among much of the American public as a decorated and famous war hero who bravely and selflessly commanded U.S. Army forces in the Pacific to victory against Japan, various long-form historical accounts from academic historians touch on the fact that much of this positive view was in a sense engineered by MacArthur's staff and public relations team. Not only, historians show, did MacArthur have a bad relationship with most of Washington's political and military leaders during and after the war, he insisted on always being the star of the show and would not allow anyone else to stand in the limelight. Several aspects which enrich and deepen the study of this period have only more recently been explored, such as a more detailed and objective look about the dynamics of MacArthur's team, referred to often as the Bataan Boys. One relationship that seems to be of particular importance is that of MacArthur and members of his intelligence staff, primarily his G-2 (intelligence) chief Major General Charles A. Willoughby, as well as Major General Spencer B. Akin, head of the Signal Corps and (only discovered after the declassification of documents more recently) a key player in Central Bureau, the secret Allied encryption unit that broke Japanese military communications codes. Studies on this unit have shown that MacArthur's usage of this intelligence gathered from Japanese military communications was selective; when he saw intelligence that lined up with his personal goals for the war, he unquestioningly used it as justification for his operations, but when encountering intelligence that went against these goals, he would ignore it or even downplay the importance of the intelligence before reporting it to superiors and field commanders. This pattern of selective use of intelligence due to narcissistic reasons and for the achievement of personal goals is echoed in studies of MacArthur's contribution to the breakdown of U.S. intelligence estimates leading up to the Chinese military campaigns during the Korean War. Willoughby, for his part, is no better, and has his own murky history, which is far less documented. Willoughby's German heritage and strong right-wing anti-communist views accompany a fascination with fascism, and these values lead him to also act in ways sometimes contrary to the goals of the overall Japanese occupation. While working officially as the historian to write MacArthur's official command history for the war and occupation, Willoughby allegedly worked to pull MacArthur's interest away from the interests of more pro-democratic actors in the Tokyo General Headquarters (GHQ), going as far as spying on his adversaries within headquarters, and aligning with high-ranking former leaders of Japanese military intelligence (who ultimately had their own dangerous goals for rearming Japan) to form a new postwar Japanese intelligence operation which would be tasked with rooting out communist and left-wing movements within the country.
Victims and Victimizers: Public Memory and Apology in Japan and the US on the 50th Anniversary of the Atomic Bombs
(2019) Xu, Amy
Public memory is the way that we as citizens collectively remember our country's past. This space is a highly controlled retelling of events, and is a frequent point of contention as different groups fight to define the narrative. This is especially true in the case of war, and even more so in the case of World War II, since it was a war of national ideology. Almost universally, war is regarded as a terrible, but sometimes necessary event. To this extent, the way that citizens understand why their country is involved in a war is crucial to maintaining national stability and popular support for the government. While Japan is often criticized for its World War II narrative, it's not clear that America is any better. Japanese memory is one that is heavily shaped by the government and which skims over Japanese atrocities, focusing instead on Japanese experience as victims of the atomic bomb. American memory of the same war is sensitive, and not open to challenge or reinterpretation. It too was shaped heavily by government. These complex, and often conflicting narratives of war are forces that continue to cause international tensions and prevent reconciliation. The 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995 was a prime time for former enemies to reconcile. The Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union had just wrapped up a few years earlier, and the anniversary brought the war to public attention. Despite this, no reconciliations or apologies occurred between the US and Japan. In fact, in 1995, the two countries publicly supported opposing views on the bomb: President Clinton affirmed (to the relief of many US veterans) that there would be no apology for Hiroshima, since wrongs had been done by their use.' On the other end, Motoshima, mayor of Nagasaki, said that the US was wrong to use the atomic bombs on Japan, and needed to apologize.
