The Atomic Bomb: Militarily Unnecessary? Influential Variables in Shaping Military Opinions

Abstract

“I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I though, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives" - General Dwight D. Eisenhower The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1963. "It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons…My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Age. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children." - Admiral William D. Leahy I Was There, 1950. Much has been made of statements by important military figures such as Eisenhower and Leahy above in expressing misgivings about the military necessity of using the atomic bombs. The general assumption, however, that military opinions about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki overwhelmingly subscribe to the orthodox view is remarkably pervasive. In the orthodox view, the atomic bombs were justified as necessary to bring the war to an early end, saving both Allied and Japanese lives by avoiding an invasion of the home islands. Throughout the over fifty years that have passed since the atomic bombings, a wealth of alternative viewpoints have emerged. Most prominent is that of revisionish scholar Gar Alperovitz, who in his book entitled Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, advocates the notion that the atomic bombs were not necessary to end the war; rather, they were used in order to intimidate the Soviet Union. Alperovitz in particular, as well as other revisionist scholars including Ronald Takaki also attempt to co-opt views expressed by certain military leaders to strengthen their argument that the bombings were completely unnecessary. Nevertheless, military opinions that the bombs were militarily unnecessary do not imply that the use of the atomic bombs were not justified in order to achieve the broader U.S. and ALlied objectives of Japanese surrender under acceptable terms as outlined in the Potsdam Declaration. There seems to only be a fine line between views opposing the atomic bombs due to their being militarily unnecessary, and the view that they were not at all necessary, but the distinction between the two views can be clearly seen and is important to delineate. Some revisionist scholars seem to take expressions by military leaders that the bombs were not militarily necessary and turning them it into an assertion that they wholly opposed the use of the bombs. Despite the revisionists' efforts, however, overall military opinions regarding the orthodox viewpoint and the perception that the military overwhelmingly subscribe to this stance remains persistent. This raises several questions: Are these revisionist scholars merely manipulating opinions expressed by the military leaders in order to add a degree of legitimacy in promoting their own argument? Is the notion that military views predominantly subscribe to the orthodox view an accurate assumption? If so, is it a justifiable belief? Also, are there any clear interservice differences of opinion? In addressing these questions, this essay represents an effort to provide greater insight into the opinions of the military and identifies important lessons, particularly for the military with regard to future implications of the prudential use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This paper argues that a clear distinction exists between the view of the atomic bomb as militarily unnecessary, and the view that the use of the atomic bombs was completely unjustified in bringing the war to an end. That difference stems from the fact that military considerations were not the only factors considered in the decision to use the atomic bombs. The achievement of U.S. and Allied objectives in compelling Japan's surrender on acceptable terms and in a timely manner factored prominently in the decision making process. I also argue that military opinions were co-opted by some revisionist scholars in an effort to make it mean something that was not originally intended. In other words, drawing a connection between opposition to the use of the bombs on the other hand is simply a misguided conclusion. Finally, I argue that military opinions, both pre- and post-Hiroshima, do in fact generally represent an orthodox perspective as a result of being influenced by several key variables.