Hirohito Re-Examined

Abstract

Following the use of two atomic bombs against Japan by the United States and the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan in the final days of the struggle, World War II came to a close on August 15th, 1945. Determined to the last moment, the Japanese, even in the last desperate days of the war before they capitulated, tried their very best to ensure that, "...the sovereignty of the Emperor of Japan would not be touched." By explicitly stating this expectation in their response to the Potsdam Declaration, Japan prompted a non-committal, vaguely intentioned response from the Allies which left substantial room for interpretation (as the Allies undoubtedly were reluctant to agree explicitly to such a condition). The request, however, did prompt intense deliberation among the Allied Powers as to what the fate of Emperor Hirohito should be, considering both his questionable war responsibility and his possible utility in Japan's recovery process during the occupation.3 Although the Allied Powers eventually chose to overlook Hirohito's past indiscretions, allowing Emperor Hirohito to retain the throne while strictly curtailing his power and influence, his level of culpability in regard to responsibility for the war has long remained a contested issue among scholars and in the public eye, both in the United States and in Japan. Although MacArthur and his administration (as well as the Japanese government in the days preceding the occupation) worked diligently to reshape the wartime image of Emperor Hirohito in such a way as to absolve him of responsibility for the war and guard him from prosecution as a war criminal, new sources of information have surfaced over the years. This information, along with a marked upsurge in studies and works aimed at reexamining Hirohito's role in the war after his death in 1989, have since provided much clearer insight into Emperor Hirohito's true level of involvement during the war, although his culpability still remains an issue of debate. This work attempts to critically reexamine Hirohito's role in the war so that a more accurate and telling portrayal of Hirohito may emerge as a result. Although Emperor Hirohito undoubtedly could not have been aware of each and every reprehensible act of war committed in his name, contention remains to show that Hirohito did indeed bear a great responsibility for the war, as he was intimately informed of, and involved in, military affairs, regardless of whether not he was ever prosecuted for it. Furthermore, Emperor Hirohito appears to have needlessly prolonged the length of the war on more than one occasion for reasons which remain unknown but which this paper will attempt to address. Lastly, Hirohito's rescript on surrender delivered via radio broadcast to his subjects, as well as his newly discovered monologue, were nothing more than works designed to conceal his war responsibility and his failures as a leader from public scrutiny. The rescript and the monologue also served to protect him from litigation as a war criminal, allowing the newly invented portrayal of Hirohito's role in the war--a portrayal of his character as an antimilitarist peace seeker--to take root both at home and abroad. First and foremost, it is important to explain the reasons why Hirohito's culpability for war crimes and responsibility for military decisions were purposefully overlooked despite reasonable cause to believe that he did in fact bear at least some share of responsibility for the war and the acts of war carried out in his name under his rule as emperor. After the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki on August 9th, 1945, the Japanese government finally made its intent to accept the Potsdam Declaration's surrender demands known, but stipulated that it understood the declaration's meaning to imply that "...the sovereignty of the Emperor would not be touched" and that Japan's surrender was subject to this understanding of the Emperor's sovereignty. Much debate ensued as to what course of action regarding the Emperor should be taken. After much deliberation it was determined that retaining the Emperor could very well be the key to ensuring Japanese surrender. Therefore, the Allies decided to respond to the Japanese in such a way as to leave room for the Emperor to retain his position while at the same time giving no firm commitment one way or the other.5 Fortunately, the Japanese agreed to the Allied response, despite the lack of explicit guarantee for the Emperor's sovereignty. In regard to what should happen to Hirohito next, MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers overseeing the occupation of Japan, was ordered by his superiors in Washington to "...take no action against the Emperor as a war criminal pending the receipt of a special directive concerning his treatment." While this did not guarantee that Hirohito would not be tried as a war criminal eventually, it did postpone the decision and any such trial indefinitely despite attempts on behalf of the Australian and Soviet governments to pursue prosecution. In the meantime, MacArthur was ordered to "...begin collecting evidence in secrecy concerning Hirohito's culpability, which then would be used to determine the possibility of his trial in the future." Although in the end the final decision spared Hirohito a war crimes trial, it was not an entirely gratuitous subversion of justice, as the Allies intended to use Hirohito "...for the mid- to long-term purpose of military occupation in Japan" in the same way they used the possibility of his retention to secure peace with Japan. As Viscount Addison, then British Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, put it to the Australian government, the hope was "to limit commitment in manpower and other resources by using [the] Imperial Throne as an instrument for the control of the Japanese people." Furthermore, others, such as MacArthur, believed as he (MacArthur) wrote in his memoir, that "...if the emperor was indicted, and perhaps hanged, as a war criminal, military government would have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guerrilla warfare would probably break out." It is apparent that, because of these intended purposes and concerns, the United States Government eventually chose to side with MacArthur and grant Emperor Hirohito de facto immunity from War Crimes prosecution.