The Literature Trapped Under the Mushroom Cloud: The Brave Hibakusha Authors the Appropriation of their Narratives by Non-Hibakusha
(2019) Estberg, Mitchell
Japan became the only nation in the world to have experienced the trauma that is atomic bombing when the United States dropped Little Boy and Fat Man on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Besides the catastrophic physical damage done by these bombs, that reduced the two cities to ruins, the bombs claimed thousands of lives and affected the lives of even more. There are over 175,000 names of the dead commemorated at the peace park in Hiroshima and over 70,000 people died due to the bombing at Nagasaki. Beyond these immediate deaths, survivors were subject to radiation sickness and Hiroshima's newspaper, the Chugoku Shimbun cites that by 1950 there had been over 280,000 deaths related to the bombing, with the same count in Nagasaki reaching around 140,000. The atomic bombs subjected those present in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to terrible horrors and pain that the rest of us can only imagine. These people are now referred to as hibakusha (被爆者), which translates literally to a person who was under attack by a bomb but conveys the connotation of those who were attacked by nuclear weapons such as atomic bombs, the only of which were used on Japanese in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (as well as Bikini Atoll). The hibakusha's narratives shed light on to what their experiences as the only survivors of atomic bombs were like. Following the atomic bombings, several hibakusha wanted to document their experiences and stories as literary works. However, due to criticism from the literary mainstream, censorship during U.S. occupation, and disagreement amongst hibakusha on how to respond to the bombings, they struggled to get their works published, recognized, and widely read. Although a number of non-hibakusha came to promote hibakusha stories through their own literary works, in doing so they appropriated hibakusha's narratives, diminished the event of the bombing, and made it harder for hibakusha authors to have their works accepted. This paper first highlights some of the hibakusha authors that wanted to document and reflect first-hand what it meant to experience the atomic bombings in literary works. Ōta Yōko, Hara Tamiki, and Hayashi Kyōko sought to use literature as a platform to commemorate what hibakusha experienced in the bombings and allow their stories to reach wider audiences. However, these authors' efforts were never as successful as they hoped them to be. The paper then examines the obstacles hibakusha faced in having their stories heard. First, there was the personal hardship of sharing one's trauma amidst the growth of a city trying to be reborn. Secondly, during the occupation period, the United States enforced strict censorship that prevented works from being published and fostered an environment in which publishing houses were hesitant to take the risk of publishing works about the atomic bombings. Thirdly, literary circles were opposed to celebrating works about the atomic bombs, scrutinizing atomic-bomb literature as unworthy of being considered literature at all. Yet, there were some works about the bombings by non-hibakusha that were wildly successful. The final portion of this paper examines why works about the bombings by non-hibakusha were accepted, continue to be some of the most widely read on the topic, and how these works misrepresent a narrative that is not their author's own.
Leading the Retentionist View: Joseph Grew's Influence on U.S. Decisions
(2019) Steckler, Eric
Joseph Clark Grew was a well-known career diplomat, serving in countries such as Denmark, Switzerland, Turkey, and Japan. His most notable duty was his ten-year term as Ambassador in Japan between 1932 to 1942 as Grew witnessed Japan's military strengthen over a decade until Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. Joseph Grew's primary purpose was practicing diplomacy through peaceful negotiations. As Ambassador, Grew worked to ensure stability between U.S. and Japanese relations but was not as successful near the last couple of years of his ambassadorship due to negligence of Japan's leaders. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, he returned to the United States and became Under Secretary of State from 1944 to August 1945. Near the end of the Pacific War, Grew was most influential in advocating for an exception to America's unconditional surrender policy-to preserve the Japanese Emperor and Imperial institution as a Post-War Constitutional Monarch. Among the U.S. leadership, there was a division between "retentionists" and "abdicationists." With an existing division of opinion among American leaders and a strong public opposition, his request was not easily supported by U.S. decision-makers. Grew was one of the top Japan specialists at the time. Serving as ambassador in Japan for ten years, his understanding of Japan's way of thinking and psychology of the kokutai concept was often unquestionable. Regardless of his knowledge, his recommendations of U.S. policy towards Japan were often overlooked. Although the U.S. did retain the Emperor in the occupation, U.S. decision-makers initially rejected Grew's proposal. Considering Grew's background and experience in Japan, why did Grew support the retentionist view, of preserving the Emperor in the post-war, and why was his view ignored? In the end, how influential was Joseph Grew in U.S. policy decision-making? Joseph Grew was quite a prominent figure who strongly advocated for the retention of the Imperial Institution and Emperor Hirohito as a condition for Japan's surrender. Gaining support for incorporating this condition in the surrender terms was a complicated process due to strong opposition from American leaders and the public. There was a clear division in the State Department between the "Japan Hands," that Joseph Grew contributed to, and the "China Crowd." Many of the diplomatic advice offered by Joseph Grew and other Japan experts were often neglected, as policy suggestions towards Japan were met with criticism. Joseph Grew was determined to preserve the Emperor due to his understanding of Japan's history and the mindset of the Japanese people. This was mainly acquired through his ten-year term in Japan and his relations with specific individuals. The reasons why Grew's suggestion was met with disapproval was because of the existing strong support for an unconditional surrender policy; the assumption that Joseph Grew was sympathetic to the Japanese; and the common idea that Emperor Hirohito was responsible for the war.
Maintaining Memory: The Inclusion of Korean Hibakusha in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Museum
(2019) Foltyn, Allison
On the morning of August 6, 1945 Lieutenant Colonel Yi U was on his way to work when the Enola Gay dropped the Little Boy bomb on Hiroshima. He was found later that day and taken to a hospital where he died the following day. Yi was one of the many Koreans residing in Hiroshima in 1945 as the war drew to a close, but unlike the majority of Korean residents Yi was a prince of the Joseon Kingdom's Yi dynasty and nephew of Sunjong, the last Korean emperor before the peninsula was annexed by Japan in 1910. In 1967 a cenotaph was erected at the location where his body was found following the blast in memory of Korean victims of the bombing. This location was outside of the Hiroshima Peace Park, however, and came to be seen to embody the discrimination faced by Korean hibakusha and by Koreans in Japan more broadly, with Korean residents' groups later moving to have a cenotaph within the park. The cenotaph and its relocation along with the inclusion of the stories of Korean victims of the bombing within the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum are the two main controversies surrounding the role of the maintenance of the existence and memory of Korean victims of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, which along with medical support has been the primary struggle of Korean hibakusha and will be the main. focus of this paper. As there has been both more written about the museum in Hiroshima and the controversies surrounding it as well as more Koreans present in Hiroshima at the end of the war, this paper will focus on Hiroshima, though Nagasaki does also have a museum and a park dedicated to the remembrance of the bombing and there is a memorial to Korean victims located there. Though a full explanation would likely fill volumes, this paper will begin by looking at a brief synopsis of the relations between Korea and Japan in the modern era and the status of Koreans in Japan in the twentieth century. This will be followed by a section on the normalization of Japan- South Korea relations and a section on the background of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Museum. Next will be a discussion on the controversies surrounding the aforementioned Cenotaph for Korean Victims of the Atomic Bombing and its eventual relocation. The third main section will focus on the inclusion of Korean, and more broadly non-Japanese, narratives in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum itself, followed by a section on Korean hibakusha in Korea and a comparison with comfort women. The final section will look at some ongoing questions surrounding the issue of Korean hibakusha before concluding. Though a full discussion of the relationship between Japan and Korea over the centuries. would take much more time and space than this paper allows, it has been, in a complete understatement and oversimplification, complicated. The statue of Yi Sun-sin, the admiral who rebuffed Japanese naval attacks ordered by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in a planned invasion of Korea in the late sixteenth century, is one of two statues standing in Gwanghwamun square in central Seoul today. The other is of King Sejong the Great, who created the Korean alphabet, hangul, in the fifteenth century. During the following Edo Period in which Japan maintained the relatively isolationist foreign policy of sakoku, however, the Japanese and Korean governments maintained relations and continued to conduct trade with one and other. Following the forced opening of Japan by Perry in the mid-nineteenth century and a series of unequal treaties between Japan and Western powers, Korea became the target of Japan's own expansionist policy. Using the same form of gunboat diplomacy that had been used against it not long before, Japan concluded the Treaty of Kanghwa with Korea in 1876. Japan continued to increase its influence in Korean affairs in the following years, including orchestrating the assassination of Queen Min, consort to Gojong, and fighting two wars over influence on the peninsula, the Sino-Japanese War from 1894 to 1895 and the Russo-Japanese War from 1904 to 1905.
The Symbolism of the Mushroom Cloud
(2017) Wood, Cameron
On August 6, 1945, at 8:15 a.m. (JST) the crew of the B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay released an atomic bomb nick-named "Little Boy" over the city of Hiroshima, Japan. The bomb fell for just under 45 seconds before detonating over the city at an altitude of approximately 600 meters. The heat of the explosion and the cool atmosphere began to combine, resulting in a giant fireball that slowly rose into the sky. As the Enola Gay flew away to safety, tail gunner George "Bob" Caron watched with his K-20 camera in hand as a "mushroom started coming in view from behind the turret, just the mushroom, the famous mushroom cloud bubbling up." Sergeant Caron called pilot Colonel Paul Tibbits over the intercom and asked him to turn the plane just a few degrees, allowing Caron to point his lens out the escape hatch window to capture his now infamous photograph for posterity. In the beginning, both the Japanese and American perception of this image seemed to align. To Americans, it represented their strength in ending the war. In Japan, top officials shifted blame from their military by crediting America's technological superiority as the reason for their defeat. However, as time went on and both sides endured the Postwar Occupation, the escalation of the Cold War, and the harsh realities of the Vietnam War, these perceptions diverged. This divergence leads me to the questions that inform the organization of this essay: How has the symbolic meaning of atomic energy and its manifestation as the mushroom cloud been used in different contexts in both Japan and America? What are the specific cultural origins of these uses? Furthermore, what perspectives do the uses of this symbol leave out?
The Moral Question of the Holocaust and Hiroshima and what it means for Concerned Citizens of the Modern Age
(2017) Schwartz, Jessica
Dull gray clouds loom above the old buildings of Majdanek on the outskirts of Lublin, Poland. Many modern high-rises of Lublin overlook the site. The old barracks sit untouched as if their occupants have only just vacated. The gas chambers still stand, the crematorium ovens. remain intact. Majdanek was a Nazi extermination camp and remains largely as it was during World War II. According to the camp's tour guides, Majdanek could be up and running again in just twenty-four hours. Around the world, nuclear warheads sit deployed and ready for use. In the U.S., the president alone has authority to order a nuclear strike. Within five minutes of deciding to use a nuclear weapon that could be launched. As Kingston Reif explains, "The U.S. right now deploys approximately 900 nuclear warheads that are on the order of 10 to 20 times more powerful than the weapons that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And those 900 warheads are available for use at virtually a moment's notice." Since the end of World War II, the ominous threat of repeating its two biggest atrocities has not disappeared. It is imperative to remember the Holocaust and Hiroshima because both are so close within reach. But remembering is not enough. One must understand how so many people ignored their intrinsic moral compass and committed terrible crimes or stood by and watched them happen. Why was humanity's inner morality insufficient to prevent these atrocities? And what does it take for one to stand up for one's morals? By understanding the forces at work, one can work to have one's morality prevail and prevent such atrocities in the future.
In the Crossfire of Nationalism: Historical Memory, National Identity, and the East Asian Controversy over Hiroshima and Nagasaki
(2017) Du, Jesse
For all Chinese, Japanese and Korean personal names, I follow the Asian custom of placing surnames before given names; for the sake of consistency, this rule is followed even for Asian authors who have published their works in English (hence "Wang Zheng" instead of "Zheng Wang"). The only exception is for those who have Asian surnames but English given names. For the transliteration of Chinese sources and terms, I use the pinyin romanization system and strictly follow the updated Basic Rules of the Chinese Phonetic Alphabet Orthography; for Japanese terms I use the Modified Hepburn system; for Korean terms I use the Revised Romanization of Korean system. However, for certain already well-known proper names, the common English spelling is used. All diacritics are omitted in text but kept in the footnotes and bibliography. When Asian characters are used to identify sources and terms mentioned, simplified characters are used for all Chinese sources and terms; shinjitai is used for all Japanese kanji terms; hangeul, immediately followed by the corresponding hanja if possible, is used for all Korean terms. In 2015, the seventieth anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, delegations from around the world gathered at the United Nations Headquarters in New York for the Ninth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a quinquennial meeting of the NPT's 190 state parties to review the Treaty's implementation in the previous five years. On 27 April, the opening day of the meeting, the Japanese delegation, led by Minister of Foreign Affairs Kishida Fumio and Ambassador Sano Toshio, called for new actions in disarmament and transparency, and commented on issues such as fissile material cut-off and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. At the end of its speech, the delegation stressed the importance of raising awareness of ""the tragedy that had been brought about by the use of nuclear weapons,and asked to have the Conference's Final Document invite the world's leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki "to witness the reality [of atomic bombings] first hand".
America Imagines the Atomic Bomb
(2018) Jacobsen, Noah
Following the use of the atomic bombs, there was a question that understandably bothered some minds: what is this thing, what happened, and what did it do? People needed a way to understand what had just happened, especially in a time when there was not an abundance of information on the atomic bomb available to the public. Ways to understand the atomic bomb came to people through literature. Since 1945, there has developed 6 main schools of interpretation of why the atomic bombs were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The most influential amongst the American public has been what is called the 'orthodox' school. What is the orthodox view? This "orthodox" school's argument's most prominent text is Henry L Stimson's article The Decision to use the Bomb, published in the Harper's magazine in 19473. The main characteristics are these: (1) the atomic bomb is "as legitimate as any other deadly weapon of war." (2) Following the recommendations of the scientists on the scientific panel of the Interim Committee, it was decided that "the atomic bomb was an eminently suitable weapon" for a quickly forced surrender induced by shock to the Japanese people and government, and that it should be used on a "military installation surrounded by houses and buildings." (3) Alternatives to a "military demonstration" such as a demonstration shot on an uninhabited area were not likely to induce surrender as the U.S. wanted it. (4) The Japanese military was still formidable and unwilling to surrender unconditionally. (5) "The Potsdam ultimatum was offered on July 26, and rejected by the Japanese two days later. Therefore bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Moreover, Nagasaki and Hiroshima fit the criteria for "military target." (6) Japan's prompt surrender after the bombings proves the function of the atomic bomb as a psychological weapon. The firebombing of Tokyo caused "greater damage and more casualties," but ultimately did not have the same effect as the atomic bombing did. (7) War is hell, and use of the atomic bomb was "our least abhorrent choice." Ultimately, the benefits of using the bomb outweighed what terrible things would come if it had not been used. It also put a stop to awful methods of warfare like firebombing. How this interpretation could have become so widely accepted and believe as it has is a part of the object of this essay. As well as that, I will attempt to shed some light on various ways in general that the American public was offered ways to think about the atomic bombs- I will be doing somewhat of a survey of literary devices. In the end, it is my hope that one may be able to take a look at any event or era, even their own, and use what I am offering so that they may be more aware of in what ways societies have been and are being persuaded to accept the ways of thinking of others that would have them do so.
A Japanese Place in Utah History: Dugway Proving Ground's Japanese Village
(2017) Plung, Dylan J.
"The M69/M69X bomb was designed to lodge in the most flammable part of the building-the ceiling beams." - U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Historical Fact Sheet, p. 1. "Initially, it often seemed a home was unaffected, until the windows began to shine from within and then glowed like a paper lantern' from a ball of fire that sprouted tentacles that danced out from beneath the eaves to envelope the house until it crumbled inward upon itself." - Richard B. Frank, describing an M-69 in the Tokyo air raid of March 9-10, 1945 Downfall pp. 7-9. "And, when I saw Japanese Village [at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah], it was burning. It went. It was gone. [It] was built in such a, you know, material, nothing like German Village, it was burnt. It burnt to the ground. All you find out there was a few pieces of wire, or something like that. Maybe some nails. That's all that's left of Japanese Village." - Ethnographic Interviewee [name withheld]. Dugway Proving Ground is a U.S. Army post roughly 90 miles southwest of Salt Lake City, Utah, in Tooele County. It is self-contained and has "all of the attributes of any small town in America" according to its official Newcomer and Visitor Guide, and is located between the Salt Lake Desert and Dugway Valley in Tooele County. The gas station-less road from Salt Lake City to Dugway Proving Ground (a site larger than the state of Rhode Island) is unfenced open range filled with wildlife, cattle, blind curves, and vision-impeding hillsides.' Isolated more than twenty miles beyond the gate of Dugway Proving Ground lies the site of German-Japanese Village, the site of WW-II testing of incendiary weaponry. Even today special clearance is required to get to the testing site. One member of the chemical corps that served at Dugway during the time of German and Japanese Village, in an ethnographic interview, called the ride to German-Japanese Village "the most boring road in the world" and told of people frequently falling asleep on evening trips. This testing site, amid an interconnecting labyrinth of seemingly nameless and featureless roadways, is difficult to locate even with online maps. It's no small wonder that even employees interviewed about their memories of German and Japanese Village rarely seemed to have had reason to go that far out onto the site.
The Ultimate Battle: Scientists as Political Activists Before, During, and After the Creation of the Atomic Bomb
(2018) Werbel, Hannah
Debates around science and morality have been going on for centuries. The question of whether scientists and engineers should think about moral questions related to their work can be found at the heart of many current news stories. For example, in March of 2018, a computer engineer who created an Artificial Intelligence algorithm to track gang crimes responded to the question, "What about the ethical implications?" with "I'm just an engineer". If it is not the engineer's job to think about the ethical implications of their work, then who should question these things? Furthermore, what happens when scientists and engineers speak up? Does anyone listen to them? The creation of the atomic bomb tested the concept of scientists as political activists. Scientists appealed to the government before, during, and after the creation of the atomic bomb to try to get their opinions heard. They were the ones who initially pushed the government to invest in atomic bomb research and were also the ones to adamantly oppose the use of the bomb against Japan. However, the atomic bomb scientists were largely ineffective in the political arena due to their lack of understanding of power politics and the nature of war. Their political naiveté prevented them from ever having a chance at influencing the government's decision to use the atomic bomb against Japan. It is important to distinguish what I refer to as "scientists" from "scientific administrators". During the Manhattan Project, several high-level scientists held positions of influence within the government. However, these scientists were very distant from the actual work going on in the Manhattan Project laboratories. In this section, I will give examples of some of these scientists and classify them as "scientific administrators" who are separate from the politically inept scientists working in the laboratories.
Operation Ketsu-Go: The Decisive Victory
(2017) Schultz, Kenyon
Japan entered World War II knowing they could not win a prolonged war with the United States. Japan did not go into the war with a long term plan, they planned on striking a decisive blow that would lead the US to seek peace. The United States chose instead to fight on and thus the war turned against Japan. The ultimate culmination of Japan's choice to attack the US was the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, the end of the war could have been delayed by a multitude of factors causing the Japanese 'Ketsu-Go' operation to come into effect. Ketsu-Go translates to 'Decisive Victory' in Japanese and was a last ditch attempt to defeat the Americans and reach a negotiated peace. Ketsu-Go was the planned defense of mainland Japan and Korea. The Ketsu-Go plan would have prolonged the war and thus caused the deaths of countless Americans and Japanese. The Ketsu-Go operation was not viable in the long-term but if conducted quickly could have led the US to a conditioned peace with Japan. The planned Ketsu-Go operation was the culmination of years of fanatical indoctrination and fighting throughout Japan and the Pacific. The idea of an attack to the Japanese homeland was unthinkable to the Japanese right up until the very end of the war. The Doolittle Raid of 1942 on Tokyo had such a large psychological impact for its extremely minor physical impact because of the thought that the Japanese home islands would always be protected from attack by the divine winds of the Kamikaze. Even in Tokyo after the raid, there was a lack of adequate air raid shelters because of the thought that the homeland would never come under attack. It took a series of drastic defeats throughout the Pacific theater for the Japanese to finally realize that the sacred home islands could ever be under attack and thus needed to be defended. Decisive battles in the Pacific slowly convinced the Japanese was planners to think of defending the homeland. A stop to Japanese advances at the battle of the Coral Sea, destruction of the main fleet carriers at Midway, the turning point at Guadalcanal, the almost complete destruction of the navy at Leyte and the loss of the Marianas left the Japanese without buffers to protect them. The Americans could destroy Japanese merchant ships at will, cut off crucial natural resources and were in bomber range of Japan itself. Despite all these defeats, the Japanese did not start planning for Ketsu-Go in earnest until the landings on Okinawa, the knowledge of imminent Russian entry to the war and knowledge of the inevitable defeat of Germany. The Japanese published the Ketsu-Go directive on April 8th, 19454 just after the landing of American forces on Okinawa on April 1st. Work on Ketsu-Go became frenzied after an official note from Russia stating that the Neutrality Pact of 1941 could no longer be prolonged, an action that made the invasion of Manchuria an inevitability. The defeat of Germany on May 7th was the final event that made the Japanese realize that an invasion of the Japanese homeland was imminent and preparations had to be completed as quickly as possible. It was in the late spring and summer that physical preparations took place to defend the home islands and to fight the final decisive victory. The Japanese started the war in the Pacific with the idea of a decisive victory winning the war. The Japanese captured large swaths of territory throughout Asia and the Pacific with the knowledge that they could not force the US to surrender in a drawn-out conflict. The Japanese planned to concede part of their territorial gains in a conditional peace with the US caused by large amounts of casualties. The Japanese also used the idea of the 'decisive victory' continually throughout the war seeking the final battle that would cause the Americans to seek a conditioned peace. The Japanese truly believed in the idea of a decisive victory because of the Russo-Japanese war decades earlier in which Russia conceded territory to Japan after the defeat at the Tsushima Strait. Before the Battle of the Philippine Sea Vice-Admiral Ozawa even said "This operation has immense bearing on the fate of the Empire. It is hoped that the forces will exert their utmost and achieve as magnificent results as in the Battle of Tsushima." The idea of a decisive victory also partially stemmed from the idea that American morale was so low that a Japanese victory in battle or even a stalemate could move American public opinion to support a conditioned peace favoring Japan. Japan continued the decisive victory mentality throughout the war despite experiencing defeat after defeat. Admiral Yamamoto was a major promoter of the idea of a decisive victory. Yamamoto had failed to strike a decisive victory at Pearl Harbor and the decisive battle at Midway had resulted in the catastrophic loss of four aircraft carriers. Admiral Yamamoto was killed in 1943 but the decisive victory mentality he promoted carried on into the Battle of Saipan. Japanese war planners declared that the battle for Saipan would be the decisive victory they needed to win the war. The decisive battle for Saipan was lost on July 9th, 1944 and the Japanese realized the need for another place to plan a decisive victory. Ketsu-Go became a last ditch attempt at the decisive victory the Japanese high command had been searching for throughout the war. The Big Six hoped that they could inflict enough casualties on the Americans to achieve victory in a conditioned peace. The main concessions Japan hoped to receive were four conditions, first to keep the Emperor and the Kokutai, second that war crimes trials held by the Japanese themselves, third the disarmament of Japanese soldiers by Japanese and fourth, that there would be no allied occupation of Japan. The members of the Big Six pushing the four conditioned offer were Anami, Umezu and Toyoda or the "War Hawks" of the Supreme Council for the Direction of War.10 The council could only make decisions unanimously so Ketsu-Go would proceed as planned unless the Big Six agreed to the same surrender terms. The Japanese planned Ketsu-Go as an all-out battle of attrition to kill as many American invaders as possible to make the four conditioned offer more attractive. Japan threw every resource they had left into the preparations for Ketsu-Go, pushed what was left of their industrial capacity to the limit and mobilized their entire population in training and preparation. Ketsu-Go would be planned out with the goal of a conditioned peace in mind.
Organizational Dynamics of Atomic Scientists: Finding a Political Voice in the Second World War
(2017) Pong, Avery
On July 16th, 1945, J. Robert Oppenheimer stood in the cold isolation of the New Mexico desert. He was somewhere halfway between Alamogordo and Secorro, and uncertain if he was more than halfway down an exponential trajectory of growth in the destructive power that humankind had brought to bear on its world. On that day, however, his work would reap many certainties. At 5:30 in the morning, the fireball of the Trinity Test ascended in a column of smoke that would not soon escape the gaze of the scientists who had just rendered it possible. Oppenheimer-awkward, eccentric, stoic-announced that he had "become Death, The Shatterer of worlds," a realization inspired from the Bhagavad-Gita epic that has since come to capture the sense of partial awe, power, urgency, and perhaps inner conflict that the first bomb must have engendered in its creators. The shock at New Mexico would soon shake the world, as Nagasaki and Hiroshima would soon witness and endure the epicenter of the bomb. So on these terms, and not necessarily on the terms of the scientists behind the miracle, the mushroom clouds would come to symbolize the end of the Pacific War and the triumph of American military might. The unique finale of the Pacific War has forced academics to produce a vast and diverse literature to grapple with the consequences of the discovery, development, and use of nuclear weapons. Particularly pressing are the historiographical treatment of the moral questions raised by the combatant use of atomic weaponry, the bomb's cost-benefit strategy undertaken by the military, and the diplomatic uncertainties that the bombs made likely in the postwar. In this way, the history of the end of the war often precipitates questions concerning the political, diplomatic, and military elements of the decision to use the atomic bomb. Yet, presenting such pressing issues squarely in the arena of the military and political elite has often left the scientists who were central to the testing and development of the bomb with peripheral political importance. This historical treatment is no coincidence. Prior to the war, science interfaced minimally with government. This precedent meant that there were few formal channels through which the greater scientific community could organize to exert their political will on Federal affairs. With respect to the historiographical treatment of the decision to use the atomic bomb, this examination identifies the wartime scientists as a politically weak amalgam of interest groups that could not contend with greater political powers for a meaningful voice on a national stage. This analysis is substantiated by two contrasting trends. First, parts of the community wanted to assume a greater social responsibility for their work, yet they were denied that opportunity. In the Chicago branch of the Manhattan Project enterprise, the scientists of the Metallurgical Lab made political demands regarding continued postwar research funding, international control of the atom, and a reconsideration in the use of the bomb against Japan. None of these grievances were immediately realized because none of them could be formally communicated to the upper echelons of the decision-making machinery in Washington. The Met Lab scientists, instead, floundered in their own political frustrations vis-à-vis reactionary committees and internal memoranda, most of which never saw the light of day. A second trend, however, emerged after the bombs had been dropped on Japan. In the postwar era, the scientific community revised their strategy and decidedly consolidated their political power into national organizations like the Federation of Atomic Scientists and the National Science Foundation. Their collective power garnered considerable public appeal and political influence to the point that the scientists became a respectable political lobby. Many of the concerns of the Met Lab scientists, then, came to light in the postwar termination of research restrictions in the May-Johnson Bill, and were rewarded with recognition in the more amicable McMahon Bill.
Projecting an Atomic Legacy: the Manhattan Project National Historical Park and Conflicting Public Memories
(2018) Twork, Monica
"When either Americans or Japanese talk about the bombings, they are thinking about the meaning of World War II, of subsequent wars, and of prospective conflicts" - Laura Hein and Mark Selden, 1997. In December 2014, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act, then-President Obama authorized the creation of the Manhattan Project National Historical Park (MPNHP) to "improve public understanding of the Manhattan Project and the legacy of the Manhattan Project." The establishment of the MPNHP in November 2015 represented the culmination of a multi-year effort from the non-profit Atomic Heritage Foundation (AHF), the National Park Service (NPS), and the Department of Energy (DOE), along with local interest groups such as the B-Reactor Museum Association (BRMA), to preserve and restore buildings associated with three major Manhattan Project sites. The national decision to preserve historical sites closely associated with the still-controversial American decision to drop atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 provoked a wide range of debate and discussion, both within the United States and in Japan. Debates over the American deployment of the atomic bomb during World War II often reflect divergent interpretations of World War II, of nuclear weapons, and of public memory. These interpretations range from the 1945 atomic bomb justifications set out by President Harry Truman and his advisors, to Japanese claims that the atomic bombing should be considered a "war crime" against Japan. Public memories of the atomic bombing naturally evolved very differently in the United States and in Japan. As the philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault argues, "historical memories are constantly refashioned to suit present purposes. Drawing from historian John Bodnar's definition of public memory as "the view of a past event that is widely shared by members of a community (local or national)," historian Michael Hogan notes that these "collective" memories are often strategically created by the government "to forge historical traditions that could serve their interests." By harnessing the "power of the group that holds [these memories]," the dominant power group is able to utilize these historical memories to override alternative memories and historical interpretations. Physical sites such as museums, public memorials, and national parks can provide a physical manifestation of dominant public memories, but conflict between the public memories presented through the physical site and alternative interpretations has provoked international public debate and controversy. This research will investigate three primary guiding questions: How is the public memory of the Manhattan Project and the atomic bomb interpreted at MPNHP? How has this interpretation diverged from other interpretations? How does the National Park Service and the Department of Energy plan address these alternative memories? Within this conceptual framework of public memorials and evolving public memory, analyzing the international debate over the Manhattan Project National Historical Park's creation provides a lens for interpreting the complexity of atomic public memories in both the United States and Japan.

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